

§ Helmut Kohl's Quest for Normality §

# MAKING SENSE OF HISTORY

*Studies in Historical Cultures*

General Editor: Stefan Berger

Founding Editor: Jörn Rüsen

Bridging the gap between historical theory and the study of historical memory, this series crosses the boundaries between both academic disciplines and cultural, social, political and historical contexts. In an age of rapid globalisation, which tends to manifest itself on an economic and political level, locating the cultural practices involved in generating its underlying historical sense is an increasingly urgent task.

Volume 1

*Western Historical Thinking:  
An Intercultural Debate*  
Edited by Jörn Rüsen

Volume 2

*Identities: Time, Difference, and Boundaries*  
Edited by Heidrun Friese

Volume 3

*Narration, Identity, and Historical Consciousness*  
Edited by Jürgen Straub

Volume 4

*Thinking Utopia: Steps into Other Worlds*  
Edited by Jörn Rüsen, Michael Fehr, and  
Thomas W. Rieger

Volume 5

*History: Narration, Interpretation, Orientation*  
Jörn Rüsen

Volume 6

*The Dynamics of German Industry: Germany's  
Path toward the New Economy and the  
American Challenge*  
Werner Abelshauser

Volume 7

*Meaning and Representation in History*  
Edited by Jörn Rüsen

Volume 8

*Remapping Knowledge:  
Intercultural Studies for a Global Age*  
Mihai Spairosu

Volume 9

*Cultures of Technology and  
the Quest for Innovation*  
Edited by Helga Nowotny

Volume 10

*Time and History: The Variety of Cultures*  
Edited by Jörn Rüsen

Volume 11

*Narrating the Nation: Representations  
in History, Media and the Arts*  
Edited by Stefan Berger, Linas Eriksonas,  
and Andrew Mycock

Volume 12

*Historical Memory in Africa:  
Dealing with the Past, Reaching for  
the Future in an Intercultural Context*  
Edited by Mamadou Diawara, Bernard  
Lategan, and Jörn Rüsen

Volume 13

*New Dangerous Liaisons: Discourses on  
Europe and Love in the Twentieth Century*  
Edited by Luisa Passerini, Lilianna Ellena, and  
Alexander C. T. Geppert

Volume 14

*Dark Traces of the Past: Psychoanalysis  
and Historical Thinking*  
Edited by Jürgen Straub and Jörn Rüsen

Volume 15

*A Lover's Quarrel with the Past:  
Romance, Representation, Reading*  
Ranjan Ghosh

Volume 16

*The Holocaust and Historical Methodology*  
Edited by Dan Stone

Volume 17

*What is History For? Johann Gustav  
Droysen and the Functions of Historiography*  
Arthur Alfaix Assis

Volume 18

*Vanished History: The Holocaust in  
Czech and Slovak Historical Culture*  
Tomas Sniegón

Volume 19

*Jewish Histories of the Holocaust:  
New Transnational Approaches*  
Edited by Norman J. W. Goda

Volume 20

*Helmut Kohl's Quest for Normality:  
His Representation of the German  
Nation and Himself*  
Christian Wicke

# HELMUT KOHL'S QUEST FOR NORMALITY

---

## His Representation of the German Nation and Himself

Christian Wicke



berghahn  
NEW YORK • OXFORD  
[www.berghahnbooks.com](http://www.berghahnbooks.com)

Published by  
Berghahn Books  
www.berghahnbooks.com

©2015 Christian Wicke

All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission of the publisher.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Wicke, Christian.

Helmut Kohl's quest for normality : his representation of the German nation and himself / Christian Wicke.

pages cm. — (Making sense of history ; volume 20)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-78238-573-8 (hardback : alkaline paper) —

ISBN 978-1-78238-574-5 (ebook)

1. Kohl, Helmut, 1930– 2. Prime ministers—Germany (West)—Biography. 3. Prime ministers—Germany—Biography. 4. Germany (West)—Politics and government—1982–1990. 5. Germany—Politics and government—1990– 6. Nationalism—Germany—20th century. I. Title.

DD262.W53 2015

943.087'8092—dc23

2014029580

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Printed on acid-free paper.

ISBN: 978-1-78238-573-8 hardback

ISBN: 978-1-78238-574-5 ebook

*For Thea*



# Contents

---

Preface	ix
List of Abbreviations	xiii
<b>Introduction</b>	1
Organization of the Study	8
<b>Chapter 1. Approaching Nationalism: Conceptual Frameworks</b>	16
Nationalism: Normal, Flexible and Personal	18
Religion and Nationalism: Replaced, Intrinsic and Constituent	25
Taming Nationalism? Liberal Nationalism and Constitutional Patriotism	31
Ethnocultural Compensation? Romantic Nationalism and Heimat	36
The Historian as Poppy Grower: A Canberran Perspective	42
Nationalism and Germany's Second Unification	46
<b>Chapter 2. Kohl as Catholic Nationalist</b>	63
The Black Giant	64
Christian Democracy: The German (Anti-)Ideology?	77
Concluding Remarks on Kohl's Catholic Nationalism	87
<b>Chapter 3. Kohl as Liberal Nationalist</b>	97
The '45er: From the War to the West	98
Preserving Adenauer's Heritage	105
Restoration and Unification: Prologue to Complete Normality?	115
Concluding Remarks on Kohl's Liberal Nationalism	125

<b>Chapter 4.</b> Kohl as Romantic Nationalist	136
The Palatine	137
Kohl's Philosophy of Heimat	147
A Subdued Romantic	155
Concluding Remarks on Kohl's Romantic Nationalism	161
<b>Chapter 5.</b> Kohl as Nationalist Historian	170
Heidelberg: Between German and Eternal Spirit	172
No Fear of History: Kohl's Integrative Republican Historism	180
Exonerating Germans from the Past: A Prelude to Normality	189
Concluding Remarks on Kohl's Historism	196
<b>Conclusion.</b> A Synthesis of Kohl's Personal Nationalism	207
Bibliography	217
Index	245



# Preface

---

In December 2011 I organized an international symposium at the Centre for European Studies of the Australian National University (ANU), entitled 'European Nationalism and Biography'. Reflecting on the discussions, Paul James concluded that 'all the key theorists [on nationalism in the 1970s and 1980s] were outsiders who, through various means, came to confront the central commonsense of their time . . .'.<sup>1</sup> I would not arrogate myself to be 'a key theorist on nationalism', but my fascination for this theme, particularly within the German context, is probably related to my position 'in between' different nations for several years. As an exchange student from Maastricht University, I was fortunate to attend my first intensive course on theories and case studies of nationalism at Boğaziçi University in Istanbul. I am still grateful to Selim Deringil for introducing me to nationalism studies and his social-constructivist view, and for his brilliant sense of irony.

