INTRODUCTION

WHAT IS WORK?

Gender at the Crossroads of Home, Family, and Business from the Early Modern Era to the Present

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1. What is work? A fresh perspective from the (alleged) margins

What is work? The question chosen as a title for this volume is an ambitious one. We are obviously aware that a huge body of literature on work exists, and we certainly do not pretend we can give a definite answer to the question,¹ which may not even be possible.² Instead, we will use this question as a tool to interrogate history, the social sciences, and also politics. Such a question prompts us in fact to adopt a critical and diversified view of work and, consequently, of economic and social policies, too. On the other hand, establishing the boundaries, implications, and stakes of a new characterization of work is a crucial issue in the contemporary debate, and is obviously also motivated by the ongoing dramatic economic, technological, organizational, social, and cultural changes affecting the world of work.

Let us start with a telling example. “Italy is a Democratic Republic, founded on work,” article 1 of the Italian Constitution, written after the Second World War and enforced in 1948, authoritatively states³: this implied and still implies a kind of overlap between enjoying citizenship and working. When the Italian Constitution was enforced, according to the Italian population censuses as many as three-quarters of adult Italian women were not working or, more precisely, were economically “inactive.” What did they do? About 60 percent of them were housewives:
they were therefore likely to actually work very hard. Moreover, some of them were working (either part time or full time) in the family business but without any remuneration. Yet statisticians and economists did not consider housewives’ activities as work, something that continues to happen even today. This exclusion obviously represented, and largely still represents, a serious gender bias in the political and economic construction of the Italian Republic.4

While the Italian case is particularly illuminating, it is not unique. Work was and still is defined in statistics such as the official calculations of GDP in such a way that it marginalizes female activities, especially those performed at home for free. Prostitution, the production and trafficking of drugs, as well as the smuggling of alcohol and tobacco have recently been officially included in the calculation of GDP in all EU countries, whereas this is not yet the case with unpaid care- and domestic work. Therefore, according to the official GDP calculations, if we order a pizza that is delivered to us at home by a pizzeria, we contribute to GDP, but we don’t if we prepare a pizza at home, except for the ingredients, electricity, etc., that we pay for; similarly, if we hire a babysitter, we increase our country’s wealth, but we don’t if we care for our children ourselves, whereas we would contribute to the wealth of the nation if we sold heroin to the young (a rather paradoxical calculation, indeed, even more so if we think that drug pushers do not pay taxes on their income).

Nonetheless, things have radically changed since the 1940s and 1950s. By the 1960s and 1970s, increasing criticism had been leveled against the rather simplified notion of work that had been developed by political economists and statisticians in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and that (though never completely uncontested) had become hegemonic.6 Female and feminist scholars and activists have played (and still play) a crucial role in questioning that notion, for instance by highlighting women’s role in economic development7 or by campaigning for wages to housewives that would make the economic value of care and housework visible,8 to quote but two examples. However, other people, too, such as the scholars who have elaborated the so-called “new home economics,”9 have called for a more complex and inclusive notion of work. As a consequence, today there is large consent on the need for such a revision and “complexification” of that very notion. Not only feminist scholars but also official statistics agencies produce statistics that include unpaid domestic and care work and calculate its economic value, though generally in “satellite accounts.” Scholars who calculate the economic value of unpaid care- and housework conclude that it is likely to significantly alter the evaluation of the wealth of each single nation and the ranking of different countries, as the quantity of this type of work is not the same everywhere.10
Approaching the question “What is work?” from a historical perspective allows us to analyze the transformations and assess the achievements of the last decades. Moreover, it allows us to unveil the variety of historical forms of work, thus contributing to the aforementioned “complexification” of the very concept of work.

As a vantage point for our analysis, we have chosen the household, convinced that it offers a particularly fruitful perspective. We will therefore present the multiple forms of labor performed within the household economy, assessing whether or not they were considered proper work by different actors in different contexts and periods. Households were and still are more than just the sites of female, unpaid, and/or (allegedly) unproductive activities. Both women and men, girls and boys performed and perform a wide range of tasks within the household, though often highly gendered ones: home-based work, care work, unpaid market work, domestic service, waged labor, housekeeping, etc. Our ambitious plan has grown from a more limited project titled *Family Work, Unpaid Work: Forms and Actors of Productive Domestic Work in Europe (15th–21st Centuries)*. This project aimed to investigate different forms of unpaid work and production for the market performed within family-run economic activities. Both unpaid and paid care and housework (respectively performed by family members and domestic workers) have been the objects of burgeoning research in the last decades, and paid industrial home work has also attracted attention. Much less interest has been devoted to unpaid work for the market carried out within family enterprises, thus the project’s intent was to gather empirical studies dealing with women’s and children’s unpaid work for the market, especially in urban domestic production.

The research developed within this project, however, has led us to analyze any type of work performed at home: the more we discovered about the importance of unpaid work for the market, not only in the Middle Ages or in the early modern era but also in present times, the more we were pushed to include in our analysis any form of home-based productive work (unpaid, paid, hybrid, and intermediate) as well as any other type of work carried out at home, both paid and unpaid, for self-consumption and care. In other words, in addition to paid and unpaid work for the market, this book will also deal with family non-market work. Yet the very notion of “non-market work” needs to be clarified. As stated by Nancy Folbre, a wide range of care work activities can be measured according to their market value. But some of the activities related to care do not have market substitutes. The definition of family work that she suggests includes both of these and aims to “refer to them as what they are, rather than what they are not,” i.e., positively as “family work” and not negatively as “non-market work.”
Rather than a social and economic history of work especially focusing on home-based activities, the book provides readers with an analysis of the (often controversial and changing) value attributed to those activities by people belonging to different classes and social groups; by different religions and cultures; and by various philosophers, economists, policymakers, statisticians, political activists, feminists, international agencies, and organizations. In order to obtain a broad picture of what was and is (considered) work, nobody can ignore its gendered dimension; to develop a gendered perspective, we have, therefore, taken into account meanings and practices associated in past and present societies with female and male activities.

All the types of work addressed in the following pages have, over time, experienced specific transformations as for their practical organization and ideological evaluation, though each with peculiar features, as this book will show, thanks to its gendered, long-term perspective (sixteenth to twenty-first centuries) and thanks to its multidisciplinary approach. The contributors, who specialize in gender history, economic sociology, family history, civil law, and feminist economics, focus on women’s work, family obligations, and household economies in European and North American countries, discussing continuities and discontinuities on gender-related tasks and forms of labor.

Today the ongoing transformations are radically modifying opportunities and implications of home-based work. The internet in particular, but also 3D printers and other devices, are making new forms of work at home (not only unpaid and non-market, but also paid and market work) possible, and a lively discussion is taking place on these new opportunities, on their advantages and disadvantages.16

By contrast, for a long time households had been increasingly considered as marginal places of economic activity in comparison to factories, shops, offices, etc., while many of the activities performed at home were ever more insistently deemed as non-work, as several chapters of this book will show in detail. Therefore, looking at work from the vantage point of the household allows us to discover the changing and often contested boundaries of what was/is regarded as (proper) work in different Euro-American contexts, from early modern times to the present. In practically any social context there are/were, in fact, different and often concurrent ideas (explicitly expressed or implicitly assumed) about what work is/was and who must or might be considered a worker, and these very ideas have changed over time, as a wealth of literature has shown.17 More particularly, our approach allows us to uncover the ambiguities and biases—especially the gender ones—of the mainstream conceptions of work embedded in laws, population census categories, national and
international statistics on labor forces, economic statistics on GDP, etc. Looking at work from its (alleged) margins therefore makes possible a fresh perspective on it, with implications that are important (at least so it seems to us) for both scholars and policymakers.

2. Changing and conflicting words and ideas

Labor, lavoro, travail, trabajo, trabalho, work, Arbeit, and so forth: the vocabulary of work is rich and interesting to analyze. It expresses both positive and negative values: etymologically, “work” expresses the ideas of an “accomplished task”; the first meaning of the Old English term weorc, worc is “something done, [a] discreet act performed by someone, [an] action (whether voluntary or required), [a] proceeding, [a] business; that which is made or manufactured, products of labor.” By contrast, labor and lavoro, as well as Arbeit and maybe even more travail, trabajo, trabalho, express toil, suffering, and pain. Labor and lavoro derive in fact from the Latin labor, which primarily means “toil”; as for Arbeit, the Germanic words from which it derives signified toil, need, and hardship, in addition to work, while the French travail (derived from the Latin trepalium, an instrument of torture) may have originally described a device to subjugate animals (now called travail à ferrer or travail de maréchal); from the twelfth century, the word is attested with the meaning of labor in childbirth, labor pain, torment, and pain. Labor and lavoro derive in fact from the Latin labor, which primarily means “toil”; as for Arbeit, the Germanic words from which it derives signified toil, need, and hardship, in addition to work, while the French travail (derived from the Latin trepalium, an instrument of torture) may have originally described a device to subjugate animals (now called travail à ferrer or travail de maréchal); from the twelfth century, the word is attested with the meaning of labor in childbirth, labor pain, torment, and pain. Labor and lavoro derive in fact from the Latin labor, which primarily means “toil”; as for Arbeit, the Germanic words from which it derives signified toil, need, and hardship, in addition to work, while the French travail (derived from the Latin trepalium, an instrument of torture) may have originally described a device to subjugate animals (now called travail à ferrer or travail de maréchal); from the twelfth century, the word is attested with the meaning of labor in childbirth, labor pain, torment, and pain. Labor and lavoro derive in fact from the Latin labor, which primarily means “toil”; as for Arbeit, the Germanic words from which it derives signified toil, need, and hardship, in addition to work, while the French travail (derived from the Latin trepalium, an instrument of torture) may have originally described a device to subjugate animals (now called travail à ferrer or travail de maréchal); from the twelfth century, the word is attested with the meaning of labor in childbirth, labor pain, torment, and pain. Labor and lavoro derive in fact from the Latin labor, which primarily means “toil”; as for Arbeit, the Germanic words from which it derives signified toil, need, and hardship, in addition to work, while the French travail (derived from the Latin trepalium, an instrument of torture) may have originally described a device to subjugate animals (now called travail à ferrer or travail de maréchal); from the twelfth century, the word is attested with the meaning of labor in childbirth, labor pain, torment, and pain. Labor and lavoro derive in fact from the Latin labor, which primarily means “toil”; as for Arbeit, the Germanic words from which it derives signified toil, need, and hardship, in addition to work, while the French travail (derived from the Latin trepalium, an instrument of torture) may have originally described a device to subjugate animals (now called travail à ferrer or travail de maréchal); from the twelfth century, the word is attested with the meaning of labor in childbirth, labor pain, torment, and pain. Labor and lavoro derive in fact from the Latin labor, which primarily means “toil”; as for Arbeit, the Germanic words from which it derives signified toil, need, and hardship, in addition to work, while the French travail (derived from the Latin trepalium, an instrument of torture) may have originally described a device to subjugate animals (now called travail à ferrer or travail de maréchal); from the twelfth century, the word is attested with the meaning of labor in childbirth, labor pain, torment, and pain.

Even in such an influential book as the Bible we find both positive and negative connotations of work: in Genesis (2:2), God is described as a worker, and one who rested after finishing his work, on the seventh day. But work is also the punishment for the original sin: “By the sweat of your brow you will eat your food” (Gen. 3:19). According to Jacques Le Goff, three themes developed from the biblical vision of the curse that followed the original sin, before which human beings joyfully participated in the work of the Creator: first, the theme of human beings collaborating with God in the completion of the creation; second, the theme of work as
a physically degrading yoke for a sinful mankind; and, finally, the theme of a mankind redeemed by Christ using work as a form of mortification in order to do penance so as to regain its original splendor.\textsuperscript{25}

The monastic world in particular developed an idea of work as an ascetic exercise and redemptive penance, well summarized in the motto \textit{ora et labora}, “pray and work.” The meaning of this Benedictine formula (dating from after Benedict), according to Le Goff, is the following: “Work to transform matter, witness of your baseness, to elevate yourself.”\textsuperscript{26} This concept of work had therefore two different sides: on the one hand, work appeared as tiring and thankless toil; on the other, it appeared as a spiritual, inventive, redeeming activity that played an important role in opening the doors of salvation for human beings.

Significantly, Mathieu Arnoux has recently suggested that the demographic and economic growth that took place in Europe from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, unaccompanied by any important technical change, was due not only to increasing peasants’ work but also to the success of the ideological model of the three-orders society—\textit{bellatores, oratores, laboratores}. This model appeared in the tenth century and spread in the following period. For about three centuries, i.e. until the great crisis that shook Europe from the 1300s, it made field work a socially and religiously valued activity and the peasant a respectable member of society, contributing to economic development and social stability.\textsuperscript{27}

In medieval but also early modern times, we find a rather positive evaluation of work in the world of urban crafts, too. In this case, work was an essential trait of individual and collective identities, a basic component of many social bodies of urban society. As Anna Bellavitis writes, “One of the most frequent representations of urban identity in medieval and early modern times is based on the complementarity between the citizens’ body [\textit{corpo cittadino}] and trades [\textit{corpi di mestiere}].”\textsuperscript{28} As such, work played a crucial role in the access to citizenship and to the political and/or economic rights connected with it (citizenship was constructed in a huge variety of ways in the complex medieval and early modern world).

Conversely, the European medieval and early modern aristocracies, despite their deep-seated differences, all by and large considered the capacity of living without exercising any “mechanical arts” firsthand a requirement to belonging to their ranks, and this capacity implied the access to rights and privileges foreclosed to the other classes. In a sense, they had to be able to escape the biblical curse, “by the sweat of your brow you will eat your food”: they should afford leisure, live on income, or at least devote themselves to activities far from the world of crafts and mechanical arts.\textsuperscript{29}

Actually, in the Western world, the upper classes’ disdain toward manual work had a long tradition, going back to the Greeks and Romans. In
ancient times the figure of the independent farmer and artisan had certainly been prized (think of Ulysses who built his own bed or Cincinnatus who went back to his fields after leading the Roman army). Yet dependent manual activities had been considered as base, slave work (though free men, too, carried out such activities, and not all slaves performed manual work or were condemned to the lowest social position). Moreover, contempt for manual work had increased over time among the upper classes. Significantly, in Roman culture, a crucial notion was that of otium, the leisure enjoyed by the most fortunate, while the activities of those who had to work to earn a living were defined as negotium, nec-otium, the absence of leisure: the central concept was not work but its absence.30

In the light of these statements, one could conclude that in medieval and early modern European societies the clergy, the aristocracy, and the third state all had their own concept of work. Yet this would be too simplistic, since those societies—despite their efforts to distinguish, separate, and rank social groups—were actually complex, interrelated, chaotic. Our statements are schematic generalizations that, however, help us to stress the presence of several concurrent concepts of work in those societies.

