Introduction
Pax Suecia, 1814–2020

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Pax Suecia. Does it exist, and, if so, what defines it? Since 1814, Sweden has been involved in no armed conflicts other than United Nations (UN)-mandated peace operations outside Swedish territory. This is an exceptional experience on the world stage – one not even shared by Switzerland – that in many it ways epitomizes the ideals of peace.¹ Yet, despite its extraordinary longevity, research about the Swedish experience of enduring peace, and that of Swedish international relations during the 200-year period more generally, is remarkably scant.² The point of departure of this volume is that this unique Swedish experience deserves more attention, both for scholarly reasons and for widening our knowledge of this history – both in Sweden and abroad.

This book has developed out of a renewed interest in reconceptualizing the field of the history of international relations. While the state and political actors remain the cornerstones of this field, they are far from being the only institutions and agents to define it. The study of Swedish peace is no longer limited to state-initiated policies, and it is not exclusively framed as political history. This book provides a number of examples of non-state agents and institutions that have shaped the perceptions of peace and neutrality in Sweden. It shows how they have contributed to and formed Sweden’s foreign policies. But it also combines this new focus on non-state agents and institutions with more traditional approaches to international relations and national security perspectives.
The book’s editors are in various ways involved in the Hans Blix Centre for the History of International Relations, which was established at Stockholm University in 2020 to facilitate a new interest in the history of international relations; the Centre provides a platform for studying this history in all its complexity. In the spring of 2020, the Hans Blix Centre hosted a workshop on the theme of Sweden’s long peace, organized by the editors. The contributions to this workshop form the basis of this anthology. In our vibrant discussions we specifically tried to explore the question of how Sweden managed to stay out of wars over the course of 200 years, and to consider what characteristics make Swedish history unique – if indeed it is. The results of these discussions, which comprise the subject matter of this book, show how various state and non-state actors have taken active parts in negotiating, defining and reinterpreting Swedish peace, and how political, cultural, social and economic factors have influenced it. Our case studies reflect the multifaceted nature of this history.

The latest war that Sweden participated in was the Swedish-Norwegian War, waged in the summer of 1814. As a condition of the truce, Sweden forced Norway into a personal union. Throughout the time of the Union, Sweden and Norway shared a monarch, who resided in Stockholm, and foreign policy was decided by the Swedish government, although in all other respects the two nations lived and developed separately: for example, there was almost no coordination of Sweden’s and Norway’s economies. Perhaps inevitably, the separate development trajectories of the two nations led to dissent, and in 1905 the Norwegians, who had been compelled in the first place, decided to leave the Union. Norway’s desire to break free from the Union, though ultimately achieved peacefully, without military intervention from either side, had been a potential flashpoint that came to nothing. The peaceful dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian Union was one of the few examples of a non-violent breakup of a modern nation state – even within the context of Sweden’s long era of peace, this was an unusual event.3

Although Sweden has not participated in any armed conflicts since 1814, there have been other instances when military conflict was either imminent or perceived as a real possibility. Later, during the Second World War, Sweden was in a very different situation. Both Norway and Denmark were attacked and then occupied in 1940 by Nazi Germany, and Germany put severe pressure on the Swedish government to allow the transit of German troops through the country. Sweden ultimately conceded to German demands – receiving criticism for breaching its policy of neutrality by doing so – during the first part of the war (1940–1943). Later, during the second part of the war (1943–1945), Sweden made consider-
able efforts to support the allies (the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Yet in both cases it managed to remain officially neutral and was not drawn into the war. After the Second World War was over, geopolitical tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War posed another looming threat. Nuclear war was seen as a potential risk that all citizens and their families needed to be prepared for. But Sweden remained similarly unentangled. To some extent, accident rather than design has helped Sweden stay non-aligned and free from conflict.