Published biographical narratives combined with Helmut Kohl's political speeches and writings form the fabric of the epistemological patchwork from which this study's central argument derives. The historiographical framework focuses on contemporary Germany, in particular West Germany after 1945, and the theoretical foundation of this research is the cross-disciplinary field of nationalism studies. The overwhelming volume of archival sources on Kohl renders any systematic usage of their inspiring material impossible in a single study. As this study is primarily concerned with Kohl's representation in the public arena over time, printed volumes comprising selections of Kohl's speeches helped the process of my own selection of primary sources and the formation of this project. Important primary data

was collected from the local archive of Kohl's hometown, especially with the great help of Stefan Mörz, who has supported me throughout this research. I enjoyed generous hospitality in Ludwigshafen. Klaus Hofmann, Albin Fleck and Eckard Seeber, in particular, kindly introduced me to some interesting facets of Kohl's former lifeworld. I also wish to express my appreciation to the academics and the private, public, religious and political institutions in Germany that provided valuable assistance by mail and email. A large part of sources were collected from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation's archive in St. Augustin (KAS), which is affiliated with Kohl's party. Substantial secondary research was conducted in state and university libraries in Berlin, Canberra, Edinburgh and Hanover. I thank Monika Storm and Alexandra Schmidt from the archive of the Rhineland-Palatine parliament. While writing in Australia, I accessed crucial sources in the online Bundestag archive with the ongoing assistance of Elisabeth Skrip of the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government of Germany (BPA).

So many wonderful people have influenced the result of this research in different ways that they cannot all be mentioned here. I must express my deep gratitude to Ben Wellings for his continuous academic and moral support at the ANU. Further, I thank Jonathan Hearn and James Kennedy for their theoretical guidance and stimulating conversations over many years since the start of my studies at the University of Edinburgh. James Kennedy's comments were very helpful for the preparation of the final manuscript. I also appreciate Paul Pickering's assistance, especially during my first year in Canberra, where I enjoyed the inspirational climate of the Research School of Humanities and the Arts. Of all places in the world, however, the ANU Centre for European Studies (initially called the National Europe Centre), hidden under the gumtrees at the end of Balmain Lane, provided the most fruitful support during my research and writing process. In particular, my 'doctoral grandfather' Bruce Kent has to be mentioned in this context. I miss our dialogues very much! I also wish to show my gratitude to Isabela Burgher, Sue and Cassandra Cutler, Diana Davis, Beth Harris, Johannes Krebs, Karis Müller, Will Shannon and Josh Wodak for their substantial help during the preparation of this manuscript. I would also like to thank the copyeditor, Jaime Taber, for her excellent work, as well as Elizabeth Berg and Adam Capitanio for organizing this publication. I thank the Collaborative Research Centre 804 at Dresden University of Technology, the history department at Monash University, and the Institute for Social Movements at Ruhr University, Bochum, for providing me with workplaces during reconsideration of some final aspects of the manuscript. Finally, I am deeply grateful to Stefan Berger, the general editor of this book series, for his helpful criticisms and comments on each chapter of this book and his support since my return to Germany from Australia.

Last but not least, my parents, family and friends have been very caring and understanding over the last years. My feelings of gratitude to Thea Coventry are

greater than any written words can convey, and not only because she facilitated this book's production with her professional editorial skills and analytical acuity.

## Notes

1. P. James. 2013. 'Closing Reflections: Confronting Contradictions in Biographies of Nations and Persons', *Humanities Research* 19(1) (J. Hearn and C. Wicke [guest eds], *Nationalism and Biography: European Perspectives*), 137.



# Abbreviations

---

ANU	Australian National University
BdV	Federation of Expellees
BPA	Press and Information Office of the Federal Republic of Germany
BVP	Bavarian People's Party
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
CSU	Christian Social Union
DHM	German Historical Museum
DPA	German Press Agency
EC	European Community
EU	European Union
<i>FAZ</i>	<i>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</i>
FDP	Free Democratic Party
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	German Democratic Republic
KAS	Archive of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation
SED	Socialist Unity Party
SPD	Social Democratic Party of Germany
StALu	City Archive Ludwigshafen
U.S.	United States



# Introduction

---

Nationalism has become normal in the contemporary world. Despite changes in international relations and notions of sovereignty, nation-states have continued to mushroom over the past two centuries. And despite efforts to write transnational histories, the public is fundamentally organized along national lines, inasmuch as its nationalized representation of the past has supplied nation-states with legitimacy. In 1989, Richard J. Evans wrote that there was ‘no fundamental reason why a linguistic or cultural group such as the Germans should need to be united under a single state, any more than the same principle should be applied to other linguistic or cultural groups, such as the English-speaking nations’.<sup>1</sup> However, after the sudden fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, it took only a few weeks for the movement for *democratization* in the German Democratic Republic to become a movement of *unification*. Millions in East and West Germany held that, to borrow the words of Willy Brandt, ‘what belongs together is now growing together’.<sup>2</sup> Many Germans believed unification would be the only feasible remedy for the historical dysgenics of their nation’s eastern appendage, and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl was celebrated as the liberator of the suppressed. It was the beginning of *Kohlmania*.<sup>3</sup>

In his memoirs, Kohl recalled German Democratic Republic (GDR) Premier Hans Modrow waiting stony-faced at the end of the escalator, when the Chancellor left the airplane in Dresden and ‘thousands of people waited for us at the airport, a sea of black-red-golden flags waved in the cold December air – in between an almost forgotten white-green flag of Saxony. . .’.<sup>4</sup> Kohl

was greatly enthused by the masses welcoming him with banners and shouting 'Helmut, Helmut', 'Germany, Germany' or 'We are one *Volk*'. Despite his enjoyment of this exaltation, however, he was apprehensive about his own appearance before the ruins of the Dresden Frauenkirche, which he feared could be interpreted abroad as nationalistic. He asked himself what would happen if the euphoric crowd began to sing, '*Deutschland, Deutschland über alles*'. Conscious of his embodiment of German normality, Kohl spontaneously asked the church to send a singer to perform 'Now Thank We All Our God', lest the masses embarrassingly strike up that first stanza of the 'Song of Germany'.<sup>5</sup>

