Introduction

Negotiation, Strategic Action, and the Production of Heritage

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The structure's fate attracted much attention after the Xicheng district government announced plans to bulldoze the building to make way for public green space, prompting calls for better protection of historical architecture amid rampant urbanization . . . In response to public outcry, Wang said that the district government would enhance protection of its 184 cultural heritage sites, including 23 former residences of famous people. ("Beijing Withdraws Demolition Plan for Late Writer’s Residence," China Times, 26 March 2012)

The race is on to salvage banks flanked by Corinthian pillars, courthouses adorned with limestone lions, and shipping headquarters decorated with dark wood and brass fixtures before they collapse of decay . . . The conservation of the buildings . . . says Thant Myint-U, the head of the Yangon Heritage Trust. “The future is all about cities,” said Mr. Thant Myint-U, who is trying to convince the government that the old has value and must be preserved. “Having a beautiful downtown will bring investment and give us an advantage over cities like Chennai and Kuala Lumpur.” (“In Myanmar, Racing to Save a Colonial Past,” New York Times, 13 December 2014)

These passages represent but two examples of a growing trend in the Global South by which unofficial groups and individuals actively participate in the construction and contestation of heritage at various scales. The contents of this book analyze and attest to a growing activism under the banner of heritage in Asia, a label we shall define later in this introduction. This growing trend is concerned with a diversity of heritages, both tangible and intangible, from various historic periods, including colonial times. The first quote

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was about a plan to demolish the residence of the Chinese literary master Lu Xun in Beijing. The second quote illustrates a desire on the part of influential players (in this case, Thant Myint-U, a Cambridge historian and Chair of the Yangon Heritage Trust) who are attempting to preserve colonial urban heritage for what they claim to be its historical and tourism values. In both instances, activism transformed the official scope and definition of heritage.

The historian Raphael Samuel (1994: 288, 292) notes “preservationism is a cause which owes at least as much to the Left as to the Right” and has “a predilection for direct action.” In other words, heritage can be used by a variety of groups across political and social spectrums. Focusing on countries in Asia, the chapters in this volume address this proposition by avoiding the pitfall of dichotomous perspectives—such as “dominant-subaltern” and “authorized-unauthorized,” “experts and nonexperts”—that seem to have dominated the field in the past decade (Rico 2015). Avoiding such dichotomous positions requires approaches that consider the details of the shifting agencies of various actors or players and the circumstance as well as the settings in which they engage with heritage and one another. The chapters in this book represent instances of such approaches in different Asian settings.

The two examples at the opening of this introduction are representative of a broader development in diverse contexts hinting at the rise of heritage and its contests in the popular imagination. Developing an academic perspective on heritage activism and the characteristics it takes relates to three big concepts in social sciences: globalization, scale, and civil society (and the state). In the following, we will briefly describe our position on these concepts and their importance to understanding heritage activism, before focusing on transformations in heritage studies itself and foregrounding the methodological and epistemological implications of learning from social movements theories in advancing our understanding of heritage. As we shall discuss later, the chapters of this volume take a range of approaches to conceptualize agency and activism in heritage, using a range of disciplinary methodologies that will be detailed throughout the chapters.

Globalization

According to Malcolm Waters (2013: 5), globalization is “a social process in which the constraints of geography on economic, political, social and cultural arrangements recede, in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding and in which people act accordingly.” According to some theorists, links between various actors, circulation of materials, and information intensify in this process, leading to a collapse of the effects of distances
and time (Labadi and Long 2010; Waters 2013). While this may be true on one level, we believe, on another level, relationships of heritage grow out of specific material conditions in places that in turn affect the capacities and actions of human agents. Among these theorists, there is broad agreement that such transformations have occurred in waves. The latest wave began in the 1960s and intensified from the 1980s. The effects of this social process are discernible on the three areas of economy, polity, and culture, with the latter gaining the most emphasis in recent times. The result is a stronger cultural circulation.

The growth of tourism indicates the intensification of both economic and cultural circulation. According to the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO 2015: 2), global tourism has steadily grown from 25 million in 1950 to 1,133 million in 2014. These statistics also clearly show a significantly higher rate of growth in international tourism in “emerging economies” (roughly mapping onto the countries of the Global South) in comparison to the “advanced economies” (roughly mapping on the countries of the Global North) (4). However, rather than homogenization driven by centralization and harmony over all scales, globalization results in “high levels of differentiation, multi-centricity and chaos” (Waters 2013: 30). This at once chaotic and global experience, the concurrent homogenizing and diversification, is to be expected. Similarly, Anna Tsing (2005) argues globalization processes are effective only once they instigate local engagement and that leads to a diverse and messy array of outcomes within scaled material networks that connect and influence a variety of people and places. Thus, while we agree heritage, in its current use, is a universalized Western European concept (Anheier and Isar 2011; Labadi and Long 2010), we also note this does not translate into uniformity across the board. Rather, heritage is the product of two conflicting forces of homogenization at global level and diversification at the local level.

Under the circumstances, and following Tsing’s (2005) formulation, heritage should be understood as an “engaged universal” (Jones et al. 2016) or a globalizing project (Labadi and Long 2010, echoing Tsing 2000)—one that, as Tim Winter (2013: 74) points out, is unfinished and “consists of [various] networks, pyramids and . . . clusters of institutions and actors who organize themselves across borders, with the deliberate aim of drawing the world together in new ways.” With the proliferation of various global nongovernmental bodies (historical societies, national trusts, and international bodies including UNESCO and the Global Heritage Fund), cultural heritage is now implicated in and related to human rights, climate change, issues of development, sustainability, poverty alleviation, and urban regeneration, to name but a few. As an engaged universal, even the demands of the most official and universalizing processes of heritage—World Heritage—is susceptible to
translation, transformation, and conflict through existing political and bureaucratic cultures (Jones et al. 2016). Through this process, rather than a uniform, singular “regime,” multiple heritage claims are created across various scales (Bendix et al. 2012: 14). Broadly speaking, as competing actors have proliferated, there is an increasing multivocality in heritage because these interactions are crucial to the constitution of heritage. This brings us to the second issue: scale

Scale

Traditionally, scale referred to how researchers balanced the extent (boundaries) and resolution (depth of information) of their research (N. Smith 1993). The political upheavals of the 1960s led to a focus on the social construction of scale, generally at the predefined levels of household, neighborhood, city, region, nation, and globe (Brenner 1997). However, this approach allocated too much causal power to the higher-level scales (particularly the global), misrepresenting local actors as without agency, and local conditions as determined by global or national forces (Marston 2000). Another critique of this understanding of scale in the heritage context is that local actors are automatically marked as progressive but powerless and national, or global actors as powerful but conservative or repressive. These critiques have been made both about the use of scale in the social sciences (Massey 2005) and in heritage research (Harvey 2015). Richard Howitt (2003) eloquently captures the contemporary definition of scale as size (geographical scale or pattern and extent), level (vertical scale of organizations), and relation (an understanding that scale is constituted through dynamic relationships in specific contexts).

