Introduction

Definitions and Characterizations

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A first problem in tackling the anthropology of Europe is the very basic one of defining Europe geographically. While the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans and the Mediterranean Sea clearly bound it on the north, west and south respectively, the land border to the east is conventionally placed in the Ural Mountains, well inside Russia, while the Dardanelles constitute the boundary between Europe and Asia in the southeast. However, for the purposes of this book, I leave aside Turkey and Russia, apart from some remarks on the latter in Chapter 8: both countries are mostly Asian states territorially, and for some purposes politically too, and until recently anthropological work on them has been rather patchy.

There are certain peculiarities of the history of the anthropology of Europe that are worth noting from the outset. First, while it has produced some excellent anthropologists and anthropological studies, it has largely spared itself the intellectual inconvenience of an inextricable association with any of anthropology's major isms: indeed, it has often been used as something of a laboratory for finding alternative pathways to them (cf. the discussion on Boissevain below). An exception is the study of networks in the 1960s and 1970s (see below), though it is no longer very salient in the anthropology of Europe. Whether this situation has changed with the dramatic increase in research following the opening up of Europe since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe is a moot point, and perhaps it is still too early to make a genuine assessment on the long-term importance of that region for the discipline. Certainly, for a long time, the anthropology of Europe was

dominated by a combination of anthropologists from the northwest of the continent and native folklorists, leading to areas like the Mediterranean and Balkans coming to represent the exotic within Europe. This exoticism was already being dismissed in the late 1980s by anthropologists of Southern Europe like Michael Herzfeld (1987) and João de Pina-Cabral (1989) as not only intellectually impoverishing but also morally questionable (see further Chapter 1).

Another issue is the increasing challenge of problems in doing 'anthropology at home', which in itself forces us to confront the idea of the 'Other' as an anthropological object (see more on this below). The anthropology of Europe was long seen as a soft option that was not particularly problematic or stimulating intellectually or methodologically, with easier fieldwork conditions and easier languages to learn (cf. Cole 1977; Davis 1977), and even being seen as more suitable for women anthropologists, as Marc Abélès reported of France. Generally, it seems reasonable to suggest that power in institutional anthropology was monopolized by white, male, North Europeans[1] until well after the Second World War.

However, as already noted, the anthropology of Europe was greatly boosted by the opening up of research opportunities in Eastern Europe after the political changes of 1989/90. Another factor encouraging a switch to Europe has been the increasing difficulties in doing fieldwork in other parts of the world, partly because of postcolonial suspicions of anthropology, as in Africa or among some Native American and Native Australian populations, and partly because of security fears, given the lengthy insurgencies in many parts of the world (including in India, my original area of interest). There have also been difficulties in combining busy and increasingly bureaucratic academic careers with second (i.e. postdoctoral) research projects, leading to more 'anthropology at home', often in the form of 'vacation ethnography' or even 'weekend ethnography' (here, of course, 'home' means somewhere in Europe).

The Debate over Community Studies as 'Tribalizing' Europe

Among early influences on anthropology in Europe was Robert Redfield's pre-Second World War work (e.g. Redfield 1930) on peasants in Mexico. This was influential as a pioneering study of complex societies in anthropology, though other anthropologists considered it naïve for insisting on the internal social harmony of village communities (cf. Lewis 1951; Foster 1965; Frankenberg 1969). Another influence was Conrad Arensberg's attempts (e.g. Arensberg 1963) to argue for the cultural distinctiveness of Europe in respect of everything from its social organization and Christianity to a supposedly

uniform bread, meat and milk diet. Other origins could be found in folklore and sociology, both of which can be said to have influenced anthropology in its infancy from the late nineteenth century, first as a charter for the incipient nationalism of that century, then in its evolutionary period, and afterwards with functionalism. Arnold van Gennep was one scholar who successfully straddled the divide between folklore and anthropology in France, based on the large amount of fieldwork he conducted across Europe, aided by his extraordinary skills as a linguist (Belmont 1974; Cheruty 2010). Other early studies were more sociological, on communities and peasants, especially by Aleksandr Chayanov in Russia (1966), interpersonal relations (networks, patronage, gossip) and internal migration, as well as early work on kinship, inheritance and gender, the latter long being seen through the lens of honour and shame, which contemporary anthropology tends to see as having been superseded by more focused gender studies. Then there was Frederic Le Play's pioneering sociological work on the family across Europe in the nineteenth century (Le Play 1982). The fashion for community studies, often in reality village studies, should be stressed for its influence on anthropological studies of European communities. This book will deal extensively with this fashion because of its profound influence on the history of this subdiscipline, which for long seemed to have been virtually its only approach, despite Boissevain's strictures about it 'tribalizing' Europe (Boissevain 1975; see also below).