In this speech on 19 December 1989, Kohl assured hundreds of international journalists that 'my goal remains – when the historical moment allows for it – the unity of our nation'. At the same time, he asked the Germans for empathy because the world was anxious about the upheaval in the GDR. Like any other *Volk* (the German term 'Volk' corresponds to both 'the people' as well as an ethnic group), he assured his audience, the Germans were entitled to the right of self-determination. But conscious of fears of another German *Sonderweg* (Germany's special historical path outside of the West), Kohl portrayed the new 'house of Germany' as 'built under a European roof'. He commemorated the bomb victims of 'this gorgeous old German city' and emphasized his guiltlessness for the Second World War by reminding his audience that he had been only fifteen in 1945. Kohl was thankful for his 'chance to grow up "over there" in my Palatine Heimat', unlike the Germans in the East, and emphasized his belonging 'to this young generation that swore after the war: "never again war, never again violence"'. I want to renew this oath here in front of you: only peace must spring from German soil in the future – that is our common goal'. Finally he reminded his listeners of the upcoming Christmas, which would foremost be a festival of peace and a family celebration. Evoking the national solidarity that transcended the border between the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Kohl affirmed solemnly that 'especially on such days we perceive ourselves as one German family'. He thanked the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev for his policies of perestroika, and the Polish Solidarity Movement and the reform movement in Hungary for helping to overcome forty years of German division, and concluded his speech: 'God bless our German fatherland!'<sup>6</sup> In exchange for some financial support, Modrow made several concessions, including the opening of the Brandenburg Gate, where Kohl would make another historic speech as a Christmas present to all Germans.<sup>7</sup>

Kohl not only symbolized Western affluence but also stood for a return to solidity and the national life in Germany, as it ought to be lived. He sought to personify the de-radicalized nationalism of the man in the street, whom he wished nobody in the world to fear anymore. This representation facilitated Kohl's reputation both in Germany and internationally as the Chancellor of Unity, whose statesmanlike actions contributed to the reappearance of a



supposedly natural order of things. Jürgen Habermas was highly suspicious of Kohl's role in the unification process, as he feared the normalization of German nationalism and the restoration of the German nation-state, which was responsible for the Second World War and the Holocaust.<sup>8</sup> However, Habermas also portrayed Kohl retrospectively as '*die verkörperte Entwarnung*'.<sup>9</sup> Beyond this comment's satirical allusion to Kohl's enormous body size, Habermas's description could be loosely translated as 'the embodiment of the all-clear'. In English the term all-clear has been used in times of war to inform others that a danger has passed. This representation of the all-clear epitomized Kohl's personal nationalism, which foreshadowed the new normality of today's united German nation-state as part of the West.

During the (re)unification process, the 'wall peckers' near the Brandenburg Gate who sold pieces of the Cold War epicentre to tourists from all over the world were, in Konrad Jarausch's view, pursuing their 'understandable urge to return to normalcy'.<sup>10</sup> Like all-clear, normalcy had become a popular expression in the United States after the First World War. However, as Philip Jenkins explained, this term implied not only the wish to return to conditions before the war, but also U.S. conservatives' desire in the 1920s for 'social tranquillity and ethnic homogeneity set somewhere in the historic past'.<sup>11</sup> As a subset of Kohl's quest for normality, this nostalgic pursuit of normalcy was also about ideological consensus and national identity. But Kohl went further in his quest for normality, insisting on territorial unity and a major image makeover for his nation. The (re)unification of 3 October 1990 eventually became the prime example of a nationalist event, fulfilling the modern 'one nation = one state' formula that has become an almost unchallenged norm worldwide.<sup>12</sup> Though this normality had been challenged under communist rule in wide parts of Central and Eastern Europe, the abnormality appeared even stranger for the German nation, which was held responsible for the two world wars and the Holocaust. Kohl felt this reputation as a thorn in his side.

For the German nation, the Second World War ended on 8 May 1945. Nevertheless, the peculiar repercussions of the all-clear signal persisted. Its reverberating undertones were fine-tuned over generations in the Federal Republic (established in 1949). Normality became a magic word among the provisional orchestrators of the West German identity project, which commenced when the emerging Cold War ended the Nuremberg Interregnum.<sup>13</sup> The downfall of the Third Reich was followed by attempts to extract 'good patriotism' from 'bad nationalism'. The great search began, excavating below the rough exterior of the German nation towards its golden heart, which the (re-)establishing political parties sought to represent during the early phase of the new West German state.<sup>14</sup> It could be argued that the question of normality then became *the* German Question. It was primarily about the reconstruction of the country, the need for security, the suppression and denial of the Nazi past, and the question of the nation-state. Further, it was about tackling the belief that the nation

and its history were special, in psychological, social, cultural and political terms. Whereas before 1945, the perception that Germans were different from other nations had been viewed as positive; afterwards it was reversed into something negative: normality was about being like all other peoples.<sup>15</sup>

The victory of Konrad Adenauer and his Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in the first elections in 1949, along with Adenauer's personification of unconditional *Westbindung* (integration with the West), had laid the foundation for the partial normality that Kohl felt obliged to defend.<sup>16</sup> Since the 1960s, however, when Fritz Fischer caused a furore by arguing that Germans had followed a negative historical trajectory from the Reformation towards Nazism, the unity of German historiography had been publicly contested amongst Federal Republican intellectuals.<sup>17</sup> The Nazi episode was subsequently historicized not simply as a historical accident that could potentially have also happened to other nations, but as the cumulative result of peculiarly German developments. At the same time, Adolf Eichmann's sentence in Jerusalem and a series of Auschwitz trials in Frankfurt increasingly confronted the public with the German past, which appeared as anything but normal at the time.<sup>18</sup> Conservatives, including the young Kohl, publicly agitated against Fritz Bauer's initial calls for younger generations to recognize the crimes committed in Nazi Germany. Ignoring the emerging studies of Nazism, Kohl's decision then was that it was too early to judge this episode of the German past.<sup>19</sup> This presumption contradicted his own approach to contemporary history: Kohl's Ph.D. thesis in history, submitted at the University of Heidelberg in 1958, dealt with the political reconstruction after 1945.<sup>20</sup>

Generations, like nations, can be regarded as large, very diverse groups that develop common identities by historicizing themselves subjectively on the basis of 'collective experiences' that differentiate them from other generations. Objectively, both are ideal-typological categories in historical and social sciences, and both provide important frameworks for ideologized narrations of the past. (Nations, however, are designed to transcend generations and have become much more powerful categories in any regard.) By retrospectively 'breaking up' nationalized time in West Germany, the protesting 1968 generation challenged the semi-normality of the country that had been reconstructed by their quieter parents, whom they held largely responsible for Auschwitz.<sup>21</sup> 'In German mythology', as Heinz Bude put it, '1968 lies between 1945 and 1989'.<sup>22</sup> The cultural process associated with 1968 stood for another normalization of Germany, a kind of westernization that differed from the conservative longing for NATO belonging. The '68ers deconstructed the myth of the *Stunde Null* (the 'zero hour' of 8 May 1945) and revealed the continuities between Nazism and Federal Republicanism. With his genuflection at the former Warsaw Ghetto in 1970, Willy Brandt (SPD) responded to the changing historical culture. Parallel to the rising demands for greater *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (coming to terms with the past) this act of political memory occurred in the context of Brandt's new Ostpolitik, which aimed at normalizing diplomatic relations with

the East.<sup>23</sup> Yet half of the West German population still found Brandt's gesture in Warsaw exaggerated.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, Christian Democrats agitated against the new foreign policies, which they saw as betraying the constitutional demand for unification.<sup>25</sup> Normality was still open to dispute.

