INTRODUCTION

As the Holocaust passes out of living memory, there is a new urgency to formulate ways in which its narratives may yet be encountered and attended to. This book turns to landscape to offer one possible solution. Three case studies are explored: the Buchenwald Concentration Camp Memorial near Weimar, Germany; the Babi Yar Ravine in Kiev, Ukraine, where a mass grave holds the remains of victims of an Einsatzgruppen massacre; and the site of the mass grave and razed village of Lidice, in the Czech Republic, also the result of an Einsatzgruppen operation. These landscapes are considered, initially, as intensely localized and geographically rooted, and in turn as co-ordinates in larger, often globally constituted networks of commemoration. Across these landscapes and networks, I suggest, encounters with topographies of suffering – landscapes formerly inhabited by those from the past with whom they may attempt to empathize – are significant co-ordinates in the formation of contemporary Holocaust cultural memory.

Why landscape? The complexity and significance of the relationship between the violence of war and the physical environment has been established (Russell and Tucker 2004; Russell 2001; Closmann 2009), as has the notable impact of military processes on landscape features; militarization ‘operates through landscape which it changes or maintains, in both a physical and cultural sense’ (Coates, Cole and Pearson 2010: 3). The fundamentally geographical nature of many of the events of the Holocaust in particular has furthermore been recognized (Cole et al. 2009), as has the idea that ‘narrative of extermination’ of the concentration camp is best expressed in geographical terms (Koonz 1994: 258–80). The ‘Nazis’ appropriation of the trope of landscape in their genocidal redefinitions of nation, home and Heimat’ (Baer 2002: 77), and their practical harnessing of topography in processes of mass killing and burial, affected the way victims experienced the Holocaust as it happened. Furthermore, the Holocaust demands a positioning of the self in relation to this history (Baer 2002: 68–69). I suggest that the
examples of Holocaust landscapes discussed in this book provoke within the viewer what Mitch Rose and John Wylie (2006: 477) have called ‘the tension of regarding at a distance that which enables one to see’. This tension is an issue for everyone who encounters these commemorative places with what Amy Hungerford (2003: 105) has described as an ‘intense concern’ for the victims of the past.

Landscape invites scholarship from many different disciplines across the social and natural sciences and humanities (see Thompson 2009: 7). For the purposes of this investigation into contemporary encounters with Holocaust history, approaches from two of these disciplines are particularly significant: cultural memory and cultural geography. As will become clear, there is a notable confluence in the way scholars from these disciplines have approached ‘landscape’ in recent years. Alongside these influences from cultural memory and geography, this book also draws on elements of ecocritical thinking. My interrogations of Holocaust literature – from testimony to fiction – pay particular attention to representations of encounters with the specifically ‘natural’ elements of the landscapes discussed. Ecocritical thinking is fundamentally concerned with the nature and representation of the relationship between human beings and the world they inhabit, and maintains faith in the potential of universal environmental sensibility.

One might well question the relevance of this environmental sensibility to a book concerned with Holocaust memory. Genocide scholar Mark Levene (2004: 440) usefully articulates the justification for this focus when he claims that ‘[a] world without genocide can only develop in one in which principles of equity, social justice, environmental stability – and one might add genuine human kindness – have become the “norm”’ (my emphasis). Indeed Levene (2010) nominated climate change as ‘the elephant in the room’ of genocide scholarship. The audience responded with concerns about the intentions of actors; in the case of genocide, the destruction of people is an explicit goal. Climate change, even anthropogenic, may have lethal consequences but, they suggested, it should not be seen in the same light. Yet such a distinction is compellingly disrupted in Rob Nixon’s (2011: 2) recent discussion of poverty and activism in the ‘global South’, in which the definition of what constitutes violence and perpetration is opened up. Nixon promotes awareness of slow, ‘attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all’, encompassing climate change, deforestation, and the radioactive aftermath of war. He simultaneously broadens the category of victimhood; his focus is not necessarily on the targets of genocidal attacks, but on the poor who have few tools to combat the violence of capitalism, a capitalism that writes ‘land in a bureaucratic, externalising and extraction driven manner that is often pitilessly instrumental’ (2011: 17). This broadening of what constitutes violence underscores the comparative frameworks into which the Holocaust
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is drawn throughout this study. The victims of slow violence, the poor, are rendered ‘dispensable citizens’, akin to those who, in Holocaust discourse, Giorgio Agamben (1995) describes as ‘bare life’; life that does not deserve to live. Examples of this rendering are visible in each part of this book, both within and beyond the context of the Holocaust.

The interaction between local, national and global environments fundamental to an ecocritical perspective is a central concern throughout this book, and one of its fundamental organizing principles. Each section begins with a consideration of a site-based memorial as a geographically specific space, with due attendance to local and national histories and associated discourse. I trace ideological heritages and the shaping of memorial topographies by particular regimes and ‘memorial entrepreneurs’ (see Jordan 2006: 11). With this fundamental platform in place, I move on to consider various mediations and remediations of each place, with a focus on literary texts. The final chapters of each part of the book all consider globally dispersed mediations of these sites beyond their original geographical locations. This structure was in part determined by the sites themselves, which were selected for the unique ways in which they are all deeply rooted and simultaneously de-territorialized, but it is also influenced by recent developments in the disciplines of memory studies and cultural geography which will be explored briefly in this introduction.

The first chapter on Buchenwald examines the past and present landscapes of the camp itself and the surrounding area, which includes the historic city of Weimar and the picturesque, forested, Ettersburg slopes. Tracing a series of landscape ideologies and redefinitions I harness existing scholarship to provide a comprehensive overview of Buchenwald’s journey from idyllic hunting land to concentration camp memorial. Close attention is then dedicated, in Chapter 2, to the literary work of Semprun, who experienced Buchenwald as an inmate from 1943 to 1945. Three of Semprun’s texts, The Long Voyage [Le Grand Voyage] (1963), What a Beautiful Sunday! [Quel beau Dimanche!] (1980), and Literature or Life [L’écriture ou la vie] (1994), discuss his memories of Buchenwald in detail. These texts are ideally suited to a consideration of process and mediation; he returns to particular moments over and over again, revising and reimagining his past, laying bare the fundamentally metamorphic nature of memory. The chapter exposes the potential of Semprun’s literature to animate the landscapes of Buchenwald for those who encounter them. Guided by Semprun, the investigation is grounded in the specific cultural history of this locale, allowing for an interrogation of the relationship between humanity and the natural world specific to the German context. The overall discussion of Semprun’s Buchenwald proposes that a fundamentally affective form of memory-work may be prompted by encounters with literature and landscape, and concludes that landscape can and
will continue to play a role in interpreting atrocious pasts and providing a platform for ethically driven response.

