This book investigates international failures that were instrumental for the ‘great seminal catastrophe’ of the First World War. But it does not examine the July Crisis, or talk of immediate causes and short fuses. It is founded on the awareness that while the outbreak of war in 1914 was neither irresistible nor improbable, many contemporaries always reckoned it possible. Its principal characters are gamblers rather than ‘sleepwalkers’. It investigates the return of imperial tensions, diverted to the periphery during the Bismarckian era, to the European centre and explores the growing fragility of the international states system. And Great Britain, traditionally deemed a ‘spectator of events’ forced to respond to external aggression, now takes up its rightful place centre stage in this story. The book attacks a long-held orthodoxy that has seen the Central Powers as the gravitational centre, whose pull meant all other powers, and Great Britain in particular, were forced to act to safeguard international stability by means of balance of power politics and a general realignment. Instead, this study argues, the British Empire – part of the traditional Vienna settlement and the largest empire the world had ever seen, credited with the greatest bargaining power but preoccupied with its countless interests beyond the continent – failed to act on its responsibilities for that balance of power and thus fuelled the volatility and instability of the international system.

The story begins at the end of the nineteenth century. Great Power relations were undergoing a fundamental reworking of which the most visible expression was the Franco-Russian Dual Alliance of 1892/94, which posed a challenge to both the European Central Powers and the global possessions of Great Britain. Yet rather than respond with immediate countermeasures and above all with closer Anglo-German relations, London and Berlin even loosened their indirect ties generated by the Mediterranean Agreements, designed to safeguard the status

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quo in south-eastern Europe. ‘Isolation’, wrote Lord Salisbury confidently to a noticeably troubled Queen Victoria, ‘is a much less danger than the danger of being dragged into wars which do not concern us’. By avoiding alliances, and the entanglements that they signified, the prime minister explicitly conveyed to Germany and Austria-Hungary alike that he wished ‘to lean to the Triple Alliance without belonging to it’. At the same time, he rebuffed Russia by informing the tsar that Britain would ‘not abandon the allies by whom we stayed so long’. However much Salisbury hoped for better relations with the Russian Empire, he was evidently too well acquainted with the mechanisms of the Great Power system to ignore the potential repercussions. In 1901, towards the end of his term, he warned against the systemic consequences of an alignment between the two least vulnerable powers when he explained to Malcolm MacColl, publicist and his intellectual correspondent, ‘Other statesmen are acutely watching the Chess-Board of Europe, and they perfectly know that a real sympathy between Russia and England would place the other Great Powers in a very inferior position’.

Only four years later, liberal Foreign Secretary Edward Grey declared real sympathies with France and Russia to be the ‘cardinal points’ of his foreign policy. Leap forward another four years and we find Great Britain behaving ‘more Russian than the Russians’ in supporting Serbia against Austria-Hungary during the annexation of Bosnia. And in October 1912, at the start of the Balkan Wars, not only did Great Britain accept responsibility for the French Atlantic coast, but Grey also insisted on informing Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov of an Anglo-French agreement to send British expeditionary forces to the continent in case of an attack by the Central Powers.

Historians have proposed that responsibility for what they have identified as the end of Britain’s isolation, its new alignments with revisionist France and Russia, which had been its arch-rivals, and the general transformation of Great Power relations before the Great War be ascribed principally to the Kaiserreich. The established interpretation runs thus: by the end of the 1890s, Germany had embarked on the construction of a battle fleet, as a result of which Great Britain had no choice but to react to this ‘unique German threat’ found ‘at her own front door’ by regrouping the fleets of the Royal Navy and starting an unprecedented ship-building programme. The narrative continues: the German peril at sea made clear to London’s political and diplomatic elites that the policy of avoiding entanglements altogether must be abandoned. One eminent political historian has summarized the causal nexus of naval race and pre-war diplomacy: ‘The fundamental change in the states system originated from the German Reich and depended on the British reaction. In other words: It was without doubt the construction of the German battle fleet’ that forced Britain’s hand and ‘contributed significantly to the revolution of the states system before 1914’.

In countering this widely held paradigm of German action and British reaction by placing Britain at the heart of the international process of change, this
study reveals a much more complex truth. It turns its gaze on the role generally attributed to Britain as an arbitrator and mediator within the states system and on London’s contribution to the consolidation of alliance structures before 1914, focusing not only on the still-controversial question of the continuity of Lansdowne’s and Grey’s diplomacy, but also on the interaction of imperial and continental interests, and especially on the hitherto much-neglected interaction on the domestic side of London’s foreign policy of party politics, press politics and public debate, defence politics that involved home and imperial defence, and inter-departmental conflict.

