IRIS CHANG REASSESSED
A Polemical Introduction to the Second Edition

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Prefatory Remarks

The Nanking Atrocity comprised mass murder, rape, arson, plunder, air raids on civilians, and the abduction of manual and sexual laborers by Japanese troops from December 1937 to early March 1938 inside the walled city and more importantly, in its six adjacent counties where most of the killing took place. Within those broad temporal and spatial contours, there were more than 100,000 but less than 200,000 massacre victims, and if one limits the event to six weeks inside the walled city as most historians do, the victim total will fall below 50,000. At our present stage of research, quantitative precision is not possible beyond such admittedly vague levels, especially with rape victims roughly estimated “in the thousands.” The Nanking Atrocity, then, is undeniable in fact, but its scale, its causes, its legal and moral ambiguities, and other thorny issues are open to honest debate by scholars of good faith based on scrupulous inquiry into the empirical evidence. In my view, the Atrocity is best understood as a reversion to siege warfare in Japan prior to the arrival of modern Western ideas about banning cruel acts in combat codified in the laws of war. All too many officers at Nanking ignored those laws and allowed units to pursue randori—predatory warfare for booty and women—as conducted by lowly footmen in medieval times.1 Glimpses of the Nanking Atrocity can be gained indirectly from the Osaka natsu no jin zubyōbu (Screen Painting of the Osaka Summer Campaign), which depicts that city’s fate after its castle fell in 1615.2 This Osaka Atrocity would be replayed in 1637 against anti-Tokugawa insurgents at Hara Castle and elsewhere in Shimabara-Amakusa, as well as in 1868 against pro-Tokugawa loyalist holdouts at Wakamatsu Castle and the Aizu region.

This perspective, stressing precedents in premodern Japanese history, sheds at least four insights into events at Nanking. First, the usual practice for ending a siege in medieval Japan was for a castle commander to surrender, execute members of his family, and commit ritual suicide with his chief retainers on condition
that the attacking commander would spare rank-and-file defenders as well as civilian townsfolk. But in the absence of this conventional surrender arrangement, murder, rape, pillage, and the abduction of men, women, and children for slavery often resulted—as attacking commanders turned a blind eye to slake the blood lust of their men. Second, we must note the practice of zantōgari or ochū-dogari—mopping up defeated stragglers—who got no quarter even if their bellicose status was in question or if they were incapacitated from wounds. Third, the victors used swords to sever heads, ears, and noses of the losers (dead or alive), and pickled these trophies in brine as proof of battlefield exploits later touted to claim promotions and rewards. Thus an Ear Mound for consoling the spirits of victims in Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s 1592 and 1597 invasions of Korea still stands in Kyoto today. Fourth, one document from that era cites 30,000 lopped-off enemy heads and facial appendages. But it is generally agreed that exploit-claimants, both in 1592 and 1937, routinely padded headcounts to exaggerate their feats of heroism, so historians must use such sources with great care.

Western journalists on the ground in Nanking explicitly reported that the behavior of Japanese troops in 1937 called to mind thirteenth-century Mongol marauders; i.e., an atavistic predatory mode of warfare. But I would argue that atavistic warfare in the twentieth century was not unique to the Japanese. In varying degrees, it also persisted for Chinese fighting in civil wars between central and regional governments, warlords, and bandits until 1949, as well as for Westerners fighting anti-colonial wars in the Philippines, the Ch’ing Empire, Southwest Africa, the Congo, Indochina, Kenya, Algeria, Malaysia, and elsewhere. In sum, attempts to describe and explain the Nanking Atrocity by likening it to “the Holocaust” are too misleading to be helpful owing to the emotional and ideological baggage carried over from Nazi Germany; and, worse still, great harm results when writers draw such comparisons with cavalier disdain for the normal rules of scholarship. It is in this polemical vein that I reassess three historical works by the late Iris Chang (1968–2004). I strive to be fair and apologize if I inadvertently misrepresent her views.

I. Chang and Her Trilogy

The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II is a record-breaking best seller that won phenomenal praise after appearing in 1997. It has left an indelible mark on learned as well as popular accounts of the Nanking Atrocity in English and Chinese, which is to say, most of the literate world. Distinguished professors at Western citadels of learning, Chang noted, “took time to review my book before publication and to enrich it with their important scholarly suggestions.” Other experts endorsed it heartily after publication. No one to my knowledge has retracted the endorsement. Chang remains the first point of reference for general readers and students who seek to understand the topic, and school text-
books tend to follow her interpretations. Emblematic of her North American academic stature is a two-meter bronze bust at Stanford’s Hoover Institution, a replica of the one displayed at the Nanking Mausoleum. The Rape remains in print, readily available in bookstores and online. It is cited by writers dealing with World War II, the Sino-Japanese War (1937–45 or 1931–45), the Holocaust of European Jews, comparative genocide, and memory in its collective, social, and public forms.

Few Western China specialists find fault with the book. Peter Hays Gries observes that “the Western print media largely either accepted Chang’s account uncritically or even actively advocated her thesis” and notes that “wartime propaganda about the ‘Japs’ still resonates in the West,” so “Japan bashing continues to be socially acceptable.” Thus, without citing a source, one Western journalist underscored Chang’s depiction of Japan as violently right wing by writing of “death threats” issued to her. In the realm of world politics, Ma Ying-jeou, then-president of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan, posthumously honored Chang with a medal in August 2015. He lauded the book as “an important document telling the truth about resistance to Japan by the Chinese people.” Ma also parroted one of Chang’s favorite diatribes: “Japan is the cause of regional tensions because it does not behave like Germany since 1945.” Thus to this day, Chang’s views of 1997 remain the established consensus for lay readers, for many if not most Western academic specialists, and for political leaders in East Asia, mainly in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Republic of Korea (ROK), though less so in Taiwan under the post-Ma administration elected in 2016.

Chang quashed the publication of a Japanese translation and volume of commentary made between August 1998 and May 1999 by Inoue Hisashi and the late Fujiwara Akira, who contributed to the present volume. The main reason for abrogating the publication contract was not Japanese academic obstructionism or threats of right-wing violence as reported in the Western press. Instead, while copies of the book sat in warehouses awaiting distribution, Chang objected to the correction of numerous major factual errors that, if left untouched, would have damaged the scholarly reputation of Kashiwa shobō, the publisher. In 2007, another publisher brought out a new Japanese translation and book of commentary that contained glosses, notes, and supplementary source material provided by the translator Wu Chao-hung, a second-generation Taiwanese born and bred in Japan, plus an afterword by Yamada Masayuki, Wu’s Japanese collaborator. This tenacious push to publish The Rape of Nanking in translation reveals the support that Chang receives from Japanese sympathizers and confutes her presumptions of hostility and/or disinterest rooted in collective amnesia in Japan. Her book is not a best seller there, but significant portions of the reading public do seek to judge its merits for themselves. In general, Chang’s supporters in Japan accept her overall thesis from shared leftist convictions but disavow most of her specific indictments as unfair, lament her countless errors of fact, and reject her appalling misuse of evidence. Those supporters are waning in number and influence as...
Japanese society sheds its ingrained ideas about unqualified pacifism and its sensitivity toward Asians. As Nishikawa Megumi at the liberal Mainichi newspaper puts it, ordinary Japanese are not “turning to the rightwing”; they yearn for “realism” in world affairs to become “a ‘normal nation’”—which has hitherto been an exclusively right-wing slogan. This more self-assertive stance pertains as well to historical views that non-Japanese misconstrue and pejoratively mislabel “revisionism.”

Eighty years after the Nanking Atrocity and twenty since the debut of Chang’s epoch-making book, it is time to review her claims, reassess the disputes she provoked, reexamine what effect these have had in the world, and reconsider some reasons for her ongoing mass appeal. To achieve those ends, and also to see how her ideas changed over a career cut tragically short by suicide at age twenty-six, we must read The Rape of Nanking (1997) in tandem with Thread of the Silkworm (1995) and The Chinese in America: A Narrative History (2003). A critique of all three books will, for starters, refute the calumny that Chang “told lies out of patriotism” for the PCR. This charge, popular in Japanese rightist circles, has recently been lodged by Lin Ssu-yün, a PRC expatriate from Nanking who lives and writes in Japan. Lin maintains that the social pressure to lie for a good cause informs what he calls “the pihui (bihui) syndrome,” a political and cultural trait peculiar to ethnic Han Chinese among whom he counts Chang. Lin is wrong in several respects. “Noble lies” for a good cause, especially for one’s polity, date from Plato’s Republic. They are found in all cultures and bear only coincidental likenesses to Lin’s “pihui syndrome,” reputedly unique to China. Furthermore, Chang self-identified as a “Chinese-American,” explicitly called them “my people,” and strove to enhance their ethnic identity to further multiculturalist ideals in the United States. Her animus extended beyond the Japanese, to white American bigots of course, but also to Ch’ing-dynasty (1644–1911) Manchus, whom she reviled as oppressors of Han Chinese. She criticized the Kuomint’ang (KMT)-led ROC and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-led PRC, and she held that its leaders subjected Nanking victims to “rape” for “a second time” by hosting a Japanese state visit in 1991. Early in her career, she took to heart lessons about fairness, balance, objectivity, and critical discernment that she learned in journalism school but forsook in writing The Rape of Nanking.

Japanese writers, especially rightists, dismiss Chang as being Chinese. Chinese writers embrace her as “a Chinese with US citizenship.” But to repeat, she called herself “a Chinese-American,” not a Chinese in America. This key nuance is lost upon East Asians, for whom US multiculturalist politics do not register. Chang produced vitriol toward Japan later in her career, which invited unforeseen exploitation by PRC über-patriots—a fortuitous outcome unconnected with her original intent to uproot racial discrimination in the United States. If Lin Ssu-yün has a point, it is that Chang’s allies promote her anti-Japanese invective that, despite her good intentions, invites chauvinist misappropriation by non-American Han Chinese on the other side of the globe.
II. History vs. Commemoration

After 1994–95, Chang affirmed that factual accuracy and logical rigor were expendable in the pursuit of her life work—to commemorate past victimization of “my people” and arouse group pride and ethnic identity needed for them to defeat US racism. Her agitation rested on an ethnic fellow-feeling antithetical to detached scholarly analysis. *The Rape of Nanking* brings to mind attributes of a literary form that Norman G. Finkelstein and Ruth Bettina Birn call Holocaust (capital “H”) literature as distinct from holocaust (small “h”) scholarship in the discipline of history. They hold that writers of “Holocaust literature” think it alright to twist or ignore facts, or to invent stories out of whole cloth, if it furthers what they deem an indisputably just cause—to portray Jewish suffering as vividly as possible and thus shape public opinion to maximal effect. Based on this rationale, some writers make up death-camp-survivor testimonials out of thin air, yet suffer no censure for distorting history if publishers label their works as fiction within the Holocaust literary genre. But, Finkelstein and Birn aver, Daniel Goldhagen presented *Hitler’s Willing Germans* as a work of empirical history despite indulging in that same poetic license for partisan ends. Chang, I hold, evinces a few parallels to Goldhagen. She felt free to stray from mere facts if it enabled her better to convey the higher moral truth she knew at heart to be right. Conveying this profound truth alone is what mattered for her, and conveying it once or twice did not suffice. She related it in over fifty US cities before largely Chinese-American and Chinese expatriate gatherings in the first seven months after publication between December 1997 and July 1998.

