INTRODUCTION

The twentieth century, more than any other era in history, was shaped by organized terror. It was the century of concentration camps, gulags, and ideologically motivated mass murder. “Ethnic cleansing” was not at the extreme end of the scale of terror, partly because of the motivations behind it. The primary goal of ethnic cleansing was not to murder and destroy a population group but to forcibly remove one from a given area. Unlike the Nazis’ death camps and the Bolsheviks’ gulags, ethnic cleansing was not invented by a totalitarian dictatorship and did not signify a breach of civilization. Ethnic cleansing is a product of the nation-state and hence one of the basic components of modern Europe. This explains in part why it occurred on such an extensive scale, affecting at least thirty million people in Europe in the twentieth century and laying waste to a large part of the continent. This book seeks to record, analyze, compare, and elucidate every large-scale removal of a population group in modern Europe.

In keeping with the United Nations (UN) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, ethnic cleansing is defined here as the systematically organized, enforced removal, by violent means and usually permanently, of a group defined by ethnicity or nationality. The negative utopia of ethnic purity condemned not only people but also their culture. The organizations and individuals engaged in ethnic cleansing burned books, desecrated cemeteries, blew up mosques and churches, and sometimes leveled whole villages.

Four closely related phenomena fall into the category of ethnic cleansing. “Flight” takes place mostly in the context of armed conflicts or war and is not perceived as final by those affected. It becomes ethnic cleans-
ing when refugees are prevented from returning to their former home on account of their ethnicity or nationality. “Expulsions,” in contrast, aim toward permanent removal and sometimes occur in retaliation. They are based on a higher level of planning but not on international agreements. “Deportations” are similarly unilateral but enforced within a state and not across borders. The fourth and by far most frequent subcategory is that of contractually arranged, forced resettlements (wysiedlenie or przesiedlenie in Polish and similar terms in all other Slavic languages; Zwangsaussiedlung in German). The technical terms “population exchange,” “transfer,” and “repatriation” are favored by proponents of ethnic cleansing and are euphemistic.

Because of the atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, ethnic cleansing has been outlawed and is prosecuted by the ICJ in The Hague. But in the first half of the twentieth century, the international community arranged or participated in removing populations on a massive scale. One of the major questions this book seeks to address is why Western democracies supported an international order based on radically homogenized nation-states. While ethnic cleansing has become an internationally current scholarly term, it is harder to find a name for the people who were violently removed from their homes. Where possible, this book distinguishes between expellees, deportees, and resettlers, or refers to refugees in general, as was the norm in aid organizations and among contemporary observers.

Ethnic cleansing is often bracketed together with genocide, or seen as a precursor of the “crime of all crimes.” But using a broad definition of the term genocide based on Raphael Lemkin’s original concept or the “UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” of 1948 has certain drawbacks for historical analysis. Ethnic cleansing and genocide differ in several respects—in objectives, outcomes, and spatial dimensions. According to the Genocide Convention, genocide aims for the “destruction” of a certain population group. The term destruction, however, can be interpreted in a number of ways that need to be differentiated. It makes a difference whether a group and its individual members were physically destroyed or removed to another territory, although the latter could claim a high toll as well. According to international law, genocide is based on a “specific intent” (dolus specialis), making it comparable to first degree murder. The main goal of ethnic cleansing, however, is the systematic removal of a population group from a given area, not mass, on-the-spot killing.

The difference between the two phenomena is evident not least in the impact on the targeted group: the proportion of fatalities rarely exceeds 10 percent in instances of ethnic cleansing, but can amount to almost
100 percent in the case of genocide. Czech historian Jan Havránek has summarized the difference between genocide and ethnic cleansing by comparing the fate of Prague’s Jews and the German minority in Bohemia: “The path of the latter, after crossing the Bavarian or Saxon border, ended in poverty, left with only their hands and their heads to rely on. The path of the former almost always led via Theresienstadt to the gas chambers of Auschwitz.” It is, then, important to distinguish between different kinds of terror and suffering. Doing so does not reduce the seriousness of the crime of “ethnic cleansing”. As a result of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) imposed long prison sentences on the perpetrators of various crimes against humanity related to ethnic cleansing (etičko čišćenje in Serbian). But the judges in The Hague distinguished these crimes from genocide. The mass murder at Srebrenica, planned in cold blood and claiming more than 7,000 lives, was the only act to be condemned as genocide.

