A study that deals with the behavior of German-Jewish functionaries in the Reich Association of Jews in Germany (Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland, RV) during the Holocaust risks receiving unwanted applause from the wrong side, that is, from those who wish to contend that the persecuted Jews participated in their own murder. It is my hope that my work does not in any way abet such mistaken assumptions, which serve to exculpate the German perpetrators. Rather, I have sought to determine what specific and ever-changing challenges and constraints the Jewish representatives faced in the years 1939 to 1945, and how they reacted to and grappled with these. Given the radicalization of the persecution of the Jews, intensified to the level of murder—evident from the rapid change in meaning that the concept of the so-called Final Solution was undergoing—they were repeatedly forced to attempt to fulfill what the National Socialist (NS) state demanded of them in a way that was not harmful to the Jewish population in the German Reich, but rather, if possible, was beneficial to the Jews remaining there. This was also the case when they were forced to participate directly in the preparations for the mass deportations. As we see more clearly in retrospect than the (Jewish) contemporaries were able to perceive at the time, such a delicate and dangerous balancing act was ultimately an impossible task. Nonetheless, over the span of some six years, they made the repeated attempt to achieve this aim.

Readers looking for simple answers will not find them here. Even if I focus on the attitudes, efforts, and ultimate unavoidable failure of the German-Jewish functionaries, it is important to be ever mindful of a cen-
central fact: they did not create the situation in which they were forced to act. If I endeavor to determine their latitude for action, this does not imply that they were in a position to exploit, refine, or expand that room to maneuver as they might desire. Moreover, even when they agreed to be included in (a small part of) the preparatory work leading to the murder of the Jews, and later did not refuse such entanglement, this does not mean that they were guilty of complicity in the Holocaust. That burden of culpability lies clearly with the perpetrators, their accomplices, and bystanders.¹

At the outset of my investigation, I asked myself whether the Reich Association of Jews in Germany had been a kind of German Judenrat (pl. Judenräte), a Jewish council similar to those set up in the occupied territories.² The task of the Jewish councils in the ghettos or in a specific territory was to implement the measures ordered by the occupiers, to keep statistics, vacate apartments, provide forced laborers, hand over valuables and tribute payments, and assemble transports to the extermination camps based on corresponding instructions given to them. However, as a rule, they also tried to organize provision of food, care for the needy, delay execution of orders imposed on them or work out ways to mitigate their severity, and to these ends exploit the rivalries that existed among the various factions within the occupiers. In short, their efforts were aimed at “buying survival time” for the respective ghetto, or, later, for its inhabitants deemed still able to work.³ As a rule, the German occupiers wanted the Jewish Communities (Gemeinden, sing. Gemeinde) to elect the Jewish councils themselves. These were to be headed by rabbis and influential individuals who were trustworthy and whom the ghetto residents would listen to and obey.

In the course of my own work on Jewish Mischlinge (i.e., “half Jews” and “quarter Jews,” “mixed-blood” Jews, sing. Mischling) and mixed marriages, I had repeatedly encountered the Reich Association of Jews in Germany, often mentioned in very neutral terms in the memoirs of survivors, sometimes noted full of gratitude or vilified with undisguised hatred. But much more frequently, it was not mentioned at all, although the Jewish spouses in mixed marriages and their children had had contact with the organization in a whole ensemble of concerns.⁴ By decree in 1939, all German or stateless Jews living in the German Reich had been forced to become members of the Reich Association.⁵ Some joined it voluntarily, and even those who kept their distance from the organization were included in its files and received orders and instructions from it. Between 1939 and 1945, all “full Jews,” according to the NS definition, who had not successfully concealed their Jewish origin had to deal with this organization in all matters of emigration, social welfare, relatives needy of support, children of school age, assignment to a Judenhaus (“Jews’ house,” pl. Judenhäuser), or
for information of any kind. The members had to pay their dues, all Jews were obliged to report any change of residence or family status, and they were ordered to have any intended request or petition to a government office first checked by the Reich Association, to name but a few reasons for necessary contact. The Reich Association was directly subordinate to the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA), and was required to implement its orders or obtain permits for its activities and those of its district branches. Should the Reich Association be equated for these reasons with the Judenräte in the occupied territories?

