INTRODUCTION

Antiyanquismo: Nascent Scholarship, Ancient Sentiments

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Only deeper and broader probing can uncover the many rich motivations, articulations, contexts, and buried representations of resistance. It is with this insight in mind that the contributors to this volume inquired into the career of anti-Americanism in Latin America and the Caribbean throughout the long history of the region’s relations with the United States. Analyzing this career, they agreed, must include re-imagining the sources, forms of expression, visions, and implications for policy of anti-US resistance.

The authors agreed not to be bound by any specific definition of anti-Americanism. Yet they operated from the assumption that anti-Americanism should be treated as an ideology in the cultural sense of the word, a protean set of images, ideas, and practices that both explain why the world is how it is and set forth a justification for future action. This definition of ideology assumes that anti-Americanism contains some negative stereotypes and simplifications, much as all ideologies do, especially those with the prefix “anti.” But it also advances that, as a complex system of thought, anti-Americanism cannot be dismissed as a mere political tool used by elites to manipulate the masses. It was, and is, meaningful to those who have embraced it, often ordinary people who rallied to integrate their shared values into resistance movements built at great sacrifice across national, class, racial, and other divides.

In this view, all criticisms of the United States developed out of some cultural process. To chart these expressions of hostility, cross-

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breeding the “new cultural history” with international perspectives was necessary.\(^2\) As Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher explained in the inaugural volume of this series, such a method sought “to decenter diplomatic history while at the same time integrating the cultural approach into the study of foreign relations.”\(^3\) Their repertoire for “culture” was already vast, ranging from dreams and ideas to cultural theory, perceptions, the creation of memory, lifestyles, emotions, art, scholarship, and symbolism.

This volume certainly draws on these now-accepted sources of cultural history—from the comedy of Mexico’s Cantinflas to the cartoons of irreverent magazines in almost every country, to the classic novels and pamphlets that envisioned Latin America’s racial, religious, and “spiritual” rejection of US norms. Yet it expands even further the material allowed in cultural interactions with international history because of the deeply ingrained meanings and emotions that Latin Americans attached to such concrete manifestations of US “hard” power as the landing of Marines or the mismanagement of US banana plantations. Cultures of resistance, especially resistance to imperialism, tend to be bound to the visceral need to halt injustice. For that reason, their motivations tend to be material rather than abstract, and their representations straightforward rather than subtle. In this volume, therefore, more traditional cultural evidence—novels, paintings, cartoons, and the like—stands shoulder to shoulder with debates over national identity, with diplomatic rhetoric, with theological disputations, and with visions of economic development. Moreover, because anti-Americanism has tended to include appeals to mass participation, the “culture” of anti-US resistance also includes manifestations of mobilization such as parades, rallies, and even riots. Finally, this volume’s contributors avoided an approach so jargon-filled that it would fall into the trap about which scholar Florencia Mallon warned students of the subaltern: a discourse so esoteric that it excludes those it is meant to help.\(^4\)

The contributors shared a final assumption: that anti-Americanism below the Rio Grande had much to teach the rest of the world. Among these teachings, a first lesson relates to the cumulative impact of time on anti-Americanism. As Mary Louise Pratt wrote, “the United States and Latin America have been entwined and entangled in a way that other places have not,” and they have been so for centuries.\(^5\) In that time, a generational sedimentation of grievances shaped historical memories and national mythologies. Latin America’s resentments fed one another over time and grew in complexity and intensity. As a result, while US diplomats often ridiculed “latent anti-Americanism” for harping over past injustices, Latin Americans were not convinced that any injustices were merely in the past or that they were
irrelevant even if they had passed. This phenomenon has most recently erupted in the Middle East, where anti-US resentments united cross-sections of generations and boosted nationalism.