The last element, relation, is the most profound, as it points out that scale is negotiated, contingent, and political (Jones et al. 2016). A focus on relations acknowledges scales are constituted as much through messy negotiations and misunderstandings as they are through collaboration and consensus. Scale itself is not a cause; it is best thought of as an “empirical generalization” or “a concept made real by building up an understanding of complex and dynamic relationships and processes in context” (Howitt 2003: 151). Like heritage, scale gains meaning and definition only when we look at the specific sets of relations that players are trying to invoke or contest (Jones et al. 2016). The attraction of heritage is often that it seeks to articulate new scales, or sets of relations between people, institutions, and things, that in turn shift relations between levels and change geographical scales.¹ Heritage and its associated scales therefore require tools that analyze the relationships between players: the activists as well as the experts, developers,
bureaucrats, lawyers, and anyone else involved in heritage creation. Scale can be applied consciously through examining its three elements, or through analysis that recognizes concepts, debates, and conflicts are negotiated and distributed and that these connections and disconnections are formative. While scale is not often explicitly invoked in this book, this approach to scale informs its analysis. This brings us to the last of the three concepts, that of civil society and, by extension, the state.

**Civil Society (and the State)**

Civil society is a contested and “elastic” concept that may be articulated in at least three ways: as part of society characterized by voluntary associations, a kind of society ruled by certain norms (law, civility, etc.), and a type of space for citizen interaction (Edwards 2011: 3). It is also continually being reshaped and reinterpreted by new actors in new contexts. Despite all these fluctuations, scholars argue the idea that voluntary collective action can influence the world for the better seems to have remained at its core. A cogent and helpful definition of civil society is provided by Michael Walzer (1998: 123–124, quoted in Edwards 2011: 4): “Civil society is the sphere of uncoerced human association between the individual and the state, in which people undertake collective action for normative and substantive purposes, relatively independent of government and the market.” Civil society relies on diverse forms of infrastructure that takes diverse shapes including grassroots organizations, professional societies, and NGOs, and these may vary in the degree of formality. It also is the outcome of the network among these organizations resulting in “assemblages, ecologies, or ‘ecosystems,’ which vary widely in their details from one context to another” (Edwards 2011: 7–8). Michael Edwards (2011: 3) describes this as the “geometry of human relations” in which individuals can engage autonomously of the state. It is important to note that networking and collective action do engender a sense of identity and strengthen civil society. However, the limits and shape of civil society are determined by other issues, including “insecurity, inequality, factionalism, the structure of communications, and the extent of civil and political liberties” (10). In other words, the political culture of the society, the type of state, and the dominant traditions are all at play.

Civil society is itself an invention and a product of particular practices of government and politics. Michel Foucault traces the historical development of increasingly sophisticated “technologies” of government that have evolved to increasingly focus on the productivity of populations (and its obstructions). In liberal democracies, productivity is governed through indirect regulation that creates and protects individual freedoms important
for contemporary conceptions of civil society while seeking to influence the habits and practices of populations. The shifting definitions of “what is within the competence of the state and what is not, the public versus the private” (Foucault 1991: 103), and therefore the limits and practices of civil society, is a historical phenomenon connected to changing ideas and “techniques” of government. These “techniques” of government have been and continue to be applied not just in liberal democracies but also colonies, kingdoms, and dictatorships (Hindess 2001; Philpott 2000). Association, resistance, and debate—all important elements of civil society—existed and exist within the diverse circumstances of any given society and form of state, and are limited and defined against and within them.² Hence, the same political practices of debate and engagement can be acceptable and even normal in one political system but outlawed in another. This diversity of norms and forms and extents of civil society is understood in relation to the concentration and exercise of power—a diffuse and unstable “ensemble of actions which induce others and follow from one another” (Foucault 1982: 217)—within the state-society relations.

Heritage is strongly implicated in political power relations. As Irene Maffi and Rami Daher (2014) point out in the context of Arabic-speaking countries, power relationships across all types of actors, boundaries, and distances are crucial for analyzing and understanding heritage. Such analytical understanding requires a concept of power able to recognize the diverse sets of relationships and actors in the making of heritage. Our volume, like theirs, relates “to meaningful objects and dynamic actions through which various categories of agents configure or reconfigure history, identity, culture and power” (Daher and Maffi 2014: 3). In our concern for heritage objects, actors, and agents, we are also mindful that various complex bodies within states constitute significant, if at times conflicting, actors in the field. While it may be true that the current regime of heritage management privileges the nation-state (Labadi and Long 2010: 9), we, following Michael Herzfeld (1991, 2014), contend the state is not a uniform body, and that it cannot enforce a perpetual monopoly over heritage.

Heritage is mobilized for various reasons, including diplomacy (Winter 2015), business ties, economic development, urban renewal, and nation-building (Bendix et al. 2012: 18). The latter is especially significant in Asia, where many countries have gained their independence in the past century and have turned to heritage to chart their historical and cultural trajectories. An interesting example of this is China’s partnership with the World Bank (WB 2011), where two of its three objectives focus on heritage (and conservation) in urban renewal and development projects (Ebbe et al. 2011). In this instance, we witness the bigger role played by a central state in heritage-related processes and nation-building. However, states only rarely

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retain exclusive power over heritage. As heritage has proliferated, various social groups find it a useful vehicle for contesting state power (Bendix et al. 2012: 19). Therefore, even highly centralized states may be compelled to be responsive to various social and economic pressures for heritage reform. As we shall discuss, the state may be crucial for the initial production of heritage, but understanding the dynamics or even the conditions of possibility of collective action becomes a useful means to understanding heritage processes. To elaborate, it is useful to briefly examine the transformation of the field of heritage highlighting the shifts in its object of study. Despite these changes, there are still few systematic studies of the role of various stakeholders and actors—institutional or otherwise—and their processes of communication and contestation in heritage.

Heritage 1: Schematizing the Evolution of Heritage Practice

Discussing the evolution of heritage comprises two aspects: how heritage has evolved in practice and how heritage research itself has evolved from multiple disciplines. For the purposes of the argument, we will schematize approaches to heritage in three time periods: first, the period leading to the 1980s when heritage was chiefly considered a resource; second, the 1990s when heritage was the field of enquiry especially dominated by archaeologists; and third, since the 2000s when critical developments has taken place and new scholarship has emerged in understanding heritage.

Current scholarship has established that, since the nineteenth century, heritage has been central to the establishment of nation-states, at first in Europe and then, often drawing on and rereading colonial research, throughout their former colonies in Asia and North Africa (Hall 2005; Kaplan 1994; Mitchell 2001; Roces 1978). The concern for heritage and its loss was prompted by Enlightenment’s transformation of the ideas of history and science, as well as social and economic changes set in motion by the Industrial Revolution, which together propelled a romantic nostalgia and the desire to preserve and resuscitate aspects of the past and the connection to nature (Lowenthal 1998; West and Ansell 2010).

