

# INTRODUCTION



According to ‘The Bolshevist World Threat’, a piece of educational material distributed to soldiers and officers of the German military, Nazism was ‘the sworn enemy of Jewish Bolshevism’. As the goal of the ‘Jewish Bolshevists’ was to ‘exterminate entire peoples’, National Socialism sought to safeguard Germany from this menace from the East. It also wanted to prevent Germany from becoming a state like Russia, in which ‘almost 98% of all leading positions [were] held by racially foreign Jews’.<sup>1</sup>

The kind of language expressed in this document would have been unremarkable in June 1941, when the Nazi regime launched a war of extermination against the Soviet Union. In a campaign based upon eliminating an enemy defined in racial and ideological terms, the Nazi leadership, with the approval of military generals, sought to annihilate the ‘Jewish Bolshevist’ system and to ‘rid Europe of Jews’.<sup>2</sup> In notable contrast, however, this document, used by the Wehrmacht in the education of its soldiers in ‘everyday political questions’, was issued in 1936. Three years before the start of the Second World War, and almost five years before the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union, the German military was training its soldiers to view their enemy in racial and ideological terms.

For many years after the Second World War, historians of Nazism, and the public at large, assumed that although the Nazi regime made use of organisations like the SS to carry out its ethnic policies, the Wehrmacht was not involved in these actions.<sup>3</sup> In this version of history, the German military either resisted these policies or attempted to keep its distance from the Nazi regime. In turn, there existed a distinction in approaches between the ideologically motivated men of the SS and the supposedly ‘clean’, apolitical

Wehrmacht.<sup>4</sup> More recent scholarship, however, has shown this interpretation to be false. Based mainly on postwar accounts from Wehrmacht veterans, it was accepted and propagated by many German historians, as well as non-German historians in the West who were largely ignorant of the realities of the war on the Eastern Front.<sup>5</sup>

A number of historians such as Jürgen Förster, Manfred Messerschmidt, Dieter Pohl, Hannes Heer, Walter Manoschek, Hans Safrian, Wolfram Wette, Omer Bartov and Ben Shepherd have since demonstrated that the Wehrmacht played a significant role in National Socialist racial policy.<sup>6</sup> Among the groundbreaking developments in Wehrmacht scholarship was Bartov's work on the German army, beginning with *The Eastern Front, 1941–45: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare*,<sup>7</sup> along with an exhibition by the Hamburg-based Institute for Social Research, titled 'War of Extermination: Crimes of the Wehrmacht'. This display was first presented to the German and Austrian public from 1995 to 1999, and outlined the crimes of the German armed forces during the war against the Soviet Union. The controversy and public reaction it aroused demonstrated the extent to which the association of the Wehrmacht with such activities was relatively unknown or suppressed within postwar German and Austrian society. While numerous errors were found in the original exhibition, resulting in its withdrawal and revision, when it was reopened in 2001 as 'Crimes of the Wehrmacht: Dimensions of a War of Annihilation 1941–1944' it maintained that it was nonetheless correct in its original, overarching argument: that the German army was heavily involved in atrocities against Soviet civilians and prisoners of war.<sup>8</sup>

The so-called 'war of extermination' that Germany carried out against the Soviet Union has dominated scholarship on the crimes of the German army.<sup>9</sup> This campaign was the largest in which the Wehrmacht took part. It had a strong racial and ideological basis, and it was the main stage for the military's criminal activity.<sup>10</sup> The army's involvement in war crimes on the Eastern Front is often explained within the framework of a number of notorious orders that the military leadership issued before and during the campaign, including the 'Commissar Decree' and the 'Guidelines for the Conduct of German Troops in the East'. When coupled with the horrific conditions of the campaign, these 'criminal orders' resulted in the occurrence of atrocities on a vast scale.<sup>11</sup>

Within this context, scholars have offered more specific explanations for perpetrator motivation. These have included the picture of soldiers who engaged in wanton violence and destruction due to a vicious 'German' antisemitism. However, the chief proponent of this argument, Daniel Goldhagen, could not offer a very convincing explanation of the origins of such attitudes other than the factor of German nationality.<sup>12</sup> While relating

specifically to a reserve police battalion, Christopher Browning's contrasting picture of dutiful men who, becoming conditioned to extreme violence and concerned with group pressure and the prospect of career advancement, dispassionately obeyed orders, has also been cited as a theoretical framework within which to account for the behaviour of members of the military.<sup>13</sup> Omer Bartov has noted that Browning's contention that obedience and peer pressure played a greater role than ideology and racism has represented the consensus within German scholarship on the Wehrmacht.<sup>14</sup>