Against the background of shifting risk assessment and developing self-perception after the mid 1890s and the emergence of a new generation of decision makers, the study looks specifically at the complex connections between threat perception and self-assertion. Noting critical and alternative responses to foreign policy along with the growing influence of the public on parliament and press, as well as public debate on security and armament policy, the book describes a public arena that determined the atmosphere in which foreign policy was intensely debated, and in which decisions were taken. Its aim is to unpick the interweaving of foreign policy and security policy for a Britain that was both a ‘world power in Europe’ and the epitome of a parliamentary state. Unlike the majority of previous studies, its focus is not on the remaining years of peace after the second Moroccan Crisis (1911) but on the frequently neglected yet widely identified ‘crucial’ formative years between the South African War and the first test of Anglo-Russian cooperation on the continent, with the Bosnian Annexation Crisis of 1908/9.

The starting point for this study is a historiographical observation. The implications of decades of searching for a guilty party and disputing the theses of the Fritz Fischer school and Germany’s major share in European developments before 1914 have meant, but not been limited to, the significant relativization of German foreign policy as an embodiment of permanent failure. Historians are now more likely to emphasize the constraints the Central Powers faced, rather than their possible options, and are also more likely to bring other players onto the field. Additionally, the notion that British diplomacy was overwhelmingly reactive has been one casualty in this new game. Most notably, historical examination of the continuity of Edwardian diplomacy and the continental bias of existing interpretation has been promoted not only by the debates surrounding Niall Ferguson’s intriguing if controversial The Pity of War but also by John Charmley’s less promoted but by no means less brilliant Splendid Isolation. Both Ferguson and Charmley follow Keith Wilson’s earlier, often neglected but always inspirational essays on British entente diplomacy after 1904 and Keith Neilson’s brilliant study of Britain’s policy towards Russia. Wilson and Neilson challenge the Eurocentric and Germany-focused perspective on the pre-war years and convincingly contend that London’s alignments first with
France and later with Russia were conceived as a stratagem that would secure the Empire and not primarily as a balancing act intended to contain Germany. All of these works share an imperial perspective on British foreign policy and thus shed new light on the string of established milestones that led up to the July Crisis. Too often, as Neilson pointed out at the outset of his outstanding study *Britain and the Last Tsar*, pre-war history was interpreted in reverse, and thus teleologically, while the Russian threat on India’s north-western frontier was neglected. For Wilson and Neilson, London had no choice but to seek an Anglo-Russian agreement.

Although the global perspective adds a long-overdue approach to interpretation of British foreign policy and British overall strategy, global thinking only formed one of the numerous parameters of decision making at Whitehall. As Zara Steiner has pointed out, the focus on London and St Petersburg’s bilateral relations, which has joined Eurocentric and Germany-focused perspectives, is too one-dimensional for a fundamental re-evaluation of London’s pre-war policy. And indeed, isolated analysis of London’s policy towards Berlin and towards St Petersburg distorts the contemporary picture, which was shaped, as the journalist Emile Dillon noted, by viewing Germany and Russia as ‘two seeming bits of threats wholly disconnected in appearance but one and the same threat, not cut at all’.

Dillon thus describes a fundamental premise of this book – Edwardian decision makers saw imperial challenges and continental challenges as two sides of the same medal; imperial or continental interests were only ever given additional weight temporarily. That judgement makes the search for alternative opportunities, examination of public controversies surrounding the rapprochement with St Petersburg, and analysis of the rising antagonism towards Germany all the more stimulating. Although deeply concerned with the British perception of Russia, Neilson misses the connection with the simultaneously evolving Germanophobia, while his general assumptions about continuity seem to work in reverse, with 1907 as their starting point – Salisbury and Lansdowne had already sought agreement with Russia, with Grey following the guidelines set by his predecessors. Differences between the approaches and goals of unionist foreign policy and liberal imperialist foreign policy – whether the traditional anti-Russian bias of radical liberals influenced the overall course, for example – remained blurred, while systemic repercussions in the Balkans were overlooked or even deliberately ignored. The Anglo-Russian convention put the south-eastern European periphery, a safety valve for pan-Slav expansionism and where Russia and Austria-Hungary gambled for the highest stakes, back on the agenda, yet London’s Balkan diplomacy has certainly not been given the attention it merits, which is all the more surprising as Lord Salisbury had understood the Central Asian and the Near Eastern question as ‘two halves of one problem’. A serious re-evaluation of London’s pre-war diplomacy, especially with regards
to its old Austrian and new Russian friends, must explore whether ultimately Whitehall used Anglo-Russian rapprochement as a ‘tool’ to manage international tensions or as a ‘weapon of power’.

