



Introduction

Turning Things into Property

Property reforms have conferred ownership titles and other legal certificates to many people throughout the world. Governments have initiated the reforms in the expectation that they would yield various kinds of benefits to the new owners, such as economic income and political empowerment. However, people have often found themselves embroiled in disparate economic, political, and cultural transformations that have prevented them from realizing such benefits. The varied and sometimes paradoxical ramifications of property reforms are shown in the following examples of land reforms in Romania, Vietnam, and Albania:

In Romania, George Ionescu, a police officer stationed in Dragomirești, long benefited from the forest titles that Romanian state officials allocated to villagers there in the 1990s.¹ However, George did not benefit from these rights because he was among the recipients. He benefited because his status in law enforcement allowed him to profit from the woodcutters and traders who made money from the forest, sometimes illegally. He became one of the primary beneficiaries of forest wealth because traders paid him to overlook unlicensed wood transports. Sometimes, allegedly, the traders even paid him to accompany them on trips. Nevertheless, George was eventually caught and forced into early retirement.

In Vietnam, there are striking similarities. Duong Kim Binh was one of the primary beneficiaries of land allocation in Ho So. Yet, like George, he did not benefit because he received a land title from Vietnamese state officials. He instead profited from land allocation because of his past work as a local official, which provided him with experience and networks to capture profits generated in the thriving land market. In late 2003, Hanoi residents discovered Ho So as a site for weekend houses. In the beginning of 2004, Binh began brokering deals between urban buyers and villagers. He sometimes prodded

fellow villagers to sell by colluding with his brother An, who was also a broker in Ho So. By the end of 2004, villagers had sold most of the suitable land and Binh had become rich in a matter of a year.

In Bagëtia, Albania, Maks Dulellari did not become rich in the process of land reform. Similar to what occurred in many other Albanian villages, a land commission set out to distribute the available agricultural land among the working population, giving each worker the same amount of land. Maks rejected the distribution because he wanted to get back his parents' land, which they had lost in the process of collectivization thirty years earlier. His family began cultivating the parents' land despite protests by a few villagers and the local government, Maks even carrying an old carbine to prove his determination. The occupation of land considered illegal and resistance against the official distribution got him into jail twelve times until the local government eventually backed down—facts that he proudly recalls. However, his actions, as important and significant as they were in village politics, were nonetheless of modest consequence in the context of the larger economic situation and the drastic deterioration of living standards in Albania. Most people, including his daughter, left the village in search of employment and a better life abroad, since agriculture no longer generated sufficient income.

This book addresses the life experiences, achievements, and frustrations of people like George, Binh and Maks. We explore their actions and reactions as they lived through major property reforms and we use the land reforms conducted by postsocialist governments for illustration.² We have a particular interest in people's claims on agricultural land and forestland, the recognition of their claims as legitimate property rights, and the benefits they derive from the rights. Our book is also about places such as Dragomirești, Ho So, and Bagëtia, as they encountered radical state efforts to remake property relations over the past two and a half decades. We find significant variation amongst people and places. However, looking at villages from three countries with distinct histories and in different parts of the world, we also identify striking similarities in the nature of property dynamics that go beyond existing analyses of "privatization" (A. Schwartz 2006). We show that the economic, political, and cultural changes effected by property reforms mutually influenced each other and produced radical transformations of rural life. Taken together, they produced surprising open-endedness and indeterminacy of societal transformations.

Property was at the core of changes in livelihoods, politics, and cultures. Land titles symbolized some of the great promises made by governments and their international advisors to rural people. Rights to agricultural land and forestland were a primary concern for people in societies experiencing market liberalization, democratization, and urbanization. Property was a crucial factor underlying the radical nature of rural transformations, which left virtually no person or place in the same condition as they had been in twenty years earlier. Thus, property tells us much about changes in rural life, as the new landowners and a host of other actors reacted to new property laws. Changes in property relations were a central element of rural transformations in Albania, Romania, and Vietnam, as was true in many other postsocialist and postcolonial countries of Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America.

The Premises of Propertizing Projects and the Dynamics of Property

The book addresses the propertizing projects that are prevalent today.³ Governments around the world have sought to refashion economies, politics, and environments through property reform. First among them, postsocialist governments have perhaps undertaken the most daring set of propertizing projects over the past two decades under the influence of their international advisors and donors. Postsocialist propertizing covers not only land and forest but also housing, industrial assets, the financial sector, and public utilities. It takes place throughout Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia and East Asia as well as parts of Latin America and Africa, and is advocated by the leading international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, as well as the European Union. These projects go far beyond privatization, in that they not only move publicly owned assets into private ownership but also encompass a much broader effort on the part of governments to assign rights and duties to private *and* public actors, the latter including various kinds of collective organizations, state agencies, and local and national collectivities.⁴ Therefore, it is more effective to examine postsocialist property reforms not as instances of privatization but as propertizing projects.

Propertizing projects are also a frequent sight in the postcolonial world. On the advice of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund many governments in the Global South have embarked on significant property reforms in a variety of sectors, from public utilities to agriculture. These reforms often entail privatization, as in the case of Cochabamba, where the Bolivian government sold off the city's water services to transnational

corporations (Perreault 2005).⁵ However, in many instances they do not involve privatization. For example, international land reforms include significant efforts to recognize customary leaders' control over land or empower the representatives of indigenous groups to govern over so-called indigenous territories (Fitzpatrick 2005). Property reforms in forestry often occur via devolutions from national governments to village committees or user groups (Larson et al. 2010). The underlying drive is one of propertizing, not necessarily privatization.

Moving beyond the postsocialist and postcolonial contexts, almost all elements in the biophysical environment have become the target of propertizing projects. Governments assign statutory property rights and obligations to a multitude of "natural resources" and "ecosystem services" in national legislation or transnational agreements. They have long extended propertizing from the focus on tangible resources, such as land, forests, and water to more ephemeral phenomena such as ocean fisheries and air. Carbon has become the target of a new propertizing project of truly global dimensions, but there are also other frontiers of property-making, including cultural landscapes, food attributes, food crops, and genetic resources. The key idea in this broad trend has been intellectual property rights, legislated by governments and promoted in transnational agreements as a way to make intangible objects amenable to propertizing. In fact, there seems to be a constant drive to carve out new objects from nature to become targets for propertizing projects, as illustrated by efforts to patent rights to transgenic animals and the human genome (Mansfield 2008; Strang and Busse 2011).