Since the revelation of the military's participation in atrocities in the Soviet Union, researchers have looked beyond the Soviet campaign to reveal involvement in war crimes on other fronts. Walter Manoschek, Hans Safrian and Ben Shepherd have documented the extensive involvement of army units in atrocities during the campaign in the Balkans.<sup>15</sup> The studies carried out by Jochen Böehler and Alexander B. Rossino uncovered the widespread participation of German soldiers in the murder of civilians, including Jews, in Poland in 1939.<sup>16</sup> While there were a number of racially driven directives handed down before the invasion of Poland, these transgressions took place well before the notorious 'criminal orders' associated with the invasion of the Soviet Union. They also occurred before the supposed 'brutalisation' of soldiers who fought in the Soviet Union. Bartov has argued that this brutalisation came about due to the Eastern Front's particularly horrific fighting and conditions,<sup>17</sup> and led to a 'perversion of discipline'<sup>18</sup> and 'distortion of reality', with soldiers becoming increasingly reliant on Nazi visions of the war and the enemy.<sup>19</sup> This raises a number of questions about the impetus behind these occurrences. In their attempts to account for Wehrmacht atrocities in Poland, Böehler and Rossino have questioned the notion of dispassionate obedience, arguing that there existed a lack of explicit orders from above, and instead the presence of vague, yet ideologically tainted instructions to act ruthlessly against civilians. Importantly, Rossino and Böehler have revealed the widespread presence of vehement antisemitism among German troops.<sup>20</sup>

Böehler and Rossino's works display parallels with earlier research carried out by Omer Bartov, Stephen G. Fritz, Walter Manoschek, Hans Safrian and Wolfram Wette. These studies emphasise the influence of racism and ideology on the behaviour of troops,<sup>21</sup> staking out a third position between Browning's circumstantial interpretation of war crimes and Goldhagen's view of a natural, 'German' antisemitism.<sup>22</sup> In attempting to account for the origins of Nazi ideology among troops, Bartov looks for accountability in other Nazi organisations such as the Hitler Youth and Reich Labour Service, and focuses on the period during and after the Barbarossa campaign in assessing the role of military propaganda.<sup>23</sup>

This leads to questions about the involvement of German soldiers in atrocities during the Polish and Serbian campaigns of 1939 and early 1941, which were, as Böhler and Rossino have established, carried out with clear evidence of fervent antisemitic and anti-Slavic sentiments among troops.<sup>24</sup> However, both Böhler and Rossino point out the limits to our knowledge of the possible origins of such attitudes and behaviour. Böhler writes that it is an area ‘that has not yet been well researched’,<sup>25</sup> while Rossino argues that looking solely to organisations like the Hitler Youth or Reich Labour Service is unconvincing. Regimental personnel surveys of those who took part in the Poland campaign show that, at least during the Poland campaign in 1939, ‘most soldiers were too old to have belonged to the Hitler Youth’.<sup>26</sup> This demonstrates the need for further investigation into the potential origins of ideological motivation among troops at the lower levels, particularly the role that their experience in the armed forces may have played.

The literature that has dealt with the influence of Nazi ideology within the Wehrmacht has been a factor in this lack of understanding. It has commonly followed two paths. That which I have described above is concerned with military atrocities during the Second World War. However, studies of German atrocities rarely pay close attention to the period before 1939,<sup>27</sup> with Wolfram Wette’s *The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality* and Ben Shepherd’s *Hitler’s Soldiers: The German Army in the Third Reich*<sup>28</sup> notable exceptions, in that they investigate the well-established antisemitism, anti-Slavism and anti-Bolshevism that existed in the German military during, and indeed well before, the Nazi era. As Bartov has pointed out, the other path, which documents the prewar politicisation of the military, seems to deal with a separate subject matter to the work of historians who tackle the involvement of the military in atrocities.<sup>29</sup> While these works thoroughly investigate and document the process in question, they concentrate on developments at the highest levels, with less focus upon how it may have influenced the experience of the rank and file. More significantly, they make little effort to question the possible relationship between the military’s prewar politicisation and its later involvement in war crimes. It is important to note, however, that many of these works were published well before the majority of studies that documented such involvement had emerged. Daniel Uziel’s *Propaganda Warriors* is an example of scholarship that documents the politicisation of the Wehrmacht and its production of Nazi propaganda, but the main focus of this work is upon the military’s production of propaganda for the public, rather than for the indoctrination of its own men.<sup>30</sup>

