

INTRODUCTION



Words are deeds.

—Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Grammar*

Symbolic power is the power to make things with words.

—Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Social Space and Symbolic Power’

Political struggle ... is inseparably theoretical and practical, over the power of preserving or transforming the social world by preserving or transforming the categories of perception of that world.

—Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*

Topic and Research Question

In 1659, the Protestant theologian Richard Baxter outlined his ideal of society in a political treatise entitled *A Holy Commonwealth*.¹ Baxter evidently believed that with the death of Oliver Cromwell, the time had finally come to put his political dreams down on paper so that they could become reality. In his search for an ideal model for the organisation of society, he turned his gaze back to the distant past before the Fall of Man: ‘When God immediately Ruled, and man obeyed, all went right’.² Baxter referred to a state built around this principle as a theocracy.

In his tract, Baxter demanded nothing less than that England itself should take on the form of a theocracy – a transformation that would result in a state where God ruled as king and all inhabitants were God’s subjects.³ The political objectives of the state would be completely congruent with the will of God, and there would

be no differences between the affairs of the church and those of the state. As such, the worldly ruler would merely be God's officer: 'This is a Theocracy [*sic*], when Princes govern from God, by God, and for God in all things'.⁴

According to Baxter, the rule of God as king is achievable in practice by establishing the *lex dei* as the highest law of the land. This law, he maintains, is implanted in all men at birth and spelled out in the Holy Scriptures. In Baxter's vision, the norms valid in the church are indistinguishable from those of society, with church and state merging into an inseparable whole. Moreover, membership of both the spiritual and the worldly community rests on a single rite of entry – that of baptism. Through this sacrament, as Baxter explains, each individual believer strengthens the bond between God and humanity that has endured since the time of Abraham. Baxter explicitly chooses not to separate the covenant of grace from the covenant of law, but conflates the two. The covenant is thus understood as conditional, in that salvation is dependent on adherence to God's law. Any violation would equate to high treason against God's sovereign rule, with consequences for the common weal.

A Holy Commonwealth represents an almost textbook attempt to use the Bible to make sense of politics. Baxter's ideal form of rule is the extreme case, in which a society subjects itself exclusively to God's norms as revealed in the Scriptures, and rejects the validity of all divergent norms. Baxter was also one of the first to refer to this political goal using the term 'theocracy'.⁵ Yet this aspiration to establish a society subject exclusively to the rule of God was already inherent in the writings of the Old Testament, and it was regularly placed on the political agenda by radical Protestant clergymen in the wake of the Reformation, especially in England and Scotland. While such pleas for the establishment of a theocracy were admittedly the exception rather than the rule in the British public sphere during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, arguments drawing on the Bible were commonplace in political discourse.

This book will focus on references to biblical maxims and exempla in political debate, as well as the justification of political statements and positions using passages from the Bible. The term commonly used to describe this practice is 'biblicism', which should be understood in a neutral way – that is, without any of the pejorative undertones associated with the term by modern theologians when referring to uncritical, literal readings of the Bible during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.⁶

In the seventeenth century, biblicism was by no means a problematic way of looking at the world; rather, it was commonly adopted as an interpretive approach beyond the disciplinary boundaries of theology, and it represented one of a number of codes with which people could ascribe meaning to and explain themselves and their environment.⁷ The Bible clearly served as a source of narratives and patterns that lent themselves to describing and assessing social and political relationships.

The political realm was by no means exempt from this code. Politics and religion were not clearly differentiated spheres, but were mutually dependent and therefore closely interwoven.⁸ In the early modern era, political rule without religious legitimation was unthinkable; yet this interdependence came with consequences. Any political rule that rested on a religious foundation was expected constantly to defend and protect the principles of the religion in question. Bible texts were also used to define how a ruler should behave as the protector of the religion, how the rule of the king stood in relation to the rule of God, what subjects owed to their worldly overlords and what they could demand in return. Political authority, according to the commonly accepted credo, had to align with the words of the Bible, and political decisions needed to be made in accordance with the provisions and maxims of the Scriptures. Based on these principles, there was a constant reciprocal relationship between politics and the Bible in both theory and practice.

For the purposes of this book, politics should be understood along the lines of Willibald Steinmetz's definition as a sequence of 'communicative events', in which 'a variety of actors participate through speaking, writing, listening, acting symbolically, and even occasionally acting with violence'.⁹ The terms 'political communication' and 'politics' also cover speech acts that make 'reference to collective units of action' and therefore touch upon 'rules of coexistence, power relations, or the limits of what can be said and done'.¹⁰ We should also add that, as a rule, political communication and political action 'aim at the establishment and implementation of generally binding regulations and judgements within and between groups of people'.¹¹ The arguments and societal blueprints produced in this way obtain plausibility by citing recognised authorities, which in turn gives them a chance of being accepted. In order to understand a given society, therefore, it is essential to look at the specific arguments raised and the reservoirs of tradition drawn upon in political debate. By focusing on these aspects of political communication, my study thus falls under the purview of the cultural history of politics.¹²

Although the authority of the Bible in the early modern period was generally uncontroversial, the validity and applicability of biblical norms as a standard for political rule in particular instances, and the specific interpretation of individual passages of the Bible, were highly contested within political discourse. The controversies over these questions saw theological and political arguments merge into an indissoluble amalgam.¹³ The following chapters are dedicated to tracing these conflicts by looking at political debates in the run-up to the English Civil War. In doing so, they focus on three key aspects of the topic.

The Authority of the Speaker: It was by no means only clergymen who used the language of biblicism in their arguments. This book will show that monarchs themselves, along with numerous other political actors, brought the rhetoric of the Bible into the realm of politics. This can be seen in the fact that biblicist

arguments appear not only in sermons and theological tracts, but also in *specula principum* ('mirrors for princes'), political treatises, political speeches before parliament and so on. This book will explain the political functions we can assign to each of these different speech acts; however, the very fact that the language of biblicism was used by many different actors on the political stage attests to its political relevance.

At the same time, it is necessary to differentiate between two different types of speakers. Firstly, there were people whose speech acts attained importance by virtue of the office they held and the authority ascribed to them. For these individuals, we need to discuss why they drew on the language of biblicism, rather than any other languages. Secondly, biblicism also allowed actors without any kind of official, institutionalised authority to become well known as speakers, insofar as they were able to clearly present themselves as witnesses of God's truth and successors to the prophets, and insofar as this imagined role was accepted by audiences.¹⁴ Between the Reformation and the Civil War, there were a few instances of self-proclaimed prophets playing a significant role on the political stage, and these occasions are worthy of close examination.