A brief history of the Swedish state provides a context to its recent experience. Major social, political and economic transformations have defined domestic developments in Sweden over the last 200 years, including processes of urbanization, industrialization and democratization. Sweden’s transformation from an agrarian to an industrialized society was exceptionally rapid, taking place between the 1850s and 1930s. By the mid-twentieth century Sweden was one of the most developed and wealthy nations in the world, and a model of the modern welfare state. Democratization, however, evolved more slowly, even though the monarch had lost much of his power with the government reform of 1809. Until 1866 the Swedish parliament (Riksdag) consisted of four early modern estates: the nobility, the clergy, the burghers and the peasants. In 1866 it was reshaped into a bicameral parliament restricted to the wealthiest citizens. Universal suffrage was only added to the constitution in 1919, and in 1921 the first elections were held in which all women could vote. Alongside the slow development of Swedish democracy and parliamentarism up to 1921, Swedish foreign policy was also gradually ‘democratized’, and this may have had an impact on the long peace.

Internationally, during the interwar years Sweden supported the efforts of the League of Nations to build a new inter-state order based on collective security, conflict mediation and agreements on arms reductions. In 1946, Sweden joined the UN, a year after the organization’s foundation. Since then, the UN has been an important platform for Sweden’s foreign policy. The second secretary-general of the UN (1953–1961), Dag Hammarskjöld, was a Swedish politician, and Sweden was a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council between 1975–1976 and 2017–2018.

The gradual development of these political ideas and commitments means that to the Swedish self-image belong the perception of neutrality and a desire to play an active role in the international sphere. Like its Nordic neighbours, Sweden characterizes itself by its commitment to international solidarity, peace-building and non-violent ambitions. In Sweden, the former prime minister (1969–1976 and 1982–1986) Olof
Palme’s sympathy for the developing world has often been presented as an example of Swedish international solidarity. Sweden’s self-image as a peaceful nation has been strengthened by international mediators and humanitarian advocates such as Folke Bernadotte, Raoul Wallenberg, Jan Eliasson and Hans Blix.\textsuperscript{11}

Some authors have pointed to the contradictions in this image of Sweden. Criticism has, for example, revolved around Sweden’s continued export of arms to countries that can use them in conflicts.\textsuperscript{12} The covert collaboration between Sweden and NATO countries over the course of the Cold War has also been perceived as a betrayal of the high ideals of independence and non-alignment that Sweden adopted during the Second World War. In fact, criticisms of Swedish double standards on neutrality and international solidarity have been a distinct theme in history writing about Swedish security policy since the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{13}

After the collapse of the Soviet Union there was no in-between space for an ideological, moral great-power. In 1994, Sweden joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. In 1995, Sweden entered the European Union and became a more ordinary European nation, even as it upheld its non-aligned security policy. Since its entry into the European Union, Sweden has had to adjust its foreign policy to conform with the joint European endeavour. Collaboration with NATO became open, via joint exercises between Swedish and NATO armed forces and in military operations. Sweden has, for example, contributed large numbers of troops – more than many NATO members – to the UN-mandated, NATO-led operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya.\textsuperscript{14}

Since 2014, however, Swedish work for global peace has also been connected to a less militaristic, so-called ‘feminist’ foreign policy, which is ‘based on the conviction that sustainable peace, security and development can never been achieved if half the world’s population is excluded’.\textsuperscript{15} In 2017, the minister for foreign affairs, Margot Wallström, connected a socially aware, just and environmental policy with one of peace when she declared that ‘deteriorating climate conditions is a definite threat to international peace and security’.\textsuperscript{16}

Whether its foreign policy has been carried out by monarchs, influential politicians or non-state actors based on pragmatically founded decisions, or on a purported Swedish peaceful ideology, Sweden has certainly remained outside of armed conflicts for more than 200 years. Yet this seemingly unambiguous position actually has a complex and multifaceted history. It cannot simply be explained by a policy of neutrality or by the actions of individuals. As shown in several of the chapters in this book, geopolitics – and, not least, the interests of the great powers – has played an important role. The aim of our book is to illuminate and analyse this
complexity and to point out the forgotten or misunderstood factors, organizations and actors.