The approach taken by these scholars, however, points to a common thread that runs through these works: the absence of a detailed study of training within the Wehrmacht as a possible influence on troops’ wartime

behaviour and attitudes. If concerned with the lower ranks, scholars have often looked to indoctrination in the Hitler Youth and Labour Service as explanations for racism, ideological conviction and violence towards the Reich's ideological and racial enemies, with less emphasis on the military's role in fostering Nazi ideology.<sup>31</sup>

While these works have made important contributions to the historiography, documentary evidence illustrates that it is problematic to appraise the wartime conduct of soldiers, particularly when questioning the extent of the ideological impetus behind it, without a detailed examination of and reference to the way in which the army itself trained them. The indoctrination that young men experienced in schools, the Hitler Youth and the Reich Labour Service is important, and this study does not discount them as important factors.<sup>32</sup> However, one needs to look at indoctrination as a long-term process that began, but did not finish, in these organisations.

In fact, indoctrination intensified once young men reached military age in order to build upon the foundations laid by the Hitler Youth and Reich Labour Service. The military leadership recognised the role that it would play in this process. Many young conscripts had indeed received ideological schooling before joining the army, and the Wehrmacht went about customising political instruction in the military to build upon it. Moreover, early on in the course of the Third Reich, the military came to view its role in indoctrinating young recruits and longer-serving officers alike as being the most important in forming the attitudes, or at least influencing the martial conduct, of millions of men. Internal correspondence reveals that, particularly early on, the military was dealing with a diverse group. While many who willingly joined the military before conscription had a history of involvement in Nazi organisations, many entrants to the armed forces, once conscription came into force, confounded the military's expectations and displayed a disappointing lack of ideological conviction, or even basic knowledge of the tenets of Nazism.<sup>33</sup> Senior officials within the military were also concerned that career soldiers and officers had not served in the Hitler Youth and Labour Service, thus missing out on years of ideological schooling.<sup>34</sup>

This indicates that while many who were to serve in the Second World War did receive prior political indoctrination, it is not enough to look to these other bodies in accounting for the influence of Nazism upon troops, since many, particularly in the early years of the Nazi regime, did not encounter formal ideological education until they became members of the military. A detailed examination of the military's programme of ideological education, set within the context of the wider experience of recruits, can help to fill a gap in our knowledge. This approach builds upon existing scholarship by looking beyond the temporal margins of the Second World

War, and by shifting the focus towards the Wehrmacht itself as a factor in the indoctrination of soldiers and officers. This places military service in the Nazi era within the broader framework of the socialisation of young men that ‘began in school and in the Hitler Youth, continued in the Reich Labour Service, and culminated in the Wehrmacht’.<sup>35</sup>

It also expands upon the work of historians who have previously looked at the prewar Nazification of the military.<sup>36</sup> It will examine how this process filtered down through the ranks and translated into the education of the regular members of the armed forces. In doing so, this analysis will approach the fields of the military’s prewar politicisation, and the involvement of officers and soldiers in war crimes, as parts of the same area of historical enquiry. By focusing specifically upon indoctrination in the military, it will also expand upon other works concerned with Nazi ideology and indoctrination, such as Koonz’s *The Nazi Conscience*, Herf’s *The Jewish Enemy* and Matthäus, Kwiet, Förster and Breitman’s *Ausbildungsziel Judenmord?*<sup>37</sup>

This book will also stand as a counterpoint to one relevant work carried out on the Wehrmacht, which deals directly with the influence of ideology on the attitudes and behaviour of German soldiers. Sönke Neitzel and Harald Welzer’s *Soldaten: On Fighting, Killing and Dying* uses secretly recorded conversations of German prisoners of war, gathered by Allied intelligence services, to assess the attitudes of German soldiers towards the war and the Nazi regime.<sup>38</sup> As will be demonstrated and discussed in further detail, the authors argue that the majority of soldiers were ‘apolitical’, and that historians should ‘stop overestimating the effects of ideology’.<sup>39</sup> Yet much of the evidence that Neitzel and Welzer present indicates that many soldiers were anything but ‘apolitical’, with numerous examples of men whose attitudes and frames of reference clearly were influenced by Nazism. The authors, however, seem to dismiss such indicators of ideology, and the subsequent importance of ideology, because as they rightly point out, very few soldiers were uncritical, fanatical ‘ideological warriors’.