Arguments and Models of Social Order. Alongside the question of *who* used the rhetoric of the Bible in the realm of politics, there is also the question of *what they said*. This book will focus exclusively on statements that deal explicitly with fundamental questions related to political rule, that defend or criticise individual political decisions using biblicist arguments, or that comment on the legitimacy, and therefore the stability, of the king's rule. As such, my study will only discuss theology and ecclesiastical politics in cases where debates emerging from these fields take on a general political dynamic and touch at least indirectly upon the king's status as a ruler. Needless to say, it is often tricky to set boundaries here, as there is no clear distinction between politics and religion.

The analysis of biblicist rhetoric in political contexts looks at what was said in the political language of biblicism, but also at what could not be said. The majority of biblicist speech acts discuss the relationship between conditions in England and God's law as revealed in the Bible – or, more specifically, in the Deuteronomistic History of the Old Testament. Likewise, biblicism played an important role whenever the political governance of the land came up for debate – that is, when the origins of sovereign rule and the monarchy, as well as the rights and duties of both the king and his subjects, were called into question.

In studying these debates, it is also important to consider the varying epistemological significance of biblicist arguments. The spectrum of biblicist reasoning ranges from the didactic use of biblical exempla to legitimise contemporary arguments to the adoption of individual, Bible-based interpretive patterns and narratives, or even the Old Testament itself, as a timeless legal code.

Consequences: The more binding a biblical argument was considered to be, the more political weight it carried. If the monarch's policies were seen in political

contexts as contrary to the *lex dei* revealed in the Bible, it would spell the erosion of the king's authority and political legitimacy in the long term. This book will therefore show the major lines of argument put forward by advocates of the king in a bid to fend off such ideas. From the early 1620s onward, however, biblicist criticism consistently dogged the politics of James I and Charles I, and ultimately contributed to the collapse of the Stuart monarchy in England.

Consequently, there is no better era in the history of England for discussing the political relevance of biblicism than the years of the Civil War, from 1642 to 1651. This book thus begins with the question of whether, and in what ways, biblicist rhetoric contributed to the development and intensification of a dangerous crisis for the Stuart monarchy in the years leading up to the outbreak of war. I intend to clarify which Bible-based arguments and concepts of political order shaped the contours of political debate as matters escalated after 1640, and also to examine the relative importance of biblicist arguments in comparison to those that drew on other traditions.

After doing the above, I will bring the historical backdrop into focus by examining the phenomenon of biblical rhetoric in detail from the beginning of King James I/VI's reign. We will see that, for the most part, the biblicist political expectations surrounding the king and Parliament at the outbreak of the Civil War were not fundamentally new interpretations; rather, most of these interpretive patterns were already well established and ripe for use in political clashes. Finally, I will draw conclusions regarding the inherent potential of biblicism in various contexts as a means of stabilising or criticising political rule.

Historiography

For Edmund Ludlow – member of the Long Parliament, high-ranking officer in the parliamentary army and staunch supporter of the execution of Charles I – the Restoration of Charles II to the English throne meant that the time had come to head into exile by Lake Geneva.¹⁵ From his new home in Switzerland, Ludlow looked back at the events of the Civil War in his text *A Voyce from the Watch Tower* and justified how Parliament had dealt with King Charles I in the following words:

... though Charles Steward was not the Anti-Christ spoken of by the Apostle, yet was he one of the kinges that gave his power to the Beast. Yea, albeit in appearance the nation had cast off that yoake, yet did he assume to himselfe the headship of the church, and in effect (as farr as he could) obstruct the propagation of the gospell, no other doctrine being willingly permitted to be taught within his dominions but such as suited with and supported his corrupt interest of tyranny and domination; which being witnessed against by the spirit of the Lord, from the beginning of Genesis to the end of the Revelations.¹⁶

According to Ludlow's reasoning, Charles I had to die because he jeopardised the salvation of the English people. He had fornicated with the Whore of Babylon, prevented the spread of the pure gospel and corrupted the church. In Ludlow's view, the execution of the king was thus necessary in order to return to the true faith. He saw Parliament's success and its victories in battle – all guided by Divine Providence – as proof that it had done nothing more than carry out the will of God.¹⁷ Ludlow regarded the Stuart monarchy and the events of the Civil War from a perspective rooted in the Bible and salvation history. For him, the Antichrist was omnipresent, especially within the Royalist camp.

When Ludlow's text was posthumously published under the title *Memoirs* in 1698/99, all these biblical allusions and his eschatological perspective were largely removed.¹⁸ The Nonconformist Ludlow, who had spent his life in anticipation of Judgement Day, was turned into a republican-minded politician and author aligned with Roman values, and thus a predecessor of the Radical Whigs, among whom his memoirs enjoyed great popularity in the eighteenth century.¹⁹

I have included this example at the beginning of my study because it clearly shows how interest in biblicist argumentation and awareness of its crucial importance in political discourse before and during the Civil War increasingly waned after the conflict had abated. To make Ludlow's text seem relevant towards the end of the seventeenth century, it was apparently deemed necessary to package his memoirs in the language of republicanism and to rid them of their biblicist interpretive patterns.

As long as the events of the Civil War and the Stuart monarchy remained an integral part of England's national self-image as the mother of liberty, the general focus lay on the supposedly modern traits of the rebellious Parliamentarians, rather than their millenarianism or their predilection for Old Testament models. The Civil War enjoyed a prominent place in the Whig interpretation of history as the victory of an unyielding Parliament that defended the rights and freedoms of the English people against the increasingly despotic Stuart monarchy.²⁰ Along these lines, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 confirmed the outcome of this initial 'revolution', and definitively turned England into a universally admired model for all freedom-loving people and nations. In this portrayal of the struggle for freedom by the people (represented by Parliament), there was no room for the biblicist rhetoric wielded by contemporaries, as their use of such language might have cast a shadow over their images as modern pioneers of parliamentary rights and liberties.

Even so, religion enjoyed a prominent place within the Whig interpretation of history. The fact that Parliament had preserved Protestantism in England, alongside the freedom of the English people, formed part of the grand narrative. In other words, freedom and Protestantism were two sides of the same coin. Samuel Rawson Gardiner coined the term 'Puritan revolution' to describe just this aspect.²¹ Those whom Gardiner referred to as Puritans, however, were not

religious fanatics or subversive social revolutionaries, but prototypes of the consummate Englishman best embodied by Oliver Cromwell himself.²² In this sense, the Puritan revolution was a struggle for political and religious freedoms.²³ Moreover, Gardiner saw religion as subordinate to the constitutional goal of limiting the monarch's right to rule. For him, religion was a means by which to legitimise and mobilise support, but not a cause of the conflict.²⁴

Interestingly, Marxist historians had little trouble coupling this narrative to their own interpretations, which were rooted in social history.²⁵ By suggesting that the seventeenth century marked the advent of the new bourgeoisie's rise to power, they did not fundamentally contradict the way history was painted in the Whig interpretation; they merely brought a few new colours onto the canvas.²⁶ Christopher Hill offers a unique take on this approach when he identifies Puritanism as the ideology of the new bourgeoisie striving to gain power.²⁷ As such, he shows more interest than earlier historians in the specific forms of this ideology, with the result that several of his books examine the biblicist political arguments of the time.²⁸ All the same, it is telling that he devotes far more attention to the biblicist arguments of the Puritans than to any of their adversaries, be they Conformist theologians or the advocates of the divine right of kings.²⁹ Moreover, Hill generally removes biblical arguments from their specific contexts in order to weave them together into a coherent overall picture of a consistent class-based ideology and world view.³⁰ In the process, however, the rhetorical content of the arguments is lost.