A second lesson from Latin America regards the unique attraction to anti-Americanism in poor countries. While Britain and France may have expressed an equally old anti-Americanism, Latin America’s was much less abstract or theoretical because of the reality of US economic domination there. “Latin America, not Europe, was the area most exposed to American power,” scholars Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin reminded us.6 Being “under the boot” of US power was often quite literal, given the hundreds of landings by US forces, and so Latin America more than the rest of the world has experienced US domination through violence and capital, both forms that affected the poor far more than the well-to-do. Now that, in the early twenty-first century, many other poor regions of the world perceive their poverty to be tied to the wealth of the United States, Washington should expect economic grievances to undergird much of contemporary anti-Americanism.

A final lesson from Latin America relates to the type of resistance that tends to emerge from powerlessness. The individual countries of Latin America began and remained relatively impotent vis-à-vis the United States. They learned, therefore, to resist with the “weapons of the weak”—not conventional warfare or political arm-twisting, but either passive resistance such as boycotts and civil disobedience or more desperate tactics such as guerrilla struggles and spontaneous rioting.7 In all these ways, today’s leaders and non-state actors around the world may see parallels to their own situations in Latin American history.

To locate the reader better within this trajectory, this introduction provides intellectual and historical contexts to the chapters that follow it. It first traces scholarship on anti-Americanism in Latin America and the Caribbean since the 1920s, making the case that a generation of more disinterested and historically-minded scholars of anti-Americanism may be finally emerging. It then outlines major periods in the history of anti-Americanism from 1783 until 2005, laying the groundwork for the case studies of each chapter, which it then briefly summarizes.

The Scholarship: A Historiography of Anti-Americanism in Latin America and the Caribbean

Scholarship on US power in Latin America and the Caribbean is certainly plentiful, but literature on the resistance to that power has
been restrained by political polarization and a lack of sources—and imagination. However, since the 1990s, and especially since September 11, 2001, new analytic sophistication and political balance in this literature have demonstrated the potential that that traumatic day has held to re-open minds to the past as well as the future of anti-Americanism.

Perhaps the earliest wave of US writings on Latin America’s hostility towards the United States focused on “Yankeephobia” in the 1920s. Like most commentators on US-Latin American affairs during this decade, most of its participants were not historians or other scholars but government bureaucrats or students who had recently traveled to Latin America, where they personally experienced animosity. They tried to make sense of past criticisms, but their explanations were fraught with clunky analysis and the need to justify US domination of the Caribbean and Central America at the time.

As the word “Yankeephobia” itself suggested, these observers tended to discard out-of-hand all criticism of the United States as an irrational fear of the progress that US military occupation or investment were forcing on a foolishly reluctant Latin America. Mistrusting US power was, to them, an engrained pathology that must be exposed to be healed. It was to be pitied, even, growing as it allegedly did out of Latin America’s failed culture—its violent Spanish heritage, priest-ridden Catholicism, abiding social inequalities, and European-dependent antimodernism. The trope of anti-Americanism-as-pathology was so consensual among 1920s observers that the construction itself suggested fear—US fear of allowing any uncovering of its wrongdoing or hypocrisy abroad. The pathology consensus sometimes even denied that Latin Americans were responsible for their own political culture. One author characterized anti-Americanism in Latin America as a “campaign” by Germans who scattered there after World War I. In a typical appraisal of the time, he was flattered because anti-Americanism was therefore a reaction to the spread of democracy, “an inevitable step in the evolution of mankind.”

This 1920s wave also suffered from methodological problems, mostly because sources were almost exclusively the “great texts” of anti-Americanism. Many 1920s authors were students of Latin American literature who valued the pithy phrases of well-heeled authors, the defiant speeches by great statesmen, and the angry verses against US agribusiness. They failed, however, to seek anti-Americanism in unpublished popular sources. One author who wished for more popular evidence of anti-US sentiment expressed frustration that it simply could not to be found among simple folk in Brazil. “Being largely passive and uneducated, the Brazilian common people afford us but
vague inlets toward their ideas. We can thus only approach their minds by personal experience, by the testimony of Brazilian scholars, who have studied their native countrymen, or by actual incidents in which North Americans have been brought into direct contact with the sentiments and actions of the populace." Even with a less disdainful researcher, the obstacles to obtaining popular evidence of anti-Americanism were serious, since none of these early chroniclers uncovered a single poll of Latin American public opinion, neither on images of the United States nor on any other topic. This first collective effort toward understanding the phenomenon, therefore, suffered from a defensive US nationalism and from the elite view that only other elites could be valid historical voices. The flawed perspective of 1920s Yankeephobia scholarship foreshadowed future failures.