In Europe and North America, activists and heritage enthusiasts initially formed societies that prompted wider, legislated protection for heritage (both natural and cultural). These societies also acted as precursors to institutionalized heritage. In a succinct summary of the development of heritage in the West, Rodney Harrison (2013a, following West and Ansell 2010) traces the creation of inventories of historic sites to 1837 in the wake of the French Revolution. There is a clear link between the production of such inventories and the concomitant perspective on the meaning of history on the
one hand, and the epistemic shifts produced by the Enlightenment and the production of the encyclopedia on the other hand. Thus, heritage processes of this period were concerned with scientific knowledge production, and its main protagonists were usually those equipped with knowledge of ordering and preserving material evidence of the past (generally professional experts). Thus, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, various “wilderness societies” appeared in North America with parallels in the United Kingdom. Concurrently, protection for both natural zones and monuments were being introduced into legislation. Nevertheless, the history of legislation for protecting heritage may be traced to Napoleon and his laws for protecting artifacts, which emerged during the Napoleonic Wars.

In the early days, two factors must be borne in mind: first, most heritage organizations began in the shape of activist organizations and preservationist societies outside the state apparatus. This suggests the strong link between the development of heritage and the formation of public spheres and civic societies. Second, and especially in the Asian context (Aikawa 2004; Bloem-bergen and Eickhoff 2015), international events and international networks were central in establishing the machinations of heritage within the state. For example, in Iran, heritage legislation was the result of a long process beginning with European rivalries in archaeological expeditions and then a French monopoly given by the Iranian government at the latter part of the nineteenth century, and culminated in a group of elites who led the establishment of Society for National Artefacts (Heritage) (Mozaffari 2014). The German archaeologist Ernst Herzfeld and the French architect and archaeologist André Godard were instrumental to forming heritage, legislation, and institutions such as the National Museum (known as the Ancient Iran Museum, est. 1936) (Mozaffari 2007).

There has been a steady growth in state control and legislation of heritage in each country. This process is combined with the rise of international concern for heritage (the case of Aswan Dam being the exemplary “myth of origin” for World Heritage (see Wangkeo 2003) and, subsequent to that, the establishment of various national legislations and institutions following the Western models. Concurrently, there has been a steady growth and diversification of specializations of various branches of heritage and thus the corresponding bureaucratic apparatuses to manage and preserve heritage. This rise has in turn expanded the scope of heritage regimes: what initially began as a concern for artifacts and sites (e.g., in the Athens Charter of 1931; see ICOMOS 2011) is expanded to include intangible practices in 2003 and the “diversity of cultural expressions” in 2005 (UNESCO 2005).

Further to this diversification, and especially since the late 1990s, it is increasingly recognized that designation, protection, and experience of heritage needs to be an inclusive process (Jones and Shaw 2012; Millar 2006).
The scope and purpose of heritage custodianship has changed to include a diversity of players (actors) at various scales, from government and state institutions to local participants from among laypeople; heritage is thus being “democratized.” Increasingly, and especially in conflict zones—given the rise of various destructive conflicts around the world and especially in the Middle East targeting heritage (e.g., Stone and Bajjaly 2008)—community engagement and capacity building have become major concerns.

In this way, it is possible to observe an almost universal pattern by which heritage processes are coming to a full circle: what began through the efforts of concerned individuals (which included experts) and societies was then gradually built into numerous legislations and state institutions (which at times absorbed the same individuals and their ideas), but throughout the twentieth century, these disparate institutions and legislations were increasingly centralized, officialized, and driven by professionals. Today, these professionals aspire to be more inclusive and recognize the diversity of stakeholders and their cultural expressions. It is noteworthy that these developments proceed from a wave of rising globalization and strategic shifts in the power balances in the world, particularly after World War II. Thus, for example, Japan’s push for the recognition of intangible cultural heritage must be seen as part of the process of legitimizing non-Western cultural attitudes in the global arena, as well as its attempt to act as a cultural powerhouse in Asia (Akagawa 2014). Within the established nation-states of the present world, heritage is also implicated in and informs development processes (e.g., China’s aforementioned partnership with the World Bank), cultural policies, issues of sustainable development (see, e.g., Labadi and Logan 2015; UNESCO 2017), and domestic and international relations (through diplomacy, as illustrated in recent research by Meskell 2015; Meskell and Bru- mann 2015; Winter 2015).

This “opening up” of heritage has coincided with rapid development in various Asian countries and concomitant economic shifts that have strained state resources and power, and contributed to social upheavals in the region. Heritage is thus further entangled in the transformation and development of public spheres, communications, and state-society relations. Political and economic shortcomings at the state level alongside the expansion of political opportunities have resulted in the growth of uncertainty, prompting people to seek further individual autonomy outside state control. If effectively organized, such cultural action can disrupt the state and undermine or displace fixed territorial boundaries (Waters 2013: 55–56). Thus, within social institutions, heritage is increasingly apparent as a significant contributor to the formation and operation of a public sphere and civil society as indicated through media and various forms of collective and individual expression. Despite these changes, as we will discuss, there are still few systematic stud-
ies of the role of various stakeholders and actors—institutional or otherwise—and their processes of communication and contestation in heritage in Asia. We now turn to the evolution of heritage research in the past decades to trace the treatment of heritage activism and social movements in heritage scholarship.

Heritage 2: Activism in Heritage Research

1980s: The Growth of a Field

Critical interest in heritage gained momentum in the 1980s with the introduction of cultural studies analysis about the growth and present-day use of heritage and history (see, e.g., Johnson et al. 1982). Implicitly or otherwise, social movements feature in the scholarship because of the cultural studies focus on the dominant subaltern class and group dynamics within their readings of history and heritage. Heritage movements generally received negative attention (Hewison 1987; Wright 1985). Often called preservationist groups, heritage movements’ main aim was the conservation of one or more sites, objects, or practices due to their interpretation of its significance to present. Our purpose here is to review the treatment of heritage movements in key texts in heritage studies to analyze why heritage movements have not consistently received the attention they have in similar fields such as environmental studies or gender studies. We have chosen these authors because of their prominence, their influence on heritage research as a field (rather than within a specific discipline), and their focus on heritage broadly conceived.