The political scientist Michael Walzer also focuses on the Puritans in his work on the 'revolution of the saints', published in 1965.³¹ According to Walzer, the English Revolution can only be explained through the ideology of the Puritan clergy and the potency of their sermons.³² The Puritans embodied an intellectual avant-garde, akin to the Bolsheviks.³³ They stood for the complete transformation and renewal of society, as manifested in its ideal form by Oliver Cromwell and his New Model Army.³⁴ Walzer explicitly rejects the Marxist assertion that the 'ideology' of Puritanism is fully attributable to changes in the traditional social structure.³⁵ All the same, he champions an approach that is no less tied to modernisation theory – one that assigns the Puritans a decisive role in the modernisation of England and the individualisation of society.³⁶ Walzer's focus is really on the modern world rather than on the English Civil War, which may explain why he acknowledges the significance of Puritan rhetoric in the abstract, but does not embark on a detailed interpretation and contextualisation of individual sermons.³⁷

Furthermore, Walzer's interpretation is largely based on older positions that are mostly considered outdated today. For example, he still upholds the now stereotypical distinction between conservative Lutherans and revolutionary Calvinists.³⁸ Walzer also understands Calvinism to be an expression of a republican ethos, following Hans Baron, whom he cites explicitly.³⁹ Yet he

overlooks the fact that James I and many of his supporters among the clergy were themselves staunch Calvinists. Moreover, he uses the terms ‘Calvinist’ and ‘Puritan’ interchangeably, treating them as distinct from ‘Anglican’.⁴⁰ The word ‘Puritan’, however, was used polemically as a means of othering Nonconformists, and for this reason alone it is a poor choice to describe specific groups within the Anglican Church.⁴¹ In Walzer’s interpretation, the Puritans’ revolutionary character is therefore merely a consequence of his arbitrary definitions and conceptual assumptions, rather than a valid conclusion reached by means of empirical analysis.

Few advocates of the grand narrative of the triumph of freedom over tyranny give religion and the Puritans as prominent a role as Walzer and Hill. All the same, the central pillars of the Whig interpretation of history exerted a decisive influence on how the political rhetoric of the time was interpreted. For a long time, there was a broad common consensus among historians that England was a special case in the early modern period. While absolutist monarchies prevailed throughout most of mainland Europe in the seventeenth century, the opposite was true in England, where Parliament asserted and consolidated itself in the face of attacks by the Crown. Parliament was thus the guarantor of English civil liberties. Historians attributed this role not only to the Long Parliament in its conflict with Charles I, but to virtually every other Parliament during the Stuart period too. At the same time, a fundamental antagonism was assumed to exist between the Crown and Parliament. If Parliament embodied freedom, then both James I and Charles I stood for the ambition of bringing absolutism to England. This interpretation implied that the Civil War was a virtually inevitable consequence of otherwise irreconcilable divisions in Stuart England.⁴² It also suggested that the constitutional conflict between Crown and Parliament was underpinned socially by the irreconcilable opposition between court and country. The Marxist interpretation then added another layer to these divisions: that of the class conflict between the new gentry and the old peerage. Stuart England increasingly took on the appearance of an unusually contentious and crisis-prone society, with no chance of survival.⁴³

This version of English history in the early Stuart period, however, no longer holds good.⁴⁴ Geoffrey Elton questioned the teleological inevitability of the Civil War as early as 1966, and a collection of sources entitled *The Stuart Constitution* was published in the same year, whose editor, J.P. Kenyon, likewise denied that the events of the era were unavoidable. Nor did he attribute the periodic crises of authority under James I and Charles I to fundamental conflicts, instead ascribing them to specific problems in English statehood and in particular the Crown’s notorious financial deficit.⁴⁵ A fundamental rejection of the idea of the Civil War’s inevitability thus emerged in the 1970s, especially with the works of Conrad Russell, Mark Kishlansky and Kevin Sharpe, whose arguments are grouped together under the name ‘revisionism’. Together, they

show that the various parliaments cannot in any way be seen as key forums of opposition to the king. The Parliamentarians were not revolutionaries, but were tied to a conservative world view and more interested in local concerns than in systematically shaping politics.⁴⁶

Above all, revisionism has done away with the notion that England was defined by ideological antagonisms in the years prior to 1640.⁴⁷ Its proponents emphasise the consensus over fundamental social and political questions in place of general political differences – or at least, like Sharpe, they take issue with the idea that the conflicts within Parliament or between Parliament and the Crown are attributable to ideological factors. Admittedly, as Glenn Burgess has rightly noted, the revisionists are not particularly interested in the history of political ideas.⁴⁸ Nonetheless, the notion of a unifying consensus among all actors is now widely accepted by historians. This is especially thanks to John Pocock's work *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law*, published in 1987, in which Pocock emphasises that the ancient constitution and common law represented a binding set of values for all actors, and that they were the main sources used to legitimise political statements in political debates. As a result, not only did Pocock strip the Parliamentarians of their revolutionary garb, but proponents of monarchical rule also ceased to be seen as apologists for absolutism. As Burgess argues, it was obvious even to advocates of the Crown that the king could not rule arbitrarily, and that he was bound by the law.⁴⁹

Yet this interpretation did more than simply remove ideological conflicts from the period leading up to the Civil War. By stressing the language of common law, it also lost sight of the use of other languages within political debate. England was not only compared with the ideal of the ancient constitution, but also with ancient Israel through the language of biblicism (among others). For Pocock and Burgess, biblical maxims and examples were at most used in political discourse to embellish the framework of values provided by the ancient constitution, and were by no means a distinct form of political rhetoric. Yet in fact, closer examination of rhetoric based on biblical models would have made it more difficult to identify an ideological consensus in England prior to 1640.