A second wave of scholarship on anti-Americanism in Latin America and the Caribbean washed over the Anglo-American world from the late 1950s until the mid-1960s. While this wave benefited from more evidence than the first, it also spread more assumptions—albeit more evenly across both ends of the ideological spectrum. Moved into action by attacks on Vice President Richard Nixon in South America in 1958 and by the Cuban Revolution, a broader variety of scholars now tried to explain the anti-Americanism of Fidel Castro’s generation. Institutions that funded scholarship on US-Latin American relations had multiplied since the 1920s, and so had the reading public. As a result, sociologists, economists, and political scientists now blended their insights with those of travelers, journalists, educators, and Cold Warriors.

Most still worked with limited evidence. Despite the fact that the United States Information Agency conducted pathbreaking polls in Latin America starting in the 1950s, few seemed aware of them. Moreover, although this generation had more direct interactions with ordinary Latin Americans, few conducted systematic surveys or creative analyses of popular sentiment rejecting US power. They focused their energies instead on extrapolating the ideas and actions from small groups of communists and guerrillas to the majority of Latin Americans. And they continued to rely heavily on the writings of intellectuals.

One result was—again—a fear that Latin sentiment was running amok. The Cold War catapulted this fear into the highest reaches of Washington, where policymakers from the Oval Office to Congress to the Pentagon associated nearly any criticism of the United States, no matter how mild, with communist propaganda. Reflecting this paranoia, scholars couched their conclusions, again, in pathological
metaphors. One called anti-Americanism a “disease” and spoke of “Yankeephobe contagion” measured on a “Yankeephobe fever chart.” Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), called the spread of Cuba’s revolutionary rhetoric “Castro-itis.” As they had in the 1920s, pathology metaphors reinforced the belief that Latin Americans were unable to forge their own arguments. They had to be “infected”—this time not by Germany, but by Moscow and Beijing.

In the 1970s and early 1980s, mainstream interest in anti-Americanism remained low and could hardly be considered a “wave.” Latin Americans, who had long since realized the deep roots on antiyanquismo, now contributed historical scholarship. Yet they often merely reprinted the “great texts” of anti-Americanism without much comment or analysis. In the United States and Europe, the anti-Vietnam War protests produced a backlash of sorts against criticism of US foreign policies everywhere—the first wave of what could be called “anti-anti-Americanism.” This focus on anti-Americanism became the refuge of scholars obsessed with branding critics abroad—and the counterculture at home—as unpatriotic, xenophobic, or opposed to democracy.

Slowly, some more analytic and empirical treatments of anti-Americanism emerged, cresting slowly into a third wave by the late 1980s and 1990s. This wave seemed motivated by a combination of the declining Western paranoia that the developing world would turn to communism and the demonizing of the United States by Islamist movements in the wake of the Iranian Revolution. Political scientists stood at the forefront of devising definitions, taxonomies, and case studies—on Latin America and elsewhere. While Alvin Rubinstein and Donald Smith’s *Anti-Americanism in the Third World* presented itself as a potential model for comparative global studies, it also suffered from the abiding tendency to defend the United States from its critics rather than understand the critics on their own terms. Nevertheless, progress was evident. Some scholars inquired into deeper strains of anti-Americanism that lay behind the official propaganda of communist states in the twentieth century. Most attention focused on the reasons why otherwise friendly nations such as France, Germany, Canada, and South Korea had developed such antipathy to the United States during the Cold War. Much of this excellent work remained obscure, however, for lack of an audience.