The first group of texts inspired a critical approach to heritage across several disciplines (Carman and Stig Sørensen 2009; Harrison 2013a). Patrick Wright’s (1985) *On Living in an Old Country* and Robert Hewison’s (1987) *The Heritage Industry* provide important analyses of the entry of heritage into everyday life and its political uses. Both authors take as their primary topic the links between the growth of heritage policy and practice, and conservative class politics, arguing that national heritage in particular is a product of a conservative reaction to changing class relations (Hewison 1987: 139; Wright 1985: 24–27, 52). Unsurprisingly, given this focus, both engage extensively with the National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland (henceforth, the National Trust) and depict its role as freezing “the whole of social life over” (1985: 26). Heritage movements are characterized as reactionary, conservative, and captured by political elites. The opportunity to study the engagement between modernity and heritage through the interaction of political and economic circumstances and the culture and social changes of the times was overlooked. This
is unfortunate, as the approach of these important books constrained the possibilities for locating the growth and shifts in heritage practices in the dynamics of social movements in critical heritage scholarship.

David Lowenthal’s *The Past Is a Foreign Country* is a survey of how people in different time periods, in particular the present, see, value, and understand the past. Lowenthal argues contemporary society’s engagement with the past through collecting and preserving is stultifying the past and limiting creative engagement. The basis of his argument is through a survey of written texts that, according to Lowenthal (1985: xxv–xxvi), is not a systematic sampling and “are heavily weighted toward literate elites who troubled to record their views.” Heritage activism is largely absent from *The Past Is a Foreign Country* because of Lowenthal’s choice of source material and his textual approach. Despite their absence, Lowenthal’s approach has implications for understandings of heritage activism, in particular his representation of preservation. Lowenthal views preservation as a limited engagement with the past caused by, and resulting in, an incapacity to understand and engage with it. Rather than being engaged drivers of understandings of heritage and history, heritage organizations in this formulation are reactive respondents to broader social changes (feelings of loss, the role of landmarks, the linking of personal with public histories (364)). Furthermore, Lowenthal’s arguments are based on a distinction between heritage and history that denigrates heritage as “domesticating the past” and reactive, reducing the creativity and capacities of its enthusiasts. While not as overt as Hewison, *The Past Is a Foreign Country* also relies on a distinction between history as critical scholarship and heritage as mindless populist entertainment that does not allow heritage activists agency in a richer formulation of social and economic change and the responses of movements.

**1990s: Challenges to the Class Critique**

Revisions of early critical approaches to heritage that viewed it as a limited and populist version of history came from several directions. Here we focus on scholarship from the fields of history (Raphael Samuel), geography (Greg Ashworth, Brian Graham, and John Tunbridge, who coauthored in various permutations many books and articles), and anthropology (Michael Herzfeld). Samuel’s *Theatres of Memory* provides a critique and a counterpoint to the earlier works of the 1980s. Samuel’s starting point is that history (including heritage) is a social form of knowledge—“the work . . . of a thousand hands”—and therefore requires an approach that addresses the “ensemble of activities and practices in which ideas of history are embedded or a dialectic of past-present relations is rehearsed” (1994: 8). He also criticizes the treatment of heritage enthusiasts within earlier approaches, and its
characterization of them as “passive consumers” of a conservative version of history, rather than as learners engaged in leisure and play who are as likely to be engaged in historical reflection and thought as the student of history (259–273).

Samuel’s chapter on politics includes a set of insights that overlaps heritage and social movement theory. He notes strong connections to cities (through land use and conflict over urban space), where the gatherings of people and resources essential to contemporary social movements were and generally continue to be located. He highlights the mobilizing power of heritage. Samuel also identifies the importance of the political opportunities within arenas to the expression of heritage, and the importance of national cultures, all important elements of social movements research: “It takes on quite different meanings in different national cultures, depending on the relationship of the state and civil society, the openness or otherwise of the public arena to initiatives which come from below or from the periphery” (1994: 306). Samuel locates the constant (re-)creation of heritage in the complexities of economic and social change, and assigns heritage organizations and activists a crucial role. Samuel’s broad approach and denial of the history-heritage division anticipated directions in heritage studies today toward analyzing the diversity of understandings and uses of heritage beyond heritage institutions and organizations, and the politics of memory and commemoration (Gentry 2014).

While writing earlier than Samuel, the anthropologist Michael Herzfeld’s A Place in History primarily engages with ethnography rather than the debates about history that incensed Samuel. A detailed study of battle “over the future of the past” of the Cretan town of Rethemnos (1991: 5), the book hinges on the division of social time, or “the grist of everyday experience” and monumental time, defined as focusing on the past and reducing social experience to steps along a collective official history (10). The richness of A Place in History is its detailed account of how the residents of Rethemnos encounter and respond to the assertion of monumental time through the conservation of their Old City. Perhaps because of the social time–monumental time division, activists are absent from a book whose primary division is between residents and bureaucrats. Heritage in this formulation is an assertion of the bureaucrats into the social time of the residents and becomes defined as an external imposition that social actors adapt “to promote some of their own ideas about what tradition might be” (205), in the process recasting and shifting official concepts. There are two issues with this formulation. First, activists are absent from the formation of heritage and debates over designation, which may be the case in Rethemnos (where heritage was imposed under a military junta) but not at other scales or in many other locations. Second, heritage is defined narrowly as official, invented tradition in contra-
distinction to the richness of social life. Research from the Pacific certainly would contest the notion that heritage is narrow and initially imposed from the state (Rio and Hviding 2011). Contemporary heritage studies has a much wider and fuller definition of heritage that has broadened and enriched heritage research. Furthermore, as Samuel argued, much historical research and interest in heritage emanates from social life through the interests and leisure time of the public. Herzfeld (1991) avoids the limitations of his narrow definition of heritage through the complexity of his detailed analysis of state-society (in his terms, bureaucrat-resident) relationships. He recognizes bureaucrats as complex social actors, and the official language and rules of heritage are often turned around in the hurly-burly of contention. His attention to the use of heritage in contention is an important precedent for analyzing heritage activism.

Ashworth, Graham, and Tunbridge’s most influential work in heritage studies, which popularized the concept in its title, is *Dissonant Heritage: The Management of the Past as a Resource in Conflict* (Tunbridge and Ashworth 1996). As geographers, Ashworth, Graham, and Tunbridge step away from concerns over history to focus on how heritage shapes and changes the world at different hierarchical and spatial scales. They treated heritage as a distinct phenomenon with specific characteristics that recur across space in particular and are evolving in a linked, simultaneous way. Their clearest and often-quoted definition of heritage (Graham et al. 2000: 2) as “the contemporary use of the past” emphasizes heritage is connected to the present needs of people and that its characteristics are located in its interpretations. They argue dissonance, or the discrepancy and/or incongruity caused by a lack of agreement over what constitutes heritage, is intrinsic to heritage because of these multiple interpretations and uses. Heritage is therefore implicated in creating and maintaining collective identities through the identification of key categories of “human division” (Tunbridge and Ashworth 1996: 71) that generate dissonance: culture/ethnicity (incorporating race, religion, and language); class (in particular, industrial heritage); and key social divisions including gender, the LGBTQ movement, and disability.