Another field within the history of political ideas consists of studies related to civic humanism and republican ideas in England.⁵⁰ Here, Quentin Skinner links the outbreak of the English Civil War with the idea of republicanism, and more specifically the adoption of ideas from classical antiquity, in an especially significant way. According to Skinner, the Long Parliament turned to classically republican notions of liberty at a moment when it saw itself facing a political emergency and staked a claim to absolute sovereignty.⁵¹ He maintains that these ideas only fully established themselves in English political thought over the course of the Civil War and during the rule of Oliver Cromwell.⁵² Yet prominent advocates of civic humanism and republicanism can also be found in the Elizabethan and early Stuart eras.⁵³ For authors such as Burgess and Pocock,

civic humanism formed, in a sense, the ideological foundation of the doctrine of the ancient constitution, and was therefore an extra glue for the ideological consensus among the English upper class, whereas Skinner's interpretation of classically derived ideas of liberty more strongly emphasises their potentially revolutionary character. What these two camps have in common, however, is that they both marginalise notions of political order in which religion played a dominant role.⁵⁴

It is presumably no coincidence that Johann Sommerville, the main critic of this view of an English society underpinned by ideological consensus, also tends to attach greater significance to biblical arguments. According to Sommerville, from the enthronement of James I onwards, England was characterised by a conflict between multiple mutually exclusive world views. England, as elsewhere in Europe, was subject to two competing ideologies, with absolute monarchy pitted against a parliament that demanded a greater role. By asserting that this ideological conflict was an important factor in the outbreak of the English Civil War, Sommerville finds himself following in the footsteps of Gardiner.⁵⁵ At the same time, however, he argues that the political language of the ancient constitution is only one language among many, and that of these, the language of the divine right of kings is the most important. According to Sommerville, references to biblical exempla within the theory of the divine right of kings were sometimes crucial – especially, for example, in Patriarchalist arguments that looked to the model of Adam as the basis for political rule.

The problem with Sommerville's depiction of political theory in the early Stuart period, however, lies in exactly this simplistic correlation between political arguments and sources. Whereas Christopher Hill primarily focuses on Puritan biblical arguments, Sommerville mostly sees the Scriptures being cited by supporters of absolute monarchy. Depending on one's perspective, the Bible provided arguments for Parliamentarians or for supporters of the king. Yet a closer look at biblicist rhetoric in political debate will show that neither of these positions adds up. Biblicism, to echo Pocock, was a political language, not a political programme.

Without doubt, revisionism has made a decisive contribution to our understanding of the early Stuart period. Yet the very success of this new interpretation of the history of the Stuart era makes the gap that still exists all the more obvious, as we are further than ever from being able to answer the question of what caused the English Civil War.⁵⁶ Moreover, the term revisionism covers an array of incompatible interpretations that overlap solely in their criticism of the grand narrative of the Puritan Revolution. Even among revisionists, one can find authors who almost entirely strip the Civil War of ideological causes, as well as others who argue the opposite and see religion as the ultimate catalyst behind the outbreak of conflict.⁵⁷

Nicholas Tyacke, in particular, has sought to develop a kind of new grand narrative that bridges what may only be an apparent contradiction between the notion of a prevailing consensus in England and the obvious conflicts that emerged after 1642. He does this by shifting focus from the Puritans to the Arminians within the English church. The Puritans, he argues, had always shared the basic consensus of the Church of England – namely, the belief in predestination – so it makes no sense to speak of a struggle within the church between Anglicans and Puritans. By contrast, the Arminians, with their teachings of grace, had broken with this consensus, thereby provoking ever-growing tensions in church and society.⁵⁸

Conrad Russell, in particular, backs Tyacke's thesis, claiming that it helps explain why a Civil War was possible in England in the first place. However, this interpretation has not gone unchallenged.⁵⁹ Firstly, there is a problem of nomenclature. Tyacke identifies Archbishop Laud and others as Arminians without proving that these clergymen did indeed follow Arminius's theology of free will in their dogma.⁶⁰ That contemporaries referred to numerous bishops in the Church of England as Arminians does not, in itself, justify the use of this term as an analytical category.⁶¹ Given the fact that the words 'Arminian' or 'Puritan' were always used as polemical, othering labels, and not as a means of self-description, it seems sensible to avoid using this term for analytical purposes wherever possible.⁶² Furthermore, Tyacke concentrates too heavily on dogmatic differences among the English clergy. Yet an examination of the debates over church politics under James I and Charles I reveals that other controversies were much more prominent than the question of predestination – namely, those related to the governance of the church and the role of the episcopacy on the one hand, and to the liturgy during church services on the other.⁶³

John Morrill takes a different approach, underscoring the central importance of religion to the question of what caused the Civil War, and demonstrating why the Civil War was above all a religious war.⁶⁴ He asks what could have induced MPs to choose one of the two camps – that is, king or Parliament – in 1642. He concludes that attitudes towards the governance of the Church of England were the decisive factor in choosing one side or the other; controversies over the king's tax privileges or the extent of his prerogatives were less important.⁶⁵ Yet Morrill's and Conrad Russell's emphasis on the religious character of the Civil War serves another purpose too. Because both authors insist that there was broad consensus over constitutional issues among the country's political elite, they need an 'external' factor beyond the realm of politics – namely, religion – to explain the outbreak of the Civil War.⁶⁶ Both historians are thus highly receptive to Tyacke's Arminian Revolution hypothesis. It is telling, however, that this type of approach leaves the political rhetoric of the time unexamined. Focusing on biblicist speech acts within the political sphere, as I propose to do in this

study, makes it far less easy to clearly separate politics from religion in line with Morrill's and Russell's approaches.

In sum, it is safe to say that the analysis of biblical rhetoric in the political discourse of the Stuart monarchy has only profited marginally from the plethora and variety of existing interpretive approaches to the history of the English Civil War. Even those studies that accord religion a significant role in the outbreak of the Civil War only seldom look at what biblical images were deployed to describe these conflicts, what biblical maxims and exempla were used to develop political arguments, and what effects this had on the perception and description of political options. Kevin Sharpe's plea for a broader understanding of the term 'religion' to encompass not only aspects of dogma and ecclesiastical matters, such as conflicts over liturgy and church governance, but also religious rhetoric in political contexts, has largely fallen on deaf ears.⁶⁷

Although the Bible was often cited as a source of authority and legitimacy in the political controversies of the Stuart period, its use in the generation of political arguments has not yet been systematically analysed. The many recent studies on the English Bible have mainly concentrated on the different English translations and their varying political connotations.⁶⁸ For the most part, they ignore the role of biblicist arguments in political debate. Even scholarship on Protestant book and reading culture pushes the political controversies of the Stuart period into the background.⁶⁹ In fact, political biblicism has thus far only been the subject of individual case studies – although the growth in such studies over the last few years is perhaps a sign of increased interest in the topic.⁷⁰

Only one aspect of biblicism has been of relative interest to historians so far – namely, the political manner of reading the Apocalypse that emerged in Protestant England. At the end of the 1970s, there was a short-lived boom in research on a specific English exegetical tradition attached to the Book of Revelation. The identification of the Pope – along with groups and protagonists allegedly close to him – with the Antichrist was particularly prevalent in England, and has therefore attracted some scholarly attention. However, this strict focus on the Apocalypse has its drawbacks, as it assumes, virtually a priori, that any political concept based on John the Divine's prophecy of the end of the world was necessarily a radical one. Yet we can only make this kind of assertion after explicit comparison with other statements framed in the language of biblicism.