The final chapter of part one undertakes a transcultural comparison between the Holocaust and Southern U.S. legacies of racial inequality, based on analysis of journalist Mark Jacobson’s travel memoir *The Lampshade: A Holocaust Detective Story from Buchenwald to New Orleans* (2010). Probing potential shared ground between very different forms of human and ‘natural’ violence, this chapter traces Jacobson’s journey from a flooded post-Katrina New Orleans – where a lampshade apparently made from human skin drifts to the surface in an abandoned house – to the Ettersburg slope and Buchenwald, the original home of this particular piece of Nazi iconography. The resulting narrative, I suggest, calls for a reconsideration of racial boundaries commensurate with emerging discourse on genocide and environmental disaster.

Part two begins with an exploration of Babi Yar in Kiev, which considers the atrocity that took place at the ravine, and the landscape of the ravine itself as a microcosm of the larger topography of the Holocaust in Ukraine. Commemoration at Babi Yar has been extremely slow to appear and is still emerging only hesitantly against a backdrop of political and cultural marginalization of the Holocaust in Ukraine, particularly in comparison to a recent official focus on the suffering of the Ukrainian people under Stalin. Both Hitler’s and Stalin’s campaigns in Ukraine resulted in a similar disruption of landscape and landscape experience; an increased acknowledgement of such similarities, I argue, might go some way to countering the marginalization of Holocaust memory in Ukraine. Chapter 5 then moves on to focus on what has become an alternative commemorative medium for Babi Yar itself: the mediation and remediation of the atrocity in literature. I trace a journey through text, beginning with a testimonial account of Babi Yar by Ukrainian survivor Dina Pronicheva. I then track the integration of this account into Anatoli Kuznetsov’s biography of his life in Kiev as a witness to the German invasion (*Babi Yar: A Document in the Form of a Novel*, 1972), and its subsequent mobilization in the fiction of the English writer D.M. Thomas (*The White Hotel*, 1981). This literary trajectory was instrumental in creating the international awareness of the atrocity that prompted the creation of a commemorative landscape thousands of miles away on the Colorado plains: the Babi Yar Memorial Park in Denver, the subject of the final chapter in part two.

Inaugurated in 1982, the park represents the efforts of community groups in Denver to draw attention to continued marginalization of minority groups in Soviet territories during the Communist era. Landscaping at the park aims to highlight certain distinctive geographical features that resonate with the specific environment of the site in Kiev, including a natural ravine on which the park is centred and a similar grassland ecosystem. The park is currently
undergoing a process of reorientation. Chapter 6 examines the new design’s integration of the Holocaust into a nationalized narrative concerning the War on Terror.

Part three explores commemoration and activism surrounding the attempted annihilation of the Czech village of Lidice. As in the preceding parts, the investigation begins with the place itself. Chapter 7 thus considers the significance of the Nazis’ attempt to remove Lidice from history and memory by re-landscaping the area and covering it with German soil. The international reaction to this act has had notable results: both places and people around the world were named ‘Lidice’ in memory of the village, which was itself rebuilt as a result of a community fundraising project based in Stoke-on-Trent almost immediately after the end of the war. The new Lidice is both living space and memorial complex, comprising a museum, one of the largest commemorative rose gardens in the world, and a large area of open landscape where the original village stood, and where faint traces of former structures are visible. I provide an overview of this complex environment, paying close attention to the particular methods of landscaping that have been employed there.

Chapter 8 moves on to examine the various textual representations of Lidice that emerged in the years following its destruction. I isolate a tendency to frame it within a narrative of the disrupted pastoral; a nostalgic vision which demonstrably resonates with people across many cultures. The final chapter focuses in particular on inscriptions of Lidice into local contexts via cosmopolitan memory processes, again demonstrating a variety of transcultural forms of engagement. I finally turn to the mobilization of Lidice in recent years: the chapter examines two particular cases of town twinning, as proposals for the Czech village to be officially linked to Khojaly, Azerbaijan (announced February 2011) and Stoke-on-Trent, UK (planning underway since September 2010) take shape. In looking closely at the dynamics of twinning, the final chapter evaluates the potential cosmopolitanism of this emerging network.

Before embarking on the three journeys that comprise the main part of this book, this introduction unpacks recent scholarly trajectories on landscape and memory, considers ways in which nature and literature may mediate memory, and interrogates the ethical potential of associated encounters with the Holocaust. I outline a theoretical confluence between cultural memory and cultural geography, demonstrating landscape’s fundamental role in shaping memory and experience. Whilst an explosion of work on memorials and monuments (see Confino and Fritzschke 2002: 1; Young 1994: 1–16) has resulted in a climate of ‘memory fatigue’ (Huysssen 2003: 3), refocusing attention on the larger landscapes which contain these structures and the processes that shape them may revitalize the study of commemorative spaces
and the encounters they facilitate. At the nexus of cultural memory and cultural geography lies scholarship on ‘difficult heritage’ (MacDonald 2009; Logan and Reeves 2009), ‘dark tourism’ (Lennon and Foley 2000; Sharples and Stone 2009) and ‘tourists of history’ (Sturken 2007). A plethora of related work has considered both the experiences of visitors at sites of former atrocities and the challenges faced by those who curate and manage these places. My own contribution to this body of work will be considered in further detail later in this introduction.

**Lieux to Landscape**

Founding texts on cultural memory and cultural geography – the study of how groups engage with and make sense of the landscapes around them (D. Atkinson et al. 2005: xiv) – bear significant similarities. By ‘cultural memory’, I refer to the diverse and ever-expanding body of scholarship which has developed since a model of collective memory was propounded by French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs ([1925] 1992 and [1950] 1980). Since Halbwachs’s innovation, memory scholars have considered ways in which individual memories become part of larger social and cultural frameworks, and vice versa. Halbwachs’s work rendered ‘the boundaries between [the collective and the individual] permeable’ (Crownshaw 2010: 2), prompting a tendency to see personal memories as existing in an inevitable dialogue with associated cultural texts, representations and media. Examinations of the interplay between memory and varied cultural frameworks, then, fall into the category of ‘cultural memory’. Halbwachs (1980: 156–7) implicitly prompts us to consider memory’s relationship to landscape by affirming the centrality of space and place to the way people think about the past; his discussion of ‘implacement’ posits groups and their environments as ‘mutually responsive’ (Browne and Middleton 2011: 40) and essential to stabilizing collective memory (Halbwachs 1980: 140).