While dissonance is intrinsic to heritage, they argue dissonance can be reduced through management, most often by the state. In *Dissonant Heritage*, the concern with management is developed through a division between the “producers” of heritage (“cultural institutions, governments or enterprises” (Tunbridge and Ashworth 1996: 69) and the “consumers,” or the ethnic, LGBTQ, working class, disabled, or other groups whose heritage may be causing dissonance. While this is clearly a division of convenience, and they themselves advocate for consultation, it is the social movements that are being managed by the providers of resources and heritage expertise. Their attention is on the management of heritage rather than the dynamics of how a social movement
uses heritage and how the characteristics of heritage are formed through the complex interactions of social movements, activism, and political elite. The creation of heritage in their model (Tunbridge and Ashworth 1996: 7) starts with the conservation agencies rather than the more complex dynamics that are inherent in their discussion of the extension of heritage in scope and volume.

2000s: The Discursive Turn and Beyond in Critical Heritage Analysis

An important shift in heritage studies occurred with the publication of Laurajane Smith's *The Uses of Heritage* because of her critical analysis of heritage management, including the concept of the authorized heritage discourse (AHD). Smith used a suite of contemporary concepts (discourse, memory, place, and collective identity) to shift the focus of heritage research toward the situated experiences of people and how heritage management affected their relationship with and use of heritage. Smith's primary argument was that the AHD, defined as “a dominant Western discourse about heritage . . . that works to naturalize a range of assumptions about the nature and meaning of heritage” (2006: 4), gave the power to manage and define heritage to experts and applied an object, rather than a people centered approach, that “explicitly promotes the experience and values of elite social classes” (30). She argues the AHD and the experts who use it undermine the relationships between heritage and subaltern groups including women, ethnic groups, Indigenous groups, and the working class. A critique of *The Uses of Heritage* is the determining power that Smith gives to the AHD to define the identity and practices of heritage practitioners and the subaltern status of other groups. Heritage activism comes from many places, including the inside of institutions, and experts can simultaneously be activists and community members. Furthermore, the idea of an elite tends to fuse various kinds of group advantages, as if they were tightly correlated, into a catchall notion of “power.” This language makes it hard to understand how non-elites, without power, can ever exert influence in contestation (Robertson 2012). Outcomes can never be assumed in advance or easily explained on the basis of “power.”

Further useful developments have been introduced through appropriating disciplinary methodologies. A recent change in archaeology that begins to address the need for nuanced understandings of the relationships and alliances in heritage work is the incorporation of ethnographic methodologies into heritage and particularly archaeological practice (Byrne 2014; Meskell 2005, 2009). Accommodations between archaeology and ethnography have pushed heritage studies toward greater reflexivity, attention to the influence of the relationship between contemporary ethical and political issues and heritage practices, and acknowledgment of the diverse and active construction of heritage by nonexpert actors (in particular, Indigenous people).
(Meskell 2009). In one of her first articles on her understanding of “archaeological ethnography,” Meskell (2005: 84) writes: “My focus, however, remains squarely on contemporary culture. I want to know the ways in which archaeology works in the world. What kinds of, and what intensities of, connection exist? How is archaeology transformative in the fashioning of possible futures?” While this is an important reframing of archaeological practice that incorporates methods capable of engaging with nonexpert perspectives and locating archaeology within broader power structures, these questions and the research that followed focus first on archaeological or heritage practices and then on the extent and qualities of participation by other groups. Hence, Helen Human’s (2015) excellent article on the effects of UNESCO requirements for greater participation on Turkish heritage management uses research methods required to understand local and activist groups and engages with them, but remains centered on archaeological practice within state and international institutions, so it does not address how these groups formulated and prosecuted their claims and therefore formulate and shape heritage.

In a later development, the material turn in the social sciences (Joyce and Bennett 2010) has begun to open up new approaches in heritage studies. Harrison in particular (2013a, 2013b, 2014) has been at the forefront of the application in heritage studies of concepts that question and ultimately seek to dissolve binaries like human/nonhuman and society/nature that have been at the foundation of contemporary Western science, including heritage management. After identifying that critical heritage research has not always adequately addressed the role of material “things” because of its emphasis on discursive approaches (2013a: 112–113), Harrison advocates for a dialogical model of heritage that views it as

emerging from the relationship between people, objects, places and practices, and that does not distinguish between or prioritize what is “natural” and what is “cultural,” but is instead concerned with the various ways in which humans and non-humans are linked by chains of connectivity and work together to keep the past alive in the present for the future. (2013a: 4–5)

Harrison uses Bruno Latour’s (2005) actor-network theory and Charles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s (1987) concept of assemblages to address the range of objects, people, categories, lists, and relationships implicated in heritage. Harrison’s attention to the range of relationships, including affect and emotions, and objects in heritage is an important reminder that heritage activists respond and use a range of material affordances in their actions and relationships with heritage. While his application of these ideas opens up heritage studies to include a range of groups of people and things, including heritage activists and their affordances, his research has tended to focus on
institutions without consideration of these groups, and his application of assemblages is similarly limited (Harrison 2013b, 2014). Such work still needs to be done.

This Volume

Our schematization of the practical and scholarly aspects of heritage suggests that while activism is always present, both practice and theory can benefit from a more deliberate engagement with various forms of activism and the lessons that may be drawn from the study of social movements. Social movements are defined as “sustained, intentional efforts to foster or retard broad legal and social changes, primarily outside the normal institutional channels endorsed by authorities” (Jasper 2014: 5). This includes heritage activists, like the Iranian activists who have carefully advocated through newspapers and occasional protests for preIslamic heritage to be considered national heritage (Mozaffari 2015), or the Pacific Island social movements that have made strong appeals to heritage in their mobilizations (Rio and Hvinding 2011). It also includes movements focused on other issues who have made use of heritage. For instance, environmental groups have fought for the preservation and thus created “natural heritage,” and religious reform or revival movements have resacralized ancient religious sites that had become heritage. Heritage processes may vary according to cultural, national, geographical, and historical contexts, which makes comparative heritage research complex. In the field of critical heritage studies, scholars have rightly critiqued Western, expert-led approaches to heritage for their exclusion of the broader public and local perspectives (Winter and Daly 2012; L. Smith 2006). Others have focused on issues in state heritage management such as the division between nature and culture, or on the dynamics of UNESCO heritage claim making (Meskell 2015, 2009; Meskell and Brumann 2015). Still, the field seems to be dominated by a focus on (first) the perspective and actions of the state or large heritage institutions and (then) the reactions, or the extent and qualities of participation by other groups.