Fruitful dialogue with Chang’s supporters is impossible because empirical history on the one hand and commemoration in moral agitation on the other are mutually exclusive endeavors. Historians admit that total objectivity is an unattainable “noble dream,” yet they still embrace it as a defining aspiration. As such, they seek to describe Nanking within the context and against the values of 1937, not those of today, as fully and faithfully as possible given the imperfect nature of extant sources. This means, for example, trying to reach a more, not a less, precise estimate of the Nanking victim toll; and, when accuracy cannot be had beyond some point, they settle for citing an empirically verifiable range of more than X but less than Y. In contrast, Chang’s allies cling to the official PRC figure of “over 300,000” as symbolic of victimization at Nanking. Just to mention a lower estimate is to “play the numbers game,” which trivializes Chinese pain that must be memorialized and Japanese evil that must be castigated. Writer Jeff Kingston lampoons anyone who indulges in “caviling about” or “quibbling over the precise scale” of the Atrocity. Mike Honda, ex-member of the House of Representatives, normally cites the figure of 200,000 comfort women for all of Asia in the entire war, but in July 2015 told then-president Ma Ying-jeou that 200,000 were from Taiwan alone. If one’s goal is moral agitation, statistical imprecision is immaterial. Chang’s victim toll for Nanking varies widely within her book cov-
ers, and that for the war as a whole spiked from 3 million to 35 million over the brief course of her career. She deftly exploited the plural “s”—in “the hundreds of thousands”—so as to inflate Nanking’s refugee population and thus the potential number of massacre victims. Through this ploy she insinuates “in the high six digits,” when the figures actually ranged from 200,000 to 250,000—the least required for a plural “s.” Arithmetic errors and semantic distortions do not matter for persons who invoke history in the service of virtue.

Unlike ancient or medieval tale-tellers, empirical historians distinguish fanciful or semi-fanciful accounts from those faithful to the documentary record. They authenticate sources with care and do not use dubious, much less spurious, ones. They do not alter sources with the intent to deceive or suppress portions therein that cast doubt on their claims. They do not misrepresent views advanced by experts in order to enhance the cogency and appeal of their own arguments. They welcome reputable revisionism that forces them to rework their claims more in line with the sources. The discovery and authenticating of new sources such as the Dead Sea Scrolls and methodological advances such as the decipherment of hieroglyphics necessitate revisionism to reappraise the accepted consensus on a topic. Every PhD dissertation is a revisionist exercise certifying the candidate’s credentials as a bona fide scholar. Revisionism is therefore neither good nor bad per se; that judgment turns on the logical rigor and quality of evidence displayed.

Chang’s moral outrage and reformist zeal win support from those steeped in nihilistic postmodernism. If no ascertainably objective facts really exist, every fact is as valid as the next, and all interpretations are equally true. Then, the only meaningful question becomes: to which putative version of the truth should we commit? Chang would reply that hers will make the world better by eradicating racism, sexual violence against women, aggressive warfare, and genocide—aims that few of us decry. She also sought to uplift the Japanese morally by elevating their contrition levels commensurate to the Germans after 1945 and US southerners since the 1960s civil rights movement. Historians aspire to much less. At most, they hope that teaching history as part of a liberal arts education will benefit society incidentally by producing critically astute citizens free of parochial, presentist bias. They study the past to understand the past, with scant concern for its use-value in current-day altruistic, meliorist agendas. This orientation invites charges of sterile fact-fetishizing, antiquarian irrelevance, insensitivity to human suffering, social irresponsibility, ethical defectiveness, and in the eyes of Chang’s supporters, Holocaust denial. As Steven Pinker sardonically notes, “a real historian is about as welcome as a skunk at a garden party.”

Peter Gries condemns PRC chauvinists who exploit Chang’s polemics for anti-Japanese purposes, yet he declines to refute “flaws in Chang’s argument” and chooses “not to question” her math in calculating the Nanking victim toll. Why, because he says: “Chang never claims to be a historian” and is “a sincere young woman enraged by what she learned” about the event. Barak Kushner rejects
Chang’s portrayal of Nanking as “the forgotten Holocaust of World War II,” yet he affirmsthat this designation is “a perhaps acceptable hyperbole given her aim.”34 Such well-intentioned tolerance is misguided and subversive of history as an academic discipline. Chang wrote three books reputed to be histories, one of which remains enormously influential. As such, her works must undergo scrupulous appraisal against normal academic standards that govern our profession. No one may claim the mantle of truth in history yet hold its rules in contempt and incessantly berate others for falsifying it.

### III. Journalistic History

Yamada Masayuki, a professor at Osaka University of Education, is one of Chang’s staunchest allies in Japan along with Wu Chao-hung, Chang’s translator in 2007. Yamada holds that proof of her scholarly worth lies in “three specialized academic studies.” The first, *Thread of the Silkworm*, is a biography of the scientist Tsien Hsue-shen (Ch’ien Hsüeh-shen/Qian Xuesen, 1911–2009) that Yamada “highly regards as following the model of Erik Erikson’s *Life History and the Historical Moment.*”35 Erikson (1902–94) won acclaim for concepts such as “identity crisis” in youth and for applying Freudian analytical theory to study Martin Luther and Mahatma Gandhi. But even in his heyday, Erikson came under attack from mainstream historians, one of whom in 1967 wrote that he does not “contribute anything of value to an understanding of Luther or his age.”36 Historians now generally discount the usefulness of psychoanalytical theory in their research; after all, its application requires direct interaction with a subject who perforce is dead.37 Chang’s method shares no identifiable affinities with Erikson’s *Life History and the Historical Moment*. She once mentions something like a childhood identity, without using the term explicitly, in referring to Tsien’s memories of Hangchou and of family legends about descent from royalty that would “shape and define his life for years to come.”38 But Tsien left Hangchou at age two by Western counting, before a memory of it could sink in, and Chang never again referred to an identity stemming from reputed blue blood. Chang based her book on “oral history interviews”39 to which Yamada again lent his support, this time against old-school critics who privilege written over oral sources: “Attitudes that deny value to oral sources are not tenable; to the contrary, research centered in oral history based on oral sources now flourishes.”40 True, but skeptics abound also. Herbert T. Hoover, an early proponent, noted in 1980 that “oral history remains an unrefined technique” with “semiprofessional status” and that “all but a small percentage of the projects and centers now in operation in the United States would receive low grades.”41 Yamada is right to note that oral sources may help supplement written documents, but he never discusses the drawbacks involved, no doubt because of his eagerness to laud Chang’s scholarly credentials while dismissing those of her critics.

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In 1991 a senior editor at Basic Books asked Chang—then a self-described “twenty-two year old graduate student” and “unknown, untested writer”—to write Tsien’s biography. She spent “three years in research” that included her “first trip to the PRC” in 1993. Thus she must have finished the manuscript in 1994, so that *Thread of the Silkworm* appeared in 1995. *The Rape of Nanking* (1997) and *The Chinese in America* (2003) followed in short order. Together, these total over 1,100 pages about topics for which Chang had no background knowledge or academic training: aeronautical engineering, chemistry, jet propulsion, physics, post-bellum US history, World War II, the Cold War in Asia, the twentieth-century genocide of European Jews, and Chinese migration from the late-Ch‘ing through the post-1949 eras. English sources abounded for Tsien’s life in the United States, but Chang admitted her illiteracy and dependence on translators for the periods 1911–35 and 1955–2009 when “much of the material about his life was in Chinese.” As well, Tsien made himself “inaccessible” to Chang, so she perforce relied on interviews with his family, acquaintances, and colleagues in China, which proved unfruitful. Her breakthrough came when “a small elite of rocket scientists” agreed to talk on condition of strict anonymity, and some “pleaded with me not to write anything that would offend Tsien for fear that they might be punished.” This tense secrecy also obtained for interviews in California with his American-born son, Yucon, who grew up in the PRC, served in the People’s Liberation Army, and returned as a US citizen. Yucon granted Chang only the “rare interview” beyond earshot and eyesight of other Chinese “in his car and in a nearby park.” Her heavy reliance on such interviews inevitably had mixed results, and she duly noted the provisional nature of her findings: “Some stories can never be confirmed,” and “some questions will forever remain unanswered.”

*Thread of the Silkworm* has much merit but also hints darkly about what is to come. Chang’s subject Tsien won the esteemed Boxer Indemnity Scholarship in 1935, left China to study at MIT, stayed on in the United States to teach, and became a well-known scientist, but he fell under suspicion, first of being a US Communist Party member and later of being a PRC spy. The US government subjected him to strict surveillance, arrested and jailed him briefly in 1950, and deported him in 1955—all without solid proof of its allegations. Back in the PRC, Tsien got a hero’s welcome, won a prized government post, became a CCP minion, and worshiped Mao. Tsien took a major role in building PRC ballistic missiles and space satellites, led work on the Silkworm Missile exported for use in the Iran-Iraq War and the Persian Gulf War against US forces, and built rockets capable of hitting targets in Japan. Chang criticized Mao’s cruel abuses during the Anti-Rightist Campaign, Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution, and T‘ien-an-men Square crackdown. Yet she examined contrary viewpoints on contentious issues. Thus she analyzed Tsien’s infamous article of May 1958 that, despite all absurdities involved, lent credence to CCP claims about raising crop yields “by a factor of twenty.” Xu Liangjing, whom Chang calls a “distinguished historian of science and democracy advocate,” reviled Tsien for this fawning arti-
cle calculated to catch Mao’s eye during the Great Leap Forward. When acted on, Xu charged, it caused “30 to 70 million people” to die of starvation. Chang, though, weighed arguments opposed to this harsh allegation against Tsien before tentatively concluding that “blaming him … may be going too far” and cautiously admitting that this “will never be an easy question to answer.”

Chang applied techniques of source criticism to assess the probative value of documents such as the US Communist Party membership card of 1938–39 that authorities used to implicate Tsien. She also uncovered facts that detract from his credibility and self-proclaimed innocence; e.g., while under suspicion of spying for the PRC, he asked well-placed relatives to facilitate his repatriation. Most notably, she extended source criticism to the key issue of memory and declared that Tsien “changed or fabricated the narrative” of his life in the United States after returning to China; i.e., what he later recalled being true differed from what he actually did. For example, he remembered losing thirty pounds (13.7 kg) due to physical abuse including sleep deprivation inflicted by US officials during a fifteen-day jail term in 1950; but Tsien’s American friends at the time, whom Chang approached for confirmation, said he had been “perfectly comfortable.” During this reputed ordeal, Tsien met regularly with his lawyer, and family members visited him in jail “almost daily,” so his claim of torture-induced emaciation was probably intended to curry favor with PRC officials after returning home. Chang concluded that his prison life was “quiet and uneventful”; it was “his pride that hurt most.” Thus, early in her career she evinced skepticism about the value of “memory” for arriving at truth about past events.

