

# INTRODUCTION

In the paradoxes of today lies the truth of tomorrow. And so one may venture to say that violence has become obsolete. It was a way in the feudal and early capitalist world to bring about a new distribution of social power, but its time is past.

Emil Lederer (1921)<sup>1</sup>

## Introduction

Emil Lederer—a Heidelberg professor, Social Democratic intellectual, and future emigrant—was right: after the Revolution of 1918/19, political violence in Germany was in fact an anachronism. The new Weimar Republic was based on a compromise between the moderate right, the political center, and the moderate left. By granting the workers' movement equal rights without fundamentally altering the social order, it offered German society the chance to pursue conflicts between classes, interest groups, and ideological camps within democratic forms. That chance, however, was squandered. Political violence accompanied the Weimar Republic from the civil war battles in its early years to the bloody clashes between National Socialists and Communists in its final phase.

Yet I shall argue that the bloody battles between 1919 and 1921 did not make the subsequent development inevitable. After the phase of civil war, political violence assumed a distinctly limited form. It was no longer aimed at killing or wounding as many opponents as possible; instead, it served political parties and organizations as an instrument for exerting pressure in the struggle over control of the street. This development was driven by the Combat Leagues (*Wehrverbände*) of all political camps, who, with their uniforms and marches, injected militaristic elements into the political culture. However, since the violence they perpetrated followed a political and not a military logic, it was, as I will show, in principle controllable and did not pose a fundamental threat to the political order, not even in 1932, that particularly turbulent year before Hitler's assumption of power. Still, in the increasingly polarized society of Weimar Germany, such "small" violence pervaded an ever growing number of places and regions. This helped the extreme right to instrumentalize violence for its campaign against the Weimar democracy, which ended in victory in 1933. It stoked the fear of a civil war the Communists were allegedly preparing, and to that end it picked

---

Notes from this section begin on page xxxviii.

up and radicalized interpretive schemes that had served to discredit the workers' movement before the First World War. The Communists' aggressive propaganda and readiness to engage in violence contributed to this development, but at no time did they pose a serious threat. It was not political violence as such that forced the Weimar Republic into a position where abandoning democracy seemed a way out, but its use as an argument by forces on the right intent on transforming the Republic into an authoritarian state.

By investigating the causes and effects of political violence in the Weimar Republic, the present study sheds new light on the first German democracy's chances of survival. The Weimar Republic has been the topic of intensive research for a long time.<sup>2</sup> And for quite some time that research has been dominated by the question about the reasons behind its failure. Scholars searched for missed opportunities in the Revolution of 1918/19 and for the factors that led to the rise of the Nazi Party (NSDAP) and Hitler's assumption of power in 1933. From that perspective, the Weimar Republic seemed nothing more than a transitional stage, a mere prehistory to the "Third Reich" and its horrors. This perception changed in the wake of Detlev Peukert's groundbreaking study of the Weimar Republic as an experiment with modernity (1987). The years between 1918/19 and 1933 are now seen as a time of a massive push toward modernization, one that triggered enormous changes in the political system, the welfare state, relations between classes and genders, and the culture at large, spawning fierce resistance in the process. Special attention is paid to the effects of the inflation that began with the outbreak of war in 1914 and reached its catastrophic climax in 1923.<sup>3</sup>

This does not mean that the question about the causes behind the failure of Weimar has been abandoned. But it has been placed within a more complex framework. The interest is now directed at the multiplicity of designs and interpretations generated by the modernizing thrust, especially in the first years of Weimar, and the reasons for why and when they became more constricted and polarized in the years that followed. The presumption, then, is of a certain openness in Weimar's development: the Republic no longer appears doomed from the very start. The present study embraces this kind of perspective. By examining political violence, a particularly dangerous element of political culture, it probes into the severity of political conflicts and the ways in which they were carried out, into the social conflicts underlying them, and into the cultural processes of interpretation that helped to either heighten or diffuse these conflicts, processes that included, not least, the definition of gender roles in the Weimar Republic. In the end, our picture of Weimar will become clearer insofar as we will get a better sense of the options that were available in Weimar's crisis and could have been used to save democracy.

## **The State of Scholarship**

In spite of the numerousness of studies on the Weimar Republic, to date there is none that has examined, alongside the organizations by which political violence

was perpetrated, this violence itself for the entire period from 1918/19 to 1933. The present book is intended to close this gap, and to show that a careful look at the contexts that gave rise to violence, at the way in which it unfolded, at its victims, and at the damage it caused is indispensable for a thorough understanding of the interpretations and actions that followed in its wake.

Among the outstanding events in the history of Weimar violence, the Kapp Putsch and the subsequent fighting in the Ruhr region have been analyzed especially closely. In the 1970s, Erhard Lucas interpreted these events rather sweepingly as the “March revolution,” seeing in them a syndicalist alternative to both the government’s policy and to the line of the German Communist Party (KPD).<sup>4</sup> However, most of the studies on political violence focus on only one side of the political spectrum. A number of older studies examined the organizational structure, the ideology, and the political behavior of the Free Corps, the Home Guards (*Einwohnerwehren*), and the Combat Leagues of all political camps; among them, Karl Rohe’s work on the Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold (Reich Banner Black-Red-Gold) stands out.<sup>5</sup> In his synthesis of these studies, James Diehl interpreted the history of the paramilitary units on the right as a continuation of the bourgeois *Sammlungspolitik* (policy of concentration) of the prewar period, with the Vaterlandspartei (Fatherland Party) as an intermediate stage. The Free Corps and the Home Guards—whose importance Diehl overestimates—in his view carried the militarization of politics into wide circles of the citizenry, thus preparing the ground for the right-wing Combat Leagues and, finally, the Nazi Sturmabteilung (SA, Storm Troopers).<sup>6</sup>

Since the late 1970s, a more refined methodology has been used to examine especially National Socialist and Communist violence in the end phase of the Weimar Republic after 1929. Following in the footsteps of Richard Bessel’s penetrating study on the National Socialist SA in the eastern regions of Prussia, Sven Reichardt has most recently studied the SA in Berlin. He explains the readiness of SA men to become violent by their habituation to violence in the male bonding world of the SA tavern. In this world, ideological driving forces were of less importance than the self-affirmation and the recognition from SA comrades that was sought in day-to-day acts of violence. In contrast to Reichardt, however, Bessel emphasizes the relatively limited character of the confrontation between the SA and its opponents.<sup>7</sup>

Peter Merkl’s analysis of the biographies of SA men also ascribes great importance to long-term learning processes of violence in conjunction with experiences of social decline.<sup>8</sup> Communist violence in the final phase of the Weimar Republic has been examined in detail by Eve Rosenhaft, who looked at the example of Berlin. She interprets this violence primarily as defensive behavior by the party rank and file, which sought to prevent the National Socialists from invading its territory and was only in part amenable to control by the party’s central organization.<sup>9</sup> Pamela Swett, focusing also on Berlin in the final years of the Weimar Republic, has recently taken Rosenhaft’s argument even further. Her explanation of street violence as product of a “neighborhood-based radical culture” that

lacked clear-cut party allegiances, however, fails to examine and therefore underestimates the influence of radical party leaders and organizations at the neighborhood level.<sup>10</sup>

The heroization of the radical left—which can be found in Lucas, for example, but still shines through in Rosenhaft, as well—is no longer convincing today. Equally to be rejected is the contrary position advanced by Ernst Nolte, namely that the violence of the radical right in the “European civil war” after 1917 was merely the inevitable response to the desire of the radical left to destroy them.<sup>11</sup> It readily equates Communist propaganda with the Communist rank and file’s readiness to take action, completely overlooks the causes of right-wing violence that are rooted in an authoritarian conception of order, and in the final analysis takes an apologetic stance toward that violence. Not long ago, Andreas Wirsching, following Nolte’s lead but also engaging his views critically, examined the radical political currents and the violence they spawned in Berlin and Paris in the period between the wars.<sup>12</sup> His approach, which is based on a modified, “historical-genetic” theory of totalitarianism, avoids the implicit value judgment of Nolte’s position. But it, too, does not escape the danger of painting an excessively monolithic picture of the Communist movement, or of downplaying the radical right prior to the rise of National Socialism.

The study by Wirsching and many others of recent date proceed on the assumption that the First World War “brutalized” European societies, and they see in this a primary cause behind the political violence of the interwar period. For the most part, the core of this brutalization is located in the violent experiences of front-line soldiers, which supposedly lowered the inhibitory threshold to the use of violence in a lasting way.<sup>13</sup> At first glance, this thesis seems plausible. Political violence characterized the interwar period not only in Germany. However, recent studies have shown that the violence was perpetrated by only a minority of the returning front-line soldiers. Moreover, the old nation states of France and England were able to keep this violence within very tightly drawn limits.<sup>14</sup> An automatic connection between the war experience and political violence after the war therefore did not exist. What was crucial is how the war experience was interpreted and employed as an argument in the political clashes.

## Approach

A study of political violence requires an explicit definition of its subject, for it is not self-evident. What is violence in the first place, and what is “political” violence? These questions are the subject of controversy and debate not only within the historical profession.<sup>15</sup> The most recent contributions to the scholarly discussion—which a single scholar can no longer even begin to keep track of—insist on taking seriously the physical act of violence as the impact upon the body, as the sensation of pleasure and pain. I try to do this here in the sense that a close look at the unfolding of specific violent events and the behavior of those who

participated forms a crucial part of the account. However, one cannot get around the fact that an approach focused on the emotions connected with violence is confronted with historical sources that often contain so little information when it comes to individual feelings that any interpretation faces clear limitations. Moreover, such an approach is not immune from describing violence too quickly as a constant that is resistant to civilization, as one can see in Wolfgang Sofsky's "tractate on violence."<sup>16</sup>

The attribute "political" indicates that the violence of interest to me here is not a matter of individuals, which means that in the final analysis it is not the motives and feelings of individual actors that are at the center of the analysis, but the factors and circumstances decisive for their collective action. In this context, Johan Galtung's concept of "structural violence," which was highly influential for a while and is still occasionally used today, turns out not to be useful. Galtung argued that violence is present "if humans are influenced in such a way that their current physical and intellectual self-realization is less than their potential self-realization." It can take the form of directly experienced, "personal" violence, or of indirect, "structural" violence, which Galtung also defined as "social injustice."<sup>17</sup> Critics have generally objected that his definition lacks specificity and is not very useful analytically.<sup>18</sup> If in principle nearly every form of social inequality is violence, it is no longer possible to draw meaningful distinctions between the varying degrees of legitimacy of such inequalities, between the different ways in which they are perceived and the resulting consequences for social action; the concept of violence dissolves into the concept of society. Moreover, this kind of notion of violence suggests a fluid transition between indirect "structural" and direct "personal" violence. By contrast, what I try to do in the present study is, on the one hand, to take seriously the act of physical violence itself, and on the other, to elucidate the processes that mediate between social pressures and personal violence and identify the latitudes for action that exist along the way.

It therefore seems more workable to place physical violence at the center of the conceptual definition I am after. In the present context, "political violence" shall thus be understood as *the exercise of physical coercion that essentially takes place collectively, can be aimed at both objects as well as individuals or groups, and whose actors seek—by selecting a specific target—to simultaneously strike a blow against the political system as a whole or against a political concept regarded as hostile.*

This definition covers a broad spectrum of motives, forms, and behaviors. The acts of violence it includes can be carefully planned and deliberately carried out, but they can also arise rather spontaneously from a specific confrontational situation and elude control. These acts can pursue a clear goal, though they may also seek to express nonspecific demands and moods; their primary purpose could also be to consolidate the group that is engaged in the action.<sup>19</sup> They can be planned and carried out by a great many persons or a small group, employ arms on a massive scale or engage in limited physical violence, and be brief or long in duration. The bearers of such violence can be "normal" citizens (male and female) as well as members of state-run organizations charged with maintaining order.

While the proposed definition draws a relatively wide circle of persons involved in political violence, it substantially limits the sphere of the political. This, too, is not self-evident. To be sure, a number of recent works have shown that collective acts of protest by the lower classes that involved moderate acts of violence, for example, by women against the dismal food supply during the First World War, certainly could force officials and government to respond, even though these actions were in no way directed or influenced by political organizations. Since they altered the balance of power between “above” and “below,” even if they usually did so only for a brief period, recent scholarship has defined them as “political.”<sup>20</sup> The Weimar Republic, especially in its early years, also witnessed such bread-and-butter protests (*Subsistenzproteste*),<sup>21</sup> which occupied officials and the public and prompted reactions. As the present study will show, however, the special quality of the history of violence during the Weimar Republic lay in the fact that the confrontations between opposing political groups or between them and the state’s forces of public order essentially revolved always around the foundations of the political system, and not merely around specific demands. By contrast, bread-and-butter protests were concerned primarily with the rapid improvement of the food supply. This distinction also shaped the public discussion. Moreover, many women participated in the bread-and-butter protests, whereas the clashes between political organizations were almost exclusively an affair of men. When bread-and-butter protests led to violence, it was directed chiefly against things and ranked far below the violence engendered by the other clashes. It therefore makes sense to draw an analytic distinction between bread-and-butter protests and political violence. Still, the present study will also deal with these protest actions. The crucial point is to determine why they remained limited and did not turn into political violence.

It is not only the definition of political violence that is controversial in the literature. Attempts at devising a typology of political violence have also failed to produce clear results.<sup>22</sup> At best two different types of political violence have been defined with some clarity: *assassination* as a carefully planned action, prepared and carried out by a small group of perpetrators with a high degree of organization; and *uprising* as an event of longer duration, with a large number of participants, with fighting on a larger scale that sometimes assumes military forms and involves corresponding weapons, and with at least part of the actors displaying a high level of organization; the *coup* contains elements of both types. These forms comprise what is in a sense the most spectacular part of the political violence in the Weimar Republic: examples are the murders of Erzberger and Rathenau in 1921 and 1922, the Ruhr uprising in 1920, or the Hitler putsch in 1923.

However, the vast majority of acts of political violence in the Weimar Republic should be assigned to the category of “unrest,” which is difficult to grasp and has for the most part not been described in detail in the existing literature: these acts arose in a comparatively spontaneous manner, were shorter in duration, and unfolded in a variety of ways. They include *clashes* between groups of political opponents and between these groups and the police, for example in connection

with public rallies and marches; *assaults* on political opponents, which often took place at night; and *brawls* during political meetings. Those who were involved, who numbered at most in the dozens, could use a wide variety of weapons, have ties to organizations that varied in their closeness, and have pre-planned the use of violence to a greater or lesser degree. On the whole, the violence was rather limited, and the number of victims and the damage tended to be minor. The starting position of the present study is that these acts, which were “small” violence<sup>23</sup> (*“kleine” Gewalt*) compared to civil war fighting and assassinations, are especially suited for identifying the causes and effects of political violence in the Weimar Republic, and showing how it gradually took root in the political culture.