A closer look at the myriad of propertizing projects reveals that national governments and their international advisors have expected them to serve various aims. It is difficult to read government officials' and advisors' statements without developing the impression that propertizing is expected to do wonders: serve as a foundation of economic growth and efficiency, create a basis for poverty alleviation, act as an important element in building democracy, contribute to the restoration of historical justice, establish a precondition for sustainable resource management, and so on. A particularly egregious expression of this unbeatable optimism is the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto's assertion that the formalization of property rights was the single most effective strategy for poverty alleviation (de Soto 2000). States, the widely cited argument goes, just need to transfer titles to the poor for the assets already in their possession, thereby unlocking the poor's potential and making new objects available for small-scale accumulation. As illustrated by the simplicity and boldness of such expectations, propertizing has become a miracle tool to be employed for whatever aims governments or other agenda-setters deem desirable.⁶

The pervasiveness of propertizing rests on the premise that such projects allow states to allocate valuable objects to social actors. This premise relies on two critical assumptions: first, that the value of the objects is known and reasonably lasting;⁷ and second, that the state is the sole institution designating and enforcing property rights according to a fixed set of procedures. Under such conditions, governments can grant property titles to the economically capable, the poor, the politically disadvantaged, the historically dispossessed or to a particular set of resource users, all with the reasonable expectation of achieving the desired outcome (e.g., economic efficiency, poverty alleviation, democracy, historical justice or sustainable resource management). However, this is only true if the objects' values are known and if a unitary state is in charge. Only then do propertizing projects allow governments and their international advisors to achieve the desired outcomes.

The two assumptions are essential. If the value of the objects was to change in the course of property reforms, then governments would no longer know what there was to distribute. Similarly, if the states mandated to conduct the reforms were to change in the process, then governments would no longer see the specific procedures applied for reform implementation. For example, governments could reasonably expect to rectify historical injustices, such as the dispossession of certain ethnic groups or collectivization of agricultural land, by giving land titles back to the historical landowners—but only if they can rely on state officials to follow the designated set of procedures and everyone to agree on the value of the affected land. If, on the other hand, state officials manipulated the implementation of national reform for their own purposes, or if people reconsidered their valuations of the affected land, then restitution to prior owners may not bring about historical justice.

In contrast to the premise underlying propertizing projects, we argue for a dynamic understanding of property. Property reforms do not take place within a static context. Instead, the dynamics of property are closely tied to broader changes in society, embedding property relations in a wider set of social relations and exposing them to wider economic, political, and cultural dynamics.⁸ Moreover, property rights and duties relate to values that are not fixed but change as people make claims. Property, in other words, does not merely reflect value but is also a factor in creating, modifying, and taking away value. Similarly, claims and property rights affect the authority attributed to states, particular state actors, and sets of state procedures. Propertizing projects, therefore, are not about governments defining rights and duties with regards to objects of known value, they are actually subject to larger dynamics of property, value, *and*

authority. The premise that governments can refashion economies, politics, and environments through property reforms does not hold up to reality.

In this book, we focus on land reforms because they offer unique insights to the dynamics of property. They are not only a classic example of the propertizing projects pervasive with governments, but they are also paramount on the international policy agenda today.⁹ More importantly, they attest to the assumed omnipotence of the state; in other words, that states can implement policy at their liking (Sikor and Müller 2009). Governments around the world have long distributed land titles on the premise that they can allocate parcels of known value to smallholders, tenants, the landless, and so on, through land reform. Considering these expectations, the outcomes of land reform have often been disappointing. Nevertheless, a dynamic understanding of property suggests explanations for the apparent shortcomings of land reform, such as the failure to create or clarify property rights in many cases. A fuller appreciation of property dynamics also indicates the cause of certain outcomes generated by land reforms—for example, the tendency to foster land accumulation and dispossession.

We develop this argument by analyzing postsocialist land reforms. Postsocialist governments and their international advisors initiated the reforms with the expectation that they would lay the foundations for economic growth, democracy, and sustainable land use.¹⁰ At least in part, these expectations materialized for some people and places. They also caused bitter disappointments for many other people and in many other places. The primary cause of the conflicting experience was not inappropriate policy design or implementation. Instead, we argue, the variation reflected the dynamic nature of property.

Postsocialist Property Dynamics

There are a significant number of writings on property in postsocialist settings, too many to be reviewed here comprehensively. We concentrate on the anthropological and geographical literature in this section, with some excursions into relevant work in political science and sociology. We are particularly interested in what the literature articulates about the connections between property, on the one hand, and changes in value and state, on the other. Attention to these connections suggests a powerful explanation for the frequently noted gap between the propertizing projects initiated by governments and actual property relations on the ground.

Property, we find in the literature, has been a battleground for competing claims made by a tremendous variety of social actors since the demise of

socialism (e.g., Kaneff 1996, 1998; Verdery 1996, 2004). It is subject to ongoing negotiations over agricultural land, forests, houses, public buildings, machinery, and so on. These negotiations are a field of micropolitics and involve various kinds of social actors asserting rights to objects, such as in the case of agricultural land: villagers, urban residents, agricultural managers, and entrepreneurs, as well as village communities and ethnic groups. Parties to these negotiations are also various kinds of state officials, local power holders and other leaders seeking to regulate property matters, a matter we will return to later. The point we wish to make here is that, in many instances, the rights asserted by various social actors are in direct competition with each other. Struggles over agricultural land rights, for example, have pitted villagers against each other, villagers against local elites, rural against urban residents, old against young, and one ethnic group against another. Property relations, therefore, are politicized through power struggles permeating them.