The Jewish councils and the Reich Association had many similarities: the Jewish functionaries active on the boards of its predecessor organization, the Reich Representation of German Jews (Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden), were placed in offices and leadership positions in the successor organization (at least those who were still in the country), at their head the respected rabbi Leo Baeck. Like the Jewish councils, the Reich Association was also required to implement Nazi German policy on the Jews in the Jewish population, keep statistics, evacuate apartments, collect valuables, and prepare confiscations of property. However, the German Jews did not live in ghettos, although in many localities they were forced to reside in assigned residential areas, in Judenhäuser or in barracks camps. The Nazi state had largely taken over the organization of forced labor, but the Reich Association was forced to participate in the financial looting of the members and deportees. This money was deposited in blocked accounts to which the Jews had no access, and confiscation of property and assets upon deportation was to the benefit of the German Reich. Thus, there are certainly external similarities with the Jewish councils, but these should not mislead us to inappropriately equate these institutions: the Reich Association had been established primarily to promote mass emigration. Its other tasks did not gain central importance until later over the course of time, and in terms of the motivation of its leadership, it was perceived as the continuation of the predecessor organization, which had been formed freely in 1933 to serve as a mouthpiece and to represent the interests of the Jews vis-à-vis the Nazi German state.

The term Judenrat is laden with certain further tacit suspicions: for one, it suggests that ultimately, the Jewish representatives on the council acted against the interests of their wards, finally delivering them into the hands of death. Second, it intimates that there had been a real alternative for action in the East. In the occupied territories, that concrete option was flight: to flee from the ghetto into the forest and join the armed resistance. However, the German Jews had no such option: they lived in the land of the perpetrators, surrounded by German Volksgenossen who profited more or less from the employment bans on Jews, their expulsion and plunder-
ing. The official anti-Jewish measures in the *Altreich* (Germany in its 1937 borders) had not been imposed by some foreign occupying power, but rather had been conceived, successively implemented, and intensified in the country where they were citizens and with whose culture they largely identified. German forests provided Jews no protection, and in most instances they were forbidden by new legislation from even entering these wooded areas. Partisan bands had not been formed in the *Altreich*; instead, a dictatorship had established itself that enjoyed broad support, and with which most *Volksgenossen* could accommodate quite well (at least until 1943). Ultimately, the German resistance movement did not begin to deal with the persecution of the Jews and their murder until 1943, when most Jews had already been killed.\(^7\) In addition, the Jewish population in Germany that had not left the country by the time a prohibition on emigration was enacted in October 1941 was a group quite advanced in age, and with a high proportion of females. If they had remained leaderless, would they then have been able to rescue more people, as philosopher Hannah Arendt criticized the German-Jewish leadership in retrospect? Arendt called the role of the “Jewish leaders” “undoubtedly the darkest chapter of the whole dark story.”\(^8\) Yet she was mistaken if she sought to refer to the entire period from 1939 to 1945: yes, perhaps younger, more courageous Jews would have been able to flee across the border into neighboring countries up until the outbreak of the war. Maybe they would have succeeded in avoiding capture by the German troops. Nonetheless, these vague possibilities to flee the Reich were an option for only a very few, and only until September 1939. And these options evaporated in the autumn of 1941 with the beginning of the mass deportations. The majority of the German Jews, unorganized and leaderless (and here Arendt was right), would likely have lived in “chaos and plenty of misery.”\(^9\) And this majority, we must recall, was aged, often ill, or in need of care.

Most German historians who have dealt with the persecution of the Jews did not ask what possibilities and alternatives were open to the Jewish functionaries: for them, the Jews had been objects of action taken by the state and ultimately victims of the Holocaust, and as such they were devoid of any latitude for action, motives, or maxims.\(^10\) By contrast, Jewish historians dealt intensively with these topics from the 1950s well into the 1970s.\(^11\) Dan Diner gave important theoretical stimuli for analyzing the events.\(^12\) Doron Rabinovici drew on Diner’s ideas in his study of the Vienna Jewish Community, the “prototype” of a Jewish council,\(^13\) and these ideas have also influenced the present study of the Reich Association. Thus, Diner stressed that the Jews (and Jewish councils) were acting in a historical situation in which, presumably or actually, no final decision on their fate had as yet been made by the Nazi leaders. Conse-
quently, they proceeded on the assumption that they still had “socially viable time” available. Confronted with real or apparent alternatives that might make their survival possible, they were forced “to anticipate the thinking of the National Socialists” and to develop a strategy to allow them to have a moderating influence on the thinking of their oppressors. They had to try to understand the logic of their adversaries rationally, and to attune themselves to this logic in order to be able to put forward proposals and suggestions that were in the interest of the National Socialists, but that always also served the aim of their own survival. For the Jewish councils in the ghettos, this was the exchange of work in order to buy time to survive. This ultimately meant they had to sacrifice some in their community in order to save the others. Yet unlike what the Jews assumed, the National Socialists, driven by a will to destruction, did not behave rationally; rather, as Diner terms it, they acted “counter-rationally.” They negated all “anticipations of human behavior ordinarily deemed to be universally valid,” instead bringing about the “rupture of civilization” (Zivilisationsbruch). Diner notes:

At the phenomenon’s center, the Jewish councils hovered between self-preservation and self-destruction; or put otherwise, at its center lay self-destruction by means of self-preservation. We face here a specific and terrible instance of a universally applicable borderline experience; it addresses basic assumptions about human nature and human behavior, bringing us to the fragile outer limits of reason and rationality.

Caught up in the vortex of this “borderline experience,” or what Diner terms a “boundary locus,” this also means that the Jews were unable to fall back on any collective or individual experience in order to place in a familiar context what was happening to them and what they were reacting to; they were unable to apply again or modify any strategy that had been successful at some point in the past. At the end of the process, they found themselves in a “trap for action”: either they would contribute to the unobstructed course of destruction, or, by resisting, provoke mortal dangers for the community. For that reason, the point of departure for all efforts by the Jewish functionaries was concern for the welfare of the Jewish community. Doron Rabinovici summarized his findings on the Vienna Jewish Community: “It was not because the Jewish councils betrayed the Jewish community but because they attempted to act in their interest that the Jewish functionaries were condemned to see things from the perspective of the authorities. They had to think like Nazis in the interest of the Jews…. They followed the enemy’s orders closely because they hoped that in return it would also keep to the system it had itself ordained.” The Jewish functionaries tried to get their persecutors to adhere to rules
and ways of behavior that they themselves were also bound to. In order to achieve this, they sought to recognize what the (ostensible) material interests of their persecutors were, as well as disputes among them over competence, their likes and dislikes, and to then make optimum use of this knowledge for their own benefit.

Against this backdrop, I formulated my own research questions: What had motivated the Jewish functionaries to remain in the German Reich and to assume an official position in the Reich Association? How did they orient their behavior within their own institution, vis-à-vis their compulsory members and those in power? What rules did they wish to implement? How did they try to connect their own interests in escape and survival with the orders of the RSHA? Did the German-Jewish functionaries also put forward an imaginary “proposal” for cooperation with their rulers, and what did it entail? Did they study the intentions of their persecutors, and where was it presumably possible for them to build on and utilize these intentions? Did they achieve any success, and if yes, what did that consist of, and how long did it last?

The Jewish functionaries’ “own interest” in the period 1939 to October 1941 lay primarily in assisting as many Jews as possible to flee from Germany. From 1941 to 1943, they sought to provide for those remaining in the Reich, while carrying out the orders for preparations for the deportations, seeking at the same time to postpone and mitigate the orders. They did this until, finally, the survival of the members and functionaries themselves was endangered. From 1943 to 1945, after the Reich Association was formally dissolved, Jewish intermediaries, so-called Vertrauensmänner (sing. Vertrauensmann), looked after the needs of Jews in mixed marriages. Central here too were provision of care and attempts to mitigate the situation as far as was possible, but they likewise were constrained to assist with preparations for the deportations. During all phases, the Jewish functionaries of the first and final hours always worked under strict control and overt or tacit threat of death. Thus, the question of how this impacted their activity and motivation runs like a dark thread through this entire study.

I examine these and further related questions in the five sections of this book: In chapter 1, the chaotic years from 1939 to 1941, after the establishment of the Reichsvereinigung, are explored. In chapter 2, my focus is on the work of their Berlin central office and the Jewish Community in Berlin, where by far most Jews in Germany lived. In chapter 3, the situation elsewhere in the Reich is examined, looking in particular at medium-sized cities where the regional branches of the Reich Association were active. I try to work out common features shared with the situation in Berlin, and also within the territory of the Altreich, as well as various
differences. Chapter 4 investigates the working conditions of the Jewish intermediaries in the rump organization, the Rest-Reichsvereinigung, after the Reich Association was formally dissolved on 10 June 1943. Finally, chapter 5 looks at the postwar aftermath for the functionaries who had survived and stayed on in Germany, and the burdens and challenges they faced in starting a new life, concluding with a comprehensive summary of the entire study. In each of the five chapters, I also seek to shed light on the personal fate of the German-Jewish functionaries whose work I am examining. Since in contrast with the leading Berlin functionaries and heads of the regional branches, a larger proportion of the intermediaries survived, the final chapter of the study also explores their fate after the war. This look at the period after 1945 is intended to give an impression of the great burden of the past the small remaining German-Jewish community had to grapple with after liberation. The insidious functionalization of the Reich Association within the process of persecution had a lasting poisonous impact on relations within the Jewish Communities and between individuals. It brought the Allied occupying powers into the arena, who pursued a number of the few surviving Jewish functionaries as Gestapo collaborators, and ultimately also impacted on scientific inquiry of this topic.

