INTRODUCTION

While waiting on the tarmac in East Berlin for the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachov on his fateful visit of the summer of 1989, Erich Honecker responded to the journalists’ shouted questions about the future of the GDR by saying that ‘reports of its death have been much exaggerated’.1 Within 16 months the state had disappeared and along with it the SED, its ruling Communist Party. In the months after the fall of the Berlin Wall the SED underwent a period of convulsion and transformation which saw the expulsion of many of its old hard-line leaders and their replacement with more moderate and reformist forces from within its own ranks. There was a move towards a more pluralistic socialist outlook, an end to the dogmatic approach of the Stalinist system and, above all, a gradual – though reluctant – acceptance that Germany would be united and that the ex-Communists would have only a minor role to play in that new nation. In December 1989 the SED mutated into the SED/PDS and then, in February 1990, into the PDS. For most commentators, the days of both the state and the party, in whatever form, were numbered. The first and last free parliamentary elections in the GDR on 18 March 1990 brought in a governing coalition of centre-right forces under the premiership of the CDU leader, Lothar de Maizière, committed to the reunification of Germany.

What the collapse of the GDR has left behind, however, is a greater sense of East German identity than probably ever existed before 1989 and a continuing political presence for the PDS which has confounded many commentators and dismayed many of its political competitors. Even though at the time of writing this introduction, the fortunes of the PDS are not at their highest point, there is every reason to believe that that situation could change again, just as it did in the mid-1990s.2 The reasons for this are manifold and reside in complicated social and psychological

1. ‘Die totgesagten leben länger’.
2. See Dan Hough, The Fall and Rise of the PDS in Eastern Germany, Birmingham, 2002, for a discussion of the varying fortunes of the PDS.
factors to do with the reciprocal relationship between the need for both individual freedom and social security in the ex-GDR. As Tanja Busse and Tobias Dürr have pointed out recently, many of the facets of eastern German identity are very similar to those of immigrant communities arriving in a new land. Without having physically moved, East Germans have indeed come to a new country and, like all immigrant communities, they have brought with them their own world-views and values and their own political cultures. This includes continuing, though perhaps unstable, support for the political party most identified with the ex-GDR, namely, the PDS. The continuing obsession with the GDR and growing self-identification as East German rather than just German also parallel the continuing and even growing identification which many third-generation immigrants in West Germany have with their grandparents’ homelands. This is unlikely to fade in the near future and may indeed last for many decades. After all, 300 years after the Act of Union in the U.K. there would appear to be little decline in the national identity of the Scottish people, despite attempts to create a British identity. Before 1989 it used to be said that there were two states in one German nation; now it could be argued that there are two German nations in one state.

However, the PDS finds itself in a situation in which it is only reluctantly a regional party and, indeed, wishes to see itself as an increasingly all-German socialist, left-social democratic or even Marxist party, able to mobilise opposition to the growing political, social and economic dislocation engendered by the marketisation of the German economy. The extent to which it will be able to play this latter role is under discussion here. There is little sign of it at present and indeed, recent elections have seen it in steady decline in its heartlands in East Germany as well. However, Germany is really only just beginning to enter a process of reform and economic adjustment which Britain undertook some thirty years ago, with the advent of monetarism under a previous Labour administration and its entrenchment under Mrs Thatcher. The political consequences of the neo-liberal undermining of the Rhenish capitalist model which, until recently, was accepted by almost all parts of the mainstream political spectrum in Germany have yet to be fully felt. It is for this reason that it would be too early to write off the PDS completely, despite the very real difficulties which it is at present experiencing.

The aim of this study is to help towards an understanding of the very complicated development of identity and opinion in the ex-GDR since 1990 in its proper historical and theoretical context. The first two-thirds of this book look at the long waves and trends at work in the socio-economic development of twentieth-century Germany. This represents an attempt to separate out the structural and the conjunctural factors at play in global politics and to identify which is most important at specific
historical and political moments. The main part of the analysis discusses
the shift from the primacy of politics, which prevailed throughout most of
the twentieth century, to the primacy of economics, which has prevailed
from around the middle of the 1970s and is the basis for what is widely
known as globalisation but which is essentially about the creation of a
market-state in which finance capital and neo-liberal short-termism has
replaced the productivist imperative. The impact this shift had on the
workers’ movement in both East and West is obvious and yet incompletely
understood, not least because the ideological shift which has accompa-
nied the economic one has been so complete that what used to be seen
as relatively moderate demands, such as the social imperative behind even
Christian Democratic programmes, are now seen as dangerously radical
and yet at the same time a part of the ‘forces of conservatism’.