Thus far, however, no one has attempted to situate these apocalyptic interpretive models within the context of biblicist rhetoric in general. Furthermore, studies that do look at the role of the Book of Revelation in political rhetoric tend to exhibit a certain bias. Their analysis is almost always limited to texts written by authors critical of the king, and therefore automatically associates the Apocalypse with a critique of monarchical rule. I aim to show, however, that the Book of Revelation, like all other biblical texts, could be interpreted to argue both for and against the king.⁷¹ What is true of biblicism in general is also true of texts

that draw on the Apocalypse: they are part of a political language, not a political programme.

Biblicism as a Political Language

My study is intended as a contribution to research into ‘cultivated semantics’ in the early modern period.⁷² The term refers to the collective body of knowledge available to a given society for the purposes of identifying and interpreting current problems. This collective knowledge comprises the sum of all individual speech acts recorded in texts, other media or even in rituals in order to make them available as a whole to society and therefore permanently retrievable. Perceptions and interpretations are thus stored, and simultaneously categorised, standardised and generalised.⁷³ What finds its way into this collective body of knowledge, and what is forgotten, can only be determined in retrospect by identifying which topics were repeatedly broached in social communication and thereby kept up to date, and which were not.

‘Cultivated semantics’ is a kind of collective term for the different, even mutually contradictory discourses or ‘meaning generators’ with which a society describes itself and attributes significance to its own activity.⁷⁴ This study sets out to show that biblicism in seventeenth-century England was a meaningful discourse that was used for societal self-description, and which was continually revised and updated. The discourses – or political languages, as I will call them from now on in this book – in which a society communicates current problems and conflicts are key to understanding its political culture. Societies construct themselves in specific ways through their self-descriptions and, at the same time, these constructions shape the individual society’s perception of the world.⁷⁵ Any description of political order that essentially draws its inventory of norms and models from the Bible will mould identities in its own particular way and develop its own concept of time; indeed, it will ultimately propagate a continuity between the times described in the Old and New Testaments and that of the contemporary era.

The following chapters will focus on texts that measure and debate the legitimacy of the monarchy and the church against standards drawn from the Bible. Formally speaking, there is no unified corpus: some of the texts are sermons that were subsequently published; others are political and theological treatises. Historiographical texts, Bible commentaries and *specula principum* have also been included in the analysis. What unites all these heterogeneous texts is simply the fact that they use the Bible as a source of authority in presenting political arguments. Their reference to the same common authority allows us to classify these texts as belonging to the same political discourse, and to treat them as various expressions of a shared, collective ‘political language’.

The methodological concept of political language draws on the Cambridge School of political thought, and was developed in particular by John Pocock and Quentin Skinner.⁷⁶ This took place over a period of at least thirty years, during which various aspects of the model were outlined in empirical analyses of the ancient constitution or early modern republicanism, for example, as well as in countless other theoretical works on the subject. I do not intend to trace the genesis of this methodological concept; rather, I will attempt to systematically present aspects of the theory that are pertinent to my analysis of biblicalism, and to draw out their consequences for my empirical study.

Following Skinner, I understand texts and linguistic expressions in a broader sense to be speech acts with specific intentions. In that sense, my goal in interpreting these texts is to trace the intention behind them.⁷⁷ It is much easier to reveal an author's intention (to adopt the term used by Skinner) if the spectrum of possible speech acts available to them for presenting their argument can be reconstructed, in order to determine which speech act and statement actually appear in the author's text.⁷⁸ Skinner and Pocock rightly agree that the author's intention cannot be adequately determined solely by reading the text; rather, a double context analysis is necessary.⁷⁹

Firstly, in order to determine the author's specific intention, the texts must be situated within the ideological or linguistic contexts of their time – that is, they must be evaluated against other texts. It is this comparison and the search for commonalities and differences that make it possible to separate specific elements from common conventions of political discourse. In this context, what Skinner calls 'conventions' are entirely congruent with Pocock's concept of political language. As Tully points out, Skinner understands conventions to be 'relevant linguistic commonplaces uniting a number of texts: shared vocabulary, principles, assumptions, criteria for testing knowledge-claims, problems, conceptual distinctions and so on'.⁸⁰

Secondly, it is essential to situate both the text and its content within the political context of the time. This involves treating political theory as a political act, and although I acknowledge that there is a difference between theory and practice, I do not see it as a cast-iron distinction. The text is embedded within the political controversies of its time, though one must always gauge whether or not the author's intention extends beyond the sphere of discourse into that of political praxis. Discourse and praxis are thus assumed to be mutually contingent: the political context is an essential prerequisite for both the generation of a speech act and the manner of its production, and the resulting ideologies are in turn a 'material factor' for political praxis, which cannot remain immune to their effects. When applied to discourse on the legitimacy of political action, this means that 'the limits of the stretchability of the available ideologies sets [*sic*] the limits to legitimate action'.⁸¹ It must be noted, however, that Pocock and Skinner both show much less interest in situating texts within their *political* context than in

analysing the *linguistic* context of political statements.⁸² Identifying protagonists' positions within the patterns of political decision-making and reconstructing power constellations and social or class stratifications do not rank among these authors' preferred topics. This is surprising, since it is hardly possible to determine the motives and intentions behind an author's linguistic statements without considering the social and political realms in which that author is active, and in which they position their statements.