The political climate change of the mid-1970s subsequently ignited a reactionary spirit of yearning for the lost values of the 1950s, which Kohl sought to put into operation with his chancellorship in 1982.<sup>26</sup> Feeling obliged to dampen the postnational aberrations of 1968, Kohl marketed this coming to power as a *geistig-moralische Wende* (spiritual-moral change).<sup>27</sup> While the division of Germany itself became more and more normal, Kohl was pursuing his quest for normality at the top level of Federal Republican politics, which caused momentous disturbances amongst the intellectual elites. He sought to endow the citizenry with emotional security and a deeper, romantic normality below the naked surface of the Cold War's political structures, but the left-liberal intelligentsia in particular was apprehensive of what they perceived as a reactionary conservatism. Pride and traditions, Kohl felt, were needed to assure the nation's well-being and prevent the regime in East Berlin from exploiting this alleged cultural vacuum. Consistent with the conservative-liberal concept of German memory, Kohl wished to prevent the normalization of a postnational identity, as envisaged by Habermas and the left-liberal antagonists.<sup>28</sup> This tension led to a major historiographical debate in 1986 known as the *Historikerstreit* (Historians' Dispute), which would have been unimaginable without the insistent domestic and international memory politics pursued under Kohl's governance.<sup>29</sup>

The quest for normality was increasingly about drawing a line – about overcoming the culture of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, often by relativizing Nazism against communism through portraying the real evil as still lying in Moscow and its East Berlin satellite. Kohl carefully walked this line, risking negative consequences for his 'all-clear' image when he pushed the boundaries of political correctness. The quest for liberation from anti-national sentiments was most dominant among, but not restricted to, the conservative-liberal establishment, which boosted Kohl's morale. The exotic example of Martin Walser suggested that someone associated with the left in West Germany could still be a nationalist writer calling for national identity and unification.<sup>30</sup> The 1980s saw a growing desire to dismantle the Germans' stigma, shake off the burden and reject the notion that the division of the nation had been a punishment for uniquely evil crimes committed by Germans.<sup>31</sup> Kohl responded to this desire and sought to amplify it. His search for normality sought both a departure from the old, anti-Western *Sonderweg* and the closure of the new, post-national *Sonderweg*.<sup>32</sup>

With the solidification of the new Berlin Republic, this double normality, which was the ideal effect of Kohl's oeuvre, has come very close to its realization. Habermas, who believed that Auschwitz was the precondition for the creation of a liberal political culture in Germany, warned of a development in

which an increasingly faint memory of the Nazi past would result in its singularity being relativized against the memory of the Stasi past.<sup>33</sup> However, after sixteen years in office at the Chancellery in Bonn and electoral defeat in 1998, the Chancellor of Unity passed the routine on to his successors, and Germans came ever closer to Kohl's vision of normality.<sup>34</sup>

Biographical interest in Kohl was particularly strong in the 1990s, due to his role in the unification process in 1989/90, and again at the end of the Kohl era in 1998. The conventional media substantially revived its interest in Kohl upon the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 2009 and Kohl's eightieth birthday celebration in 2010. In 2011, Kohl was again in Germany's mainstream media spotlight after public disclosure of details of his family life.<sup>35</sup> In October 2014, during the week of the Frankfurt Book Fair, Kohl once more dominated the mainstream media in Germany; without Kohl's permission, Heribert Schwan, who Kohl had hired as ghost writer for his memoirs, published a book containing controversial statements Kohl made during interviews Schwan had conducted in the early 2000s.<sup>36</sup> Kohl simultaneously published an updated version of his memoirs on the (re)unification process.<sup>37</sup> Shortly thereafter he presented his book *Aus Sorge um Europa*, reaffirming his belief in European integration and attacking his successors for the wrong policies, and staging himself again as a 'great European'. Despite Kohl's ongoing presence in German public debate, little has been written about his ideology. He described himself as anti-ideological, and his biographers have tended to emphasize a primary interest in political power rather than looking at the ideas, rhetoric and representation of this key figure in contemporary European history.<sup>38</sup> It is worth noting that Hans-Peter Schwarz's recent standard work on Kohl does not aim at a break with the established narrative about Kohl, and is careful in maintaining the image of him as an average hero. Schwarz's political biography is surprisingly unsurprising in its narration and analysis, given the impressive research undertaken.<sup>39</sup>

In contrast to his allegedly anti-ideological facade, Kohl strove to be remembered as a man of principles and identities, devoted to Christian, Palatine, Federal Republican, German and European ideals.<sup>40</sup> In Kohl's worldview, these ideals were not contestable: they were historically derived and beyond discursive reason. He based his ideology on a conviction of natural law and stylized his own personality as representing and guarding a deeper truth from which Germans were alienating themselves. Patrick Bahners explained Kohl's notion of normality as situated beneath 'the really predominant or the statistically dominant'; it was something regulative and unavoidable: 'the norm provided an order, which could not be changed. One may disagree with that normality but would still have to comply'.<sup>41</sup> Kohl suffered a holistic bias, and in trying to mute any oppositional voices he used Karl Popper's concept of critical rationality, which did not abide by the normality he represented. Any criticism would be dogmatic and allow for the polarization of society that Kohl warned against throughout his political career.<sup>42</sup>

Kohl perceived the absence of the nation-state as abnormal, but achieving it was not a central value for him. That is, realizing territorial unity was not the highest aim in Kohl's nationalist rhetoric; instead, it was one of several crucial aspects of his quest for normality. Irrespective of the borders, he presented the unity of the German nation as destiny. As long as the *Kulturnation* (cultural nation) was maintained, so the argument ran, the theoretical prospect for unification could be preserved. The cultural and ethnic German nationhood underpinning political realities was key to providing Germans with permanent assistance to internalize this truth. Kohl believed that all Germans were called to work for unification. It was the constitutional demand, and the constitution was a quasi-sacred national symbol in Kohl's personal nationalism. Nonetheless, the lesson Kohl had learned from Konrad Adenauer – the major national hero in Kohl's narrative of the past – was that unification must not happen at the expense of Germany's belonging to the West. Belonging to the West and being on equal moral terms with Western nations were central elements of Kohl's personal nationalism. By positioning his romantic conception of German nationhood under the hegemony of the West, Kohl was able to rehabilitate allegedly dangerous traditions in German nationalism. This synthesis was part of his personal manifestation of German normality.