While trying to make a rough list of different interpretations of work, we should also remember that within the Christian world other reasons to praise work, in addition to those already mentioned, had been suggested especially by St. Paul and had been circulating since his times. Paul had in fact warned Christians to work so as to avoid being an idle burden to others (2 Thess. 3:7–12). Additionally, he had warned thieves to stop stealing and to work honestly in order to earn their living and the means to help people in need (Eph. 4:28). Jumping to the early modern times, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries we find humanists influenced by Stoic philosophy highlighting the value of labor.31 The Catholic humanist Juan Luis Vives, too, had a positive view of Stoicism, as he considered the Stoic sage the truer Christian.32 Concern toward growing poverty and vagrancy led him to write the well-known treatise De subventione pauperum (1526), where he suggested a kind of disciplinary welfare system that implied a concept of work as a remedy to poverty and to its dangers: while the poor who were unable to work because of age or illness should be assisted by public authorities, those able to work should work, and if they refused, they should be forced to do it.33 On the other hand, the Protestant Reformation, with the notion of Beruf, introduced another positive meaning of work, if and when it was and is performed according to God’s calling. In Lutheran milieus, the Hausväterliteratur played an important role in developing such a view.34 Significantly, as Mary Ågren writes in this book, in early modern Lutheran Sweden, “those who did not work were branded as ‘time-thieves’”—a concept suggesting that work was the
normal and recommended way of spending one’s time.” Here, too, there was a convergence with ideas brought about by humanism, despite the fact that Lutherans frequently rejected humanist ideas: Leon Battista Alberti, for instance, in his dialogue *I Libri della Famiglia* (1433–40) had stigmatized idleness, arguing that time was very precious and should not be wasted.35

As is well known, rivers of ink have already been used to discuss Max Weber’s hypothesis that the Reformation ethics prompted the capitalist development, so we will not delve into this issue here.36 However, we want to highlight that between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the idea of work as toil to be avoided was increasingly criticized by thinkers who stigmatized the (alleged) idleness of the aristocracy and (in part) of the clergy, stressing the importance of work for the economic growth and well-being of the nation. Yet, work was not only increasingly seen as a welcome source of wealth. When the balance between the negative and positive connotations of work resolutely shifted toward the latter, work became less associated with painful and degrading activities, being conversely seen increasingly as a source of dignity. Furthermore, people shared more and more the idea that work was or must be a source of rights.37 A society was emerging where—according to Adriano Tilgher—“work seems the summing up of all duties and virtues. It is in work that man of capitalistic civilizations finds his nobility and worth. His whole code of ethics is contained in the one precept, ‘Work!’ . Labor, for him, is no longer the expiation of the sins of his father, nor is it a contact with something necessarily contaminating. It is through work that he embodies in himself the sacred principle of activity.”38 “The modern age has carried with it a theoretical glorification of labor and has resulted in a factual transformation of the whole of society into a laboring society,” Hannah Arendt confirmed.39 Labor became the “mediator between the individual and the collective” and was codified as social status “providing access to citizenship within the welfare state.”40

This does not mean that other concepts of work ceased to exist: in a sense, work continued to be like both sides of a coin. This is particularly clear in Marx’s view, despite its complexity and change over time.41 On the one hand, especially in his earlier writings, he associated labor with alienation (*Entäusserung*). “What, then, constitutes the alienation of labor?” he asked in *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, answering as follows:

First, the fact that labor is *external* to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his essential being; that in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his
physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself.\textsuperscript{42}

Yet, in Marx’s view, not all labor was alienating; on the contrary, he argued that “it is just in the working-up” of the world that “man first really proves himself to be a species being”: “through and because of this production, nature appears as his work and his reality.” As a consequence, alienated, estranged labor, “in tearing away from man the object of his production . . . tears from him his \textit{species life}.” This also means “that man is estranged from the other, as each of them is from man’s essential nature.”\textsuperscript{43} According to Marx, who increasingly refused any essentialism, the alienated labor with such dehumanizing consequences was represented by waged labor under capitalism. Communism, the suppression of private property,\textsuperscript{44} and the reduction of necessary labor time\textsuperscript{45} would allow humans to overcome alienation.

The tension between the notion of work as a source of alienation and self-realization is still present today.\textsuperscript{46} Nonetheless, from the late eighteenth century onward, as mentioned, the positive views of work gained much ground, and for the last couple of centuries Europeans have belonged to societies (mainly) based on work.\textsuperscript{47} While the fundamental questions remain of whether work still is, will be, and must be the basis of our societies,\textsuperscript{48} if we look at work in a historical perspective, a crucial issue is whether the positive views of work that spread from the eighteenth century onward encompassed any type of toil. In the following pages, we will try to answer this question, which is decisive also to understand some of the limits and problems of labor-based societies as well as some of the reasons of their current crisis. We will address the issue in relation to the manifold forms of work performed at home. Let us therefore first of all illustrate their features in medieval and early modern households, i.e. before the “glorification” of work.

3. The medieval and early modern households as a site of multiple activities

The biblical curse against Adam and Eve and their eating of the forbidden fruit not only condemned men to procure their food by the sweat of their brows, it also established that women would suffer when giving birth to their children.\textsuperscript{49} Interestingly, in many languages the same word can be used to identify both work and the pains of childbirth,\textsuperscript{50} as if the two activities—named production and reproduction in modern socioeco-
nomic language—belonged to the same domain and were two different but equally painful gendered ways to reach the same goal, i.e. making sure that both human life and mankind would live on.

In a sense, such a view of labor expressed the reality of a large share of preindustrial European households. Many of them were not only kin groups but also work groups, and they were often sites of all those activities today defined as production, consumption, reproduction, transmission, and care respectively, as shown by a rich body of literature. Significantly, the word “economy,” which nowadays indicates something different from the household activities, originally referred precisely to households: in ancient Greek, the word literally meant “household management” and kept this meaning for centuries, with the current definition starting to emerge as late as the mid-seventeenth century. Household members, men and women, adults and children, would in normal circumstances all cooperate in some way to ensure their own survival, often producing goods and services for larger circles, too.

This does not mean that every family was a cooperating working team. At the bottom of the social ladder there were people who were certainly too poor to have a house and/or who lived from hand to mouth or on charity, not involved in any common work. On the other hand, as a cause or consequence of poverty, the destitute often had rather weak family ties or no family at all. Additionally, there were differences among households due to the activities performed by each individual or family, as well as to the peculiar economic features of each place: the households of day laborers, for instance, were likely not to be, or only marginally to be, sites of production; therefore in those places where day labor was very common, many households were not productive units. Furthermore, not every house was a place of activities such as cooking: the poor, especially in the cities, might not be able to afford a dwelling equipped with a fireplace and might eat food obtained as alms or bought in inns, in shops, or from street sellers who were largely women. Especially in certain regions, however (particularly, it seems, in Mediterranean Europe), eating on the streets or in taverns or in open-air working places such as fields or construction sites was very widespread and not necessarily a sign of poverty.

While these differences have to be stressed to avoid misleading generalizations and to appreciate the complexity and variety of medieval and early modern societies, it remains true that, as mentioned, many urban and rural households were places of production (both for themselves and for the market) as well as consumption, reproduction, transmission, and care. This was also the case with the households of the aristocratic families who despised manual work. A wealth of literature has proposed a model...
of self-sufficient noble households where, under the wise and expert direction of the family head, live-in staff, outdoor servants, and peasants dealt with almost all everyday needs, also ensuring the production of victuals and even textiles for the family. This was certainly an ideal model that overvalued self-sufficiency while undervaluing the recourse to the market. Nevertheless, noble households, too, were to a certain extent places of production, although this was normally thanks to the manual work of servants rather than that of their masters, if we exclude the manual activities performed (especially by noblewomen) to prevent the vices brought about by idleness, as prescribed by sermons and conduct literature.

In peasants’ as well as in artisans’ families, generally all members who were able to work contributed to the household economy. Recent research, as illustrated in the next pages, is revealing that the division of work might have been more or less rigid but usually was more complex than was previously assumed. However, one’s status within the family (head of the family/dependent, husband/wife, parent/child, master/servant) resulting from the intersection of gender (men and women), generation (parents and children, birth order), marital status (unmarried, married, separated, [divorced], widowed), age (adults, children, the elderly), economic and legal (in)dependency, social position, etc., contributed in defining the tasks that he or she carried out.

Early modern Sweden was, for instance, a society with a relatively low degree of specialization, as shown by Maria Ågren in this volume. As for gender, on the basis of sixteen thousand statements on work activities drawn from Swedish sources spanning from 1550 to 1799, she concludes that in such an example of a mainly rural society, no category of work was “all-male or all-female, with military work as the only exception”: although rare, there were also women fishers and hunters. In other contexts, the degree of specialization along gender lines was often higher than in Sweden, especially (but not only) in the cities. Women were barred from many activities, to the point that cross-dressing might (also) be a strategy used by some of them to carry out male jobs—for instance, to become soldiers or even, for unmarried women, to keep a tavern. Additionally, their work, if paid, was normally remunerated at a lower rate than men’s. Furthermore, among artisans, they generally had no or only limited access to ruling roles within the guilds.

On the other hand, however, women did not work less than men, as also maintained by the Venetian writer Lucrezia Marinella in her book on women’s excellence (1600–1601). Everywhere they normally and actively contributed to the family economy in manifold ways. Examining as many as 13,500 answers to the question asking what they were “worth”
and how they supported themselves, given by witnesses to the ecclesiastical courts judges of seven English dioceses, two archdeaconries, and the Cambridge University courts between 1550 and 1728, Alex Shepard has, for instance, recently concluded that marriage was normally an economic partnership and married women played a crucial role in household economies: significantly, the word “wife” had not only a legal but also an occupational dimension. In this context, housekeeping was work connected to marital status and was crucial to the household economy.

A longstanding tradition, going back to Xenophon’s Οἰκονομικός (a dialogue on household management), stressed the importance of preserving the family assets: according to innumerable early modern conduct manuals, preserving the household’s possessions was a wife’s responsibility, whereas the husband was in charge of acquiring goods for the family. Such a rigid division of responsibilities was an ideal model, and everyday life was often far less neatly cut. Women, however, were often actually in charge (among other things) of preserving goods, and this was no minor task, especially at a time when preserving was considered as important as (or even more important than) acquiring. Possessions were indeed crucial to assess and keep one’s status. Sumptuary laws that, in late medieval and early modern towns, very often addressed women might contribute to this division of tasks. According to Martha Howell, when the so-called “commercial revolution” took place, men acquired the positive role of producers and women the negative one of consumers. Sumptuary laws, then, were conceived to keep women away from excessive consumption and to force them to keep and preserve the goods of the family.

Household management was likely to be anything but simple. Significantly, Antonio Genovesi, who in 1765 was appointed to the first Italian chair in economics, noting that the entire economic management of middle-class households was in female hands, argued in favor of better education for women (also) to improve their capacity to cope with this responsibility. In Paris and Holland—he recalled approvingly—girls from merchant families were schooled in writing and numeracy. Not surprisingly, it has been argued that the very reason for improving women’s education was to prepare wives to be good assistants for their husbands: in Denmark, the Copenhagen Dottreskolen, a school created in 1791 where male teachers gave girls a scientific education, was in fact intended to prepare good merchants’ wives, capable of keeping account books. In artisans’, merchants’, and shopkeepers’ households all over Europe, wives were indeed likely, among other things, to serve as accountants for the family enterprise. Additionally, they might also have taken care of the relationships with customers, to mention but another task. Noblewomen, too, however, might have kept account records.
Households might also have been the site of other activities, to our eyes far less obvious, such as, for instance, schooling and even university teaching. We do not refer, in this case, to the fact that in late medieval and early modern Europe tutors were often hired by parents to educate their children at home. Rather, we would like to stress that in some contexts, such as Reformation Germany, university professors gave lessons at home and their wives (and other family members) were directly involved in the organization of teaching and of students’ hospitality.77

This intermingling within the domestic space of multiple activities might give women unexpected chances, especially—as has often been maintained—when they were widows or otherwise alone and continued to manage the household and/or the family enterprise. In many cases, guild statutes, too, recognizing women’s skills, officially gave widows the right to replace their dead husbands in the workshops.78 Historians have in fact often considered widowhood as the period when women—no longer subjected to their husband’s authority—could become heads of their families and were freer to control their possessions. At the same time, however, scholars have also stressed the very fact that widows’ skills had often been developed during marriage, noting that guilds might “make it hard for widows to replace lost spousal labor” and denouncing the many risks of becoming poor attached to widowhood, as well as the differential impact of economic crises on different types of women.79

Earlier studies already suggested that women’s relationship with work was highly influenced by their life cycle, stressing the differences among unmarried girls, married women, and widows.80 Recent research, on the one hand, has highlighted the consequences of marriage—as for family status and type of work carried out—not only for women but also for men, though also showing the existence of social, regional, cultural, and historical differences, with marriage playing a more crucial role in northern than in southern Europe. At least in part, this was due to different legal contexts: under Roman law, a son, be he single or married, remained under parental authority for as long as his father was alive, unless he was emancipated through a legal act, whereas emancipation, in other legal systems, was generally linked to marriage and/or adult age.81

On the other hand, while confirming the importance of marital status for women, recent studies have shown that the gulf between unmarried singles and wives was often larger than that between wives and widows.82 Research on England83 and Scandinavia in particular has shown that, for women, marriage implied a transition to more authoritative and managerial roles, especially in households with servants to be governed by the family heads. In her contribution to this book, Maria Ågren shows that in early modern Sweden “the division of work was strongly struc-
tured by marital status, household position, and, implicitly, age. The work repertoires of unmarried people, who were often young, were radically different from that of married and widowed people: a major conclusion of the project whose results are illustrated by Ågren is “the paramount importance of marriage in early modern society. Marriage was important to both women and men because it provided them with possibilities of supporting themselves through their own work and through the work of those that they could govern”: “early modern women did not get married to be supported by their husbands. They got married to be better able to support themselves. The same was true for men: marriage improved their chances of supporting themselves too.” While this conclusion is undoubtedly very important, we must never forget the high diversity in European regions. Marriage certainly did not have the same role everywhere, both for men and for women. In contexts where marrying implied creating a new, independent household and becoming family heads, which, even in Mediterranean Europe, was the norm for the majority of urban families, a couple’s role and responsibility were different from those experienced in contexts where complex households prevailed and young people, after marriage, lived in the parental house of one of the spouses and were subject to the authority of an older couple. This was, for instance, the case in the large sharecroppers’ households typical of the countryside of central Italy, rather strictly organized along gender and generation lines, to quote but one example. Italian sharecroppers’ households were work units, as were many other types of households around Europe. This does not mean, however, that each household was a working group whose members were all toiling in and for the family trade, shop, or farm, with wives and children “assisting” the male family head. As mentioned above, in destitute families, each member often provided for his/her own survival. Because of poverty, family distress, education and many other reasons, children might be sent to another household to work as servants or apprentices. Certain live-in servants often became members of a household, different from their parental one, which was a working group. Yet there were also families whose members, all or part of them, (mainly) worked outside their households—sailors who spent most of their lives away from their families are only an extreme case of a wide range of possibilities. Furthermore, it is important to note that there were dual-earner families, with husband and wife engaged in different trades. In some cases, even guild statutes recognized the women’s right to work independently from their husbands; for example, in Nantes, the master butchers’ wives could sell offal coming from their husbands’ activities, but independently from them. Lively debates have arisen about European diversity as well as
about historical change, discussing whether and how the organization and economic role of household work have changed over time because of growing commercialization, capitalist development, “industrious” and “industrial” revolution, (alleged) consumer revolution, etc.\textsuperscript{92}

Before addressing those issues, it has to be stressed that in medieval and early modern Europe the multiple activities performed at home which today we would classify as production, reproduction, and care were normally and crucially all considered as work: it is true that on the whole they were neither recorded, nor praised, nor adequately rewarded with money, goods, or gratitude, as denounced by authors like the proto-feminist Moderata Fonte and François Poullain de la Barre.\textsuperscript{93} Nevertheless, they were not considered leisure or something different from proper work. Yet things would change over time.