This approach is, however, not sufficiently subtle or complex. It is not realistic or useful to group soldiers within such separate and contrasting categories. As will become clear, many members of the Wehrmacht were critical of numerous aspects of the Nazi regime and its ideology. Yet this does not mean that they were not influenced by Nazi ideology at all. Many who voiced criticisms of Nazism still agreed with, or were clearly influenced by, many of its tenets, particularly in the way in which they viewed the war and the enemy they faced. Herein lies the danger in categorising people in such a distinct manner. As this study will demonstrate, there were many differing degrees of ideological accord, for many differing reasons, which need to be closely investigated in order to allow a more complex picture of the attitudes of members of the Wehrmacht.

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This book examines documents that historians have largely overlooked in accounting for the involvement of the German military in war crimes. The unpublished documents it uses are drawn from various German archives. They are examples of the educational material that German soldiers, from 1933 onwards, encountered during their training and while deployed in the field, as well as correspondence within the military concerning ideological education. These documents include examples of compulsory lessons and training material undertaken during the basic training of conscripts and officers, as well as the ideologically tainted lessons and newsletters they received on a regular basis both in training camps and later in the field. The documents will illustrate how soldiers were trained to see their role, particularly in the campaigns that took place in the East, against people portrayed as ethnically and ideologically alien, and as occupiers of lands that rightfully belonged to Germany. Importantly, this book also examines indoctrination material issued within the Hitler Youth and the Reich Labour Service in order to investigate the political schooling that took place within these organisations, along with the relationship they bore to later political training in the armed forces. This is critical, since I am not trying to argue that indoctrination in the military is the sole explanation for ideological conviction and subsequent military atrocities, nor can any of this be understood in isolation from other potential causal factors.

This work will also include an examination of theoretical and empirical studies on military training and indoctrination. This will provide a framework within which to place this specific study. It will set out the theories, processes and goals of indoctrination and military training, and, in turn, question the influence that this programme may have had upon soldiers and their conduct at war. The case studies examined will be drawn from the fields of history, sociology, political science and psychology.<sup>40</sup> To further investigate the link between training and attitudes, it will also examine internal correspondence within the military, along with *Feldpostbriefe*, letters that soldiers sent home from the front while deployed, which can reveal the attitudes of individual soldiers and officers of varying ranks.

The first chapter of this work will attempt to explain how and why the military aligned itself with the Nazis and began implementing political schooling within its ranks. It will do so by analysing the position in which the military found itself in the aftermath of the First World War and during the Weimar Republic, as well as by evaluating the political persuasions that existed within the armed forces during and before this period.

Chapter two will set out a theoretical framework that will examine how indoctrination is carried out in military organisations, as well as investigating

the extent to which it can influence behaviour. Chapter three will address the onset of ideological schooling in the German military, providing examples of indoctrination material and demonstrating how it sought to shape the attitudes and conduct of soldiers and officers. It also cites examples of disagreement with the encroachment of Nazi ideology, or certain aspects of it, to show that Nazism did not have a stranglehold over the military, with some viewing the Nazis with outright disdain.<sup>41</sup> Chapter four looks at indoctrination during the crucial lead-up to the Second World War, before looking at how the analysis of prewar political schooling can add further depth to our understanding of German war crimes during the invasion of Poland.

Chapter five addresses the wider context within which military indoctrination took place by examining political schooling in the Hitler Youth and Reich Labour Service – what it involved, how it was carried out, and how its level of success often varied according to the background of the recruits and the areas in which it attempted to school them. It will also demonstrate how it related to indoctrination within the armed forces.

Chapter six examines the ongoing influence of a competing ideology within the German military: Christianity. Throughout earlier chapters it will become clear that some aspects of ideological schooling were more successful than others. One that was relatively unsuccessful, and a common cause for dissent among soldiers and officers, was Nazism's incompatibility with Christianity. Numerous members voiced their dissent on the grounds of religious belief.<sup>42</sup> Christianity had, after all, long held an important place within the German armed forces, as it had done in German society generally.<sup>43</sup> This chapter will seek to address the tension that existed between Nazism and Christianity, and how the military dealt with it, with a particular focus on the ongoing presence of the military chaplaincy.