The property relations resulting from these negotiations are often a far cry from the stipulations made in national law and reform regulations. The difference may come from the variation in whose claims are recognized to be legitimate. In Albania, for example, many villages restituted agricultural land to historical owners and their heirs, instead of distributing the land equally among the current agricultural workforce. Although the national land law ordered distribution, villagers restituted the land to historical owners with the conviction that it was the right thing to do (de Waal 2004). The difference may also take the expression of variation in the specific bundles of rights and obligations accorded to landowners. National law and local property relations may provide different answers to questions about what land owners can actually do with their land, what they cannot do, and what they ought to do. For example, agricultural producers have been observed to resist restrictions on land use practices and shed obligations of land stewardship laid out in environmental regulations. Their practices do not reflect ignorance but conscious efforts to negotiate the concrete rights and obligations attached to titles in an attempt to shore up the value that the land possesses for them (Sikor 2006). The landowners thus seek to untie the bundles of rights and obligations transferred to them as part of land reform, add additional rights, discard obligations and re-tie the bundle. This untying and retying takes place in agriculture, but even more so in relation to forests and protected areas, where villagers often oppose the obligations, duties, and restrictions imposed by environmental regulations on their land use practices.¹¹

Postsocialist Struggles over Value

The literature demonstrates that this claim-making and negotiating takes place within wider struggles of value. On the one hand, people justify their claims on resources in reference to various kinds of social values, not limited to the notions of private ownership and capitalist individualism driving postsocialist propertizing projects (Hann 1993; Humphrey 1995; Kaneff 1995, 1996; Verdery 1998, 1999). Some assert the primacy of individual entitlement, such as the land rights accorded to them in national legislation. Others call for historical justice as the primary principle according to which land should be restituted to its owners prior to collectivization. And there are people who justify their claims on valuable objects in reference to kinship under the motto of, “I am the son, daughter, sister, brother of...,” or diametrically opposed to this, the efficiency of the market, “I have paid for this.” Alternatively, as Katherine Verdery reports, people may make claims on the basis of collective labor invested in the past. At her Romanian field site, villagers oppose the sale of a granary to a private entrepreneur even though he had made the highest bid in a public auction. The villagers argue that they built the granary together under socialist agriculture, and that this collective labor investment of the past still matters more than any monetary payment (Verdery 1999).

Negotiations over property thereby connect with people’s identities and visions of a desirable future. The influence of identities and visions plays out in many ways. For example, a frequent observation during the initial years of land reform was that people attached surprisingly high significance to getting the land back that they or their parents owned prior to collectivization, and then went about working the land again. This significance, Chris Hann explains, had little to do with the material value of land, but largely reflected strong emotional attachments because property rights to land served as means for conserving family bonds (Hann 1993). Claims on land were closely tied to people’s efforts to see themselves as members of a family or extended kinship group. Similarly, Katrina Schwartz finds that Latvians who reject proposed national parks do so less on material grounds than on their opposition to the vision of the cultural landscape underlying the proposals (K. Schwartz 2006). Their views of the landscape are firmly agrarian, as a productive landscape that is tightly connected with a broader discourse of Latvian identity as a “nation of farmers.” Latvian park proponents, however, assert landscape visions stressing their function as habitats for biodiversity, alluding to a broader narrative of Latvia similar to Europe and European visions.¹²

On the other hand, even where people emphasize material over other kinds of social values, they rarely attribute a single economic value to

particular objects. As Adrian Smith has shown, not even the economic forces unleashed by market liberalization gravitate into a single, uniform system of value (Smith 2000, 2002a, 2002b). As there are multiple systems of value at work, postsocialist countries witness “multiple geographies of economic practices” (Smith and Stenning 2006). Land and other assets become valorized in different ways, such as through the global commodity economy, national product markets, and local barter. These systems of value do not operate separately from each other, since people often engage with different economies simultaneously. A good illustration of this comes from the much noted rise of subsistence agriculture in Central and Eastern Europe (Bridger and Pine 1998; Smith 2002a; Meurs 2002; Pickles 2002). Many smallholders produce grains and vegetables to meet important dietary needs at home, or to prove good husbandry of their land. As important as the products are to them within their local systems of value, they do not possess significant value in the monetary economies. As a result, they experience a massive shortfall in monetary benefits, even though they continue working the land for other benefits. Given the opportunity, however, they would happily sell their products in the monetized economy or shift to producing other crops for sale.

These multiple systems of value do not operate to the equal advantage of everyone. A primary theme in the literature is that small landowners often find themselves in a disadvantaged position in relation to other actors, such as traders and the owners of agricultural machinery. Even though the landowners hold titles, they depend on access to complementary productive resources and markets to derive benefits from the titles (Verdery 1998, 1999, 2003; Zbierski-Salameh 1999; Giordano and Kostova 2002). Some have difficulty accessing necessary machinery, obtaining credit, and purchasing inputs. They encounter product markets controlled by a few buyers and urban speculators, such as the *akuli* (sharks) who have a hold over grain marketing in Bulgaria. Selling or leasing land is not a profitable option for many smallholders either, since they receive only meager payments. These observations do not deny that at least some small landowners do well in the new monetary economies. Some carve out profitable niches for themselves in local and regional product markets by shifting production to new crops and livestock (Sikor 2001a; Sikor and Pham 2005; Winkels 2008). Nevertheless, more often than not small landowners end up on the losing side.

Property and the “State” of the Postsocialist State

The literature shows that postsocialist negotiations are not only about the social values associated with property but also about the state as the

ultimate enforcer of property rights and obligations. Negotiations over property involve various state officials at the local and central levels just as much as the social actors demanding ownership or use rights.¹³ Legislators and central officials make laws and regulations to stipulate the procedures applicable to land affairs. Local officials staff the committees in charge of privatizing land and other assets, and implement the directives set down by central governments. Negotiations over property also raise questions about applicable state procedures and legitimate state practices (Harms 2009). Postsocialist property reforms, therefore, have as much to do with property as they do with the state.

Property reforms open up a space for local officials to maneuver, as Janet Sturgeon shows in her work in southern China (Sturgeon 2005). Various reform policies enacted by China's central government, such as land auctions, afford local cadres significant leverage on property rights. The local cadres exercise control over property to a greater extent than is afforded to them by law. The property dealings influence the position of the local government toward villagers, allowing the cadres to solidify their control over village affairs. They also help local governments to sustain relative autonomy from central directives and interventions. This struggle between central government and local officials is a dynamic also observed in many other postsocialist settings (Humphrey 1995; Kaneff 1996; Ho 2001; Lampland 2002; Verdery 2002; Kerkvliet 2005). Another, related dynamic originates from competition between different branches of a central or local government, such as forest departments and land administration agencies (Stark 1992; Sowerwine 2004; Sturgeon 2004).