Occasional early efforts aside, a truly modern anthropology of Europe is therefore really post-Second World War, though substantial amounts had already been done by the time John Cole wrote his review article in 1977. For Cole, none of the traditional fieldwork areas in Europe are actually traditional or have been unchanged by history, despite an emphasis in some quarters to the contrary by, for example, Edward Banfield (1958) deploring the lack of change or Juliet du Boulay (1974) regretting change. However, there was still an early focus on small-scale communities (as in traditional anthropological fieldwork), which took time to focus on mainstream European societies (promoted by Diana Forsythe (1984) for Germany) and issues (including migration, Third World minorities, tourism or ethnicity). A lot of early work was functionalist (e.g. Juliet du Boulay (1974) on Euboea, Greece; some approaches to honour and shame), while other later work was structuralist (e.g. aspects of du Boulay's (1982) work and Sandra Ott (1981) on French Basques), tendencies that have fallen out of fashion, both here and in anthropology generally. There was an alternative focus on the factors preventing change (the influence of Oscar Lewis' culture of poverty argument in Mexico (1951), Edward Banfield's amoral familism (1958) and George Foster's limited good (1965), all linked to 'backward societies' and reasons for their alleged backwardness), but the availability of historical documents

soon made social change itself an issue. The 1950s and after also saw work on networks, quasi-groups and nongroups, and action sets – broadly speaking, the informal groupings and collectivities that exist between the individual ego and formal corporate groups, including patronage relations and modes of exchange (Barnes 1954; Bott 1957; Barth 1966; Boissevain 1966, 1968, 1971; Bailey 1969, 1971). Such works tended to be anti-structural-functionalist because of what many of these authors saw as functionalism's static view stressing social equilibrium and harmony over change and conflict. The idea that traditional societies fused roles and personhood more than in Europe led to the focus shifting to processes rather than functions or structures. European societies were thought to have less kinship than other parts of the world, but more of other kinds of relations (e.g. networks, patronage, neighbours and other intra-community ties, employment, citizenship and the state). This approach became one area where Europeanists were pioneers to some extent within anthropology itself, though most of the jargon then created (see above) is no longer current.

In line with this, Boissevain (1975) famously dismissed village studies in Europe for 'tribalizing' Europe. This was partly because they neglected phenomena such as industry or bureaucracy as transferring power from the state as well as to it, or as inducing massive social change. Boissevain himself countered this to some extent, as did Ralph Grillo's work (1980) on nationalism and the state. Both emphasized the contingency of state power locally because of patronage, bureaucratic failings, the emphasis on legal rights for individuals, etc. This could be compared with an earlier argument that the focus on honour in Mediterranean communities especially is linked to the weakness of the state locally. Here the significance of feud was highlighted (for example, in the Balkans) and of early mafia organizations (for example, in Sicily) (Blok 1974, Schneider and Schneider 1976): in this view, both honour and feud were considered self-defence mechanisms (on feud, see Boehm's (1984) later work on Montenegro). Similarly, for Eric Wolf (1982), European peasant communities were not isolated, but belonged to the world economic system through the expropriation and sale of their economic surpluses by their rulers. Wolf, John Cole (1973), the Schneiders (Schneider and Schneider 1976) and Sydel Silverman (1968, 1975) all adopted Marxist perspectives linked to ideas of political economy. Generally they were opposed to Banfield's 'culture of poverty' argument (1958) and to the parochialism of village studies like his (see Boissevain 1975). For these writers, individuals were trapped in systems of power to which they responded in ways that determined cultural forms rather than vice versa. This led to an abortive focus on regions (Schneider and Schneider (1976) on Sicily and Boissevain (1975) more generally, a topic revived subsequently in the context of European integration, e.g. Parkin (1999)).