This volume stems from an alternative proposition: begin with the social movements that perform and maintain alternative forms of heritage and heritage practice in Asia, and work to have these practices acknowledged and/or supported by other, often larger, institutions (in particular, official institutions). As such, the book pursues both epistemological (how we research and understand heritage and social movements) and ontological (moving toward a broader consideration of heritage and its relationship to a range of players) goals. Analysis of heritage in Asia tends to rest on a set of theoretical considerations that have not been empirically tested.
(Winter and Daly 2012). Extending the direction of research on heritage and communities (Smith and Waterton 2009), this study provides an alternative basis for heritage theory in the circumstances, actions, and dynamics of civil society rather than in state policies and programs and the responses of specific groups. Heritage research, while recognizing the expansion of heritage in Asia (Winter and Daly 2012), has yet to focus on the groups who have lobbied for heritage reform in Asia, or to have undertaken this sophisticated analysis of heritage politics. In examining the construction, formation, and contestation of heritage in Asia, the focus of the book is driven by geographical context, as well as methodological concerns, which, as our chapters illustrate, highlight several worthwhile themes, to which we shall return. However, in the first instance, one needs to clarify our use of the term Asia in this volume.

A Note on the Concept of Asia

Our intention here is not to outline the problems inherent in the concept of “Asia,” a task others have undertaken with considerable eloquence (Lewis and Wigen 1997). Rather, in this brief passage, our intention is to orient the reader as to its logic and our use of the term. In this respect, we wish to outline the pitfalls we want to be avoided in using the term here and highlight the geographical logic of the contributions to the volume, which is undeniably also partly determined by the availability of the scholarship in the field of heritage. Deploying “Asia,” we recognize the contested nature of this “metageographical” concept. While the term is deployed in multiple contexts and in various combinations, its boundaries and connotations are context-specific and just as varied. In The Myth of Continents, Martin Lewis and Kären Wigen present a fascinating exploration of the history of metageographical concepts such as continents, (first, second, and third) worlds, and East-West or North-South divisions. As social constructs, such taxonomic systems set up zones of identity and othering rather than empirically verifiable geographical facts on the ground. The deployment of such categories may be prompted by perceptions of or desire to instill cultural, religious, or ultimately civilizational differences. An East-West division, for example, could be traced to the old-world empires of Romans (and the Greek before them, if need be) (1997: 53) in distinction to the Persians. Then, as in many instances in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Romans were usually designated as the roots of European culture and civilization (Aînalov 1961; Strzygowski 1902) and in relation to Christendom versus the others. Throughout history, such divisions (for example, farther East and hither East in Hegel) have been revised many times and their boundaries redrawn.
depending on global geopolitical developments. Thus, such divisions perform a political and cultural function (Hall and Page 2017; Lewis and Wigen 1997). For example, their deployment in the nineteenth century reaffirmed European colonial power and outlook. However, non-European ideologies including variations of pan-Islamism and pan-Asianism (Aydin 2007) have used the very same categories, albeit uncritically, to challenge European hegemonies (Lewis and Wigen 1997: 189).

A conventional step is to conceive of Asia as a continent. Even so, one can recognize that the notion of Asia, which has been used since the time of Homer, and Herodotus after him, designated a different place (essentially around present-day Turkey) than the landmass to which it referred in the late nineteenth century. In other words, the boundaries and meaning of the term have changed in time. Nevertheless, as we noted, the use of “Asia” (which also implies “not Europe”) suggests cultural and civilizational differentiation. Building on this, our use of the term implies not uniformity but rather a gradation of cultural practices, political systems, and social structures that make for geographical and human entities that are distinguishable from non-Asia, meaning Europe, large parts of Africa, and the Americas. The recognition of cultural differences and the role they play in the propagation of historical memory but also in social norms is thus a motivation for our use of Asia (Chong 2004; Tamney 1996; Weiming 2000). However, in this usage, we are also cautious to avoid four common pitfalls in the use of metageographical concepts.

The first pitfall, which is evident from our discussion to this point, is the assumption of the immutability and “naturalness” of such metageographical divisions. We acknowledge the boundaries of “Asia” are highly fluid and fraught with political intent. We even acknowledge our inclusion of Iran as one bookend of Asia, while acceptable to many, including the World Tourism Organization, which considers Iran as part of South Asia,12 may be surprising to others. By the same token, and following Lewis and Wigen (1997), among others, we do not subscribe to any essentialist divisions of geographical categories. Thus, we see little analytical value in the use of notions such as East versus West or North versus South in this context. Such “jigsaw puzzle” conceptions of the world are at once inaccurate and risk the naturalization and imposition of constructed hierarchies (Lewis and Wigen 1997: 10). In our opinion, such a reductionist and essentialist conceptualization constitutes the second pitfall, is to be avoided.

A corollary conception and third pitfall to be avoided is “geographical determinism,” as “the belief that social and cultural differences between human groups can ultimately be traced to differences in their physical environments” (Lewis and Wigen 1997: 42). The last pitfall we wish to avoid is
suggestions of Asian exceptionalism: that there is an essentially immutable “Asian” set of values that differentiate Asia from others, presumably the Europeans, in areas including cultural heritage. We do nevertheless acknowledge that even in heritage, the tacit or explicit invocation of the idea of Asia has led to productive imaginations. For example, the promotion and institutionalization of intangible heritage, especially by Japan (Aikawa 2004; UNESCO 2003), is indebted to notions of an Asian culture in contradistinction to Eurocentric conceptions of material, monumental heritage, and authenticity (Smith and Akagawa 2008). In this respect, heritage is also an instrument of cultural diplomacy within Asia (Akagawa 2014).

Other economic and infrastructure developments propelled by powers such as China and India have created new international dynamics in within the continent, which may result in concomitant cultural and heritage components. A significant example in this regard is China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In constructing major “economic cooperation corridors,” China invokes and reinvents the historic notion of the Silk Road in both land and maritime contexts. The initiative’s areas of emphasis include development policies, infrastructure, investment and trade, financial cooperation, and social and cultural exchange (Wade 2016). The already-apparent result of this—also contested by other powers such as India—is a greater connectivity with tangible movements of people, technologies, and materials that results in reconceptualizing the notion of an Asian continent with China as its major powerhouse (Habib and Faulknor 2017; Winter 2016). Considering all these transformations, our conception of Asia in this volume refers to a “more or less discrete” landmass (Lewis and Wigen 1997: 35). Here, Asia is neither determined nor dominated by any singular civilization, religion, language, or political culture and social norms.

Within this broad and loose definition of Asia, our chapters address various regions—“more or less boundable areas united by broad social and cultural features”—that are conceptualized based on “real patterns in the world that precede to understand them,” and their identities are amplified through globalization (Lewis and Wigen 1997: 14). We therefore use the term Asia to refer to a large and diverse region that has, through political, economic, and academic processes, become defined in contradistinction to other diverse regions, primarily Europe but also Africa and the Americas, and we use contemporary geographical groupings while acknowledging their historical contingency and mutability. As such, our chapters address the social aspects of heritage construction ranging from East Asia to South, Southeast, and finally West Asia. Despite our efforts, we could not find contributors from the Central Asian region, which remains a fascinating area for future investigation.