In some circumstances, struggles over postsocialist property even challenge the state's monopoly over the definition and enforcement of property rights. For example, in some places, people justify their claims on valuable resources, not in reference to state law, but in regards to various forms of customary arrangements. The significance of custom as a definer and enforcer of property rights emerges strongly in Clarissa de Waal's research in Albania (de Waal 2004, 2005). De Waal recounts how many Albanians assert various kinds of customary rights to agricultural land and forests, restituting them to their historical owners in direct contradiction with state legislation. They also resolve land disputes on the basis of customary regulations. Customs thus offer justifications for claims on land and other resources, a phenomenon that has also been observed in the mountains of China and Vietnam, and the grasslands of Central Asia.¹⁴

More broadly, research on postsocialist negotiations over property demonstrates that people assert claims in reference not only to state laws and procedures but also to a variety of other institutions, including various forms of customs, transnational law, religious norms, rules enforced by

powerful networks, and regulations governing the operations of international donors and non-governmental organizations.¹⁵ States consequently encounter competition in their claim to hold the monopoly over the definition and enforcement of property rights. These contestations of control over property contribute to and simultaneously reflect what Katherine Verdery calls “parcelization of sovereignty” (Verdery 1996). The state is no longer the sole sovereign over people’s affairs, if it ever was.

Research on postsocialist property dynamics, therefore, shows that property relations have been at the core of people’s struggles to make sense of broader economic, political, and cultural changes. As governments propertize agricultural land and forests, in reaction people have not only questioned government definitions of legitimate claims but also negotiated the implicit definition of value and state. Moreover, the research shows, we suggest and seek to elaborate next, how propertizing projects and people’s reactions to them are part of wider processes revalorizing productive activities and reconfiguring authority. Property relations reflect the influence of broader processes making and unmaking value and authority as much as property practices help constitute value and authority relations. We discuss this mutually recursive constitution of property, value, and authority in the following section, using observations from postsocialist Europe and Asia for illustration.

Concepts: Property, Value, and Authority

Before we begin our empirical inquiry, we will review a set of relevant concepts to guide us. It is useful to start with C.B. MacPherson’s classic definition of a property right as being about “an enforceable claim to some use or benefit.”¹⁶ Property is about claims, this widely recognized definition states. In addition, two further elements are crucial. First, property requires some “use” or “benefit”—that is, it involves definitions of what is desirable to be used, or to derive benefits from. Objects must be considered useful or valuable, at least by some, to become worthy of rights and obligations. Second, claims become “enforceable” through sanctioning by institutions of authority. Claims turn into property rights only if recognized by a politico-legal institution with the authority to do so, such as the state. This definition of property gives a roadmap for our conceptual explorations. We begin with the concept of value, followed by a discussion of authority.

Value and Property

Value is integral to the idea of property, since at least some social actors must consider objects valuable to assert claims and demand rights to them. However, value is a problematic concept; it has been the subject of much debate in the social sciences.¹⁷ For our purposes, we draw on David Graeber's work, in particular his argument for an integrated theory of value that captures both wider social norms and the worthiness attributed to a specific object (Graeber 2001). The benefit of such an integrated theory of value, Graeber shows, is that it helps to establish both qualitative and quantitative differences. Qualitative difference refers to "conceptions of what is ultimately good, proper, or desirable in human life"; in contrast, quantitative difference is about "the degree to which objects are desired" (*ibid.*). In other words, value is about different kinds of social values (wealth, happiness, etc.) and the particular benefit assigned to an object, including but not limited to its monetary value or price.

Therefore, we use value in two ways, as value regimes and the benefits attached to particular objects. Following Graeber, we articulate value regimes when we refer to imaginary totalities organized around different conceptions of value. Social actors employ different modes of valuing and therefore prioritize actions, things, ideas, and so on in different ways. This notion of value regimes strongly resonates with the discussion of postsocialist property dynamics above, as the move toward capitalism exposes people to new systems of value (Tompson 1999; Humphrey 2002; Verdery 2003). At the same time, people adhere to some of the socialist values and moralities of the past as they display a "gut loyalty to this former everyday life" (Humphrey 1999: xii). As noted by many scholars, people in postsocialist societies have been engaged in intensive debates about social values and different economic value regimes (Hann 1993; Humphrey 1995; Smith 2000, 2002a, 2002b; Verdery 1998, 1999).

Negotiations over value often connect with contestations over social identities, such as ethnic and national identities.¹⁸ Deema Kaneff, for example, shows in her research on Bulgaria how different notions of social identity surface in the restitution of agricultural land (Kaneff 1998).¹⁹ The restitution of agricultural land to historical owners leads villagers to emphasize ethnic cohesion as a primary social value to guide village affairs. Further, the growing attention to ethnic identities (Bulgarian, Macedonian, Turk, Pomak, Gypsy) shapes people's evaluations of land claims as being either legitimate or illegitimate—in stark contrast to national legislation that accords equal rights to all citizens. In this way, land takes on value as ethnic territory, because the restitution of agricultural land connects with contestations over social identities.

Value regimes are also in direct relationship to different views of the landscape and proper practices of land management, as Janet Sturgeon reveals in her research in China (Sturgeon 2005). Villagers' views emphasized flexibility and diversity, whereas officials sought to homogenize and stabilize the landscape through their projects. As a result, villagers and officials recognized different landscape elements as meaningful and valuable. Their different landscape visions resulted in different conceptions of what kinds of resources were "up for grabs" (Sturgeon 2004)—that is, available for property claims.

Value, we also assert, refers to the benefits attached to particular objects. Value understood in this way involves the ranking of particular objects within a value regime. Since these benefits are specific to value regimes, an object may be attributed high value in one regime but given no or low value in another. Consequently, land may possess a high symbolic value to rural people, but many may discover that it generates only low financial benefits according to the rules of the monetized economy, as highlighted in the work of Adrian Smith discussed above (Smith 2000, 2002a, 2002b). The same insight applies to particular components of rural landscapes, because each may be considered valuable in one value regime but be of little benefit in another, as illustrated in the work of Katrina Schwartz (2006) discussed above. Latvians are involved in intense debates about protected areas and rural environments, in part because they value different landscape components: where the agrarians see large fields the Europeans look out for footpaths.

The rankings of particular objects within a value regime are not a given. Instead, they are the subject of often intense negotiations, particularly within newly emerging value regimes. As David Stark writes on the privatization of Hungarian industry, managers of privatized state enterprises react to the changes in the values of their assets due to market liberalization and new accounting rules (Stark 1996). The managers renegotiate companies' rights and obligations by recombining the privatized assets in new ways. Their responses affect the valuation of companies, as managers succeed in shifting liabilities onto the shoulders of the public and retain valuable assets in reorganized companies. By the end of the privatization process managers have unpacked and repacked assets in surprising ways, repositioning the assets under their control within the new value regime.