The cultural turn in geography left behind ‘spatial science’ to achieve more holistic considerations of ‘humanized space’, notably echoing Halbwachs’s model of implacement. As Todd Samuel Presner (2007: 11) notes, ‘while the discipline of cultural geography lies primarily outside of literary and cultural studies, there are a number of significant points of contact … not the least of which is the idea that culture is spatially constituted’. Early cultural geographers frequently conceptualized landscapes as ‘indigenous’ spaces in which identity and place were organically connected (Wylie 2007: 23), often through a nostalgic lens which mourned the post–World War II loss of romantic rural vistas and ways of life (see Hoskins [1954] 1985). This markedly nostalgic nationalism led to a distinct research focus on remnants that seemed to fix or
embody particular pasts. In memory studies these tendencies can be traced to Pierre Nora (1989: 7), whose attempt to stay the ‘acceleration of history’ resulted in an exhaustive seven volume essay assemblage of French *lieux de mémoire*, including texts and sites from ‘true memorials – monuments to the dead [to] objects as seemingly different as museums, commemorations, archives, heraldic devices or emblems’ (Nora 2001: xix). Whilst dealing with a broader spectrum of social collectives, even Halbwachs (1950: 50) originally conceived of collective memory as taking place within ‘the theatre’ of his national society. It is crucial to note, particularly in relation to the first section of this book on the camp at Buchenwald, that both disciplinary trends have been traced back to nineteenth century German romanticism, ‘from whence ideas about the particularity, value, and vitality of certain “cultural groups” … first emerged’, later to ‘culminate in twentieth-century cultural nationalism’ (Wylie 2007: 22). Implied here is a ‘superorganic’ understanding of culture (Duncan 1980) as existing ‘both above and beyond the participating members’ of that culture; ‘an entity with a structure, set of processes, and momentum of its own’ (Zelinsky 1973: 40–1). The analyses in this book are wary of assuming these ‘naturalized affiliations between subject and object’ (see Campbell 2008: 3) that reify culture, granting it autonomy beyond individual or even group human participation and endeavour.

Awareness of landscape’s memorative preservation of ‘the order of things’ (Yates 2001: 17) is implicit in both Halbwachs’s notion of implacement and Nora’s (1989: 7) crystallization of the ‘history of France through memory’ (2001: xx), a text which assumes that symbols and sites can ‘embody’ memory. These texts can thus be read as ‘specific representations’ of that memory (2001: xviii), a logic which set in motion a tendency in others to overlook the way in which memorial sites are subject to continuous evolution.¹ Much 1980s US cultural geography echoed Nora’s notion of embodied memory, in examinations of ‘repositories of myth, imagination, symbolic value and cultural meaning’ (Wylie 2007: 44–5). The influential Berkeley School privileged a focus on the ‘ordered presentation’ of visible objects as they exist in relation to one another (Sauer 1963: 97–98), extending to material manifestations in landscape, rather than associated processes (Mikesell and Wagner 1962). Reading landscapes as text undeniably results in rich, highly textured works (see Schama 1995; Iles 2003). However, this turn cast landscape as an archive from which stable meanings may be retrieved and recuperated. A similar tendency has been prevalent in discussions of the ‘sites and events’ of ‘dark tourism’ which are often seen as ‘products’ (Lennon and Foley 2000: 3), a term implying both fixity and homogeneity, and, furthermore, casting the tourist as consumer. Recent scholarship continues to define sites of ‘difficult heritage’ as *lieux de mémoire* (Logan and Reeves 2009: 2), reinforcing a dominant assumption that such places ‘harbour’ memory, and echo Nora’s con-
nection between site and nation-state (see MacDonald 2009: 2). Certainly such places have often become visitor attractions because of their perceived role in the construction – or destruction – of nations and national identity, but this is by no means the only way in which they are encountered, as the transculturally grounded explorations in this book demonstrate; for ‘the meanings of landscape, either historically or for the future, are never simply there, inherent and voluble’ (Dorrian and Rose 2003: 17). Buchenwald, Babi Yar and Lidice are, therefore, not read here as representations of memory, but as co-ordinates in the dialogue that fuels memory’s dynamism and evolution.

Early cultural geographers also generated the understanding that perceiving the world as landscape (either those we dwell in or travel through) is itself an objectifying ‘way of seeing’ (Cosgrove and Daniels 1988), drawing attention to the questionable ethics of landscape traditions. Perhaps rightly, the landscape mode has frequently been seen to function as a duplicitous vehicle for transcendent redemption. This possibility is interrogated in my consideration of the difficult relationship between Buchenwald and the ideological heritage of nearby Weimar in part one; Semprun positions Johann Wolfgang von Goethe as a figure who ‘see[s] with landscape’ and in doing so assumes the privilege and mastery of a detached vision germane to European elite consciousness (see Cosgrove [1984] 1998: 1).

It should be noted at this stage that the fundamental viability of representation in itself is one which haunts discourse surrounding the Holocaust. The perceived extremity of original victim experience has generated a sense that it remains ‘unclaimed’ (Caruth 1996: 4) and accordingly cannot find adequate representation, whether in literature, the visual arts, or in place. We are warned that aestheticizing the Holocaust in representation risks redeeming it (Adorno 1965: 125–7), even through the act of writing its history (Friedlander 1993: 61). We are left with the delimitation that ‘neither acts of remembrance or ethical action’ can ‘provide a sense of what it was like to be there’ (Bernard-Donals and Glejzer 2001: 2). In this context, it seems that promoting landscape as a way of seeing, or at least as a platform for encountering, the Holocaust, risks replicating a perspective which has been linked to its perpetrators; the object of the gaze – including the human subject – is evaluated and classified, deemed other and objectified (see Milchman and Rosenberg 1998: 229–232). Following this logic, Zygmunt Bauman (2000: 92) argues that the modern culture that made the Holocaust possible is a ‘garden culture’: ‘If the Jews are defined as a legitimate problem, if the garden needs weeding, then there is a surely a “rational” way to proceed’ (Markle 1995: 128). This perspective is explored in my discussion of landscaping practices at Lidice in section 3, where I suggest that the nationalistic, superorganic bounded nationhood central to Nazi ideology, explicit in Blut und Boden [blood and soil] rhetoric, must be acknowledged but not reinscribed.
as the genocide is remembered and commemorated. Bauman’s gardening metaphor takes on an uncomfortable literality in Holocaust landscapes, which were often implicated in genocidal processes, a notion probed in my discussion of Ukrainian topography in Part 2.