Chang contextualized the horrors of Nanking, if inadvertently, by listing death tolls for other ghastly events in modern China: “three to fifteen million” dead in World War II, “30-70 million” in the Great Leap Forward, “four hundred thousand” in the Cultural Revolution, and “more than seven hundred … killed and thousands wounded” at T’ien-an-men. She did not shrink from relating Chinese-on-Chinese atrocities; e.g., “opium dens and brothels flourished” in 1920s Shanghai, where “women who had been sold into prostitution serviced twenty to thirty men a night.” Owing to KMT wartime food requisitioning, she says, “men sold wives or children for two pounds of rice and subsisted on leaves, bark—even human flesh.” PRC famines led to “people killing and eating their own babies or abducting and killing children and selling the flesh for food.” Chang calls Nanking “one of the worst orgies of rape and massacre in world history” which left “between two and three hundred thousand” dead. Yet compared with her other death figures and atrocity accounts, the Japanese do not look exceptionally bad. Her book calls to mind those written in the 1940s by reporters such as Graham Peck, Theodore White, Edgar Snow, and Jack Belden, who identified KMT corruption and incompetence as the main cause of suffering in wartime China. They described Japanese cruelty but did not cite any extensive popular Chinese animus toward Japan at that time. This point moved John K. Fairbank to observe in a 1967 preface to Peck’s *Two Kinds of Time*, “What the Japanese invaders do to
the Chinese in warfare is no worse than what the Chinese habitually do to one another in peace time.”\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Thread of the Silkworm} falls into this Western tradition of journalistic historical writing about China, which obliquely softens Chang’s anti-Japanese sentiment.

Still, this book is marred by flaws. One is Chang’s misuse of a literary device that I call “self-projection through artistic reconstruction,” applied more skillfully by Natalie Z. Davis in \textit{The Return of Martin Guerre}. As Davis admits in her preface, “What I am offering you here is in part my invention”; i.e., she was submitting “not proofs, but historical possibilities” inferred from other contemporaneous sources about how Guerre’s wife Betrande might have behaved.\textsuperscript{59} This inferential mode of proof left Davis open to charges of speculation or reading a “present-day feminist belief in the strength and ingenuity of women,” back into sixteenth-century French peasants.\textsuperscript{60} Omitting Davis’s up-front candor, Chang also resorted to imaginative inference of this sort; she projected her own hopes on to Tsien, making him think, say, and do as she wished. Thus his “dream” was to help China “defend itself against repeated acts of Japanese aggression.” He first chose railroad engineering as an academic major to counter Japan’s rail line from “Pusan in Korea to Mukden.” After Japanese air raids on Shanghai in 1932, he switched to aviation, for “one cannot underestimate the impact of the bombing on Tsien. It was easily the single most dramatic and frightening episode of his life.”\textsuperscript{61} Chang gives no evidence for these views attributed to Tsien except, in some cases, interviews that readers can neither access nor assess. Flaws like these raise major doubts about her neutrality, familiarity with the sources, and use of artistic reconstruction; whereas the comparative absence of these suspicions in Davis’s book makes it seem less empirically problematic.

Chang’s anti-Japanese bias, though mild, produced defects. We all commit errors of fact, oversight, and interpretation, but these occur randomly in the work of scrupulous historians. By contrast, Chang’s mistakes fall consistently in one direction—to make Japan and the Japanese look bad. A small sampling from \textit{Thread of the Silkworm} follows.

(1) Chang writes that in 1909 Japan was China’s “oldest and probably still most feared enemy.”\textsuperscript{62} There is much Japanese animosity toward modern China for historians to relate, and Chang is right to do so, but there are other sides to the story. Japan was not the first imperial power to ravage Ch’ing and Republican China and was the least rapine until the Twenty-one Demands of 1915, which it retracted under pressure. Japan returned its conquests in Shantung—made after declaring war on Germany in August 1914 to comply with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance—and pursued policies of non-military economic encroachment in the 1920s, though under extraterritoriality to be sure. Eight thousand Chinese students were studying in Japan when the revolutionary T’ung-meng-hui was founded in 1905. Chang’s hero Sun Yat-sen fled to Japan several times and stayed a total of nine years. He got support from Japanese friends such as Umeya Shōkichi (1866–1926), who donated over half of his wealth to Sun without leaving an estate to his
family, worked tirelessly for Sino-Japanese peace in his later years, and was branded a traitor for his efforts. In her trilogy, Chang writes nothing about Japanese goodwill or aid of this type. Instead, her relentless teleology dictates that “Japan spent decades training its men for combat,” intent on an “inevitable war with China.”

(2) Chang asserts that “Japanese officers blew up a railway line outside Mukden, a city south of the border of Manchuria,” and conquered all of it in 1931 because “GMT” [recte: GMD or KMT] armies did not resist. This event did take place, but Chang mistakenly locates the key Manchurian city of Mukden (now Shenyang) south of the Great Wall in China proper as delimited in that era. Her books are awash in errors of fact, romanization, and historical geography; e.g., by describing the Mongols as being in “western China.” Indeed, she seems to think that the borders of “China” have always been what these are today.

(3) She states that Japanese planes bombed Shanghai in 1932, producing “six hundred thousand refugees” and leaving the city “strewn with corpses and the charred ruins of tenement housing,” which “sent shockwaves throughout China” and “seared the national consciousness.” Chang seemingly mixed up the assault on Shanghai prior to Nanking in 1937 with the Shanghai Incident five years earlier, from 28 January to 3 March 1932, and she exaggerates the scale and impact of this 1932 Incident. Japan did not torch the entire city. Chang’s civilian death toll—unstated in *Thread of the Silkworm*—rose to “tens of thousands” in *The Rape of Nanking*. In fact, the thirty-three-day Shanghai Incident left 1,400 Chinese civilians dead and 14,000 Chinese military casualties, meaning dead and wounded. Although segments of China’s intelligentsia and urban classes were intensely anti-Japanese in 1932, most of its vast rural populace knew little about this Incident and could have cared less.

(4) Chang argues that “Japan embarked on still another series of military aggressions” to “expand the territory ceded to them during the Tanggu Truce of 1933 and take over all of Hebei province.” The May 1933 truce forced the Japanese to withdraw from this province and observe a demilitarized zone bordered on the south by the Great Wall. But China did not cede territory to Japan, and partly because of the ceasefire that this truce created, bilateral relations improved between 1933 and 1936, producing hopes for long-term peace. Only hindsight tells us that full-scale war would break out in August 1937 at Shanghai, where Chiang Kai-shek switched theaters of operation hoping to gain strategic advantages. And it was a botched ROC air attack, killing some 1,000 Chinese and Western residents that set off hostilities there. Still, the overall thrust for war came from Japan. Its civilian Konoe cabinet and army expansionists leapt at Chiang’s bait, but they envisioned one knock-out blow settling issues with China, not an eight-year full-scale conflict that gravely inhibited preparations they were making for a war with the USSR.

(5) *Thread of the Silkworm* contends that the Japanese at Nanking “killed between two and three hundred thousand Chinese.” Chang presumes that this figure—which appeared only several years later—got “worldwide coverage” in
1937 that “Tsien followed closely” in Los Angeles.\textsuperscript{75} Her anachronistic non sequitur later became a delusive fixation. Some newspapers such as the \textit{Chicago Tribune}, \textit{New York Times}, and \textit{Washington Post} did describe a barbaric “sack” or (small “r”) “rape” of Nanking in December 1937. Reporters cited helpless Chinese murdered en masse but treated this as part of a war with killing on both sides. They calculated Chinese belligerents who died in action plus civilians murdered in cold blood to estimate deaths in the thousands, not in six figures. Most of all, those journalists did not liken this event to a genocide of Jews, which had yet to occur, for no one had a crystal ball to disclose its onset several years later. In March 1941, historians tell us, “33,000 Jews in Berlin were working in arms factories,” and in “mid-March 1942, some 75 to 80 percent of all victims of [what we now call] the Holocaust were still alive.”\textsuperscript{76}

In \textit{Thread of the Silkworm}, Chang’s anti-Japanese bias stemmed more from historical errors than personal animus, and she did not flaunt multiculturalist polemics. She did not portray Tsien mainly as a victim of anti-Chinese racism. She censured the Chinese-American community in Los Angeles for its “indifference” to his fate and stated that scientists from other ethno-cultural groups suffered worse persecution. Her main culprits were McCarthy-era bearbaiting, Cold War hysteria, and turf-protecting bureaucrats. These were political issues. She posed the key question: “Who is to say that it couldn’t happen again, with someone of a different ethnicity?” Chang’s answer was quite upbeat: “It isn’t likely” because “today we have a press that is more adversarial toward the government” and “Americans are more sensitive to issues of race and ethnicity in the 1990s.”\textsuperscript{77} Her optimism would prove short-lived.

### IV. Ethnic Awakening

After Chang’s death in 2004, her close friend, Paula Kamen, revealed “the Iris Code” to unlock secrets of Chang’s research method: “Just think big! … Just decide what you want and go get it. To the point of being naïve.” Kamen went on: “Part of the power of her interviewing was that she had no filters to block out anything that was being said to her; I suspect she didn’t even know that people came with filters.” Chang herself said of \textit{The Rape of Nanking}, “I wrote it out of a sense of rage. I didn’t really care if I made a cent from it. It was important to me that the world knew what happened in Nanking back in 1937.”\textsuperscript{78} Though quoted out of context, these remarks divulge key elements in Chang’s second book—a boundless gullibility about victims and an all-consuming fury to expose victimi- ers—inimical to the fairness, objectivity, and balance that she tried to achieve in her first book. What explains this change? I believe that, by embracing an ethnic identity in 1994–95, she affirmed a Manichaean dualism of beastly Japanese predators versus innocent Chinese prey, with nothing in between.
Although born on the East Coast in 1968, Chang grew up as an assimilated American of Chinese ancestry in the Midwestern university town of Urbana-Champaign, Illinois. She writes: “I remember driving to Chicago Chinatown with my family, but only for the same reason Americans of other ethnicities went there—for a particularly good Chinese meal, not to strengthen any connection to my roots.” From this and much else in her writing, I judge that Chang was fully acculturated to US society and had no desire to discover her Chinese heritage through academic study. She says that parental horror stories about the war had always been with her, but she displayed no urge to pursue this issue with the late Lloyd Eastman, a world authority who taught in Urbana-Champaign at the University of Illinois. Chang did not immerse herself in Chinese language, history, and culture at this major US center for East Asian Studies; she took up journalism there. In a telling anecdote, she reveals with chagrin that she and fellow-ethnics of Chinese descent were “seen as foreigners in their own land” despite never having been to the PRC or ROC. Their quandary lay in “identity issues: a sense of feeling different, or alien, in their own country” that produced “a crisis of confidence.” Thus she was “regarded as too Chinese to be American” by mainstream US whites yet “too American to be Chinese” by recent arrivals from China, then derisively labelled “FOBs [fresh off the boat]” by established “ABCs” [American-born Chinese].

Chang found her _deus ex machina_ in December 1994 at age twenty-six, after she had married and moved to California. There, she experienced a “single blinding moment” of ethnic revelation at a photo exhibit and conference on Nanking held by a Chinese-American “network of activists,” the “Global Alliance for Preserving the History of World War II in Asia.” Their major concern was to impart an ethnic identity—to “pass their wartime memories down to their children and grandchildren, fearful that assimilation into North American culture might cause them to forget this important part of their historical heritage.” One wonders why memories of Nanking are a heritage more worthy of preservation than Confucian thought, T’ang poetry, or Sung painting—which enhance appreciation for wisdom and beauty in all of us. In any case, Chang embraced an ethnic group identity linked to a memory of shared victimization that had “slipped away” due to acculturation in US society. Now, she recalled, her parents “never forgot the horrors of the Sino-Japanese War, nor did they want me to forget.” “Quivering with outrage,” they labeled Nanking “the single most diabolical incident in a war that killed more than 10 million Chinese people” and declared that “the Japanese sliced babies not just in half but in thirds and fourths” so that “the Yangtze River ran red with blood for days.” Chang did not search for empirical evidence to corroborate her parents’ recollections or subject conference photos to source criticism in an effort to confirm their authenticity and weigh their evidentiary value. Out of hand, she shirked these arduous tasks of verification indispensable to scholarly probity. As she candidly admitted, “Neither of my parents
had actually witnessed “the Rape” because they were not in Nanking at the time; so, her memory of it perforce consisted of hearsay accounts three times removed and dredged up over half a century later. As Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. observes, “militants of ethnicity” exploit pseudo-academic therapies of this type to “raise minority self-esteem,” but their rhetoric “nourishes prejudices, magnifies differences, and stirs antagonisms.” Chang mobilized this memory to valorize a group identity defined solely by past suffering, which fomented ethnic resentment toward another ethnic group, even if this was not an express aim of the conference organizers.