No satisfactory explanatory model for why political conflicts turn violent has been devised to date, but the classical models of the systematic social sciences are useful in developing a heuristic concept. Robert Gurr’s notion of “relative deprivation” has an opposing idea in Charles Tilly’s “collective action.”<sup>24</sup> At the center of his model, Gurr places the discrepancy between a social group’s expectations of material well-being and political influence, on the one hand, and the perceived chances of realizing these expectations, on the other. Underlying it is the basic assumption that rapid social change leads to the collapse of civilizing control mechanisms and thus turns into a cause of political violence. The transformation of “relative deprivation” into violence requires mediating factors, which also include norms and historical experiences, for example, but the model does not describe how this mediation takes place.<sup>25</sup>

Against Gurr, Charles Tilly has sought to explain violence as arising from the mechanisms of the struggle for power, and to decouple it from a direct link with abrupt changes in a social structure.<sup>26</sup> Political violence occurs, according to Tilly, when newly emerging or declining groups struggle for shares of power in such a system and the regime responds to this challenge with repression on a moderate level.<sup>27</sup> The potential with which a group enters the struggle over power grows primarily from two elements: its organizational strength, and its ability to mobilize.<sup>28</sup>

There is no doubt that the early years of the Weimar Republic, especially, were rife with experiences of “relative deprivation.” But Tilly’s model helps us to understand why the shocks of military defeat, revolution, and inflation on the side of the bourgeoisie, but also the disappointed hopes on the other side in 1919/20, did not lead invariably to violence. Tilly’s category “organization” underscores the importance attached to the development of membership numbers, local groups, and auxiliary organizations within the radical parties and the Combat Leagues close to them. The category “mobilization” directs our attention, first, at the availability of material resources such as weapons, means of transportation, and tools of communication, and second, at the willingness of an organization’s members and supporters to take on tasks in accordance with the directives of the leadership. As we shall see especially in the case of the Communists, this willingness to follow had very clear limits.

For all its differentiation, Tilly’s model lacks a dimension that a modern social history can no longer ignore: that of culture.<sup>29</sup> Scholars have emphasized how

important images, symbols, and the political language were especially for the Weimar Republic. Useful in this regard is the concept of “political culture” developed by the American scholars Almond and Verba;<sup>30</sup> important contributions in Germany have come especially from Karl Rohe.<sup>31</sup> The concept embodies those fundamental attitudes, emotions, and actions that are determinative for the actors in a political system over a longer period of time. In its ideal form, political culture can be divided, according to Rohe, into the areas of “social culture” and “interpretive culture.” While “social culture” refers to the practices and ritual of everyday political life, “interpretive culture” refers to the processes of reflection and discussion in which these behaviors are debated and affirmed, but also newly defined. This distinction does not necessarily coincide with that between a party’s “base” and its leading thinkers.<sup>32</sup>

The present study will examine political language as an important part of the political culture of the Weimar Republic. It will probe the guiding concepts and core arguments that were used to discuss political violence, the ways in which its causes and presumed consequences were articulated, and what recommendations for action were derived from this understanding.<sup>33</sup> A second focus will be on the forms and content of public political self-representation. Here the study will examine the references to violence found in the rituals and in the world of images and symbols, with special attention given to the gender-specific attribution of spheres of action and characteristics. Political violence was a phenomenon molded by men, yet the “manliness” that all political camps called for displayed important differences alongside common elements.<sup>34</sup> To reiterate: the study of political culture as a whole is thus concerned with both patterns of interpretation and modes of behavior. My intention here is neither to pursue a pure history of concepts and political discourse, on the basis of lead articles, for example,<sup>35</sup> nor to concentrate solely on symbolic practices.<sup>36</sup>

The political culture of the Weimar Republic was not a homogeneous whole. In fact, it is precisely its “fragmentation”<sup>37</sup> into several hostile subcultures that seems to have been characteristic of the unstable republic. So far, however, scholarship has not been able to determine the precise boundaries of these subcultures, the boundaries of the political milieu.<sup>38</sup> Only the continued existence of a Catholic milieu, though diminished, appears to be uncontested. By contrast, whether a separate Communist milieu took shape—clearly distinct from the Social Democratic milieu—is as controversial as the question of which political milieu(s) the bourgeoisie established. Harder still is the allocation of the NSDAP to one or several milieus, especially if—as scholars have been doing increasingly—one conceives of it as a kind of mass party.<sup>39</sup> However, as the basic framework for the present study I use the three-camp model that Karl Rohe proposed on the basis of election analyses. According to this model, the electoral landscape had been dominated since the Empire by a Catholic, a Socialist, and a National camp (which might better be called the “bourgeois-national” camp). Using this approach, Rohe is better able than the previous milieu models to explain especially the disintegration within the bourgeois party spectrum and the rise of the NSDAP.<sup>40</sup>



The present study examines the issue of political violence by looking at one larger German region. It is easier to achieve greater empirical depth by narrowing to this mid-size level than by encompassing all of Germany. At the same time, the important differences between city and countryside and between various sociopolitical milieus are more visible on this scale than with the focus on a large city. Because of its diversity of milieus, its importance to the history of violence in the Weimar Republic, and the quality of the available sources, I have chosen the Prussian province of Saxony as the region to study. The province included areas that were predominantly agricultural as well as important industrial regions. Some of the industrial sectors and enterprises had been around for quite some time by the beginning of the 1920s and employed many skilled workers; others had received the decisive growth impulse only during the First World War and were home to many unskilled and semiskilled workers. While the KPD had one of its strongholds in Germany around Halle-Merseburg, in the heart of the province, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) was dominant in the north. Magdeburg was the founding city of the Stahlhelm (Steel Helmet), soon to be the largest of the right-wing Combat Leagues, and later of the Republican Reichsbanner; Halle, the bastion of the right wing of the Stahlhelm, was the birthplace of the Wehrwolf (Werewolf), another large Combat League of the right. In 1919 and 1920, the region witnessed bloody clashes between workers and Free Corps, and in 1921 the KPD staged its only attempt at a larger uprising here, the “March action”; in addition, there were numerous clashes between members of the various Combat Leagues and later with the SA.

The state of research and scholarship on this politically highly interesting region does not reflect the very good overall availability of sources, for reasons that are not difficult to see. The studies that were undertaken in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), especially in the 1960s and 1970s, examined the emergence and further development of the KPD, its influence on industrial and rural workers, and its program.<sup>41</sup> Separate studies were devoted to the defeat of the Kapp putsch and the “March action,” as well as to the history of individual enterprises, especially the Leuna Works and the Mansfeld Combine.<sup>42</sup> These studies contain a wealth of valuable source references and a lot of useful, detailed information on the organizational and political history of the workers’ movement. However, since they were interested solely in the rise of the KPD, in keeping with the official guidelines for East German historiography, the insights we can derive from them are, on the whole, clearly limited. Alongside the “treason” of the SPD and the Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD), these studies mention at most internal organizational shortcomings and the insufficiently enlightened consciousness of the masses as obstacles to the rise of the party.<sup>43</sup> The studies on the province of Saxony that have been published since the end of the GDR have continued to focus largely on its political history.<sup>44</sup>

The present study is based largely on government files. Especially well preserved for the Weimar period are the files of the *Oberpräsidium* (provincial government), which received copies of all the reports sent by the presidents of

the administrative districts (*Regierungspräsidenten*) to the Prussian Minister of the Interior. The great majority of sources that I have used come from this collection. I have also drawn on the files of the *Regierungspräsidium* of Merseburg and Erfurt (those in Magdeburg are missing for the period of the Weimar Republic) and the files of the Prussian Ministries of the Interior and Justice. In individual cases I was also able to evaluate files from the *Landratsämter* (rural county offices). As a whole, the official files yielded a wealth of information on larger and smaller incidents of violence, on the general mood within the population, and on the structure and propaganda activity of the radical parties and organizations, most abundantly for the years from 1920 to 1923. Since all state agencies of the province at all levels were in the hands of republican officials until the late summer of 1932, their reports are highly credible, especially with respect to the extreme right. Of course, this observation needs to be qualified for parts of the rural areas, especially the Altmark, where it is possible that the authorities did not become aware of all the subversive activities by the radical right. Their reports need to be read through critical lenses, especially when they deal with the Communists.

Another source I have drawn on is court files, though their availability is much more limited. Preserved in their entirety are only the files of the extraordinary courts that were set up after the “March action” of 1921. In addition to the sentences, they contain reports about the trials, sometimes also detailed records of interrogations, variously detailed information about the biographies of the accused, and frequently also information about the subsequent pardon process. Otherwise, large collections of files can be found only for individual prosecutor’s offices, such as those in Halberstadt and Naumburg; these merely document selected cases of violence and contain large gaps.

A not very extensive but very informative source of nongovernmental files I evaluated is the reports of the KPD district leadership in Halle-Merseburg and other material from the internal communication of the party. Though likewise riddled with large gaps, they contain important data on the movement of membership and assessments of the actual political situation. Another central source is the daily newspapers of the region. Here I had to take into account their very uneven survival, and at the same time be selective for practical reasons. I drew closely on the Magdeburg *Volksstimme* as the leading Social Democratic paper, the Halle *Volksblatt* as the most important organ of the USPD until 1920, the *Klassenkampf* as the organ of the KPD district Halle-Merseburg, and, finally, the *Magdeburgische Zeitung* and the *Saale-Zeitung* (Halle) as the leading, opinion-shaping papers of the bourgeois press.<sup>45</sup> All the papers listed have survived with only minor gaps for the entire period of the Weimar Republic.<sup>46</sup> I evaluated reports and commentaries on local and supraregional incidents of violence<sup>47</sup> and on celebrations and rallies the Combat Leagues organized or participated in, as well as the lead articles and commentary on political events of central importance, such as Reichstag elections or changes in the government.

## The Prussian Province of Saxony up to 1918

With the exception of Anhalt, some parts of Thuringia, and a strip of land around Eilenburg and Torgau that was assigned to the Free State of Saxony, the Prussian province of Saxony was largely equal to the modern federal state of Saxony-Anhalt. Great differences characterized its economic and social structure. The deepest agricultural imprint was found in the *Regierungsbezirk* (administrative district) of Magdeburg, which had nearly 1.3 million inhabitants in 1925 and was the second largest of the three administrative districts. A quarter of the population (25.5 percent) was still within the agricultural sector. But while the Altmark (the *Landkreise* [rural counties] of Salzwedel, Osterburg, Stendal, and Gardelegen) was dominated by medium- and large-sized peasant holdings,



**Map I.1** Prussian Province of Saxony, 1921

large estates prevailed in the very fertile Magdeburg Börde (the counties of Neu-haldensleben, Wolmirstedt, Calbe, and Wanzleben) and in the foothills of the Harz; a substantial portion of their arable land was devoted to sugar beets. For example, in the county of Salzwedel, medium- and large-scale peasant farms (5–100 hectares) controlled more than 82.8 percent of the acreage, while owners of large estates (more than 100 acres) held only 7.5 percent of the land; by contrast, in the county of Wanzleben the corresponding figures were 31.2 and 54.1 percent.<sup>48</sup> Over a third of the population (36.6 percent) lived from work in trade and industry, concentrated in the southern portion of the administrative district. Large potash salt deposits and processing enterprises were found in the area around Staßfurt, and brown coal was extracted in the counties of Calbe and Neu-haldensleben.<sup>49</sup> Magdeburg itself was by far the most important center of machine building in the entire province. Three-fifths of all workers in the mechanical engineering industry in the administrative district (and more than one-quarter of all those in the province), a total of nearly 21,000 in 1925, were employed in the city.<sup>50</sup> The First World War led to a strong rise in the number of those employed in the metal processing and machine building industries. That was true not only for the largest enterprise, the Gruson Works, since the 1880s part of the Krupp conglomerate, but also for smaller firms like the Poltesche Patronenfabrik (cartridge factory), which employed only 568 workers at the outbreak of the war, more than 5,000 by the end of 1914, and eventually 10,000 by 1918.<sup>51</sup> Other centers of machine building lay in the environs of Magdeburg; in the north of the province there was only Stendal, which was in fact the only city with any industry to speak of in this area.<sup>52</sup>

The industrial heart of the province beat in the administrative district of Merseburg, which counted 1.4 million inhabitants and was thus the district with the largest population. The development of the very abundant brown coal deposits had begun around 1800; after 1900 they were extracted chiefly by open-pit mining. Most important were the Bitterfeld and Zeitz-Weißenfels mining areas, alongside the Liebenwerda area that was located entirely in the east; in the 1920s, the newly opened mining area of the Geisel Valley between Merseburg and Querfurt topped the list.<sup>53</sup> By contrast, the extraction of copper ore in the Mansfelder Land had been going on for centuries. The pits and smelting works were owned by the Mansfeld Combine, which was notorious for its low wages and harsh working conditions.<sup>54</sup> In the entire administrative district, more than 45,000 workers were employed in mining in 1925, surpassing any other industrial sector.<sup>55</sup>

In second place (or third, after the construction industry) stood the chemical industry, which employed nearly 35,000.<sup>56</sup> It had received its decisive developmental boost during the First World War. The salt and brown coal deposits of the region supplied cheap raw materials and energy. Its location at a considerable distance from the borders offered protection against enemy attacks, and after 1914 this prompted the establishment of large enterprises that initially produced military goods but were able to retool quickly after the end of the war, manufac-

turing chiefly nitrogen and fertilizer. Far and away the largest among them was the Leuna Works near Merseburg (founded in 1916), a branch of the Badische Anilin- und Sodafabrik (BASF), that employed about 14,000 by the end of the war. The factory was notable not only for its exceptional size, but also for the fact that even years after the war it was as much a construction site as a production site. Because of the steady expansion of the installations, about half of the workers in the first years after 1918 were construction workers, and supervising them proved especially difficult for the company's management.<sup>57</sup>

Another important wartime creation was the Nitrogen Works Piesteritz near Wittenberg, which employed 2,700 workers in 1918/19. Massive expansion occurred during the war at the chemicals plant Griesheim Elektron in Bitterfeld and the neighboring paint factory Wolfen, both of which were later part of I. G. Farben. The chemicals industry in the Bitterfeld region employed more than 13,000 workers in 1918/19, more than three times as many as before 1914.<sup>58</sup> The number of workers had risen dramatically, not only but especially in the chemicals industry (and in mining); many came from the countryside and were first-generation unskilled or semiskilled industrial workers.<sup>59</sup> They were less willing to follow the party or union leadership and were more inclined to political radicalism than were workers from the traditional Social Democratic milieu.<sup>60</sup>

All other sectors lagged far behind. Among them, machine building topped this list with more than 24,000 workers in 1925. About half were employed in Halle itself, where, as in Magdeburg, chiefly agricultural machines were manufactured, and in neighboring Ammendorf, where railroad cars were built.<sup>61</sup> Of some importance was also the soil and rock industry with nearly 15,000 workers, which had large production sites in the Bitterfeld earthenware pipe industry.<sup>62</sup>

The distribution of brown coal deposits and other mineral resources ensured that the industrial workers in the Merseburg administrative district were not concentrated in a few locations. Only in the rural counties of Eckartsberga (at the border with Thuringia) and in Schweinitz (at the border with Brandenburg north of the Torgau) was the ratio of the industrial population—at 24.1 and 20.9 percent, respectively—far below the district average of 46.1 percent. In three rural counties it was above 50 percent (Weißenfels, Merseburg, and Saalkreis, i.e., the rural county around Halle), in two it was even above 60 percent (Zeitz and Bitterfeld).<sup>63</sup> Moreover, many industrial workers did not live in cities but in villages, where they often owned a small piece of land. In 1925, fields of less than 2 hectares (the smallest pieces included in the statistics) made up 7.3 percent of all the agricultural land in the Merseburg administrative district, which was well above the average for Prussia. There were hardly any large settlements of purely rural character.<sup>64</sup> For that reason alone, peasants played no more than a subordinate role here, unlike in the north of the province; added to this is the fact that large-scale landholdings—most of which, incidentally, were in bourgeois hands—accounted for a share of agricultural land that was only slightly less than that in the administrative district of Magdeburg. In 1925, enterprises with a size of over 100 hectares controlled more than 26.6 percent of agricultural acreage,

the soil of which in the larger environs of Halle had the same excellent quality as in the Magdeburg Börde.<sup>65</sup>