4. Productive, unproductive, reproductive work and the “delaborization” of household work

In any society, as mentioned above, different and even conflicting concepts of work can probably be discovered. Additionally, new concepts appear; some become more common, others decline or even disappear, and even the range of ideas on the subject changes over time. While in medieval and early modern Europe, as mentioned, several different concepts of work coexisted, philosophers and writers from the second half of the seventeenth century onward increasingly regarded work as an activity that created value\textsuperscript{94}: in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, scholars such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx would elaborate different labor theories of value, referring to value “as the amount of labor necessary to produce a marketable commodity.”\textsuperscript{95} Fated to prompt huge debates, those theories are today generally rejected by mainstream economists. While associating work with value, early modern and modern scholars considered as value-producing all those activities that were performed for pay or that generated income. In other words, work was increasingly seen as a commodity: “A man’s Labour also is a commodity exchangeable for benefit, as well as any other thing,” Hobbes argued in the \textit{Leviathan} (1651).\textsuperscript{96} The idea of work as a commodity sold and bought according to the laws of supply and demand was destined to gain credit,\textsuperscript{97} and this would eventually lead to (proper) work being considered as (almost) only paid work.\textsuperscript{98}

Such a change was not gender neutral: in a sense, it broke the unified meaning field suggested by the use of the same word, in many languages, to indicate the painful toil of childbirth to ensure the survival of
the species and the similarly painful toil performed in the fields, workshops, or elsewhere to ensure subsistence. Labor in the sense of delivery was never a commodity exchanged for money (if we exclude recent implications of surrogate motherhood and womb-for-rent). Many other activities necessary to individual and collective survival and welfare were done for free or, more often, as part of complex networks of mutual duties and exchanges regulated by customs, solidarity norms and culturally constructed emotional ties rather than by the market. These activities—frequently performed at home and mainly by women—were increasingly seen as something different from (proper) work, as we will show.

The growing association of work with value and money was not the sole change that affected the way human activities were considered. Especially to the eyes of Enlightenment philosophers, “work came to appear as an active human intervention in nature for the purpose of assuring the ongoing existence of the human species”: “man was seen as ruling over nature” and tools were increasingly considered the basis upon which the “human dominion over nature rested.” In fact, the idea of man as *Homo faber* and even as *Homo artifex* had a long tradition. Yet, according to specialists, the emphasis on the ability of and legitimacy for mankind to intervene on nature (i.e., on what was still seen by most people as God’s work) was new. Again, activities such as childbearing, breastfeeding, and caring for children were no longer considered as work inasmuch as they did not imply any particular dominion over nature nor the use of any particular tool; rather, in this new perspective they could and would be strictly associated with nature and seen as natural activities radically different from the (emblematically cultural) activity represented by work, which conversely implied to intervene and rule upon nature.

This undervaluation of reproduction and care work also implied, as shown by Nancy Folbre in her chapter, that several intellectuals believed that human beings were not themselves “produced.”

The aforementioned change intermingled with the gradual reduction in the plurality of meanings of the notion of work. Whereas many different human activities had usually been seen as work, in the eighteenth century only some of them were associated to the general and abstract concept of work that was then developing. Seen as a “purposeful application of physical and mental forces in order to fulfil needs” and as a commodity that everybody could sell at his/her wants on the basis of freely agreed contracts, work was indeed increasingly separated from single individuals. An abstract and general category of work (though also present in some contexts of the past, such as Ancient Greece) was increasingly developed: in this way, work became something measurable in time and money, and was sold/paid accordingly.
ent paradox, the emerging general concept of work was more limited than the traditional one: specific to the Western world, it eventually “narrowed down to mean work for a living and for an earning, work and work-products to be sold,” “market-related work,” excluding domestic chores and family care.\textsuperscript{106}

An important step along this route is represented by Adam Smith’s distinction between productive and unproductive work. In a well-known page from the \textit{Wealth of Nations} (1776), he wrote that

there is one sort of labour which adds to the value of the subject upon which it is bestowed: there is another which has no such effect. The former, as it produces a value, may be called productive; the latter, unproductive labour. Thus the labour of a manufacturer adds, generally, to the value of the materials which he works upon, that of his own maintenance, and of his master’s profit. The labour of a menial servant, on the contrary, adds to the value of nothing. Though the manufacturer has his wages advanced to him by his master, he, in reality, costs him no expense, the value of those wages being generally restored, together with a profit, in the improved value of the subject upon which his labour is bestowed. But the maintenance of a menial servant never is restored. A man grows rich by employing a multitude of manufacturers: he grows poor by maintaining a multitude of menial servants.\textsuperscript{107}

Smith was aware that productivity could not be the sole criterion to measure the importance of an activity:

The labour of some of the most respectable orders in the society is, like that of menial servants, unproductive of any value, and does not fix or realize itself in any permanent subject; or vendible commodity, which endures after that labour is past, and for which an equal quantity of labour could afterwards be procured.\textsuperscript{108}

Even “the sovereign, for example, with all the officers both of justice and war who serve under him, the whole army and navy, are unproductive labourers,” as well as “some both of the gravest and most important, and some of the most frivolous professions: churchmen, lawyers, physicians, men of letters of all kinds; players, buffoons, musicians, opera-singers, opera-dancers.”\textsuperscript{109} Additionally, he maintained that the servant’s work, as well as that of the manufacturer, “has its value, and deserves its reward.”\textsuperscript{110}

Nevertheless, the distinction between productive and unproductive labor subtly lessened the activities now labeled as unproductive. As stressed by Nancy Folbre, Smith actually devalued domestic and care work. Significantly, explaining the “principle which gives occasion to the division of labour” and stressing the positive consequences of self-interest, he ar-
argued that “it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.” Smith neglected to mention that none of these tradesmen actually puts dinner on the table, ignoring cooks, maids, wives, and mothers in one fell swoop,” Folbre acutely comments. He did not even take into account the obvious fact that unpaid family care work is crucial to ensuring the supply of labor to the market: “It is a necessary input into the production of a future generation of wage earners, as well as maintenance of existing wage earners in the face of the depreciation wrought by aging, morbidity, and death. It is a necessary input into human capital, and, more broadly, human capabilities.” Smith was not the only thinker to ignore that contribution; quite the opposite: Folbre argues that this was largely the case with the British and French liberal, political, and social theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In a sense, they shared Hobbes’s approach that looked “at men as if they had just emerged from the earth like mushrooms and grown up without any obligation to each other.” Locke would argue that workers were not themselves produced, and this idea would be later developed by Ricardo and Marx. The latter conceived productive and unproductive work as notions historically variable according to the mode of production: within capitalism, only work that produces a surplus value for the capitalist can be considered productive. Many other scholars discussed the categories of productive and unproductive work; Jean Baptiste Say, to mention but another one, considered as productive all those activities that were sold and paid for.

Although different, all these economic theorists considered unpaid carework and domestic tasks as unproductive. They brought about a theoretical “delaborization” of that kind of work, which later would be (often) defined as reproductive. As explained by Alessandra Pescarolo in this volume, classical economists ignored such activities: “The concept of reproductive work does not exist in classical economics.”

In her contribution, Pescarolo focuses precisely on the reproductive-productive work dichotomy, analyzing its elaboration and meanings and discussing whether it could and can help to give value to domestic and care work. She explains that the category of reproductive work was first conceived in the 1960s by Marxist feminists who tried to situate domestic activities within the Marxist theoretical framework and to pinpoint their connection with wage labor. The category was destined to be successful, mainly (according to Pescarolo) because of its proximity to the concept of social reproduction: a concept already used by Marx and very common in sociological literature. Yet, while the category of reproductive work originally referred to the reproduction of the working capacity, it
would later also be used with different meanings by both Marxist and non-Marxist scholars and activists, sometimes encompassing only unpaid domestic and care work, at other times also paid domestic work and paid extra-domestic personal services. In this book, Eileen Boris defines as “reproductive labors” “those activities that exist as a counterpart, but also prior, to employment or income generation, what usually is considered production. Also referred to as social reproduction, such work is about the making of people through the tasks of daily life which are necessary to develop and sustain labor power. These activities are both material (like feeding), emotional (like love), and assimilative (like the transferring of norms and values), whether occurring in the family, school, church, or community.”

The concept has recently been expanded to the global level by theorists who denounce the global division of reproductive labor, which implies an “extraction” of such labor from the South of the world by the North through the emigration of millions of people, especially women, from their impoverished countries to work as domestic workers and caregivers in affluent ones.117

While Rhacel Parreñas’s comparative research on Filipina domestic workers in Rome and Los Angeles has played a crucial role in the development of the very concept of the international division of reproductive labor,118 Italy had also been important for the elaboration of the category of reproductive labor by Marxist feminists in the 1970s. In both cases, this role by Italy does not seem casual: in the 1960s and 1970s, Italy had very high percentages of housewives among adult women compared to other European countries;119 in the last decades, the recourse to (foreign) paid domestic workers and caregivers has become very common among Italian families.120 Not surprisingly, Italian feminist theorists were influenced by the emergence of materialistic feminism elaborated between France and the United States by Christine Delphy in the seventies. According to her well-known critical analysis, in the domestic model, production is based on the household conceived as a socioeconomic institution.121 The labor force of the household members—women, children, unmarried siblings—belongs to the head of the household, who takes advantage of this work for both market and non-market production. According to Delphy, there is a lack of analysis in Marx’s theory on the sexual division of work in the patriarchal mode of production, which he “under-problematizes.” This does not mean, in Delphy’s words, that Marx’s materialistic concepts cannot be applied to “women’s oppression.”122 Nor that he completely ignored the sexual division of labor: “It is in fact not so much a matter of non-recognition as of non-problematization.”123 Marx, though disregarding domestic and care work, addressed the issue of reproduction
work. He considered the part of factory work exchanged by workers for the salary necessary to guarantee their survival (the so-called “necessary work”) as such, whereas he considered the other part of work, producing surplus, as productive: “Productive labour, in its meaning for capitalist production, is wage-labour which, exchanged against the variable part of capital (the part of the capital that is spent on wages), reproduces not only this part of the capital (or the value of its own labour-power), but in addition produces surplus-value for the capitalist.”

The members of the Italian collective Lotta Femminista (Feminist Struggle), founded in Padua, Italy, in 1971, contended, from a Marxist perspective, that unpaid work performed by housewives was reproductive work. At the same time, they questioned the idea that domestic work was unproductive, arguing that it actually produced the “strange commodity” represented by “the laborer himself,” i.e., labor power. Thanks to the collaboration between the founder of the collective, Mariarosa Dalla Costa, and the American, Britain-based feminist Selma James, these elaborations intertwined with those of other feminists and launched the debate on domestic labor on an international level. Dalla Costa and James maintained that housewives’ work guaranteed the reproduction and production of labor power (which was vital for capitalism):

The ability to labor resides only in a human being whose life is consumed in the process of producing. First it must be nine months in the womb, must be fed, clothed and trained; then when it works its bed must be made, its floor swept, its lunchbox prepared, its sexuality not gratified but quietened, its dinner ready when it gets home, even if this is eight in the morning from the night shift. This is how labor power is produced and reproduced when it is daily consumed in the factory of the office. *To describe its basic production and reproduction is to describe women’s work.*

Their book *The Power of Women and the Subversion of the Community*, published in Italian in March 1972, in English in October of the same year, and soon translated into German (1973), French (1973), and Spanish (1975), was in fact destined to become a bestseller. It offered the women’s movement “a material foundation for ‘sisterhood,’” as Dalla Costa and James wrote in the foreword to the third edition (1975). “That material foundation was the social activity, the *work*, which the female personality was shaped to submit to. That work was housework.”