This “blinding moment” in late 1994, early 1995 was decisive for Chang in my view. Thereafter, her nascent, relatively mild anti-Japanese orientation bloomed into a full-blown conspiracy theory of history. Her assertions, especially in *The Rape of Nanking* (1997), required no academic credentials, just a fertile imagination, robust distrust, and large doses of ill will. If evidence for a claim is lacking, Japan surely destroyed or concealed it and must be forced to come clean. If plausible alternative explanations exist, these can be ignored. When no evil occurred, the Japanese were poised to make it happen but somehow got foiled. The only proper response to Chinese suffering became an insatiable desire to get even. A few examples will illustrate.

(1) One question arises: Why was no large-scale bloody revenge exacted after the defeat, surrender, and disarming of Japanese troops at war’s end? Why did Nanking victims or their kin not wreak retaliatory vengeance in 1945 when, one assumes, this would have been easy? Chang relies on the “memory” of some Nanking residents she interviewed for “the answer”—not “one answer.” They recalled hiding at home, “too fearful to even celebrate in case news of a Japanese defeat turned out to be not true,” and that the Japanese “evacuation was swift.” Thus in 1945, trauma prevented Chinese victims from exacting vigilante justice, and the Japanese made a speedy getaway. But a different memory complicates the picture. The late Princeton historian Fritz Mote was doing a university degree in Nanking in 1945. He recalls unarmed Japanese troops and civilians who “safely walked the streets,” for residents said it was “unreasonable” to attack them since they were not the same Japanese who perpetrated violence in 1937. Mote concluded that these “survivors bore scars, but they had moved on with their lives.” As a historian, he likened them to Chinese who lived under the alien Jurchen Jin dynasty (1115–1234). In both cases, few ordinary Chinese were “obsessed with anti-Jurchen [anti-Japanese] feeling.” They accepted invasion and occupation by aliens as “little different from warfare inflicted by Chinese leaders and armies,” so they harbored “very little enduring hatred or irredentist sentiment.” Nanking residents in 1945, Mote wrote, were “resilient,” “active in adapting to changed circumstances, ready to rebuild and carry on the lives of their families and their communities,” and quick to “take advantage of new situations to benefit themselves.” We cannot conclude that Chang is totally wrong and Mote totally right. Some will balk at his bold leap across centuries. Others will note that, owing to
massive migration into and out of the city, Nanking residents in 1945 were not the same as those in 1937. Still others will protest that his memory must be checked against recent research by Barak Kushner, who had access to information that Mote as a young student lacked in 1945. Even so, Mote offers insights lost upon Chang who was bent on finding only fearful enmity in Nanking residents. Her political agenda would not let them forbear if not forgive, disregard the past if not forget it, and move forward with life.

(2) Based on hearsay in the PRC, Chang writes that Chinese scholars who travel to Japan for research risk bodily harm or death from right-wing thugs. Thugs do exist, and ugly incidents of hate speech do occur, but violent hate crimes against Chinese are almost unheard of in Japan, where Chinese who deviate from the official PRC line on any major issue enjoy legal rights and personal safety denied to them at home. Chinese academics hold tenure at virtually all large Japanese universities. One of them, Chu Chien-jung (Zhu Jianrong), was indefinitely detained by the police in July 2013, being deprived of due process without the laying of charges—not in Japan where he works, but on a trip home to Shanghai. Protests from Japanese friends helped secure his release in January 2014. Likewise, based on phone tips from activists, Chang spins a cloak-and-dagger tale about rescuing the Rabe diary manuscript from sinister Japanese clutches, and tells us that secret incriminating documents seized during the Allied Occupation (1945–52) suffered destruction after US officials naively returned these to Japan. Imperial government authorities did burn large amounts of incriminating documents before Occupation forces arrived in the summer of 1945, but it is absurd to insinuate that this happens today. As Chang herself argues, historian Yoshimi Yoshiaki made public documents about the comfort women preserved in Japanese state archives.

(3) Chang insists that she found no books about Nanking during her youth—although Timperley, What War Means (1938) and Hsü, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone (1939) were available—and concludes that the “Holocaust” at Nanking was deliberately consigned to historical oblivion through political connivance. First, “the Rape” got worldwide front-page coverage in 1937, but Chinese victims suffered wartime neglect like that endured by Jews. Second, Japanese dailies had reported atrocities like the 100-man killing contest in detail in 1937, but Tokyo swept this dirt under the rug in cahoots with a US ally hostile to the PRC during the Cold War. Third, the postwar CCP and KMT regimes sold victims down the river by angling for “an alliance” with Japan to secure lucrative development monies. Chang’s subtitle, then, should read “the thrice-forgotten Holocaust,” with Han Chinese guilty the third time around.

(4) Contrary to Chang’s claims, there was no intentional postwar cover-up of the Nanking Atrocity; rather, there were no special-interest groups demanding that disproportionate attention be paid to it. This is why so few books were devoted to Nanking—and the rub comes here—as a stand-alone topic. Wartime Western field reporters such as White, Belden, and Peck had tended to portray
KMT-inflicted horrors as worse than those by the Japanese, and postwar historians treated the Atrocity as one horror among many in a brutally cruel war. Similarly, Jews and Gentiles writing about World War II or Nuremberg did not turn a blind eye to “the Judeocide”—a term coined in 1988 by Arno Mayer. Here, too, the “one horror among many” mode of portrayal obtained, as seen in works by journalists such as William Shirer and historians such as Alan Bulloch, A. J. P. Taylor, and Joachim Fest. Taylor portrayed Slavs, not Jews, as the traditional targets of German “extermination” in *The Course of German History* (1945), and he has no index entries for “anti-Semitism,” “Jews,” or “the Holocaust” in his classic *Origins of the Second World War* (1961). Jewish-Americans did not deem the Judeocide as central to or defining their ethnic identity in the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s. Books exclusively dedicated to the event did not appear until the 1960s, and “the Holocaust” (with a definitive article and capital “H”) did not assume prominent usage as a historical term until the 1970s. Historians ascribe this change in Jewish-American memory and identity to the 1961 Eichmann trial and the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Similarly, Jews had always known about the roughly 1,000 Israelites who killed themselves rather than surrender to Rome at Masada in 73 AD, but this incident did not traditionally call for iconic commemoration. That is to say, Masada did not enter into Jewish-American memory and identity—with the ritualistic warning “never forget”—until the postwar state of Israel felt threatened by Arab enemies.

Thus, collective memory and mass commemoration of past events do not arise from thin air; a political need and social context are always at work. For Nanking, these took the form of a feel-good, lock-step Chinese-American identity and memory that emerged from the multiculturalist milieu peculiar to US society, especially on the West Coast, in recent times. This explains the dearth of books exclusively devoted to Nanking and the scant interest displayed in it during Chang’s younger years. Moreover, ethnic self-portrayal as having suffered victimization was unpalatable for Jewish, Chinese, and other groups in that macho era, for it would have lain bare their shame in being weak. Weakness earned derision, not empathy, back then when less compassionate codes of social conduct obtained. To celebrate, or memorialize, or commemorate having been victimized, bullied, conquered, massacred, or otherwise humiliated would have seemed masochistic.

(5) In a section titled “The Comfort Women: The Legacy of Nanking,” Chang raises the issue of wartime sexual violence against women. She declares that “the first official comfort house opened near Nanking in 1938” when “the Japanese high command made plans to create a giant underground system of military prostitution—one that would draw into its web hundreds of thousands of women across Asia” (again, note the plural “hundreds”). Specifically, “between eighty thousand and two hundred thousand” women were seized, mostly in Korea; but “later, the world learned of this plan,” so Japan denied it until 1991, when
Yoshimi Yoshiaki uncovered incriminating sources in state archives. And Chang asserts that “20,000 to 80,000 Chinese women were raped” at Nanking in six weeks.95

As related elsewhere, I do not deprecate the terrible suffering of rape victims or comfort women; nor do I absolve wartime Japanese of atrocities.96 But I suggest here that Chang’s main concern lay not with discussing rape in war as a universal gender issue, or with Nanking and the comfort women as historical case studies of it. If that were true, she would have shown at least some empathy for non-Chinese victims. Instead, her aim was to lash out at Japan, and only at Japan, for conduct that was undeniably shameful and worthy of condemnation. But she did so in unfair ways—through one-sided exaggerated claims without adequate empirical grounding or regard for circumstances in the period, and through a deliberate silence about apologies with compensation made to victims by prime ministers and through the Asian Women’s Fund set up in 1994, well before Chang’s book came out. The adequacy of such efforts at penance can be debated, but it is inexcusably dishonest to lead readers into believing that Japan made no efforts at all.

To label the comfort woman institution a furtive “underground system” is laughable. Even right-wing Japanese nationalists who detest the term “sexual slavery” affirm the common knowledge that comfort stations operated in plain sight. The actual number of comfort women cannot be ascertained, but it was a fraction of the 80,000 to 200,000 that Chang cites. Although scholars debate their breakdown by nationality, which changed over time, most were Japanese to start with. Above all, there is no direct causal link between Nanking and the comfort women. Comfort stations long antecedent the 1937 Atrocity. All cities in Japan with military bases had comfort stations in licensed red-light districts dating from premodern times, and overseas comfort stations, run more viciously than those at home, existed from the Siberian Intervention (1918–22). The unprecedented scale of military operations starting in August 1937, and a desire to reduce rapes in the Shanghai-to-Nanking region, did give a major ancillary boost to the system, but this would have happened anyway as the war expanded in China and spilled over into the Pacific. The number of comfort stations thus coincidentally increased from 1937, and Japanese military leaders saw this as a reform measure to reduce rapes of local women. Chang never posed the key historical question which, ironically, is the most abominable for right-wing Japanese nationalists: Why were imperial armed forces incapable of devising other, less brutal, reform measures to further that end?

Historians of Europe present contrastive insights into Chang’s treatment of Japanese rape. German women suffered most cruelly from sexual violence in World War II. As a whole, they lent eager support to Hitler’s regime, but that does not mean they deserved their fate; nor does it preclude historical commiseration. From elderly women to small girls, their ordeal began in October 1944 when Soviet troops entered East Prussia, and it reached a crescendo from 24 April to
5 May 1945 with the siege of Berlin. Michael Kater reckons that “up to half a million in Berlin alone (which would mean every third female)” were raped in those two weeks. Anthony Beevor, Richard J. Evans, and Ian Kershaw cite “1.4 million” women raped, many of them multiple times, in East Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia during the Soviet assault from October 1944 to May 1945. This amounts to “18 percent of the female population of those three regions,” and the percentages were probably higher in East Prussia. Beevor argues that “at least 2 million” German women suffered rape and gives a graphic description: drunken Soviet troops, “unable to complete the act of rape, used the bottle instead with appalling effect.”