Each case study in this book, then, attends to earlier cross-disciplinary conceptualizations of landscape and associated ethical concerns. However, beyond this, I promote a new way of perceiving landscape influenced by more recent scholarship which has acknowledged that monuments and memorials are constantly subject to ‘shifting social frameworks’ (Rigney 2008: 94), and performative and dynamic processes (Rigney 2008: 94; Parr 2008: 1). Understanding memory as ‘embedded in social networks’, as a set of ‘practices and interventions’ rather than a textual or representational medium (Confino and Fritzsche 2002: 5) grounds a turn ‘from “sites” to “dynamics” parallel to a larger shift of attention within cultural studies from products to processes, from a focus on discrete cultural artefacts to an interest in the way those artefacts circulate and interact with their environment’ (Erl and Rigney 2009: 3). Memory is never static, as the texts around which it circulates are continuously involved in processes of mediation and remediation (Erl and Rigney 2009: 1–14). Attention to movement and process led cultural geographer W.J.T. Mitchell (1994: 1) to proclaim that landscape ‘circulates as a medium of exchange’, in other words, that landscape itself ‘travels: [is] not just literally transported, but that values, beliefs and attitudes that work through and emerge from specific landscape practices and “ways of seeing” can be seen to migrate through spaces and times’ (Wylie 2007: 122). This book sees both landscape and memory as created through social processes, evolutionary in a way that defies the fixity of Nora’s lieux. Landscapes ‘are always in the process of “becoming,” no longer reified or concretized – inert and there – … always subject to change, and everywhere implicated in the ongoing formulation of social life’ (Schein 1997: 662). Furthermore, as Dorrian and Rose (2003: 17) argue, ‘landscapes are always perceived in a particular way at a particular time. They are mobilized, and in that mobilization may become productive: productive in relation to a past or to a future, but that relation is always drawn with regard to the present.’ Such mobilizations are clearly demonstrated in my discussion of Lidice’s twinning with Khojaly and Stoke, highlighting the extent to which landscape and memory are fundamentally realms of the present. Thus, whilst Confino and Fritzsche (2002: 5) take memory ‘out of the museum and away from the monument’, I return to these ‘sites’ of memory as landscapes; not as places which embody memory, but as co-ordinates in dialogue with others that produce it. Where ‘site’ implies stasis (Rigney 2008: 93), ‘landscape’ implies metamorphosis. I focus, then, not only on ‘sites’ as they can be seen to represent political and institutional agendas, but as experiential frameworks.
As indicated above, these landscapes are considered both as geographically rooted territories, determined by specific local national polemics and co-ordinates in global memory trajectories. In relating Buchenwald to New Orleans and observing the mobilization of Babi Yar in Denver and Lidice in Azerbaijan and the United Kingdom, I follow Neil Campbell (2008: 8) in thinking space ‘rhizomatically’, ‘beyond its function as national unifier’, as ‘unfinished multiple, and ‘open’ in order to ‘trac[e] divergent, entangled lines of composition that both interconnect and split apart constantly’. Probing the way in which memory may appear simultaneously locally determined and geographically uncontainable, Presner (2007: 12) advocates a focus on how ‘language and the places of encounter … have become deterriorialized and remapped according to new constellations, figures and sites of contact’. This cultural-geographical approach fruitfully maps historical events in nexuses, rather than marked points on a chronological line, allowing ‘a new topology of concepts and problems to surface’ (Presner 2007: 14). Crucially, rhizomatic geography is one of ‘becoming’ (Campbell 2008: 34), not ‘arboreal’ rootedness or completion, a notion explored in relation to Semprun’s testimonial literature in part one. As I will also propose throughout each section of this book, such geographies facilitate what Michael Rothberg (2009: 3) calls memory’s multidirectionality, its subjection ‘to ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing and borrowing’; each section closes with a consideration of ways in such multidirectional work is performed in the respective public sphere discussed, and to whose benefit or detriment.

Similarly, whilst I explore ways in which landscapes have historically been perceived as organically linked to particular national identities in the service of both genocide and memory, I am mindful that such perceptions have all too often led to a focus on ‘roots’ rather than ‘routes’, on ‘dwelling’ rather than travel (Campbell 2008: 4). I therefore embrace Campbell’s ‘mobile genealogy’, ‘a cultural discourse constructed through both national and transnational mediations, of roots and routes, with its territories defined and redefined (deteriorialized) from both inside and outside’ (2008: 8). As such, I place each of my three case study sites in transcultural context. Pioneered by Wolfgang Welsch (2009) as a methodological premise for literary analysis, transculturalism moves beyond the kind of intercultural delimitation fundamental to the lieux de mémoire. Astrid Erll (2011a: 7), echoing other key thinkers in a move beyond the lieux (see Confino and Fritzsche 2002: 1–24; Rigney 2008: 93–4), has argued that Nora’s binding of nation-state and ethnicity constitutes an ‘old-fashioned concept of national culture and its puristic memory’, which refuses the multiethnic, multicultural reality of contemporary life. A transcultural view allows for this reality, provides a lens through which we may comprehend ‘the sheer plethora of shared lieux de mémoire that have emerged through travel, trade, war, and colonialism’ (Erll
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2011a: 8). Accordingly Erll (2011a: 11) conceives of transcultural memory ‘as the incessant wandering of carriers, media, contents, forms, and practices of memory, their continual “travels” and ongoing transformations through time and space, across social, linguistic and political borders’. Key to the transcultural turn is the opening up, or transcendence of, national borders, and a cosmopolitan outlook characterized by a reluctance to lose sight of or universalize cultural specificities (see Bond and Rapson 2014), an approach maintained in each section of this book as I navigate between local sites and transcultural networks.

The transcultural lens facilitates a focus on deterritorialization, a term which, as noted above, can generally be used to describe the definition and redefinition of territory’ (Campbell 2008: 8). In introducing the notion of cosmopolitan memory, Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider (2006) utilize the term hyphenated4 to highlight the way in which site-specific atrocities may become ‘de-territorialized’ from their original locations via related mediatory, commemorative and social processes. Accordingly, the potential exists for a variety of memory texts to become more accessible to people from diverse cultural backgrounds and geographic locations, as new global links place them at the centre of a dynamic creation of ‘new connections that situate … political, economic, and social experiences in a new type of supranational context’ (Levy and Sznaider 2006: 10). The limitations and potential of this theoretical model will be discussed in relation to the twinning of Lidice with Stoke-on-Trent and Khojaly in Part 3. Levy and Sznaider’s use of the term ‘de-territorialization’ resonates with its conceptualization by Dorrian and Rose (2003: 16), who propose the de-territorialization of landscape as ‘up-rooting it from its location within fixed webs of signification and transporting it, trailing a set of potentialities which can produce effects in new domains. This is certainly not an argument for evacuating … the “content” of the term’. Thus when I suggest the de-territorialization of memory from landscape at various points in Topographies of Suffering, I similarly maintain that neither landscapes nor the memories connected with them are necessarily evacuated in the process. As theories of transculturalism, cosmopolitanism and multidirectionality have developed, the inherently processual, travelling nature of both memory and landscape has come to the fore. Yet as Susannah Radstone’s (2011) summary of the emergence of transcultural and multidirectional theories insists, locatedness remains central to the experience, practice and theory of memory. Thus in drawing attention to the many ways in which Holocaust memories may travel across Europe and beyond, this book also recognizes the geographical specificity of their origins in Germany, Ukraine and the Czech Republic.

The local-global dynamic recognized by the transcultural turn is also fundamentally resonant with the ecocritical sensibility maintained throughout
the analyses offered here. As Lawrence Buell (2005: 12) notes, ‘environmental criticism’s working conception of “environment” has broadened … to include … the interpenetration of the global by the local’. Ecocritical attachment to the earth functions at these two interconnected levels. That we feel intensely for the local environments we inhabit and consequently strive to protect them may lead to a concern for the world in its entirety, for each local environment is a part of that larger whole. Ecocritical logic is sceptical towards:

...mythographies of national landscape ... intensified both by mounting critique of the perceived ethnocentricity of all such myths and by the increasing awareness that the environmental problems the world now faces ‘are quite unaware of national and cultural boundaries’ (Claviez 1999: 377). National borders by no means regularly correspond with ‘natural’ borders (Buell 2005: 81–2).