Spatial dimensions are another important factor distinguishing ethnic cleansing from genocide. The proponents of population removals always had a place of destination and reception in mind for the refugees, usually a coethnic state. Consequently, most instances of ethnic cleansing connected distant places and involved crossing international borders. Deportations within a state, such as took place in the Soviet Union under Stalin, were the exception. While Stalin’s victims were not deported to a supposed external homeland, they were nevertheless moved across huge distances. Genocide, by contrast, is often carried out on the spot, in the place of settlement of the nation affected. Examples are the countless mass shootings of Jews in Nazi-occupied Eastern Europe and the massacres of Armenians in Eastern Anatolia (although many Jews and Armenians were also deported over large distances), the recent genocide in Rwanda, and other cases in Eastern Europe that will be dealt with in chapter 3 of this book.

On account of these differences and in view of the extensive literature on the subject, this book will not engage with the Nazi genocide of the Jews in depth. From the outset, the Nazi hatred and persecution of Jews was accompanied by racist fantasies of destruction, which were not echoed to such a radical degree in any case of ethnic cleansing. It would be questionable, then, to interpret Auschwitz as the continuation or escalation of the ethnic cleansing of the Jews in the 1930s. Genocides operate as deportation to oblivion, as the rail tracks ending in Auschwitz-Birkenau eerily symbolize. However, as Götz Aly has shown, there were connections on an organizational level between the destruction of the Jews and the deportation and expulsion of other population
groups during World War II. The Nazis often used the same trains for routes of deportation, expulsion, and settlement, and they brought new settlers to places where the Jews had been killed or deported.

The term “ethnic cleansing” has been used so often that it is high time to define it properly. Gaining currency among scholars about twenty years ago, it was borrowed from the language of the perpetrators and their mentors. It was not, as is often presumed, invented by the media covering the Yugoslav conflict. The concept of “cleansing” appears throughout the twentieth century and occasionally even in the nineteenth century in documents, newspaper articles, and political writings concerned with the ideal of homogenous nations and nation-states and the minorities supposedly obstructing it. It originates from military references to territories being “cleansed” of the enemy in war. Communists and advocates of other ideologies harnessed the purification rituals invented by various world religions for the purpose of political cleansing. In the age of modern nationalism, these roots germinated in the idea that entire nations and their territories could be cleansed. The word “cleansing” often appears in German sources (Säuberung) from the late nineteenth century, but also exists as Očysta in Czech, Oczyszczenie in Polish, Chistka (Чистка) in Russian, and Čišćenje in the now defunct Serbo-Croat. Correspondingly, nearly all the standard literature on problems with minorities in Europe, ethnic conflicts, expulsions, and ethnic cleansing focuses on the eastern part of the continent. But there is also the French term épuration and the English equivalent, “purification.” This was, then, a pan-European concept that should be portrayed as such and not merely as a problem of Eastern European history. Indeed, the global dimensions of ethnic cleansing should be considered, since ultimately the practice and the ideas it was based on were exported from Europe to other parts of the world.

To explain the causes of ethnic cleansing, one must also consider all of Europe, since prominent Western European politicians and scholars were among the key supporters of ethnic homogeneity and mass population movements. These should be distinguished from “ethnic migration,” which is pursued by specific ethnic groups but does not involve any clear element of force.