The administrative district of Erfurt, the smallest with a population of 570,000, had a level of industrialization that was nearly as high as that of the administrative district of Merseburg, but it lacked the latter's giant enterprises. In 1925, 45.7 percent of its population lived from industry and trades, and only 21.5 percent from agriculture.<sup>66</sup> Large landholdings accounted for only a little more than 10 percent of the agricultural acreage, while nearly half (43.4 percent) was cultivated by medium-sized farms (5–20 hectares).<sup>67</sup> The most heavily agricultural rural district was that of Erfurt, with a corresponding population ratio of nearly half (45.8 percent), but even here the industrial population accounted for one-third (33.0 percent) and was thus substantially higher than in the counties of Eckartsberga and Schweinitz in the administrative district of Merseburg.<sup>68</sup>

Mining played no role in the administrative district of Erfurt; industry itself was dominated by consumer sectors. In 1925 about 20,000 were employed in each of the apparel business (with the center of shoe manufacturing in Erfurt), food processing, and luxury goods production (chiefly tobacco), while around 16,000 worked in the textile industry.<sup>69</sup> About 14,000 each worked in machine and equipment buildings and in metal goods manufacturing, with precision mechanical goods playing a preeminent role. A politically explosive combination of several factors occurred in the rural county of Schleusingen. Its chief town of Suhl was home to the rifle factory Simson & Co., a central armaments enterprise during the war, when its workforce grew from around 1,000 to 5,500. After 1918 it became a factory for hunting weapons, though needless to say, its highly qualified skilled workers would find it easy to turn them into “real” rifles. If that alone was reason for vigilance by the authorities, it seemed all the more necessary as Schleusingen formed an exclave surrounded completely by Thuringian territory about 50 kilometers south of Erfurt: this would make it more difficult to control than other danger spots in case of unrest.<sup>70</sup>

Another special feature of the Erfurt administrative district was politically relevant. In the rural counties of Heiligenstadt (including the Eichsfeld) and Worbis, Catholics accounted for nine-tenths and three-quarters of the population, respectively, which guaranteed the Center Party the dominant position here until the end of the Weimar Republic, and nearly half of the population in the rural county of Mühlhausen. In the entire administrative district, however, their share was no greater than one-fifth, and in the other two administrative districts only around a tenth, which meant that the identity of the province as a whole was unquestionably Protestant.<sup>71</sup>

The province of Saxony had developed into a bastion of the workers' movement long before 1914. On the eve of the First World War, the Magdeburg SPD could look back upon a decades-long tradition. As early as 1884, a Social Democrat was elected to the Reichstag for the city. The long-term continuity of leadership by representatives of the right wing of the party (men like the future Reich Justice Minister Otto Landsberg), together with a high degree of union

organization among the local industrial workforce, ensured that the Magdeburg SPD developed into a solid and well-organized bastion of the party's right wing. Between 1906 and 1914, membership in the SPD district of Magdeburg-Anhalt rose to nearly 38,000, an increase of nearly fivefold. In 1912, five of its eight electoral districts were represented in the Reichstag by Social Democrats.<sup>72</sup>

On the eve of the First World War, the SPD district of Halle could also look back upon its party work with much satisfaction. It had more than 26,000 members, nearly three times as many as in 1906. The party had three of the eight Reichstag seats after the 1912 election, two of which, for Halle and the Saalkreis and for Naumburg-Weißenfels-Zeitz, it had held since 1893. In Halle, which had the strongest organization in the district in terms of members, conditions were similar to Magdeburg: a large number of skilled workers, especially in the metal industry, and a high degree of union organization. In 1914, however, the local party was clearly on the left wing of the SPD, which was working for a revolution that would be triggered by a mass strike, and which was suspicious of any rapprochement with the bourgeois parties. Since 1905 there had been clashes in the district between the two wings of the party, from which the left—centered on the Reichstag delegates Kunert and Albrecht and the new editor-in-chief of the *Volksblatt*, Hennig—emerged the winners once and for all. As the holder of a Reichstag seat, Kunert had been exerting influence on the Halle party since the 1890s, while the moderate Adolf Thiele had been at the head of the *Volksblatt* until 1907, after which he withdrew to his electoral district of Naumburg-Weißenfels-Zeitz, which he had represented since the 1890s.<sup>73</sup> This configuration continued during the Weimar years, when the districts of Zeitz and Weißenfels—following the intermezzo of the USPD—remained Social Democratic bastions in a region otherwise dominated by the KPD. Thus long before the sociostructural conditions in the industrial region of central Germany underwent massive change, the stage in the Halle district had been set for the split of the party in the First World War and the rise of the KPD. But it was only the changes produced by wartime that imparted the real dynamic to this development.<sup>74</sup>

Since Erfurt was located in the Thuringian-Saxon land that gave birth to the SPD, it could also look back on a long party and union tradition in 1914. The local SPD had 2,500 members, and the unions had 10,000. In the northwestern part of the administrative district in the workers' villages around Nordhausen, the party was able to knit an especially dense network of precursor organizations, thus laying the foundation for a consistently strong position right up to the end of the Weimar Republic. The political position of the district could not be clearly determined, even if its long-term chairman, Paul Reißhaus, who simultaneously represented the electoral district of Saxony-Meiningen 2 in the *Reichstag*, was close to the left wing of the party.<sup>75</sup>

On the other side of the political spectrum, the three large bourgeois parties were about equal in strength, though with regionally distinct centers of gravity. In the district of Magdeburg, the field was headed by the National Liberals, who won just under a fifth of the votes in the first round of voting in the elections

of 1912, followed directly by the Conservative Party, which was closely allied to the Bund der Landwirte (Farmers' League). In the district of Merseburg, on the other hand, the leading role clearly belonged to the left-leaning Liberals, who captured nearly a quarter of the ballots in the 1912 elections. A distant second was the other conservative party, the Reichspartei. In the district of Erfurt, the National Liberals lost their leading position in 1912 to the Conservative Party. There was hardly another Prussian province in which conservative and liberal parties were similarly more or less equally balanced, with the two conservative parties at 22.2 percent across the province, and the two liberal parties with exactly 25.0 percent.<sup>76</sup>

In spite of the pronounced political tensions in the authoritarian empire, whose leading strata saw themselves confronted by a Social Democratic movement that was steadily growing right up to 1912, confrontations between the two sides remained relatively free of violence. Beginning in 1906, the SPD, notwithstanding all official restrictions, used the public sphere of the street to articulate its demands in a previously unknown manner. It called for large gatherings on 21 January 1906 in many places throughout Prussia to protest the three-class suffrage system, which weighted the ballots of voters according to their tax returns and strongly disadvantaged workers. In anticipation of the large crowds that would be marching through the streets on this occasion, the authorities made provisions for a massive show of force. On instructions from the Prussian Minister of the Interior, the military kept handguns at the ready for the police and prepared to intervene itself; lists of party and union leaders who were to be arrested should the situation warrant it were compiled.<sup>77</sup>

What actually transpired on 21 January in the streets of the cities in the province of Saxony and other parts of Prussia was far removed from the horror scenario that the authorities had laid out. In Magdeburg, about 10,000 workers marched peacefully around the blocked-off central part of the city to the site of the meeting. Later, 200 of them tried to get to the center of town, though they were prevailed upon to turn around by police, who brandished—but did not use—their weapons. Halle offered a similar picture: mounted police “cleared” the street near the market and arrested thirty-four individuals, but here, too, there were no clashes. Reports from Erfurt spoke of complete calm at all the events.<sup>78</sup> When the SPD announced similar gatherings for March of the same year, Interior Minister Bethmann Hollweg considered precautionary measures by the police to be entirely sufficient.<sup>79</sup>

Even when the demonstrations reached their climax at the beginning of 1910 in the “suffrage storm,” there were no incidents in Magdeburg.<sup>80</sup> Not so in Halle: on 13 February, following the end of several meetings, about 2,500 individuals—almost exclusively men, in contrast to previous demonstrations—congregated for an unauthorized march through the downtown. The police officers tried to stop and disperse them. When mounted officers advanced on the crowd from several sides, they were heckled as “bloodhounds” and then pelted with stones. Finally, the policemen drew their swords and moved against the demonstrators



with few inhibitions; even uninvolved bystanders who were unable to escape quickly enough were brutally beaten. This day, which became known as “Bloody Sunday” in the collective memory of the workers’ movement in Halle, resulted in: five slightly injured police officers, forty injured demonstrators, among them three with serious injuries, and eighty arrests.<sup>81</sup> The responsibility for what had happened lay largely with the police, whose response had been completely disproportionate. In part, however, the demonstrators themselves were also responsible, for their behavior was noticeably more aggressive than on previous occasions.

Anger at what had happened and with what was perceived to have been a departure from the previous conduct of the police was reflected in the editorial statement of the Halle *Volksblatt*. The actions of the police were described in detail and in harsh words—but the reason behind their deployment and the cause of what the commentator called the “outrageous bloodshed” were not mentioned. Anyone who had seen the “atrocities yesterday,” the paper thundered, could not but “feel unquenchable hatred” and the “utmost contempt towards people who were willing to commit such outrages.” But the following day the paper sounded a different tone and reaffirmed the party’s fundamental position on the instrument of street demonstrations: equal suffrage would be won only if demonstrations were “calm and disciplined”; one’s own discipline had to become “unshakable.”<sup>82</sup> During new gatherings on voting rights at the beginning of March, the local party leadership made every effort to prevent clashes with the police under any circumstances.<sup>83</sup> Even if the leadership approved of the “street politics” of mass demonstrations as the first step toward a mass strike and ultimately revolution, it could not expect any benefit from violent confrontations with the police, notwithstanding the urgings of the party rank and file to pursue a more aggressive line.

The liberal press of the province, which set the tone in the middle-class public, took the street demonstrations of the Social Democrats as an occasion to demarcate very clearly what separated it from them. The left-liberal *Saale-Zeitung* referred explicitly to Berlin Police President Jagow, who was not known for his liberal attitudes, in noting in a commentary on the events of 13 February 1910 that it was “unwise and fundamentally wrong to carry politics into the street.” Harsher still was the characterization of the actors at the demonstration by the National-Liberal *Magdeburgische Zeitung*: behind it all there stood, in the final analysis, the Social Democratic leaders, who were able to slip into the role of “inciters” and “agitators.” Although the masses they directed comprised for the most part “very decent, conscientious, and hard-working men” (the women who also participated in the demonstration do not appear in this categorization), there was also a minority of “rowdies, toughs,” and “anarchists,” the very “riffraff” that the Social Democrats themselves should keep at arm’s length.<sup>84</sup> True, the *Saale-Zeitung* had to acknowledge that “deeply regrettable missteps” had been made by the police in Halle. Yet some members of the bourgeoisie had been at the receiving end of the sword not purely by accident, but because they had watched as “idle gawkers” and had thus contributed to politicizing the street.<sup>85</sup>

Of course, not only was Social Democracy responsible for these kinds of disturbances, but it constituted a threat to the state, pure and simple. On this point, though, the accents in the papers deviated more strongly in line with their respective party-political sympathies. In the eyes of the *Magdeburgische Zeitung*, the SPD, which sought to deprive the citizens “of everything ... that makes life worth living in the first place,” simply stood for “subversion.” The acknowledged discipline of the Social Democratic demonstrators was therefore not exactly a good sign, for it merely revealed the degree to which the party leadership controlled its followers.<sup>86</sup> By contrast, while the *Saale-Zeitung* denounced the SPD’s “revolutionary phrases” and its unrealistic radicalism, it did believe that the party was fully capable of “positive participation” in the Reichstag.<sup>87</sup> Fear of the SPD thus had two components: the Social Democratic movement was dangerous, first because it challenged the state and society of the empire in principle, and second because it bore responsibility for what were directly experienced as disturbances of “peace and orderliness.” After the war and the Revolution, the second point would come to dominate bourgeois criticism of the Communists, while the first provided the basis for it and in the end also defined the relationship to the SPD.

The relationship between the middle class and the Social Democrats was also influenced by labor struggles. At the end of September 1909, the workers in one shaft of the Mansfeld Combine walked off the job after management had fired a number of miners because of their party and union membership. To the surprise of the company management, the strike, led by the national chairman of the Social Democratic Miners Association, spread quickly and eventually involved more than half of the 21,000 workers of the combine, in which a strict “master-of-the-house” regiment had prevailed, and where a “yellow” work association had organized the most workers. The work stoppage had to be terminated on 13 November without any immediate success, though it did lead to a wave of new members for the party and the union and provided the impetus behind a reversal of the political majorities in the Mansfeld region. Although the conservative Reichspartei won the mandate in the 1912 elections, the SPD was able to force a second ballot and to nearly double its votes to just under 50 percent. The work stoppage itself was a largely peaceful affair, even though the Prussian military was in action alongside the police beginning on 22 October.<sup>88</sup> The strike leadership employed monitors chosen by the miners themselves in order to avoid clashes, and by and large it was successful in doing so. However, the day before the arrival of the military witnessed a clash when a group of “laborers willing to work” (*Arbeitswillige*) encountered a larger number of strikers who were returning home from a film showing; the strikebreakers were insulted, pelted with rocks and dirt, and punched. Twelve strikers were later put on trial for breach of the public peace, and despite the efforts of their prominent defense attorneys, the SPD politicians Landsberg and Heine, they were sentenced to prison terms ranging from six months to a year.<sup>89</sup>

The trial and its outcome expressed the dilemma in which the leadership of the SPD and the Free Unions, which were affiliated with the party, found them-

selves time and again. On the one hand, they tried, with a good deal of success, to emphasize the respectability of the workers' movement and to avoid violence against the authorities and other opponents like the strikebreakers as much as possible, that is, to pursue a "policy of peacefulness and lawfulness," as the *Volksstimme* put it in a commentary on the Ruhr miners' strike in 1912.<sup>90</sup> On the other hand, "small violence," the goal of which was not to inflict serious harm on the person targeted but to drive home the reprehensible nature of his wrongdoing, was part of the social culture of the lower classes. Beating strikebreakers was a common method in this repertoire of behavior, though it could occasionally lead to more serious violence.<sup>91</sup> An authoritarian state that used its security forces (and later its judicial system) to "protect those willing to work," without at the same time acting vigorously to make sure that a powerful company took seriously the right of association, which had long since been granted by law, was certainly not doing anything to contain this kind of violence "from below." The SPD, for its part, if it did not want to lose credibility, could not abandon those who vented their anger in such "small" violence, even as it did everything in its power to undercut their behavioral tradition in the long run. In so doing, however, it provided fodder to the hostile image in the bourgeois camp of a party that failed to distance itself clearly enough from the "rabble" (*Janhagel*).<sup>92</sup> Here was a potential for conflict that was covered up by the outbreak of the First World War, though by no means did it disappear.