In the book he edited with John Friedl, *Beyond the Community: Social Process in Europe* (1975), Boissevain emphasized the following points, which the editors felt were valid at the time of writing. European village communities were not isolated but influenced by regional, national and international ('global') factors. Although anthropologists had recognized the importance of supracommunity levels, they had neglected to probe the often significant interactions between them. Formerly they also neglected the historical dimensions of processes like industrialization, urbanization, and geographical and social mobility. All these failings reflected the prior dominance of the functionalist model, together with its assumptions regarding equilibrium, corporations, balanced oppositions, reciprocity and consensus, instead of conflict, competition, irreversible social and economic change, networks and patronage, and political and economic inequality. Social process was therefore more important for Boissevain than notions of structure or function, though there was some convergence between him and the functionalists in the idea that change could only be external in origin. Other, less obvious processes can be mentioned, like the centralization of power regionally or nationally, coupled with the greater presence of the state locally through administration, welfare, development and the law, though the central authorities might have to compromise with local powerbrokers. One can also cite the decline in the autonomy of small-scale units like the nuclear family; the development of cooperative arrangements not involving kinship, or only minimally; increased internal migration (i.e. within the continent of Europe, as well as within individual states); the rise of democratic party politics, often coupled with the survival of patronage; social mobility in the direction of a greater democracy of values, if not of wealth; the reduced dependence of lower status groups on higher-status ones through kinship, patronage, etc.; the development of tourism; and, even at that time (the mid-1970s), the retreat of the state, the decline of welfarism and the rise of international forces and organizations competing for power with the nation state (e.g. the then European Economic Community (EEC), but also globalization). Many of these processes are interrelated: for example, migration, wage labour, education, unionism and welfare provision may all permit greater freedom from 'traditional' social constraints like patronage. However, others may seem contradictory, such as advances in state power and increases in formally democratic politics locally, which may actually perpetuate the patronage relations that the state is keen to eradicate as a rival, as well as for reasons of bureaucratic efficiency and social equality.

Thus, there are studies in Boissevain and Friedl's volume showing how government grants to rural communities and rural policies tend to increase the power of local powerbrokers rather than of their actual targets (e.g. small farmers and rural labourers); the impact of reverse migration from

the towns on rural communities; the impact of industrial wage labour on the worker-peasant phenomenon;[2] the links between traditional patronage, modern party politics and modern bureaucracies, both locally and between the locality and the centre; the conservatism inherent in ostensibly modern agricultural cooperatives, which may act to the detriment of those they are intended to benefit; and the consequences of national policy for ethnic minorities, who can often manipulate the law in their favour, as well as being subject to it. Boissevain's overall argument is as follows. The state becomes more visible and present in the localities, where it undermines traditional local decision-making power, while also boosting that power through the greater democratization and provision of resources. This in turn enables large modern power coalitions to be formed (trade unions, local branches of political parties, and pressure groups) to counter both the state locally and local powerbrokers. International organizations, both formal and political, also erode the power of the nation state, as do multinational companies. The lens of core–periphery relations unites some of these themes: for example, peripheries like Sicily haemorrhage resources (including labour) for the benefit of core regions like Northern Europe or the United States. However, the periphery can also become the core (through development or changing trade flows, such as occurred in England and later Britain after the Middle Ages), while the core can become a periphery through migration or the loss of economic resources. Thus, Italy lost economic power and trade to Spain and Northern Europe after discovery of the New World and of the sea route around Africa.[3]

However, while many anthropologists followed Boissevain's lead, whether directly or indirectly, it has proved difficult to abandon the village or community study entirely in the anthropology of Europe, wherever one undertakes it. Indeed, similar studies were still being produced in the 2000s, such as Wessendorf's (2009, 2011) on the borough of Hackney in London. Admittedly, this was not a village but an urban area, or what she calls a 'superdiverse' borough, which can hardly be said to have had much community spirit. Nonetheless, her interest is still largely in internal relations (or the lack of them) within the borough rather than its connections with the world beyond its borders. Even later is Pozniak's (2013) study of the town of Nowa Huta in eastern Poland and the decline it has undergone from being a model socialist town with a gigantic steel works to a shadow of its former self heavily reliant on the industrial heritage of those works to survive economically. Other recent examples used here include Berdahl (2010), Dawson (2002), Harrison (2011), Just (2000), Kaneff (1996), Moss (2008), Seiser (2000) and Sorge (2008). As with anthropology generally, it has proved hard if not impossible to break with localist traditions of fieldwork.