Sources show that the prefix “ethnic” was added only in the last three decades. It was superfluous up to the mid-twentieth century, since it went without saying that, in the context of discourses on nation, the term “cleansing” referred to national minorities. These were not regarded as a valuable addition to the nation-state but as a problem and a danger, as foreign bodies in the flesh of the nation. Eric Hobsbawm sees a direct connection between the founding of nation-states and ethnic cleansing:
“The logical implication of trying to create a continent neatly divided into coherent territorial states each inhabited by a separate ethnically and linguistically homogenous population, was the mass expulsion or extermination of minorities.”\(^7\) Norman Naimark and Michael Mann have criticized the model of the democratic nation-state along similar lines.\(^8\) Why did common concepts of nation, and the idea and practice of the nation-state, cause minorities to be viewed as personae non gratae? This is one of the questions considered in chapter 1 of this book.

The first point analyzed is “population policy,” which was predicated on the introduction of statistics. In the late nineteenth century, the population of Europe was classified according to mutually exclusive and apparently objective national categories. Zygmunt Bauman has identified this pseudoscientific, bureaucratic practice as a building block of modern Europe. The German Empire and subsequently other European states tried to manipulate the ethnic composition of their populations in disputed regions by purposeful colonizing measures. As a rule, nationalist-motivated settling was followed by attempts at forced removals in later years.

The goal of ethnic cleansing—the homogenization of nationally defined states—could equally be achieved by the assimilation and settling of coethnic groups. This book makes a departure from previous studies on ethnic cleansing by also considering these methods of striving for national homogeneity. In this way, the narrative can avoid breaking off at the point where victims lose their homeland. The history of ethnically cleansed regions and countries did not come to an end there. They continued to be inhabited by people who had to come to terms with the traumatic events they had experienced; often settlers had been refugees, too. This state of affairs has been largely disregarded by recent literature, which tends to dwell on the violence, bloodletting, and deaths, and afterward leave the “bloodlands” of Eastern Europe as if their history had ceased to exist along with the dead. Other methods of ethnic homogenization, the largely failed attempts at forced assimilation and additive population policy, are explored here.

Recent, constructivist literature emphasizes the mutability and subjectivity of concepts of ethnicity. While people did not necessarily think of themselves in national or ethnic terms,\(^9\) states did, using these pseudo-objective criteria. Contemporary documents in English frequently utilize the term “race,” indicating a rigid, starkly delineated understanding of nation. Nationality was rarely determined by individuals’ self-perception or sense of belonging but by how bureaucratic institutions classified them. Millions of people were persecuted because they did not have a concrete or exclusive sense of nationality.
According to Foucault’s concept of power, the very classification of nationalities may contain an element of violence. Yet one should not equate cultural repression with physical violence. Social sciences, especially, tend to speak of “ethnic cleansing” in reference to cases that have more in common with forced assimilation and do not involve any change of location. But being forced to outwardly conform, perhaps in denial of one’s true identity, is not the same as being forced to leave one’s homeland at gunpoint or to escape acute physical danger. The late Polish historian Krystyna Kersten made the useful distinction between “direct force,” which emerges from an act or threat of violence, and “situative force,” which develops when those affected see no alternative but to leave their homeland because they expect their “social death.”

Ethnic cleansing was based on a growing asymmetry in the modern age between the perpetrators—individuals and groups—and the victims of violence. Violence in the context of ethnic cleansing was often open and demonstrative, intended to humiliate and inspire terror in the targeted group. The perpetrators of this violence transgressed religious and moral codes, attacking victims’ sexuality and dignity. Due to the pointedly public and often ritual character of these actions, they can be defined as “symbolic violence.”

Another characteristic of ethnic cleansing is the total and systematic nature of its execution. In this regard, a critical turning point was reached as early as the 1920s. This is shown by diachronic comparison with the early modern era. From the fifteenth to the eighteenth century, population groups that did not conform to the ideal of religious homogeneity were driven out of parts of Europe. However, these expulsions were not as well organized as in modern times and were mostly confined to specific regions or towns. Violence and terror was usually sudden and short-lived while migration, such as that of the Huguenots, continued for several decades. Many people simply converted, and this was often welcomed. Aside from a few notable exceptions, like Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this distinguished the religious persecution of the early modern era from modern ethnic cleansing.