The shift from one value regime to another can lead to serious devaluation or virtually complete annihilation of the value they attribute to an object. People may end up holding property rights to some resources but derive little or no benefit from them, something that Verdery calls a lack of "effective ownership." Studying smallholders in Transylvania, she finds that property

titles do not enable people to “realize the values they saw in their new property object” (Verdery 2003: 104). Lack of machinery and inputs as well as unfavorable terms of trade make people’s farming unprofitable in the terms of the new market economy. More generally, property rights do not grant an automatic share in the overall benefits attached to a particular object. Other social actors may be in a better position to generate profits from an object, even though they do not hold property rights.²⁰

From this brief review, then, we learn that negotiations over property involve negotiations over value. As social actors make claims on resources, they do so within particular value regimes and attribute specific benefits to particular objects. Value regimes and benefits are both subject to the very same struggles over property, as are the rights and obligations attached to particular objects. Propertizing projects, by implication, involve negotiations over the kinds and levels of value that people attach to objects. The designers and implementers of propertizing projects cannot assume that these values are fixed.

Authority, Property and the State

Next, we discuss the issue of authority, the second defining criterion of property. Authority relates to property because rights and obligations require sanctioning in order to be considered more than a claim. This sanctioning results from politico-legal institutions of recognized authority (Benda-Beckmann 1995; Lund 2002).²¹

Authority, we suggest by way of a simple definition, is power considered legitimate. In the words of Max Weber, authority refers to an instance of power that is associated with at least a minimum of voluntary compliance, making it likely “that a command with a specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons” (Weber 1976: 28). Authority characterizes the capacity of politico-legal institutions, such as states and their constituent institutions, village communities and religious groupings (as well as customary arrangements, moral conventions, and other social norms), to influence other social actors in ways considered legitimate. It is similar to power in the sense that it does not refer to any organization itself, but emerges from social practices and becomes a feature inherent to certain kinds of social relationships.²² It is different from power, because the latter involves all forms of coercion, whether considered legitimate or not.

Authority is neither inherently stable nor a fixed attribute of a particular institution. Instead, authority is unstable and volatile since it requires ongoing legitimization vis-à-vis specific constituencies, and because this legitimization waxes and wanes in the wake of ongoing struggles over legitimacy (Moore 1988; Lentz 1998). The legitimacy attributed to any

institution results from continuous practices of legitimization. Implied in this is the idea that an institution's authority always relates to particular constituencies and fields of social action, such as a government agency's jurisdiction over land matters vis-à-vis citizens. Authority may travel from one field of social action, such as control over land matters, to control over labor affairs, but that is far from automatic. Authority is about social relations, relations that tend to be contested. In many situations authority relations are highly contested as multiple politico-legal institutions attempt to turn power into authority by gaining and sustaining legitimacy in the eyes of their constituencies. This is a situation characteristic of postsocialist and postcolonial settings (Shipton and Goheen 1992; Verdery 1996; Humphrey 2002; and Sikor and Lund 2009b).

Claims and property rights feed into these contestations over authority. As we have seen, claims on resources require authorization by institutions of authority. In addition, claims on valuable objects simultaneously help to constitute authority. When someone asserts rights to a particular object then they also tend—explicitly or implicitly—to invoke an institution that they expect to sanction their claim as legitimate. By making their claim they simultaneously attribute authority to an institution. This intimate, two-way connection between property and authority finds illustration in Katharine Verdery's research on land restitution in a Romanian village (Verdery 1996, 1999, 2002). Verdery observes that every villager is busy making demands for the restitution of agricultural plots. The demands refer to various institutions as the ones sanctioning them as legitimate rights. Most, but not all, invoke the state in some form or other. One of the most active participants in this claim-making is the local mayor, because he positions himself between villagers and the central government. Nevertheless, not all claims invoke state discourses, laws or practices, and the claims invoking the state do not refer to a single, coherent set of state rules and practices. This observation leads Verdery to conclude that people's claims have not gravitated into a clear and coherent set of "routinized rules and crystallized practices of exclusion and inclusion" (Verdery 1999: 55). Many of the land disputes she witnesses are due to ongoing contestations over authority, and not simply direct competition for particular plots of agricultural land.

The state is often a key politico-legal institution invoked in social actors' claims on resources.²³ It figures in property dynamics in two ways. First, the state appears in claims on valuable objects and property rights as a unitary politico-legal institution or "idea" (Abrams 1988). People appeal to the state to provide the required backing for their claims, such as when the beneficiaries of land restitution hold up their ownership titles in opposition to encroachment on their land. However, the authority attributed to the

state as a politico-legal institution may be in contest with competitors such as religious groupings or customary arrangements (Tilly 1985; Lund 2008). In Albania, for example, Clarissa de Waal finds in the research discussed above that many people no longer call upon the state to sanction their claims on agricultural land and forest (de Waal 2004). Many refer to customary arrangements and not state law when they seek authorization for their claims on resources.

Second, we consider it helpful to examine the state as a forum in which multiple social actors contest the exercise of state authority (Migdal 2001; Corbridge et al. 2005).²⁴ The contestations are not only about the jurisdictions held by particular state entities, such as a Ministry of Forestry's control over a share of the national territory; they are also about the applicable procedures recognized as legitimate. For example, Allina-Pisano finds that local government officials exert a strong influence on the implementation of land reforms in Russia and the Ukraine (Allina-Pisano 2008). They create Potemkin villages by distributing land on paper but prevent the presumed beneficiaries from effectively claiming their new land rights. The local officials support the land claims of powerful actors, such as collective farm managers and private entrepreneurs. Local officials thereby exercise an understanding of applicable rules and procedures that is radically different from national legislation and land regulations. The difference reflects ongoing struggles of authority within the state, in this case between local officials and the central governments.

Negotiations over property, therefore, connect with contestations about authority and the state. As social actors make claims on what they consider valuable, they do so in reference to particular politico-legal institutions of authority and to specific sets of rules and practices. Institutions, rules, and practices of authority are an integral part of struggles over property. The implications for propertizing projects are clear: their designers and implementers cannot assume the institutions, rules, and practices to be fixed.