Although the present work strives to approach the anthropology of Europe from other angles as well, it cannot avoid looking at village and community studies itself some of the time, as they are very much part of its history. Indeed, Chapters 3 and 4 in particular summarize some examples from around the northern Mediterranean in detail as a tribute to what might be called the classic, pioneering period of the anthropology of Europe. Above all, these examples show many deeply embedded similarities, but also embody certain often striking differences. They should also, of course, now be treated historically, a circumstance that does nothing to detract from their importance as contemporaneous ethnographic accounts of social situations that can still teach us lessons in the here and now. Naturally one must assume that they have undergone far-reaching changes since they were published, but unfortunately subsequent work to update them is rare.

Other Ethnographic Topics

However, as I hope will become apparent in the course of this book, more recent anthropology on Europe has tended to focus not on whole communities, but on parts of them, often without specific roots, such as organizations, leisure and lifestyle groups, political parties and other forms of civil society, sports clubs and pressure groups. For example, fairly recent work on Britain is represented by Nigel Rapport's edited volume *British Subjects* (2002), which contains innovative articles on fans of the monarchy, ballet as a nationalist trope, the heritage industry, the enforced leisure of redundancy, psychiatric care, childhood, internet relationships and lesbian group organization, as well as more conventional studies of religion, community studies and ethnicity. In France, there have been studies of the bourgeoisie (Le Wita 1994), a nuclear plant in Normandy (Zonabend 1993), education (Reed-Danahay 1987, 1996), kinship (including some longitudinal studies, such as Segalen (1985) and Zonabend (1984)), local politics in Burgundy (Abélès 1991) and witchcraft in the Île de France (Favret-Saada 1989). Generally there has still been much more work on Greece than Germany, and even recent studies of the latter tend to concentrate on East Germany as an area of profound social and economic change (e.g. Thelen 2007). In fact, there is a plethora of themes today, making it difficult to discern clear trends, and there are, perhaps, somewhat fewer debates (unlike past debates over honour and shame, or the mafia, as contested themes, or Boissevain's revisionism). Other edited collections of this sort, though with coverage of all of Europe, include Macdonald (1993), Goddard et al. (1994) and Abrahams (1996) (the latter on Eastern Europe specifically).

A list of key themes, grouped regionally, follows:

MAIN REGIONAL THEMES
Southwest Europe (including Mediterranean)
- Village studies.
- Honour and shame.
- Amoral familism.
- Kinship generally.
- Agrotown economies.
- Patronage and brokerage.
- Mafias.
- Evil eye.
- Is the Mediterranean a true culture area? Should its northern shore be compared with/included in its southern shore (i.e. North Africa) or with Northern Europe?

Northern Europe
- Community studies (cf. village studies around Mediterranean).
- Marginal ethnicities (especially Celtic).
- Family histories (especially in France).
- Ritual, politics and identity.
- Why does Northwestern Europe so often seem the most progressive part of the continent politically, socially and economically?

Eastern Europe
- Early work in the Balkans on presocialist and socialist economies
- More recent work on the postsocialist transition (restoration of property and land rights; the shift to democracy and capitalism)
- The postsocialist firm.
- Postsocialist deprivation and inequality, especially of women; unemployment among the former proletariat and loss of welfare services.
- Ethnic violence, such as in the Balkans or against migrants in East Germany: is this a revival of presocialist practices or a continuance of socialist ones, or something completely new?
- Why is Eastern Europe, especially the Balkans, so often considered the poorest and most backward part of the continent, supposedly comparable in some areas to Third World conditions, when so many other parts of Europe appear to be suffering decline?

Methodological Peculiarities

One methodological challenge of doing anthropology in Europe is the potentially greater resistance of informants to being studied anthropologically, not liking to be confused with 'primitives'. Anthropologists of Europe may also find themselves sharing more space with other disciplines, literature on which must often also be mastered (e.g. history, sociology and politics). Traditional fieldwork may be more difficult methodologically: how should the state or the region, let alone the nation state, be studied ethnographically, given anthropology's traditional focus on villages or other small-scale communities? There is potentially a greater need for multisited ethnography, for example, in studying urbanization or migration. It may be necessary to examine extensive documents and archives, as well as do fieldwork, though archival research has sometimes been thought to present the danger of the anthropology of Europe becoming just another form of social history; moreover, archives are not always reliable, and it may be hard to reconcile their contents with what one has picked up through participant observation or interviews (see Makris 1992; Smith 1992). Interviews may nonetheless be needed (or be more feasible, such as in an office) more than traditional participant observation (e.g. of life in a bar or of a ritual). However, interviews may also prove problematic, as they may well produce formalized answers designed to protect the interviewee or please the interviewer rather than off-the-cuff comments from casual conversations.[4] Fieldwork languages may be easier to learn, but more than one may be needed. Perhaps most critical conceptually is the danger of insufficient distance when truly doing 'anthropology at home', especially in one's own society: there may be a tendency to take a lot for granted because those who have been brought up in Europe have already acquired a habitus. If anthropology, a modern, Western discipline, is the study of the Other, and given that most anthropologists of Europe are themselves Europeans, the idea of an anthropology of Europe can seem like a contradiction in terms. Comparison may be also difficult, with a lack of emerging regularities. However, conversely and more positively, Nigel Rapport (2002) has emphasized the benefits of doing anthropology 'at home', where one already shares a lot with one's informants (including language) and can therefore understand more through verbal and nonverbal cues, etc.[5]