A distinction should also be made between ethnic cleansing and the actions of the European settlers in North and South America and Australia. In terms of death tolls, what happened to the Amerindians and indigenous Australians had more in common with genocide. Yet as a comparative study on “forced removal” has shown, the primary objective of these deportations was to acquire land as cheaply as possible. Often enough this resulted in a logic of elimination, but there were no ideologically charged, outspoken ethnonational claims to certain territories or plans to exterminate minorities as in the twentieth century.
Even though the “white” settlers treated Africans and Amerindians with colonialist contempt, the high death toll among the native populations was due less to willful murder or genocide than to the diseases and epidemics the colonists brought with them.

Yet these distinctions should not mask certain lines of continuity between early modern and modern history. There is a connection in European history between Christian and nationally defined ideals of homogeneity. Various national movements in Europe were grounded in religious or denominational motives. The Balkan nations’ wars of liberation against the Ottoman Empire were also legitimized by religious causes. In the early twentieth century, the violence against “the Turks” mutated into ethnic cleansing. These connections are considered in chapter 1, on the preconditions of ethnic cleansing, under the subheading “Christian Intolerance.” The title is not intended to imply that other religions were necessarily more tolerant than Christianity in all its phases and variations. The Sunnite Ottomans, for example, committed repeated massacres of the Shiites of Mesopotamia. Nevertheless, far more Muslims than Christians were targeted for mass persecution and expulsion in Southeastern Europe. This applies especially to converts and their descendants, who often held privileged positions in the Ottoman Empire but were viewed with suspicion in Habsburg-ruled Spain and Austria. The policy of jus sanguinis, defining nationality by parentage, which led to the persecution and expulsion of religious and, later, national minorities, was a European invention, as was the homogenous nation-state.

But it took a modern state apparatus and population policy to put these principles into practice on a broad scale. Statistics on nationality, which were standardized at the International Statistical Congresses of the latter nineteenth century, provided a key. Censuses recorded populations in terms of supposedly objective national criteria, down to the remotest villages. These statistics counted down to the last digit of seven- or eight-figure numbers, indicating that the state assigned nationality or ethnicity to all at birth. The compulsion to be clear on the issue grew, making life difficult for anyone with a multinational or protonational identity. There was little scope for changing nationality, which became even more difficult than changing religion in the age of religious wars. Chapter 1, on the preconditions of ethnic cleansing, and the chronologically ordered chapters 2–5, trace the process by which anonymous bureaucracies classified and ultimately segregated populations according to national criteria. From 1918, a consensus prevailed on the norms governing this classification and on the homogenization of nation-states. As is evidenced in the Paris Peace Treaties and the first period of ethnic cleansing (see chapter 2), the goal of homogenization took priority over
the protection of minorities. But modern Europe was also built upon a
categorization of the population according to social criteria, especially
in the Soviet Union. Most literature fails to differentiate between ethnic
cleansing and the social cleansing directed against noblemen, kulaks,
and many other groups during the Stalinist era. Again, the difference
between the two phenomena is best determined by exploring the moti-
vations of the perpetrators.