The two authors were aware of the novelty of their approach:

In singling out the work of the housewife as that for which women are trained and by which women are defined; in identifying its product as labor power—the working class—this book broke with all those previous analyses of capitalist so-
ciety which began and ended in the factory, which began and ended with men. Our isolation in the family while doing our work has hidden its social nature. The fact that it brought no wage had hidden its social nature. The fact that it brought no wage had hidden that it was work.\textsuperscript{129}

Both to reveal the true nature of housework and to empower women, they invoked wages for housework: “If our wageless work is the basis of our powerlessness in relation both to men and to capital, . . . the wages for that work, which alone will make it possible for us to reject that work, must be our lever of power.”\textsuperscript{130} Their book, therefore, became the starting point of an international campaign for wages for housework. During a meeting held in Padua in 1972, Dalla Costa and James, together with Silvia Federici, an Italian woman living in the United States, and Brigitte Galtier, a French one, founded the International Feminist Collective to prompt discussion on the production/reproduction issue and to coordinate feminist actions, and shortly thereafter Wages for Housework groups and committees started to form.\textsuperscript{131}

Issues of racial discrimination were soon joined to gender issues, thanks to the foundation of the International Black Women for Wages for Housework group by Margaret Prescod and Wilmette Brown in 1974, and in 1975 the Wages Due Lesbians organization campaigned for wages for housework because they wanted both the “unwaged work lesbian women have in common with other women, and the additional physical and emotional housework of surviving in a hostile and prejudiced society, recognized as work and paid” as such.\textsuperscript{132} Despite the international spread of the campaign and the theoretical support of it by professional economists such as Antonella Picchio,\textsuperscript{133} many feminists, however, did not advocate it, being afraid that wages for housework, if introduced, would make the gender division of labor more rigid.

These fears were not without reason. The idea that wages for housework would empower women had certainly circulated rather early among activists: as recalled by Nancy Folbre in her chapter, “in 1873, an article in The Woman’s Journal explicitly demanded wages for housework,” and “in 1878, the National Woman Suffrage Convention passed a resolution calling for the legal recognition of women’s rights to ‘the proceeds of her labor in the family.’” Nonetheless, as shown by Alessandra Gissi in her chapter on the Italian debate on housewives’ wages, ideas on the need to pay for housework were not necessarily leftist, revolutionary, or women-friendly ones; proposals of this kind had indeed been suggested (without being realized) during Italian Fascism in the 1930s, within a program aiming to consolidate gender hierarchies, to configure motherhood as a patriotic duty, and to make the most of the resources of domes-
tic work, rationalizing it according to the domestic Taylorism proposed by the American Christine Frederick and encouraging housewives’ hard working.\textsuperscript{134}

Conversely, from the point of view of the promoters and supporters of the campaign for wages for housework, the worries on the possible negative consequences of granting a payment to housewives might sound paradoxical: promoters and supporters called for wages also to “denaturalize” housework\textsuperscript{135} and to contribute to a real revolution and empowering of women. As Silvia Federici writes,

The wage at least recognises that you are a worker. . . . To have a wage means to be part of a social contract, and there is no doubt concerning its meaning: you work, not because you like it, or because it comes naturally to you, but because it is the only condition under which you are allowed to live. But exploited as you might be, you are not that work. Today you are a postman, tomorrow a cabdriver. . . . But in the case of housework the situation is qualitatively different. The difference lies in the fact that not only has housework been imposed on women, but it has been transformed into a natural attribute of our female physique and personality . . . the unwaged condition of housework has been the most powerful weapon in reinforcing the common assumption that housework is not work. . . . Yet just how natural it is to be a housewife is shown by the fact that it takes at least twenty years of socialisation-day-to-day training. . . . By denying housework a wage and transforming it into an act of love, capital has killed many birds with one stone. First of all, it has got a hell of a lot of work almost for free. . . . At the same time, it has disciplined the male worker too, by making his woman dependent on his work and his wage, and trapped him in this discipline by giving him a servant after he himself has done so much serving at the factory or the office. . . . But if we take wages for housework as a political perspective, we can see that struggling for it is going to produce a revolution in our lives and in our social power as women.\textsuperscript{136}

The naturalization of housework was indeed an issue that in the 1960s and 1970s all feminists and women’s and gender historians had to tackle.\textsuperscript{137}

5. Historicizing, deconstructing, and dismantling separate spheres

By the time second-wave feminisms developed, family and the domestic sphere were often seen as a space for “natural” relationships, i.e., those belonging to nature as opposed to culture and history. Many people believed that domestic tasks and care work were mainly performed out of natural instincts and love; as such, they were generally performed, and
must be performed, for free. They were not regarded as proper work: as already mentioned, from the eighteenth century onward, paid work, especially individual waged labor, had increasingly been considered as proper work. The spreading ideology of separate spheres had been associating the private one (as opposed to the public) with nature, instincts, emotions, love, the family, the home, domesticity, women, femininity, care, protection, leisure, non-market activities, and, definitely, non-work. The public one had conversely been associated with history, culture, rationality, impersonality, men, masculinity, politics, bureaucracy, market, money, contracts, competition, factories and work, labor, employment, and the professions. While reality could not be reduced to those rigid dichotomies, they had contributed and were contributing to shaping people’s ideas about proper roles and goals to reach, actually influencing their lives. Women had been and were largely encouraged to give up their waged employment to stay at home to care for their families, and this had become an ideal to pursue even in the eyes of many working-class men and women. People (especially women) who did not agree with the ideology of separate spheres and its implications had certainly always existed, as shown by several contributors to this book, as did families who were too poor to afford for the wife/mother to be a housewife. Nevertheless, the separate-spheres ideology had gained ground for a couple of centuries before becoming the target of increasing criticism—a milestone in this direction was represented by Betty Friedan’s *The Feminine Mystique* (1963), which denounced the housewives’ frustration and lack of fulfillment. Before this happened, the separate-spheres ideology was shared not only by conservatives but also by many leftists.

Women’s and gender history made a crucial contribution in destroying such an ideological construct. Recovering women’s forgotten history and looking back to the past to discover the roots of the present was an important issue for feminists, both for those who were and those who were not professional historians—we would say for the entire feminist movement. Inasmuch as research progressed, it unveiled the historical and cultural variability of allegedly natural and immutable realities such as the family and motherhood—feminists were obviously working in contexts where many other researchers, too, from anthropologists to historians of the family, to mention but two, had provided and were providing evidence of such variability. Recovering women’s history, therefore, implied expanding the historians’ territory to include the family and the domestic sphere within the realm of history. This did not only shift and threaten the boundaries between the supposedly separate spheres, it also undermined the very foundations of the separate spheres. Showing their historical variability implied, in fact, the unveiling of the artificiality
and therefore the changeability of such a social and ideological construct, normally presented as a natural and immutable fact.141

Crucial research would show when and how separate spheres had been constructed. Leonore Davidoff’s and Catherine Hall’s *Family Fortunes* (1987) was an especially important contribution to understanding both the development of the ideology of the separate spheres and the actual changes of family life and gender roles that took place in England between 1750 and 1850, even though the book was interpreted differently and sometimes criticized because it allegedly overemphasized the effectiveness of the public/private divide.142 As shown by Davidoff and Hall, during that period, large sectors of the English middle classes moved to new houses with gardens in the elegant neighborhoods that developed away from the rapidly spreading factories and the unhealthy working-class quarters. This was cause and effect of the growing separation between enterprise and household in the age of developing capitalism that brought about the rise of the private company and the business corporation, the development of public accountability, and more formal financial procedures: a series of changes that contributed in shifting “the world of women ever further from the power of the active market.” The family head was then increasingly seen as the sole breadwinner for the family, while as the nineteenth century progressed, “the view hardened that female relatives were and should be dependants.”143 In early modern times, adult men were the heads and leaders of a co-residing working team that included their wives, children, and servants and whose activities were all considered as work. In the nineteenth century, they remained family heads as they used to be, but their wives were increasingly considered responsible for managing the house, educating the children and directing the servants. Of course, especially in small family businesses or shops of the lower middle class, women and children continued to work unpaid both in care duties or by helping in the making and selling of craft products. At the same time, all these activities, especially care tasks, were less and less seen as proper work, or considered due as mutual marital help in the case of unpaid work for market production. As John Tosh would stress some years later, for men the home was increasingly constructed not as a workplace but as a refuge from the conflicts and hardship of the workplace, the market, and politics.144 While Tosh referred particularly to middle-class men, this change was actually likely to affect the working class, too: the worker “is at home when he is not working, and when he is working he is not at home,” Marx argued in the 1840s.145

But let us continue to focus on the English upper middle classes. According to Davidoff and Hall,
Women’s identification with the domestic and moral sphere implied that they would only become active economic agents when forced by necessity. As the nineteenth century progressed, it was increasingly assumed that a woman engaged in business was a woman without either an income of her own or a man to support her. But unlike a man whose family status and self-worth rose through his economic exertions, a woman who did likewise risked opprobrium for herself and possible shame for those around her. Structured inequality made it exceedingly difficult for a woman to support herself on her own, much less take on dependants. . . . At a time when the concept of occupation was becoming the core element of the masculine identity, any position for women other than in relation to men was anomalous.146

Not every middle-class woman became an “idle” housewife; yet, when women contributed to the family enterprises, their contribution, according to Davidoff and Hall, increasingly became a “hidden investment.” The two authors saw the marginalization of women from the realm of economy as a further step down the lane described by Alice Clark for the seventeenth century and Ivy Pinchbeck for the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: in their pioneering works, published in 1919 and 1930 respectively, according to Davidoff and Hall, they had “outlined the slow shift from women’s active participation in commerce, farming and other business pursuits.”147

While both Clark and Pinchbeck had spoken of a declining women’s employment opportunity, Clark’s view was actually more pessimistic than Pinchbeck’s. Focusing on the women’s role in London textile crafts,148 Clark argued that the progressive separation of the workplace from the family house, a consequence of the capitalist evolution of the English textile industry in the seventeenth century, had pushed women out of the production.149 Clark mainly stressed the negative consequences of raising capitalism on women’s work, whereas Pinchbeck (dealing with a different period), though maintaining that at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution women had suffered from declining employment opportunities, concluded that “the Industrial Revolution has on the whole proved beneficial to women. It has resulted in greater leisure for women in the home and has relieved them from the drudgery and monotony that characterized much of the hand labor previously performed in connection with industrial work under the domestic system. For the women workers outside the home, it has resulted in better conditions, a greater variety of openings and an improved status.”150

In the last decades, innumerable studies have addressed the impact of capitalism as well as that of the Industrial Revolution on women’s work. As for Clark’s decline thesis, much research, especially on the German area, confirmed this decline, stressing the role played by the guilds in the
whole process. In their books, both published in 1986, Martha Howell and Merry Wiesner attributed this decline to economic and cultural factors. Wiesner insisted at the same time on the increasing specialization of craftwork and on the competition between men and women in labor markets, in a context of demographic growth, but also on the emergence of new family models due to the Protestant Reformation.\textsuperscript{151} For Howell, when production moved out of the family, women’s work was gradually eliminated, as their work outside of the home threatened to undermine the patriarchal family. At the same time, in some German cities, the political role of guilds meant the immediate exclusion of women.\textsuperscript{152} More recently, Sheilagh Ogilvie has proposed a different interpretation, seeing guilds as masculine societies that excluded women, as well as Jews, from their “social capital” and forced many women into marginal activities such as spinning or begging, as well as the black market “informal sector.” Ogilvie draws a stark boundary between privileged insiders and dishonored and impoverished outsiders.\textsuperscript{153}

The French case does by no means support the “decline thesis”: female guilds that existed in the Middle Ages in Paris and Rouen continued to exist in the early modern period, like for example the “lingères en neuf” in Rouen, a guild that totally excluded men, even from the government offices.\textsuperscript{154} In addition, and above all, new female guilds were created at the end of the seventeenth century, following a decree by Colbert imposing that all crafts be organized in guilds. This is the case, for example, of the Parisian guild of seamstresses.\textsuperscript{155}

On the other hand, being a member of a guild did not necessarily involve just privileges, but also obligations, control, and tax imposition. This is the reason why craftswomen often \textit{refused} to enter guilds, preferring to work on their own.\textsuperscript{156} More generally, the “decline” movement was all but unidirectional, and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, guilds were in most cases reopened to women as a means to lower production costs.\textsuperscript{157}

As for the discussion on the impact of the Industrial Revolution on the gendered division of work and on women’s work, it cannot be separated from the new views of the impact of the first industrialization wave itself. Since the early 1970s, historians have paid growing attention to the importance and features of “the industrialization before the industrialization,” i.e. proto-industry,\textsuperscript{158} and what has been called the “industrious revolution.”\textsuperscript{159} The term “rural proto-industry” has been coined to describe nonagricultural activities for the interregional and international markets performed, at home, by the rural population to supplement their earnings from agricultural work by producing items, generally textiles, for merchants who provided them with the raw materials. These activities often represented the start of industrialization, even though the areas in
which they were highly developed did not always turn into industrialized areas and sometimes even experienced de-industrialization. Scholars of the phenomenon stressed the large increase in production that proto-industry made possible, thus proposing an interpretation of historical change that made the Industrial Revolution less revolutionary than generally accepted. They also highlighted that such an increase was reached in the absence of significant technological innovation boosting productivity, in contrast to what would happen with the Industrial Revolution. Proto-industrial activities might be carried out not only by landless rural populations who did not manage to work on a continuous basis but also by landed families, especially during the periods when work in the fields was not very demanding. In any case, a common and crucial feature of proto-industry was the exploitation of then (relatively) underused work capacities within the family. This implied a growing involvement of women and children into market-oriented work. To explain the demographic growth that characterized many proto-industrial populations, scholars suggested that the opportunity to earn offered by proto-industry and the rentability of children’s work for proto-industrial families loosened the constraints to family formation that had traditionally led to late marriage and low fertility rates, favoring early marriage and relatively high fertility rates. Empirical research has eventually shown highly diversified cases, thus partially undermining the strong links between economic and demographic behaviors suggested by this interpretation which has nonetheless contributed to make women’s and children’s work visible, as would also be the case with the category of the Industrious Revolution.