"We are not jubilant, we know that, in spite of everything, a serious struggle awaits us, but the time of hesitation is over. Now the fatherland is calling. We all will follow."<sup>93</sup> These lines from the lead article of the *Saale-Zeitung's* morning edition of 2 August 1914 convey a better sense of the general mood at the outbreak of war than does the conventional picture of overwhelming enthusiasm among the population. Although the further right-leaning *Magdeburgische Zeitung* saw a "storm wind of enthusiasm" blow through the city when the kaiser's mobilization order was made public on 1 August, it arose out of an atmosphere of "utmost tension" and was not able to sweep away the "fateful seriousness of these hours."<sup>94</sup> In the previous week, the paper had initially expressed the hope that the expected confrontation could be limited to the Balkans and pled for "calm composure" with which to face all other eventualities. Then, when the outbreak of the Great War was expected any hour, the paper noted that a "breath of relief" ran "through the doubts of the days and weeks."<sup>95</sup> To be sure, the enthusiasm that coursed through streets and squares on the day of mobilization—at least in the cities—was not invented, but neither was it the expression of a sustained mood that had slowly built up over the preceding four weeks; rather, it was above all the release of a tension that seemed to have become nearly unbearable by the end. It was "nervous unease,"<sup>96</sup> a mix of the most diverse emotions, that had been spreading in the weeks since the beginning of July—not exuberant patriotic enthusiasm.<sup>97</sup> Moreover, it was more likely the members of the bourgeoisie who were filled with this kind of elation. "Our heart knows nothing of a war enthusiasm," wrote the *Volksstimme* on 2 August, but if it was no longer possible to stop the calamity,

and if one imagined what a victorious czarism would do in Germany, one could not refuse to join in. Yet the price for relenting was immediately stipulated and to the point: “A free German people that conquers its fatherland by defending its country.”<sup>98</sup>

On 9 August, the *Magdeburgische Zeitung* looked back at the first week of war and noted with satisfaction: “Here a *Volk* rose up as *one* man ... here every barrier that otherwise separates us disappeared ... *a united Volk of brothers*.”<sup>99</sup> The evoked unity was the dominant motif in the articles and commentaries when war broke out. This unity was, notwithstanding all political differences, chiefly a unity of men, and the virtues assigned to it were primarily masculine. The “hardening of the ideal of manhood” since the turn of the century had carried the day for good.<sup>100</sup> However, determination and courage were demanded not only from soldiers on the front line, but also from those at home; the model was the uprising of 1813.<sup>101</sup>

As the war dragged on and a growing disillusionment set in about its consequences and the inability of the empire to reform itself, the unity of the SPD fractured. At the beginning of April 1917, its left wing split off and formed the Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD). The USPD refused to continue supporting the policy of the “truce” (*Burgfrieden*), the SPD’s compromise course toward the leadership of both the Reich and the moderate bourgeois parties, and urged the immediate conclusion of a peace. In the province of Saxony, the split ran along the lines of conflict that had existed within the party before the war. While the USPD was able to win only insignificant influence in Magdeburg—even though Alwin Brandes, Reichstag delegate for Halberstadt and a leading member of the metal workers’ association, joined the party at the beginning of 1918<sup>102</sup>—the district organization of Halle-Merseburg switched to the new party almost in its entirety in July 1917, with only twenty local organizations remaining with the old SPD (now called the Majority Social Democratic Party, MSPD). This was also important in that here, the new party had at its disposal a well-functioning organizational structure and the important newspapers, including the *Volksblatt*.

This move was prepared through the establishment of a network of trusted individuals in the large armament plants, in which the brothers Wilhelm and Bernhard Koenen had played an important part. In March of 1917, they set up the first Social Democratic factory-based organization at the Leuna Works, and a month later they brought it into the new party.<sup>103</sup> The balance of power within the Social Democratic movement was less clear-cut in the administrative district of Erfurt. In the city itself there was a two-thirds majority in favor of joining the USPD in May 1917, though the youth and educational activities continued to be run together with the MSPD. Although the editorial office of the *Tribüne* was now in the hands of the USPD, the MSPD was allowed to continue publishing reports of its meetings and announcements.<sup>104</sup> A similar picture emerged in Nordhausen, where the movement toward the USPD was even stronger, though the press organ also continued to be available also to the MSPD.<sup>105</sup>

The split within the party was also the result of the growing war-weariness on the part of the population, which manifested itself, especially after the “starvation winter” of 1916/17, in food unrests and strikes, and which undercut the basis of legitimacy of the political system of the empire to the point where the latter collapsed without any meaningful resistance in November 1918.<sup>106</sup> Women and youths, who could not be threatened with being dispatched to fight at the front, were prominent participants in food protests. These kinds of protests developed spontaneously. A “crowd” would gather in front of city halls or bakeries, officials were insulted and called upon to do something to improve the food situation, shop owners were harassed and compelled to sell food at reduced prices, and sometimes rocks were thrown through shop windows and goods hauled off without payment. Still, these disturbances were *not* marked by unbridled violence. It was also typical that no party-political demands were put forth and “ringleaders” could not be identified among the ranks of the radical left.<sup>107</sup> In this sense, the protests did not have a political character because they lacked the link to a specific political organization or a specific political program. Their long-term effects, however, were political. They made the authoritarian state that was no longer able to secure the material existence of its population the subject of public criticism. In so doing, they expressed a new conception of “nation” that had been taking shape since the beginning of the war, one that placed the class-transcending exertions and sufferings of the mobilized national community (*Volksgemeinschaft*) front and center, and demanded in return that the state provide certain services (of providing for their livelihood). The failure of the (authoritarian) state that was now defined increasingly as a welfare state stripped it of its political legitimacy.<sup>108</sup>

Much the same is true for strikes during the war, which increased sharply in number in 1917 and 1918. The wave of strikes in April 1917, triggered by the February revolution in Russia and the kaiser’s half-hearted “Easter message,” seems to have largely missed the province of Saxony, including the Leuna Works, where the influence of the radical left was already strongest.<sup>109</sup> However, the middle of August 1917 saw the first mass strikes since the beginning of the war at the Leuna Works, as well as in Halle and at other armament plants. Set off by the announcement of a cutback in food rations, they were able to force through some material demands like special food allotments.<sup>110</sup> The great wave of strikes at the end of January 1918 gripped the entire province. In Halle, the strikers were already drawing up lists of names for a workers’ council.<sup>111</sup> In Magdeburg, where Alwin Brandes assumed the leadership, 23,000 workers walked off the job on 29 January; the following day, the MSPD and the union cartel got involved to slow the movement.<sup>112</sup> At the rifle factory in Erfurt, a part of the workforce under the leadership of supporters of the Spartacus League, the germ cell of the later KPD, went on strike, but here the MSPD and the USPD were able to keep the action from spreading.<sup>113</sup>

For the bourgeois public of the province, this development was for a long time no topic at all. The otherwise commentary-happy *Magdeburgische Zeitung* had only brief reports about the January strikes, while the *Saale-Zeitung*, in a

lead article, criticized the MSPD's decision to join the Berlin strike committee as "politically unwise," though not so much because this move strengthened the radical forces of the left as because it provided ammunition to the right for its strategy of blocking domestic political reforms.<sup>114</sup> The primary concern had to be the preservation of domestic unity. But while the paper from Halle emphatically supported the reforms in the spirit of the left-liberals and backed the peace resolution of the Reichstag majority, the Magdeburg paper advocated a cautious reform course while—still confident of victory—rejecting a "peace of surrender (*Verzichtfrieden*)."<sup>115</sup> Both papers agreed, however, that the Germans must "not lose their nerve." "The people will keep its nerve, only let us take it like a nation of men, not like a nation of neurasthenics!" demanded the Magdeburg paper. Statements like these reflect the emphasis—further reinforced since the beginning of the war—of the political value of "masculinity," while at the same time mirroring the fears emanating from the "femaleness" of the subsistence protests.<sup>116</sup>

But when the *Magdeburgische Zeitung* gave voice, with enormous bitterness, to the realization in the middle of October that the war was lost, it set its sights not at this mental state of society, but at the political institutions of the empire. Never before had "such a great and brave people not only been left in the dark so irresponsibly, but also, through the abuse of the press from the prewar period until now, been misled about its place in the world."<sup>117</sup> Following the offer of truce from the German military leadership, which came as a complete surprise to the public, one must not nurse any more illusions, the paper declared. The war was lost, the Germans would have to pay its costs, and because of that "heavy burdens will weigh on our children and their future."<sup>118</sup> The responsibility lay first and foremost with those politicians who had spoken untruly during the war, and before the war had charted a course that was characterized by the "immense misperception of reality," the overestimation of German strength, and the false interpretation of the alliance system. Now the Germans were experiencing nothing less than the "collapse of our entire policy of illusion since Bismarck's dismissal." Even if part of the blame had to be assigned to Social Democracy—its stance on foreign policy had been too weak, its critique of the inner condition of the Empire sometimes too harsh<sup>119</sup>—the paper was by no means articulating a "stab-in-the-back legend"; instead, leaving aside all tactical considerations for the MSPD that it might have entertained in the first days of November, it was unambiguous in assessing the primary responsibility for Germany's collapse. The *Magdeburgische Zeitung*, the leading bourgeois press organ in the province of Saxony, had essentially given up on the empire once the inevitability of military defeat was obvious, and it clearly identified the consequences that would flow from this situation for the foreseeable future.

The lead articles and commentaries of the *Volksstimme* as of the beginning of October reflected the dilemma of the Majority Social Democrats. The party's goal was to democratize the empire in an evolutionary way, yet it had to take up the revolutionary sentiment among the masses and demand comprehensive as well as rapid domestic political reforms if it wanted to continue to play a leadership role.

In the process, it had to avoid being forced onto a radical track, for otherwise it would be playing into the hands of the USPD and the Spartacus League, and the result could be the kind of chaos that happened in Russia after the Bolshevik revolution. Thus the *Volksstimme* on 30 October called on the German people to now “make a clean sweep” of the guilty, “autocracy and class rule,”<sup>120</sup> and yet three days later, following the abdication of the kaiser and the crown prince, it still considered a representative monarchy a possibility. But then, on 8 November, the paper, having warned three days earlier—with an eye toward Berlin—about “hotheads,” demanded: “Open the valves!” for “the revolution is sweeping across the land from Kiel.” Of course, the paper wanted nothing to do with “Russian methods”—Germany “was not a Tartar state, but a European one.”<sup>121</sup>

As for the *Magdeburgische Zeitung*, it believed that the only thing at stake at the end of October and the beginning of November was to preserve at least the foundations for a revival of Germany. The important thing was to remain “proud and undaunted,” to preserve “the calm in the land” and stand side by side “in shared work.” To that end, one must not impede Social Democracy if it turned against the radical left. But if the Majority Social Democrats did not prevail, one had to expect Russian conditions, with the “possibility of a civil war, a war of all against all with chaos as the backdrop.”<sup>122</sup> It was only now that a domestic political enemy was coming to the fore, though not as a cause of the defeat, but a danger to the reconstruction.

When the Revolution actually came, the fears of the bourgeois press, like those in Germany in general, at first proved groundless. “The movement, which began suddenly, had quickly carried the day without running into opposition,” noted Merseburg Regierungspräsident von Gersdorff on 14 November 1918, summarizing his impressions in the observation that the “sweeping change” had “occurred for the most part without notable unrests or excesses.”<sup>123</sup> The same was true in the other two districts. The collapse of the old order took place everywhere in a similarly calm manner, regardless of the social and political developments that had preceded it locally.

Even in Halle, the strongest bastion of the USPD, the party had made no preparations for the Revolution. It was not workers who set things in motion, but soldiers of the air force reserve unit, who disarmed their officers on 7 November. The next day, a workers’ and soldiers’ council dominated by the USPD was set up and confirmed by a mass assembly. The chairmanship was assumed by the editor of the *Volksblatt*, Otto Kilian, a leading member of the left wing of the USPD and later of the KPD in the district. Although pressure was soon exerted on the bourgeois newspapers of the city, which went so far as individual censorship measures, beyond that the workers’ and soldiers’ council made no attempt until December to establish its own instrument of military power or interfere in the local administration in more than a merely supervisory capacity.<sup>124</sup> At the neighboring Leuna Works, the revolutionary movement grew out of gradually intensifying demands for higher wages, shorter hours, and a better supply of food, which were articulated by the full assembly of shop stewards (*Vertrauensmänner-Vollversammlung*)

that was in permanent session beginning 3 November. The demands were presented to the managing board on 9 November in the form of an ultimatum; at the top of the list stood the call for an eight-hour day. Management quickly accepted. That same day, a workers' council was set up (which also included salaried employees) and elected an executive committee. The work of the committee ran along the lines of the previously formulated demands. The talks with management in the following days revolved around "clothing allowance, worker protection regulations, kitchen supervision, overtime," and similar demands, but of course also around the recognition of the Free Unions, which was now pushed through.<sup>125</sup> General political demands were not advanced, and not yet raised was the call for socialization, which would dominate the revolutionary movement in the central German industrial region as of the beginning of 1919. The workers' councils movement was comparatively well developed, though the focus of its activities was not the political system, but the factory.<sup>126</sup>

In Magdeburg, too, which was in the hands of the Majority Social Democrats, the Revolution was initiated by the military: on the morning of 8 November, sailors from Kiel prevailed upon the men of several artillery units to refuse to obey orders; afterward, the soldiers marched into the center of the city. A mass assembly, at which representatives from the MSPD and the USPD spoke, agreed to form a workers' and soldiers' council. From the very beginning its members also included a number of white-collar workers, civil servants, and representatives of the bourgeois parties. On 11 November, a "burghers' council" (*Bürgerrat*) was added with the consent of all the parties. In Magdeburg as well, the workers' and soldiers' council limited itself to supervising the bureaucracy. The USPD council member Albert Vater, later one of the co-founders of the local KPD, was assigned to the police president, and the city delegate and future SPD Lord Mayor Beims was assigned to the municipal authorities.<sup>127</sup> In the Erfurt workers' and soldiers' council, representatives of the right wing of the USPD were in charge along with the MSPD and also charted a moderate course.<sup>128</sup>

Things remained quiet during the November days on the great estates in the province of Saxony. The revolutionary movement barely took hold of the rural workers, whose Social Democratic Deutscher Landarbeiterverband (DLV, German Rural Workers' League) had only limited influence. Workers' and soldiers' councils were initially set up in county cities and smaller towns that were also home to large numbers of industrial workers, as for example in the Mansfeld Gebirgskreis. In addition to supervising the bureaucracy, their chief concern here was a secure food supply, which is why the council in Nordhausen, for example, took pains to maintain close contact to the farmers in the county. Although the Landrat in Eisleben, the center of the Mansfeld Seekreis, noted the existence of "strong differences of opinions between the independents and the governing socialists (!)," both parties were promoting "peace and order in every way," and in the workers' and soldiers' council they had agreed on an appeal directed at all communities that also called "for protection of property and obedience toward the authorities."<sup>129</sup> Councils of farmers and rural laborers were slow to form. The



initiative came from estate owners and from associations of rural workers that denounced strikes and sought to establish a counterweight to the workers' and soldiers' councils, which were dominated by the Socialist parties. In the process, the large landowners behaved in a fairly flexible fashion. As early as the middle of December 1918 they recognized the DLV as a partner in wage negotiations and agreed upon regulations that later became part of the labor regulations for all of Germany in January of 1919. The position of the organized rural workers was thus noticeably strengthened, though it still lagged far behind that of the industrial workers.<sup>130</sup>

Although the collapse of the old system in the November days of 1918 did not take place without violence, it was not the kind of harsh and costly violence that pervaded later confrontations. If there was violence, it was directed—as often in later years—primarily against symbols. Shoulder straps were torn from the uniforms of officers and their swords taken away—that covered most cases in which force was used.<sup>131</sup> The point was to dismantle the military hierarchy at least momentarily and thereby symbolically abolish the social order of the fallen empire, which found its most memorable expression in the red banners newly hoisted over city halls or factories. However, in the November days there was neither organized resistance to the revolutionary movement nor any attempt on the part of the revolutionaries to set up their own instruments of military power.<sup>132</sup> The first new security organ reported in the sources was a “citizens’ militia” (*Bürgerwehr*) of 300–400 men set up by the Magdeburg workers’ and soldiers’ council (which by now had been joined by a council of officers alongside the council of citizens).<sup>133</sup>

The language with which the mouthpiece of the USPD, the *Volksblatt* in Halle, praised and defended the Revolution was, though harsh, still very different from the later civil war rhetoric of the KPD. A few days after the formation of the workers’ and soldiers’ council, the paper emphasized that the issue now was “to nip all assaults upon the achievements of the Revolution in the bud! Ruthlessly!” At the same time, it reproached the Prussian Conservative Party for using the threat of “civil war,” while the Liberals were judged to be balanced and fair.<sup>134</sup> Once the Revolution was secure, democracy would exist “also for our harshest opponents!” but should they choose a different path, “they are playing with fire,” the paper declared at the end of November.<sup>135</sup> The harsh tone in such declarations of willingness to fight, especially if it was combined with censorship measures by the workers’ and soldiers’ council, certainly did not help allay the fears in the bourgeois camp. However, this rhetoric was not backed by any potential threat of military force, nor was there any call to establish such a force.