Studying Property Dynamics

With the above set of concepts in mind, we will begin our empirical inquiry into propertizing projects. The challenging nature of such an endeavor becomes immediately apparent even if the spatial dimensions alone are considered, and even though we limit the scope of our empirical inquiry to postsocialist land reforms. The latter have taken place in large parts of Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and East Asia, as well as some countries of Africa and Latin America. The transformations experienced by societies undergoing property reforms involve changes in multiple and overlapping

dimensions. Therefore, it is useful to discuss the method that has informed our research and the choice of the three countries—Albania, Romania and Vietnam—in which we conducted our empirical work.

A Few Words on Method

Our inquiry into property dynamics uses an ethnographic approach. Ethnography helps to show the issues rural people confront, and how they react to changes in their political-economic and biophysical environments. Ethnography of economic, political, and environmental change in specific geographical locations indicates the key elements and processes of societal transformations, together with how the transformations reflect particular histories and local conditions. In the spirit of Verdery's suggestion that "any instance provides insights," ethnographic monographs have developed new original frameworks for understanding societal transformations (Verdery 2003: 30). They show how people negotiate their way through turbulent times, refuting teleological ideas about singular and uniform transitions, such as the transition from public to private ownership.²⁵

We present multiple ethnographies of change in eight villages of Albania, Romania, and Vietnam. The value of multiple cases and coordinated ethnographies has long been highlighted in commentaries on various fields of research. Nonetheless, ethnographic studies involving multiple cases remain confined to a few rare exceptions such as the volume jointly authored by Chris Hann and the Property Relations Group (2003). For our own purposes, we believe that drawing together eight case studies will allow us to illustrate the political-economic and environmental complexities of change better than if examined separately. Including them in a single book builds a stronger analysis of property dynamics, highlighting the open-endedness and, to a certain degree, indeterminacy of the societal transformations accompanying propertizing projects.

Our ethnographies communicate with each other around the set of basic concepts introduced above. These shared concepts allow us to generate a grand narrative on propertizing projects from the data and insights produced in the case studies. By putting ethnographies into communication with each other—between the two covers of a single, co-authored book—we hope to learn about property projects in general: their characteristic features, key processes, and historical significance.

Communicating ethnographies helps us to narrow the gap between the apparent complexity of single ethnographies and the striking simplicity of grand narratives. Coordinated studies generate valuable empirical insights into wider societal transformations, highlighting their complexity and ambiguity. They also demonstrate the tremendous variation among

transformations in particular locations, and indicate the continuum of possible trajectories of change.²⁶ The goal is not to produce empirical typologies, but to reveal underlying dynamics producing economic, political, and environmental change through multiple analytical lenses. In other words, we build specific comparisons and contrasts into our analysis of the dynamics of property, value, and authority in particular locations.

We recognize that our approach of communicating ethnographies is unusual. Multiple ethnographies are rarely found in a single monograph, since they usually come in the form of edited volumes. Ethnographically minded readers may question the comparisons, which may appear overly reductionist to them. The comparatively inclined readers may find the empirical detail offered in the ethnographic chapters atypical. Our approach presents a response to what we perceive as a significant methodological tension in research on property. Ethnographic research is at its strongest when highlighting the specificity of local people's claims on resources in response to changes in their political-economic and biophysical environments. The emphasis is on open-endedness and process. Comparative analysis, in contrast, focuses on similarity and difference. Highlighting variation across space and/or time, it often tends toward rather static depictions of isolated instances or variables. By way of communicating ethnographies, we hope to weigh ethnographic inquiry and comparative analysis against each other in a productive manner.

Albania, Romania, and Vietnam

The book draws on eight village studies from Albania, Romania, and Vietnam, situating them in relation to broader economic, political, and cultural changes. Our choice of the three countries is a deliberate one. We want to critically interrogate the distinction between societal transformations in Europe and those taking place in East Asia. The distinction has been axiomatic in the political sciences and a defining element of area studies, effectively preventing a more analytical approach to comparisons and distinctions between Europe and East Asia.²⁷

We understand that putting Albania, Romania, and Vietnam into the same mix and labeling them "postsocialist" is a contentious decision. It may not raise concerns if we refer to the political regimes of Albania, Romania, and Vietnam in the decades leading up to 1990 as socialist.²⁸ All three countries called themselves Socialist Republics under the leadership of a Communist avant-garde party. The party-state managed the economy through a centralized regime of economic planning. State enterprises and collectives controlled production in all sectors, the former taking on a prominent role in forestry, and the latter being widespread in agriculture.

Yet, we are aware that referring to contemporary Albania, Romania, and Vietnam as “postsocialist” provokes dissent (e.g., see Reid-Henry 2007). Whereas Albania and Romania now possess constitutions as liberal democracies, Vietnam continues to pride itself as a Socialist Republic. Vietnam’s Communist Party remains firmly in charge of the party-state, in sharp contrast to the multiparty systems in the other two countries. Still, all three countries have embarked on fundamental economic reforms. Control over production has shifted from state and collective entities toward private actors. Markets have replaced administrative decisions as the major mechanism for allocating products and productive resources. All three countries have opened up their economies to international trade and investment. There are sufficient similarities, we are convinced, that warrant comparisons. It is useful to put village cases from the three countries into the same mix in order to identify their distinctive features in the process of comparison.

The three countries have embarked on massive propertizing projects to reform rural relations, as have many other countries in the previously socialist world.²⁹ The Albanian parliament passed a “Law Concerning the Land” in 1991, the Romanian parliament passed Law 18 in the same year, and Vietnam’s National Assembly instituted a new Land Law in 1993. The laws signaled the beginning of enormous land reforms, as is widely noted in the literature. Far-reaching programs distributed agricultural land held by state and collective units to households and other private entities. The stated objective in all three countries was to achieve an egalitarian distribution of agricultural land, either by limited restitution to historical owners or their heirs (Romania), or distribution to the current population (Albania and Vietnam). The same land reform laws also extended to forests, but have not resulted in the massive privatization seen in agriculture. Property reforms in forestry have granted many rural households and other private entities ownership titles to forest, but on a smaller scale than in agriculture. In forestry, much of the propertizing has taken the form of legislative initiatives aimed at revamping the relations between the state and other actors, involving changes in regulatory control and the meaning of state ownership.