Chapter seven will look at the military's war crimes in the Balkans and in the Soviet Union, looking at how an analysis of ideological training of soldiers and officers can add to our existing knowledge. It will also further address the reception of Nazi ideology within the ranks by looking at *Feldpostbriefe*, letters that soldiers sent home from the front.

Throughout this study, there will be a focus upon the relationship between orders and ideology, and how this relationship influenced the activities of soldiers. Within the context of the debate over the relative importance of ideology and orders, which is perhaps most clearly visible in the respective theses of Bartov and Browning, this study will emphasise the importance of ideology. This is not to say that it will regard orders and obedience to them as unimportant, as this clearly was not the case. It is, however, crucial to understand the way in which orders were often issued and carried out. The system under which the German army operated relied upon commanders



being able to issue relatively unspecific orders that often did not explicitly order men to carry out specific actions, but instead gave them a broader overall goal or task to achieve. It was left up to the lower-ranking men to decide how they would achieve it. This allowed, and indeed encouraged, a high level of initiative and independence.

In this sense, ‘obedience’ or following directives was a factor, but not in the strict sense of blindly following orders and doing exactly what one was told. Military actions did not always work that way. Looking at the way in which soldiers were trained thus fills an important gap in understanding the process of how imprecise orders were often enacted in such brutal ways. An analysis of the Wehrmacht’s ideological education programme can help us to better comprehend soldiers who carried out atrocities against Nazism’s ideologically defined enemies without specific orders to do so, or at the very least, how the directives handed down from commanders were often interpreted in the most radical sense, with the principles of Nazism foremost in acting against enemies.

This analysis also suggests that the presence of political indoctrination may even have convinced those unmoved by Nazi ideology that committing atrocities was part of their duty, due to a number of factors, least of all the status it gained as being ‘as binding as any order’.<sup>44</sup> The military’s programme of ideological instruction sought to foster an attitude that saw violence against non-military targets, particularly those in the East, who were deemed racially and ideologically alien,<sup>45</sup> as necessary, encouraged and, importantly, well within the perceived bounds of duty for a German soldier. This means that while not all soldiers became ideologues, at the very least the weight of expectation was placed upon the shoulders of such men. In this sense, the German army’s programme of indoctrination allows us to view orders within the military, and the command principle that underpinned them, within the wider context of years of rigorous ideological schooling.

## Notes

1. ‘Die Bolschewistische Weltgefahr’, in Reichskriegsministerium (ed.), *Richtlinien für den Unterricht über politische Tagesfragen*, 15 October 1936 edition, 3–6. Archival documents from the archives of the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich (Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich; hereafter IFZ), Da 33.60.
2. Wolfram Wette, *The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge, MA, 2006), 98.
3. Omer Bartov, ‘Savage War: German Warfare and Moral Choices in World War II’, in Berel Lang and Simon Gigliotti (eds), *The Holocaust: A Reader* (Carlton, VIC, 2005), 224; Ute Frevert, *A Nation in Barracks: Modern Germany, Military Conscription and*