Further, Kohl did not see the instalment of state unity within the Western framework as necessarily assuring complete normality. During the (re)unification process, when asked about his vision for the next ten years, he responded 'that things will normalize. That's the most important thing for us. That we become a wholly normal country, not "singularized" in any question . . . [Y]es, that we simply don't stick out [*sic*]'.<sup>43</sup> The prospect of the new German nation-state thus was not enough to cure his national inferiority complex. Kohl remained unsettled about the success of his controversial attempts to relativize the Nazi past. He felt that his calls for a more positive national identity were left unanswered, and that Germans' reputation as a rogue nation had yet not disappeared.

In line with most Germans, Kohl's rhetoric regarded nationalism as a faux pas, something erroneous, abnormal, outdated and essentially dangerous. He saw this terminological sanitization as necessary to conform to the standards of German normality. However, Kohl was his own individual type of nationalist. His imagination, rhetoric, actions and representation helped preserve and reshape the German nation. The personal nationalism of the Chancellor of Unity thus went much further than his claims for (re)unification, which merely followed Ernest Gellner's prominent definition of nationalism as 'a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent'.<sup>44</sup> Kohl had never been indifferent about the content of the *Deutschlandbegriff* (notion of Germany), which was analogical to his idealized portrayal of himself as the embodiment of German normality. His early socialization supplied him with a repertoire of self-images that he mobilized selectively in the course of his political career to represent a particular vision his nation.

Nationalism has been described as a quasi- and post-religious phenomenon that endows societies with a sense of transcendence across time and space.<sup>45</sup> Though often implying something extreme and out of date, here nationalism is treated as a contemporary, mainstream phenomenon that traverses personal, public and official spheres. Nationalism is not only an issue of organized politics; it is an informal matter of everyday life, where things, ideas and actions have been culturally nationalized.<sup>46</sup> This omnipresence makes nationalism hard to reflect upon and easy for politicians to exploit. Nationalism, however, does not exclusively emanate from the upper classes to the masses. Political elites' mind-sets are themselves products of their nationalized environment that develop over the course of their socialization, which should not be seen as disconnected from the mainstream socialization. Thousands of notions of the nation exist, informed by melanges of ideas and concepts idiosyncratic to each individual. As Kohl's example demonstrates, religion, political ideology, generation, region, education and profession are integral to the repertoires that shape notions of nations. Nationalism is a discursive phenomenon, but one that is permanently penetrated by other discursive phenomena. These vary amongst members of the same national group, although commonalities exist to which all members can refer. Clearly, then, nationalism cannot be a singular concept but rather takes many forms through diverse social and conceptual frameworks. Some of these multiple faces of German nationalism are discernible within Kohl himself, who personified a particular nexus between national, group and individual identities. Born on 3 April 1930 in Ludwigshafen on the Rhine, Kohl's trajectory as a Christian Democratic politician provides important perspectives on nationalism in contemporary Germany. This research thus aims to use the life and ideology of Kohl to explore the management of national representation and historical culture in the Federal Republic.<sup>47</sup>

## **Organization of the Study**

Chapter 1 is designed to provide a theoretical foundation and framework for this study, which can be read as a methodological proposal to scholars of nationalism in general.<sup>48</sup> The chapter explores theories on nationalism and provides definitions for key concepts that underpin subsequent chapters. It proposes working definitions for concepts of nation and nationalism, and reasons for the choice of biographical method. Because the terminology used here may have different meanings depending on the respective authorship and discursive context, the reader should know that in this study, 'Catholic nationalism' is a form of religious nationalism, in which religious thought and belonging shape the notion of nation; 'liberal nationalism' consists of a set of normative efforts to preserve the integrity of nationalism under the hegemony of liberal values; 'romantic nationalism' refers to the accentuation of ethnic and cultural

attributes of nationhood over political structures, noting particular connotations in the German context (it could also be treated more generally as ‘ethno-cultural nationalism’); and ‘national historicism’ is the act of conceptualizing the past in national categories, or the use and production of history for nationalist purposes. Finally, the concept of unification is introduced.

Chapter 2 examines Kohl’s socialization in the Catholic milieu, where his Christian Democratic ideology originated and his notion of Germany became imbued with religious ideas. In German historiography, Catholicism re-emerged from the Second World War as representing a notion of Germany that stood in contrast to the anti-Western and pro-Prussian *Sonderweg* image. Kohl’s autobiographical representation drew on a portrayal of his parents and political mentors as at once religious, patriotic and dissociated from Nazi ideology. He thereby historicized his own background as a positive example in German history, emphasizing the continuity between the political Catholicism of the Weimar Republic and Christian Democracy in the Federal Republic, while concealing the relationship between Catholicism and Nazism. This biographical feature was a useful asset in his quest to represent German normality.

As a successor of the former Catholic Centre Party, the Christian Democratic Union rapidly emerged as the main conservative force in West Germany by accommodating a broad electorate, including liberal Protestants. The westernization of German conservatism under the umbrella of Christian Democracy marked a significant shift whilst also preserving the anti-communist tradition. Adenauer was able to present the curing of Nazi Germany’s apostasy from God as in keeping with the persistent threat from the East, and Kohl projected this position thereafter. The protection of the Christian occident was consistent with the Americanization of the German economy and culture, and European integration was advocated as an expression of the common Christian heritage among European nations that must not be suppressed by ‘ideologies’. In Kohl’s imagination, the process of Westernization was an advent of normality with which he himself strongly identified.

Kohl’s subsequent political life was characterized by theorizing the liberal principles of the Federal Republican constitution and German culture as rooted in Christianity. Positing Germany as an essentially Christian nation, he depicted his party as the most patriotic trustee of the national heritage. He propagated Christianity as an anti-ideological force: Nazism and communism were equally dangerous atheist ideologies, whereas his worldview and that of his party were beyond ideology and protected by belief in the human being as the image of God. In addition to Christianity’s importance for political and national well-being, Christian ethics were vital to personal, emotional security and solidarity in society. Kohl thus resorted to religious motives during his conservative reaction against the ‘spiritual-moral crisis’ of the post-1968 era.

Chapter 3 positions Kohl’s generational belonging in relation to his liberal nationalist rhetoric. Kohl belonged to the ‘45ers, the generation sandwiched

between Wilhelminian parents, who had been in charge during the Weimar Republic and Nazi Germany, and the '68ers. His experiences during the Third Reich, towards the end of the Second World War and in its aftermath fundamentally shaped both his idea of Germany and his ideal of Germany's historical culture, which he sought to disseminate as a politician. His generation could claim to be eyewitnesses to the transition from Third Reich to Federal Republic, and his generational identity endowed him with an appearance of historical authenticity in his representation of this new German state. This biographical characteristic bequeathed to Kohl a powerful narrative that he was able to use in his political life to sustain the representation of normality. He portrayed himself as someone who was too young to be guilty of the Nazi atrocities yet old enough to know the meaning of war and dictatorship. He thus staged himself as predestined to represent the spirit of the foundation of the Federal Republic and its liberal political culture, and to ensure that German history would not repeat itself.