This book is not an exhaustive or empirical account of the fortunes of
the PDS as a contemporary political party. There are many such studies
and simply to add to them would not be of great benefit. Instead, this
book sets out the development of the ‘Stalinisation’ of the communist
movement in Germany in the context of a global primacy of politics. It
discusses the role and function of the SED in the GDR and the continu-
ing debate about the extent to which the PDS is simply the successor
party to the SED and therefore irretrievably ‘Stalinist’ as is often main-
tained also within this global political context. The main question though,
is the extent to which it is a new departure from its own past, able to
jump over its own shadow.

In 1944 Karl Polanyi, in his book *The Great Transformation*, argued that
the rise of fascism and the Second World War had been brought about
by the shifting balance in the relationship between politics and econom-
ics in the first part of the twentieth century.4 He believed that the
ascendance of market liberalism and the primacy of economics had
brought about a dislocation which issued directly into social instability.
In many ways, what I have tried to do here is to adapt this analysis to
the collapse of communism and to see the latter as a symptom of the re-
emergence of a triumphant market neo-liberalism out of the economic
crisis of the 1970s which continues to reshape the world. In that sense
this book is about the second great transformation, this time at the end
of the twentieth century, and the effect that it is having on the world in
general and Eastern Germany in particular.

When looking at Eastern Germany and the PDS we can see that the
history of the GDR and the SED has both uses and disadvantages for the
PDS and that the monumentalist, antiquarian and critical elements at
work in the history of the German workers’ movement continue to func-
tion both positively and negatively within the party. In an interview
conducted in 1998, the then Deputy Chair of the PDS, Sylvia-Yvonne

Kaufmann, spoke of the ‘rucksack of history’ which the party is obliged to carry with it. This was meant as a metaphor for the burden of the GDR past, but a rucksack is also a very useful thing to carry on a journey. What this book aims to do is to unpack the PDS’s rucksack and find out what is in it. To what extent are its contents weighing the party down and impeding its progress, and to what extent are they useful on a journey which is taking Germany through a second great transformation?

The PDS arouses passions on all sides, which remain to a large extent irreconcilable. It is what makes it one of the most interesting parties to study in Europe today, but it is also what makes it one of the most difficult to fully comprehend. Above all, this is because to understand the party today it is necessary to grapple with some of the fundamental dilemmas of twentieth-century political life as it relates to the German workers’ movement. As Gerhard Schürer stated in his evidence to the Enquête-Kommission on the history of the GDR and the role of the SED:

If one analyses the power structures [of the GDR], then one must also study their relationship to the Soviet model which was adopted. One has to analyse the history of both East and West Germany. One has to analyse the Cold War. I don’t think one can say that one does not have space or time for it. On the contrary, it is essential to any convincing historical analysis of the GDR.

In order to understand the PDS, therefore, one has to understand the SED and the GDR. But in order to understand them one has to understand the relationship between Stalinism and the Cold War. However, these phenomena only become clear if, in turn, one has a grasp of the fundamental turning-points in the history of the twentieth century, and the motivating forces behind them. The relevance of this historical framework will become clear during the exposition of the themes contained here.

In any perusal of the books and pamphlets on the PDS, from both within its own ranks and outside, one is struck by the omnipresence of the historical debate and the lessons which that history can teach. On the one hand the party is attacked for still believing in ‘socialism’ in a post-socialist world. On the other hand, those within the party understand socialism in very disparate and vague terms. Furthermore, the Stalinism debate within the party, which has consumed much theoretical energy in since 1989, has produced relatively little enlightenment but has at least allowed the different factions to present their own political credentials.

What all of those factions have in common – no matter how far apart they may seem – is their commitment to a sense of the primacy of the political and the collective over the individual and the purely economic.