Pocock emphasises that political speech acts – for which he repeatedly uses the structuralist term *parole* – must align themselves with the available political languages, which he equates with the term *langue*.⁸³ These political languages, in turn, determine the possibilities and limits of what can be said: 'For anything to be said or written or printed, there must be a language to say it in; the language determines what can be said in it, but is capable of being modified by what is said in it'.⁸⁴ Pocock argues that this does not result in statements becoming homogenised, since contradictory positions can easily be expressed in the same political language, but that it generates a shared canon of authorities, as well as a certain amount of shared terminology for the topics under debate.⁸⁵

Moreover, in order to make statements about the significance and effect of a speech act, one must also consider how it is received. If a text first appears publicly in printed form, the reader is not subject to any authority insisting that they interpret it in a certain way.⁸⁶ Pocock characterises the process of reading as follows: 'any and all of the speech acts the text has been performing can be reperformed by the reader in ways nonidentical with those in which the author intended and performed them'.⁸⁷ Although authors try to steer the interpretation of texts in many different ways – such as by adding notes and footnotes to the text, or by suggesting an interpretation in the preface – there is no guarantee that their efforts will be successful.⁸⁸

However, historians face a substantial source problem when they try to establish the ways in which particular texts were received by contemporary readers. The only thing that historians possibly have to go on is the ongoing development of the discourse. Speech acts often prompt responses; in other words, the reading of political texts leads to the writing of counterarguments. In this way, the experience of reading feeds into further speech acts. The publication of a text can lead to the appearance of more and more texts, which refer to one another and compete to become the dominant interpretation within a political language. It is this 'continuum of discourse' that most clearly attests to the existence of a political language.⁸⁹ For the language of biblicism in particular, the 'continuum of discourse' can often be traced in sequences of texts – that is, in statements and responses that generate further texts in their wake. In scholarship on discourses, the category of political language has a function similar to that of the term 'structure' in the interpretation of human action. Political languages establish a structure for political speech acts; they have both an enabling and

a limiting function. A given spectrum of political statements is possible within a particular political language, but the use of that language will also preclude certain other statements.

The similarity of the category of political language to that of structure means that political language is sometimes equated with terms such as ‘mentality’ or ‘habitus’.⁹⁰ However, this misunderstands the different methodological concepts behind these terms.⁹¹ A habitus is acquired through socialisation and becomes virtually ingrained, so that it decisively shapes people’s perceptions and world views, as well as their behaviours and lifestyles. Unlike theories whereby the actor is steered towards or excluded from certain modes of behaviour by virtue of their role, habitus becomes a permanent aspect of the individual once their socialisation is complete, and can neither be exchanged nor adapted at will to new social demands.⁹²

Political languages, on the other hand, are much closer to the category of roles than to the concept of habitus. For every speech act, the author has a selection of different languages at their disposal, as long as they know their rules and do not reject any political language out of principle – for example, on ideological grounds. Moreover, different languages can be incorporated into the same text, which is a relatively common way of constructing an argument in political discourse.⁹³

Therefore, any sort of congruence between habitus and a given political language forms the exception rather than the rule. This is always likely to be the case when only one of the possible languages appears to be legitimate, and all others are rejected in principle for reasons tied to habitual or ideological dispositions. For example, in political discourse, a Presbyterian has almost no choice but to express themselves exclusively in the language of biblicism, since all other sources of authority are subordinate to the Bible, if not outright illegitimate.

The fruitfulness of the concept of political language has been impressively demonstrated in numerous studies.⁹⁴ Yet while the purpose of this kind of intellectual history is to draft a ‘linguistic map of the early modern era’, there are still blank spots on the chart of politically influential languages.⁹⁵ Although the languages of the ancient constitution, civic humanism and republicanism have been intensively discussed, biblicism still huddles in the shadows of the Cambridge School of political thought. However, I believe this book will show that biblicism – that is, the use of the Bible as a primary source of authority when discussing political rule – can also be seen as a political language that has played a significant role in political discourse, especially in the Stuart monarchy in the years leading up to the Civil War.

One reason why this topic is largely ignored by the pioneers of the Cambridge School in particular may lie in the fact that even Pocock and Skinner cannot resist the temptation to trace the origins of modernity back to the early modern era. Both Pocock’s *Machiavellian Moment* and Skinner’s *Foundations of Modern*

Political Thought ultimately pursue the same goal, albeit in completely different ways: whereas Skinner tries to locate the origin of modern political thought in the work of premodern authors, Pocock looks to the tradition of premodern languages.⁹⁶ It is easy to see how tracing a link between premodern and modern political ideas might be more challenging when looking at biblicism rather than republicanism – leaving aside the question of whether the latter endeavour overlooks the differences between Machiavelli’s discussion of republics and the debate surrounding the US Constitution in order to highlight the postulated similarities between them.⁹⁷

From this perspective, it is probably an advantage that there is little danger of hastily labelling speakers and authors who use biblicist arguments as founding fathers and pioneers of modernity. Rather than any perceived relevance to the present, the fact that these authors’ manner of constructing meaning seems strange and alien to us today is what ensures that our reconstructions of their motives and intentions do not devolve into mere reflections of modern ideas. Skinner’s goal of tracing the intentions of authors by analysing their linguistic and social contexts is doubtless easier to achieve if no deliberate attempt is made to link the past with the present.

Notes

1. All dates are given according to the Julian calendar that was valid at the time in Protestant England. However, the *mos Anglicanus* custom of taking the feast of the Annunciation on 25 March as the first day of the year, which remained common practice until the mid-eighteenth century, has been adapted to the continental European practice of marking the beginning of the year on 1 January.
2. Baxter, *A Holy Commonwealth*, 200.
3. *Ibid.*, 210.
4. *Ibid.*, 216.
5. Other examples of the use of this term can be found in Cotton, *A Discourse about Civil Government* and Rogers, *Diapoliteia*. See also Gebhardt, ‘Alle Macht den Heiligen’.
6. See Karpp, ‘Bibilizismus’.
7. Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 27; Reckwitz, ‘Politik der Moderne’.
8. See the general observations made in Taubes, ‘Theologie und politische Theorie’.
9. Steinmetz, *Das Sagbare und das Machbare*, 26.
10. Steinmetz, ‘Neue Wege’, 15, fn. 20.
11. Patzelt, *Einführung in die Politikwissenschaft*, 23.
12. See Mergel, ‘Überlegungen’; Frevert, ‘Neue Politikgeschichte’; Landwehr, ‘Diskurs – Macht – Wissen’; Stollberg-Rilinger, *Was heißt Kulturgeschichte des Politischen?*; Schorn-Schütte, *Historische Politikforschung*. For critical objections to the new cultural turn in scholarship on the history of politics, see Rödder, ‘Klios neue Kleider’ and Nicklas, ‘Macht – Politik – Diskurs’.
13. Schorn-Schütte and Tode, *Debatten*, 9.