Nevertheless, it is clear that, at the level of greatest detail, Europe is no more uniform than other parts of world. The literacy of informants may be linked to a greater use of anthropology and folklore for political purposes (including the politics of nationalism and other forms of identity), as well as 'roots research', in the sense of a personal journey using anthropology to determine and elucidate one's own social or ethnic origins as an individual. Politically class may be opposed to ethnicity and nationalism as identities

unifying around a single culture (but see Pratt (2003), discussed in Chapter 2), while colonialism is also a factor, often still at work through its baleful long-term consequences. Although there were colonies in Europe, such as Malta and Cyprus under the British, in general Europe is seen as having provided the imperial powers, and non-Europe the colonies. However, before the First World War, all Europe's imperial powers could be said to have had colonies within Europe, given the penetration of the German, Austrian, Russian and Ottoman Empires into parts of Eastern Europe that were foreign to them, being occupied by Hungarians, Greeks, Albanians or non-Russian Slavs. Here, though, the fact of colonization was masked by the ideology of dynastic power, rights and responsibilities, including the divine right of kings and royal absolutism. The same could be said of Wales, Ireland and, to a lesser degree, Scotland in relation to the British Empire, forming an interesting contrast with the more overtly colonial statuses of Malta and Cyprus.

Then there are distinctive attitudes to science and rational thought, ideas of civilization and progress, the so-called 'Enlightenment' of the eighteenth century, all seen, increasingly controversially and problematically, as dividing the West from the rest. Secularism is another alleged factor, but recent trends and events suggest that this has been exaggerated, and the word itself is constantly being deconstructed. In practice too, basic religious beliefs survive, even though low church attendance, for example, may suggest otherwise. As Asad pointed out (Asad et al. 1997; see below), 'civilization' was later replaced by 'development', then by 'modernization' – which didn't prevent searches for the 'exotic' in Europe itself, especially around the Mediterranean and in the Balkans, or in Ireland or the Swiss Alps (Netting 1980).

Europe in Whole and in Part(s)

I have already touched on definitions in passing. In more detail now, one must beware of a certain tendency to reduce Europe to the EU, despite the proximity of acknowledged nonmembers of the EU like Norway and Switzerland (and since Brexit in 2020 the United Kingdom). There is more ambiguity and hesitation about some other states that claim a European heritage, such as Turkey and even Russia and Ukraine,[6] reflecting uncertainty over where Europe's eastern border is located (elsewhere, as already noted, Europe is clearly bounded by its sea borders). This has led Chris Hann (2005) to advocate Eurasia as a suitable unit for anthropological enquiry, a perspective that stresses continuities rather than the more conventionally stressed disjunctures across this vast territory.

Other ambiguous categories might include Britain, which tends to define Europe as somewhere else, over the Channel; Greece and other Balkan states

for their allegedly somewhat chaotic politics and corrupt governance regimes; Hungary's 'Asiatic origins' and increasingly undemocratic political class (as of 2024); or the 'interference' in, and thus rejection by Europe of, for example, Serbia or Estonia (over closeness to Russia and alleged maltreatment of its significant Russian minority respectively).