Japanese rapes too were abhorrent and in some cases beastly; and, the comfort woman reform measure deserves censure by today’s moral standards. But, at the risk of being mislabeled a misogynistic racist, I suggest that rapes by the Japanese at Nanking were not unique in the context of a cruel world war; and, although these did occur in the thousands, their rate of incidence cannot be precisely gauged compared with other armies.

Kershaw lists “lurid descriptions of crucifixions” and other ghastly accounts of sexual violence. But he submits these to a critically detached analysis and draws discreetly tentative conclusions: “Some testimony, given a few years afterward, which left a lasting mark on the gruesome imagery of events, is of doubtful veracity” and “the most gristy scenes may have been a fabrication” by Goebbels’s Propaganda Ministry to whip up hatred for the foe. Chang displays not an inkling of skepticism about allegedly fiendish Japanese outrages that border on pornographic sadism. She swallowed whatever her translators and interviewees told her hook, line, and sinker, and never imagined that the KMT, like all wartime governments, told lies as a matter of policy to make people hate the enemy. Kitamura Minoru examines one source cited by Chang containing scenes of horrid sexual torture and perversion—Kuo Chi (Guo Qi), Shen-t'u hsü-liu-lu (Record of Blood and Tears in the Fallen Capital)—and shows that it was not Kuo’s original document, which had far less lurid contents. Instead, this was a latter-day published edition altered to incriminate war crimes suspects in court. Kitamura also found a reference to possible Japanese use of poison gas in the Chinese translation of Rabe’s diary that does not exist in the original German. Probably only a minority of reported Japanese rapes at Nanking were products of propaganda, document tampering, or faulty memory. But Chang had a duty to make attempts at verifying the authenticity and truthfulness of such accounts, especially oral testimonies—and not to accept anything and everything that suited her polemical purposes.

V. Holocausts Real and Imagined

Chang’s core thesis asserts the immoral equivalence of imperial Japan and Nazi Germany, with each perpetrating a Holocaust. It turns on the revulsion for Hitler
and Nazism that few people, German or non-German, would disavow today. But Chang read this latter-day revulsion, rooted in the Judeocide of the 1940s, back into the early and mid-1930s before Hitler and Germany morphed into avatars of depravity. The Nazis were never angelic, but when viewed in historical context, their 1935 Nuremberg Laws, for example, fell largely in line with Jim Crow legislation except for stripping Jews of German citizenship; and racial violence in Germany was less than in the southern United States, in eastern and southeastern Europe, in the USSR, or in the Middle East at that time. Nazi-style anti-Semitism went by fits and starts: “Several thousand Jews who had left the country in 1933 had actually returned in the following years as the situation in the streets seemed to calm down.” Hitler put on a deceptively virtuous face. He purged the worst hooligans among his followers, such as Ernst Röhm and the Brown Shirts, in a bid to win credibility as a responsible ruling regime and also to boost its image before and during the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games. As Ian Kershaw puts it, British conservatives were “making friends with Hitler” because they preferred Nazis to Bolsheviks, and royals such as King Edward VIII openly admired Germany. Columbia, Harvard, and other prestigious US universities showed support for the Nazi state despite its anti-Semitism. Given Hitler’s revival of full employment at home and national prestige abroad, Reich citizens were, in general, fairly happy under his rule until war brought suffering, deprivation, and death mainly from 1941 onward. Hitler’s mask of deception did wear thin in November 1938 at Kristallnacht—a massive pogrom that marked “a qualitative change” in German anti-Semitism from “legal and administrative discrimination to raw violence.” His seizure of rump Czechoslovakia in March 1939 provided more grounds for negative reappraisal. But, as Kershaw stresses, even in 1939 “Hitler was without doubt the most popular government head in Europe.” Volume 1 of Saul Friedländer’s magisterial Nazi Germany and the Jews calls 1933–39 “years of persecution,” but few back then could foretell the need for a sequel, “years of extermination,” that would follow. Accordingly, Chang’s insinuation of Japanese guilt through comparisons with Germany—e.g., “even the Nazis in the city were horrified” by Japan’s “bestial machinery”—is anachronistic for the years up to and including 1937. And, her core thesis about congruity with Hitler’s Germany in plotting a Holocaust is defective in conception and substantiation.

(A) Conception

Historians disagree about the timing, causes, and other salient features of the Holocaust, but they equate it with “the Final Solution to the Jewish Question” and with few exceptions assume that it denotes a state policy of killing every Jewish man, woman, and child who fell within German grasp, which in theory was limitless, so that no Jew anywhere would survive. Japan had no policy to murder
Chinese of all ages and both genders wherever found, whether they resisted, collaborated, or kept out of the way. This is, on the whole, also true for the Three-All policy that Chang cites. Armies commonly employ anti-insurgency tactics of this type, with no genocidal intent, against guerillas in contested, as opposed to secured, areas. Japan armed Chinese troops to fight in puppet armies and paid Chinese civilians to run puppet regimes, including the purportedly “true” KMT government set up at Nanking in March 1938 as an alternative to Chungking. While citing vicious outrages against helpless Chinese, Lloyd Eastman admitted, “In areas where the Japanese had consolidated control, life and labor went on more or less normally.” Repeated claims by Niall Ferguson notwithstanding, Japan had no blueprint for lebensraum, or “living space”, i.e., to conquer and depopulate lands for strictly Japanese habitation except for a few natives spared to toil as helots. Nothing of this sort took place in foreign lands under Japan's military occupation or colonial control. Imperial government propaganda depicted Manchuria as a paradise governed by Mencius’s Kingly Way where “the Five Ethnics” lived in harmony—not as a Japanese volkstum cleansed of inferior breeds.

Chang ascribes a Nazi-style “master-race mentality” to the Japanese. It is true that the Japanese military, like all wartime militaries, dehumanized enemies to weaken scruples against killing them; and most Japanese in that day deemed themselves superior to foreigners. Unlike with genocide, however, this Japanese killing in war would end with the conclusion of peace. And feelings of Japanese superiority never presumed a right and moral duty to annihilate some group, as per Friedländer’s “redemptive anti-Semitism”; i.e., even in peacetime, Germans had a sacred mission to save the world by eliminating Jews, likened to vermin or bacilli that would destroy civilization if left alive. This Nazi idea of racial annihilation as a positive virtue differed decisively from earlier conventional types of anti-Semitism derived from religion, socioeconomics, and culture that largely had died out with Jewish assimilation before Hitler's takeover. In World War I, 12,000 German Jews died for the Second Reich and 30,000 were decorated for bravery. The line dividing Jews from Aryans—porous in pre-Nazi days—became watertight under the 1935 Law to Preserve German Blood and Honor that banned inter-marriage and sexual intercourse. By contrast, the Japanese passed a law to preserve their kokutai, or emperor system, not their “blood and honor.” Koreans, Manchus, and Chinese who married Japanese became imperial subjects, and the Japanese government persuaded female imperial house members such as Nashimoto Masako and Saga Hiro to wed Yi- and Ch’ing-dynasty royalty.

Discrimination in Japan did not encompass “redemptive anti-Sinicism.” Japan did not make Asians wear stigmatic emblems like the yellow Star of David or adopt ethnicity-specific names like “Sara” and “Israel.” Japan did pressure some Asians to adopt Japanese names. Thus, the father of South Korean ex-president Park Guen-hye, Park Chung-hee, called himself Takagi Masao to facilitate advancement as an officer in the imperial army. Semi-forced assimilation of this type warrants condemnation when judged against present-day liberal democratic
ideals, but Holocaust historian Donald Bloxham construes the policy as “unmixing” ethnic elements in a state to “homogenize” it, “minimize heterogeneity,” and thereby thwart collusion with external enemies of the same ethnicity in case of war. Unmixing of this type is at odds with US-style multiculturalist toleration today, but it was a relatively mild way back then to “homogenize” the population of imperial Japan; and, though hateful for the Asians involved, it was a far cry from “cleansing” through genocidal murder.

Imperial Japanese racial and ethnic biases lacked the vile repugnance found in Nazism. We find nothing like Julius Streicher and his weekly Der Stürmer which, he boasted, was “the only paper Hitler read from cover to cover” and reached a circulation of “over 700,000.” Richard Evans describes it as “full of sexual innuendo, racist caricatures, made-up accusations of ritual murder and titillating, semi-pornographic stories of Jewish men seducing innocent German girls.” Streicher’s rag-sheet inspired two full-length films shot under the aegis of Goebbels’s Propaganda Ministry in 1940. The Eternal Jew said that “rats are parasites and bacillus-carriers among animals, just as the Jews occupy the same position among mankind.” Jew Süss is the story of a seventeenth-century usurer hanged in a cage for deviously extorting money from honest Germans and having “abducted and raped a beautiful young German girl” after seducing several others. In the same year of 1940, Japanese, Chinese, and other Asians flocked in record numbers to see Shina no yoru (“China Nights,” titled “Shanghai Nights” in China). In this maudlin tale, an idealistic ship captain (Hasegawa Kazuo) based in Shanghai, eager to foster friendship with China, overcomes all obstacles to win the heart of a beautiful, rabidly anti-Japanese resistance fighter (Li Hsiang-lan), who weeps inconsolably after hearing that fellow guerillas killed him in an ambush, only to live happily ever after when he miraculously comes home alive. This pan-Asianist love story, even as propaganda, is beyond belief for a Wehrmacht or Einsatzgruppe officer and a female Jewish partisan.