The anxieties that were articulated within the bourgeois public were therefore far more varied than the argument of the fear of Bolshevism suggests. They were initially fed by incidents like the freeing of inmates from the military jail in Halberstadt, who then used force to procure foodstuffs from a sausage factory, or the refusal of peasants to live up to their delivery obligations—“it is now Revolution, they say, and one does not have to make any more deliveries.”<sup>136</sup> These kinds of

behaviors did not have a thrust that could be identified with any particular party politics. Still, they seemed to indicate profound threats to the general order, especially a further intensification of the conflict—stoked by the command economy and inflation—between rural producers and urban consumers.<sup>137</sup>

The *Magdeburgische Zeitung* picked up on this when it warned that an excessively radical course of the Revolution, by sparking resistance in the countryside, would give rise first “to economic conditions of a Russian nature” and then related political conditions, which would be followed, finally, by a “period of the harshest reaction”—though the paper hoped that the German people would be spared such “dishonor, shame, and misery.” This was the often invoked and highly emotionally charged fear of chaos that was shared by the Social Democratic *Volksstimme* and expressed itself, for example, in that paper’s warning that a hasty socialization of mining and industry would mean “chaos . . . famine, revolts, civil war, and economic anarchy.”<sup>138</sup> Of course, the model of how the Revolution would unfold was based not only on contemporary events in Russia, but also on the French Revolution, and it was—as the reference to the danger of “reaction” showed—therefore based on a liberal foundation.<sup>139</sup> One aspect from the prewar period that returned in the argumentation of the *Magdeburgische Zeitung* was the notion of an easily swayed “mass” and its leaders who therefore had to be made all the more aware of their responsibility to save their followers from radical “excesses,” especially in the face of a “national body (*Volkskörper*)” as economically and socially complex as the German one.<sup>140</sup> The mass-leader argument and the concept of the *Volkskörper* were subsequently picked up by the bourgeois press time and again, with increasingly anti-liberal connotations.

## Notes

1. Emil Lederer, “Soziologie der Gewalt: Ein Beitrag zur Theorie der gesellschaftsbildenden Kräfte,” in E. Lederer, ed., *Soziologische Probleme der Gegenwart*, (Berlin, 1921), 16–29, here 16.
2. Recent introductions: Eric D. Weitz, *Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy* (Princeton, 2007); Eberhard Kolb, *The Weimar Republic*, trans. P. S. Falla, 2nd ed. (New York, 2004); Detlev J. K. Peukert, *Die Weimarer Republik: Krisenjahre der klassischen Moderne* (Frankfurt, 1987), English edition, *The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity*, trans. Richard Deveson (New York, 1992); see also Ian Kershaw, ed., *Weimar: Why Did German Democracy Fail?* (New York, 1990).
3. See, for example, Richard J. Bessel, *Germany after the First World War* (Oxford, 1993); Martin H. Geyer, *Verkehrte Welt: Revolution, Inflation und Moderne. München 1914–1924* (Göttingen, 1998); Bernd Widdig, *Culture and Inflation in Weimar Germany* (Berkeley, 2001); Janet Ward, *Weimar Surfaces: Urban Visual Culture in 1920s Germany* (Berkeley, 2001); Julia Sneeringer, *Winning Women’s Votes: Propaganda and Politics in Weimar Germany* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2002).
4. Johannes Erger, *Der Kapp-Lüttwitz-Putsch* (Düsseldorf, 1967); Erhard Lucas, *Märzrevolution im Ruhrgebiet: Vom Generalstreik gegen den Militärputsch zum bewaffneten Arbeiteraufstand*

- März–April 1920, 3 vols. (Frankfurt a. M., 1970–78); Johannes Gorlas and Detlef J. K. Peukert, eds., *Ruhrkampf 1920* (Essen, 1986); Erwin Könnemann and Hans-Joachim Krusch, *Aktionseinheit contra Kapp-Putsch: Der Kapp-Putsch im März 1920 und der Kampf der deutschen Arbeiterklasse sowie anderer Werktätiger gegen die Errichtung der Militärdiktatur und für demokratische Verhältnisse* (East Berlin, 1972); Sigrid Koch-Baumgarten, *Aufstand der Avantgarde: Die Märzaktion der KPD 1921* (Frankfurt, 1986); Stefan Weber, *Ein kommunistischer Putsch? Märzaktion 1921 in Mitteldeutschland* (Berlin, 1991); Martin Sabrow, *Der Rathenaumord: Rekonstruktion einer Verschwörung gegen die Republik von Weimar* (Munich, 1994); Harold J. Gordon, *Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch* (Princeton, N.J., 1972); Thomas Kurz, *Blutmai: Sozialdemokraten und Kommunisten im Brennpunkt der Berliner Ereignisse von 1929* (Berlin, 1988); Richard Bessel, “The Potempa Murder,” *CEH* 10, no. 3 (1977): 241–254.
5. Robert G. L. Waite, *Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Postwar Germany* (Cambridge, MA, 1952); Hagen Schulze, *Freikorps und Republik 1918–1920* (Boppard, 1969); Erwin Könnemann, *Einwohnerwehren und Zeitfreiwilligenverbände: Ihre Funktion beim Aufbau eines neuen imperialistischen Militärsystems (November 1918 bis 1920)* (East Berlin, 1971); David Clay Large, *The Politics of Law and Order: A History of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr, 1918–1921* (Philadelphia, 1980); Volker Berghahn, *Der Stahlhelm: Bund der Frontsoldaten 1918–1935* (Düsseldorf, 1966); Alois Klotzbücher, “Der politische Weg des Stahlhelm, Bund der Frontsoldaten, in der Weimarer Republik: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der ‘Nationalen Opposition’ 1918–1933,” PhD diss., University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, 1964; Klaus Hornung, *Der Jungdeutsche Orden* (Düsseldorf, 1958); Kurt Finker, “Die militaristischen Wehrverbände der Weimarer Republik und ihre Rolle bei der Unterdrückung der Arbeiterklasse und bei der Vorbereitung eines neuen imperialistischen Krieges (1924–1929),” habilitation thesis, PH Potsdam, 1964; Karl Rohe, *Das Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und Struktur der politischen Kampfverbände zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik* (Düsseldorf, 1966); Kurt G. P. Schuster, *Der Rote Frontkämpferbund 1924–1929: Beiträge zur Geschichte und Organisationsstruktur eines politischen Kampfbundes* (Düsseldorf, 1975). Only the most important works are listed here and in the following footnotes.
  6. James M. Diehl, *Paramilitary Politics in Weimar Germany* (Bloomington, IN, 1977). So far, the history of the police in the Weimar Republic has also been written primarily as an institutional history. The existing studies emphasize the continuity in terms of personnel and ideology with the imperial army, stress the orientation of police training along military lines, and point to the crumbling of the esprit de corps and the growing right-wing orientation of policemen since the beginning of the economic crisis: Peter Leßmann, *Die preußische Schutzpolizei in der Weimarer Republik: Streifendienst und Straßenkampf* (Düsseldorf, 1989); Richard Bessel, “Militarisierung und Modernisierung: Polizeiliches Handeln in der Weimarer Republik,” in A. Lüdtke, ed., *‘Sicherheit’ und ‘Wohlfahrt’: Polizei, Gesellschaft und Herrschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt a. M., 1992), 323–343; see also Johannes Buder, *Die Reorganisation der preußischen Polizei 1918–1923* (Frankfurt, 1986); Jürgen Siggemann, *Die kasernierte Polizei und das Problem der inneren Sicherheit in der Weimarer Republik: Eine Studie zum Auf- und Ausbau des innerstaatlichen Sicherheitssystems in Deutschland 1918/19–1933* (Frankfurt, 1980); His-Huey Liang, *Die Berliner Polizei in der Weimarer Republik* (Berlin, 1977); completely inadequate: Johannes Schwarze, *Die bayerische Polizei und ihre historische Funktion bei der Aufrechterhaltung der öffentlichen Sicherheit in Bayern von 1919–1933* (Munich, 1977).
  7. Richard Bessel, *Political Violence and the Rise of Nazism: The Storm Troopers in Eastern Germany, 1925–1934* (New York, 1984); Sven Reichardt, *Faschistische Kampfbünde: Gewalt und Gemeinschaft im italienischen Squadristismus und in der deutschen SA* (Cologne, 2002).
  8. Peter H. Merkl, *The Making of a Stormtrooper* (Princeton, N.J., 1980); idem, *Political Violence under the Swastika: 581 Early Nazis* (Princeton, N.J., 1975) (Merkl’s work is based on a problematic source: a collection, compiled after 1933, of the biographies of Nazi activists who had joined the movement before September 1930); Conan Fischer, *Stormtroopers: A Social, Economic and Ideological Analysis, 1929–1935* (London, 1983), is an unconvincing attempt to

- demonstrate that the SA had a particularly high ratio of workers; as a synthesis see Peter Longrich, *Die braunen Bataillone: Geschichte der SA* (Munich, 1989). Schematic in nature is the approach of Hans-Joachim Mauch, *Nationalistische Wehrorganisation in der Weimarer Republik: Zur Entwicklung und Ideologie des "Paramilitarismus"* (Frankfurt, 1982), who, with reference to Geiger, Freud, and Adorno, argues that the reason why the right-wing Combat Leagues attracted so many followers lies in the "authoritarian character" of the panic-stricken members of the middle class.
9. Eve Rosenhaft, *Beating the Fascists? The German Communists and Political Violence, 1929–1933* (London, 1983); idem, "Links gleich rechts? Militante Straßengewalt um 1930," in T. Lindenberger and A. Lüdtke, eds., *Physische Gewalt: Studien zur Geschichte der Neuzeit* (Frankfurt, 1995), 238–275. Hans-Ulrich Ludewig, *Arbeiterbewegung und Aufstand: Eine Untersuchung zum Verhalten der Arbeiterparteien in den Aufstandsbewegungen der frühen Weimarer Republik 1920–1923* (Husum, 1978), sees in economic and social conditions an explanatory factor of only limited reach and points to genuinely political causes. The quantifying counterpart, as it were, to Ludewig's study, which is based on arguments drawn from the history of ideas, is Gerhard Botz, *Gewalt in der Politik: Attentate, Zusammenstöße, Putschversuche, Unruhen in Österreich 1918 bis 1938*, 2nd ed. (Munich, 1983); according to Botz, unemployment provides the key to explaining the violence.
  10. Pamela E. Swett, *Neighbors and Enemies: The Culture of Radicalism in Berlin, 1929–1933* (Cambridge, 2004).
  11. Ernst Nolte, *Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917–1945: Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus* (Berlin, 1987). Dissertations written under Nolte's supervision have illustrated his basic thesis with additional material, but have not developed it further: Christian Striefler, *Kampf um die Macht: Kommunisten und Nationalsozialisten am Ende der Weimarer Republik* (Berlin, 1993); Kai-Uwe Merz, *Das Schreckbild: Deutschland und der Bolschewismus 1917 bis 1921* (Berlin, 1995).
  12. Andreas Wirsching, *Vom Weltkrieg zum Bürgerkrieg? Politischer Extremismus in Deutschland und Frankreich 1918–1933/39: Berlin und Paris im Vergleich* (Munich, 1999).
  13. On the brutalization thesis see, for example, Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914–1991* (New York, 1994), 125, who calls the First World War a "machine for brutalizing the world" but then proceeds to partly retract his sweeping thesis by noting that only a minority of radical right-wing supporters in Germany and elsewhere "gloried in the release of their latent brutality"; George L. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (Oxford, 1990), esp. chap. 8; Hans Mommsen, "Militär und zivile Militarisierung in Deutschland 1914 bis 1938," in U. Frevert, ed., *Militär und Gesellschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 1997), 265–276; Wirsching, *Weltkrieg*, 546; Eric D. Weitz, *Creating German Communism, 1890–1990: From Popular Protests to Socialist State* (Princeton, 1997), 135, 200; Klaus-Michael Mallmann, *Kommunisten in der Weimarer Republik: Sozialgeschichte einer revolutionären Bewegung* (Darmstadt, 1996), 109f.; Reichardt, *Kampfbünde*, 616.
  14. See Dirk Schumann, "Europa, der Erste Weltkrieg und die Nachkriegszeit: Eine Kontinuität der Gewalt?" *Journal of Modern European History* 1, no. 1 (2003): 24–43, as well as the other contributions to this volume; also, Benjamin Ziemann, *Front und Heimat: Ländliche Kriegserfahrungen im südlichen Bayern 1914–1923* (Essen, 1997); see also Joanna Bourke, *Dismembering the Male: Men's Bodies, Britain, and the Great War* (Chicago, 1996). Bernd Weisbrod, "Gewalt in der Politik: Zur politischen Kultur in Deutschland zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen," *GWU* 43, no. 6 (1992): 391–404, places the accent on the interpretation processes after the war.
  15. On the problems of definition see the detailed overview by Ekkart Zimmermann, *Political Violence, Crises, and Revolutions: Theories and Research* (Cambridge, MA, 1983), 6–15.
  16. Thomas Lindenberger and Alf Lüdtke, eds., *Physische Gewalt: Studien zur Geschichte der Neuzeit* (Frankfurt, 1995); Trutz von Trotha, ed., *Soziologie der Gewalt* (Cologne, 1997); Wolfgang Sofsky, *Traktat über die Gewalt* (Frankfurt, 1996), English edition, *Violence: Terrorism, Genocide, War*, trans. Anthea Bell (London, 2003); on the historical study of violence in general see