"HERITAGE MOVEMENTS IN ASIA: Cultural Heritage Activism, Politics, and Identity" Edited by Ali Mozaffari and Tod Jones. https://berghahnbooks.com/title/MozaffariCultural
Chapters in This Book

Heritage studies is an umbrella field, a trans-field that brings together various disciplines ranging from history to sociology and anthropology. While the chapters in this book exemplify various forms of individual or collective activism in heritage, not all borrow explicitly from social movements theories and terminologies. This unevenness, we feel, is justified by disciplinary multiplicity in heritage studies itself, and contributes to building a variety of approaches to understanding activism and social movements in heritage that are required to address different circumstances.

In chapter 1, Tod Jones, Ali Mozaffari, and James Jasper illustrate the methodological implications of approaching the question of activism and movements in heritage through the lens of social movements theories. We use heritage research and exemplar to demonstrate how heritage is produced through the activities and occasional protests by activists with various agenda. As we have already mentioned in this introduction, there is a methodological weakness, if not a gap, in understanding and conceptualizing activism in heritage studies. This is also apparent in the shortage of terminologies that can sufficiently or systematically categorize with various analytical concepts required for understanding heritage activism. Therefore, our chapter explicitly borrows from and experiments with terminologies and concepts such as “players” and “arenas,” developed by James Jasper, from the field of social movements. Our chapter introduces a different perspective into the reading and understanding of heritage politics and civil society. Exploring the relationship between heritage and activism also pertains to the formation or “geometry,” as well as the limits, of civil society and the public sphere. In this respect, the role of various forms of media in relation to heritage activism becomes significant. However, heritage studies has yet to fully incorporate this aspect into its theoretical and methodological repertoire. Chapters 2 and 7 in this collection go some way to initiate this aspect of heritage research.

In chapter 2, Tod Jones, Transpiosa Riomandha, and Hairus Salim examine the role of social media—in this instance, Facebook—in forming new identity groups and redefining heritage in Indonesia. Acknowledging the nascent research in the relationship between social media and heritage activism, the authors provide an engaging account of the relationship between social media and heritage by focusing on one particular heritage group: Bol Brutu. Engaging with Indonesian archaeological sites through social media combined with trips to sites and other activities, the group promotes creative and entertaining engagement with material remains, and through this, shifts their members’ heritage practices. The authors highlight the importance of intermodality and recognizing the continuum of online-offline activities of
heritage activists—a fact insufficiently examined in current heritage activism and heritage and digital media literature. It would be erroneous to imagine social media detached from the vast network of connections, exchanges, and knowledges on which it rests, and concurrently, it helps make and promote heritage. Bol Brutu exemplifies this relationship in the specific historical, cultural, and political context of Indonesia. However, as the authors tell us, the group’s existence is underpinned by practices of travel to, and movement in and around, heritage sites. This combination of social media (with all their affordances) and on-site practices creates a focus around which social class, cosmopolitanism, and new conceptions and practices of heritage coalesce. Importantly, the chapter shows that not all heritage activism is driven by oppositional politics against a reductionist conception of a “state.” Rather, there are complexities and nuances in the production of heritage and social class that may be discerned through a careful attention to the activists and their modes of internal and external communication.

While speaking of Asia, we are mindful of the significant variations in the shape and extent of the civil society and the potential dominance of the state apparatuses in the daily affairs of the citizens. As Gary Sigley shows in chapter 3, the tensions between this and the globalization of heritage, as evidenced through rising tourism, illustrates an interesting dynamic in China. The strong hand of the various factions within the state suggest there is only limited potential for explicit social activism that may upset the authorities in various locations. While China seeks to expand its tourism market and increase its prestige through the inscription of World Heritage Sites, the political opportunities for activism in various forms of heritage are bound to be limited by the willingness of state apparatuses. Nevertheless, Sigley points out the limited albeit expanding nature of the public sphere in China. Rising wealth in Chinese society and the opening of borders to foreign visitors has stimulated domestic and international tourism. China is thus playing an increasingly strong globalizing role just as it engages with global demands, movements, and pressures, including in tourism. Focusing on the commercial tourism activities of the US citizen Brian Linden and his family in China’s city of Dali, Sigley illustrates how one individual’s understanding of cultural and linguistic nuance can help him pave the way for both his commercial gain and the presentation of a different Chinese cultural experience to his clientele. The chapter illustrates the importance of particular actors to understandings of heritage and how their institutional and subject positions (in this case, as a foreigner in a nation-state that controls the limits of political speech) shape their activism and understandings of heritage.

Singapore provides an interesting comparison with China. A state with strong central control, but more open than China, Singapore affords greater opportunities for heritage activism. In chapter 4, Terence Chong offers a
short and engaging account of the development of middle-class heritage activism in Singapore understood as a corporatist, centralized state. It integrated the development of heritage with the shifting political, economic, and social conditions of Singapore. Chong demonstrates how the political modalities of Singapore condition heritage activism and heritage activists are able to pick at the seams of these modalities through their use of local, national, and international narratives and networks. Chong’s chapter shows the delicacies of heritage activism that seeks to engage with and collaborate with the state. In such instances—as is the case in several other countries, including Iran—activist groups and individuals draw on their personal networks and engage in “backroom activism” to realize their goals. Through such activism, activists engage in a politics of scale. Like their Iranian counterparts, they use international listings and covenants to pressure the state over heritage regulation (as Chong notes, “calibrating local practices to international norms”). Chong shows the media are also used to pressure the state in decision-making about heritage matters, a clear indication of the role of civil society players in the formation of heritage. Here too the rise of heritage and its concomitant activism is linked to the growth of the middle class and identity politics in Singapore.

In chapter 5, Sudeep Jana Thing writes about a local Indigenous movement in a Nepalese national park, providing an interesting contrast with Chong’s nationwide Singaporean activism. Thing establishes the concept of biocultural heritage—a recent international concept that is itself the product of international NGOs and organizations—and then applies it to the Sonaha minority and their relationship to a riverscape that is now within a national park. Applying a lens of political ecology to contests over natural resource management, the chapter examines the activities of Indigenous ethnic social movements and other players in various arenas. The author argues biocultural heritage is shaped through the political opportunities, circumstances, and rifts within the Indigenous ethnic Sonaha social movement. He also suggests this type of heritage is a useful concept for empowering minority ethnic groups in their relations with the state. Thing clearly demonstrates Indigenous social movements are crucial for understanding the articulation of biocultural/cultural landscape heritage and that the political opportunities the state provides for Indigenous recognition and rights are therefore linked to the emergence of such heritage, however it is termed.