Is Israel European? Territory is of course against it, but most of its leaders or their descendants hailed from Europe, including the state's founders back in 1948, as well as through ordinary immigration up to the present day. The country has a European-style democracy extending as of 2023 to widespread street unrest over proposals to alter the Constitution, allegedly to reduce judicial independence and, as of 2024, to the Gaza hostage crisis and its violent aftermath. It also has widespread nonreligious Jewish identities, as well as disadvantaged Palestinian and 'Israeli Arab' minorities. However, other foundations are also claimed for it from antiquity, such as the argument that, in occupying the West Bank, the Jews are simply returning to the Holy Land 2,000 years or so after the Roman defeat and dispersal of them in AD 70 and after. Among other things, this argument is used to justify the increasing spread of Israeli settlements on Arab land, in defiance of international law and the international community. Accordingly, the rest of the Middle East views Israel as a Western, democratic but hostile presence intruding into its more authoritarian neighbourhood.

Of the states mentioned above, for a variety of reasons ranging from inadequate sources to ambiguous statuses as European, Turkey, Ukraine and Israel are excluded from consideration here, as is Russia for the most part, while the remaining states receive treatment somewhere or other in this volume. Nor will Switzerland feature more than occasionally, largely because of a paucity of sources.

The development of the EU has led to a focus on the whole of Europe's legacies or heritages. Christianity is obviously one, despite internal divisions between Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox, and despite the relatively recent arrival of non-Christian faiths through migration. Others one might cite are the humanism of the Renaissance and the rationality and scientific revolution of the Enlightenment, both of which can be seen as challenges to formal Christianity, though more explicitly in the latter case. Humanism also gave expression to the pre-Christian legacies of Greece and Rome, which lasted for centuries, though given that ancient European writers such as Aristotle and Boethius were widely studied throughout the Middle Ages, the break is perhaps less sharp than it once seemed. Another legacy might be the Industrial Revolution, pioneered in and by Britain, and the political ideologies that arose out of it, such as socialism, communism, nationalism and democracy, though all but the last have now become discredited as far as polite opinion is concerned, despite both

nationalist and socialist currents still existing, largely in more disadvantaged circles.

Among Europe's Others both today and in history have been various peoples classed as 'Semitic', from Carthage[7] and its struggles against Rome and Sicilian Greeks to Islam (represented by the Ottoman Empire and Barbary pirates through to present-day Muslim immigrants and occasional terrorists) to long-term antisemitism against the Jews. Other others at various times have included Russia (still today in fact) and the Soviet Union (making Europe essentially Western Europe during the divisions of the Cold War). America was opposed to Europe in and after the War of Independence, but is still linked with it culturally, with influences in both directions, as well as more recent diplomatic and military cooperation (currently (2025) under challenge), though through migration its ethnic balance is constantly changing.

Europe's geographical divisions also deserve some discussion. Perhaps the most obvious one is East versus West, the former having a much more fluid history in identity terms, with shifting borders, and becoming a field for the expansion of Europe's own multinational empires (Russia, Austria, Germany and Turkey). All these empires lacked the ready access to the sea enjoyed by Britain, France, Spain and Portugal, whose empires were overwhelmingly extra-European, while they themselves have enjoyed the stability of more or less the same national boundaries for centuries. Eastern Europe also experienced a different historical trajectory in certain respects, serfdom there being associated more with the royal and imperial absolutism of the early modern period rather than the feudal decentralization of the Middle Ages, and coming much later, from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, long after Western Europe had dismantled feudalism. Moreover, Eastern Europe's twentieth-century history is largely one of authoritarian rule (fascist and military as well as communist or authoritarian socialist), giving way to nationalism and the break-up of dynastic and communist empires into typically small nation states with little historical legitimacy as much as to democracy. One of these shifts took place in and after 1989, at a time when Western Europe's Member States were increasingly integrating through the EU as an alternative to nationalism, a trajectory that is seemingly now (2024) being reversed. In other words, Western and Eastern Europe seem perpetually out of step with one another, despite Eastern Europe still claiming to be part of the European heritage, seeing itself as 'rejoining Europe' after 1989.

Other conventional internal dichotomies that anthropology should and does interrogate include Northern Europe versus the Mediterranean and/ or Balkans, the latter both exotic and supposedly more backward and politically unstable; Teuton and Slav; Anglo-Saxon and Celt; British and French; Catholic and Protestant; Catholic and Orthodox; religious and secular; Muslim and Christian; Jewishness and Christian. Jews, like Roma, have had

a presence historically in most of Europe, though both are still treated as marginal. Nonetheless, there is a difference between them, as Jewish communities in Europe tend to be more prosperous and economically integrated than Roma ones, despite ongoing antisemitism. Roma, by contrast, find it more difficult to defend themselves against marginalization. Class too comes into this, as many Jewish communities are middle class, while most Roma are stuck with the status of a marginalized underclass, though they are no less despised for all that. Sport is still largely arranged along national lines, despite, for example, the importance of the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) as football's organizer at the international level.