- Dirk Schumann, "Gewalt als Grenzüberschreitung: Überlegungen zur Sozialgeschichte der Gewalt im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert," *AfS* 37 (1997): 366–386.
17. Johan Galtung, *Strukturelle Gewalt: Beiträge zur Friedens- und Konfliktforschung* (Reinbek, 1975), here 9 and 12. Examples for the influence of Galtung's concept: Jörg Calließ, ed., *Gewalt in der Geschichte: Beiträge zur Friedenserziehung* (Düsseldorf, 1983); Udo Rauchfleisch, *Allgegenwart der Gewalt* (Göttingen, 1992).
  18. For an overview with additional references: Wolf Dieter Narr, "Gewalt und Legitimität," *Leviathan* 1, no. 1 (1973): 7–42, reprinted in O. Rammstedt, ed., *Gewaltverhältnisse und die Ohnmacht der Kritik* (Frankfurt, 1974), 9–58; Terry Nardin, "Conflicting Conceptions of Political Violence," in C. P. Cotter, ed., *Political Science Annual: An International Review*, vol. 4 (Indianapolis, IN, 1973), 75–126, esp. 106–110; Friedhelm Neidhardt, "Gewalt: Soziale Bedeutungen und sozialwissenschaftliche Bestimmung des Begriffs," in Bundeskriminalamt, ed., *Was ist Gewalt?* vol. 1 (Wiesbaden, 1986), 109–147, esp. 128–131; Botz, *Gewalt in der Politik*, 13f.
  19. See the list of the functions of political violence in Harold L. Nieburg, *Political Violence: The Behavioral Process* (New York, 1969), 14.
  20. Belinda J. Davis, *Home Fires Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2000); on the concept of "street politics" see Manfred Gailus, *Straße und Brot: Sozialer Protest in den deutschen Staaten unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Preußens, 1847–1849* (Göttingen, 1990); Thomas Lindenberger, *Straßenpolitik: Zur Sozialgeschichte der öffentlichen Ordnung in Berlin 1900 bis 1914* (Bonn, 1995). Both are guided by the concept of *Eigensinn*, which Alf Lüdtke has developed (John Eidson has defined *Eigensinn* as "putting up with political power to the degree that one must, while pursuing one's own ends to the degree that one can"). Nieburg, *Political Violence*, 13, defines political violence in this kind of overly broad sense as "acts of disruption, destruction, injury whose purpose, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation, and/or effects have political significance, that is, tend to modify the behavior of others in a bargaining situation that has consequences for the social system." For a critique see Zimmermann, *Political Violence*, 8.
  21. The use of this word reflects the tendency of recent research into protest, following criticism of the vagueness of the concept of "social protest," to focus on acts of protest in connection with satisfying one's basic material needs, though in the process to increasingly include also the twentieth century. See Karin Hausen, "Schwierigkeiten mit dem 'sozialen Protest': Kritische Anmerkungen zu einem historischen Forschungsansatz," *GG* 3, no. 2 (1977): 257–263; Heinrich Volkmann and Jürgen Bergmann, eds., *Sozialer Protest: Studien zu traditioneller Resistenz und kollektiver Gewalt in Deutschland vom Vormärz bis zur Reichsgründung* (Opladen, 1980); Manfred Gailus and Heinrich Volkmann, ed., *Der Kampf um das tägliche Brot: Nahrungsmangel, Versorgungspolitik und Protest 1770–1990* (Opladen, 1994).
  22. Ted Robert Gurr, drawing on older efforts, distinguished only three types (turmoil, conspiracy, internal war); Botz created a schema that is less clear-cut and uses new forms. Both use as their basic criteria only the degree of organization, the number of individuals involved, and the duration. While Gurr's definitions remain qualitative, Botz draws the lines when it comes to those involved at 10, 500, and more than 500. Apart from the fact that the sources rarely provide such specific information, a persuasive justification for these kinds of determinations is not apparent: Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, 1970), 11; Botz, *Gewalt in der Politik*, 14f.
  23. Lindenberger and Lüdtke, *Physische Gewalt*, 22–27, also speak of "small" violence, though they relate the concept primarily to everyday violent practices such as slapping within the family or in closed institutions.
  24. For a useful overview see Harry Eckstein, "Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Collective Political Violence," in T. R. Gurr, ed., *Handbook of Political Conflict* (New York, 1980), 135–166. The discussion has become too vast to keep track of: see Zimmermann, *Violence*, whose bibliography lists about 3,000 titles.

25. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, 12–25, 46–56, 105–109. See Zimmermann, *Violence*, 37–71. Needless to say, my brief remarks can only sketch the complexity of Gurr’s concept. In the subsequent empirical study of the model, the mediating factors were moved into the foreground, though this did not lead to the presentation of a new concept. See Zimmermann, *Violence*, 48–50; Eckstein, “Theoretical Approaches,” 160f.
26. Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly, *The Rebellious Century, 1830–1930* (Cambridge, MA, 1975); Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA, 1978); idem, “Review of Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*,” *Journal of Social History* 4, no. 4 (1971): 416–420. See Eckstein, “Theoretical Approaches,” 147–149, on related approaches.
27. Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly, *Rebellious Century*, 239–244, 285–287; Tilly, *Mobilization*, 16–51, 172–188.
28. Tilly, *Mobilization*, 62–84. See Zimmermann, *Violence*, 424. As “organization” Tilly defines the strength of shared convictions, the strictness of the demarcation against the outside world, and the network of relationships between the members of an organized group (with no requirement that formal structures and institutions must have been created in the process); “mobilization” is the availability and usability of various resources, which in turn depend on the maintenance of group coherence. As further factors of importance to collective action, Tilly lists common interests within group and the external conditions (“opportunities”), which are above all the product of a particular political system. Tilly, *Mobilization*, 7f., 52–62, 98–142. Tilly’s approach was developed further by Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics* (New York, 1994), who also works with the concept of “protest cycle.” See Erich Weede and Edward N. Muller, “Rationalität, Repression und Gewalt,” *KZfSS* 42, no. 2 (1990): 232–247, who in a comparative study on the basis of international data from the 1970s support Tilly’s thesis that a moderate level of repression is responsible for an especially high level of political violence, while indicators of “relative deprivation,” such a low life expectancy and a low GDP, reveal no significant correlation with political violence.
29. Fruitful attempts at linking cultural and social history can be found in the work of William H. Sewell: see his essay “The Concept of Culture” in V. E. Bonnell and L. Hunt, eds., *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture* (Berkeley, 1999), 35–60; on the discussion in Germany in general see Thomas Mergel and Thomas Welskopp, eds., *Geschichte zwischen Kultur und Gesellschaft: Beiträge zur Theorie-Debatte* (Munich, 1997); Ute Daniel, *Kompendium Kulturgeschichte: Theorien, Praxis, Schlüsselwörter* (Frankfurt, 2001).
30. The best introduction is by Wolf M. Iwand, *Paradigma Politische Kultur: Konzepte, Methoden, Ergebnisse der Political-Culture Forschung in der Bundesrepublik. Ein Forschungsbericht* (Opladen, 1985); see Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Jakob Schissler, eds., *Politische Kultur in Deutschland: Bilanz und Perspektiven der Forschung* (Opladen, 1987), with important contributions by Almond, Rohe, and the editors. See also the informative though in the final analysis unsatisfying outline of the problem by Carola Lipp, “Politische Kultur oder das Politische und Gesellschaftliche in der Kultur,” in W. Hardtwig and H.-U. Wehler, eds., *Kulturgeschichte heute* (Göttingen, 1996), 78–110. For criticism of this concept by political scientists who fault its flexibility—which is helpful to historians—as a lack of clarity, see especially Max Kaase, “Sinn oder Unsinn des Konzepts Politische Kultur für die vergleichende Politikforschung, oder auch: Der Versuch, einen Pudding an die Wand zu nageln,” in M. Kaase and H. D. Klingmann, eds., *Wahlen und Politisches System: Analysen aus Anlaß der Bundestagswahl 1980* (Opladen, 1983), 144–172; David J. Elkins and Richard E. B. Simeon, “A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?” *Comparative Politics* 11, no. 2 (1979): 127–145.
31. Karl Rohe, “Politische Kultur und der kulturelle Aspekt von politischer Wirklichkeit: Konzeptionelle und typologische Überlegungen zu Gegenstand und Fragestellung Politischer Kulturforschung,” in Berg-Schlosser and Schissler, *Politische Kultur*, 39–48; idem, “Politische Kultur und ihre Analyse: Probleme und Perspektiven der politischen Kulturforschung,” *HZ* 250 (1990): 321–346; idem, *Wahlen und Wählertraditionen in Deutschland: Kulturelle Grundlagen deutscher Parteien und Parteiensysteme im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt, 1992), 9–18,

- 19–29; see also his “Regionalkultur, regionale Identität und Regionalismus im Ruhrgebiet,” in W. Lipp, ed., *Industriegesellschaft und Regionalkultur* (Munich, 1984), 123–154.
32. Rohe, “Kulturelle Aspekt,” 42f. Political culture “consists, for one, of those things that are undiscussed and self-evident, which mark the latent or dormant part of political culture; at the same time, however, it also consists of cultural discussions that challenge precisely these self-evident realities and make up the manifest realm, as it were, of political culture” (42).
  33. This also picks up on the reflections by Thomas Childers, “The Social Language of Politics in Germany: The Sociology of Political Discourse in the Weimar Republic,” *AHR* 95, no. 2 (1990): 331–358. What I am concerned with here are the fundamental elements of everyday political language. It would therefore be inappropriate to concentrate on the thought world of individual intellectuals.
  34. For an introduction into the male-specific aspects of gender history see Thomas Kühne, ed., *Männergeschichte – Geschlechtergeschichte: Männlichkeit im Wandel der Moderne* (Frankfurt, 1996).
  35. This was the narrow approach of a Berlin project on the political culture of the Weimar Republic: Detlef Lehnert and Klaus Megerle, eds., *Politische Identität und nationale Gedenktage: Zur politischen Kultur in der Weimarer Republik* (Opladen, 1984); idem, *Politische Teilkulturen zwischen Integration und Polarisierung: Zur politischen Kultur in der Weimarer Republik* (Opladen, 1990); Dietmar Schirmer, *Mythos-Heilshoffnung-Modernität: Politisch-kulturelle Deutungscode in der Weimarer Republik* (Opladen, 1992).
  36. This is the tendency in the otherwise very stimulating study by Rohe’s student Andreas Dörner, *Politischer Mythos und symbolische Politik: Der Hermannsmythos. Zur Entstehung des Nationalbewußtseins der Deutschen* (Reinbek, 1996). The more recent theoretical discussion about the meaning of cultural history as a supplement to social history or as a competing approach, as well as the more specific question about the role that discourses should play in it, cannot be pursued further here. See Wolfgang Hardtwig and Hans-Ulrich Wehler, eds., *Kulturgeschichte heute* (Göttingen, 1996); Mergel and Welskopp, *Geschichte*. Incidentally, it would be a rewarding undertaking to examine the discourses on violence in the Weimar Republic in the pertinent disciplines such as criminology, sociology, or psychology.
  37. This is the starting hypothesis of Lehnert and Megerle, *Teilkulturen*.
  38. Fundamental to the political milieu is still M. Rainer Lepsius, “Parteiensystem und Sozialstruktur: Zum Problem der Demokratisierung der deutschen Gesellschaft,” in M. R. Lepsius, *Demokratie in Deutschland: Soziologisch-historische Konstellationsanalysen. Ausgewählte Aufsätze* (Göttingen, 1993 [1966]), 25–50.
  39. Jürgen W. Falter, *Hitlers Wähler* (Munich, 1991).
  40. For a summary of the discussion about political milieu and the counter-model of “camps” see Rohe, *Wahlen*. For a recent monograph see Siegfried Weichlein, *Sozialmilieus und politische Kultur in der Weimarer Republik: Lebenswelt, Vereinskultur, Politik in Hessen* (Göttingen, 1996); however, political culture in the sense I have just discussed is dealt with only marginally. The better studies of political milieu have examined above all the most clearly demarcated Catholic milieu; see, for example, Doris Kaufmann, *Katholisches Milieu in Münster 1928–1933: Politische Aktionsformen and geschlechtsspezifische Verhaltensräume* (Düsseldorf, 1984); Cornelia Rauh-Kühne, *Katholisches Milieu und Kleinstadtgesellschaft: Ertlingen 1918–1939* (Sigmaringen, 1991); Oded Heilbroner, *Catholicism, Political Culture, and the Countryside: A Social History of the Nazi Party in South Germany* (Ann Arbor, 1998). The study of the bourgeois camp or bourgeois milieu is getting off the ground only slowly. See, for example, Peter Fritzsche, *Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar Germany* (New York, 1990); Rudy Koshar, *Social Life, Local Politics, and Nazism: Bourgeois Marburg 1880–1935* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1986); Helge Matthiesen, *Bürgertum und Nationalsozialismus in Thüringen: Das bürgerliche Gotha von 1918 bis 1930* (Jena, 1994).
  41. Karl-Heinz Leidigkeit and Jürgen Herrmann, *Auf leninistischem Kurs: Geschichte der KPD-Bezirksorganisation Halle-Merseburg bis 1933* (Halle, 1979); Eberhard Schultz, “Rolle und