Accordingly, my discussions of various textual mediations – the work of Semprun, Jacobson, Thomas, Kuznetsov and Millay, amongst others – are undertaken from a broadly ecocritical perspective.

Concurrent with the embrace of transcultural dynamism, memory studies scholars have increasingly drawn attention to the processes of mediation and remediation that keep memory moving. The introduction now moves on to briefly highlight the potential of the key mediating factors of commemorative dynamism I explore in this book: the shaping of natural processes and elements by heritage professionals, and literary representations of the landscapes in question.

‘Natural’ and Literary Mediation

Within the context of Holocaust memorials, a ‘return to nature’ may seem conceptually appropriate as a way to lay the victims of industrialized processes (see Bartov 1996: 3–4) to rest, yet extended studies of visitor engagement with natural materials in these landscapes are surprisingly rare. Nonetheless, work on commemorative landscape in general offers some useful insights. The apparent vulnerability, mutability and regenerative capacity of many ‘natural’ materials renders them powerfully affective, leading John Dixon Hunt (2001: 16) to argue that landscape will always enjoy ‘a fundamental advantage’ over other commemorative forms. Much existing discussion of memory and landscape tends to echo official discourse surrounding commemorative practice at Holocaust memorials; that is, nature is frequently designated as a witness to human violence (see Schama 1995: 24). This anthropomorphic pre-mediation of nature is clearly illogical – ‘culture perpetuates itself though the power of the dead, while nature, as far as we know,
makes no use of this resource except in a strictly organic sense’ (Pogue Harrison 2003: ix) – but affective nonetheless. As Elaine Scarry (1985: 288–9) explains, whilst ‘[t]he naturally existing external world … is wholly ignorant of the “hurtability” of human beings … [t]he human imagination reconceives the external world [by] quite literally, “making it” as knowledgeable about human pain as if it were itself animate and in pain’. Whilst the natural world ‘cannot be sentiently aware of pain’, ‘its design, its structure, is the structure of a perception’. Thus we grant nature perception, and likewise memory, for its design, structure and dynamism are akin to those of perception and memory. Whilst this book pays due attention to the affectivity, I also keep in mind nature’s intrinsic amorality and its purely organic response to human violence and death.

To say that natural regeneration consoles us does not rely so completely on the anthropomorphic logic that grounds an assumption of sympathy, for we can be consoled by something without any agenda of its own. In this book the affectivity of regenerative growth is considered alongside the rhetoric of ruins. Ruins are the remains of deliberately constructed human structures, worn down by the encroachment of natural elements, but they are not to be conflated with them; ruins are constantly diminishing, whilst nature ‘grows’. Yet the two together have affective impact: ‘inert matter is made increasingly meaningful by its juxtaposition to living forms … we are pleased by the contrast between the fixity of the inert and the mutability of its natural frame’ (Stewart 1998: 111–112). This juxtaposition, and the affectivity of natural regeneration, is considered in detail in relation to Semprun’s mediation of Buchenwald, the work of memorial entrepreneurs at the Babi Yar Park in Denver, and landscaping practices at Lidice. Michael Roth et al. (1997: 5) argue that ruins ‘embody the dialectic of nature and artifice’; ruins are often the ‘work’ of nature. It is often suggested that ruins take us closer to the events of history, but in actuality ruins, precisely in their visible dialogue with nature, force us to realize the unbridgeable gap between the present and the past, a gap which my own discussions of sites strives to recognize. Charles Merewether (1997: 25) has argued that ‘ruins collapse temporalities’, when in fact they may reassert them. Natural materials are central to this reassertion, unique in their ability to record the passing of time; nature, that which exists both before us and around us, forces a recognition of the impossibility of collapsing temporal distance between the past and the present. In fact, nature presents us with the stark reality of this distance in a way that cannot be avoided or glossed over in the commemorative environment. Our sentimental anthropomorphism may render it affective, but it is in its indifferent growth – its very lack of agenda – that it situates us in relation to history.

This book also highlights the frequently pastoral sensibility fundamental to the affectivity of nature at commemorative sites. No longer simply an in-
vocation of an ‘lived harmony between people and place’ which was only ever imagined, yearned for rather than lived (Gifford 1999: 31), the term ‘pastoral’ has itself evolved to describe a particular state of mind which reduces the complex to the simple (Peck 1992: 75). Always-already elegiac, the pastoral ‘takes the form of an isolated moment, a kind of island in time, and one which gains its meaning and intensity through the tensions it creates with the historical world’ (Lindenberger in Peck 1992: 75; also see Young [1994: 120] on the ‘unexpected, even unseemly beauty’ of concentration camp landscapes).

In my discussions of the mediation of the memory of landscape in literature (and film, in Part 3), I demonstrate the way in which Western associations of rural nature with an ideal past have shaped a range of mediatory texts and processes. In such texts, nature, like the ruin, becomes a link to a past to which we might long to return and avert catastrophe ahead, a spatial and temporal marker – for natural growth records the passing of time – inherently tied up in Western cultural consciousness with a sense of belated responsibility (Soper 1995) similar to that which inspires the retrospective creation of memorials.

In a departure from the study of memorial spaces as realms of representational fixity, then, I pay particular attention throughout this book to ‘natural’ elements of landscape which are constantly in flux: plants, soil, topographical contours, weather and climate. I also isolate the processes of mediation that shape the affectivity of these natural forms in memorial landscapes – processes to which I now turn attention. Perhaps unsurprisingly in light of the above discussion of nature’s affective potential, despite the increase in the use of technology in Holocaust museums the ‘natural’ areas of memorial landscapes continue to capture curatorial and visitor imaginations. Camps and mass graves were often located away from urban centres, and with the passing of time they increasingly lend themselves to integration with their surrounding natural environments. Their management, as several examples in this book demonstrate, reveals a distinctive curatorial reliance on nature’s commemorative value, as something that can both sympathize and console. However, and not unlike its museum counterpart, the memorial landscape raises ethical issues for curators which warrant an attention that has so far been largely lacking in scholarship on the subject. Perhaps this is because theorists assume, as Sarah Farmer (1995: 98) does, that ‘[u]nlike the writer of a book or the director of a museum, the custodian of a memorial site is not free to select what to tell and what to leave untold’. This is a suggestion largely refuted in this book, as I demonstrate the extent to which commemorative curation is also a process of subjective history-writing much the same as that which occurs within the walls of museums and which similarly mediates visitor experience (see Baruch Stier 2003: 126).