This category, elaborated by Jan de Vries in the early 1990s to interpret some phases of the western European past by reworking the same definition proposed by the demographic historian Akira Hayami in relation to Japan, has contributed to convince a growing number of economic historians to admit the economic importance of working women in pre-industrial times (until recently, economic historians generally considered women’s work as complementary to adult men’s work, dismissing it as if it were a phenomenon that had little impact on economy and society: an object to which they paid little attention). De Vries’s Industrious Revolution category deals with the economic changes that preceded, prepared, and flanked the Industrial Revolution. According to de Vries, from the mid-seventeenth century, households chose to reallocate their time and labor, hitherto devoted to recreation and to the production of non-market goods, toward the production of marketable goods in order to increase their purchasing power and consumption. One of the main ways to achieve this goal, according to de Vries, was the growing participation of (married) women and children in the wage labor market. Thus,
a new allocation of resources within the households would have led to a joint increase in the supply and demand of market goods. On this, he suggests, lay the foundations of economic growth in the period preceding industrialization. The thesis is based primarily on the cases of the Dutch and English economies.164

This analysis has prompted a lively debate and new research. De Vries’s conclusions have been challenged by several scholars: Gregory Clark and Ysbrand Van Der Werf have not found evidence of growing work rates in England and Wales,165 while Robert C. Allen and Jacob Louis Weisdorf have pinpointed two “industrious revolutions” among English rural workers but both attributable to economic hardship and not accompanied by growing consumption; conversely English urban laborers displayed signs of industrious behavior not linked to economic hardship, which might imply higher consumption.166 Sheila Ogilvie has stressed the institutional constraints to women’s work and consumption in Germany.167 As for the Low Countries, a group of Dutch historians (including Elise van Nederveen Meerkerk, Danielle van den Heuvel, and Ariadne Schmidt) has collected a large amount of empirical data as part of a research project titled “Women’s Work in the Early Modern Northern Netherlands, c. 1500–1815” (2003–2009).168 De Vries’s thesis certainly has the merit of highlighting the utmost importance of work performed by married women and children. But in the case of the Low Countries, where we do see a strong increase in the participation of married women and children in the labor market in the seventeenth century, it is doubtful—according to the aforementioned historians—that consumption was the first motivation of the increased households’ work effort. New consumption patterns really developed in the Dutch Republic on a large scale only in the eighteenth century, when the new colonial products (coffee, tea, tobacco) became accessible to part of the middle and lower classes. In the view of the aforementioned Dutch historians, it is therefore proletarianization and economic need, rather than new attitudes toward consumption, that comes into play to explain the Industrious Revolution, even though the work of wives in proletarian families could sometimes become an incentive for extra consumption. Nonetheless differences between periods and socioeconomic groups due to the labor market segmentation must be considered: from the early seventeenth century, emerging capitalist production relations were the cause of increasing proletarianization and, after 1650, of a growing shift of textile production to rural areas, where wages were lower. Consequently, both among the urban poor and in rural families, women and children were increasingly involved in production for the market, whereas the economic decline following the Dutch Golden Age (1600–70) affected artisans and traders in particular.169
While married couples traditionally often formed an economic partnership, especially among self-employed artisans and business people, the aforementioned transformations also implied a decreasing cooperation between husbands and wives. Among pre-industrial but proletarianized Dutch textile workers, both spouses were increasingly waged workers and among the middling sort, where married couples used to cooperate in the same trade, women increasingly started independent businesses. Guild regulations, by admitting or excluding married women as independent members, were certainly important in making this change possible; research carried out in the last few years shows, however, that large supply and demand of commodities gave women new opportunities to start and manage their own businesses. New colonial products implied changing consumption attitudes and also brought about new types of shops where women, too, might be involved. In Leiden, for instance, hundreds of people entered into the booming tea- and coffee-selling trades during the eighteenth century. Interestingly, they were mostly women: women who were very often married and whose husbands worked in different economic sectors. Unfortunately, the available data does not allow us to know how many of them moved from the condition of unpaid housewives to that of independent traders; it does show, however, that at least one-third of them “did not withdraw from a typical family economy in which husband, wife and children worked together in the same trade,” moving from the condition of (unpaid) assistant of their husbands to that of independent retailers. They were in fact married to men whose job was not normally carried out at home. Furthermore, contrary to the stereotypes according to which women stopped having extra-domestic work when they married and became mothers, most of the tea and coffee sellers started their businesses a couple of years after marriage and after the birth of their first children—a good example to challenge stereotypes but also to show how difficult it is to generalize about work and women’s work in particular.

If on the one hand the notion of Industrious Revolution as formulated by de Vries is not, or not completely, supported by the available empirical data, on the other hand it has turned out to be extremely useful in prompting research, especially on the issues at the very core of this book: family economy, paid and unpaid household production, women’s work, etc. As mentioned, consumption—the desire to consume—plays a crucial role in de Vries’s interpretation of historical change. Yet he rejects the idea that the new consumer demand was a “‘consumer revolution,’ an exploding volume of purchased goods.”

Such an idea had been suggested by Neil McKendrick, John Brewer, and J. H. Plumb in 1982 in their highly influential book The Birth of a
Consumer Society: The Commercialization of Eighteenth-Century England, whose first chapter, significantly entitled “The Consumer Revolution in Eighteenth-Century England,” opens with the following statements: “There was a consumer boom in England in the eighteenth century. In the third quarter of the century the boom reached revolutionary proportions. . . . Just as the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century marks one of the great discontinuities in history, one of the great turning points in the history of human experience,” so “does the matching revolution on consumption. For the consumer revolution was the necessary analogue to the industrial revolution.” Though different from de Vries’s Industrious Revolution, the Consumer Revolution had not only the focus on consumption but also the attention to the role of women in common with the latter: “Men, and in particular women, bought as never before.”

The author of the first chapter of the book, Neil McKendrick, had already started to stress women’s and children’s roles in previous years. In an essay published in 1974 on home demand and economic growth during the Industrial Revolution, he had highlighted the importance of women’s and children’s wages both for the survival of the family and for making new forms of consumption possible, contributing in creating demand for goods of central importance to the very development of industry. Yet waged work by women and children outside the home—badly paid but nevertheless paid—threatened traditional gender and generation hierarchies within the family. Exactly because of this, according to McKendrick, its economic value was not recognized and its negative aspects (which certainly existed) were overemphasized by a chorus of voices denouncing heartless exploitation, the removal of women from the family and their maternal role, the undermining of the paterfamilias’s authority, and the new opportunity for women to have their own money with which they could indulge their vanity.

McKendrick’s arguments contributed to a wide-ranging debate on the importance of female and child labor in the growth of both production and demand for consumer goods. At the same time, they helped the development of studies into the reasons for the previous lack of interest in consumption among academics. While the last thirty years have witnessed a booming development of studies on the history of consumption, for a long time scholars had indeed focused on production, neglecting consumption. According to several scholars, a crucial reason for such neglect was the establishment of theoretical positions contrasting production, which in its “proper” form was supposed to be an adult male activity, and consumption, seen as a fatuous female activity.

In the light of recent research, briefly mentioned above, showing that it was not at all infrequent for women and children in pre-industrial so-
cieties to work and earn outside their families, it may be surprising to learn which tremendous anxieties and worries female and child waged factory work caused during the Industrial Revolution. Interestingly, as a reaction against such a disturbing contemporary reality, some people even rewrote the past. In spite of the fact that women and children had worked in pre-industrial society, too, it was argued that their labor was an unwelcomed novelty brought about by industrialization.180

Anxieties reached such a point that in a sense the woman worker became a product of the Industrial Revolution, as argued by Joan Scott: never before had working women been observed and described in such an obsessive way. The very fact that the relatively new types of working women emerging during industrialization were perceived as a problem gave them unprecedented visibility precisely in order to overcome the problem they represented.181 Solving such a problem meant, for many people, emphasizing the distinction between private and public and pursuing individual, familial, national, etc., strategies to convince or force women to work for free at home caring for their families. In a sense, the discourse on separate spheres was a reaction to ongoing transformations more than a reflection of them.182 According to some scholars, the breadwinner ideology, inextricably linked to the ideology of separate spheres, or even the breadwinner family model, was already a fact before the Industrial Revolution.183 Nevertheless, the spreading of female and child factory work184 certainly prompted the development of those ideologies: female factory workers, according to many thinkers, priests, politicians, social reformers, and the like, should be brought back home from the allegedly immoral and de-womanizing environment of the factory and educated to their “natural” role as wives and mothers, for both their well-being and that of their children and families.185 While the anxieties caused by factory work contributed to giving women’s workers, perceived as a problem, large visibility in the public discourses, the efforts to put men and women in their allegedly “right place,” according to the dominant ideas on proper gender roles, were not without consequences on people’s behavior and women’s work. Among other things, they might also imply making working women invisible and “effacing” paid women’s work, thus affecting the very production of documents that later would be used by historians precisely to study gender roles.

6. The cunning historian:
   unveiling and overcoming the gender bias

As long as women were associated with the allegedly immutable realm of nature186 rather than with history and change, asking whether women
had a history and whether women’s history did exist was far from rhetorical, as stressed by Gisela Bock or Michelle Perrot. Such questions, asked from a feminist perspective, were provocative rather than trivial. On the other hand, women were really absent from most historical narratives: there were “hardly any women at all,” as already declared by Miss Morland in Jane Austen’s *Northanger Abbey*. For those (mainly feminist) historians who considered it obvious that women actually had a history, how to write their history making them visible was conversely far from obvious. In other words: how could *her-story* be written? Finding sources on women was naturally crucial to writing such a history. Contrary to what one might expect, sources on women turned out to be not at all rare, also allowing historians to document the existence of women who were radically different from the housewives, spouses, and mothers who allegedly should have represented all our female ancestors. Italian historians, to quote but one example, were quick to document illegitimate mothers; women active in “public,” from prostitutes to saints; and women who did not live in households headed by a man but in not-kin, all-female households, in institutions, and in convents. Many sources also allowed historians to show that women had always worked, performing both paid and unpaid activities, both domestic and extra-domestic: their roles had changed over time, but paid extra-domestic work was not a novelty brought about by industrialization and/or modernization. Yet, while on the one hand sources turned out to be rather plentiful, on the other hand they often were heavily gender biased. This was also the case with supposedly gender-neutral documents such as statistics and population censuses, which were often presented as scientific tools for the knowledge and representation of a country. In fact, they were crucial weapons used within the political struggle to shape social reality: ideas on the proper place for men and women affected how data about the working population were collected and presented. Unveiling the fact that these documents were (and still are) gender biased has been a major contribution by women’s and gender historians. By way of comparing different sources on the same individual and analyzing how information was collected and reported in the documents, numerous scholars were able to show that women, especially married ones, were recorded in most sources only according to their marital status, therefore simply as “wife of,” or as housewives. This was common practice both in the early modern age and in later times. Nonetheless, even the meaning of such classifications was radically different in different periods. Overseeing such a difference might imply and actually has implied anachronistic and misleading representations of the past. As mentioned above, in early modern times being a wife/housewife was a
well-defined role with an economic content. Especially among people
who had to work to survive, i.e. among the large majority of the popu-
lation, being a wife and being defined as such did not imply being (con-
sidered) someone who did not work, but rather the contrary. This was
even more so if the woman was described as a housewife, housewifery
being a kind of work. To contemporary scholars interested in knowing
what wives and housewives actually did, such definitions might certainly
be useless, since they might imply many different activities, according
to the context, the family business, the job of the husband. In order to know
what early modern women actually did, historians have to use sources and
methods allowing them to go beyond simple labels such as “housewife.”
This is the case with the verb-oriented method illustrated in this volume
by Maria Ågren.194

As mentioned, while many early modern sources defined women as
housewives and/or according to their (partially overlapping) marital sta-
tus, this did not imply that their activities were deemed as economically
irrelevant. Things went all the more differently when housewifery was
increasingly seen as something other than proper work. The professional
classification, not only of women but also of men, was a difficult task for
the statistical authorities who, especially from the nineteenth century on-
ward, were developing and were assuming increasing importance: many
men had unstable jobs, worked irregularly, performed multiple activities,
lived from hand to mouth, etc. Yet the classification of women turned
out to be particularly difficult and ideologically laden. Ambiguities were
in fact often overcome by classifying women according to what was con-
sidered to be their proper role, i.e. as housewives, even though they also
performed other activities, sometimes even paid, extra-domestic ones. At
the same time, housewifery was increasingly seen as something different
from proper work, as explained above. In other words, in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, women were often statistically constructed as
dependent and unproductive, “whatever their productive functions.”195

Nancy Folbre, who in the 1980s and 1990s wrote important contri-
butions on the statistical construction of the unproductive housewife,196
deals with that issue in this book, too. She shows, among other things,
that in the 1851 Census for England and Wales wives, mothers and mis-
tresses who did not work for pay were placed in a category by themselves,
different from that of “dependents” (children, the sick, vagrants, etc.),
whereas in 1881 housewives were classified as “unoccupied” and in 1891
as “dependents.” The new classifications mirrored the developing catego-
ries of the political economy and strengthened a statistical representation
of the country in line with the breadwinner ideology, according to which
the male family heads provided for their wives and children (whereas, in
fact, many families would not survive without the paid or unpaid work of women and children; yet this representation also justified very low female and children’s wages). Similar decisions to classify wives and daughters not engaged in paid occupations as “dependents” were taken in Australia and in the United States.

However, the underrepresentation of women in statistics did not only depend on the classification of housewives as non-workers; nor did it simply depend on the fact that women were especially likely to engage in irregular and/or home-based activities that, although paid, easily escaped recording. Criteria used to classify women and men might be explicitly different. As shown by Raffaella Sarti in her chapter, the General Report referring to the 1901 Italian Census explained that individuals were classified according to their professions, not according to their conditions. This meant, for instance, that lawyer capitalists had been classified among lawyers and not among capitalists, without checking how much time they devoted to the activity of lawyers. On the contrary, as explicitly explained in the Report, if a woman had declared that she was in charge of domestic tasks and was also engaged in “secondary” activities such as spinning, weaving, sewing for herself or others, or worked as a temporary servant, she was classified as a housewife (which was considered being a “condition”) among the “people supported by the family,” while all the other occupations carried out, although paid, had been put “in the classification of accessory professions” (not even analytically sorted in the census). While adult men were often assumed by default to be workers, women might be underrecorded even when they performed paid extra-domestic work on a regular basis. Cristina Borderías, for instance, working on the women employed by the Spanish national telephone company, thanks to data from the company’s archive, estimated an underrepresentation of about 35 percent in the municipal population census of Barcelona in 1930. On the other hand, inasmuch as performing paid and/or extra-domestic jobs was stigmatized, women themselves were occasionally likely to hide their occupation when declaring their status to census officers or filling out census forms (but often such declarations were made by the male head of the family).

Both Borderías and Sarti, in their contributions to this book, document a growing tendency to classify women as housewives in population censuses, in Spain and Italy respectively, between the late nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth. While single historical population censuses differ both because of peculiar national approaches and changes over time, to the point that each census almost has its own features, generally speaking huge research on these sources has revealed that they all had similar biases and often experienced similar changes over
time. Many scholars from different countries would therefore subscribe, with reference to the country they analyze, to Borderías’s claim that the statistical system “contributed decisively to the progressive invisibility of the labor activities of women.”