5. Interview with Yvonne Kaufmann, Karl Liebknecht Haus, 26 September 1998.
The main difference arises not over whether the approach should be a collectivist one, but where the locus of collectivism should rest: with the community or with the state. Since 1990 the party has had to try to maintain its position as representative and defender of the community of the ex-GDR, whilst at the same time attempting to become a party with a role to play at the federal state level. The PDS has reached that point which faces all those parties which start off as anti-systemic: namely, whether to criticise the system or to exercise power within it, or indeed both. The latest developments and the outcome of the city elections in Berlin in 2001, in which the PDS gained nearly 50 per cent of the votes in the eastern parts of the city, and the federal election of 2002 in which it maintained a high level of support in the East but still failed to leap the 5 per cent hurdle would seem to suggest that the party has begun to turn back towards its own community in the ex-GDR for support. It is attempting to solve or at least ameliorate the dilemma of power by exercising it in the East as a form of opposition to the prevailing Western-dominated federal system.\(^7\)

This dichotomy is compounded by the fact that in the East it has to appeal to voters who are, in traditional political terms, relatively conservative whilst trying to appeal to radicalised and marginalised groups in the West. Paradoxically, therefore, its association with the GDR and the SED is not an expression of its political radicalism but of its social conservatism and is of considerable benefit to it in the ex-GDR. In the West this social conservatism can be a deterrent to winning over the libertarian Left, who traditionally vote Green. Concepts such as order, discipline, family, community and nation do not have the same negative connotations in the East as they do for the Western Left. It is certainly the case that within the PDS there is a tendency towards the acceptance of traditional hierarchical categories. As Toralf Staud has pointed out, the values of the membership of the PDS tend to be quite conservative compared with those of the Western Left, and the election in October 2000 of Gabrielle Zimmer as the new leader, to replace Lothar Bisky, seemed to imply a retreat by the party into its heartlands.\(^8\) This was compounded by the federal election defeat of 2002 and the fact that, despite that defeat, Zimmer was re-elected as party leader. Zimmer stepped down, however, in June 2003 and Bisky took over once again as party chairman. He saw part of his job, and was supported by Zimmer in this as well, as attempting a reform of the party's fundamental positions and the adoption of a 'basic programme' which moved the party increasingly away from its more orthodox traditions towards a modernised socialism.

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7. At the time of writing, in addition to its acquisition of governmental responsibility in Berlin, it was in government in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and supported the red-green government in Sachsen-Anhalt and the SPD minority government in Brandenburg as well as forming the governing party in many cities and local authorities.
capable of accepting important changes to the structure of the global economy and supporting the 'enterprise culture' as something positive.

Within the Gysi/Bisky/Brie group the trend has long been to try to break out of the traditionalist ghetto and turn towards a more liberal or even libertarian version of socialism that would appeal to Western voters. In the Berlin city election of 2001, Gregor Gysi was very much at pains to distance himself from the more orthodox views of his party in order to appeal to West Berlin voters. He stated, for example, that, in a conflict of interests between the party and Berlin, he would always choose Berlin. This is a radically liberal position for any party leader to take and is even more the case in a party which emerged out of the rigid democratic centralism of the SED.

In general, then, we can say that the PDS continues to represent a part of the Left historically anchored in collectivist values but with increasingly libertarian tendencies which are bound, one might say designed, to upset the more traditionalist wings. The struggle for the direction and locus of the party is far from over. Put in general terms, the East/West split is compounded by the Left/Right split but the outcome of these constant splits and fusions will be determined by forces and developments beyond the party’s control. As Yvonne Kaufmann has maintained, ‘The PDS is a party opposed to the prevailing system. That is central to the identity of the party. Without it we would be superfluous.’9 Its whole political physiognomy is an expression of a commitment to socialism in its traditional vein but with modernising influences. Effectively it wishes to return to being a pre-Stalinist communist party, with a Marxist base but a lively culture of factions, tendencies and discussion but with one important dimension, namely that of revolution, largely removed. Despite the replacement of Zimmer with Bisky and a more liberal orientation, the PDS will remain a party of the East and that it will be forced to be anti-systemic within its electoral fortress of the ex-GDR rather than the whole of the Federal Republic. This demonstrates that the basic values of the PDS, although still of the Left, are actually fundamentally different from those in the West. Its 1968 was primarily that of the Prague Spring rather than Paris and it did not grow up in the context of the Anglo-Saxon individualism which so characterises the mainstream Western liberal Left. For this reason its roots are in a more orthodox Marxism, tempered by a regionalist nationalism, in which values of order and community take precedence over individualism. Whether there can be local solutions to global problems today remains, however, an unanswered question. And when we look at that question in the context of the notion of the end of ideology which claims that there can no longer be global solutions to local problems, we can see the nature of the crisis which faces the PDS and the Left in general.