We start with the narrative of Sweden’s neutrality. It is well known that Sweden’s modern position on neutrality has received a lot of research interest. A particular scholarly focus has been given to the theoretical understanding of the concept of neutrality and its historical origins. In Chapter 1, Leos Müller shows how these origins were first located in the early nineteenth century and connected either to the Congress of Vienna or to King Charles XIV John’s declaration of neutrality in 1834. Müller argues, however, that the nineteenth-century history of Swedish neutrality is far less clear-cut than we have been led to believe. Sweden’s attitudes to its policy of neutrality have changed over time. Müller traces its origins instead to the concept of early modern maritime neutrality, which was declared by non-belligerent states in maritime conflicts. Any neutral state could claim its right to carry on trading and shipping in wartime. For many countries, such as Sweden, this was a viable policy option during early modern conflicts. Müller argues that Sweden did just that, especially in the formative period 1793–1806, with the result that Swedish shipping and trade boomed. But business conducted under neutral flag was risky, and sustaining a policy of maritime neutrality became increasingly difficult when the Napoleonic Wars escalated and drew in even non-belligerent states such as Sweden and Denmark.

Müller points to three policies of neutrality that characterized the nineteenth-century international order: guaranteed permanent neutrality, long-term voluntary neutrality and occasional neutrality. Permanent neutrality, such as that adopted by the Swiss and Belgians, was guaranteed by the great powers in multilateral congress agreements, such as the Vienna Congress of 1814–1815. Long-term voluntary neutrality expressed the neutral state’s long-term determination to refuse to take side in a war, but was not guaranteed by the great powers. Occasional neutrality was the proper neutrality of any state that declared neutrality at the outbreak of a war between two (or more) other states. It was frequently used by great powers to avoid escalation of a war. While Sweden is often considered to have been a long-term voluntary state, Müller argues that its nineteenth-century neutrality must be understood in the context of its transformation from a middle-ranking state into a small state with restricted foreign policy options. Swedish neutrality during the nineteenth century, Müller argues, was at times inconsistent and vulnerable. As such, its position should instead be characterized as small-state occasional neutrality. On several occasions, Sweden was on the brink of war. Like Jacob Westberg (Chapter 2), Müller uses both internal and external factors to explain the development of Swedish – and other European states’ – neutrality policies over
time. The most important factor for Sweden was the shifting geopolitical situation. But internal factors, especially the agency of domestic actors such as the king and the military, played a role in how this policy evolved.

In Chapter 2, Jacob Westberg focuses on how Sweden, traditionally considered a small state since the nineteenth century, has managed to stay out of wars since 1814. Although Westberg’s main focus is on Sweden, he also puts the Swedish experience within a Nordic context. Westberg studies four armed conflicts in which Sweden did not participate: The first and second Schleswig Wars (1849–1852 and 1863–1864) and the two world wars. His analytical framework builds upon the notion that Sweden is a small state. Westberg examines some of the external variables influencing strategies adopted by small states, including balance of power and strategic exposure, which explain participation in or avoidance of war. He also considers some of the internal explicatory variables, such as domestic unity, democratic control of the executive parts of the government, and liberal democratic peace theory.

He begins with the Schleswig Wars, which originated in a conflict between Germany (or, more exactly, until 1871, Prussia) and Denmark over the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. Westberg discusses these wars in terms of how the responses of the Swedish king and Parliament and the nature of domestic political debates changed over time. In the first war, Sweden sent troops to Denmark to help the country—an expression of Scandinavian solidarity. Westberg argues that Sweden’s subsequent refusal to send troops to help Denmark in the second Schleswig War can be attributed to the fact that Sweden was then experiencing a lack of domestic political unity. He also highlights the diminishing autonomy of the Swedish king. External variables also influenced the position Sweden took in these wars. In 1849, for example, Sweden’s support of Denmark was contingent on the great powers: when the great powers were unwilling to support Denmark in the second war, Sweden also opted not to support its neighbour. The lack of a balance of power in Europe in 1863–1864, therefore, had a strong restraining influence on the Swedish government’s decision whether or not to give Denmark military support.