Conversely, things that unite Europe might include the use of English as a main second language, even as a *lingua franca*, and extending to much popular culture and the internet, though neither is solely an English-language domain. In this sense, English can be compared with Latin and French in the past (international but also elite usage), as compared with the failure of artificial international languages like Esperanto to replace genuine *linguas francas*. The euro currency is to some extent a unifier for those states that have it, especially as some countries outside the eurozone, like Montenegro, also use it by agreement with the EU. However, John Bornemann and Nick Fowler have argued that the EU is not and never will be unified like a nation state: 'identification with Europe is an empty sign. Europe has no Spirit, in the Hegelian sense, since, unlike a nation-state, it does not live off the dead. States conjure up ghosts who have lived and died for the nation and its territory, but within Europe there are no European graveyards' (1997: 492–93; cf. also Shore (2012) on the euro). Certainly the vision of European integration is forward-looking, though it does have its myths of origin and its heroes, such as Maurice Schumann and Jean Monnet, the French politician and civil servant who together started the ball rolling with the European Coal and Steel Community in 1953. It did not arise out of the struggles against others that gave birth to so many nations, but precisely out of a desire to avoid such struggles being repeated after the excesses and destruction of the Second World War. Support for the EU therefore tends to be intellectual and pragmatic, not emotional and irrational – not, as the cliché has it in relation to nationalism, 'visceral'. Yet nationalism itself is not a 'natural' form of political organization, but has its own very specific historical foundations (see Gellner (1983), who locates its foundations in the nineteenth-century European middle classes). And while it may seem counter-intuitive, given the perpetual strains in the EU, there is nothing inherently preventing the emergence of a more rooted European identity at some time in the future.

Rethinking Europe

All contributors to the 'Provocations of European Ethnology' (Asad et al. 1997) op-ed stress the need to decentre Europe, i.e. to make it less like the standard against which all other parts of the world are measured culturally and socially. However, each writer has his or her own approach.

Thus, Michael Herzfeld stresses the continued tendency to orientalize the Balkans and therefore make the area seem backward and less civilized than other parts of Europe. This is partly because of the Turkish domination of the past. In the form of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey in the nineteenth century was itself seen as part of the Orient, as absolutist and decadent, and as the 'sick man of Europe' politically. This has carried over into a view of the Balkans as politically fragmented, giving rise to the English phrase 'Balkanization' for weak, failing and/or territorially collapsed states such as the former Yugoslavia. This was confirmed for many by the wars of the 1990s that accompanied the break-up of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo crisis. Greece has its own particular features, being seen as the fount of European civilization, but also as the 'sick man' of the EU in, for example, the financial crisis that erupted in 2008. Herzfeld also suggests that the new nation states that had emerged in the 1990s may be nationalist, i.e. reject multicultural-ism, because the latter does not seem a priority to them. What he does not mention is that: (1) it may be seen as interfering with the very foundations of the nation state; and (2) multiculturalism was precisely what communism was associated with, both as an aspect of the Soviet Union, despite its Russian dominance, and also because of communism's universalist claims and ideo-logical focus on an international working class. Herzfeld ends by arguing that the anthropology of Europe has thus far either been atheoretical or has derived its theory from other parts of the world. He pleads for this to change.

Katherine Verdery is a leading voice in the anthropology of Eastern Europe. She wants to decentre the concepts that have been used in explaining the transition in Eastern Europe, as has been done in relation to change in other parts of the world, in particular the penetration of Western capitalism into societies without this concept or economic system. These changes have been taken for granted in Eastern Europe, she argues, in a way that has not been the case elsewhere. This is partly because they are close to the centres of capitalism in western Europe, but also because in the Cold War, Eastern Europe was seen as having the potential for both capitalism and democracy, only being prevented in developing either by the dominance of the Soviet Union, with its alien forms of both economy and society. However, Verdery points out that there are local ideas of labour, markets, property and its ownership, and the economy, as well as of the state (given the state's col-lapse in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia), of civil society,

which is alleged to have disappeared under communism while it flourished in the west (cf. Hann and Dunn 1996), and of liberal democracy, which in Eastern Europe has often had illiberal, nationalist overtones. Verdery also advocated studying communism as a political, economic and social system in its own right, but she was later criticized for presiding over a missed opportunity for the anthropology of Eastern Europe to develop its own theories by Tatyana Thelen, an anthropologist of eastern Germany (Thelen 2011, 2012; cf. Verdery and Dunn 2011).