To date, the history of the Reich Association of Jews in Germany, its leading functionaries, and its regional representatives has not been investigated in terms of the research questions formulated above. The research literature, which I confront critically in all sections of the present study, concentrated mainly on the fact that the Jewish community, even under the extreme conditions of National Socialist rule, preserved its concepts of humanity, its values and dignity. 21 It is the particular merit of Otto Dov Kulka and the late Esriel Hildesheimer to have explored the strands of continuity in the work of the Reich Representation and the Reich Association, which they identified in the spheres of education, vocational training, and social welfare. They concluded that the chief priority for the Jewish leadership in each and every phase of the persecution was to preserve and maintain the material and psychological/spiritual existence of the Jews. Later on, that became the desperate struggle for the survival of the Jews and the humane face of their community. 22 In this they agree with the surviving German-Jewish representatives. 23 Yet the Jewish community was not an isolated, untouched island within the National Socialist dictatorship: the Jewish representatives always worked under direct Nazi control, “whether they cooperated or attempted to sidestep official decrees,” as Rabinovici noted regarding functionaries in Vienna. 24 The continuity in personnel stressed by Kulka and Hildesheimer undoubtedly existed, yet the democratic election of the leading functionaries of the
Reich Association lay up to six years in the past, when there were still a large number of Jewish groups operating in Germany. By 1939, most of their electors and colleagues had long since emigrated from the Reich. Nonetheless, the remaining Jewish representatives had actually almost all stayed on in Germany, principally in order to care for the needy. But the Reich Association was subordinated to the powerful RSHA, and the Jewish functionaries, who soon found themselves entrapped in the Reich, were walking down a dangerous path. They cooperated with their oppressors, yet an end to the process was nowhere in sight: in order to make mass emigration possible (especially from 1939 to October 1941) and to preserve the survival of the remaining community, they made decisions and accepted orders under duress that clashed fundamentally with their own identity and convictions. This practice served to turn their aspirations and claims into the very opposite of what they desired, and, with the slightest sign of protest, cost several of their most outstanding leaders, such as Otto Hirsch or Julius Seligsohn, their lives even before the beginning of the mass deportations. These representatives were forced to radically alter their ideas of social care and welfare, and ultimately had to sacrifice a part of the community in order—perhaps—to continue to care for the needs of those remaining and to be able to prevent even worse things. In short, their conceptions of humanity were subjected to an externally imposed rapid process of transformation, and they were in many instances stripped of their human dignity. In addition, from October 1941, they were constrained to participate in preparations for the mass deportations to the ghettos and concentration camps in the occupied Eastern territories. In this way, the focal point of their work successively shifted, until those dependent on protection and social care were likewise deported. To bracket out their part in preparations and organizing for the deportations—which became, step-by-step, in fact the main task of the Reich Association—means, at least at first glance, to concentrate solely on the non-problematic aspects of the history of the Reich Association. For Hildesheimer and Kulka, the history of the Reich Association ends with the deportation of the leading representatives in 1943, who had embodied the organization’s continuity with the Reich Representation. However, the deported Jewish functionaries continued their work in the committees inside the Theresienstadt ghetto camp, and their successors in the Altreich, the intermediaries, headed up the New Reich Association (or rump organization, the Rest-Reichsvereinigung) until the war’s end. Most of these final remaining Jewish functionaries had already worked earlier as legal “consultants” (Konsulenten, the Nazi term for Jewish lawyers) or “Jewish practitioners for the sick” (Krankenbehandler, the Nazi term for Jewish physicians)\textsuperscript{25} for the Reich Association or its institutions.
They perhaps had little or no connection with Judaism as a religion, but they were not outsiders, and their activity is an integral component of the history of this organization. In the face of all the hostility they were subjected to by representatives of the Nazi regime or members of the Reich Association, they were the last Jewish officials who endeavored to protect the remaining not yet deported Jews.