14. For some initial thoughts on 'Biblical Parrhesia and Reformation Frankness', see Colclough, *Freedom of Speech*, 77–93.
15. On Ludlow, see Firth, 'Ludlow [Ludlowe]'.
16. Ludlow, *A Voyce from the Watch Tower Part Five*, 144.
17. *Ibid.*, 144. On this perspective, see also Worden, 'Providence and Politics' and Davis, 'Living with the Living God'.
18. Ludlow, *Memoirs*.
19. See the introduction by Blair Worden in Ludlow, *A Voyce from the Watch Tower Part Five*, 5–13. On the question of John Toland's role as the potential publisher of the memoirs at the end of the seventeenth century, see *ibid.*, 17–39.
20. The term originates from Butterfield, *Whig Interpretation*. This book also contains an early critique of the teleological understanding of history; see Elton, 'Herbert Butterfield'.
21. See Gardiner, *First Two Stuarts*.
22. See Gardiner, *Oliver Cromwell*; also Howell, 'Images of Oliver Cromwell', 28–29. This interpretation was also suggested by John Milton; see Milton, 'Pro Populo Anglicano Defensio Secunda', 215 and 222.
23. John Pocock also sees a synthesis of political and religious motives: 'To the men of 1628 the reaffirmation of Magna Carta and the struggle against Antichrist at home and abroad were to be much the same'. Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, 345. The rather surprising interpretation that the English Civil War was fought in order to establish religious tolerance was also advanced by apologists for Cromwell's Protectorate; see Richardson, *Apology for the Present Government*, 4: 'for now wee enjoy freedome from persecution in matters of Religion, which is the greatest outward blessing wee can enjoy; this alone is worth all the blood and treasure that hath been spent.' See also the major work by Wilbur Kitchener Jordan, *The Development of Religious Toleration in England*, in which he dates the origin of religious tolerance back to early in the sixteenth century. A new assessment of this phenomenon can be found in Walsham, *Charitable Hatred*.
24. Gardiner, *Constitutional Documents*, xi: 'No such conflict could be successfully waged without reliance on spiritual forces', and xxiii: 'Taken by itself, the dissatisfaction of thoughtful and religious men would not have produced a Revolution.' See also Gardiner, *History of the Great Civil War*, vol. 1, 9.
25. By way of example, see Christopher Hill's introduction to Gardiner's *History of the Great Civil War*, in which he supports Gardiner's interpretation over those of revisionists on a number of points: Gardiner, *History of the Great Civil War*, vol. 1, xxv–xxxi.
26. Tawney, 'Rise of the Gentry'; Hill, *English Revolution*. For opposition to the notion of the emergence of a new 'class' of gentry, see in particular Stone and Fawtier Stone, *An Open Elite?*
27. Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution*, 3–31 and 'A Bourgeois Revolution?'
28. Hill, *English Bible; Intellectual Origins; World Turned Upside Down; Antichrist*.
29. This is also noted by Peter Lake in Lake, 'Puritanism, Arminianism and Nicholas Tyacke', 2: 'Hill's was a narrative in which all sorts of progressive forces ... were associated, in one way or another, with puritanism'.
30. For a similar approach, see Baskerville, *Not Peace but a Sword*.
31. Walzer, *Revolution of the Saints*.
32. *Ibid.*, 114–47; see also Walzer, 'Puritanism as a Revolutionary Ideology'. Interestingly, Thomas Hobbes reaches a similar conclusion in his book *Behemoth*; I will discuss this further in my conclusion.

33. Walzer, *Revolution of the Saints*, 121: “The Puritan ministers provide, perhaps, the first example of “advanced intellectuals in a traditional society””; Walzer also refers to Karl Marx, Karl Mannheim and their assessment of the role of intellectuals in revolutions (ibid., 126, fn. 31). At one point in his interpretation of the role of the Puritans in the English Civil War, Walzer draws an explicit parallel to the Leninist concept of the intellectual avant-garde (ibid., 310, fn. 14 and 313–16).
34. Ibid., 13 and 265–66.
35. Ibid., 309.
36. Ibid., 312–13.
37. A similar critique can be found in Wilson, *Pulpit in Parliament*, 6 and 234, fn. 114.
38. Walzer, *Revolution of the Saints*, 23–27. Although this stereotype is considered outdated, it nonetheless persists stubbornly in historical studies; see e.g. Benert, ‘Lutheran Resistance Theory’; Benert, ‘Inferior Magistrates’; von Friedeburg, *Widerstandsrecht*, 47–50; Schorn-Schütte, ‘Politische Kommunikation’.
39. Baron, ‘Calvinist Republicanism’.
40. This misleading use of terminology can also be found in Seaver, *Puritan Lectureships*.
41. See Collinson, ‘Comment’ and *Puritan Character*. See also Haigh, ‘Character of an Antipuritan’ and, most recently, Lake, ‘Anti-Puritanism’, 85 on the term ‘Puritan’ as an element of polemic rhetoric: ‘Puritanism studied ... through the lens provided by anti-puritanism, tells us a good deal more about the people doing the constructing and the labelling ... than it does about the persons being labelled.’ Numerous examples of the arbitrary use of the term ‘Puritan’ among contemporaries can be found in Cressy, *England on Edge*, 141–46.
42. Mitchell, *Rise of the Revolutionary Party* (referring to the Puritans).
43. See e.g. Stone, *Causes*. Stone considers the whole of English history from 1529 onward to be a prequel to the ‘Revolution’.
44. This remains a valid assessment despite the fact that rehashed versions of the old theories still crop up today; see e.g. Hexter, *Parliament and Liberty* and Prall, *Puritan Revolution*.
45. Elton, ‘High Road’; Kenyon, *Stuart Constitution*, 7, 175ff.
46. Russell, ‘Parliamentary History’; Russell, *Parliaments and English Politics*; Kishlansky, ‘Emergence’; Sharpe, *Faction and Parliament*.
47. On revisionism, see Asch, ‘Triumph des Revisionismus’; Burgess, ‘Review: Revisionism’; Hellmuth, ‘Die englische Revolution’.
48. Burgess, *Politics of the Ancient Constitution*, 110–11.
49. Burgess, *Absolute Monarchy*, 17–62.
50. See Richard Tuck’s foundational work, *Philosophy and Government, 1572–1651*.
51. Skinner, ‘Classical Liberty’.
52. Skinner, *Liberty before Liberalism*.
53. Peltonen, *Classical Humanism*; see also Colcough, *Freedom of Speech*.
54. I have already noted that although Pocock acknowledges the significance of Michael Walzer’s ‘revolution of the saints’ as a cause of the Civil War, he still comes to the conclusion, as the advocates of the concept of the Puritan Revolution did before him, that ‘to the men of 1628 the reaffirmation of Magna Carta and the struggle against Antichrist at home and abroad were to be much the same’. He goes on to add: ‘We can easily see that God’s Englishman might have to choose between acting as Englishman, as traditional political being, and as saint; but it is not certain that to see this is to see to the bottom of the problem’ (Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, 345).