9. Interview with Yvonne Kaufmann.
However, what worries the leadership of the PDS is not so much the need to maintain a Marxist focus: Yvonne Kaufmann maintains that the party is proud to see itself as part of a tradition stretching from Marx and Engels via Liebknecht and Luxemburg. However it is also concerned that for anti-PDS commentators of the Centre and Right, but also for the more orthodox members of the party in the Kommunistische Plattform (KPF) and the Marxistisches Forum (MF), there is, in effect, little or no difference between Marxism and Stalinism. A recent example is to be found in an essay by Konrad Weiss, where Marxism is equated with Stalinism in a very black and white view of the PDS: ‘I believe that a Saul can become a Paul; the Bible describes that quite clearly. But I do not believe in mass conversion as a result of a conference resolution: a resolution which makes Marxists into democrats, militarists into pacifists, militant atheists into believers, privileged functionaries into lovers of humanity.’ The end result is that both of these elements supply each other with ammunition for their cause. The Right can point to the existence of the KPF and MF and maintain that the party is therefore still ‘Stalinist’ and the KPF and MF can point to the fact that the leadership has talked about their expulsion as proof that the party is in danger of becoming ‘social-democratised’. An almost obsessive discussion of Stalinism and the Stalinist nature of the GDR is therefore central to the electoral fortunes of the party, rather than, as some see it, a harmful diversion from the reality of day-to-day politics. The real locus of the problem lies not in the theoretical hair-splitting but in the fact that any attempt to prioritise the political over the economic is therefore seen as essentially dogmatic and therefore – in a Marxist party, at least – Stalinist.

The PDS is therefore confronted with the task of remaining a distinctive party of the Left in Germany (which means that it has to remain true to its roots in Marxism) and yet not appear so radical as to preclude the chances of cooperation at local and federal state level with parties which have long since arrived in the Federal Republic. As Michael Schumann observes: ‘On the one hand there are those who solemnly celebrate their views of orthodox socialism in a sort of self-constructed religious fervour, whilst others – apparently far removed from all programmatic discussions and theories – carry out basic day-to-day policies.’ In other words, it is a party like any other. In order to survive in post-unification Germany,
the PDS has to adapt to the very values which are so distant from its own traditions and at the same time try to bring its own values into the political agenda of the Federal Republic. It is in this context that the accusation of lingering Stalinist tendencies and social authoritarianism, which is often levelled at the party, has to be analysed. The aspects under examination are therefore not so much to do with the objective socio-economic but rather the subjective politico-cultural or even psycho-social situation in the ex-GDR since unification. However, one of the most important things to remember in any analysis of the debates within the PDS is, to paraphrase Karl Kraus, that even when it all appears to be about opinions and political positions, the determining contradictions exist in the real world and not merely in the heads of the participants.

Having said that, any conclusion reached on the PDS is inevitably determined by the political position of the observer. Patrick Moreau and Jürgen Lang, for example, see the PDS as a dangerous communist organisation, determined to reintroduce a Stalinist regime.\(^{14}\) Equally Christian von Ditfurth sees it as a Trojan horse for the KPF and the MF: ‘Bisky, Brie und Co. can get on with the business of presenting a modern, socialist face to the world. Uwe-Jens Heuer and his comrades are happy with that as long as they and the rest of their Marxist Forum can determine the central ideological basis of the party.’\(^{15}\)

Eva Sturm, in the introduction to her work on the *Politikfähigkeit* (the acceptability or adaptability of a party to the mainstream) of the PDS, discusses the various ways in which parties in general and the PDS in particular are interpreted.\(^{16}\) What emerges from her study is that the general attitude to any party on the part of most political scientists is based on the assumption that a party will not challenge the basic organisational tenets of the state. Any party which does so is automatically described as being politically *unfähig* (incapable or unacceptable). As we have seen above though, the PDS still understands itself, at least to some extent, as an anti-systemic party. Even if one rejects Patrick Moreau’s very narrow definition of *Politikfähigkeit* as being merely about *Demokratiefähigkeit* in favour of a wider definition of it as one of exercising ‘legitimational, representational, integrational, transmissive and indicative functions’, as Sturm does,\(^{17}\) this still leaves out of the equation the right and ability of a party to challenge the existing form of state and democracy.

As we can already see from these few examples, much of what is written about the PDS’s position is designed to deny the PDS its own

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17. Ibid., p. 13.
political legitimacy and challenge its right to existence in the form that it sees fit. The party’s continued existence and electoral prosperity have to be seen, therefore, not only in their contemporary but also in their ideological and its historical contexts. It is the uses and disadvantages of history for the PDS – the contents as well as the specific weight of the rucksack – which are under consideration here.