When it came to the First and Second World Wars, differences relating to strategic exposure were the most important factors that determined why some states were drawn into the conflicts and others were not. Sweden declared its neutrality in both wars, but early on it promised to pursue a benign policy towards Germany and to support concessions in favour of the German war effort. Nevertheless, Sweden managed to stay out of the First World War, in part because the country was not strategically exposed. This was an important factor that, according to Westberg, ultimately enabled Sweden to remain neutral in both wars.
Other political factors were significant: throughout the Second World War, Germany’s occupation of Norway and Finland’s successful efforts to protect its political independence created both the need and opportunity for Sweden to pursue an appeasement policy towards Germany. Swedish non-involvement was dependent on this policy and on changes in the regional balance of power. The appeasement policy towards Germany was, however, gradually phased out and replaced with support for its neighbours and the Allied war effort.

While Müller’s and Westberg’s contributions rely on traditional facets of international politics and domestic political actors, Fredrik Egefur, in his contribution (Chapter 3), looks at powerful non-governmental actors of foreign policy, namely international peace movements. He analyses their ideological roots and describes their subdivisions in Sweden during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a period when these movements were significantly impacting the domestic public debate. Two organizations, the International Peace Bureau (IPB) and the Second International (SI), grew rapidly during this period, 1889–1914. The IPB was ideologically rooted in liberalism, and championed the idea that individual actors could collaborate with legal institutions to prevent war. The SI was a socialist organization which argued that real peace could only be achieved in a socialist society. Both movements promoted internationalism, and both believed that international arbitration courts and international law were significant tools for preventing war.

After describing the international scene in which these peace movements operated, Egefur turns his attention to Sweden and the Swedish subdivisions of these organizations. The Swedish Peace and Arbitration Association (Svenska freds- och skiljedomstolsföreningen – SFSF) was founded in 1883 by liberal parliamentarians who called for regulations for disarmament and a unilateral neutrality proclamation. The SFSF was originally formed in opposition to proposals that Swedish prime minister Arvid Posse had made concerning a new military order in the early 1880s. The SFSF published writings, newspapers and pamphlets and arranged lectures. It collaborated with Free Church parishes and sobriety associations, labour clubs and the suffrage movement. It promoted free trade, believing that closer trade relations between countries would prevent war. Divisions appeared within the SFSF when it came to relations with Norway, but the association eventually cooperated with its Norwegian counterparts and actively supported the Norwegians in the dissolution of the union in 1905. The SFSF and the labour movement collaborated in standing against Posse’s government.

The labour peace movement was subsumed by the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP). In the early twentieth century, the SAP had
two competing youth unions. The main differences between the Young Socialists and the Young Democrats related to anti-militarism. The Young Socialists were influenced by emerging French syndicalists and anarchists, and they opposed the new law that had been passed in Sweden in 1901 mandating the introduction of general military service in the country. The Young Socialists’ criticism of Sweden’s military threats against Norway coincided with this increased militarization.

As Egefur points out, anti-war sentiments more generally were demonstrated on two levels in Sweden during this period. One was the bourgeois peace movement, which was dominated by activists who had parliamentary power, and cultural personalities and activists such as the feminist writer Ellen Key, the painter Carl Larsson and the museum manager Richard Bergh. The second form of civil opposition was exemplified by groups such as the Young Socialists. Egefur puts the Swedish anti-war sentiments in an international context, revealing that the Swedish experience was not unique. Liberal and socialist anti-war movements in Sweden drew heavily from their international counterparts.

Moreover, the women’s rights movement was deeply engaged in anti-war campaigns. In 1935, for example, the Swedish section of the Women’s International League of Peace and Freedom (WILPF) gathered together 20,000 liberal and social democratic women to protest against war. Women also fought for equality and peace in connection with the dissolution of the union between Sweden and Norway.

In Chapter 4, Anne Hedén focuses on one strong yet politically ambiguous women’s organization, the Swedish Women’s Voluntary Defence Organization (Svenska Lottakåren). The contradictory nature of the organization came from the fact that while on the one hand it was a military association directly linked to Sweden’s defence forces, on the other it worked for peace and participated in the international peace movement. Hedén focuses in particular on the ways in which this association was involved in and related to peacebuilding during the Second World War up until the 1960s.