- Civil Society* (New York, 2004), 259–60; Jürgen Förster, ‘Complicity of Entanglement? Wehrmacht, War and Holocaust’, in Michael Berenbaum and Abraham Peck (eds), *The Holocaust and History: The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Reexamined* (Bloomington, IN, 1998), 266.
4. Omer Bartov, *Germany’s War and the Holocaust: Disputed Histories* (London, 2003), 7–8.
  5. Ibid. See also Omer Bartov, *Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich* (Oxford, 1991), 7–10; Wette, *The Wehrmacht*, especially chapter five, ‘The Legend of the Wehrmacht’s “Clean Hands”’, 195–250; Frevert, *A Nation in Barracks*, 259–60; for works that propagated the notion of the ‘clean Wehrmacht’, see, for example, Erich von Manstein, *Lost Victories* (London, 1958); B.H. Liddell Hart, *The Other Side of the Hill: Germany’s Generals: Their Rise and Fall, with Their Own Accounts of Military Events, 1939–1945* (London, 1948).
  6. See, for example, Hannes Heer and Klaus Neumann (eds), *War of Extermination: The German Military in World War II 1941–1944* (Oxford, 2000); Dieter Pohl, *Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht: deutsche Militärbesatzung und einheimische Bevölkerung in der Sowjetunion 1941–1944* (Munich, 2008); Wette, *The Wehrmacht*; Walter Manoschek (ed.), *Die Wehrmacht im Rassenkrieg: Der Vernichtungskrieg hinter der Front* (Vienna, 1996); Jürgen Förster, *Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat: Eine strukturgeschichtliche Analyse* (Munich, 2007); Mary R. Habeck, ‘The Modern and the Primitive: Barbarity and Warfare on the Eastern Front’, in George Kassimeris (ed.), *The Barbarisation of Warfare* (London, 2006); see also more general works on the Second World War that document Wehrmacht involvement in war crimes, including Richard Bessel, *Nazism and War* (London, 2004), 103–27; Richard J. Evans, *The Third Reich at War* (London, 2008), 19–27, 175–78, 236–39; Ian Kershaw, *Hitler* (London, 2010).
  7. Omer Bartov, *The Eastern Front, 1941–45: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare* (Basingstoke, 1985).
  8. ‘Report of the committee reviewing the exhibition Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944, November 2000 (excerpt)’, in Hamburg Institute for Social Research (ed.), *Crimes of the Wehrmacht: Dimensions of a War of Annihilation 1941–1944* (Hamburg, 2002).
  9. Christian Hartmann, Johannes Hürter and Ulrike Jureit, ‘Verbrechen der Wehrmacht: Ergebnisse und Kontroversen der Forschung’, in idem (eds), *Verbrechen der Wehrmacht: Bilanz einer Debatte* (Munich, 2005), 21–28; see also Jochen Böhrer, *Auftakt zum Vernichtungskrieg: Die Wehrmacht in Polen 1939* (Frankfurt, 2006), 9–11. See, as examples, Bartov, *The Eastern Front*; idem, *Hitler’s Army*; idem, ‘Operation Barbarossa and the Origins of the Final Solution’, in David Cesarani (ed.), *The Final Solution: Origins and Implementation* (London, 1996), 119–36; idem, ‘Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich’, *The Journal of Modern History* 63(1) (March 1991), 44–60; Jürgen Förster, ‘Operation Barbarossa as a War of Conquest and Annihilation’, in Lang and Gigliotti, *The Holocaust: A Reader*, 184–97; idem, ‘Der Weltanschauungs- und Vernichtungskrieg im Osten’ in *Das deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg Band 9/1: Der deutsche Kriegsgesellschaft 1939 bis 1945* (Munich, 2004), 519–538; idem, ‘Geistige Kriegführung in der Phase der ersten Siege’, in *Das deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg Band 9/1*, 506–19; Stephen G. Fritz, “‘We Are Trying ... to Change the Face of the World’ – Ideology and Motivation in the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front: The View from Below”, *The Journal of Military History* 60(4) (1996), 683–710; Ben Shepherd, *War in the Wild East: The German Army and Partisans* (Cambridge, MA, 2004); Walter Manoschek and Hans Safrian, ‘Österreicher in der Wehrmacht’, in Ernst Hanisch, Wolfgang Neugebauer and Emmerich Talos (eds), *NS-Herrschaft in Österreich*