In the 1960s, Otto Dov Kulka came across the extant though not complete files of the Reich Association in the Central State Archive in Potsdam in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), now accessible in the Federal Archive (Bundesarchiv) Berlin and in copy form in other archives. Naturally, the official protocols of the association’s board, memoranda, and correspondence of the board members and coworkers of the Reich Association had to be formulated in a neutralizing discourse under the Nazi regime. The memoranda in particular were presented to corresponding officials in the RSHA for approval. To express resistance and protest against these measures or fears about their effects in writing would have resulted in immediate arrest and internment in a concentration camp. Consequently, the existing documents seem almost like administrative instructions and orders, and thus strangely distant from the brutality of the persecution of the Jews of which they were nonetheless a part. In order to obtain a multiperspectival picture of how Jewish functionaries acted in the years 1939–1945, I utilized materials in Israeli, German, British, and American archives. These included posthumous papers, memoirs of survivors, letters or reports by later-murdered Jewish functionaries or their family members, and files on reparations. These reports, retrospective or written in the freedom of their country of emigration, constitute a necessary supplement to the central core of documentation of the Reich Association files: they enrich this material by adding the “unspeakable” and subjective perspectives on events, even if these sources were in part composed after the fact and with some cognizance of the Holocaust. Consequently, using these later-composed source materials harbors the danger that the judgment of a situation is distorted by knowledge acquired after the war. Frequently they also are tacitly imbued with the character of something written in order to justify and legitimate one’s own past actions. This notwithstanding, I chose to make use of them because they can cast needed light on the accompanying circumstances under which an ostensibly “neutral” document of the Reich Association was composed, or they permit me to include events whose mention was assiduously avoided in the contemporary correspondence of the Jewish functionaries. For that reason, along with the subjunctive mood, the modal adverbs “apparently,” “presumably,” “possibly,” “perhaps,” “probably,” and the qualifier “in retrospect” appear quite often in this study.
My investigation focuses on the history of the organization and its functionaries. But in order to make clear the different perspectives on events, I also always made selective use of source materials that provide a window into the perspective of the “ordinary members” and subordinate staff workers in the Reich Association, and that help to show how their attitude changed toward the activities of their representatives over time. I was able to locate such reports in the Yad Vashem Archive in Jerusalem, the US Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) in Washington DC, the Leo Baeck Institutes in Jerusalem, New York, and Berlin, and the Wiener Library in London. Some of these subjective documents were composed in retrospect, immediately after emigration or in the postwar period, so that they involve the same set of problems described above.

The Jewish-German functionaries of the first hour were almost all murdered, and the few survivors left relatively few testimonies, at best some short statements, mostly in interrogation or testimony in court. This gives rise to the problem of finding it necessary to utilize by and large the extant “official” or organization-internal documents in order to illuminate their motivation, how they understood their work, and the possibilities and limits for action. These documents contain no expression of their doubts and despair, fears, aversion and reluctance, their reservations, the humiliations they suffered or maltreatment they endured. Rather, they were specifically drafted to consciously ensure that any such reference to this was eliminated. The files of the Jewish Communities that I used to sketch and reconstruct the work of the Reich Association branches have a similar self-censored character. The sources I employed to help reconstruct the work of the Vertrauensmänner after June 1943 provide a different picture: housed in the main state archives (or still within the files of the public prosecutors) are the files of a number of postwar legal proceedings against responsible Gestapo leaders or other perpetrators. In these proceedings, surviving Jewish representatives and Jews in mixed marriages testified as witnesses. If these legal proceedings were proximate in time to the actual persecution, then persecutors, family members of the victims, returnees from concentration camps, and intermediaries were among the witnesses summoned, that is, the entire spectrum of events was addressed. This encompassed knowledge and partial knowledge about the mass murder of the Jews, the constant threat of death associated with the office a person held, the concrete pressures connected with specific measures of the Gestapo and other institutions of persecution, the isolation from the non-Jewish-German surroundings and the indifference pervasive there, as well as the isolated position of the Jewish functionaries in their own environment.

These source materials differ from those on which chapter 2 is based. They enable us to develop greater empathy for the individual actors than
the “neutral” memoranda or minutes from the Reich Association board in its central office tend to allow. In addition, in the American and Soviet occupation zones, the organs of the occupying power gathered evidence against Jewish functionaries who had been accused of collaboration, generally by their own membership. In the worst-case scenario, these persons were subsequently convicted of complicity in Gestapo crimes and imprisoned in the same concentration camps in which they had been interned in 1938 after the November pogrom. While persons so accused were in time rehabilitated in the American zone, in the Soviet zone it generally took years until they were released—if indeed they survived this second phase of persecution and did not perish in the special camps of the Soviet occupying power in Germany’s east.