Whilst museum spaces are often subject to intense scrutiny, and even unintended echoes of perpetrator ideology are subject to critique (see Crown-
such rigorous interrogation of representative strategy has infrequently been applied to the natural landscapes that exist in dialogue with museal structures. A rare exception can be found in Michael Addis and Andrew Charlesworth’s (2002) study of Auschwitz and Plaszow, which takes into account the effect human intervention, or its lack, may have on visitor experience. In considering the extent to which management practices may constitute an unwitting parallel with Nazi ideology, they note that ‘uniform lawns are more likely [than meadows] to let us regard the victims as the authorities did, as “Figuren”, objects, a mass’ (2002: 246). This study reminds us that, outside as well as inside, curators are polemically motivated, and they create meaning as well as simply organizing objects which are in themselves perceived as meaningful. In doing so they narrativize visitor performance (see Patraka 1999: 122 and Young 1994: vii), a practice considered in relation to the specific topography of each memorial site in this book. Finally, as Chris Pearson (2009: 152) argues, ‘the environment as natural entity’ is frequently overlooked in investigations into the construction of memorials and the way they are experienced, as is the way in which ‘memorials actively engage with their environment and in turn the environment naturally engages with them’. Inspired by such gaps, this book examines how both curatorial polemics and environmental factors contribute to contemporary landscaping of Holocaust memory.

The final mediating co-ordinate I rely on is literature, a representational form which has been embraced by scholars of memory (see Erll 2011b: 144–71), and, more recently, cultural geography (see Wylie 2007: 206–7), for whom it ‘brings to the fore the possibility of sharing stories via landscape experience’ (Lorimer 2006). Landscape writing, in particular, may provide a way into understanding experiences of ‘mobility, exile, distance and non-belonging’ (Wylie 2007: 211), ‘to reintroduce … questions of subjectivity and the self’ (2007: 213). Attention to landscape is often notable as a component of Holocaust writing, not least because victim experiences were frequently diasporic; new landscapes were encountered through deportation and internment, and subsequent descriptions often foreground testimonial accounts.

However, as noted previously, all representative forms meet a challenge in the context of the Holocaust. In the case of literature by original witnesses, there are undoubtedly problems of translation: how can experiences belonging to the past – experiences which only exist in memory – be effectively translated into language? This question is particularly central to my discussion of Semprun’s work. The perception that literature is an aestheticizing form that inevitably transforms experience into linear narrative, and the idea that personal narratives invite personification (see Lang in Levi and Rothberg 2003: 330 and Hungerford 2003) – also plague discussion of literary repre-
sentation, concerns which become more explicit and divisive with regard to literature about the Holocaust created by those who did not experience it (see Vice 2000: 1; Wiesel in Lewis and Appelfeld 1984: 155). Analyses of Holocaust literature in this book do not aim to advance the debate over which genres are appropriate or acceptable, but focus instead on the capacity of these texts to animate Holocaust in the reader’s imagination; for ‘[w]hat is remembered of the Holocaust ‘depends … on the texts now giving them form’ (Young in Levi and Rothberg 2003: 335).

I am, then, less concerned with discrepancies between history, memory and representation, than with the intricate and intimate relationship between these co-ordinates. Thus I focus not solely on the texts themselves, but on their relationship with the imaginative work of memory they may potentially provoke. As Huyssen (1995: 2–3) reminds us, ‘[r]e-presentation always comes after … The past is not simply there in memory, but it must be articulated to become memory.’ Literary mediations of Holocaust memory by visitors to commemorative sites are therefore examined alongside those produced by those originally persecuted at them, for the journeys taken by all inform the way a site can be interpreted and understood. As Kathryn Jones (2007: 36) suggests, many survivors ‘use the familiarity of the journey in order to engage with the uninitiated reader’s everyday experience[s], and furthermore that the experiences of travellers to Holocaust sites are structured by their recollection of related literary material (2007: 60). Thus these authors ‘contribute to the interactive, dialogical relationship between Holocaust memorial and visitor’ (2007: 61). However, crucially, Jones (2007: 51) concludes her discussion of visitor engagement by underlining the way in which, at times, metaphors of travel may be ‘evoked solely in order to be negated’, serving only ‘to underline the irreducible gulf constructed by the authors between the reality they experienced in the camps and the knowledge of their addressees and readers who did not enter this world’. Thus she advocates the use of metaphorical associations as a way into accessing the experience of victims, but not as a way to take ownership of this experience. The particular form of ‘becoming’ implied in Jones’s descriptions of the productive interplay between memorial environments, literature and memory, and the gulf that is nonetheless maintained between victim and visitor, are key characteristics of the model of memory proposed in this book.

Encountering Past Others: Visitors and Victims

The notion that landscape experience has played an inherent role in the acquisition of power recurs in postcolonial discourse (see Tolia-Kelly 2010). Correspondingly, travel is sometimes seen to be superficial, vicarious and
fundamentally self-serving, ‘a way of having the encounter [with the other] while keeping it in the realm of otherness and fantasy’ (Clark 1999: 167). A similar logic casts tourists as consumers (Urry 1990), a notion endorsed by Lennon and Foley’s model of dark tourism. Yet travel should not necessarily be interpreted as a claim to ownership, either of place or the experience of others. Susan Sontag (2007: 228) reminds us that ‘[t]o be a traveller … is to be constantly reminded of the simultaneity of what is going on in the world, your world and the very different world you have visited … it’s a question of sympathy … of the limits of the human imagination’. Self-other engagement may indeed be confined to certain limits, but some sense of limitation – certainly an avoidance of total identification – is ethically desirable for reasons which will be discussed shortly.

There are understandable ethical concerns about the integration of sites of atrocity into tourist itineraries which may potentially normalize atrocious histories and provide a form of entertainment, concerns exemplified in debates surrounding the inclusion of Auschwitz-Birkenau to ‘stag’ weekend itineraries in Krakow; the seriousness demanded by the concentration camp sits ill within a category predominantly embedded in concepts of leisure, pleasure and relaxation. However, binary opposition between touristic states such as pilgrimage (commonly understood as a sacred endeavour) and leisure (aligned with secularity and comparative profanity) can be disrupted: ‘The notion of leisure contains elements of purposefulness and dedication, while pilgrimage, the pursuit of the transcendent, also carries with it senses of travel, excitement and adventure’ (Keil 2005: 480). Furthermore, ‘[m]any forms of contemporary tourism can be said to be guided by a self-consciousness about the potential superficialities of everyday tourism’ (Sturken 2007: 11). Tourism is too complex to be understood merely as a means to a straightforward and predictable end; rather, it ‘instantiates, a hermeneutics … based on the interpretation of a multiplicity of texts and markers, all oriented to producing knowledge of Self and Other” (Koshar 2000b: 103). Rudy Koshar follows Michel de Certeau (1988: xiii) in emphasizing the potential of everyday activities to transgress prescribed limits of meaning, returning autonomy to consumers; rendering them ‘unrecognised producers, poets of their own acts’, creators of ‘sentences’ or ‘trajectories’ which, whilst ‘composed with the vocabularies of established language … trace out the ruses of other interests and desires that are neither determined nor captured by the systems in which they develop’. This recognition of consumer autonomy is not fully embraced in studies of dark tourism, but a valuable precedent can be seen in MacDonald’s (2009: 147) in-depth review of tourism to Nuremburg, which recognizes audiences as ‘active rather than passive’. MacDonald’s methodology also accommodates ‘the gloriously unavoidable nature of human interaction’ (2009: 21). Such unavoidable interactions similarly shape my handling
of each case study site in this book, an aspect of my own methodology which is mainly explored in the concluding chapter.