The second historiographical observation on which the book is based concerns naval history, which still has a surprisingly long way to go if it is to move beyond bibliographies and take up the analytical reflection found in modern diplomatic histories. In recent years, however, naval historians have challenged the commonly held notion of German action and inevitable British reaction. Instead of focusing on Germany and extrapolating Great Britain’s naval policy from German aims, they have highlighted the complex British context formed by financial pressure after the Boer War, naval thinking, technological innovation and grand strategy. Thus, their results have proven in more than one way Paul W. Schroeder, that it is still ‘one thing to show that Germany blundered and had dangerous aims; quite another to prove that these really caused the outcome, or that, had Germany not made them, the overall outcome would have been drastically changed’. Yet political and particularly diplomatic historians have largely turned a deaf ear to the four driving forces behind British naval policy that have been identified by revisionist historians such as Jon Sumida and Nicholas Lambert: first, the heavy financial burden of naval armament at the beginning of the twentieth century, which drove home a need to cut costs and improve efficiency; secondly, the technological revolution marked by telegraphic communication, greater speed, and inventions such as the torpedo, submarine and battle-cruiser; thirdly, a grand strategy that did not focus only on Germany or on the over-rated two-power standard – an instrument used to placate parliament – but was aimed at sustaining overall supremacy over all modern fleets, especially over the French and US navies, not through numbers but through quality and mobility (the designation of Gibraltar as a new major station, thirty hours’ steaming from the North Sea, must, for example, be seen in light of this global strategy); and fourthly, a more nuanced vision of sea power that – unlike the approach of new and less experienced naval powers such as Japan, the United States or Germany – was profoundly different from the concepts found in the popular writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose emphasis on capital ships, tonnage, command of the sea and decisive battles was criticized by First Se lord John Fisher, Lord Selborne, Julian Corbett and others.

However persuasive the case made by the revisionists, we are still left with the question of why pre-war British public opinion was so emotionally charged when it came to the German navy, far more so than for any other foreign navy. Jan Rüger’s study of naval celebrations – his innovative integration of naval and cultural history allowed Rüger to demonstrate how sea power was constructed – shows us how we might account for the public’s obsession with German power at sea. He defines the cult of the naval race as part of what can be called the theatre of diplomatic relations before the First World War, where demonstration of
power and deterrence counted for more than the facts themselves.\textsuperscript{43} By combining naval history with modern media history, the study of party and propaganda politics and consideration of departmental rivalries, we can also investigate the growing public hysteria’s associations with political decision making.

This leads to the third observation and premise this book is built on. It refers to the still neglected public dimension of foreign and defence politics. Shortly before Salisbury handed over to his nephew Arthur J. Balfour he not only warned against the repercussions of an Anglo-Russian rapprochement but he also emphasized structural changes within the public sphere of policy making: ‘Another insuperable difficulty lies in the attitude of what is called public opinion here. The diplomacy of nations is now conducted quite as much in the letters of special correspondents as in the despatches of the Foreign Office’.\textsuperscript{44} The book takes up this insight and conceives political journalists, special correspondents and certain publishers as influential political actors of their own right within the policy process in London.

Traditionally, the emotional build-up among the British and German publics has been interpreted in contrasting ways: while German public opinion has always been explained by cynical manipulation of the press bureau or a dangerous self-mobilization,\textsuperscript{45} the influence of public opinion in Britain has usually been interpreted as something positive and useful.\textsuperscript{46} However, recent research on the press as a rising political actor in both Germany and Britain has stressed that the ‘similarities between the two countries’ are more striking than the differences and that ‘the political and cultural liberalism’ in pre-war Britain has often been ‘overestimated’.\textsuperscript{47} The press should not be used as an expression of unfiltered perception. Moreover it should be understood that it followed its own rules and political agendas.\textsuperscript{48} Analytically satisfying conclusions require a combination of approaches and the identification of links between the cultural sphere and decision making. That method is applied, for example, when the emotional public debate on science-fiction stories, invasion and spy stories, theatre plays and press campaigns is contrasted with naval and military experts’ viewpoints – revealing surprising differences between the latter’s risk assessment of the German battle fleet and the public scares.\textsuperscript{49}