- (Vienna, 2000), 123–158; Horst Boog et al. (eds), *Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion* (Frankfurt, 1991); Wette, *The Wehrmacht*.
10. Hartmann, Hürter and Jureit, ‘Verbrechen der Wehrmacht: Ergebnisse und Kontroversen der Forschung’, in idem, *Verbrechen der Wehrmacht*, 23.
  11. See Bartov, *Hitler’s Army*; idem, ‘Savage War’, Wette, *The Wehrmacht*, 94–131; Bessel, *Nazism and War*, 117–27, Förster, ‘Operation Barbarossa as a War of Conquest and Annihilation’, Helmut Krausnick et al. (eds), *Anatomy of the SS State* (London, 1968), 318–19.
  12. Daniel Goldhagen, *Hitler’s Willing Executioners* (New York, 1996).
  13. Christopher R. Browning, *Ordinary Men: Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (London, 2001).
  14. See Bartov’s discussion of Browning’s thesis in Bartov, *Germany’s War and the Holocaust*, 132–57.
  15. Walter Manoschek, ‘Partisanenkrieg und Genozid: Die Wehrmacht in Serbien 1941’, in *Die Wehrmacht im Rassenkrieg*; idem, ‘The Extermination of the Jews in Serbia’, in Ulrich Hebert (ed.), *National Socialist Extermination Policies: Contemporary German Perspectives and Controversies* (New York, 2000), 163–85; idem, ‘Serbien ist judenfrei’: *Militärische Besatzungspolitik und Judenvernichtung in Serbien 1941/42* (Munich, 1993); Walter Manoschek and Hans Safrian, ‘Österreicher in der Wehrmacht’, in Ernst Hanisch, Wolfgang Neugebauer and Emmerich Talos (eds), *NS-Herrschaft in Österreich* (Vienna, 2000), 123–58; Ben Shepherd, *Terror in the Balkans: German Armies and Partisan Warfare* (Cambridge, MA, 2012).
  16. Jochen Böhler, *Der Überfall: Deutschlands Krieg gegen Polen* (Frankfurt, 2009); idem, *Auftakt zum Vernichtungskrieg: Die Wehrmacht in Polen 1939* (Frankfurt, 2006); idem, “Grösste Härte ...”: *Verbrechen der Wehrmacht in Polen, September, Oktober 1939* (Warsaw, 2005); Alexander B. Rossino, *Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity* (Lawrence, 2003). See also Evans, *The Third Reich at War*, 102–5 and Kershaw, *Hitler*, 523–25.
  17. Bartov, *Hitler’s Army*. On the nature of the conditions, see chapter one, ‘The Demodernization of the Front’, 12–28.
  18. Bartov, *Hitler’s Army*, 94–96.
  19. *Ibid.*, 106–78.
  20. Böhler, *Auftakt zum Vernichtungskrieg*; idem, “Grösste Härte ...”; Rossino, *Hitler Strikes Poland*.
  21. Bartov, *Hitler’s Army* and idem, *The Eastern Front*; Stephen G. Fritz, *Frontsoldaten: The German Soldier in World War II* (Lexington, 1995); Manoschek, ‘Partisanenkrieg und Genozid: Die Wehrmacht in Serbien 1941’, in *Die Wehrmacht im Rassenkrieg*; idem, ‘The Extermination of the Jews in Serbia’; idem, ‘Serbien ist judenfrei’: *militärische Besatzungspolitik und Judenvernichtung in Serbien 1941/42*; Manoschek and Safrian, ‘Österreicher in der Wehrmacht’; Wette, *The Wehrmacht*. See also Habeck, ‘The Modern and the Primitive’, 84–96.
  22. Bartov, *Hitler’s Army*; idem, *The Eastern Front*; idem, *Germany’s War and the Holocaust*, 130–32.
  23. Bartov, *Germany’s War and the Holocaust*, 106–79. See also Claudia Koonz, *The Nazi Conscience* (Cambridge, MA, 2003), 10–11.
  24. See Böhler, *Auftakt zum Vernichtungskrieg*, 20; Rossino, *Hitler Strikes Poland*, 217–21.
  25. Böhler, *Auftakt zum Vernichtungskrieg*, 36.
  26. *Ibid.*, 220.