The long-term analysis of female participation to the labor force based on censuses and other similar sources has revealed a U-shaped trend: broadly speaking, female participation rates were shown to be falling during the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries, then recovering after the Second World War. According to the “classical” narrative by Claudia Goldin,

> When incomes are extremely low and when certain types of agriculture dominate (for example, poultry, dairy, rice, cotton, peanuts; generally not grains, livestock, tree crops, sugarcane), women are in the labor force to a great extent. They are sometimes paid laborers but more often are unpaid workers on family farms and in household businesses, often doing home workshop production. As incomes rise in most societies, often because of an expansion of the market or the introduction of new technology, women’s labor force participation rates fall. Women’s work is often implicitly bought by the family, and women then retreat into the home, although their hours of work may not materially change. The decline in female labor force participation rates owes, in part, to an income effect, but it may be reinforced by a reduction in the relative price of home-produced goods and by a decrease in the demand for women’s labor in agriculture. Even when women’s relative wage rises, married women may be barred from manufacturing employment by social custom or by employer preference.

> But as female education improves and as the value of women’s time in the market increases still further, relative to the price of goods, they move back into the paid labor force, as reflected in the move along the rising portion of the U-shaped curve.

In light of the biases shown in research conducted on censuses and other similar sources, a crucial issue is whether such a U-shaped participation to the labor force mirrors “reality” or is only a statistical illusion due, as for the declining part of the U-trend, to the growing underrecording of female work described above. The ideas on the proper role and right place of men and women that led to undervalue, underrecord, and even to efface women’s work from such sources were actually real phenomena that deserve to be illustrated and understood. Such ideas certainly did not just cause census officers, family heads, and sometimes women themselves to make female work invisible; they also affected decisions, by men and women, on the actual activities performed by women, and induced some of them (how many?) to avoid entering the labor market or to withdraw from it when they could afford “not to work.” Much discussion has indeed addressed the question whether two clearly distinct spheres
really existed, with some scholars stressing that for the lower classes it was impossible to separate the spheres,\textsuperscript{202} and others arguing that middle-class women never stopped playing a crucial economic role and in the nineteenth century were able to exploit the new economic and financial opportunities opened up by economic development, to quote but two positions within a multifaceted debate.\textsuperscript{203}

Establishing whether the aforementioned biases make those sources completely useless or whether ways actually exist to measure and deal with women’s underrepresentation is therefore a crucial endeavor if one wants to know which changes affected the structure of the labor force, its composition by age and gender, the contribution of men and women to family budgets, and national domestic product.\textsuperscript{204} It is true that a possible way to roughly calculate the total female economic contribution to GDP is to give housework the same market value as if it were performed by paid servants/domestic workers.\textsuperscript{205} Yet ignoring how many, and which, women really were unpaid housewives and how many, and which, women performed paid activities (possibly paid at different rates than domestic service) producing goods or services in precise economic sectors instead represents a serious bias (even though \textit{unpaid} housewives, too, might and may actually produce goods and services for the market).\textsuperscript{206} Pinpointing how many, and which, women workers were underrecorded in censuses and similar sources is important to reconstruct long-term historical trends. While more recent and better estimates of the value of household production are based on more telling sources than censuses, such as time budgets,\textsuperscript{207} the available sources on the use of time in past centuries are generally qualitative ones and difficult to compare with modern ones.\textsuperscript{208} As a consequence, censuses, despite all their bias, remain rather important sources.

Efforts to evaluate the reliability of censuses and other similar sources and to correct female underrecording started rather early and have not only been pursued by feminist historians.\textsuperscript{209} Women’s and gender historians, however, have been especially active in this area. Some scholars have confirmed census biases and suggested possible corrections\textsuperscript{210}; in Britain, some historians have even “rehabilitated” the censuses, showing, especially through comparisons with other sources, that the original data collected in the Census Enumerator’s Books was much more accurate and reliable than the aggregate one published in the tables.\textsuperscript{211}

Though with some exceptions,\textsuperscript{212} the results of these efforts seem to confirm that long-term female participation to the labor force actually had a U-shaped trend, but with participation rates always significantly higher than previously calculated using original, uncorrected data taken from censuses and other similar sources.\textsuperscript{213}
“Cunning” historians are thus not only able to document the biases of the sources but also to find ways to overcome them. A crucial method is to compare sources that, being written with different purposes, have a different “interest” in recording or omitting women’s work. The very existence of such sources testifies that even within contexts where ideologies devaluing women’s work were very strong, they did not permeate the entire society rigidly and homogeneously. According to the goal to be reached, reality could be described in different ways, often ignoring women’s work, but sometimes highlighting it. In this book, the chapter by Margareth Lanzinger presents a particularly telling example of the potential of comparing sources aiming to reach different goals. Lanzinger focuses on applications for permission to marry submitted to the Catholic religious authorities in nineteenth-century Tyrol by men and women who, being blood relatives or related by marriage, could marry only if they obtained a special dispensation (marriages among kinfolk were forbidden). People had to justify their requests with arguments, which are likely to include detailed descriptions of women’s activities and skills. This was often the case with brothers- and sisters-in-law, who—after the death of the man’s wife and the woman’s sister—wanted to marry, having often been living under the same roof for several years. In such cases the man was likely to describe the role of the woman in the family business, her contribution to the survival and well-being of the household in great detail, in order to present her as the best, not to say his only, possible wife. While these touching requests were often rejected, forcing people to resubmit them several times, the reiterated applications, forcibly enriched with new arguments, represent today a particularly rich source for historians, often revealing details of the multiple activities performed by women, too.

7. The value of home-based work and its regulation

The obscuring of women’s work not only affected censuses and similar sources but many other documents as well: as shown by Eileen Boris in her chapter, this was long the case even with the documents and reports produced by the International Labour Office, even though this institution would also support research and campaigns that have been, and still are, crucial to recognizing the value of different types of home-based work.214 This is the case, to quote but one example, of the ILO-sponsored book Lace Makers of Narsapur: Indian Housewives Produce for the World Market by Maria Mies (1982), a study examining “substantial household industry in Andhra Pradesh, India, in which secluded poor Christian and
Hindu women produced lace which yielded about 90 per cent of the State’s handicraft export earnings. These poor women produced the lace through an extensive network of male agents, traders and exporters. The business was very profitable for most of those male actors, whereas the producers themselves, all females, became impoverished: they were not even ‘considered ‘workers’ but rather ‘housewives,’ in spite of a 6-8-hour day at lace work (in addition to about 7 hours of other productive work and housework).’ To define this process, Mies introduced the very discerning concept of *housewifization.* What was at stake was not only scientific precision: “the illusion that the women produce lace in their leisure time” contributed in fact “to inhibiting the sole means of improving their lot—organisation.”

From a feminist perspective, the effort to identify exactly what women all over the world did and do, and to correct data taken from biased sources accordingly, does not aim to produce a more accurate picture of the work/non-work divide, but rather the contrary. Having more accurate data on women’s roles is indeed necessary, not only to better evaluate the female contribution to GNP as is traditionally calculated but also, and mainly, to calculate the economic value of all those forms of home-based work that are not included in traditional GDP calculation’s methods alongside those that are already included.

Recent research focusing on “unpaid” work performed within the household has contributed to disclose a nuanced continuum encompassing a wide variety of home-based activities: unpaid care for the family members, unpaid work for self-consumption, unpaid and paid market-oriented work for the family business, paid industrial homework, paid carework performed in one’s household, paid carework and paid domestic work in others’ households. It is a variety that challenges the “classical” dichotomy of unpaid vs. paid work, as well as that of family vs. market. At the same time, observing such a multifaceted variety, neither a serious scholar nor a fair policymaker can avoid tackling the question of the economic value of all these forms of work. In other words, the question is not only to distinguish between “real” housewives and “housewifized” workers: though this distinction is important for the sake of precision, the crucial issue is to arrive at a much more complete calculation of the economic contribution of any type of work.

Interestingly, studies focusing on the medieval and early modern periods show that working within one’s family normally gave people, especially adults, some rights on the family revenues and assets, entitling them to some form of remuneration, even though the actual type of remuneration may be effective in the short or long term, and was likely to depend on age, gender, position within the family, etc.; therefore, ac-
cording to the idea that all humans are equal, it was not necessarily fair but might be considered fair or at least acceptable in a world structurally based on inequality, where a different value was attributed to men and women, adults and children, masters and servants, etc.\textsuperscript{220} Intermingling with moral and legal norms, this created complex networks of gendered and generational rights and duties, solidarities and obligations, credits and debts among family members,\textsuperscript{221} which makes it impossible to reduce the unwaged activities performed at home to the category of “unpaid” work.\textsuperscript{222} Such a category, though very useful to interrogate the sources, is too rigid, one-sided, and clearly misleading when historians look for appropriate interpretative frameworks. It runs the risk of obscuring the multiple ways of remunerating one’s contribution to the family’s survival, welfare, and wealth.

Yet, as explained above, especially from the nineteenth century, the domestic sphere was increasingly considered the site of unpaid, gratuitous, love-driven activities seen as the opposite of the paid, market-oriented activities performed in factories, companies, shops, and offices. Even domestic workers, who were actually paid, were generally no longer considered proper workers precisely because they were associated with the domestic sphere and carried out more or less the same tasks that wives and mothers carried out for fee.\textsuperscript{223} These ideas, which obscured the economic value of home-based activities, solidified in laws. Many scholars, activists, and policymakers are aware, today, that the emphasis on love and gratuity actually implies a marginalization and a discrimination of those who perform care, domestic, home-based activities. Nonetheless, not only GDP calculation but also the law still contributes in preventing a fair appraisal of their economic value (such an appraisal would obviously not entail denying their emotional importance). As Maria Rosaria Marella writes in her chapter, “the results achieved by other social sciences in the analysis of housework have not been shared so far by legal analysis. Lawyers keep on ignoring the issue, projecting it in the background of a strict family/market divide.” According to Marella, we cannot properly speak of a “legal irrelevance of housework; rather, it has a limited relevance, restricted to the field of family law, assumed in its exceptionalism.” In Italy, a country whose constitution (article 29) defines the family as a “natural society” based on marriage, the courts assume that the relationship between family members is shaped by “a natural obligation” of solidarity that excludes any contamination with economic exchanges. Yet these apparently economically invaluable activities, done for free because of a “natural obligation,” surprisingly become “economically relevant and valuable with market parameters” in relations with a third party. According to the law, their loss represents in fact a damage valued in pecu-
niary terms: a solution, according to Marella, that both the systems of common and of civil law share. In fact, the 1975 Italian reform of family law has tried to overcome such a naturalization of family relationships. Yet, as stated by Marella, the productive function of the family is still misunderstood; the recognition of productivity is limited to the regime of the family business, while for the rest the “rationale of family solidarity—and its ‘natural’ corollary of the gratuitousness of the work done in the domestic sphere” is dominant. Article 230bis of the Civil Code, regulating family businesses, states, in fact, that the family members who work for the family and those who work for the family business have the right to be supported according to the wealth of the family and to share in the business earnings, also making clear that “the work by a woman is considered equivalent to that by a man.”

In point of fact, recent research on Italian women involved in family businesses shows that, while their numbers are growing, they are often invisible, barred from decision-making and not rewarded fairly as for job titles and salaries, although, according to Francesca Cesaroni and Annalisa Sentuti, their minor roles are not always the result of gender discrimination. Gender discrimination and gender stereotyping are conversely at work among French wine-grape farmers in the Cognac region who even nowadays normally pass on their farms, professional skills, and the status of business head to their male heirs assuming that, if there are sons and daughters, the latter are “not interested” in inheriting the farm.

As in Italy, in France, too, state attitude toward the regulation of home-based work has turned out to be difficult and ambiguous. As noted by Manuela Martini, the French Parliament has been very slow in defining the legal status of family workers, despite the fact that family businesses are still widespread in the country. Although social rights in France are among the most advanced in Europe, in this case a law to grant occupational status to collaborating spouses as well as social security benefits to those carrying out unpaid work was eventually enacted as late as 1982; it implied a refashioning of the boundaries between the marital duty to assist one’s spouse and the work that, exceeding this moral and legal obligation, gives legal right to compensation. As illustrated by Florence Weber in her chapter, the French do have a legal obligation to support a family member in need (spouse, parent, child, grandparent, grandchildren, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, mother-in-law, father-in-law, but not siblings). Furthermore, the so-called piété filiale (filial devotion) is a moral duty and an absolute obligation. French law does not subject the children’s duty to support their parents to any conditions: “For jurists, the reality, both past and present, of family relationships cannot justify the presence or absence of help to a parent nor the ‘amount’ of this help.”
a consequence, all children have an identical obligation to care for their parents, and, if necessary, to pay for caring for them, independently from their emotional relationship and from the economic exchanges that might have been favoring one child and unfavoring another; conversely, the care they normally provide does not affect their share of the inheritance. Yet, in two cases the law considers the reality of family relations to compensate for an excessive burden instead. Already in 1939, a law was introduced to take into account the unpaid work carried out, in agriculture, by children who remain with their parents, becoming their “family workers,” while their siblings no longer work on the family farms: in this case, the law calculates for them “deferred wages” (salaires différés) to be settled with a larger share of the inheritance (law 29 July 1939). Furthermore, a judgment of the French Supreme Court of 12 July 1994 introduced the notion of “unjust enrichment within family relations” (enrichissement sans cause dans les relations de famille), to grant an advantage at the time of inheritance to a child who took care of his/her elderly parents, who had become impoverished, to compensate him/her for the larger family work he performed in comparison with his sister.

These cases show that, at least in particular cases, the law assesses both the unpaid market-oriented work performed within the family business and the care work done for free, because of love or at least moral obligations, in economic terms, showing how ambiguous and blurred the boundaries between all those activities are. It is not just state authorities, however, who have tried and try to regulate home-based labor. In her chapter, Eileen Boris illustrates the difficult growth, within the International Labour Organization (ILO), of the consciousness of the numerous activities performed at home by women, of the importance of those activities, and of the need to consider them as proper work and to regulate them. The ILO’s mainly male representatives initially considered only paid extra-domestic work performed in factories, shops, offices as work, being at the same time often afraid of the possible disruptive consequences, on the family, of the massive entry of women into such working contexts. Over time, however, especially thanks to clever and engaged women, the ILO has passed important conventions, such as Convention 177 on home work in 1995 and Convention 189, in 2011, on “Decent Work for Domestic Workers” in particular: with convention 177, “for the first time, the ILO valued work in the home as worthy of a labor standard of its own. Technical assistance and standard-setting on home work solidified institutional support for the informal sector, helping to redirect ILO efforts to the reproductive labor that occurs in that realm.” Convention 189 “marks the worthiness of monetized reproductive labor” and became “conceivable because of the earlier victory of home-based pieceworkers.”
8. Which future for home-based work?