This study tries to combine Eurocentric as well as global and domestic approaches to British foreign policy and builds on Sumida’s and Lambert’s research, broadening their arguments along such lines. Its central cause is that we have to take the complex domestic realities behind British foreign politics more seriously than has hitherto been the case.\textsuperscript{50} The most striking paradox of the general consensus on British policy before 1914 is that while all major studies agree that Great Britain represented the epitome of a parliamentarian system before the Great War, it has been taken for granted that its diplomacy was directed somewhat autocratically by a caste of diplomats and a few politicians and was conducted in a strange vacuum, independent of influences beyond
A modern analysis of foreign politics in the late Victorian and Edwardian era must question this contradiction. It must scrutinize assumptions about above-party continuity in British foreign policy and about an official thinking that was untouched by public interests, influences and pressures. It must consider interest groups, financial and trade concerns, tradition, ad hoc contingencies, imperial issues alongside continental or British issues, personal and institutional interests, institutional frameworks, the public and party dimensions manifest in foreign policy debates, military issues, risk assessments and so on and so forth. In short, it must bear in mind that Great Britain was not only an empire or a continental Great Power, it was also a very modern state, with all that comes with that designation.

Notes

15. Hildebrand, ‘Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk’, 28. ‘It was the foreign policy of Germany that caused the Anglo-Russian rapprochement’ [trans. A.R.], Hildebrand, *Das vergangene
Reich, 203; see also Brechtken, Scharnierzeit, 58; Ivo N. Lambi, The Navy and German Power Politics, 290; as concerns the inevitability of the Dreadnought, see Marder, Anatomy, 457–67; more doubtful, especially on Marder’s sources, is Fairbanks, ‘The Dreadnought Revolution’; Mackay, Fisher, 273–349; Sumida, In Defence, passim; Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution, passim.

16. See Monger, End of Isolation; Grenville, Lord Salisbury; Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance; Rolo, Entente; Williamson, Politics of Grand Strategy.

17. See the definition of the ‘Edwardian generation’ by Keith Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar, 3–50; Wohl, Generation of 1914, 1–4; Rose, Zwischen Empire und Kontinent, 27–40.

18. See Rose, ‘Der politische Raum Londons’, 95–121 (chaps. 1 and 2).


20. See Adams, Brothers; Schroeder, ‘Embedded Counterfactuals’, 170. For Charmley, Lansdowne is the least studied of British twentieth-century foreign secretaries. Charmley, Splendid Isolation, 279; see Newton, Lord Lansdowne; Monger, End of Isolation.


22. On Germany, see Canis, Weg in den Abgrund; on France, see Schmidt, Frankreichs Außenpolitik; on Russia, see McMeekin, Russian Origins and Lieven, Towards the Flame; on Austria, see Kronenbitter, Krieg im Frieden and Canis, Die bedrängte Großmacht.

23. Ferguson, Pity of War; see also Winkler, ‘Der falsche Krieg’; Michalka, ‘Blick voraus’; Mommsen, Weltkrieg; Charmley, Splendid Isolation; Kennedy, ‘Why Britain Went to War’; Harris, Britain, 298.

24. Wilson, Policy of the Entente.


26. Wilson, Policy of the Entente, passim; idem., Limits of Eurocentricity, esp. 7–21; Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar, passim.

27. See also Otte, China Question, esp. 4–5.


31. Dillon to Spring Rice, 9 Oct. 1909, CC, CASR.

32. Neilson does not pay much attention to the Balkans. See Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar.

33. Cited in Hoyer, Salisbury und Deutschland, 318.


35. Mackay, Fisher; Sumida, In Defence; Sumida, ‘Sir John Fisher and the Dreadnought’; Fairbanks, ‘The Dreadnought Revolution’, 263; Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution. On the historiographical debate in the wake of the Fischer controversy, see Rose, Zwischen Empire und Kontinent, 171–76. For a plea to combine naval history with political and diplomatic history, see Rose and Geppert, ‘Machtpolitik und Flottenbau’. Most recently, Christopher Clark has seized on these ideas. Clark, Sleepwalkers, 148–50.

36. A typical example of a study that merely extrapolates Britain’s naval policy from German sources is Brechtken, Scharnierzeit.


43. Rüger, *The Great Naval Game*.


49. See Geppert, *Pressekreie*.

50. For Fischer’s thesis about the primacy of domestic affairs, see Fischer, *Krieg der Illusionen*. For comparison, see Kennedy, *The Realities behind Diplomacy*, which, despite its promising title, due to its scope of 135 years can provide nothing more than a start. A closer comparison with Fritz Fischer’s primacy of the domestic is provided by Keith Wilson’s stimulating essays, which unfortunately so far have not led to a comprehensive analysis of Edwardian diplomacy. Wilson, *Policy of the Entente*.

51. Steiner, *The Foreign Office*. 