In the first two chapters the categories of monumental, antiquarian and critical history are borrowed from Nietzsche and applied to an analysis of the German workers’ movement. Stalinism is defined and its development traced from high to neo-Stalinism. Stalinism itself, however, is in turn put in a firm historical, socio-economic and inter-systemic context. The twentieth century is broadly defined as a short political century driven by the need to integrate the working class into the social project and subordinate economic decision making to the political exigencies of the Long Cold War between East and West. I have coined the term Long Cold War here to describe the global situation prevailing between 1917 and 1990, from the Russian revolution to the unification of Germany. Within this framework I analyse the history of the workers’ movement as divisible into three distinct periods:

1. The period of critical Marxism (1850s–1920s) in which a critique of society and history was undertaken from a position of fundamental and radical opposition.
2. The period of monumentalist Marxism (1920s–1950s) in which both social democracy and communism exercised real power under conditions of ideological struggle and the fight for political hegemony and in which their attitudes to history and ideas were based in hypostatised dogma. That is, the ideologies of Weimar social democracy and Soviet Stalinism became reified into Bernsteinian and Marxist-Leninist dogmas respectively.
3. The period of antiquarian Marxism (1950s–1989) in which socialism in East and West became de-ideologised. During this period there was a depoliticisation of power, an integration of the working class into conservative social settlements on both sides of the Wall and a bloc mentality in which stability rather than progress or change became the highest goal.

The third chapter will deal with the consequences of these developments for the PDS today. There I shall also discuss the extent to which it is possible for the Left to move on to a new period representing a return to the critical tradition out of which Marxism grew, rather than a repeat of the monumentalist or antiquarian dogma which Marxism became.

This study concerns itself with the PDS’s own self-understanding in the context of the history of the ex-GDR. It also seeks to challenge the common assumption that its support is simply based on a politics of protest at the socio-economic consequences of German unification. There
is a fundamental critique here of the position taken by many commenta-
tors that the party is likely to fade as a political force once German unity
becomes more established. In most cases this is no more than an expres-
sion of desire rather than of objective analysis. I shall argue that the
decline facing the PDS since the election of 2002 is not necessarily a long-
term one and that it is too early to write it off – once again – as a serious
contender.

The motivating theme behind this study is to plot and analyse change
and flux in global conditions and how they affect Germany and its polit-
ical developments. It is no coincidence that German unification took place
at perhaps the second most important turning-point in the twentieth
century since 1917, namely, 1989/90. Rather, it represents an essential
element of the second great transformation of the world economy. The
relationship between economic transition and the collapse of the politi-
cal superstructure of social states in both East and West in the latter part
of the twentieth century will form a central part of the analysis here. It
is therefore important to look at the party’s potential impact as a social
defence organisation as well as political party for both East and West in
the coming period and the extent to which it can influence and shape the
wider society in terms of cultural and political developments.\footnote{The
reason for doing this lies with one further little-noticed contradiction
facing Germany in the twenty-first century, namely the conflict of priori-
ties between the axes of economics and politics.}

There is a further division of the history of the workers’ movement and
the industrial world in the twentieth century. In chapter 2 it will be
divided into three periods. For reasons of space and relevance the first
period will be briefly described rather than deeply analysed:

1. The period (1850s–1917) in which political decision making largely
issued from economic requirements. The working class was effectively
excluded from power or government and imperial expansion and world
trade dominated the political agenda.

2. The period (1917–1974) in which integration of a large and politicised
working class led to the relative subordination of purely economic
factors to socio-political necessity.

3. The period (1974–present) in which social cohesion has once again
taken second place to the primacy of economic decision making.

If these two forms of periodisation are examined it is clear that they are
interwoven and that the ideological turns which exist within the world
of political history can be seen to be concurrent with – both determined
by and determining – shifts in economic conditions. Below, I shall first
deal with the ideological periodisation of the politics of the workers’

\footnote{\textit{Gesellschaftsanalyse und politische Bildung} e.V. (ed.), \textit{Zur Programmätik der Partei des
movement before going on to deal with the underlying economic and social forces at work.