This book focuses on the perpetrators for several reasons: a two-
hundred-page survey cannot cover all aspects of a subject in depth.
Furthermore, in the last ten to twenty years, much has been said and
written about the victims of ethnic cleansing. The specialist literature
has followed the universal trend toward victimology, which can also be
observed in other fields, such as scholarship on Native Americans. By
empathizing so intensely with the victims, authors risk reducing per-
secuted individuals and groups to mere objects of history. To analyze
ethnic cleansing, it is important to bear in mind that refugees had often
taken one side in an ethnic conflict; some had been perpetrators before
they became victims. True, this often occurred in reaction to trauma,
flight, or expulsion. But assuming victims’ collective innocence would
not correct previous constructions of collective guilt. This book there-
fore avoids polarizing victims and perpetrators but seeks to maintain an
overview of the different periods and causes of ethnic cleansing. Most
victim-centered literature, moreover, concentrates on one, usually na-
tionally defined group, one example being German literature on the
postwar German expellees (Vertriebenen). Studies in this field received
strong political support in the 1950s and 1960s and were used to under-
pin legal, financial, and territorial demands during the Cold War. These
ethnocentric victim narratives lost relevance in the era of détente, when
international reconciliation was sought. In the last decade, however,
narratives centered on one nation have become fashionable again, es-
pecially in Germany. It is therefore false, but in line with traditional
and postmodern victimologies, to claim that German suffering has been
a taboo subject.

A comparative approach is the best method for dealing with all these
analytical and normative problems. My own dissertation of 1998 was,
to my knowledge, the first comparative analysis of the flight, expul-
sion, and forced resettlement of the members of two nations. In the
last fifteen years, a number of comparative publications have appeared
on Poland, Ukraine, Hungary, Turkey, Greece, and other nations that
were affected by ethnic cleansing. Due credit must go to the Lexikon der
Vertreibungen (Encyclopedia of Expulsions), edited by Stefan Troebst,
Holm Sundhaussen, and Detlef Brandes, for documenting all known
cases of ethnic cleansing from A to Z. Likewise, this book is based not only on Western literature, but also on current research in all the major countries affected by ethnic cleansing. The state of research in more than fifteen European and extra-European countries is outlined in the annotated bibliography and will hopefully inspire and assist further investigation.

The first, pioneering book dealing with the most important cases of ethnic cleansing in Europe over the entire twentieth century was Norman Naimark’s *Fires of Hatred*. The task of subsequent authors has been greatly simplified thanks to the example Naimark provides in terms of material and methodology. The title chosen by the publisher is somewhat misleading, since hatred or vengeance at most influenced the manner in which population removals were carried out. Practically all cases of ethnic cleansing were very well organized, as Naimark himself writes. Ethnic cleansing did not break out spontaneously but was planned in an exceedingly rational way. It arose from specifically European and modern ideas of nation and nation-states. But Naimark’s choice of cases for comparison, in particular his consideration of the Nazi persecution of Jews in the Third Reich, does not entirely convince. To understand the flight, expulsion, and forced resettlement of Germans from East Central Europe after World War II, it is essential to consider the ethnic cleansing that took place under German occupation and German hegemony during World War II as well as Poland’s shift west. Similarly, a long chain of events preceded the genocide of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and the expulsion of the Greeks from nascent Turkey. In this respect, Benjamin Lieberman’s overview, beginning in the nineteenth century, is commendable. While Lieberman’s broader temporal focus is elucidating, his tendency to equate any case of communal violence with ethnic cleansing overstretches and dilutes the latter concept. But his consideration of individual victims, hatred, and suffering brings the reader closer to the events and makes them tangible.

As the many examples in this book show, only a fraction of all cases of ethnic cleansing were caused by the irrational hatred and violent conduct of “ordinary citizens.” Most were the result of processes engineered by international politics and steered by nation-states. Their portrayal and analysis should then begin on these two levels.

Various forms of historical comparison can be applied to this end. This book seeks to identify the most significant similarities and differences and formulate a typology of ethnic cleansing by comparing national and regional case studies. Comparison is made both synchronously, that is, between countries, regions, towns, and villages within one epoch, and diachronically, between different times. Groups targeted by ethnic
cleansing often experienced a sequence of distinct phases of flight and contractual removal. This distinction is not merely academic, as a new phase could have dramatic consequences, tipping the balance toward either life or death.