The three countries resemble each other in two additionally important ways. First, at the onset of the property reforms, land and forest were important resources for rural livelihoods in Albania, Romania, and Vietnam. Rural people derived a major part of their income from agriculture and forestry as living standards in the three countries remained low. Productive uses such as cropland, meadows used for grazing, and actively managed forests dominated rural landscapes in 1990. Second, all three countries harbor significant ethnic diversity even though one ethnic group

in each country—the Albanians in Albania, the Romanians in Romania, and the Kinh in Vietnam—accounts for the majority of the population and dominates national identity and culture. In addition, there are other ethnic groups with their own distinct identities and cultures, including: Greeks, Macedonians, Vlachs, and Roma in Albania; Hungarians, Roma, and Rudari in Romania; and Muong, Tay, Nung, Thai, Hmong, and Dao in Vietnam.

Nevertheless, there are significant historical differences among the three countries. First, Albania, Romania, and Vietnam have found themselves in very different geopolitical positions for much of their recent history. Albania gained national independence in 1912 after a protracted struggle against the Ottoman Empire, and concerns for national independence strongly influenced socialist policy. Romania grew into its contemporary shape after World War I and joined the Soviet bloc after World War II. Vietnam, in turn, was a French colony until World War II and only gained independence and national unity after protracted wars against France and the United States. Second, socialist regimes displayed distinct features in the three countries. In Albania, the Hoxha regime not only held a firm grip on the economy and society but also isolated the country from the rest of the world. The Ceaușescu regime in Romania established totalitarian control over economic, social, and cultural life. In contrast, revolutionary leaders in Vietnam were never able to centralize power to the same degree. Third, the socialist regimes promoted different policies for the countryside. The Hoxha regime wanted to achieve national self-sufficiency in basic staples at any cost, together with the limited development of basic rural industries. Ceaușescu sought to transform the countryside by pushing rural industrialization, export-oriented agriculture, and rural–urban migration. Vietnam’s policies for rural areas granted agricultural collectives significant power over production but channeled a large share of agricultural surplus into cities and industries.

We argue that solid foundations exist for productive comparisons among the eight villages in Albania, Romania, and Vietnam. All three countries implemented radical propertizing projects as part of broader efforts to refashion economies, politics, and environments. Their relative similarities help us to set aside questions about the effects of living standards, kinds of land use, and ethnic heterogeneity as causes of potential variation. At the same time, ongoing differences among the three countries enable us to explore the significance of historical influences on contemporary transformations.

The Argument: Propertizing Projects and Societal Transformations

Our argument, as presented in the chapters of this book, asserts that propertizing projects have led to radical changes in property, value, and authority in Albania, Romania, and Vietnam. Agriculture, the subject of Part I, underwent fundamental processes of devaluation and revaluation. The new landowners faced drastic changes in the relative prices of agricultural output. Furthermore, new opportunities of migration and non-farm activity revalorized the relative returns achieved in agriculture, as did a rapidly growing urban demand for rural tourism and weekend homes. More broadly, villagers became exposed to new social values and visions of a desirable life. The new landowners responded to these changes in different ways. Chapter 1 shows how some Albanians moved abroad in search of employment and a better life, while others tried to make a living in agriculture. Chapter 2 conveys how some Romanians sought to generate profits by commercializing production, while others focused on subsistence crops and livestock. Chapter 3 recounts the stories of some Vietnamese landowners who sold their land to tourism entrepreneurs and urban residents for recreational purposes, and others who acquired additional land to expand agricultural production.

The central elements in these varying reactions were people's efforts to gain property titles and to attach monetary or new symbolic value to them. As much as people valued the new land titles for their political significance in the 1990s, they subsequently looked for new monetary values inside and outside agriculture. Postsocialist negotiations over property, therefore, coincided with intense struggles over value. People valued land for the associated monetary returns, as a basis of subsistence, and as a source of social prestige or a signifier of identity. Their valuations sometimes reflected events far away from their villages, locating them within transnational processes that revalorized property rights, such as migration flows conditioned by immigration policy in other countries. The valuations also revealed the influence of local livelihood traditions that had proven effective under socialism and even prior to it. The values people attached to land also connected with the ideas they had about themselves and others, and about the lifestyles and futures they wanted for themselves and their children. In doing so, the land reforms did not benefit all new owners equally; of course, some people experienced significant improvements in the material and symbolic values attached to their land, while others witnessed dramatic declines, which deprived the land of any kind of value.

In contrast, forests, the subject of Part II, experienced nothing less than a frenzied grab for property rights and other forms of access. Our

ethnographies show how many different social actors made claims on forests, which turned out to be the most valuable resource available in many locations. People struggled over the distribution of ownership titles, providing various justifications for their claims. Those who received titles contested the restrictions and obligations imposed on them by state regulation. Many others made claims on forests even though they had not received any titles. In the Albanian villages, covered in Chapter 4, many people claimed rights to forest with reference to state law or various kinds of customary arrangements, or they rushed on the forest without further justification. In Chapter 5, we explain how, in the Romanian villages, the new forest owners lost out to local state officials and other powerful actors who forced owners to sell at low prices, traded wood illegally, or rigged timber auctions. Finally, in Chapter 6, we see how, in Vietnam, local officials manipulated or ignored central government programs to derive personal benefits from timber logging and forest protection.

The ethnographies in Part II show how property struggles intersected with contestations over authority along several dimensions. One dimension was the kind of politico-legal institution to which people attributed the authority to sanction claims on resources as property. In some places, various kinds of customary arrangements became the main points of reference for property rights to land and forest. In others, it was mostly state law and practices that sanctioned claims as property. In yet others, multiple institutions offered competing authorizations for claims on resources. Another dimension in these contestations involved the procedures by which state authority was to be exercised. Where the state was the dominant politico-legal institution, the exercise of authority varied between rule-based and personalized forms. A third dimension in contestations over authority was the struggle between different state actors. Local officials and central governments often ended up competing over who was to set the rules and make decisions on forestry matters.

We revisit the premises underlying property projects in the Conclusion. Insights from postsocialist land reforms demonstrate that propertizing is not simply about states allocating objects of known value to social actors, a finding that possesses direct relevance for propertizing projects beyond postsocialist settings. Instead, negotiations over property simultaneously deal with competing sources of value and contestations over authority. Property dynamics reflect the influence of broader economic, political, and cultural processes, as well as feeding into wider societal transformations that involve simultaneous changes in property, value, and authority. The grandness of the propertizing projects and their societal effects may not be as fundamental elsewhere as the ones we describe in postsocialist contexts. Nevertheless, propertizing projects always involve simultaneous negotiations

over property, value, and authority, making their outcomes much less predictable than their designers and implementers like to believe. This lack of predictability was particularly striking in the postsocialist moment, reflecting the exceptional open-endedness of postsocialist transformations.