Talal Asad has written widely on colonialism and the rise of anthropology, drawing attention to the links between them. Here he switches the focus to the idea of civilization, which is often linked to Westernization, but also involves discrimination and hegemony, and a hierarchy between the civilizing and those being civilized. This obviously applied to colonialism outside Europe, but also within it. Compare the allegedly civilizing influences of Rome, Greece, the Teutonic Knights and German expansion generally into Eastern Europe, Peter the Great as Russia's great Westernizer, Christianity generally in the Middle Ages, the English in the Scottish Highlands or in Ireland, Austro-Hungary in the Balkans, the post-1860s Italian state in southern Italy and so on. Terms like 'development' and 'modernization' have been used in similar ways.

Jane Schneider wants to decentre England specifically. She focuses on those who are or have been displaced or marginalized by 'progress', especially in English history (e.g. peasants forced off the land and into the towns, into industry, as well as to enable more capitalist, more intensive forms of farming – the 'sheep eating men' phenomenon in various periods of English history), but also more generally. This displacement is justified by those doing the displacing, who suggest that the displaced will only suffer a temporary inconvenience before they are reabsorbed back into a more efficient economy and a more just society (cf. the 'trickle-down' effect associated with Thatcherism and Reagonomics in the 1980s). This prevents an excessive reaction because those who are not reabsorbed are given the hope that they may be. However, to Schneider, this hope seems to be a forlorn one, and the popular reaction may be more severe. What is at the root of the problem for Schneider is the false image of unending economic growth and improvement at the heart of capitalist theory and practice.

Finally, João de Pina-Cabral, writing on the Mediterranean and both its shores, argues that this is not a culture area, despite the claims made for it by David Gilmore and John Davis, though the latter spoke of convergences through culture contact (a diffusionist view) rather than intrinsic and/or shared structural features like Gilmore. Thus, Pina-Cabral dismisses a number of alleged traits supporting the culture area view, like honour and shame, amoral familism (or the predominance of the nuclear family), the

weakness of the state and the lack of a genuine work ethic. To him, the Christian northern shore of the Mediterranean should be compared with Northern Europe, or at least with the north of countries like Italy, Spain and Portugal, not with the southern, Islamic shore. For example, in the hands of others, the honour and shame complex is made to appear on both sides of the Mediterranean and even further afield. This was another area initially exoticized by Northern European anthropologists, much to the resentment of Mediterraneanist anthropologists like Pina-Cabral himself or Michael Herzfeld (1987).

These views show how the anthropology of Europe has become valued as a way of decentring Europe itself in terms of anthropological objects and thus abolishing the old polarity between the West and the rest, while at same time according the powerful and mainstream in European societies the same importance as the marginal and unvoiced in anthropological analysis and deconstruction. Among other things, this applies to how notions of race, gender and class are used as ways of forming and informing identities.

Notes

1. These descriptions also apply to me personally.
2. That is, where a farm, or a member of a farming family, relies on both farm and off-farm labour in establishing a livelihood. See Chapter 2.
3. For further reflections on this debate, see Douglass (1992).
4. Though in the case of interviews, the interviewee might become somewhat more open once the tape recorder has been switched off and the notebook put away.
5. In Rapport's case, this means not Europe, but Britain. See my summary of his work in Chapter 5.
6. Russia and Turkey might also be said to represent the exotic in Europe, due not so much to their alleged backwardness as to their continued tendency to exercise an authoritarianism rooted in the historical precedents of supposedly 'Asian' autocracies. By contrast, even before the Russo-Ukraine war that started in 2022, Ukraine was showing its desire to establish its credentials as part of liberal-democratic Europe by seeking membership of the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
7. The now-dead Carthaginian language Punic was Semitic, and those who spoke it attracted not dissimilar stereotypes to the Jews in later European history. For example, for literate Greeks and Romans especially, the usual theatrical stereotype of the Carthaginian was that of the grasping but ingratiating merchant, which is well known in more recent antisemitism. And perhaps the legends, for which there is some archaeological evidence, of Carthaginians unnaturally sacrificing their children in times of crisis find a certain resonance in the blood libel of later antisemitism.