Diachronic comparison between different epochs can be illuminating, and is sometimes imperative. The ethnic cleansing that took place in Croatia and Bosnia in 1991–95 cannot be grasped without knowledge of events between 1941 and 1944, for example. Thus, the comparisons in this book also seek to show the correlations between individual cases of ethnic cleansing. The comparative method is sometimes criticized for focusing too much on structures and causal chains and for de-personalizing history. In response to such criticisms, chapters 2–5 present the masterminds of ethnic cleansing in each period. Some readers might miss more detailed information about medium-level or local agents of ethnic cleansing (many of whom have been convicted at the IJC since 1995), but their radius of action often changed dramatically depending on their orders from above. This also had a major impact on how ethnic cleansing was carried out, which is an equally important and elucidating topic as the “why” question.

When considering and comparing different epochs, the question of when ethnic cleansing actually began inevitably arises. According to Lieberman and Sundhaussen, it was first practiced in the nineteenth century.17 Certainly, the flight and expulsion of about two million Muslims from Southeastern Europe following the war of 1876–78 had much in common with modern cases of ethnic cleansing. Yet the migrations triggered then were hardly organized and took place over several decades. Furthermore, the governments concerned did not yet pursue population policies or the systematic settlement of members of the respective titular nations. Ultimately, these wars and the continuing violence they sparked were triggered more by religious than by ethnic differences. This is reflected in the use of the term “Turks,” which originally denoted all Southeastern European Muslims and did not primarily signify nationality until the early twentieth century. Hundreds of thousands of Muslims from the Balkans and the Caucasus followed the sultan-caliph’s call to devout Muslims to return home to what remained of the Ottoman Empire. His policy shows that religious motivations still predominated over national considerations. There were, then, not only “push” but also “pull” factors at play. For these reasons, the mass flight of Muslims from Southeastern Europe and the Caucasus in the nineteenth century is analyzed in chapter 1, on the preconditions of ethnic cleansing.

The actual starting point is taken here to be the two Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. The population shifts that took place during and follow-
ing these wars were mainly ethnopolitical and were state-planned and organized. The nation-states involved were struggling for dominance over disputed areas by means of ethnic homogenization and pursued purposeful, large-scale settlement policies to this end. The Balkan Wars also marked a watershed in another respect: they prompted the first international agreements on the “exchange” of minorities. Rather than being rooted in a supposedly unique tradition of violence and intolerance in the Balkans, they were the outcome of an international consensus and negotiations with the major Western powers. For this reason, chapter 2, on the first phase of ethnic cleansing, gives special consideration to international diplomacy and the rationality characterizing it. When I started to write this book, I did not intend to devote so much attention to diplomatic history; I was primarily interested in the motives and mechanisms of violence at the sites of ethnic cleansing. But as my research progressed, I was so astounded by the Western consensus on ethnic cleansing and its long-term continuities that these aspects became two guiding themes of the book.

The Treaty of Lausanne, which provided for the first instance of large-scale ethnic cleansing in two states, Turkey and Greece, marked the end of this period in the mid-1920s. Contrary to the opinion of many scholars, ethnically defined population shifts were not confined to the Balkans. France pursued a policy of épuration in Alsace, setting a precedent among democratic nation-states in Central Europe. This case shows that, with regard to the history of ethnic cleansing, Europe’s “dark side” covered more than just the eastern part of the continent. To paraphrase Mark Mazower, Europe was a “dark continent,” overshadowed not only by its ideologies, but also by the way its nation-states implemented them. Even if this book does not intend to engage in victimology, those who suffered as a result of ethnic cleansing nevertheless deserve the empathy of today’s authors and readers. The lack of any such sensitivity following the Treaties of Neuilly and Lausanne had dire consequences: the new round of “population exchanges,” which began in 1937–38, was broadly accepted as a way to “solve” domestic and international conflicts.