Kohl cleverly aligned himself with the new post-1945 situation. He became a politically active paragon of the new civil society. Members of his generation saw the Federal Republic as fundamentally superior to the political and social order they had experienced as children and teenagers during the Second World War, and they reacted strongly to any potential undermining of the legitimacy of the republic and its belonging to the West. The progression from the Third Reich to the Federal Republic, the economic miracle and the westernization of his state were the dominant developments in Kohl's historical memory until (re)unification.

Within this generational spectrum, Kohl was among the liberal nationalists, who believed that their constitutional patriotism still required a national underpinning. He articulated a German nationalism that, though fearful of any further *Sonderweg*, did not allow for a complete break with the nationalist tradition. The zero hour was thus not an absolute rupture for Kohl, who always put great emphasis on the positive, liberal continuities in Germany's political culture and sought to highlight the connection between Weimar and the new system in Bonn. The liberal principles of the constitution were, for Kohl, rooted in a much older, Christian and Enlightenment heritage of the German nation.

Kohl articulated the 'dogmatism' of 1968, which he also associated with Social Democracy, as a threat to the republic. It was part of his political method to continually attribute the success of the golden years of the early West German state to Adenauer and his party in power. Seeking to instigate a revival of national and Federal Republican identity, he constantly reminded the public of Adenauer's heritage and styled himself as his political grandson. Kohl used the connection between himself and Adenauer to suggest his categorical commitment to the West, the Transatlantic Alliance and the vision of a united Europe – a significant alignment in his representation of normality. A key observation in this regard is that Western integration (i.e., loyalty to the United States and NATO as well as to the European integration project)



and national restoration were two mutually reinforcing principles in Kohl's liberal nationalism. Remembering Kohl as a nationalist thus does not preclude a public memory of Kohl as a statesman convinced of the existential need for European integration.

Chapter 4 deals with Kohl's regional background and his romantic nationalism. His Rhenish origin endowed him with another biographical characteristic by which to demonstrate German normality. He emphasized the Palatinate's geographic position bordering France and articulated his Palatine identity as a sign of his genuine Western and European nature. His display of Palatine belonging was also part of his representation of Germany's decentralized makeup as a conglomerate of local folk cultures. Like religion, these regional traditions were, in Kohl's view, important to preserving solidarity and emotional security against alienation in modern industrial societies and, at the same, ensuring the functionality of democracy. Kohl's propagation of a particular *Heimat* consciousness (the romanticized notion of homeland), comprised of romantic associations with both local and national origins, was part of his conservative vision of a 'spiritual-moral' change in society, in reaction to the structural and ideological constraints of his time.

The German Volk was primarily defined as a group with common ethnic and cultural backgrounds rather than a political nation. However, Kohl's ethnic conception of German nationhood was in harmony with Federal Republican law. The cultural reading of Germany that Germans had traditionally generated in response to the absence of the nation-state was, in Kohl's case, pervaded by Cold War rhetoric. He believed only the Federal Republic was entitled to represent German culture. The GDR, he retorted when East Berlin aspired to claim the prerogative of German history, should be excluded from the national heritage. Further, Kohl's demand for unification focused only on the territories of the FRG and GDR. Though forced to accommodate German expellees' organizations and right-wing nostalgia about the lost regions further east, Kohl never raised any revanchist, territorial claims. Paradoxically, the romantic nationalism that sustained his representation of Germany as an essentially European and Western nation, as communicated in his correspondence, was often subordinated to his liberal nationalism and thus worked to support his image of normality.

Chapter 5 outlines Kohl's style of historicizing the German past. The essay first offers some insights into the ambience of Kohl's university education at Heidelberg in the 1950s, where he was taught by professors who had previously sympathized with Nazi ideals or been actively involved in the Nazi movement and remained able to continue their careers at public institutions in the Federal Republic. Kohl's Ph.D. focused on political reconstruction in his home region after the Second World War. The year 1945 was the vanishing point of his historical study. In essence, however, he bypassed the negative episode of the Third Reich, except for the positive imagery of the resistance, and emphasized the

democratic attitude of postwar politicians who had been active prior to the Nazi takeover of power. This was integral to Kohl's schema for signalling the all-clear. In his view, the new state legitimized itself not only against the backdrop of Germany's historical accident, which he presented as caused largely by Hitler alone, but also in relation to a continuous national history connected to the role of political parties and individuals in the Palatinate.

As a trained historian, Kohl was confident in his pursuit of controversial *Geschichtspolitik* (history politics), which has attracted intensive scholarly attention since the Historikerstreit of the 1980s. He was conscious of his self-revelation as the epitome of German normality – the one who had learned the lessons from history. But in pursuing his conservative agenda, Kohl caused a series of domestic and international scandals that threatened his quest for normality. Kohl followed Germany's 'historist' tradition: he had internalized a conception of history in which a few incontestable entities followed a natural determination. He used this method to legitimize the (West) German state, his ideology and his power. As he saw it, public contestation of Germany's national history not only harmed the German nation's reputation but also undermined the legitimacy of its possible political (re)union and, most importantly, questioned its natural belonging to the West as a fundamental part of Europe. For Kohl, history was something absolute and essentially national; therefore it was impossible, or at least immoral, to sever ties with it. History was in accordance with human nature: not perfect but generally positive. The aberration of the Third Reich and the GDR only confirmed the otherwise positive stream of Germans' history, in his account. In this apologetic presentation of Germany, the Germans themselves eventually entered the circle of Nazi victims, and though the younger generations should not forget this dark chapter of their history, it was time to walk out of Hitler's shadow and get back on track towards a brighter future.

Hence, Kohl's personal nationalism will be analysed along four traditions in German nationalism, which he internalized during his early socialization. The four empirical chapters of this volume discuss Kohl in that order – as Catholic nationalist, liberal nationalist, romantic nationalist and nationalist historian – each connecting Kohl's nationalist ideas to a particular biographical narrative. The conclusion marks the synthesis of these four nationalisms: combined, they shaped Kohl's representation as the embodiment of German normality.

## Notes

1. R.J. Evans. 1989. *In Hitler's Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past*, New York: Pantheon Books, 102.

2. B. Rother. 2001. "‘Jetzt wächst zusammen, was zusammengehört’ – Oder: Warum Historiker Rundfunkarchive nutzen sollten", in T. Garton Ash (ed.), *Wächst zusammen, was zusammengehört?* Berlin: Schriftenreihe der Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung, 25–30.