Victims and visitors are capable of forging their own paths through landscapes, and mark out trajectories between them, a phenomenon particularly evident in my discussion of Jacobson’s navigation between Buchenwald and New Orleans. The terms in which I consider the potential of the sites to facilitate engagement with difficult pasts is grounded in a phenomenological strain of cultural geography (Tilley 1994; D. Abrams 1996; Ingold 2000; Cloke and Jones 2001; Wylie 2005, 2006) influenced by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962: 303–4): ‘the system of experience is not arrayed before me as though I were God, it is lived by me from a certain point of view; I am not the spectator, I am involved’. Leaving behind models of place as ‘decentred from agency and meaning’ and ‘equivalent to and separate from time’ (Tilley 1994: 9), phenomenological studies of landscape recognize varied modes of perception, such as smell, hearing, and touch, ‘releas[ing] the visual gaze from its detention as the accomplice of Cartesian spectatorial epistemology’ (Tilley 1994: 9). Hence the potential of the phenomenological approach in the context of the Holocaust as understood by Bauman; that is, as an event resulting from an excess of Cartesian rationalism. This strain of scholarship sees landscape as a participatory platform, a space of engagement; something with which we are ‘intertwined’ (Wylie 2007: 152). Ingold (2000: 207) similarly proposes that a phenomenological approach renders landscape a space for ‘attentive involvement’, a phrase which places the subject in an intimate relationship with the world around us without ‘making it’ the same. Furthermore, whilst pure phenomenology is focused on bodily experience in the world, the ‘lived immediacy of actual experience’ (Thrift 2008: 6), there is a cognitive dimension to phenomenological immersion which prompts discussion, analysis, reflection and theorization of that bodily experience. In this way, immersion in landscape retains an element of essential reflexivity which my studies of Buchenwald, Babi Yar and Lidice hope to maintain. These places are always guided by personal memories, but also ‘replete with social meanings’ due to the ‘constant process of production and reproduction through the movement and activities of members of a group’ (Tilley 1994: 16). Thus landscape, like memory, is conceptualized as a production, ‘both constituted and constitutive’ (Tilley 1994: 17).

Phenomenological cultural geography has also set a precedent in the embrace of nonrepresentational perspectives, or in Hayden Lorimer’s (2005: 84) phrasing ‘more-than-representational’ theory:

The focus falls on how life takes shape and gains expression in shared experiences, everyday routines, fleeting encounters, embodied movements, precognitive triggers, practical skills, affective intensities, enduring urges, unexceptional inter-
Influenced by Deleuzian thought, a relational approach to geography has been increasingly popular since the late 1990s (Wylie 2007: 199). Relational geography presents ‘a topological picture of the world’ more concerned with ‘networks, connections, flows and mobilities’ (Wylie 2007: 199) than with the specificities of particular spaces and how they are experienced. In privileging ‘connective properties’ over the traditional geographical denominators of ‘distance and position’ (Wylie 2007: 204), relational topology presents a challenge to conventional ways of thinking about landscape. Whilst it can be argued that in such an approach ‘a certain topographical richness is being sacrificed for the sake of topological complexity’ (Wylie 2007: 205), it is worth looking for memory both as it is forged within memorial spaces and as it creates new ones. Accordingly, whilst each part of this book opens with a topographical reading of the site in question, topological networks, flows and mobilities emerge throughout each one, connecting Buchenwald to New Orleans, Babi Yar to Denver, and Lidice to Stoke-on-Trent, Khojaly and beyond. There may be tensions between these spaces, but this can be seen as contributing to, rather than negating, the discourse that both surrounds them and constitutes their dynamism.

The cultural geographic model of phenomenology as discussed here has fruitful implications for the contemplation of the Holocaust and its victims, if we consider what a phenomenological inhabitation of the past might be. Clearly such a model implies the breakdown of formerly assumed delimiting borders between victim and witness, just as landscape might collapse the divide between the world and the self. Such a breakdown is visible in trauma theory; according to Dori Laub (in Felman and Laub 1992: 57), for example, witnesses who view traumatic testimony become not only ‘participants’ but ‘co-owners’ of the experiences described therein, in a troubling conflation of self and other. This overextension could similarly be seen to characterize some variations of Marianne Hirsch’s model of ‘postmemory’ (1997). Developed to describe ‘the second generation response to the trauma of the first’ (2001: 8), postmemory usefully articulates the way memories of events we have never lived through are both intensely powerful and intensely mediated; a form of ‘imaginative investment and creation’ (Hirsch 1997: 22), an ‘encounter with another, an act of telling and listening … to another’s wound, recognizable in its intersubjective relation’ (Hirsch 2001: 12). Postmemory’s potential for reciprocity – for a meaningful encounter between the self of the present and the other of the past – is appealing. However, this compelling concept has been overapplied, often without sufficient critical distance, in
subsequent studies of memory, not least because Hirsch herself places few limitations upon it; indeed she posits postmemory as ‘a space of remembrance’ open to those who care enough to inhabit it (1999: 8). As Weissman (2004: 17) has argued, the very idea ‘that a deep personal connection to the Holocaust is enough to transform its learned history into inherited, lived memory’ is ‘dubious at best’. According to this logic Alison Landsberg’s (1997: 82) ‘spaces of transference’ – film or museum spaces which give the participant ‘a kind of experiential relationship’ that ‘might actually install in us “symptoms” or prosthetic memories through which we didn’t actually live’ – also raise questions.