The Munich Agreement is most often linked with the failed policy of “appeasement” toward Hitler. But it also marked a further turning point in the history of ethnic cleansing. With this agreement, the European great powers abandoned the half-hearted protection of minorities written into the Paris Peace Treaties and redrew the borders of Central Europe along ethnic lines. The new order outlined in Munich affected not only the border regions of the Czech lands but also southern Slova-
kia. In the ensuing years, a series of contracts were drawn up concerning the resettlement, exchange, or one-sided “transfer” of minorities in the parts of Europe occupied by Nazi Germany or ruled by its allies. Chapter 3 considers and compares instances of ethnic cleansing in the Soviet Union and asks to what extent the phenomenon is characteristic of totalitarian dictatorships. In *Bloodlands*, Timothy Snyder concentrates on the Nazis and the Soviets in his chapter on ethnic cleansing as he does throughout the book. But as is shown in detail below, apportioning the blame above all to Hitler and Stalin is misleading. These dictators utilized ethnic cleansing, but tended to favor other, even more evil measures to achieve their goals. Ethnic cleansing was more characteristic of democratic or authoritarian regimes.

During the second phase of ethnic cleansing, 1938–44, “wars within the war” broke out in several parts of Europe, once again triggering large-scale flight and expulsion. This is explored in a comparative section in chapter 3 on the Ukrainian-Polish and Serbo-Croatian conflicts. These wars were inflamed by the negative example set by the Nazis, such as in their treatment of Jews and their cooperation with the radical wings of the respective nationalist movements. By the time the German army withdrew from the occupied territories in Central and Eastern Europe, a large part of the continent had been permanently scarred by ethnic cleansing. After the war, the population shifts performed under German occupation and hegemony were not treated by the West as crimes to be rectified, but as a point of departure for a new postwar order.

Chapter 4, on the third phase of ethnic cleansing, 1944–48, opens with a survey of Allied negotiations. The first point on the postwar agenda arranged by Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States in the fall of 1943 was Poland, then occupied by the German Reich. The Allies decided to shift Poland westward by about two hundred kilometers, benefiting the Soviet Union at Germany’s expense. The new Poland was supposed to be a homogenous nation-state without Germans or other minorities. In fall 1944, in a speech in Parliament on the future of Poland, Winston Churchill announced a “clean sweep” to finally take care of the “mixture of populations” causing “endless trouble.” He had in mind the ethnic reshuffling of entire East Central Europe from the western border of the Soviet Union to Germany’s new eastern border. It is a striking fact that here, as in earlier cases, ethnic cleanings were planned and borders drawn by experts who had little or no specialist knowledge of the regions in question or of the logistical difficulties involved in forcibly resettling millions of people. They fol-
ollowed an imperial tradition of mapping that began in colonial India in the early twentieth century.

Reverberations from events in the British colonies were pivotal for the postwar order created after the Balkan Wars and after World War I. For this reason, the book in hand also takes postcolonial approaches into account and extends the scope of its investigation beyond the geographical boundaries of Europe. Another reason for going beyond Europe was the fact that the ideology and practice of ethnic cleansing were adopted in two former British colonies, India and Palestine. As the comparative case study in chapter 4 shows, at least 13 million people were affected here by ethnic cleansing in 1947–50. Highlighting the impact of European ideologies and political practices in the Near East and southern Asia might provoke accusations of “Eurocentrism,” but it should be stressed once more that the utopia of homogenous nation-states originated in Europe.

After Great Britain, it was chiefly the Soviet Union that supported ethnic cleansing at the conferences in Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam. This is as well researched as the extensive deportations within the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the literature on “Soviet ethnic cleansing” should be approached with caution, because it tends to make little distinction between ethnic and social cleansing. With regard to Soviet history between 1938 and 1953, then, the key question to ask is when and why the state’s brutal social cleansing gained an ethnic thrust.