The Rape of Nanking reflects the structure of Raul Hillberg’s Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders who stand for the Japanese, the Chinese, and uncaring foreign onlookers except for heroes such as the good Nazi, John Rabe. But Chang’s titular categories unravel when examined against key facts in the 1930s. She alleges a German-Japanese congruity dating from 1931 when Japan invaded Manchuria: “Just as Hitler’s Germany would do half a decade later [1936], Japan used a highly developed military machine and a master-race mentality to set about establishing its right to rule its neighbors.” In 1936, Hitler sent troops into the Rhineland, a part of Germany. This was not foreign aggression, although it did violate the 1919 Versailles Treaty. In 1938, Britain and France accepted Hitler’s Anschluss or union with Austria and his seizure of the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia on the grounds that ethnic Germans, who formed the vast majority in those areas, had the right to join a Greater Reich if they wished, and most fervently did. Britain and France deemed Hitler’s acts legitimate for rectifying the unjust peace treaty they foisted on Germany in 1919 and for being in line with Wilson’s ideal
of national self-determination. After all, 3.25 million Germans lived in the Sude-
stenland whereas 3 million Slovaks lived in all of Czechoslovakia.\footnote{Only in May 1945 did the world wake up to find that Austrians are not really Germans and that Vienna had been the first victim impaled on Hitler’s fangs. According to Steven Beller, this was the \textit{Lebenslüge} or “vital lie” to create the “convenient historical amnesia” that absorbed Vienna of war guilt and justified exemption from reparations payments.\footnote{Nazi Germany provided generous aid to China in the form of military hardware and experts to use it, plus a loan of 100 million marks in 1936 to finance Chinese exports of war matériel such as tungsten needed by Germany. The last German military advisors left China in July 1938, seven months after Nanking fell, and bilateral trade in Chinese war matériel for German weaponry continued until July 1941.\footnote{KMT China gained significant military and financial benefits from Nazi Germany, which became a military ally of Japan only in September 1940. Thus Chang’s view of Japanese-German collusion from 1931 is an anachronistic delusion.}} Historians are divided about when Nazi Germany decided on its Final Solution to murder all Jews because less extreme attempts at eliminating them had failed and wartime conditions seemed apropos. The commonly accepted date is early 1942, during or just after the Wannsee Conference, but Christopher Browning, for example, makes a strong argument for October 1941.\footnote{In any case, the Japanese in 1937 had no Nazi prototype to follow, so Chang had to prove that they made the same decision for a Holocaust on their own. She seeks this proof in long-discredited writers like David Bergamini and in sources like \textit{The T anaka Memorial}, long-exposed as spurious. Although lamenting that “unfortunately, Bergamini’s book was seriously criticized by reputable historians,” Chang cited it eighteen times to support her claims because she concluded that “in all fairness” it is a “valuable—even if flawed and confusing—resource.”\footnote{Chang seeks something akin to a Japanese Führer Order—not found in Germany either—because she is certain that “the terms of surrender exonerated” imperial family members so that these “chief culprits” “never spent a day in court.” No such “terms” are stipulated in the Potsdam Declaration or in the Instrument of Surrender, but Herbert Bix told Chang by phone that “it is `incon-}
ceivable’ that the emperor Hirohito could not have known” about Nanking which, by not going into specific details, says little. So Chang reluctantly admitted that “we will probably never know exactly what news Hirohito received about Nanking as the massacre was happening,” but she hastened to add that “he was exceptionally pleased by it.” She cites “the notorious Kempeitai” as “the secret Japanese military police”124—with “secret” implying affinities with the Gestapo. But those units openly wore armbands marked “kenpei” or “MP” in Chinese characters. Observers in 1937 as well as later historians agree that outrages in Nanking would have decreased greatly if more MPs had been there to uphold order. Japanese leftist historians rightly hold the Shōwa emperor culpable for wartime atrocities, but they back up charges with evidence. Lacking proof, Chang piles conjecture upon innuendo to reach the conclusion she started out with.

Chang lauds R. J. Rummel, author of China’s Bloody Century (1991), as “perhaps the world’s greatest authority on democide (… genocide and government mass murder),” and she relies heavily on his work. Thus she writes that the total Chinese death toll was “incredible, between 1,578,000 and 6,325,000. R. J. Rummel gives a prudent estimate of 3,949,000 killed, of which all but 400,000 were civilians.” This much is an accurate quotation. Then Chang goes on: “But he points out that millions more perished…. If those deaths are added to the final count, then one can say that the Japanese killed more than 19 million Chinese people in its war against China.”125 In actuality, Rummel gives a final count of about 19,440,000 Chinese war deaths, but he breaks down this aggregate to read “6,157,000” in the “KMT/COM democide” and “3,949,000” in the “Japan democide,” and he ascribes the remaining 9,334,000 deaths to KMT-induced famines, warlord conflicts, and “civilian war dead exclusive of democide.”126 In sum, Chang makes Rummel say that Japanese troops murdered all 19,440,000 Chinese who died in the eight-year war, when he in fact attributed 15,491,000 deaths in that total—about three out of four—to the Chinese side.

This is not an isolated example. Throughout his book, Rummel gives statistics and makes statements contrary to, or greatly at odds with, Chang’s. For instance, he quotes a contention by ROC war crimes prosecutor Shih Mei-yu that “the Kempeitai (secret police) had recommended to Tokyo that ‘Japan wipe out all Chinese from the map,’ a Japanese version of Hitler’s ‘final solution’ for the Gypsies and Jews.” But Rummel explicitly confutes Shih: “My reading of the transcript does not support his interpretation. In the main, Japan’s policy toward China appeared aimed at making her a docile member of a Japanese-dominated ‘co-prosperity sphere.’” Thus Rummel notes: “It was often well enough if the Chinese bowed (as humiliating as it was) when they saw a Japanese soldier and, in general, did not act or appear anti-Japanese.”127 He also asserts that “the [KMT] nationalists likely murdered some 2,000,000 more [than did Japan] during the war, and this toll or something like it is virtually unknown…. Apparently the [KMT] nationalists got away with murder; responsible Japanese were tried as war criminals.”128 And, “the Khmer Rouge’s murder of 2,000,000 of their own Cam-
bodian countrymen in the 1970s received world attention and condemnation. The [KMT] nationalists deserved as much.”

Rummel’s main relevant contentions can be summed up as follows. The Japanese did not commit a Nazi-style Holocaust in China. They were guilty of truly horrible mass murders in the millions. But they were duly punished by a court of law and before world opinion. In contrast, KMT forces killed millions more Chinese. Yet the world remains ignorant of these killings. This faulty memory is unfair to Japan. Chang is not obliged to follow Rummel in all respects, but after citing him as “perhaps the world’s greatest authority on democide” to support her own thesis, she is honor bound to specify where, how, and why they differ. Instead, she makes him a ventriloquist’s dummy saying whatever she wants because mere facts do not matter so long as she gets the right message across.

VI. A Forgotten Genocide?

As with _Thread of the Silkworm, The Chinese in America_ yields insight into Chang’s ideas unattainable from _The Rape of Nanking_ alone. This last book in her trilogy is part history and part Asian-American ethnic identity studies, a transdisciplinary field that has recently arisen from a distinctive academic, sociopolitical, and cultural milieu on the West Coast. Its adherents empower ethnic groups in a multiculturalist America by therapeutically nurturing self-esteem to overcome racism and make contributions in society while retaining a proud group identity, in this case Han Chinese, distinct from hegemonic white Anglo culture. Chang takes pride in relating how individual Chinese won success through hard work, talent, thrift, and perseverance: “The America of today would not be the same America without the achievements of its ethnic Chinese.” She also stresses Chinese group valor in defying racist oppression through violent vigilante justice if need be. Yet she displays no solidarity with Koreans, Vietnamese, Filipinos, and other Asian American groups victimized by imperial Japan, and none for Blacks, Indigenous Peoples, Chicanos, or other visible minorities persecuted by white American racists.

Chang seeks to write a factual narrative history while giving vent to activist polemics on what America ought to represent, along with normative declarations of what “my people” should aspire to. Contradictions result. Throughout most of the book, she argues that lucrative economic incentives spurred Chinese immigration—from mid-nineteenth-century peasants who craved the riches of Gold Mountain to women in the 1990s who braved gang rape, robbery, and murder by snakeheads—for “one dominant reason: money.” “For no matter how bad things were in the United States, the opportunity to earn more money outweighed the risks.” But by the book’s end, she was writing, “It was to escape the oppression of group identity—the burden of racial antagonisms, inherited by blood”—that Chinese came to America. In the United States, where “all men are created
equal,” an inclusive multiculturalist society would welcome them as full-fledged Americans while honoring their Chinese ethno-cultural identity and even enhance this through bilingual public school instruction and in university ethnic studies programs.

The lynchpin in Chang’s group identity is commemoration of wartime victimization by Japan as epitomized by the 1937 Rape of Nanking. This is not an identity based on knowledge or skills that anyone can acquire by dint of application. It is a Han Chinese preserve determined partly by DNA—she includes offspring of intermarriages—but mainly by sharing sentiments in a contrived memory; “contrived” because few Nanking survivors live in America. Chang’s critics in Japan—including PRC nationals such as Lin Ssu-yün—go astray because they see only her anti-Japanese diatribes and miss her underlying multiculturalist aim to win authentic treatment as Americans for “my people” in a society purged of racism. To achieve that aim, she practiced her own revisionist history to “dispel” this or that “still pervasive myth” along with “offensive stereotypes” that “long permeated the US news and entertainment media.” These myths and stereotypes “dehumanized” Han Chinese and “reduced them to alien things”; and this reductionism, she insisted, was the “first, essential step toward … genocide” that must be exorcised. In stark contrast with her earlier optimism about race relations in Thread of the Silkworm, Chang now believed that, given popular hostility toward Han Chinese due to the rise of PRC power, genocide could happen again. After all, white racists in the 1880s spoke of “exterminating” Chinese through aerial bombings, and “several Chinese communities in the West” suffered “cleansing [of] the region of their presence” through “violence that approached genocide.”135 Chang stressed that “episodes of racism” in the United States “do not occur by accident, in a vacuum.” Instead, “throughout American history” and in “most societies,” “the ruling class has carefully exploited differences in race and ethnicity as a mechanism of control—as a convenient smoke screen to make their control more palatable.”136

This was eminently true for the Ch’ing (Qing) Manchu ruling house (1644–1911), under which “my people” suffered a suppression of identity and mass murder. After toppling the native Ming dynasty, the Manchus enacted discriminatory laws to “guard their status as a privileged class” and to “enforce the subjugation of the Han people.”137 The Manchus “outlawed intermarriage,” “mandated that all Han men wear long, braided queues as a badge of their humiliation (to shave one’s head was a considered a sign of treason),” and “forbade Han migration to Manchuria,” an area needed as “their own region within China to which they could safely retreat in case they were ousted from power” by native secret societies cherishing “the goal of one day overthrowing the Qing.” Manchu suspicions extended to the “Chinese island of Taiwan” as well as to the area around Canton, where most early Chinese immigrants originated, which was “notorious for its independence” and “powerful legacy of anti-Manchu subversion.” These regions groaned under a Manchu policy of isolation to debar the
overseas Chinese,” descendants of Ming-era adventurers bent on revolution, from returning to reclaim their homeland. For any Han Chinese who violated this isolationist policy, “the penalty was death by beheading.”

“The most effective weapon in the Manchu arsenal,” Chang contends, was the imperial examination system to recruit government officials. “As a mechanism of social order,” it “created the illusion of meritocracy,” but in fact favored the rich and entirely excluded some groups such as women. “As designed, defined, and dictated by the Manchus,” civil service exams had “the nefarious result of creating a society in which the Han constantly competed against each other for favor with the rulers.” This set-up was “more potent than any military force, as the people themselves embraced this as an instrument of their own oppression.” Years devoted to assiduous study of the Confucian classics, she observed, “served as a safe outlet” for Han energies that redounded to Manchu benefit, for career advancement through academic achievement precluded “openly questioning and challenging the system.” Worse still, this “turned the most talented sons of the Han Chinese, who should have been their leaders, into agents of the oppressor group.” Chinese who passed the exams and became officials under Manchu aegis “often ruled their districts like totalitarian despots.” Each in fact “was the law.” They enjoyed immunity from indictment and prosecution for crimes such that one of them boasted, “I would rather be mayor in China than President in the United States.” These collaborator-administrators mercilessly sent Chinese commoners to prison—the “depths of cruelty” under the dynasty—for non-payment of taxes or debts. But native Han secret societies such as the Red Turbans, Triads, and T’aip’ings had long “plotted the overthrow of the Manchu government,” and “a desperate citizenry” joined in violent uprisings against Ch’ing rule in the 1850s. The Manchus responded with “a bloody reprisal that beheaded some seventy-five thousand suspected participants” and spawned fraternal warfare between Han Chinese cultural subgroups, the Punti and Hakka, which “killed two hundred thousand people.”