The issue of assessing the value of any kind of home-based work, always important, is all the more crucial if we consider that such forms of work, far from being about to disappear thanks to technical and social modernization, as many people expected until some decades ago, are experiencing an expansion instead. This is precisely the case with paid domestic and care work as well as with home work. Paid domestic and care work is experiencing a real boom at the global level, while home work and offshore production, as explained by Eileen Boris, “encouraged by favorable tariff and tax policies,” “spread beyond their historical presence in garments and textiles to include the making of additional consumer goods, electronics, and plastics. With the computer revolution, telework and home assembly of components updated the practice of clerical homework in Australia, Canada, and other ‘developed’ nations, but also served as additional forms of offshoring from North to South and from expensive to cheaper labor markets.”

A complex scene therefore unfolds before our eyes. Until some decades ago, many people expected economic and social modernization to lead to the spreading of “standard” paid extra-domestic work; to put it in the simplest terms, they expected, thanks to growing opportunities for work in “standard” sectors as well as expanding welfare and public services, that paid domestic work and home-based work would disappear, and that women would increasingly be freed from caring and domestic tasks and be all the more integrated in the standard labor force, gaining, in this way, not only a salary but also all the growing benefits, protections, and rights associated with proper work. In fact, things have gone differently: because of a variety of causes, in “developed” countries where “standard” work used to be common, it is increasingly a privilege, while multiple forms of “non-standard” work—poorly paid, irregular, insecure, not granting any or little social protection—are spreading. Domestic and care work, even live-in, is experiencing a revival, while multiple forms of home-based work, both “traditional” and “new” are spreading. The struggle to make home-based labor visible and to give it fair recognition happens at a time when “standard” labor is becoming less common: according to some scholars, as explained by Sarti in her chapter, there is a kind of feminization of work, in the sense that work today is becoming, for both men and women, more similar to traditional women’s work than used to be in “developed” countries until a few years ago; i.e., it is becoming more irregular, less paid, less recognized, less associated with rights and status, less crucial for the foundation of one’s
identity. Furthermore, growing automation and robotization make the scenario of a spreading lack of work and unemployment all the more possible and threatening.

While, on the one hand, this landscape is rather disturbing, on the other hand, the idea that universal basic income could be introduced, guaranteeing at least a minimum for survival to everybody, independently from the fact of working and earning, is gaining momentum, counterbalancing, at least in part, the alarming scenery we broadly described above, even though in fact there is no agreement on the possible advantages and disadvantages of such an introduction, both in general and in particular on gender equality. The world is rapidly changing, challenging the received social equilibriums as well as reality’s interpretations: new disquieting problems, such as the aforementioned ones, climate change and ecological unsustainability, are arising and new imbalances are developing between rich and poor, North and South, West and East. Yet at the same time, new opportunities unfold. Avoiding the obscuring of the contribution made by a section of humanity—actually the largest—to the common survival and (potential) well-being is in any case a crucial premise to make the worst scenarios for the future less likely. This book aims to make a contribution to reach this goal.

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Notes

This essay is the product of the many discussions had by the editors of the volume. Nonetheless, section 1 was jointly written by the three editors; sections 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8 were mainly written by Raffaella Sarti (who has also written the short introductions to the first three parts of the book); section 5 was jointly written by the three editors, with large parts done by Anna Bellavitis; section 7 was mainly written by Manuela Martini. English revision by Clelia Boscolo, University of Birmingham.


2. As written by Jürgen Kocka, “A history of work would seem to be highly attractive, because it would have to integrate very different approaches, methods and aspects, ranging from straightforward economic history to cultural constructivism, including the analysis of institutional politics. But can it be done? There is reason for doubt, since the concept of ‘work’ is not very precise, [is] very changeable over time and between cultures and highly contested. Very often what it means is not easily separated from other human activities, but embedded, which makes its separate conceptualization appear a bit artificial and problematic. In addition, concepts like ‘work’ are highly aggregate and abstract; they comprise very different phenomena. This diversity makes it difficult to formulate observations valid for the whole aggregate, i.e. work in general”; see Jürgen Kocka, “Work as a Problem in European History,” in *Work in a Modern Society: The German Historical Experience in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Jürgen Kocka (New York: Berghahn, 2010), 1. On the very existence of societies with/without a concept of work, see Marie-Noëlle Chamoux, “Sociétés avec et sans concept de travail,” *Sociologie du travail* 36, Hors série, no. 4 (1994): 57–71.


4. See on this issue Raffaella Sarti’s chapter in this book.


13. As stressed by Lisa Phillips, “Silent Partners: The Role of Unpaid Market Labor in Fami-
lies,” *Feminist Economics* 14, no. 2 (2008): 37, “unpaid market labor is conceptually distinct from both paid work and unpaid domestic labor.”

14. The project was led by the three editors of this book and supported by the École Française of Rome and the Universities of Paris-Diderot (ICT laboratory), Rouen (GRHIS laboratory), and Urbino Carlo Bo. Seven research meetings/conferences have taken place, in Paris (2011), Glasgow (2012), Rouen (2012), Rome (2014), Turin (2015), Valencia (2016), and Madrid (2016). So far, the outcomes of the project are contained in the article by Manuela Martini, “When Unpaid Workers Need a Legal Status: Family Workers and Reforms to Labour Rights in Twentieth-Century France,” *International Review of Social History* 59, no. 2 (2014): 247–78; the special issue “Households, Family Workshops and Unpaid Market Work in Europe from the 16th Century to the Present,” edited by Manuela Martini and Anna Bellavitis, of the journal *History of the Family* 19, no. 3 (2014); and the special issue “Familles laborieuses: Rémunération, transmission et apprentissage dans les ateliers familiaux de la fin du Moyen Âge à l’époque contemporaine en Europe,” edited by Anna Bellavitis, Manuela Martini, and Raffaella Sarti, of the journal *Mélanges de l’École française de Rome—Italie et Méditerranée modernes et contemporaines* 128, no. 1 (2016), including mainly articles in French especially focusing on artisan families from the Middle Ages to the present.


   Wallon, trava, travail de maréchal; provenc. trabalh, trebalh, trebail, fatigue; esp. trabajo, fatigue; portug. trabalho, fatigue; ital. travaglio, travail de maréchal et fatigue. Il est impossible de séparer travail des maréchaux et travail, peine, fatigue, pour la forme, ni même pour le sens; car, de travail qui assujettit les animaux, on passe sans peine à travail, gêne, sens primordial (travail de labors, Job. 454). Travail se tire du prov. travar, entraver, du lat. trabs, pouteur.


24. All Scripture citations are taken from the New International Version unless otherwise noted. In the Bible there are of course many other references to work.


26. Ibid.


34. Lis and Soly, *Worthy Efforts*, 194.
43. Ibid., 76–77, emphasis in the original.
44. Ibid., 102.
In fact, the realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production. Just as the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce life, so must civilised man, and he must do so in all social formations and under all possible modes of production. With his development this realm of physical necessity expands as a result of his wants; but, at the same time, the forces of production which satisfy these wants also increase. Freedom in this field can only consist in socialised man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working-day is its basic prerequisite (571).

Even though in this passage Marx associated freedom with the reduction of necessary labor, and despite the fact that he increasingly refused any essentialism, stressing the historical variability of working conditions, not only in earlier writings but also in the Capital, he considered labor as a crucial feature of humans. In the first volume, considering “the labour-process independently of the particular form it assumes under given social conditions,” he maintained that labor is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material reactions \([\text{Stoffwechsel, also translated with ‘metabolism’}]\) between himself and Nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature’s productions in a form adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and compels them to act in obedience to his sway. We are not now dealing with those primitive instinctive forms of labour that remind us of the mere animal. An immeasurable interval of time separates the state of things in which a man brings his labour-power to market for sale as a commodity, from that state in which human labour was still in its first instinctive stage. We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realises a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will. And this subordination is no mere momentary act. Besides the exertion of the bodily organs, the process demands that, during the whole operation, the workman’s will be steadily in consonance with his purpose. This means close attention. The less he is attracted by the nature of the work, and the mode in which it is carried on, and the less, therefore, he enjoys it as something which gives play to his bodily and mental powers, the more close his attention is forced to be.” (Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1, book 1, The Process of Production of Capital [1867], first English edition of 1887 [fourth German edition changes included as indicated] with some modernization of spelling, translated by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, edited by Frederick Engels [Moscow, Progress Pub-
lishers, w.d.], retrieved 8 January 2017 from https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/index.htm, 127)
46. Zimmermann, Work and Labor, 16562.
48. As stressed for instance by Méda, Le travail, 15–16, almost paradoxically, while in the 1970s liberation from work (considered as a source of alienation) was seen as a goal by many thinkers and political activists, in the last decades growing unemployment due to different phenomena has been causing great concern and alarmed debates among policymakers, intellectuals, and ordinary people. Among the causes of such a growth, we can mention increasing productivity due to mechanization, digitalization and the internet, rapid population growth, the slowing down of economic development, financial and economic crises. On the liberation from work, see for instance André Gorz, Paths to Paradise: On the Liberation from Work (London: Pluto Press, 1985). For an early analysis of the crisis of labor-based societies, see Ralf Dahrendorf, “Im Entschwinden der Arbeitsgesellschaft: Wandlungen in der sozialen Konstruktion des menschlichen Lebens,” Merkur 34, no. 8 (1980): 749–60; Joachim Matthes, ed., Krise der Arbeitsgesellschaft? Verhandlungen des 21. Deutschen Soziologentages in Bamberg 1982 (Frankfurt, Campus, 1983); Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990), 79, original edition: Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne: Zwölf Vorlesungen (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1985).
49. Genesis 3:16: “I will make your pains in childbearing very severe; with painful labor you will give birth to children.”
50. See the dictionaries mentioned above, notes 19–22. Marcel van der Linden (“Studying Attitudes to Work Worldwide,” 26), referring to W. N. Evans, writes that “there are linguistic indications to suggest that work was originally associated with womanhood.”
57. Sarti, Europe at Home, 75–78; Raffaella Sarti, Ländliche Hauslandschaften in Europa in einer Langzeitperspektive, in Das Haus in der Geschichte Europas: Ein Handbuch, ed. Joachim Eibach and Inken Schmidt-Voges, together with Simone Derix, Philip Hahn, Elizabeth
Harding, Margareth Lanzinger, red. Roman Bonderer (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2015), 175–94.

58. Sarti, Europe at Home, 95, 162–63.


60. Melissa Calaresu and Danielle van den Heuvel, “Introduction: Food Hawkers from Representation to Reality,” in Calaresu and van der Heuvel, Food Hawkers, 1–18: “A variety of ‘street luxuries’ were available on the streets to serve poor and rich alike” (2).


63. This does not mean that nobles interested in manual work were absent. Lis and Soly (Worthy Efforts, 205), for instance, report that Gervase Markham, the son of a country gentleman and author of several books—the best known of which is The English Huswife (London: Roger Jackson, 1615)—spent several years living as a husbandman among husbandmen.

64. See note 61.

65. In addition to the texts mentioned in the following notes, see for instance Amanda Flather, “Space, Place, and Gender: The Sexual and Spatial Division of Labor in the Early Modern Household,” History and Theory 52, no. 3 (2013): 344–60.


67. The bibliography on women and guilds is large and dominated by the so-called “decline thesis”: for a critical update on this debate, see Clare Crowston, “Women, Gender and Guilds in Early Modern Europe: An Overview of Recent Research,” in The Return of the Guilds, ed. Jan Lucassen, Tine De Moor, and Jan Luiten van Zanden, supplement of International Review of Social History 53 (2008): 19–44. More generally, on women’s work
in Early Modern Europe, see Anna Bellavitis, Il lavoro delle donne nelle città dell’Europa moderna (Roma: Viella, 2016).


69. Alexandra Shepard, Accounting for Oneself: Worth, Status, and the Social Order in Early Modern England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 257 (wives “were charged with managing, saving, and increasing household assets—and it is possible that these tasks, encompassed within the skills lumped together as ‘housewifery,’ lent an occupational dimension to the term ‘wife,’ which tends to be overlooked in approaches to marriage predominantly as a legal status determined by coverture. The logic that matched husbandry with housewifery extended to couples with means as well as those without”). See also Alexandra Shepard, “Crediting Women in the Early Modern English Economy,” History Workshop Journal 79, no. 1 (2015): 1–24.


72. Genovesi may have overgeneralized the managerial responsibilities of middle-class Italian women; see Sarti, Europe at Home, 218.

73. Antonio Genovesi, Lezioni di Commercio o sia di Economia Civile (1765–67; Bassano: Remondini, 1769), 338.


83. Shepard, Accounting for Oneself.

84. As written as early as 1984 by Marzio Barbagli referring to Italy: “From the fourteenth century onwards, the majority of urban population after marriage followed the neolocal residence rule and spent large part of their family lives in nuclear households”; see Sotto lo stesso tetto: mutamenti della famiglia in Italia dal XV al XX secolo (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1984), 238.


86. See notes 54–60.


92. In this book we have chosen to focus on commonalities and historical change more than on differences among regions. This does not mean, however, that we undervalue geographical diversity, rather the contrary.


99. Ibid.
100. Tilgher, Homo Faber; Lis and Soly, Worthy Efforts, 14, 318, 322.


103. Kocka, “Work as a Problem,” 3. See also Keith Thomas, The Oxford Book of Work (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), xiv, who states that in the eighteenth century work was an activity having “an end beyond itself, being designed to produce something,” and was associated to a market value.


108. Ibid., 2.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid., 1.


113. See Folbre’s article in this volume.


117. Rhacel Salazar Parreñas, “Migrant Filipina Domestic Workers and the International Division of Reproductive Labor,” Gender & Society 14, no. 4 (2000): 560–80; Barbara Ehren-

118. In addition to the previous note, see Rhacel Salazar Parreñas, Servants of Globalization: Migration and Domestic Work, 2nd ed. (2001, with the subtitle Women, Migration and Domestic Work [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015]).