Whilst both Hirsch and Landsberg are arguably uncritical of an empathy unconstrained by the limitations of a bounded self, Dominic LaCapra’s (2001: 102) notion of ‘empathic unsettlement’ provides an approach to secondary witnessing which avoids the ‘extreme identification’ (LaCapra 2001: 103) implicit in some variations of post- and prosthetic memory. Covering a number of loosely defined modes of response in which an individual is significantly affected by exposure to a traumatized other, the empathically unsettled subject remains aware of the caesura inherent to an ethical self/other relation. LaCapra (2001: 102) redefines the limits of traumatic transference, suggesting that, whilst secondary trauma cannot be discounted as a potential response, ‘it is blatantly obvious that there is a major difference between the experience of camp inmates or Holocaust survivors and that of the viewer’. Thus he remains keen to restrict the use of the term trauma to “limit cases” that pass a certain threshold (Bennett 2005: 9). Furthermore, LaCapra (2004: 41) recognizes that ‘empathy is an affective relation to the other recognized as other, while identification involves acting out [their] problems’. Empathic unsettlement, then, might characterize an onlooker whose genuine concern for the others of the past leads them to attempt to imagine others’ past suffering whilst simultaneously acknowledging their bounded selves. Such a possibility is implied in Derek Dalton’s (2009) exploration of a visit to Birkenau, in which the author identifies himself with Amy Hungerford’s model of an onlooker who shows ‘an intense concern with the subject despite that they are not themselves survivors’ (2009: 188). Reassured by evidence of many small acts of performative commemoration, ‘responses … as unique and personal as the thousands of people who visit Auschwitz Birkenau each year’ (2009: 211) Dalton concludes that whilst ‘[t]he experience of visiting Auschwitz-Birkenau as a dark tourist must entail an experiential failure’ (2009: 211), the site nonetheless provides ‘a powerful backdrop – a type of mise en scène – that helps animate the imagination’. This is a ‘small paradoxical triumph … worth celebrating … whilst I cannot ‘live [the] loss’ [of victims] … I can pause to imagine their suffering’ (Dalton 2009: 218). Dalton’s ‘out-of-wartime temporality’ (2009: 218) refuses
the extremity of empathic overidentification, and the metamorphosis of the landscape itself is essential in this realization of difference. His imagination is also animated through an on-site consideration of relevant literary material that was fundamental to his experience at Birkenau, for his visit was mediated by both ‘the exhibits and sights’ he encountered there and ‘the memory of … representations that are evoked by being there’ (2009: 118).

The three case studies discussed in this book demonstrate the diversity of the mediatory co-ordinates that ground our encounters with past suffering, envisioning how our relations with the others of the past may be founded upon a fundamentally ethical premise; demonstrating intense concern, yet avoiding complete identification.

Throughout these case-based explorations, I rely on the notion that visits to sites of atrocious histories are rooted in complex personal motivations as well as previous encounters with diverse media, both literary and visual. The same factors inevitably shape academics who work on these landscapes. In some cases, as in Dalton’s essay, the resulting work takes into account the personal experiences of the writer alongside a consideration of theoretical or conceptual concerns. In turn, this adds to the rich archive of existing work by survivors, travel writers and even authors of fiction, all of whom contribute to the mediation and remediation of memorial landscapes. As Lucy Bond (2011: 749) notes, some ‘testimony-criticism’ of this nature risks ‘engendering a conflation of biography and analysis’ to produce ‘a form of theory that draws upon the author’s own experiences as its principle frame of reference’ (Bond 2011: 749). Critiqued in the particular context of 9/11 literature, Bond notes that an overemphasis on personal experience risks the despecification of the event’s larger sociopolitical context. Clearly a similar risk may be extended to the Holocaust context, but some examples of what we might call Holocaust testimony-criticism, notably those which avoid the inclusion of the self within an extended traumatic paradigm,10 are enriched by the integration of an author’s personal response to the landscapes in question (see Bartov 2007; MacDonald 2009). Such authors are most successful when they maintain a separation between themselves and the others of the past, focussing reflexively on their encounters as secondary witnesses. Thus the final challenge, perhaps, of work such as this, must be to situate not only the self but also myself, in relation to the Holocaust and its landscapes.

Beneath the theoretical models explored in this book lies my own sense of unsettlement in the face of historical suffering. More explicitly personal cudas complete each chapter, and this separation of analysis and biographical recollection is deliberate, for my own experience is but a small part of my frame of reference. I optimistically maintain that both the specificity of past suffering and the unique contexts in which it occurred are thrown into relief, rather than obscured, by my own involvement.
Notes

1. Nora himself was aware of the necessarily evolutionary nature of memory sites, stating that their capacity for metamorphosis is central to their existence (1989: 19), but memory is still seen to be ‘attached’ to such sites.

2. See Elie Wiesel’s commonly cited remark that the Holocaust is ‘[t]he ultimate event, the ultimate mystery, never to be comprehended or transmitted’ (in Roth and Berenbaum 1989: 3).

3. As Ann Whiston Spirn argues, ‘dictionaries must be revised, and … older meanings revived’; ‘[O]lder meanings’ – based on the etymology of ‘scape’ from the Danish skabe and the German schaffen (‘to shape’) – imply both the association between people and place which creates landscape and their ‘embeddedness in culture’ (1998: 17).

4. In order to maintain a clear usage, when I discuss ‘de-territorializations’ of memory from landscape I adopt their spelling. When referring to an attempt to attach a fixed meaning to a particular landscape, I employ the term ‘territorialization’.

5. Young, for example, remarks on the common habit of ‘mistaking the piece [the artefact or ruin] for the whole, the implied whole for unmediated history’ (1994: 127).

6. In certain contexts this has been illuminating. Marita Sturken (2007), for example, demonstrates how a culture of fear and paranoia in the wake of specific acts of terrorism – the Oklahoma City bombings in 1995 and the destruction of the World Trade Center in 2001 – resulted in particular consumer behaviours motivated by desire for security, comfort and the consolidation of specific forms of North American national identity. This analysis serves to articulate ways in which tourism, memory production and identity are deeply related, but does not advance understanding of the tourist beyond existing assumptions about their susceptibility to manipulation by capitalist systems.

7. For example, the head of the Holocaust Educational Trust Karen Pollock stated that the advertisement of Auschwitz visits ‘alongside nights of drinking and clubbing’ was ‘entirely inappropriate (NineMSN 2010), and subsequent defence by an associated tour operator (‘Denzil’, NineMSN 2010). Whether or not one agrees with the inclusion of Auschwitz in such an itinerary, the motivations of and behaviour exhibited by the tourists in question are undoubtedly worthy of note. Outrage is understandable, but too frequently results in dismissal, which rarely advances discourse. Whilst ‘[c]onsensus … leads to invisibility’, ‘[c]ontroversy … may be the most important factor in keeping memory alive’ (Rigney 2008: 94).

8. Whilst originally a term to describe ‘second-generation memories of cultural or collective traumatic events and experiences’ (1997: 22), Hirsch’s definition of the second generation (‘those who grew up dominated by narratives that preceded their birth, whose own belated stories are evacuated by the stories of the previous generation shaped by traumatic events that can be neither understood not recreated’) (1997: 22) – is somewhat loose.

9. The viewer in the context of LaCapra’s discussion is someone exposed to Holocaust testimony videos, but the principle can arguably be applied to those who contemplate the suffering of others in various other mediums.

10. For example the ‘travelling’ of trauma implied by Caruth: ‘In a catastrophic age … trauma may provide the very link between cultures: not as a simple understanding of the pasts of others but rather … as our ability to listen through the departures we have all taken from ourselves’ (1996: 11). The potential of listening through shared departures is arguably undermined by the overextension of the trauma itself.