The Swedish Women’s Voluntary Defence Organization was founded in 1924 by wives of officers. It was established within the context of a conservative militaristic mobilization against Parliament’s decision to reduce the Swedish army. The organization grew significantly during the Second World War, as the Swedish government began promoting civilian defence planning. Although it was marked out as a middle- and upper-class women’s association in its initial years, the influx of women from various social backgrounds, particularly working-class women, during the early 1940s helped the organization grow. By 1941 it had around 110,000 members – an impressive membership in Sweden. Hedén points out that
the association experienced some class-based tensions, but that its female-friendship ideology remained.

Hedén explains how the organization was characterized by the idea of social motherhood and the notion that women are the ‘matrons’ of society. During the Second World War the women performed various voluntary assignments, such as in liaison centres and aircraft reconnaissance. They set up canteens and collected money for refugees. After the war, the organization adjusted to peacebuilding efforts and took a pragmatic stance towards the realities of postwar society. New activities included arranging youth summer camps, organizing summer colonies for children, undertaking humanitarian assignments and coordinating nurseries. The group also raised money for various humanitarian causes, often in close contact with other organizations such as the Red Cross. Hedén explains that these new ambitions were connected by some observers to the changing identity of the group and to Sweden’s international position as a country that promoted peace and prosperity.

Like Egefur, Hedén shows how Sweden’s development took its lead from international movements, and describes how the group collaborated with its counterparts in other countries. Since its inception, Lottakåren had had close contact with sister organizations in the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Finland, Norway and Denmark. Hedén also discusses the importance of the organization within a domestic context. When women started entering the Swedish labour force in larger numbers in the 1960s, the Swedish Women’s Voluntary Defence Organization experienced difficulties attracting new members. To retain its allure, Lottakåren framed membership as advantageous for career development. Women could gain valuable experience in the group which could launch their future careers within the Swedish public sphere. In this way, the Swedish Women’s Voluntary Defence Organization also put itself at the centre of the mainstream modernization of Sweden and of the country’s new gender equality efforts.

Turning away from the internal workings of Swedish society, in Chapter 5 Janne Väistö examines how the question of the status of the Swedish language in Finland from around 1917 influenced cultural and political ties between the two countries, and indeed affected security and stability in the Nordic region until the end of the Cold War. Finland and Sweden share over 500 years of history. From the thirteenth century up until 1809 Finland formed the eastern part of the Swedish realm. In 1809, Finland was incorporated into the Russian empire as the Grand Dutchy of Finland. In 1917, as an outcome of the Russian Revolution, Finland became an independent nation for the first time. This long common history with Sweden has meant, however, that Finland is home to a politically
and economically influential Swedish-speaking minority. Väistö focuses on how the Swedish language, as one of the two official languages in Finland (together with Finnish), has played a significant geopolitical role within a Nordic security context.

Väistö connects the status of the Swedish language in Finland to the larger context of Finnish incorporation into the Nordic cultural, economic and political community, with particular focus on the Cold War period. Finnish is a Uralic language, while Swedish, Danish and Norwegian are Germanic. By zooming in specifically on Finnish school reforms and on political discussions about the possibility of changing the status of the Swedish language, Väistö shows how the language question has related to wider issues of peace and security in Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. Swedish diplomats in Finland followed the domestic debates on the status of the Swedish language closely. Finnish social democrats, for example, have generally seen cooperation with Sweden as something desirable for increasing Nordic integration and cooperation. Large numbers of Finnish migrant workers came to Sweden in the 1950s and 1960s, and the two countries remained close, even though Finland was not a ‘rich’ country until the 1970s.

From a geopolitical point of view, Finland, as a democratic, Nordic, economic and political partner of Sweden, created a clear border between them both and the Soviet Union. The Danish and Norwegian press and governments also argued that a common Nordic language was important both for Nordic cooperation and for keeping Finland in the Western community. By helping to support the presence of the Swedish language in Finland, they believed that it was possible to maintain a joint Nordic identity. And so, what on the surface appeared to be a domestic issue which related merely to the Swedish language question in Finland was actually connected to matters of Nordic security, peace and stability. And while at times the issue led to tensions in Finnish–Swedish political relations, it was also used by both countries during the Cold War as a counterweight to Soviet pressure. But with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, and Swedish and Finnish membership in the European Union four years later, interest in the language issue in the Nordic region evaporated.