- Anteil des linken Flügels der USPD im ehemaligen Regierungsbezirk Halle-Merseburg bei der Herausbildung und Entwicklung der KPD zur revolutionären Massenpartei (1917–1920),” PhD diss., University of Halle, 1969; Helga Schubert, “Der mitteldeutsche Generalstreik 1919,” PhD diss., University of Leipzig, 1963; Willi Tonn, “Der Kampf der KPD um die Aktionseinheit der Arbeiterklasse im Bezirk Merseburg in den Jahren 1921–1923,” PhD diss. (A), Martin Luther University, Halle-Wittenberg, 1973; Wilhelm Vogler, “Probleme des Klassenkampfes zwischen den Landarbeitern und Gutsbesitzern im Regierungsbezirk Merseburg (1918–1923),” PhD diss. (A), Martin Luther University, Halle-Wittenberg, 1973; Willibald Gutsche, *Die revolutionäre Bewegung in Erfurt während des 1. imperialistischen Weltkrieges und der Novemberrevolution* (Erfurt, 1963).
42. Joachim Schunke, *Schlacht um Halle* (East Berlin, 1956), on the battles in March of 1920; *Die Märzkämpfe 1921*, ed. Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institut (East Berlin, 1956); S. Weber, *Ein kommunistischer Putsch?* (based on a work from the period before 1989); *Kämpfendes Leuna: Die Geschichte des Kampfes der Leuna-Arbeiter*, Part 1, vol. 1 (1916–1933) (East Berlin, 1961); Werner Imig, *Streik bei Mansfeld 1930: Der Streik der Mansfeld-Arbeiter im Jahre 1930 und seine Unterdrückung mit Hilfe des Staatsapparates der Weimarer Republik* (East Berlin, 1958); Karl Lärmer, *Vom Arbeitszwang zur Zwangsarbeit: Die Arbeitsordnung im Mansfelder Kupferschieferbergbau von 1673–1945* (East Berlin, 1961); Wolfgang Jonas, *Das Leben der Mansfeld-Arbeiter, 1924 bis 1945* (East Berlin, 1957).
43. One exception is the project—undertaken from the perspective of folklore studies—on the social structure and way of life of the workers in the Magdeburg Börde, although its central focus is on the nineteenth century: Hans-Jürgen Rach and Bernhard Weissel, eds., *Landwirtschaft und Kapitalismus: Zur Entwicklung der ökonomischen und sozialen Verhältnisse in der Magdeburger Börde vom Ausgang des 18. Jahrhunderts bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges*, 2 vols. (East Berlin, 1978–79); idem, eds., *Bauer und Landarbeiter im Kapitalismus der Magdeburger Börde: Zur Geschichte des dörflichen Alltags vom Ausgang des 18. Jahrhunderts bis zum Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts* (East Berlin, 1982); Hans-Jürgen Rach, Bernhard Weissel, and Hainer Paul, eds., *Die werktätige Dorfbevölkerung in der Magdeburger Börde: Studien zum dörflichen Alltag vom Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts bis zum Anfang der 60er Jahre*, 2 vols. (East Berlin, 1986–87).
44. Ingrun Drechsler, “Die Magdeburger Sozialdemokratie vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg,” PhD diss., University of Magdeburg, 1992; idem, “Die Rote Stadt im Roten Land: Die Magdeburger Sozialdemokratie unter besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer Gründungsphase und Entwicklung vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg, als sozialdemokratische Hochburg im Spiegel ihrer Wahlergebnisse während der Weimarer Republik und ihrer erfolgreichen kommunalen Wohnungsbaupolitik,” *IWK* 29, no. 2 (1993): 177–194; idem, “Von Fehden und Kämpfen: Der schwierige Weg der Magdeburger Arbeiter bis zur Gründung einer sozialdemokratischen Partei 1900,” in H. Grebing, H. Mommsen, and K. Rudolph, eds., *Demokratie und Emanzipation zwischen Elbe und Saale: Beiträge zur Geschichte der sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterbewegung bis 1933* (Essen, 1993), 42–53; Hans-Dieter Klein, “Zwischen Burgfrieden und Komintern: Die Unabhängige Sozialdemokratie in Halle-Merseburg 1917–1920,” in Grebing, Mommsen, and Rudolph, *Demokratie und Emanzipation*, 181–195; Klaus Schmidtke, “Die Sozialdemokratie in Nordhausen und Salza-Bürgerstadt und Arbeiterdorf zwischen Kaiserreich und DDR,” in F. Walter, T. Dürr, and K. Schmidtke, eds., *Die SPD in Sachsen und Thüringen zwischen Hochburg und Diaspora: Untersuchungen auf lokaler Ebene vom Kaiserreich bis zur Gegenwart* (Bonn, 1993), 183–286; Steffen Raßloff, *Flucht in die nationale Volksgemeinschaft: Das Erfurter Bürgertum zwischen Kaiserreich und NS-Diktatur* (Cologne, 2003). Hans-Ulrich Ludewig wrote his essay without consulting primary sources: “Unruhen, Aufstand und Bürgerkrieg 1918–1923 im mitteldeutschen Raum,” in W. Freitag, K. E. Pollmann, and M. Puhle, eds., *Politische, soziale und kulturelle Konflikte in der Geschichte von Sachsen-Anhalt* (Halle, 1999), 164–174. Weitz, *German Communism*, takes a broader approach that deals with both the Ruhr region and the central German industrial region around Halle-Merseburg.



45. See Fritz Faber, "Magdeburgische Zeitung, Magdeburg (1664–1945)," in H.-D. Fischer, ed., *Deutsche Zeitungen des 17. bis 20. Jahrhunderts*, vol. 2 (Pullach, 1972), 57–73; *Sperlings Zeitschriften- und Zeitungsadreßbuch: Handbuch der deutschen Presse*, 52nd ed. (Leipzig, 1926), 420–422, 53rd ed. (Leipzig, 1927), 469, 55th ed. (Leipzig, 1929), 497f., 57th ed. (Leipzig, 1931), 539. Each of the papers I have listed had a circulation of about 40,000 copies. The region lacked a large conservative or German-national paper, at least in the years up to 1923. After that date, however, the initially left-liberal *Saale-Zeitung* (and part of the Hugenberg group) moved increasingly to the right.
46. Most critical is the absence of the months November and December 1918 for the *Saale-Zeitung*, and that of the months of January and February 1933 for the *Volksstimme*; in the latter case, I was able to use the *Volksblatt* in Halle, which was by then part of the SPD again.
47. I should emphasize here that even with the addition of the official files, this did not yield a data base of all cases of violence that would have allowed any kind of valid quantification. To that extent, the goal here can be only to describe trends and examine typical cases.
48. Author's calculations based on Erwin Haneke, "Die Bodennutzung, das Personal, die Vieh- und Maschinenhaltung der landwirtschaftlichen Betriebe im Freistaat Preußen, in seinen Provinzen, Regierungsbezirken und Kreisen nach den Ergebnissen der landwirtschaftlichen Betriebszählung vom 16. Juni 1925," *Zeitschrift des preußischen statistischen Landesamtes* 68 (1929): 89–219, here 174f. On the economic development of Börde counties up to the First World War see Sieglinde Bandoly, "Veränderungen der sozialökonomischen Struktur in der Magdeburger Börde von dem ersten Weltkrieg," in H.-J. Rach and B. Weissel, *Landwirtschaft und Kapitalismus*, vol. 1, 233–262, and the other essays in this collection. On the social structure of the province as a whole see also Table 1 in Chapter 1.
49. Hans Thormann and Erich Staab, *Der mitteldeutsche Raum: Seine natürlichen, geschichtlichen und wirtschaftlichen Grenzen* (Merseburg, 1929), 78–83, 72; Friedrich-Wilhelm Henning, "Ansätze der industriellen Entwicklung in Sachsen-Anhalt im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert," *Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preußischen Geschichte, Neue Folge* 4, no. 1 (1994): 1–30, here 14f.
50. In precise numbers there were 20,842, which accounted for 61.5 percent of all machine builders in the administrative district and 29 percent of all machine builders in the province. Author's calculations based on *Statistik des Deutschen Reiches, Neue Folge* 403, part 9, 74–164, here 76f., 88, 100.
51. Martin Lichtenberg, "Entwicklungstendenzen in der Magdeburger Industrie," PhD diss., University of Jena, 1934, 53–55.
52. Thormann and Staab, *Mitteldeutscher Raum*, 93f.
53. Henning, "Industrielle Entwicklung," 11–16; Thormann and Staab, *Mitteldeutscher Raum*, 72.
54. Beginning in 1921, the "Mansfeldsche Kupferschiefer bauende Gewerkschaft" operated as the "Mansfeld A.G." The extraction of potassium that was begun in 1897 was henceforth in the hands of the "Mansfeld Kaliwerke A.G.," added to this was the "Mansfeldsche Metallhandel A.G." in Berlin. The seat of the enterprise was in Eisleben. For the development of the company see Walter Hoffmann, *Der Mansfelder Kupferschieferbergbau: Ein Beitrag zur mitteldeutschen Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (Meisenheim a. Gl., 1957); on working conditions see Karl Lärmer, *Vom Arbeitszwang zur Zwangsarbeit*, and Waltraud Robbe, *Die Knappschaftsfessel von Mansfeld: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Lage und des Kampfes der deutschen Arbeiterklasse in der Zeit von 1850 bis 1900* (East Berlin, 1958).
55. *Stat. Dt. R., N. F.* 403, part 9, 86.
56. *Stat. Dt. R., N. F.* 403, part 9, 86, 88.
57. *Jahresberichte der preußischen Regierungs- und Gewerbe- und Bergbehörden für 1914–1918* (Berlin, 1919), 553; *Kämpfendes Leuna, part I, 1 (1916–1933)*, 145.
58. Erich Knabe, "Die mitteldeutsche chemische Industrie in ihrer standortmäßigen Bedingtheit," PhD diss., University of Halle, 1927; *Jahresberichte*, 553f.; Thormann and Staab, *Mitteldeutscher Raum*, 103.

59. Compare with additional figures in Klein, "Burgfrieden," 182f. According to these data, the number of chemical workers in the Bitterfeld region rose by another 1,500 to 10,000 between 1905 and 1919, the number of miners in the Geisel Valley (where the coal for Leuna was being extracted) grew between 1916 and 1919 alone from 2,844 to 9,815.
60. On the disposition of workers in such monoindustrial sites with extremely rapid growth toward radical behavior, see the fundamental observations by Klaus Tenfelde, *Proletarische Provinz: Radikalisierung und Widerstand in Penzberg/Oberbayern 1900–1945* (Munich, 1982), 4–6.
61. Thormann and Staab, *Mitteldeutscher Raum*, 94, 96; *Stat. Dt. R., N. F.*, 403, part 9, 88f., 94.
62. Thormann and Staab, *Mitteldeutscher Raum*, 84.
63. Author's calculations based on *Stat. Dt. R., N. F.*, 403, part 9, 89, 93; Thormann and Staab, *Mitteldeutscher Raum*, 65.
64. Thormann and Staab, *Mitteldeutscher Raum*, 131; Vogler, "Probleme des Klassenkampfes," 8.
65. Thormann and Staab, *Mitteldeutscher Raum*, 131; also see Vogler, "Probleme des Klassenkampfes," 13. In the administrative district of Magdeburg, the figure was 27.5 percent. On the structure of agriculture in the province in general see also Thomas Nabert, *Der Großgrundbesitz in der preußischen Provinz Sachsen 1913–1933: Soziale Struktur, ökonomische Position und politische Rolle* (Cologne, 1992), esp. 12ff., 57ff.
66. *Stat. Dt. R., N. F.*, 403, part 9, 98.
67. Thormann and Staab, *Mitteldeutscher Raum*, 131.
68. *Stat. Dt. R., N. F.*, 403, part 9, 98.
69. *Ibid.*, 99f.; Thormann and Staab, *Mitteldeutscher Raum*, 126, 112, 110. See also Raßloff, *Flucht*, 41–60.
70. Thormann and Staab, *Mitteldeutscher Raum*, 92–94, 96; *Jahresbericht*, 583.
71. *Stat. Dt. R., N. F.* 401, 363f. (results of the census of 1925).
72. The preceding discussion is based on Drechsler, "Rote Stadt," 177–190; *idem*, "Fehden," 42–53; *idem*, "Sozialdemokratie."
73. Roswitha Mende, „Geschichte der Sozialdemokratie im Regierungsbezirk Merseburg von der Jahrhundertwende bis 1917,“ PhD diss. (B), University of Halle, 1984.
74. The debate over when precisely the development that led to the party split in 1917 began and which specific factors were decisive cannot be pursued here. On this see Dieter Groh, *Negative Integration und revolutionärer Attentismus: Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges* (Frankfurt, 1973); Carl E. Schorske, *Die große Spaltung: Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie 1905–1917* (Berlin, 1981); most recently Wolfgang Kruse, *Krieg und nationale Integration: Eine Neuinterpretation des sozialdemokratischen Burgfriedenschlusses 1914/15* (Essen, 1993).
75. Ulrich Heß, "Entwicklung zur Industriestadt und zu einem Zentrum der Arbeiterbewegung (1871 bis 1897/98)," in W. Gutsche, ed., *Geschichte der Stadt Erfurt* (Weimar, 1986), 281–320; Willibald Gutsche, "Übergang zum Imperialismus und Erster Weltkrieg (1897/98 bis 1917)," in W. Gutsche, *Geschichte der Stadt Erfurt*, 321–358; Franz Walter, "Sachsen und Thüringen: Von Mutterländern der Arbeiterbewegung zu Sorgenkindern der SPD: Einführung und Überblick," in F. Walter, T. Dürr, and K. Schmidtke, eds., *Die SPD in Sachsen und Thüringen zwischen Hochburg und Diaspora: Untersuchungen auf lokaler Ebene vom Kaiserreich bis zur Gegenwart* (Bonn, 1993), 11–38; Schmidtke, "Sozialdemokratie," 183–213.
76. *Stat. Dt. R., N. F.* vol. 250, 22–25. Given the complete lack of studies on the bourgeois parties in this region, these brief indications must suffice.
77. See on this the correspondence in LHAM C 20 Ib 202/I. At that time, the commanding general of the IVth Army Corps headquartered in Magdeburg was Paul von Hindenburg, the future Reich President.
78. LHAM C 20 Ib 202/II, fol. 16f. (Regierungspräsident (RP) of Magdeburg to the Oberpräsident (OP), 21 January 1906), fol. 20–22 (RP Merseburg to OP, 25 January 1906), fol. 23f. (RP Erfurt to OP, 22 January 1906).
79. LHAM C 20 Ib 202/I, fol. 44 (Ministry of the Interior to all Oberpräsidenten, 7 March 1906).

80. LHAM C 20 Ib 202/II, fol. 78 (Polizeipräsident (PP) of Magdeburg to OP, 16 March 1910). However, the “soft” line of the police president was harshly criticized by the Regierungspräsident, who was not interested in the fact that there had not been any clashes, but merely held that the mob had “ruled the street.” The real problem was the symbolic victory of the demonstrators, their occupation of public space (ibid., fol. 81f, RP to OP, 30 March 1910).
81. LHAM C 20 Ib 202/II, fol. 62f. (RP Merseburg to OP, 25 January 1910); LAME C 48 Ia 217, fols. 104–107 (Police Administration of Halle to RP, 14 February 1910); *VB* no. 38, 15 February 1910. Eighty-eight individuals were later sentenced to prison terms and seventy-five were fined, with not a single policeman among them.
82. *VB* no. 38, 15 February; no. 39, 16 February 1910. In an editorial, the *Volksstimme* in Magdeburg also criticized the arbitrary conduct of the police in Halle and elsewhere, but at the same time it warned against a “blue rage” (*VS* no. 41, 18 February 1910).
83. LAME C 48 Ia 217, fol. 126f. (Police Administration of Halle to RP, 7 March 1910). See the account of the events in Mende, “Sozialdemokratie,” 225–232, who does not mention the dominance of the men among the demonstrators, a critical difference from earlier demonstrations. Weitz, *German Communism*, 43–45, suggests that the experience with police brutality pushed the Social Democrats in Halle to the left. He overlooks, first, the development since the 1890s I have sketched above, and, second, the fact that the brutality of the police response on 13 February was not the rule, but the exception.
84. *SZ* no. 74, 14 February 1910; *MZ* no. 37, 21 January 1906.
85. *SZ* no. 74, 14 February 1910. On the demonstrations over voting rights in Berlin and the reactions to them see Lindenberger, *Straßenpolitik*, 304–351.
86. *MZ* no. 20, 12 January 1912; no. 48, 26 January 1912; no. 37, 21 January; no. 40, 23 January 1906.
87. *SZ* no. 38, 24 January 1910; no. 21, 13 January 1912.
88. *VS* no. 65, 17 March 1912. For the long-term significance of this and other strikes in the area under investigation see the apt comment by Weitz, *German Communism*, 40–43.
89. Mende, “Sozialdemokratie,” 205–212; *VB* no. 39, 16 February; no. 40, 17 February; no. 41, 18 February 1910. On the relationship between the authoritarian Wilhelminian state, the police, and the workers’ movement in general, see Gerhard A. Ritter and Klaus Tenfelde, *Arbeiter im deutschen Kaiserreich 1871 bis 1914* (Bonn, 1992), 682–684; Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, vol. 3: Von der „Deutschen Doppelrevolution“ bis zum Beginn des Ersten Weltkriegs, 1849–1914* (Munich, 1995), 1045–1050. Ralph Jessen, *Polizei im Industriegebiet: Modernisierung und Herrschaftspraxis im westfälischen Ruhrgebiet 1848–1914* (Göttingen, 1991) emphasizes especially the indirect effect of police action: although it could intervene palpably in the daily life of the proletariat again and again, it prompted especially the SPD to distance itself clearly from violent forms of action.
90. *VS* no. 64, 16 March 1912.
91. See, for example, the minor clashes during a lockout of several hundred tobacco workers in Nordhausen in 1901, LAG Reg. Erfurt 8793 (not paginated), passim; on the background see Schmidtke, “Sozialdemokratie,” 188f. During a strike of construction workers in Erfurt in 1907, Italian workers, who had been brought in as strikebreakers, shot at the strikers with revolvers, but nobody was hurt (LAG Reg. Erfurt 12354, fols. 3, 8, 9f.); during a strike of metal workers in Erfurt in 1911, two strikebreakers were assaulted in the dark of night and severely beaten, and here, too, shots were fired (ibid., fol. 85, Polizei Erfurt to RP, 12 September 1911). For a detailed discussion of the various forms of this “small” violence see Lindenberger, *Straßenpolitik*, passim, on the strike esp. 233–240.
92. See, for example, *MZ* no. 132, 12 March 1912, where the miners’ strike in the Ruhr was described as a “frivolous strike,” one that revolved in the final analysis around questions of political power; the “most serious danger,” however, was that the strikers, “under the pressure of hatred and hunger, will eventually lose any discipline and therefore try to block the entrance into the mines by force.”