3. A. Glees. 1996. *Reinventing Germany: German Political Development since 1945*, Oxford: Berg, 249–52.
4. H. Kohl. 2005. *Erinnerungen*, vol. 2: 1982-1990, Munich: Droemer, 1020. All primary and secondary sources that were originally written in German have been translated by the author into English, unless otherwise indicated.
5. Kohl, *Erinnerungen*, vol. 2, 1022–23.
6. H. Kohl. 1990. 'Ziel bleibt die Einheit der Nation' (Speech delivered at a rally in Dresden, 19 December 1989), in *Reden und Erklärungen zur Deutschlandpolitik*, Bonn: BPA, 138–42.
7. Kohl. 1990. 'Eine der glücklichsten Stunden' (Speech delivered at the opening of the Brandenburg Gate, 22 December 1989), in *Reden und Erklärungen zur Deutschlandpolitik*, Bonn: BPA, 154–55.
8. J. Habermas. 1990. 'Der DM-Nationalismus', *Die Zeit*, 30 March; J. Habermas. 1992. 'Die zweite Lebenslüge der Bundesrepublik: Wir sind wieder „normal“ geworden', *Die Zeit*, 11 December.
9. J. Habermas. 1994. In U. Greiner (ed.), *Meine Jahre mit Helmut Kohl*, Mannheim: Bollman, 9–11.
10. K. Jarausch. 2006. *After Hitler: Recivilising Germans 1945-1995*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 214.
11. P. Jenkins. 1997. *A History of the United States*, Basingtoke: Macmillan, 209.
12. J. Breuilly and R. Speirs. 2005. 'The Concept of Unification', in J. Breuilly and R. Speirs (eds), *Germany's Two Unifications: Anticipations, Experiences, Responses*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2.
13. J. Herf. 1999. *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; P. Bender, 1997. *Episode oder Epoche? Zur Geschichte des geteilten Deutschlands*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., Munich: dtv.
14. J. Gabbe. 1976. *Parteien und Nation: Zur Rolle des Nationalbewußtseins für die politischen Grundorientierungen der Parteien in der Anfangsphase der Bundesrepublik*, Meisenheim a.G.: Anton Hain.
15. See Aleida Assmann on the notion of normality in (West) Germany: A. Assmann. 1999. 'Die Schlagworte der Debatte', in A. Assmann and U. Frevert, *Geschichtsvergessenheit, Geschichtsversessenheit: Vom Umgang mit deutschen Vergangenheiten nach 1945*, Stuttgart: DVA, 59–63; see also L. Niethammer. 2001. "'Normalization" in the West: Traces of Memory Leading Back into the 1950s', in H. Schissler (ed.), *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949-1968*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, chapter 10.
16. A. Poppinga. 1975. *Konrad Adenauer: Geschichtsverständnis, Weltanschauung und politische Praxis*, Stuttgart: DVA; N. Frei. 2002. *Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration*, trans. J. Golb, New York: Columbia University Press.
17. J. Moses. 1975. *The Politics of Illusion: The Fischer Controversy in German Historiography*, London: Prior.
18. R. Wittmann. 2005. *Beyond Justice: The Auschwitz Trial*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
19. C. Fröhlich. 2005. *Wider die Tabuisierung des Ungehorsams: Fritz Bauers Widerstandsbegriff und die Aufarbeitung von NS-Verbrechen*, Frankfurt: Campus, 151–52; F. Bauer. 1961. *Die Wurzeln faschistischen und nationalsozialistischen Handelns*, Mainz: Landesjugendring Rheinland-Pfalz.
20. H. Kohl. 1958. 'Die politische Entwicklung und das Wiedererstehen der Parteien nach 1945', Ph.D. dissertation, Heidelberg: University of Heidelberg, copied from the *Bibliothek des Niedersächsischen Landtags*.
21. H. Kundnani. 2009. *Utopia or Auschwitz: Germany's 1968 Generation and the Holocaust*, New York: Columbia University Press. Cf. C. Lorenz and B. Bevernage (eds). 2013. *Breaking up Time: Negotiating the Borders between Present, Past and Future*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. For a critique of generational analysis see also W. Kansteiner. 2014. 'Generation and Memory: A Critique of the Ethical and Ideological Implications of Generational Narration', in S. Berger and B. Niven (eds), *Writing the History of Memory*, New York: Bloomsbury, 111–34.

22. H. Bude. 2009. 'Achtundsechzig', in É. François and H. Schulze (eds), *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte* 2, Munich: C.H. Beck, 122. For a more general discussion of generational analysis, life stories and historical science, see J. Reulecke (ed.). 2003. *Generationalität und Lebensgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert, Schriften des Historischen Kollegs*, Kolloquien 58, Munich: Oldenbourg. In a chapter in this volume entitled 'Die 50er Jahre im Spiegel der Flakhelfer- und der 68er-Generation', Heinz Bude contrasts Kohl's generation with the 68ers, arguing that Germany has been a more 'generation-ridden' society, at least in comparison to the more 'class-ridden' British society (p. 145).

23. C. Fink and B. Schaefer (eds). 2009. *Ostpolitik, 1969-1974: European and Global Responses*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

24. *Der Spiegel*. 1970. 'Kniefall angemessen oder übertrieben?' 14 December.

25. C. Clemens. 1989. *Reluctant Realists: The Christian Democrats and West German Ostpolitik*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

26. *Der Spiegel*. 1975. 'Tendenzwende: Jeder fühlt den neuen Wind', 6 January.

27. R. Seuthe. 2001. *Geistig-moralischen Wende? Der politische Umgang mit der NS-Vergangenheit in der Ära Kohl am Beispiel von Gedenktagen, Museums- und Denkmalprojekten*, Frankfurt: Peter Lang.

28. J. Habermas. 1988. 'Historical Consciousness and Post-Traditional Identity: Remarks on the Federal Republic's Orientation to the West', *Acta Sociologica* 31(1), 3–13.

29. C.S. Maier. 1988. *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

30. M. Walser. 1987. *Dorle und Wolf*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp; M. Walser. 1989. *Über Deutschland reden*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. In the 1990s Walser was increasingly associated with right-wing revisionism, see T.A. Kovach. 2008. *Martin Walser: The Burden of the Past, Martin Walser on German Identity: Texts, Contexts, Commentary*, Rochester, NY: Camden House.

31. A.D. Moses. 2007. *German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 24–31, 258.

32. S. Berger. 2007. *The Search for Normality: National Identity and Historical Consciousness since 1800*, revised ed., Oxford: Berghahn Books, xiii–xxvi and 176–97.

33. J. Habermas. 1995. *Die Normalität einer Berliner Republik*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 170.