Rather than seeing this as a simple base and superstructure model, however, I have interwoven economic, political and ideological components at all points. This is therefore a study which places the PDS in the context of an understanding of the continuing contradictions of socio-economic formations in the modern world. The problems facing Germany as well as the PDS at present stem from the fact that the shift from political to economic primacy has necessarily been accompanied by the end of the certainties and simplicities of antiquarian thinking. This conjuncture has been misidentified elsewhere as the end of history and ideology, but I hope to show here how it represents, in fact, the recom-mencing of history and the end of de-ideologisation.

The reason for the confusion in these matters rests on the fact that the majority of analyses recognise the existence of one or another of these factors and yet they rarely tie them in together, nor do they look for motivating forces. Thus the shift back to the primacy of economics is widely recognised by many economists, social commentators and journalists and yet its connection with the collapse of communism and the end of ideology is largely seen as coincidental. Equally, those who work primarily in the realm of ideas see the end of communism and ideology as events and processes unconnected to tectonic shifts in the world economy. A thoroughgoing de-linkage of influences and forces has taken place which, in Habermas’s words, has rendered the world *unübersichtlich* (incomprehensible). The result of this has largely been a celebration of incomprehensibility rather than an attempt to clarify the situation.

Ralf Dahrendorf – in a remarkably Marxist class analysis for a convinced liberal – has also addressed these issues. He briefly outlines the emergence of a new global class and economic system which could only re-emerge with the end of the Cold War and the rebirth of class war:

1989 was not the end of history or the final triumph of democracy and the free market. In fact the opposite could be said to be true. History, for so long boxed in by the miserable coexistence of the two blocs, which needed each other in order to prevent change and maintain control, began to get under way again. In that sense the threat to democracy and the market has become reality rather than empty shadow-boxing.

21. Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘Die globale Klasse und die neue Ungleichheit’, *Merkur, Deutsche Zeitschrift für europäisches Denken*, Stuttgart, no. 11, 2000, pp. 1057–1068. It is remarkable how many old liberals are using (albeit very vulgar) Marxist analysis these days. Marion Dönhoff writes about the deutsche Leitkultur (the dominant culture of Germany) in the following terms: ‘The globalisation of economics and finance is largely complete. The same is true of supranationalism in politics and in communication. Culture will follow.’ *Die Zeit*, no. 9 November 2000, p. 4.
The final sentence of this quotation is the most important in the context of this study. The end of reified monumentalist and antiquarian thinking is an absolute precondition for the return of critical history and, as far as the PDS is concerned, radical action.

This study is therefore an attempt at restoring comprehensibility to the many concurrent but disjointed debates about contemporary society and places a consideration of the PDS and socialism in that context. I have tried to do this whilst at the same time being fully aware of my own motivating interests. These are shared with John Elster when he maintains that ‘the goal of the social sciences is the liberation of man’. The choice of subject here is therefore certainly politically motivated and the conclusions arrived at will also inevitably be at least coloured by the author’s views; yet it is hoped that the requisite objectivity in considering the evidence will be maintained.

This study has relegated empirical analysis to the role of supporting evidence for a theoretical framework which goes far beyond any mere consideration of the electoral fortunes of a given party. There are already myriad empirical studies of the PDS and the Left in general. There are also those which deal with relatively superficial questions of political acceptability and the supply of and demand for political parties in some sort of electoral market-place.

However, to take in the ideas of Nietzsche again, history itself is open to interpretation and functionalisation. Whilst not wishing to adopt the radically subjective positionism of Nietzschean thought, I do wish to avoid the pitfalls of vulgar-Marxist objectivism as it was too often practised in the GDR itself. The best way to avoid going too far along either intellectual path, it seems, is to merge them both: that is, to maintain that there is a historic truth about certain events, trends and tendencies in human history but that people construct their own truths about those events, trends and tendencies, not all of which have equal value, but all of which need to be considered.

24. In any case, many of these detailed empirical and statistical studies often come up with conclusions of a level of banality such as; ‘the probability of a vote for an extreme right or left-wing party increases with the degree to which the voter thinks of himself as right or left-wing.’ Rudolf Günter Deinert, Institutionsvertrauen, Demokratiezufriedenheit und Extremwahl. Ein Vergleich zwischen westdeutscher Rechts- und ostdeutscher PDS-Wahl, St. Augustin, 1997, p. 135.
Essentially, this study represents an unapologetic attempt to restore a grand narrative to our historical and political considerations. The approach taken here is to look for connections and to see the historical object of analysis not merely as a deconstructed set of free-floating metaphors but as a related and interpenetrating series of events and their consequences. After all, to paraphrase Marx, parties make their own history but not just as they please.