27. See Koonz, *The Nazi Conscience*, 10–11. For examples, see Bartov, *Hitler's Army*; Böhler, *Der Überfall*.
28. Wette, *The Wehrmacht*, 1–90; Ben Shepherd, *Hitler's Soldiers: The German Army in the Third Reich* (New Haven, 2016), chapters one and two.
29. See Bartov, *Germany's War and the Holocaust*, 65–72. For examples of such works, see Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.), *Das deutsche Reich und der zweite Weltkrieg* (Munich, 2004). In particular, see Jürgen Förster's essay 'Geistige Kriegführung in Deutschland 1919 bis 1945' in Volume 9, Part 1, 506–19; Förster, *Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat*; Karl Demeter, *The German Officer Corps in Society and State 1650–1945* (London, 1965); Michael Salewski, 'Wehrmacht und Nationalsozialismus 1933–1939', in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.), *Handbuch zur Deutschen Militärgeschichte 1648–1939* (Munich, 1978); F.L. Carsten, *The Reichswehr and Politics, 1918–1933* (Oxford, 1966); Manfred Messerschmidt, *Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat: Zeit der Indoktrination* (Hamburg, 1969); Robert O'Neill, *The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933–1939* (London, 1966); Klaus Jürgen Müller (ed.), *Armee und Drittes Reich 1933–1939: Darstellung und Dokumentation* (Paderborn, 1989).
30. Daniel Uziel, *Propaganda Warriors: The Wehrmacht and the Consolidation of the German Home Front* (Oxford, 2008).
31. See Bartov, 'Operation Barbarossa', 124; idem, *Hitler's Army*; Böhler, *Auftakt zum Vernichtungskrieg*, 20; Rossino, *Hitler Strikes Poland*, 217–21. See also Felix Römer, *Kamaraden: Die Wehrmacht von innen* (Munich, 2012), 60–110.
32. Michael H. Kater, *Hitler Youth* (Cambridge, MA, 2004); Detlev Peukert, 'Youth in the Third Reich', in Richard Bessel (ed.), *Life in the Third Reich* (Oxford, 1987), 25; Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Ippermann, *The Racial State: Germany 1933–1945* (Cambridge, 1991), 205; Gerhard Rempel, *Hitler's Children: The Hitler Youth and the SS* (Chapel Hill, 1989); David Welch, *The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda* (London, 1993); Jill Stephenson, 'Inclusion: Building the National Community in Propaganda and Practice', in Jane Caplan (ed.), *Nazi Germany* (Oxford, 2008), 99–121.
33. Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv, Freiburg (hereafter BA/MA) RW6/161, *Erster nationalpolitischer Lehrgang für Lehrer der Kriegsschulen, Akademien usw vom 17.1.37 bis 23.1.37 in Berlin*, 23.
34. *Ibid.*, 24.
35. Ute Frevert, *Die kasernierte Nation: Militärdienst und Zivilgesellschaft in Deutschland* (Munich, 2001), 315–17.
36. O'Neill, *The German Army and the Nazi Party*; Frevert, *Die Kasinierte Nation*; Carsten, *The Reichswehr and Politics*; Förster, *Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat*; idem, 'Die politisierung der Reichswehr/Wehrmacht', in *Das deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg Band 9/1*, 484–505; idem, "'Aber für die Juden wird auch noch die Stunde schlagen, und dann wehe ihnen!'" Reichswehr und Antisemitismus', in Jürgen Matthäus and Klaus-Michael Mallman (eds), *Deutsche, Juden, Völkermord: Der Holocaust als Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Darmstadt, 2006), 21–37; Klaus Jürgen Müller, *The Army, Politics and Society in Germany, 1933–45: Studies in the Army's Relation to Nazism* (Manchester, 1987); Salewski, 'Wehrmacht und Nationalsozialismus'.
37. Koonz, *The Nazi Conscience*; Jeffrey Herf, *The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during World War II and the Holocaust* (London, 2006); Jürgen Matthäus et al. (eds), *Ausbildungsziel Judenmord?: Weltanschauliche Erziehung von SS, Polizei und Waffen SS in Rahmen der Endlösung* (Frankfurt, 2003).
38. Sönke Neitzel and Harald Welzer, *Soldaten: On Fighting, Killing and Dying* (London, 2012).

39. Ibid., 319.
40. For example, Joanna Bourke, *An Intimate History of Killing: Face to Face Killing in Twentieth Century Warfare* (London, 1999); Gregory G. Dimjian, 'Warfare, Genocide, and Ethnic Conflict: A Darwinian Approach', *Baylor University Medical Center Proceedings* 23(3) (July 2010), 292–300; Eyal Ben-Ari, *Mastering Soldiers: Conflicts, Emotions and the Enemy in an Israeli Military Unit* (London, 1998); Adam Lankford, *Human Killing Machines* (Plymouth, 2009); Robert Jay Lifton, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of Brainwashing in China* (London, 1961); Ben Shalit, *The Psychology of Conflict and Combat* (New York, 1988); Hugo Slim, *Killing Civilians: Method, Madness and Morality in War* (London, 2007); Denise Winn, *The Manipulated Mind: Brainwashing, Conditioning and Indoctrination* (London, 1983); E.S. Williams (ed.), *The Soviet Military: Political Education, Training and Morale* (Basingstoke, 1987).
41. O'Neill, *The German Army and the Nazi Party*, 5–8, 139.
42. BA/MA RW 6/V. 166, *Sommer-Lehrgang für Offiziere in Bad Tölz*: 'Vortragsreihe über nationalsozialistische Weltanschauung und Zielsetzung vom 11.-17.6.1939 in Bad Tölz'.
43. Demeter, *The German Officer Corps*, 220; O'Neill, *The German Army and the Nazi Party*, 75; Frevert, *A Nation in Barracks*, 187–88.
44. O'Neill, *The German Army and the Nazi Party*, 71.
45. See Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, *War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity and German Occupation in World War I* (Cambridge, 2000), 247–56; idem, *The German Myth of the East: 1800 to the Present* (Oxford, 2009), 170.