93. *SZ* no. 357, 2 August 1914.
94. *MZ* no. 565, 2 August 1914. It should also not be forgotten that after 1 August 1914, all newspapers were subject to censorship; their reports about war enthusiasm must also be evaluated from this perspective.
95. *MZ* no. 546, 26 July; no. 547, 27 July; no. 562, 1 August 1914.
96. *SZ* no. 355, 1 August 1914.
97. Christian Geinitz and Uta Hinz have argued along the same lines: “Das Augusterlebnis in Südbaden: Ambivalente Reaktionen der deutschen Öffentlichkeit auf den Kriegsbeginn 1914,” in G. Hirschfeld et al., eds., *Kriegserfabrungen: Studien zur Sozial- und Mentalitätsgeschichte des Ersten Weltkriegs* (Essen, 1997), 20–35, here 20–28; Christian Geinitz, *Kriegsfurcht und Kampfbereitschaft: Das Augusterlebnis in Freiburg. Eine Studie zum Kriegsbeginn 1914* (Essen, 1998).
98. *VS* no. 178, 2 August 1914. As late as 28 July (no. 173), the paper had opposed the “politics of the street” that bourgeois papers were trying to generate by disseminating exaggerated reports about a mood of enthusiasm in the streets. See Kruse, *Krieg*, 54ff., who has argued convincingly against the older thesis of a wave of patriotism also among the workers; also see his “Die Kriegsbegeisterung im Deutschen Reich zu Beginn des Ersten Weltkriegs: Entstehungszusammenhänge, Grenzen und ideologische Strukturen,” in G. Mergner and M. van der Linden, eds., *Kriegsbegeisterung und mentale Kriegsvorbereitung* (Berlin, 1991), 73–81. On the lack of enthusiasm in the countryside see Ziemann, *Front*, 39ff.; of course, it should be tested to what extent Ziemann’s findings for a Catholic region apply to rural Protestant areas. For a comprehensive look at the mood at the outbreak of the war, see Jeffrey Verhey, *The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth and Mobilization in Germany* (Cambridge, 2000), who sees the enthusiasm that can be found as above all a phenomenon in the large cities, carried by young men from the bourgeoisie.
99. *MZ* no. 584, 9 August 1914; emphases in original.
100. Thus the tenor of the reflections by Joachim Radkau, *Das Zeitalter der Nervosität: Deutschland zwischen Bismarck und Hitler* (Munich, 1998), 389ff., quote on 389. On the practice of “hard” masculinity in the prewar society see Ute Frevert, *Ehrenmänner: Das Duell in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft* (Munich, 1991), English edition, *Men of Honour: A Social and Cultural History of the Duel*, trans. Anthony Williams (Cambridge, MA, 1995), esp. chaps. 3 and 4; on the hardening of the ideal of manhood see also Svenja Goltermann, *Körper der Nation: Habitusformierung und die Politik des Turnens 1860–1890* (Göttingen, 1998), 126ff., 290ff.
101. *MZ* no. 565, 2 August; no. 573, 5 August 1914; *SZ* no. 537, 2 August; no. 361, 5 August 1914. By comparison, the notion of war as a bath of steel that purified man was secondary. See on this the recent, detailed analysis of the press by Thomas Raithel, *Das „Wunder“ der inneren Einbeit: Studien zur deutschen und französischen Öffentlichkeit bei Beginn des Ersten Weltkriegs* (Bonn, 1996), esp. 467ff.; in the same spirit Geinitz and Hinz, “Augusterlebnis,” 28.
102. Susanne Miller, *Burgfrieden und Klassenkampf: Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Düsseldorf, 1974), 339.
103. Mende, “Sozialdemokratie,” 411–429; Schultz, “USPD,” 45–49; Klein, “Burgfrieden,” 181–186. Both men later played leading roles in the KPD.
104. Gutsche, *Bewegung*, 84–91.
105. Schmidtke, “Sozialdemokratie,” 209. Crucial in this case were the aftershocks from the “second ballot quarrel” in 1912, when the local party organization was unwilling to adhere to the “restraining agreement” (*Dämpfungsabkommen*) made by the SPD and the liberal Fortschrittliche Volkspartei and was able to push through its own candidate, Cohn; Cohn, like the Reichstag delegates Reißhaus from Erfurt and Kunert from Halle, was an early opponent of approving additional war bonds.
106. The study by Jürgen Kocka remains of fundamental importance: *Klassengesellschaft im Krieg: Deutsche Sozialgeschichte 1914–1918*, 2nd ed. (Göttingen, 1978); for two syntheses see Thomas Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1866–1918, vol. 2: Machtstaat vor der Demokratie* (Munich,

- 1992), 778ff., 850ff.; Roger Chickering, *Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914–1918* (Cambridge, 1998).
107. Examples of such protests in LHAM C 28 If 2269, fols. 105ff. (in Magdeburg on 28 March 1917); fols. 173ff. (in Gardelegen on 30 and 31 July 1917). See the detailed account of a food disturbance in Tangermünde in Ute Daniel, *Arbeiterfrauen in der Kriegsgesellschaft: Beruf, Familie und Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Göttingen, 1989), English edition, *The War From Within: German Working-Class Women in the First World War*, trans. Margaret Ries (Oxford, 1997), 247f. However, Daniel's statement that such protests had "brought the governability of the cities into question" (p. 247) seems overdrawn.
  108. For general discussions see Peter Fritzsche, *Germans into Nazis* (Cambridge, MA, 1998), 11ff.; Davis, *Home Fires Burning*; Geyer, *Verkehrte Welt*, 28ff.
  109. LHAM C 28 If 2269, fol. 25 (work stoppages in several Magdeburg machine factories in protest against a cut in the bread ration and additional holiday shifts, PP Magdeburg to RP, 6 April 1917); Mende, "Sozialdemokratie," 434; Gutsche, *Bewegung*, 87f.
  110. Schultz, "USPD," 58f., Mende, "Sozialdemokratie," 441f.; Klein, *Burgfrieden*, 186f.; *Kämpfendes Leuna*, 88–91.
  111. Schultz, "USPD," 67–70; Klein, "Burgfrieden," 187; *Kämpfendes Leuna*, 96.
  112. LHAM C 28 If 2269, fols. 220–229 (several reports by PP Magdeburg to RP).
  113. Gutsche, *Bewegung*, 106f.
  114. *SZ* no. 54, 1 February 1918.
  115. *SZ* no. 185, 8 April; no. 166, 10 April; no. 318, 10 July; no. 334, 19 July 1917; no. 429, 13 September 1918; *MZ* no. 244, 1 April; no. 261, 8 April; no. 715, 25 September; no. 971, 31 December 1917.
  116. *SZ* no. 455, 28 September 1918; *MZ* no. 500, 8 July 1917 (quote); no. 528, 18 July 1918. On the broad debate over "nervousness" in Germany before 1914 see Radkau, *Zeitalter der Nervosität*, 389ff., 416ff., esp. 428, who puts forth the thesis that until 1914, the problem of a lack of nervous strength was certainly discussed with a sense of ambivalence and that people were skeptical of draconian treatments; it was only during the war itself that a tendency toward toughness prevailed in the scientific discussion. On fear of the "female" subsistence protests see Davis, *Home Fires Burning*; Geyer, *Verkehrte Welt*, 48f.
  117. *MZ* no. 767, 14 October 1918. The paper was paraphrasing a statement from the Association of German Newspaper Publishers.
  118. *Ibid.*
  119. *MZ* no. 802, 27 October; no. 818, 2 November 1918.
  120. *VS* no. 255, 30 October 1918 (here the last quote); see no. 221, 20 September; no. 239, 11 October; no. 250, 24 October ("remain firm"); no. 252, 26 October 1918.
  121. *VS* no. 258, 2 November; no. 260, 5 November; no. 262, 7 November ("Tartar state"); no. 263, 8 November 1918 (here the longer quote). On the position of the SPD leadership in October 1918 see Susanne Miller, *Die Bürde der Macht: Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie 1918–1920* (Düsseldorf, 1978), 62–69.
  122. *MZ* no. 767, 14 October; no. 825, 5 November; no. 833, 7 November; no. 834, 8 November (here the last quote). Incidentally, the *Saale-Zeitung* fell largely silent from the second half of October onward, limiting itself to very brief reporting of the events. There is a gap in the surviving editions of the paper for the months of November and December.
  123. LHAM C 20 Ib 4786/1, fol. 7.
  124. Eberhard Kolb, *Die Arbeiterräte in der deutschen Innenpolitik 1918–1919* (Düsseldorf, 1962), 93; Leidigkeit and Herrmann, *Leninistischer Kurs*, 31–36; Schultz, "USPD," 87–89; "Anklagerede des Staatsanwalts im Kilian-Prozeß," in *SZ* no. 577, 10 December 1919; according to this statement by the prosecutor, Lord Mayor Rive was, by his own account, not impeded in the exercise of his official duties until 23 December.
  125. *Kämpfendes Leuna*, 102–106, quote on 106; see Leidigkeit and Herrmann, *Leninistischer Kurs*, 38; Schultz, "USPD," 96–100.

126. Peter von Oertzen, *Betriebsräte in der Novemberrevolution: Eine politikwissenschaftliche Untersuchung über Ideengehalt und Struktur der betrieblichen und wirtschaftlichen Arbeiterräte in der deutschen Revolution 1918/19*, 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1976), 133f., emphasizes both of these factors as specific to the workers' councils movement in central Germany compared to the workers' councils in the Ruhr region. On the development in the other cities of the district of Merseburg during the November days see Schultz, "USPD," 90–96; David Morgan, *The Socialist Left and the German Revolution: A History of the German Independent Social Democratic Party, 1917–1922* (Ithaca, 1975), 173–176. Only in Weißenfels did the workers' and soldiers' council co-founded by Alfred Oelßner (later KPD) have a leadership as radical as that in Halle; elsewhere, the MSPD had greater influence.
127. LHAM C 20 Ib 4786/I, fols. 4–6 (Report of RP Magdeburg to OP, 13 November 1918), which also gives a report of the unfolding of the movement in the other cities of the region; Manfred Wille, "Grundzüge der Entwicklung Magdeburgs von 1917 bis 1945," in Rach, Weissel, and Plaul, *Dorfbevölkerung*, vol. 2, 255–279, here 256–258; VS no. 263, 9 November 1927 ("Days of Revolution in Magdeburg," remembrances by the SPD district chairman Ernst Wittmaack).
128. Gutsche, *Bewegung*, 127–50; Raßloff, *Flucht*, 155–163.
129. The reports of the Landräte in LHAM C 20 Ib 4786/I, fols. 34, 36, 37, 46, 50, 53; the quote is from the report by the Landrat in Eisleben dated 12 November 1918, fol. 37.
130. Vogler, "Klassenkampf," 71–88, 93–116, 151–156; on the details of the agreement of 13 December see 116–132. Martin Schumacher, *Land und Politik: Eine Untersuchung über politische Parteien und agrarische Interessen 1914–1923* (Düsseldorf, 1978), 85ff. (on the rural laborer regulations of 24 January 1919 see 105–116), criticizes the overly accommodating attitude of the DLV during the negotiations at the Reich level. The eight-hour day was not achieved during the negotiations in the province of Saxony (instead, work shifts between eight and eleven hours, changing depending on the time of year, were stipulated), wages in kind were not abolished, child labor was not limited, and no regulations were made about vacation.
131. Examples in LHAM C 20 Ib 4786/I, fol. 9 (RP Erfurt to OP, 12 November 1918); fol. 6 (RP Magdeburg to OP, 13 November 1918); VS no. 263, 9 November 1927.
132. This is also true, for example, for Suhl and its weapons factories, the most likely place where (as in Halle) one might have expected such efforts among the workers who tended toward the left-wing USPD; it was not until 16 January 1919 that the workers' and soldiers' council, now completely under the control of the USPD, set up a force of its own: Heinz Oeckel, *Die revolutionäre Volkswehr 1918/19: Die deutsche Arbeiterklasse im Kampf um die revolutionäre Volkswehr, November 1918 bis Mai 1919* (East Berlin, 1968), 119.
133. LHAM C 20 Ib 4786/I, fol. 6 (RP Magdeburg to OP, 13 November 1918). In Magdeburg, however, just as in Stendal and Quedlinburg, for example, the local police force was able to resume its armed service after only a few hours of interruption (*ibid.*, fol. 5).
134. VB no. 268, 14 November 1918.
135. VB no. 278, 27 November 1918.
136. LHAM C 20 Ib 4786/I, fol. 4 (RP Magdeburg to OP, 13 November 1918), fol. 7 (RP Merseburg to OP, 14 November 1918). Military jails were also opened in Quedlinburg and Magdeburg. Examples for the problems in the countryside, *ibid.*, fols. 34ff. For example, the Landrat of Nordhausen reported that by 14 November, "the storage rooms for the separators for goat and cow farmers had already been stormed in three villages and the separators had been removed" (fol. 50). The Landrat of Schleusingen believed that especially the supply of potatoes to the industrial communities was "most seriously" imperiled by the possible formation of farmers' councils, and he pointed to the refusal of smaller farmers to fulfill their obligations (fol. 53).
137. For a general account of these disturbances of 'peace and order' see Bessel, *Germany after the First World War*, 81, and on the city-countryside conflict during the war and the immediate postwar period see Ziemann, *Front*, 308ff.; Robert G. Moeller, *German Peasants and Agrarian Politics, 1914–1924: The Rhineland and Westphalia* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1986); Geyer, *Verkehrte Welt*, 40ff.

- 
138. *MZ* no. 940, 10 November 1918; *VS* no. 293, 14 December 1918, compare no. 269, 15 November. Heinrich August Winkler, *Weimar, 1918–1933: Die Geschichte der ersten deutschen Demokratie* (Munich, 1993), 32.
139. On the comparison with the French Revolution see also *SZ* no. 18, 11 January 1919. For a clear separation from the empire in Germany's liberal press (*Münchener Neueste Nachrichten, BZ am Mittag, Frankfurter Zeitung*), see the not very insightful work by Burkhard Asmuss, *Republik ohne Chance? Akzeptanz und Legitimation der Weimarer Republik in der deutschen Tagespresse zwischen 1918 und 1923* (Berlin, 1994), 89f., 100f., 115–118.
140. *MZ* no. 840, 10 November 1918. On the concept of the *Völkörper* and its male connotations see Goltermann, *Körper der Nation*, esp. 333–336.