Democratic Theory

This article identifies three central axes in the contemporary constellation of democratic theory and practice: (1) redefining the roots of democratic power, or kratos, in response to new challenges to popular participation in democracy; (2) the rescaling of the demos given the growing dissatisfaction with liberal cosmopolitan approaches to global democracy; and (3) the de-parochialization of democracy within a multipolar world in light of democratic erosion in liberal democracies across Europe and the Americas. This article arrives at these axes by way of revisiting the relation of the two concepts constituting democracy's etymological roots—demos and kratos—in recent work in democratic theory. It concludes by urging to move beyond the post-Cold War social imaginary by exploring the question “What demos and kratos for the twenty-first century?”

Is it possible to rescue the concepts of ‘the people’ and popular sovereignty from their use and abuse at the hands of right-wing populist politics? In this article I look at two competing challenges to populist ideas of popular sovereignty. Underpinning a liberal critique of populism is a constrained view of democracy that either rejects any ideal of popular sovereignty altogether or reserves popular sovereignty for hypothetical moments of constitutional justification. The second view, which I call democratic pluralism, defends a dispersed view of popular sovereignty in which the people are conceived of as both inclusive and as ruling. In conclusion, I argue that this second option offers the most adequate answer to the populist challenge.

Hélène Landemore's Open Democracy (2020) offers both a normative conception of popular rule and an institutional schema intended to advance it. This schema is grounded in a normative conception of popular rule that associates democracy with the values of inclusion and equality. But this association misses a historically important dimension of popular rule—popular sovereignty—which requires the people as a whole to play a critical part in decision making. Landemore's dismissal of popular sovereignty informs her institutional schema, which relies upon both sortition and self-selection. It leaves no significant room for the people as a whole to act, either directly (via referenda) or indirectly (via election). Landemore never explicitly defends this dismissal of popular sovereignty from her conception of popular rule. Given the historical importance of this dimension of popular rule, and its continuing intuitive appeal, any such dismissal requires careful justification.

How can we ensure that global public institutions such as those associated with the United Nations will address the pressing global problems of our time without committing abuses of power? In republicanism, participation by citizens is the primary condition for the protection of liberty. In particular, citizens are expected to be vigilant—to maintain awareness of and protest domination when and where it occurs. Global republican scholars such as James Bohman (2007) have been sensitive to this demanding ideal of citizenship. However, the grounds and mechanisms for fostering allegiance to the state—such as a joint history or language, public education, and the practice of joint participation in political decision making—are still largely absent at the global level, and this has implications for the robustness of non-dominating global public institutions. This article considers whether and how globally vigilant citizenship may be encouraged or cultivated in the short- to medium-term.

This article defends a set of three apparently mutually inconsistent claims and shows how they can and should be simultaneously held. First, that one of the most pressing normative problems we face is constituted by the wealth of opportunities for transnational domination—of states by other states, of states and individuals by supranational organizations and institutions as well as transnational corporations, of vulnerable individuals by powerful ones. Second, the most appropriate way to tackle this issue, far from being the implementation of a cosmopolitan agenda, is the strengthening of states and their problem-solving capacities. Third, this agenda toward the (re-)strengthening of states requires a demanding form of transnational solidarity, if one that significantly differs from more traditional liberal notions of cosmopolitan solidarity.

The article claims that the dominant interpretations of the current crisis of democracy have many implicit normative assumptions as background and basis, previously established according to particular theories of democracy. Unraveling such assumptions may allow us to understand the theoretical limitations of such approaches as well as point out the politically self-destructive alternatives they project of either returning to the institutional model before the crisis or succumbing to authoritarianism. Examining the case of the functioning of Brazil's political system in recent decades, that initial approach should allow us to understand the specificity of the crisis of democracy in this country. As in the case of dominant explanations of the current crisis of democracy more broadly, the development on Brazil will also show the part that dominant explanations in political science play in it, and how it obscures the understanding of ongoing changes and the fight against the current authoritarian threat.

The constituted legal status of “Union citizenship” has added another democratic static to the European Union's institutional architecture but it is not yet a status of full political empowerment. What is missing is a citizen-centered opening-up of the (technocratically disguised) European level as a political arena. This article argues that the idea of European citizenship can function as a normative reference point for struggles of political empowerment and institutional reform. Democratic innovations such as sortition-based citizens’ panels organized within the framework of the Conference on the Future of Europe have a socializing function, paving the way for a European-wide public debate on issues of common concern and opening up a chance of (re)appropriating the European Union's institutional structure as a political space. But in order to support lasting democratic transformations they must be backed up by institutional reforms that make European political rights more effective.

This article proposes a definition of the concept of postcolonial justice in view of elaborating a fruitful theoretical framework for connecting distinct demands for racial, cultural, epistemic, memorial, and spatial justice that have been emerging on a global scale in the last two decades. The article conceives postcolonial justice as both critical and reparative, maintaining that reparation claims must be considered a crucial pillar in a theory of postcolonial justice. It also argues that postcolonial justice is better understood as a complement to a radically egalitarian conception of global social justice, which is anti-capitalist and anti-colonial. Finally, it concludes that while reparations are relevant for an anti-capitalist and anti-colonial theory of global social justice, the reparative grammar of postcolonial justice is not sufficient to target current distributive inequalities that depend on existing infrastructures of domination. The latter cannot be repaired and should instead be abolished.

This article uses Arash Abizadeh to illustrate the appeal and difficulties of the claim that random selection is a more democratic way to select a legislature than election. It agrees with Abizadeh that representative democracy cannot be reduced to the right of voters to choose their legislators. However, it challenges his view that elections are inherently inegalitarian because they enable voters to discriminate unfairly among electoral candidates and his assimilation of gyroscopic to descriptive representation. Finally, the article highlights the difficulties of justifying random selection while rejecting election on egalitarian grounds. It therefore concludes that democratic equality requires more, not less, attention to the ethics of voting and to the conceptual, moral, and political dimensions of citizens’ claims on elected office.