55. See Sommerville, *Royalists and Patriots*, 1–5.
56. As John Morrill remarks: ‘they succeeded in explaining why a civil war did not take place in seventeenth-century England’ (see Morrill, *Nature*, 188 and *Revolt in the Provinces*, x).
57. Unorthodox approaches like that of Adamson, who interprets the Civil War as a ‘baronial revolt’ and thereby strips it of almost all its ideological causes, have been positively received, at least within scholarly circles; see Adamson, ‘Baronial Context’. Adamson has since published an overview of the Civil War, *The Noble Revolt*, that follows the same interpretive tack. The clearest riposte to this approach can be found in Kishlansky, ‘Saye No More’.
58. Tyacke, ‘Puritanism, Arminianism and Counter-Revolution’; ‘Debate’; and *Anti-Calvinists*. See also Lake, ‘Puritanism, Arminianism and Nicholas Tyacke’.
59. See e.g. Davies, *Caroline Captivity*.
60. White, ‘Rise of Arminianism’; Davies, *Caroline Captivity*, 95. For Tyacke, Bishop Lancelot Andrewes is a kind of founding father for all English Arminians; see Tyacke, ‘Lancelot Andrewes’ and ‘Archbishop Laud’, 212–14. However, Andrewes himself always energetically denied being an Arminian.
61. White, *Predestination* and ‘Via Media’; Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, Chapter 6 and *Remapping*, 349; and Davies, *Caroline Captivity*, 122.
62. See Milton, *Catholic and Reformed*, 5 ff. See also Fincham and Lake, ‘Ecclesiastical Policy’, 193. The fact that the terms ‘Arminian’ and ‘Puritan’ were especially used for othering purposes does not prevent Fincham and Lake from using both terms as analytical categories in their otherwise excellent contribution. For an early example of the pejorative nature of the term ‘Puritan’, see Parker, *Discourse Concerning Puritans*, 45–47; for a convincing demonstration of the ambiguity of the term ‘Puritan’ in early literature, see also Holmes, *New World*, 23: ‘As said a Parliamentman in Parliament, the word Puritan in the mouth of an Arminian, signifies an Orthodoxe divine; in the mouth of a drunkard signifies a sober man; and in the mouth of a Papist signifies a Protestant.’ One could also make a similar assessment of the different uses of the term ‘Arminian’.
63. See primarily White, *Predestination*. For the reign of James I, see especially Prior, *Defining the Jacobean Church* and Lake, ‘Laudian Style’, 163. See also the example of Joseph Mede in Jue, *Heaven upon Earth*, 28–29. In his most recent publication, however, Tyacke tries to link his concept of Arminianism to the debates on changes to ceremonies; see Fincham and Tyacke, *Altars Restored*.
64. Morrill, *Nature*, 33–44; as a direct counterargument, see Burgess, ‘English Civil War’.
65. Morrill, *Nature*, 40–43. See also Morrill, ‘Attack’ and ‘Coming of War’.
66. Russell, *Causes*.
67. Sharpe, *Remapping*, 12.
68. Examples include: Katz, *God’s Last Words*; Daniell, *Bible in English*; MacKenzie, *Battle for the Bible*; Nicolson, *Power and Glory*. There have also been countless studies looking primarily at questions of biblical hermeneutics; for some examples see Hessayon and Keene, *Scripture and Scholarship*; Jenkins and Preston, *Biblical Scholarship*.
69. Green, *The Christian’s ABC and Print and Protestantism*.
70. Sharpe, ‘Reading Revelations’; Fischlin, ‘To Eate the Flesh of Kings’; Bradshaw, ‘David or Josiah?’; Collinson, ‘Biblical Rhetoric’; Metzger, ‘David, der Musterkönig’.
71. See Asch, ‘Revelation of the Revelation’.
72. This term comes from Luhmann, *Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik*, vol. 1, 9–71 (especially 19).
73. *Ibid.*, 18.

74. Bohn and Willems, *Sinngeneratoren*, 9.
75. Luhmann, *Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft*, 866.
76. Pocock, 'Languages and their Implications' and 'Concept of a Language'; Tully, *Meaning and Context*; Richter, 'Rekonstruktion'; Hellmuth and von Ehrenstein, 'Intellectual History'; Ottow, 'Cambridge School'; Schorn-Schütte, 'Kommunikation über Herrschaft'.
77. I have borrowed this concept from Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*. The issue centres on the 'illocutionary act' – the question of what the author does or what intention they have when they speak. See also Skinner, 'Social Meaning', 83–84.
78. Pocock, 'State of the Art', 4.
79. Ottow, 'Cambridge School', 35–37.
80. Tully, *Meaning and Context*, 9. See also Skinner, 'Conventions'.
81. Tully, *Meaning and Context*, 23.
82. See the critique offered by Hampsher-Monk, 'Review Article: Political Languages', 109, and Goldie, 'Obligations', 733; see also the overview in Hellmuth and von Ehrenstein, 'Intellectual History', 165. For plausible alternative views, see Ashcraft, *Revolutionary Politics* and Collins, *Allegiance*.
83. Pocock, 'State of the Art', 5 ff. Pocock also introduces parallel terminology to the field, such as vocabularies, rhetorics and discourses; see Pocock, 'Concept of a Language', 21. In my opinion, however, this plurality of terms leads to confusion. I will therefore only use the term 'political language', since this is most closely associated with my proposed theoretical concept.
84. Pocock, 'Concept of a Language', 20.
85. Pocock, 'State of the Art', 8–10.
86. See Fish, *Is there a Text in this Class?*, 305; see also Sharpe and Zwicker, *Reading, Society and Politics*, 2.
87. Pocock, 'State of the Art', 20.
88. Kevin Sharpe in particular draws attention to this aspect; see Sharpe and Zwicker, *Reading, Society and Politics*, 5–8 and Sharpe, 'Reading Revelations', 122–25.
89. Pocock, 'State of the Art', 28.
90. See e.g. Skinner, *Foundations*, vol. 1, xi, in which the terms '*mentalités*' and 'political thinking' are treated as synonyms.
91. Pocock emphasises that these two terms are in no way identical; see Pocock, 'State of the Art', 18 and 'Concept of a Language', 22.
92. Bourdieu, *Logic of Practice*, 52–65.
93. Pocock, 'Concept of a Language', 30–31. Pocock emphasises that political languages must also be learned, although unlike habitus, the learning process does not necessarily shape the speaker's identity. The number of different political languages learned by an author thus depends on their respective level of education. The following chapters will provide numerous examples of individuals who mastered more than one such language.
94. See e.g. the *Ideas in Context* series from Cambridge University Press, which now has over one hundred volumes.
95. I have borrowed the phrase 'linguistic map' from the German 'sprachliche "Landkarte"' in Hellmuth and von Ehrenstein, 'Intellectual History', 159.
96. Skinner, *Foundations*, vol. 1, ix: 'I hope to indicate something of the process by which the modern concept of the State came to be formed'. See also Hellmuth and von Ehrenstein, 'Intellectual History', 167.
97. See in particular Wolfgang Mager's repeated critical objections: Mager, 'Republik' and 'Genossenschaft'.