Turning to Swedish neutrality in the twentieth century, Christopher Seiberlich, in Chapter 6, explains that it has been closely associated with the government power that the SAP retained in Sweden from the early 1930s to the late 1970s. In the 1970s, the link between neutrality, internationalism and peace efforts was embodied in the policy of solidarity. Seiberlich studies the Swedish policy toward the Global South, comparing the foreign policy ambitions of three social democratic governments in Sweden, West Germany and the Netherlands. By studying government
declarations, strategy papers, internal discussions and public speeches, he sets the Swedish case in a wider context, revealing that several aspects of the Swedish policy of neutrality during the 1970s were not unique.

Seiberlich’s chapter shows the benefits of a comparative approach, as it details similarities and differences between the three countries. He emphasizes that the 1970s was a period in which social democratic parties shaped their foreign policies in new ways. Labour movements had already by the nineteenth century connected the peaceful international order to social and economic equality, with the presumption that economic development would follow. In the 1970s, the foreign policy of social democratic governments began to link a peaceful world order to social developments in the Global South. The Swedish prime minister, Olof Palme, was far from the only politician to underline the importance of economic development and equality to international peace.

Seiberlich’s comparative approach shows that social democratic parties in several European countries pursued similar projects, and that the push for social and economic equality and justice in their perception of peace should be understood as a leftist spin on larger debates about the changing nature of foreign politics in the 1970s. Seiberlich also shows that the new peace policy was problematic in several ways. The idea that the economic and social development of the Global South went hand in hand with the abolition of colonialism persisted. The 1970s was a decade of armed struggle in the Portuguese colonies, Rhodesia and South Africa. The struggle against colonial oppression in the Global South and the liberation movement as a whole were perceived as necessary for a durable international peace. According to the labour movement, the bloody liberation wars in Africa were a precursor to a new, peaceful international order, just as the nineteenth-century class struggle had been. This revealed the ideological roots of the concept of international peace among social democratic movements, but it was far from how it had been understood throughout Sweden’s 200-year history of peace.

We opened this introduction by stating that Sweden’s history of 200 years of peace is unique in Europe. Nevertheless, its lasting peace has not been an outcome of a consistent, conscious and active foreign policy of neutrality – as it is often presented by politicians. The chapters of this book show that Swedish foreign policy has followed very disparate aims over the course of time, political actors have seldom shared political visions, and, moreover, Swedish priorities have rarely played an important role in major international conflicts.

Sweden is a small state, and a small state’s foreign policy is always a balance between external and internal factors. In Sweden’s case this means the geopolitical situation, or its own level of strategic exposure. The lack of
great powers’ interest in the Nordic region in the nineteenth century is one way to explain why Sweden was able to stay out of wars – which applies to the First World War (and explains why Norway and Denmark were also able to stay out of this conflict). The situation changed in 1939, after which Sweden’s strategic exposure increased during the Second World War and the Cold War.

Even today it is open for discussion how important Swedish territory – and the Nordic region as a whole – is with respect to the strategic interests of Russia, the United States or NATO. Deepening collaboration between NATO and the two Nordic non-aligned states, Sweden and Finland, along with Denmark’s and Norway’s membership of NATO, would suggest that the region remains geopolitically important and strategically exposed, meaning that in a future conflict the kind of voluntary neutrality that was possible in the nineteenth century will be difficult to maintain.23

The contributions to this book also demonstrate the important role of internationalism and non-governmental organizations and actors in shaping the self-image of Sweden as a peaceful nation. Since the late nineteenth century the different ideologies of internationalism have influenced both the perception and practice of Swedish foreign policy. The importance of these factors has been underestimated, and they are often omitted in studies of the long peace in Sweden and attempts to understand Swedish foreign policy. We hope that this book, situated outside the traditional framework of foreign policy studies, will help us to re-evaluate such factors and stimulate interest in this history, both in Sweden and internationally.

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**Notes**

2. This is especially true when compared to research on neighbouring Norway and Denmark; see Robert Dalsjö and Magnus Petersson, ‘200 år av fred: Dags för ett arbete om svensk utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik 1814–2014’, *Historisk tidsskrift* 134(2), 2014, 248–258.
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Bibliography