34. For a recent discussion on the concept of normality in the German context, see S. Taberner and P. Cooke (eds). 2006. *German Culture, Politics and Literature into the Twenty-first Century: Beyond Normalization*, Rochester: Camden House.

35. The books by Helmut Kohl's son Walter and by Heribert Schwan, were bestsellers in Germany; see W. Kohl. 2011. *Leben oder gelebt werden: Schritte auf dem Weg zur Versöhnung*, Munich: Integral; H. Schwan. 2011. *Die Frau an seiner Seite: Leben und Leiden der Hannelore Kohl*, Munich: Heyne; see also R. Urschel. 2011. 'Das private Martyrium', *Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 18 June.

36. H. Schwan and T. Jens, *Vermächtnis: Die Kohl-Protokolle*, Munich: Heyne, 2014.

37. H. Kohl, *Vom Mauerfall zur Wiedervereinigung: Meine Erinnerungen*. New Edition, Frankfurt: Droemer, 2014.

38. For some biographies on Kohl see, e.g., W. Wiedemeyer. 1975. *Helmut Kohl: Porträt eines deutschen Politikers. Eine biographische Dokumentation*, Bad Honnef: Osang; F. Hermann. 1976. *Helmut Kohl: Vom Kurfürst zum Kanzler, Person, Politik, Programm*, Stuttgart: Bonn Aktuell; K. Hofmann. 1984. *Helmut Kohl: Kanzler des Vertrauens, Eine politische Biographie*, Stuttgart: Bonn Aktuell; E. Henscheid. 1985. *Helmut Kohl: Biographie einer Jugend*, Zurich: Haffmans; W. Filmer and H. Schwan (eds). 1990. *Helmut Kohl*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed., Düsseldorf: Econ; K. Hofmann and G. Mächler. 1992. *Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of German Unity: A Biography*, trans. K. Muller-Rostin, Bonn: BPA; W. Maser. 1993. *Helmut Kohl: Der deutsche Kanzler*, revised ed., Frankfurt: Ullstein; A. Gauland. 1994. *Helmut Kohl: Ein Prinzip*, Berlin: Rowohlt; K.H. Pruys. 1996. *Kohl, Genius of the Present: A Biography of Helmut Kohl*, Chicago: Edition Q; P. Bahners. 1998. *Im Mantel der Geschichte: Helmut Kohl oder die Unerstetzlichkeit*, Berlin: Siedler; J. Busche. 1998. *Helmut Kohl: Anatomie eines Erfolges*, Berlin: Berlin; P. Clough. 1998. *Helmut Kohl: Ein Porträt der Macht*, trans. S. Aeckerle, Munich: dtv; K. Dreher. 1998. *Helmut Kohl: Leben mit Macht*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Stuttgart: DVA; B. Engelmann. 1998. *Schwarzbuch Helmut*

*Kohl - oder: wie man einen Staat ruiniert*, revised ed., Göttingen: Steidl; H. Bering. 1999. *Helmut Kohl*, Washington D.C.: Regnery; H. Leyendecker et al. 2000. *Helmut Kohl, die Macht und das Geld*, Göttingen: Steidl; J. Leinemann. 2001. *Helmut Kohl: Ein Mann bleibt sich treu*, Berlin: Aufbau; K.H. Pruis. 2004. *Helmut Kohl – Der Mythos vom Kanzler der Einheit*, Berlin: Edition Q; J. Schönfelder and R. Erices. 2007. *Westbesuch: Die Geheime DDR-Reise von Helmut Kohl*, Quedlinburg: Bussert and Stadeler; W. Bickerich and H. Noack. 2010. *Helmut Kohl: Die Biographie*, Berlin: Rowohlt; H. Schwan and R. Steiniger. 2010. *Helmut Kohl: Virtuose der Macht*, Mannheim: Artemis and Winkler. This list can be extended. For an interesting collection of essays on his chancellorship, see C. Clemens and W. Paterson (eds). 1998. *The Kohl Chancellorship*, London: Frank Cass. For a volume of essays on various thought-provoking aspects of Kohl's worldview, see R. Appel (ed.). 1990. *Helmut Kohl im Spiegel seiner Macht*, Bonn: Bouvier.

39. H.P. Schwarz. 2012. *Helmut Kohl: Eine Politische Biographie*, Munich: DVA.

40. Kohl's Ph.D. thesis had autobiographical elements; see Kohl, 'Die politische Entwicklung und das Wiedererstehen der Parteien nach 1945'. Kohl's first major autobiographical work focused on his role in the unification process; see H. Kohl. 1996. *Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit*, ed. K. Diekmann and R.G. Reuth, Berlin: Propyläen; see also H. Kohl. 2000. *Mein Tagebuch: 1998-2000*, Munich: Droemer, which he wrote in response to the CDU contributions scandal of 1999. For Kohl's most important autobiographical writing, see the three volumes of his memoirs: H. Kohl. 2004. *Erinnerungen*, vol. 1: 1930-1982, Munich: Droemer; Kohl, *Erinnerungen*, vol. 2; H. Kohl. 2007. *Erinnerungen*, vol. 3: 1990-1994, Munich: Droemer. To reach a broader readership, Kohl published a shorter version of his memories of the (re)unification process; see H. Kohl. 2009. *Vom Mauerfall zur Wiedervereinigung: Meine Erinnerungen*, Munich: Droemer.

41. Bahners, *Im Mantel der Geschichte*, 54.

42. H. Kohl. 1984. *Hausputz hinter den Fassaden: Praktikable Reformen in Deutschland*, Osnabrück: A. Fromm. This early programmatic booklet by Kohl outlined his ideology in response to the challenges of the time, when his party was in opposition in the Bundestag.

43. S. Schmemann. 1990. 'Kohl, the Man for the German Movement' (interview with Helmut Kohl), *New York Times*, 1 July. Stephen Brockmann took this interview as the starting point for his essay, S. Brockmann. 2006. "'Normalization": Has Helmut Kohl's Vision Been Realized?' in S. Taberner and P. Cooke (eds), *German Culture, Politics and Literature into the Twenty-First Century*, 17–30.

44. E. Gellner. 2006. *Nations and Nationalism*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1.

45. B. Anderson. 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, revised ed., London: Verso.

46. R. Jenkins. 2008. *Rethinking Ethnicity: Arguments and Explorations*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., London: Sage, 164–67.

47. For a useful volume on methods in political biography see T. Arklay et al. (eds). 2006. *Australian Political Lives: Chronicling political careers and administrative histories*, Canberra: ANU E Press.

48. An article summarizing the argument and methodology of this study was published as C. Wicke. 2013. 'The Personal Nationalism of Helmut Kohl: A Paragon of Germany's New Normality?' *Humanities Research* (19)1, 61–80.