122. “Ainsi il est clair que la non-reconnaissance de la division sexuelle dans l’analyse du Capital n’empêche nullement l’application de concepts matérialistes à l’oppression des femmes”; Delphy, “Un féminisme matérialiste est possible,” 62; English version, “A Materialist Feminism is Possible,” 87: “It is therefore clear that the non-recognition of sexual division in the analysis of Capital in no way prevents the application of materialist concepts to the oppression of women.”


125. On the collective, see the chapters by Alessandra Pescarolo and Alessandra Gissi in this volume.

126. Selma James, “Introduction,” in Dalla Costa and James, Power of Women (third edition), 10–11 (describing Dalla Costa ideas). “It is no accident that the Dalla Costa article has come from Italy. First of all because so few women in Italy have jobs outside the home, the housewife’s position seems frozen,” James wrote (14). A second reason, according to James, was that “the working class there has a unique history of struggle” (15).
127. Ibid., 11, emphasis in the original. On these issues, see also Maud A. Bracke, “Between the Transnational and the Local: Mapping the Trajectories and Contexts of the Wages for Housework Campaign in 1970s Italian Feminism,” Women’s History Review 22, no. 4 (2013): 625–42.


129. Foreword to the third edition of Dalla Costa and James, Power of Women, 3.

130. Ibid.

131. Archivio di Lotta Femminista, 3.


139. Think, for instance, of the interest in witches and witch-hunting by nonprofessional historians such as Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English, authors of Witches, Midwives, and Nurses: Complaints and Disorders (New York: Feminist Press, 1973), and Luisa Muraro, author of La signora del gioco: episodi di caccia alle streghe (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1976).

140. In 1960, for instance, Philippe Ariès suggested that even the parental love for children was a historical phenomenon whose advent could be placed around the seventeenth century; his conclusions were not confirmed by later research but prompted a lively debate lasting for decades; see Philippe Ariès, L’enfant et la vie familiale sous l’ancien régime (Paris: Plon, 1960), Engl. transl. Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life, trans. Robert Baldick, London: Jonathan Cape, 1962).


144. Tosh, *A Man’s Place.* See also Sarti, “Men at Home.”


146. Davidoff and Hall, *Family Fortunes,* 272.


148. See, for an overview of the “decline thesis,” Crowston, “Women, Gender and Guilds.”


160. For instance, the need, for many people, to wait until they inherited a farm before marrying.


164. See note 159.


172. Van den Heuvel, “Partners in Marriage and Business?”


Women made up 56.6 percent of new tea and coffee sellers in the first half of the century, 80 percent in the second half. Among women, married ones grew from 60 percent in the first half of the century to 77 percent after the 1750s.


179. Sarti, *Europe at Home*, 219, with further references.


183. Marion W. Gray, *Productive Men, Reproductive Women: The Agrarian Household and the Emergence of Separate Spheres during the German Enlightenment* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), 9, argues that norms about separate spheres that “came to characterize the nineteenth century were actually in place in German-speaking Europe before industrial capitalism, in conjunction with the increased power of the state, disrupted traditional living and working condition”: in her view, “while the Industrial Revolution was responsible for the establishment of the roles of ‘housewife’ and ‘breadwinner’ as widespread social phenomena, the ideas fostering this development circulated widely before industry altered the social and economic landscape”; according to Jane Humphries, *Childhood and Child Labour in the British Industrial Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 120, in Britain, “the male-breadwinner family” “preceded industrialization.” “Whether its origins were in the sixteenth or seventeenth century, or even earlier in the medieval period, by the eighteenth century a male-breadwinner system appears established.” See also Horrell and Humphries, “Women’s Labour Force Participation”; Sara Horrell and Jane Humphries, “The Origins and Expansion of the Male Breadwinner Family: The Case of Nineteenth-Century Britain,” in “The Rise and Decline of the Male Breadwinner Family!,” ed. Angélique Janssens, special issue of *International Review of Social History* 42 (1997): 25–64. The whole issue is important for the history of the breadwinner family. A large conference on *Women, Work and the Breadwinner Ideology* took place in Salzburg, Austria, in 1999. For a report, see Marian van der Klein, “Women, Work and the Breadwinner Ideology, from the Fifteenth to the Twentieth Century,” in *International Labor and Working-Class History* 58 (2000): 318–21. For more recent inquiries on the origin of the breadwinner model, see Laura L. Frader, *Breadwinners and Citizens: Gender in the Making of the French Social Model* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), and Osamu Saito, “Historical Origins of the Male Breadwinner Household Model: Britain, Sweden and Japan,” *Japan Labor Review* 11, no. 4 (2014): 5–20.
The phenomenon was stressed, with many others, even by Marx and Engels in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (1848): “Modern Industry has converted the little workshop of the patriarchal master into the great factory of the industrial capitalist. . . . The less the skill and exertion of strength implied in manual labour, in other words, the more modern industry becomes developed, the more is the labour of men superseded by that of women. Differences of age and sex have no longer any distinctive social validity for the working class. All are instruments of labour, more or less expensive to use, according to their age and sex.” (Quote taken from the online version of the *Manifesto* available at https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/index.htm; source: *Marx and Engels Selected Works* [Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969], 1:98–137; trans. Samuel Moore in collaboration with Frederick Engels, 1888; transcribed by Zodiac and Brian Baggins; proofread and corrected against the 1888 English edition by Andy Blunden 2004; copy left: Marxists Internet Archive [marxists.org] 1987, 2000, 2010; permission is granted to distribute this document under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Share-Alike License).

As McKendrick writes in “Home Demand and Economic Growth,” 163: “Whatever the truth of the matter, female and child labour was seen as a novel abuse which must be condemned.” Not just politically conservative or reactionary people but also radical and revolutionary ones often argued that women should be “brought back” home from the factories. An interesting case is represented, for instance, by Jules Simon (1814–96), a radical French politician and prime minister (1876–77), who, though being aware that female extra-domestic work was not at all a novelty due to industrialization, maintained that any means permitted by freedom should be used to bring wives and mothers back home (“il faut user de tous les moyens que la liberté autorise pour ramener l’épouse et la mère dans la maison,” Jules Simon, *L’ouvrière* [Paris: Hachette, 1861], vi). On Simon’s book, see Joan Wallach Scott, “L’ouvrière! Mot impie, sordide . . .”: Women Workers in the Discourse of French Political Economy, 1840–1860,” in Joan Wallach Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 138–63 (or. ed. in Joyce, *Historical Meanings of Work*, 119–42).

After Darwin, considering nature as immutable was obviously increasingly out of date.


pagnia e vivere a dozzina: gruppi domestici non coniugali nella Bologna di fine Sette-
cento,” in Ragnatele di rapporti: Patronage e reti di relazione nelle storie delle donne, ed. 
Lucia Ferrante, Maura Palazzi, and Gianna Pomata (Torino: Rosenberg & Sellier, 1988), 
344–81. For more details, see Raffaella Sarti, “Oltre il gender? Un percorso tra recenti 
studi italiani di storia economico-sociale,” in A che punto è la storia delle donne in Italia, 

191. Alice Kessler-Harris, Women Have Always Worked: A Historical Overview (New York: 
Feminist Press, 1981); Gisela Bock, Geschlechtergeschichten der Neuzeit: Ideen, Politik, 
Praxis (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014), 47 (the chapter was originally writ-
ten in 1989); Cristina Borderías, Cristina Carrasco Bengoa, and Carme Alemany, eds., 
Las mujeres y el trabajo: rupturas conceptuales (Barcelona: Icaria, 1994); Groppi, Il lavoro 
delle donne; Silvie Schweitzer, Les Femmes ont toujours travaillé: Une histoire du travail des 
femmes aux XIXe et XXe siècles (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2002).

192. An early inspiring study on statistics is Joan Wallach Scott’s chapter “Statistical Represen-
tations of Work: ‘The Politics of the Chamber of Commerce’s Statistique de l’Industrie à 
Paris,’ 1847–48,” in Work in France: Representations, Meaning, Organization, and Prac-
tice, ed. Stephen Laurence Kaplan and Cynthia J. Koepp (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 

193. For instance, Margherita Pelaja, “Mestieri femminili e luoghi comuni: Le domestiche a 
Roma a metà Ottocento,” Quaderni storici 23, no. 68 (1988): 497–518; Raffaella Sarti, 
“Servire al femminile, servire al maschile nella Bologna sette-ottocentesca,” in Operaie, 

194. A similar method was suggested as early as 1990 by Margherita Pelaja, “Relazioni perso-
nali e vincoli di gruppo: il lavoro delle donne nella Roma dell’Ottocento,” Memoria 

195. Desley Deacon, “Political Arithmetic: The Nineteenth-Century Australian Census and 
the Construction of the Dependent Woman,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and 

196. Nancy Folbre and Marjorie Abel, “Women’s Work and Women’s Households: Gender 
Unproductive Housewife: Her Evolution in Nineteenth-Century Economic Thought,” 

197. Cristina Borderías, “Women’s Work and Household Economic Strategies in Industrializ-

198. Such a case of women ashamed to declare their occupation was mentioned, for instance, 
in the 1899 Dutch Census; see Schmidt and van Nederveen Meerkerk, “Reconsidering 
the ‘First Male Breadwinner Economy,’” 80.

199. E.g. ibid., 86 (“This under-recording was apparently more serious in 1899 than in 
1849”); Elise van Nederveen Meerkerk and Richard Paping, “Beyond the Census: Recon-
structing Dutch Women’s Labour Market Participation in Agriculture in the Netherlands, 

and Economic History,” in Investment in Women’s Human Capital, ed. T. Paul 
Schultz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 62; see also page 88:

In sum, I have demonstrated that the labor force participation of women is gen-
erally U-shaped over the course of economic development. The reasons for the 
downward portion of the U are probably found in a combination of an initially 
strong income effect and a weak substitution effect, and a change in the locus of 
production from the home to the factory. It was the rising portion of the U that 
concerned most of this essay. Why the function changes direction holds the key to
why women enter the labor force at higher stages of economic development and why their social, political, and legal status generally improves with economic progress. The reasons were sought in the change in the education of females relative to males as educational resource constraints are relaxed, and in women’s ability to obtain jobs in the white-collar sector after school completion. Their increased education and their ability to work in more prestigious occupations both increases the substitution effect and decreases the income effect. As the substitution effect begins to swamp the income effect, the upward portion of the U is traced out, and women’s labor force participation enters the modern era.


203. Beachy, Craig, and Owens, Women, Business and Finance.

204. A wrong evaluation of women’s work may significantly alter our understanding of the past, as Maxine Berg writes in relation to the Industrial Revolution:

Failure to take account of gender divisions may also have affected macro-economic indicators of the Industrial Revolution. If it was the case that higher proportions of women than men were occupied in the newer progressive manufacturing sectors, then the distribution of the labour force between different industries would be changed, and with this productivity estimates based on these. We can, indeed, ask to what extent our views of the low productivity of British industry in the crucial years of the Industrial Revolution have been distorted because we have been looking at the industrial distribution of the wrong workforce. It was the female not the male workforce which counted in the new high-productivity industries. Women’s labour was, on the other hand, also heavily concentrated in traditional labour-intensive activities. As the relative significance of traditional and dynamic industries changed, so too did distributions within the female workforce.”


205. On estimates of the economic value of housework made in this way, see Folbre’s and Boris’s contributions in this book.

206. The fact that unpaid housewives might and may actually produce goods and services for the market (better addressed below) obviously makes things even more complicated. On this issue, see Manuela Martini and Anna Bellavitis, “Household Economics, Social Norms and Practices of Unpaid Market Work in Europe from the Sixteenth Century to the Present,” History of the Family 19, no. 3 (2014): 273–82.

207. See Folbre’s contribution and note 10.

208. See, for instance, Lorna Weatherill, Consumer Behaviour and Material Culture in Britain 1660–1760 (New York: Rouledge, 1988), 143, to quote but one example.

209. The census officers themselves often discussed reliability and underrepresentations, as shown in this volume by Sarti. Among scholars who tried to correct censuses, see Ornello Vitali, Aspetti dello sviluppo economico italiano alla luce della ricostruzione della popolazione attiva (Roma: Failli, 1970); Olivier Marchand and Claude Thélot, Deux siècles de travail en France (Paris: Insee, 1991).


213. Humphries and Sarasúa, “Off the Record.”

214. The ILO, for instance, very early on, beginning in 1937, included the category of “unpaid family workers” in family businesses among the active population in the tables of its Yearbook of Labour Statistics, Martini, “When Unpaid Workers,” 248.


216. For instance, breastfeeding carried out at home in the past, *maman de jours* in the present.

217. In addition to all the chapters in this book, see also the other publication by our research group: Martini and Bellavitis, *Households, Family Workshops*; Bellavitis, Martini, Sarti, *Familles laborieuses*; on servants see Sarti, “Who Are Servants?”


219. Children working at home were generally supposed to work for free. This might lead someone to create ambitious adoption-like relationships with young apprentices and servants that might turn out to be highly exploitative; see Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, “Disciples, fils, travailleurs: Les apprentis peintres et sculpteurs italiens au XVe et XVIe siècle,” *Mélanges de l’École française de Rome—Italie et Méditerranée modernes et contemporaines* 128, no. 1 (2016): retrieved 17 December 2017 from http://journals.openedition.org/mefrim/2469?lang=it#text. Furthermore, a father had full rights over the earnings of his children legally dependent on him if they had gainful employment; see for instance Cavallo, “Fatherhood and the Non-properitied Classes.”


225. Francesca Maria Cesaroni and Annalisa Sentuti, “Women and Family Businesses: When Women Are Left only Minor Roles,” *History of the Family*,” 19, no. 3 (2014): 358–79. In some cases, especially in past years, legal requirements for managing a business, such

226. Bessière, “Female and male domestic partners.”
228. Sarti, “Historians.”
229. Addressing the lively discussion on universal basic income and other possible solutions to cope with current problems is beyond the scope of this Introduction. For a useful anthology see Karl Widerquist, José A. Noguera, Yannick Vanderborght, and Jurgen De Wispelaere, eds., Basic Income: An Anthology of Contemporary Research (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2013). The anthology also has a section on “Feminism” that “examines whether Basic Income enhances gender equality. It shows how feminists are deeply divided on the issue. Some believe Basic Income will enhance women’s ability to challenge the gendered division of labor. Others believe it will perpetuate traditional women’s gender roles by making it easier for them to fall into household care work” (xx).

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