In this study, I have concentrated on the research questions outlined above, and have left out other thematic fields that likewise emerged as possible topics from work on the documentation of the Reich Association, such as the complex “Aryanization” of plots of land and buildings owned by the Reich Association and the educational efforts or work over years of the Jewish Kulturbund (Jewish Cultural Federation). I also have given only selective treatment to the various spheres of Jewish social welfare, in order to point to how their character changed over the course of the progressively worsening persecution, ultimately becoming part of the events of deportation.

This book deals with the leadership stratum of German Jewry from 1939 to 1945: the governing board of the Reich Association, Jewish functionaries in the Berlin central office, the key staff members and responsible officials in the branch offices across the Reich, and the heads of the Jewish Communities—that is, a limited circle of persons, yet one whose precise number is difficult to determine. They all had decided to remain in the German Reich, together with the members of their communities. As highly qualified legal experts, economists, or experts in other academic professions, they were accustomed to assuming the mantle of responsibility for others, to represent them and act on their behalf. They sought to build up a Jewish administration that implemented all orders and instructions from the Nazi rulers in such a manner that the latter would have no reason to carry out this work themselves. At the same time, this administration was structured so as to rule out any arbitrary action or corruption, in that it operated in accordance with the principles of adherence to a set of specified rules, transparent, working in accordance with fixed channels and assigned competencies and responsibilities. From the perspective of the Jewish representatives, their strategy of cooperation with the Nazi authorities was always bound up with their endeavor to decelerate events, and if possible to prevent the constant further radicalization of the Na-
ional Socialist measures. That path proved to be a dangerous balancing act, a tightrope walk strung between their own desires, the massive external constraints, and an anticipatory obedience so as to avert further escalations. I also chose the concept of a “tightrope walk” (*Gratwanderung*, literally “walk along a ridge”) in my first extensive study on the topic, when I sought to analyze the changes that transpired in the relation of the Jewish functionaries to their compulsory membership in the Reich Association, looking at their efforts while walking a thin line between responsibility and entanglement.27 If the functionaries tried to extend their constantly shrinking latitude for action with respect to an (imagined) overall interest of their membership, then they themselves tended to curtail the individual latitude of the members for action by doing so. The members increasingly defended themselves against the control that the Reich Association exercised over them.28 By means of the strategy of cooperation, the Jewish functionaries intended quite the opposite, but the National Socialist state used them in order to implement its panoply of ordinances against the Jews. For many of those impacted by these measures, the Nazi persecution of the Jews thus also bore the thumbprint and face of its Jewish representatives, then and in retrospect, whose supervision they endeavored to elude and escape.

**Notes**

5. This also held for mixed marriages if the Jewish spouse was the husband, or if the mixed marriage was not classified as “privileged” (10. VO zum Reichsbürgergesetz, RGBl. 1939, 1097). In addition, the Jewish Communities had to report the names of their members who had been included in the membership of the Reichvereinigung.
6. On the Reich Representation, see chapter 1 of this book.
9. Ibid., 125.
10. Günther Plum describes in a few pages the continuity between the Reich Representation and its successor, the Reich Association, and their tasks, but mentions only briefly the assistance given for organizing the deportations; see Günther Plum, “Deutsche Juden oder Juden in Deutschland?,” in *Die Juden in Deutschland 1933–1945*, ed. Wolfgang Benz (Munich, 1988), 66–74.
15. Ibid., 136.
16. Ibid.
17. Diner, “Beyond the Conceivable: The Judenrat,” 128, 118; see also Diner, “The Limits of Reason: Max Horkheimer on Anti-Semitism and Extermination,” in *Beyond the Conceivable*, 104.
18. Ibid., 133; Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, rev. ed., 3 vols. (New York, 1985), 1038–1039. Hilberg pointed out that to refrain from resistance had indeed been an old Jewish strategy to avoid pogroms. Later he was more differentiating, and recognized that the German-Jewish functionaries had tried with their limited possibilities to postpone the worst, to “retard the downward trend, to save at least some people,” or through petition to achieve a period of grace or some modicum of mitigation; see Raul Hilberg, *Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders: The Jewish Catastrophe, 1933–1945* (New York, 1992), 114–15.