We conclude that negotiations over property can tell us a great deal about wider societal transformations. In addition, we can gain important insights on larger economic, political, and cultural changes by looking at struggles over property in particular places, especially if our ethnographies communicate with each other. Our inquiry into property dynamics in three Albanian villages shows how twice in the 1990s it was possible that the Albanian state would collapse. Likewise, the village studies from Romania indicate how the country gained admission to the European Union in 2004—and why it took that long. Finally, our exploration of the three Vietnamese villages reveals how Vietnam's Communist Party has managed to remain firmly in power despite the evidence of widespread corruption. Property, we find, provides a special lens to examine social change.

Notes

1. The name is a pseudonym, as are all of the personal and village names used throughout the book.
2. We prefer the term “postsocialism” to “postcommunism” because the latter is tainted by its frequent usage for political abuse. In addition, socialism refers to the society-focused ideal equivalent to capitalism in the West. In contrast, communism entails a Marxist–Leninist model as, for example, applied in the Soviet Union.
3. Our term “proptertizing projects” is similar to Pauline Peters’s (1994) notion of proptertization. While we agree with the substance of her argument, we disagree with her conclusion that property is not a useful analytical concept. Property can be useful for analytical purposes as long as we distinguish it from the legal specifications enshrined in particular legislation or the terms used by people.
4. For examples of collective organizations, consider the allocation of grazing rights to groups of herders in Central Asia (Humphrey and Sneath 1999), the restitution of forests to cooperatives in Bulgaria (Cellarius 2004), and the transfer of ownership rights on secondary irrigation canals to local organizations in Bulgaria (Penov 2004). For examples of collectivities and state agencies, see the delineation of forestland as public forest managed by a state department (Staddon 2000; Sikor 2001b), and the expansion of protected areas under the control of environmental agencies (Franklin 2002; Zingerli 2005).
5. For example, see Perreault (2005).
6. For a good, empirically informed critique of de Soto’s argument, see Benjaminsen et al. (2008).

7. One could also argue that this assumption contains another one: that there is a general agreement about the nature of objects and about the ability to appropriate them as separate physical or legal entities.
8. We use the term “property relations” to highlight the social embeddedness of property (cf. Hann 1998; Verdery 2003). We speak of “property rights” only when we refer to the specific rights granted by an institution, such as the state, to a particular actor, or when we refer to particular discourses of property.
9. For the latter, see the World Bank report by Deininger (2003). For comprehensive reviews, see Heller and Serkin (1999), Akram-Lodhi, Borras and Kay (2006), Fay and James (2009) and Lipton (2009).
10. See Sachs (1990) and Manser (1993) for the boosterism found among economists and environmentalists in the early 1990s.
11. On protected areas, see Franklin (2002) and Zingerli (2005). On forests, see de Waal (2004) and Sowerwine (2004).
12. Harms (2011, 2012) provides an insightful discussion of how property practices connect with people’s notions of beauty in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam.
13. See Baum and Shevchenko (1999) and Grzymala-Busse and Luong (2002) for insightful discussions on local governments and their relations with the central organs of the state in China and Eastern Europe.
14. On Vietnam and China, see Sowerwine (2004) and Sturgeon (2004). On Central Asia, see Anderson (1998), Humphrey and Sneath (1999) and Fernandez-Gimenez (2002).
15. On the Mafia, see Verdery (1996), Penov (2004), and Theesfeld (2004). On the influence of transnational norms, see Zingerli (2005).
16. MacPherson (1978: 3). Our approach to property draws on the works of Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, in particular their suggestion to use property as an analytical framework for looking at relationships among social actors with regard to objects of value. Among others, see Benda-Beckmann and Benda-Beckmann (1999) and Benda-Beckmann, Benda-Beckmann, and Wiber (2006).
17. For key writings on value, see Mauss (1965), Appadurai (1986), Munn (1986), and Strathern (1988).
18. Another way to put the linkage between property and identities is to look at how human subjectivities influence property claims, and are influenced by them. See Agrawal’s discussion (2005) of environmentality and changes in human subjectivities underlying forest stewardship in India, and Kligman and Verdery’s account (2011) of collectivization in Romania. See also Mansfield (2007) on privatization, Strang and Busse (2011) on private ownership, and Humphrey (2002) and Verdery (2003) on postsocialist property reforms.
19. See also the book she edited with Leonard (2002).
20. Here we connect with the theory of access developed by Jesse Ribot and Nancy Peluso (2003). They note that a property right to a particular resource does not necessarily create the ability to benefit from that resource, pointing out a number of “access mechanisms” that enable other social actors without property rights to benefit from resources. These insights, we suggest, may be usefully extended by considering multiple value regimes, particularly non-monetary ones, and attention to processes creating value.

21. What follows is a synthesis of the argument developed in Sikor and Lund (2009a).
22. This is a possible point for confusion, as many people commonly refer to particular organizations, such as a central or local government, as “authorities.” However, we think it is useful to distinguish between politico-legal institutions (which may or may not be embodied in organizations, and which take on a fixed quality), and authority as an emergent feature of social relationships.
23. The connection between property and the state has a long tradition in social theory. See MacPherson (1978) for a selection of classical writings.
24. See also Kligman and Verdery (2011) on the linkages between struggles over property and processes of state formation.
25. On postsocialism, see Burawoy and Verdery (1999) and Humphrey (2002). Kligman and Verdery (1999) develop a convincing case of how ethnographic research can help to avoid wrong generalizations.
26. Complexity, ambiguity, and diversity are also key themes in the special issue of *Conservation and Society* 2(1) (2004) on postsocialist property relations, and in Tassilo Herrschel’s work (2007a, 2007b) on the geography of postsocialism.
27. Walder (1995) is a rare exception.
28. For useful discussions of the socialist regimes, see Sjöberg (1991) on Albania, Verdery (1996) on Romania, and Fforde and de Vylder (1996) on Vietnam. For overviews of the reforms, see de Waal (2005) on Albania, Weiner (2001) on Romania, and Fforde and de Vylder (1996) on Vietnam.
29. See Verdery (2003), Mathijs and Swinnen (1998), and Rozelle and Swinnen (2004) for overviews of privatization strategies and changing ownership structures in agriculture. On property reforms in forestry and nature conservation, see World Bank (2000, 2005).

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