In chapter 6, Aimée Douglas turns her attention to Sri Lanka’s Dumbara Rata weavers to critically examine the relationship between various parties and their contests over heritage and traditional knowledge in a village impacted by the global pressures of a changing market economy. As modernity and globalization have increased the demand for “authentic” crafts of the weavers, the ownership of the knowledge of its production has become a
source of social and class contention in that region. Presenting a detailed and fascinating ethnographic account of the relevant events in the village, Douglas shows how market forces (modern and global) shift communal and class identities (local and traditional) and how this results in claims and counterclaims over the authenticity and ownership of traditional production. In this displacement, both local activists, who enter the contest to protect their class interests, and officials engage. This engagement is beginning to change the nature of the caste and the old order that dominated interactions and relations of production surrounding Dumbara Rata. Here the scale of activism is local and within the community of the village but also involves players representing the state.

In the final chapter, Ali Mozaffar examines the relationship between heritage activism and the media in Iran. Through a close reading of media statements issued by activists in two provinces (the capital of Tehran and the southern provincial city of Ahwaz), the chapter traces some of the characteristics of heritage activism in Iran. The media releases examined here relate to two specific events: one related to a dam near the World Heritage Site of Pasargadae, and the other related to metro lines in Ahwaz. While concentrating on specific sites, both cases have national repercussions for defining collective identity and heritage, illustrating the interdependence of heritage and scale. The chapter shows heritage activism—rather like all forms of activism—goes through cycles of escalation and de-escalation. Also, activists adapt their tactics to the political environment around them, which is to say the shape and characteristics of civil society are in a constant process of change and evolution. Working with the concept of framing in social movements, the chapter shows representations (in this case, words and speech) function as frames in the construction and sustenance of heritage activism both at local and national scales. Like some other examples in this book, Iran has “strong” state apparatuses, and activists tend to be cautious in their challenges. Similar to their Singaporean peers, in addition to occasional protests, they tend to draw on their networks to persuade various factions within the government toward their goals. This suggests activism, at times, takes the form of cooperation or critical engagement with state institutions.

In its totality, the volume, which covers several subregions within Asia, suggests interesting peculiarities around activism and contestation of heritage in Asia. First, we can see the political structure of the state determines the limits of the public sphere and thus the very possibility and tone of activism. Understanding the nature, shape, and even the possibility of heritage activism in a given context thus relies on many other analyses, namely the cultural and political history of the given context; the diversity, depth, and machinations of social institutions; and the availability and spread of various forms of technology, especially communication technologies. It fol-
lows that not all heritage contests and activism is resolved through conflict. In this sense, understanding heritage and its dissonances and contestations may deviate from the core concerns of many social movement theories. Second, although controlled, media and, increasingly, social media play a significant role in shaping imaginations and practices of heritage. They help recruit, legitimize, and promote a point of view but also, through framing, turn emotional concerns into persuasive arguments. Third, the appearance of heritage activism is a symptom of and a prompt for social change. Fourth, in any given context, activists employ a range of strategies to advance their cause. Finally, the role of individual players in heritage activism should not be discounted. Many movements begin with and are sustained through the actions of a few or even one committed individual.

As many of Asian societies experience modernization within a postcolonial condition, traditional social dynamics are reconfigured not only by an often insular and controlling cultural nationalism and the global exchange of ideas and capital, but also by social movements who reconfigure these forces through their activism and circumstances. The change in heritage is also intimately related to shifts in class consciousness and identity (such as the rise of the middle class in its broadest definition). These characteristics distinguish the Asian heritage scene from much of what takes place where heritage has a longer history of institutionalization, such as Europe and North America. As this introduction has shown, the significance of activism in heritage should be understood as a constituting element of the rise of heritage in Asia—a phenomenon that is occurring right now, driven by increasingly sophisticated and politically astute individuals operating in and across groups who are pursuing their interests and making brave decisions to influence and direct powerful and, in some places, repressive regimes.

Acknowledgments

The research for and production of this introduction was made possible in part thanks to a grant awarded by the Australian Research Council (grant no. DE170100104) to Ali Mozaffari.

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**NOTES**

1. For a recent collection of essays dedicated to the exploration of heritage and scale, see Lähdesmäki et al. (2019).
2. For an example of the cultural policy continuities and breaks across different political periods in Indonesia, see Jones (2013).
3. The National Trust’s history is viewed through the lens of its conservative political affiliations in the 1980s. For instance, Wright (1985: 51) characterizes the goals of the National Trust’s three founders, Octavia Hill, Robert Hunter, and Hardwicke Rawnsley, as “saving beauty spots” and focuses on its role in shaping national heritage in a way that accorded with the goals of the conservative establishment. For instance, he writes: “One doesn’t have to take a completely negative view of the National Trust to see that the inalienability of the Trust’s property can be regarded (and also stages) as a vindication of property relations” (52). Both Wright (1985: 48–56) and Hewison (1987: 54–58) focus on the National Trust’s role in the preservation of the English country house, characterized as a process through which English landscape, the political elite, and conservative ideals coalesced to produce a “dominant” version of English heritage. Reading the National Trust through Frankfurt School theories of modernity and mass culture (explicitly in Wright 1985: 1–32, implicitly in Hewison 1987, although he does acknowledge his debt to Wright’s ideas) leads to issues with the characterization and analysis of heritage movements.
4. For instance, Lowenthal (1985: 405) writes: “Preservation can fairly be charged with segregating the past. Consciousness of the past as a separate realm arouses the urge to save it; doing so then further sunders it from the present.”

5. As the permutations of Ashworth, Graham, and Tunbridge changed between publications, we are keeping them in alphabetical order here and providing longer citations to indicate order in a specific publication where necessary.

6. There were also challenges from archaeology through public archaeology (Carman and Stig Sørensen 2009; Skeates et al. 2012) and in museums through the new museology (Vergo 1989).

7. Samuel (1994: 292) writes: “The cry of ‘heritage in danger’ has proved by far the most potent of mobilizing forces—and of networking—in environmental campaigns.”

8. Samuel’s nuanced treatment of the National Trust notes the activities of two of its founders in defending the land rights of villagers and commoners (Robert Hunter), and defense of open space against private property (Octavia Hill) (1994: 296–297). He records that the National Trust welcomed the Labour government after World War II in Britain (288) and that the preservation of country houses was thought be a Labour cause in the 1930s (297).

9. They also contributed earlier books on heritage management including *Heritage Planning* (Ashworth 1991) and *The Tourist-Historic City* (Ashworth and Tunbridge 2000), and prominent later books such as *A Geography of Heritage* (Graham et al. 2000) and *Pluralising Pasts: Heritage, Identity and Place in Multicultural Societies* (Ashworth et al. 2007).


11. While Smith (2006: 299) provides provisos about her “strong characterization of a discourse” when she writes about the AHD, these do not temper her statements about experts.

12. This is also noted by Hall and Page (2017). For the UNWTO, see UNWTO (2019).

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