Aside from knee-slappers like citing Red Turbans (the wrong dynasty), declaring head-shaving treasonous toward the Manchus (the converse was true), and finding “mayors” plus a “citizenry” in the Ch’ing empire, Chang’s sketch of Manchu-Han relations is revealing. She contrasts Ch’ing society against the multiculturalist, pluralistic, inclusive ideals that the United States supposedly embodied, yet casts Manchus in an evil light for their two-faced egalitarianism. Since 1644, they had oppressed Han Chinese through the stick of terror, the carrot of co-optation, and legalized forms of discrimination. Above all, Chang contended, Ch’ing avenues of upward social mobility quashed Han identity formation. This was “the oppression of group identity—the burden of racial antagonisms, inherited by blood” that Chinese immigrants had “sought to escape” by leaving for America. Chang is selective in her ethnicity arguments. She turns a blind eye to non-Han minorities such as the Mongols, Uighur Turks, and Tibetans who suffered conquest and suppression by the Manchus as well, and she ignores equally
oppressive misrule by native Han Chinese dynasties through identical institutions. Thus Han scholar-officials justified collaboration with the Ch’ing by arguing that Manchu conquerors had rescued Chinese commoners from misery under a corrupt Ming regime in the seventeenth century.

Chang’s account shares key polemical points with virulently anti-Manchu tracts produced by late-Ch’ing Han revolutionaries. Typical of this genre was Ko-ming-chün (The Revolutionary Army), written by a refugee student in Japan, Tsou Jung (Zou Rong 1868–1905).138 Printed versions first appeared in 1903 and “perhaps a million copies were published in the ensuing years.”139 According to Tsou, alien Manchu barbarians were the cause of China’s misery, partly by insidiously exploiting the examination system to suppress the Han majority and thus buy off its educated elite who should be spearheading resistance. Tsou felt that the alien Manchus had little right to be in China, and none at all to rule over it. He envisaged China, which he called by various names including “Shina,” as a truncated monoethnic state comprising “eighteen provinces” below the Great Wall “within the [Shanhaikuan] passes,” where only descendants of the Yellow Emperor could live. By contrast, Chang tripled Tsou’s land mass by applying late-Ch’ing boundaries at their furthest extent to subsume regions such as Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Turkestan inhabited by multiple ethnic minorities—which is what the revolutionaries would do after seizing power. Tsou also differed from Chang by agitating not only to depose the Ch’ing regime politically but also to eradicate Manchu residents physically because they were racially unassimilable and also to avenge massacres of Chinese three centuries earlier portrayed in Accounts of the Slaughter in Ch’ia-ting, Ten Days at Yangchou, and other anti-Manchu tracts.

Earlier historians dismissed this rhetoric of annihilating Manchus—which Goldhagen would call an “eliminationist” ideology—by arguing that little racial violence accompanied the 1911 Revolution. Rummel, for example, said “no more than 1,000 to 2,000” Manchus died.140 According to Mary Wright, for Han Chinese reformers such as Liang Ch’i-ch’iao, the Ch’ing dynasty was “no more alien to its people than was the British monarchy,” the German House of Hannover. Even for Han revolutionaries such as Sun Yat-sen, Wright said, “the ethnic issue was largely irrelevant.” But she also observed, “In some instances, ‘massacre’ may not be too strong a word to use” for what resulted in 1911.141

Historians now affirm Wright’s second strand of analysis. As Peter Zarrow says, “the main issue for the revolutionaries was anti-Manchusm”; they “put race at the core of the vision of the nation.”142 Joseph Esherick says that Chinese mass murders of Manchus at Wuchang “approach racial slaughter.”143 Edward Rhoads holds that anti-Manchu ideology “was no mere rhetorical flourish.” Han revolutionaries took pains to select their targets by checking female foot sizes and hairstyles and by holding pronunciation tests to confirm local dialects that proved Han ethnicity (Manchus spoke only what is now called Mandarin or standard Chinese). Rhoads identifies ten cities where major massacres took place, and in five of these, Manchu men, women, and children put up no armed resistance but
still ended up as “victims of genocide.” Although Rhoads did not define that term or give a victim count for the whole empire, he pointed out that Han insurgents slaughtered half of all Manchus living in Sian—10,000 out of 20,000 persons—so their death toll in this one city was “several times that” of the 1,000 to 2,000 earlier estimated by Rummel for all of China. And, Rhoads declared, male and female Manchus in Nanking were “all but wiped out during the revolution” in spite of their passive non-resistance.

Of course, Chang did not support ethnic massacres by Han Chinese in 1911, but she did not reveal their occurrence either. Her narrative depicts events in squeaky-clean terms: “Sun’s revolutionary alliance was eventually successful” as “mutinous troops defeated imperial forces in Nanjing” and “declared the birth of a new government, the Republic of China.” Chang uncritically parrots the Han Chinese patriotic line by portraying Sun Yat-sen as a Cantonese Abe Lincoln and his cohorts as being in thrall to US sociopolitical ideals so that they took “American style democracy as their model.” Critical scholarship in English on this topic was available when she wrote The Chinese in America but somehow escaped her notice. Throughout her trilogy, she gives evidence of Chinese violence against other Chinese but never violence directed at other groups, such as their racially inspired reputedly genocidal killing of Manchus in 1911. This, I would suggest, is because Chang’s a priori agenda dictated that only the suffering of “my people” warrants commemoration.

VII. Amulet and Cudgel

Peter Zarrow relates the anguish felt by 1911 Han Chinese revolutionaries: “Pain and humiliation were expressed repeatedly, and it may be that they even came to be treasured by many intellectuals as part of their identity.” That same anguish, I submit, finds hearty resonance in the PRC today. Peter Gries similarly stresses the centrality of “rape” in national narratives of suffering endured by innocent and helpless Chinese. Yet how far do this identity and memory reflect objective reality before and after China’s “century of humiliation,” 1840–1949? Based on studies by the self-described “atrocitologist” Matthew White, Steven Pinker lists some of the “Worst Things People Have Done to Each Other” since the fall of Rome. Ranked among his top ten are: (1) World War II, (2) Mao Tse-tung, (3) the Mongol conquests, (4) the T’ang-era An Lu-shan rebellion, (5) the fall of the Ming, and (6) the Taiping rebellion, but An Lu-shan comes in first place after proportional adjustment for twentieth-century population.

Excluding World War II, which had multiple global actors, Pinker’s worst five relate to Han Chinese, though their ethnicity is distorted by the latter-day lens of nationalism. Areas now comprising integral parts of central and south China and the peoples living there were, for most of history, deemed alien and “barbarian” prior to Han assimilation. An Lu-shan was a Sogdian Turk. The T’ang ruling
house against which he rebelled was largely Hsien-pei in ethnic origin and thus, strictly speaking, non-Han aliens like the Ch’ing Manchus. Also, a high percentage of Chinese and Koreans invaded Japan in Mongol navies and armies. But such qualifications aside, Pinker’s list shows that Han Chinese dished out plenty of misery to other groups when viewed outside the politically warped confines of 1840–1949. They perpetrated murderous violence as much as any other people in human history, yet the notion of China as predator finds no place in their memory and identity. As President Hsi Chin-p’ing (Xi Jinping) proclaimed in July 2015, “Genetically speaking, there is nothing in the blood of our Chinese race to make us conduct aggression or advocate hegemony.”

This arbitrarily fostered, tactically exploited forgetfulness qualifies as historical amnesia, which Chang reinforced. Writing four decades after the “century of humiliation” was over, she stated in *Thread of the Silkworm* that PRC China was transferring missile-building technology and selling rockets to rogue states such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Perhaps sensing that readers might look askance at Tsien Hsue-shen’s fidelity to such a regime, she defended him by protesting that “he saw nothing immoral in this, nothing threatening to world peace and security. The China of recent history had never been an aggressor nation; it had always been the target of colonialist exploitation.” As a news reporter, Chang knew or should have known that the PRC had conquered East Turkestan and Tibet and had invaded Korea, India, and Vietnam; that it gave generous financial and military support to the genocidal Pol Pot regime in Cambodia; and that it threatened the use of force to achieve *Anschluss* with Taiwan.

Japanese actions at Nanking were barbaric and at times beastly but cannot be explained by comparisons to “the Holocaust,” and Chang’s attempts to do so failed to meet minimally accepted professional standards of historical scholarship. *The Rape of Nanking* is replete with egregious factual errors, grotesquely distorted contentions, consistently one-sided biases, routine misrepresentations of evidence, and willful ignorance of political, military, and sociocultural contexts in which the Atrocity took place. Chang crossed the line that demarks history from fable, and her followers today dogmatically shut down reasoned debate about complex issues surrounding Nanking for which a plurality of explanations should be encouraged. Contrary to her altruistic intentions, this abuse of history to commemorate Chinese victims has done nothing to lessen, and much to worsen, ethnic and national animosity. Her simplistic, unrelenting, one-dimensional tale of Han suffering, and only Han suffering, hands PRC leaders an amulet with built-in cudgel. They clasp the amulet to ward off critics and wield the cudgel to bludgeon rivals. Space here does not permit extensive discussion, but at least three key assertions raised by Chang in 1997 were being affirmed and played out on the world stage in May 2017 as this manuscript was going to press.

1. On 15 August 2015, ethnic activist groups in California celebrated the opening of an “Overseas Hall to Commemorate the War of Resistance against Japan” under the directorship of Florence Fung, an expatriate PRC business exec-
utive, in San Francisco’s Chinatown. This is the first memorial hall of its kind permanently established outside mainland China, where scores of them exist. The Hall boasts some fifty permanent panel and photo exhibits. Some depict “the Nanking Holocaust,” as it is called, in graphic ways that permit no one to be misled by alternative portrayals that diminish its horrors. Chang’s 1994–95 ethnic awakening was aroused at a similar activist venue. PRC state officials, including the consul-general in San Francisco, attended the opening to endorse this project and its mandate “to tell the world that China was the real victor in the war.” This “China as real victor” thesis, as described by Rana Mitter, is hard to reconcile with its prevailing image as penultimate victim in a century of humiliation, but the PRC squares this circle by glossing “real” as being similar to the USSR. The USSR held down multitudes of German troops who could have been deployed westward against the Allies in Europe, and China did likewise in the Asia-Pacific theater. Furthermore, the USSR, like China, sustained enormous losses. Historians estimate that 11 to 26 million Soviet troops died, plus millions more civilians, totaling perhaps 14 percent of the Soviet population overall. But at this point the analogy breaks down. The USSR repelled all invading armies—over 3.5 million German, Austrian, Hungarian, Italian, and Romanian troops—and single-handedly captured the enemy capital of Berlin. Those battlefield feats are what won Stalin a seat at the victors’ table and the right to help redesign postwar Europe. China did nothing similar in Asia, so it deserved no equal recognition or prerogatives. But, in order to propagate its “real victor” view in October 2015, the PRC staged a massive seventieth-anniversary victory parade at T’ien-an-men Square, and in that year, state filmmakers produced The Cairo Declaration wherein they placed Mao Tse-tung, not Chiang Kai-shek, alongside Roosevelt and Churchill at that November 1943 summit.