By the 1990s, there was no longer an international consensus on mass population removals. After the long period of peace in Europe since 1945, the ethnic cleansing that took place in the former Yugoslavia seemed like a return to the bad old days of World War II. Indeed, Milošević and the Serbian nationalists in Croatia and Bosnia harnessed such associations for their own ends, deliberately evoking memories of genocidal violence under the Ustasha (Ustaša in Croatian) regime in order to mobilize their supporters and legitimize renewed violence. The “ghosts of the past” in the title of chapter 5, on the 1990s, were also among the causes of the violent conflicts in the Caucasus. In each case, the war shaped the course of ethnic cleansing, as is considered in special depth in the case study on Bosnia and Herzegovina. This war claimed many victims on all sides, not only among Bosniaks. As the more recent, substantially moderated statistics on casualties—and a veritable Histo-rikerstreit in Bosnia and Herzegovina—have shown, Serbs did not make up a significantly smaller proportion of the victims. They constituted about one-third of the population at the outbreak of the war and about a quarter of its casualties by the end of it. It is important to note, however, that the Bosnian Serbs, unlike the Bosniaks, counted members of the
military and relatively few civilians among their victims. The highest number of civilian Serbs in any Bosnian town died in Sarajevo, killed by fire from the Bosnian Serb Army. It was, then, also a war among Serbs, and not simply an ethnic war to be blamed ex post facto on one specific nationality. Correspondingly, chapter 5 looks for political explanations and analyzes the motives of those involved.

All four empirical chapters (chapters 2–5) refer to significant publications from the countries in question as well as Western secondary literature. These were read in the original, as far as my knowledge of the respective languages allowed, or via specially commissioned synopses or translations. In addition, this book relies on various archival materials. Back in the 1990s, I collected German, Polish, Czech and Soviet documents from the late wartime and early postwar period for my dissertation and a cowritten volume published in the US about ethnic cleansing in Central Europe.21 The evidence collected by the International Court in The Hague is an excellent source for research into ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The Open Society Archive (OSA) in Budapest has gathered many reports from the various bodies and representatives of the United Nations (some of these are also available on the webpage of the UN), international and local NGOs, eyewitness reports and other ego-documents.22 For all the periods here it was also worth re-reading diplomatic documents such as the protocols of the Lausanne Conference in 1922–23. Last but not least, some great source collections have been published in recent years.23 All these materials have been consulted to ensure an equal source basis, in terms of quantity and quality, for the entire span of the investigation. In this respect, too, this is a book trying to write a history covering all, or at least most of Europe.

Notes

1. On the use of this term by the UN and the ICJ, see Cathie Carmichael, Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans: Nationalism and the Destruction of Tradition (London, 2002), 2.
6. Cyrillic script is transcribed phonetically here, except in the case of imported names and terms, e.g., Kiev.
7. Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalisms since 1780 (Cambridge, 1990), 133.
9. On the Habsburg Empire, see Pieter Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, 2006). See also various articles in Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz, eds., Shatterzones of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman Borderlands (Bloomington, IN, 2013).
12. Perhaps this is why Ray Douglas’s book was immediately translated and enthusiastically received in Germany. In terms of framework and scope, it is strikingly similar to much of the literature published in the early Cold War period of the 1950s and 1960s (when another American scholar, Maurice de Zayas, gained popularity among German expellee organizations). See Ray M. Douglas, Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War (New Haven, CT, 2012).
13. On the comprehensive research in postwar Germany, see Gertrud Krallert-Sattler, Kommentierte Bibliographie zum Flüchtlings- und Vertriebenenproblem in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in Österreich und in der Schweiz (Vienna, 1989).
15. The annotated bibliography contains full citations for all books and articles listed.
18. Mark Mazower used the metaphor of darkness in his 1998 book that provides succinct analyses of the major European ideologies. The book in hand is concerned above all with the realization and destructive consequences of these ideologies.
22. See the holdings HU OSA, 304-0-2 (International Human Rights Law Institute, Interim and Supplementary Reports of the UN Special Rapporteur); HU OSA 304-0-6 (International Human Rights Law Institute, Materials on Ethnic Cleansing); HU
OSA 304-0-4 (International Human Rights Law Institute, United Nations, International Red Cross Committee, International Court of Justice). The OSA has also collected a great amount of press clippings.