(2) Chang’s “forgotten Holocaust” thesis hinges on reputed “facts” she unearthed: Despite “three hundred thousand murdered Chinese,” the “Rape of Nanking” did not penetrate the world consciousness in the same manner as the Holocaust or Hiroshima,” but “deaths at Nanking far exceeded … the two atomic blasts,” and “a popular revisionist view” among Japanese is that, “in return for its noble efforts” to liberate Asia, “Japan itself ended up as the ultimate victim at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.” In sum, Nanking was far worse than atomic warfare against Japan, but goes unrecognized while a “carefully cultivated myth” emerged that “Japanese were the victims, not the instigators of World War II.” Chang’s thesis effectively won international endorsement in May 2015, with legitimizing political implications for the PRC military. At a conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons held in New York, delegates from the non-nuclear state of Japan suggested in a draft proposal that world leaders visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki to see firsthand the horrors of atomic warfare, but this non-binding suggestion was deleted at the insistence of PRC delegate Fu Ts’ung, who said, “Japan is using this conference” to “distort its [wartime] role”
and “conceal the misery it caused other nations, which is unacceptable.” Japan “started that war as the aggressor but tries to make itself the victim” and “repeatedly denies atrocities perpetrated by its armies in Korea, China, and Southeast Asia.” Asked by Japanese reporters if Chinese leaders might visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki, PRC state spokeswoman Hua Chun-ying shot back, “Let me ask you: ‘When are Japanese leaders coming to Nanking?’” Among nuclear powers at this New York non-proliferation conference, Russia and the United States reduced their atomic warheads in 2014–15; China increased its nuclear warheads without meeting opposition.157

(3) Up to now, the PRC has shown no interest in the comfort women issue, and busy as it was propping up Pyongyang, it voiced no solidarity with Seoul about it vis-à-vis Tokyo. But a volte-face took place under Hsi Chin-p’ing (Xi Jinping) and Park Geun-hye; their two peoples became allies as common victims of Japanese imperialism. Hsi gave a lecture on history at Seoul University in July 2014 and pronounced: “Japanese militarists waged savage wars of aggression against both Korea and China; they annexed the Korean peninsula and occupied half [sic] of China.” Then, ignoring the Korean War of 1950–53 but citing Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s invasion in 1592, he solemnly declared: “Every time in history that danger arose, our two nations helped one another overcome it.”158 A month earlier, in June 2014, the PRC applied to register sources on Nanking and the comfort women with UNESCO’s Memory of the World program. In October 2015, UNESCO announced its decision to approve those on Nanking, and thus endorse the official PRC view of it, but to veto those on the comfort women, and proposed that a fuller dossier be submitted with relevant nations next time in 2016. Civic groups in Seoul immediately agreed. Chu Ch’en-shan, director of the Nanking Mausoleum, exclaimed, “Now the whole world shares our understanding [of Nanking].”159 It is hard to believe that Chang’s book played no role in these developments. Meanwhile in October 2015, Britain’s Magna Carta, registered in UNESCO’s Memory of the World six years earlier, was abruptly and without explanation pulled from a museum in the People’s China University at Peking where it was to go on public display.160

Also in October 2015, a coalition of Chinese and Korean activists, with support from their governments, erected a pair of comfort woman statues, one Chinese and one Korean, side by side in a Seoul public park. In earlier years, statues of Korean comfort women—all apparently cast from the same mold—were erected at various sites in North America and at some forty sites in South Korea, including in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul. This coupling of statues was replicated in Shanghai and is scheduled to be replicated in San Francisco.161 There is no absolute proof that this Sino-Korean linkage resulted from Chang’s untruthful claim about the very first comfort station in Japan’s furtive sex slave system being set up at Nanking in 1937, but again it is hard to assume mere happenstance.
This is a cautionary tale about what happens when we stop caring about, or derisively smirk at, Leopold von Ranke’s legacy of evidenced historical scholarship in which fidelity to the documentary record is our sole categorical imperative. As an academic discipline rooted in empirical proof, historical study sits high on the endangered species list largely because we fail to defend it against sophists who flaunt theorized casuistries about indeterminable facts that do not matter, against moral agitators bent on making the world better for oppressed minorities, and against government leaders unconcerned with telling the truth as a matter of principle. If memorialization trumps factuality in relating past events, the feel-good Yasukuni narrative of Japan having liberated oppressed Asians is no more false than any other. Ethnic memory and identity facilitate such self-deceptions.

In 1961, the distinguished military historian Michael Howard identified “myth” in “nursery history” as useful and needed for “breaking children in to the facts of life.” But, he said, this form of history is meant for juveniles who must be “disillusioned” of it if they are to mature into adults able to discern the complexities of real history in a democratic society. “Inevitably,” he concludes, “the honest historian discovers and must expose things that are not compatible” with myth. Following Howard, I would add that the falsity of myth is painful to admit, but admit it we must. Ethnicities and nations, the Japanese included, cherish myths integral to memory- and identity-based nursery histories because these therapeutic mental crutches salve the pain of humiliation and spur efforts toward greater group achievements. But memory and identity possess limitless malleability and infinite exploitability. Therein lay their dangers.

This helps explain why Iris Chang’s *The Rape of Nanking* enjoys enormous popularity since 1997 among Han Chinese the world over. Militants of Han memory and ethnic identity insist on the group’s unconditional duty to remember and commemorate past suffering; for, to forget is an unforgivable blasphemy toward victims. But serious problems emerge from this attitude. Forgetting occurs naturally as time passes but remembering requires conscious effort by group members who cannot possibly recall all events in the past equally. Hence, political or moral authority figures dictate which events must be remembered and which, forgotten. For example, “the Rape of Nanking” enjoins commemoration while the Great Leap Forward, Great Famine, and Cultural Revolution—to say nothing of ethnic cleansing in East Turkestan and Tibet—may be recalled only in officially sanctioned bowdlerized versions, if at all. Furthermore, in exploiting the duty to commemorate, Han Chinese militants of memory justify distorting or falsifying the historical record to make their group victimization seem more acute than the facts will allow.

Such problems will decrease if we all abandoned nursery history, as promoted by militants of ethnic memory and identity, many of whom advance altruistic causes. Historians should study the past for its own sake in order to describe
events in the context of that age as accurately as the admittedly flawed sources will allow, and should welcome reputable scholarly revisionism that adheres to accepted rules of academic inquiry. If we as historians feel we must make the world better, we should do so as teachers who nudge societies and ethnicities painfully toward emotional and intellectual maturity. To paraphrase the Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant, “dare to know” and leave behind self-imposed adolescence. This may be what Hata Ikuhiko meant to convey when, with his typical disdain for savoir faire, he called on Chinese to a “grow up a little.”

Notes

1. Fujiki, Shinpan: Zōbyō tachi no senjō, pp. 3–92.
2. Osaka natsu no jin zu byōbu, preserved in Osaka Castle.
4. Called hitzando no sō in modern Japanese. In addition to ibid., there are many studies. A classic is Okamoto, Osaka hōju no jin natsu no jin, pp. 193–205.
8. Spence, Search for Modern China; Bentley and Ziegler, Traditions and Encounters.
11. August, “Rape of Nanking Haunted Her.”
14. The successful second attempt was Wú, trans., Za répu obu Nankin; Wú, ed., Za répu obu Nankin o yomu.
17. Chang, Rape of Nanking, p. 183.
23. That is, they designate “holocaust” as the actual historical event and “Holocaust” as its ideological distortion.
24. Finklestein and Birn, A Nation on Trial, pp. 87–100; Finklestein, Holocaust Industry, pp. 55–62.
26. Peter Novick admits that, although generations of US historians have fallen short of realizing that dream as an ideal, “the proposition that ‘truths’ are multiple and perspectival never had the corollary that there is no such thing as error or mendacity.” Novick, That Noble Dream, p. 153.
29. For classic statements, see Levine, Humanism and History, pp. 19–36, and Nelson, Fact or Fiction, pp. 1–37.
33. Gries, China’s New Nationalism, p. 84 and p. 169n51.
34. Kushner, Men to Devils, Devils to Men, p. 23 and p. 308.
38. Chang, Thread of the Silkworm, p. 2.
39. Interviews comprise fourteen of twenty-five endnotes to one chapter dealing with the key period of Tsien’s life in Shanghai (1929–34) just before he left for the United States.
43. Ibid., p. xiv. She claimed “oral fluency.”
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid, pp. xv–xvi.
46. Ibid, p. xv.
47. Ibid., pp. xiv–xv and p. 231.
49. Ibid., p. 243.
50. Ibid., p. 244.
51. Ibid., p. 169.
52. Ibid., pp. 182–83.
53. Ibid., p. 151
54. Ibid., p. 163.
57. Ibid., p. 81.
58. Peck, Two Kinds of Time, second edition, p. 3.
59. Davis, Return of Martin Guerre, p. 5 and p. viii.
62. Ibid., p. 37.
63. Asahi shinbun (26 September 2009).
64. Chang, Rape of Nanking, p. 29.
65. Ibid., p. 28.
68. Eguchi, *Jūgonen sensō no kaimaku*, pp. 143–54; Kuroha, *Nit-Chū sensō (1)*, pp. 123–57; Coble, *Facing Japan*, pp. 39–55. This event was retroactively labeled “the First Shanghai Incident” after 1937 to differentiate it from the one beginning in August of that year.
69. Jordan, *China’s Trial by Fire*, p. 77, pp. 100–5, p. 149; he calls Shanghai in 1932 “the world’s first large-scale bombing of civilian urban targets”; p. 63, p. 236. He notes that “elusive Chinese would fall back into villages, doff their uniforms, and pose as farmers, after which they would reenter the Chinese lines to fight again”; p. 143.
70. Chang, *Rape of Nanking*, p. 29.
80. Ibid., p. xiii., p. xi, p. xv.
83. Ibid., pp. 7–8.
84. Schlesinger, *Disuniting of America*, p. 22.
88. Four major national dailies in Japan—the *Asahi, Mainichi, Yomiuri*, and *Sankei*—carried this story on 24 January 2014.
89. Chang, *Rape of Nanking*, pp. 52–53
92. Taylor, *Course of German History*, pp. 2–3.
96. Wakabayashi, “Comfort Women.”
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106. Ibid., p. 80; Benz, A Concise History of the Third Reich, p. 144.
108. Chang, Rape of Nanking, p. 6.
112. Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews: vol. 1 The Years of Persecution, pp. 73–112.
113. Burleigh, Third Reich, p. 264.
116. Evans, Coming of the Third Reich, pp. 188–89.
118. Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders.
120. Beller, A Concise History of Austria, pp. 249–53, p. 259; Bessel, Nazism and War, p. 208.
123. Chang, Rape of Nanking, p. 177 and p. 275n.
124. Ibid., p. 203.
125. Ibid., pp. 216–17.
127. Ibid., p. 116, p. 152.
128. Ibid., p. 7.
129. Ibid., p. 119.
131. Ibid., pp. 62–63.
132. Ibid., p. 19, p. 144, p. 378, pp. 382–85
133. Ibid., p. 403.
134. Ibid., p. xv, emphasis in original.
136. Ibid., p. 393.
137. The following on late Ch’ing Manchu-Han relations is in ibid., pp. 7–19, pp. 68–69.
138. Lust, Revolutionary Army. Colin Green kindly directed me to this source.
139. Zarrow, After Empire, p. 155.
140. Rummel, China’s Bloody Century, p. 41.
141. Wright, ed., China in Revolution, p. 21, p. 23.
142. Zarrow, After Empire, p. 278.
143. Esherick, Reform and Revolution in China, p. 182.
144. Chang, Thread of the Silkworm, p. 6; Chinese in America, p. 160.
145. Zarrow, After Empire, p. 280.
151. Coverage in NHK radio news, 16 August 2015; Sankei shinbun, 28 March, 16 August, and 29 August 2015.
154. Guardian (17 August 2015); Sankei shinbun (19 August 2015).
156. Ibid., p. 15.