Precociously belonging to this third wave, Carlos Rangel’s *The Latin Americans* appeared in 1977 and became the first book, in Latin America or elsewhere, to offer a sweeping interpretation of Latin America’s image of the United States. It was a smash in France and
in Rangel’s home country, Venezuela. The book relied on sometimes thin psychological meta-narratives, but Rangel usefully underscored what few dared declare in public: that Latin America’s images of the United States were deeply ambivalent. Almost simultaneously, others added context to that perspective. Carlos Rama in Spanish, and then John Reid, and F. Toscano and James Hiester in English, all joined their otherwise unremarkable “great text” anthologies with observations of the material and cultural conditions that produced historical shifts in anti-Americanism in the hemisphere—the sharing of books, the increase in commerce, the development of universities.

By the 1990s, Latin American anti-Americanism more fully entered the purview of historians. One group of Mexican scholars provided one of the best social histories of the phenomenon, Estados Unidos desde América Latina, which paid serious attention to social psychology, institutional context, and how anti-Americanism varied from one social group to another and one country to another. And the topic continued to attract a broad audience in Latin America. In 2000, a group of Latin American scholars updated Rangel’s critique of reactive anti-Americanism in the hemisphere in their popular Guide to the Perfect Latin American Idiot.

A fourth and defining wave of scholarship swelled quickly when the world stood agape at the destruction wrought on September 11, 2001 upon the US sense of invulnerability. That day opened up scholarship on antiyanquismo by allowing hemispheric scholars to participate in a worldwide conversation on anti-Americanism with the broader public and by building a stronger bridge between scholars regardless of their politics. To be sure, some perils lingered in this scholarship. Just as anticommunism had distorted the understanding of anti-Americanism in the 1960s, the fear of terrorism now threatened to derail informed scholarship in the 2000s. The nationalistic cant swirling around the media and the simplistic reassurance from the Oval Office that foreigners hated the United States “because we are free” demonstrated the need for disinterested scholarly attention.

The longing for balanced histories of anti-Americanism would not easily be satisfied. Two edited volumes published in 2004 illustrated the continuing political polarization of what could increasingly be called anti-Americanism studies. The first, Paul Hollander’s Understanding Anti-Americanism, stood firmly to the right of this polarization. Hollander, a Hungarian expatriate, pioneered much of the scholarship on anti-Americanism in the 1980s and 1990s. He often exposed the institutional background and facile scapegoating of anti-Americanism, especially among the left-leaning US intelligentsia. But he too often slapped the term “anti-American” onto anyone inside or
outside the United States who criticized its policy or society with any consistency. In Understanding Anti-Americanism, his rhetorical technique was in evidence throughout: to string together seemingly intemperate quotations out of context and thus whip up the unwitting reader’s outrage at critics of the United States. While Hollander himself was careful to state that anti-Americanism could be either rational or irrational, he and his contributors tended to illustrate only the latter. Several chapters exclusively charted “irrational” anti-Americanism and paid only lip service to the “rational” variety. Typical of this false balance was Roger Kimball’s assertion that “there may be—in fact there assuredly are—many things to criticize about the United States. But anti-Americanism has almost nothing to do with criticism. It is more a pathology than a position, operating not by evidence but emotion.” Kimball and others were indeed keen on perpetuating the image of anti-Americanism as a disease. Michael Radu, another contributor to Understanding Anti-Americanism, called Mexican intellectuals’ anti-Americanism “Pavlovian” and Argentine versions “fashionable.” The end result was not, in fact, an “understanding” of anti-Americanism but rather the reinforcement of the shopworn nationalistic assumption that “they hate us” because of who we are: free, modern, democratic, wealthy, and so on. At its worst, this argument made a mockery of the term “anti-American” when its users abused it to bully dissidents into silence the way Joseph McCarthy did with the term “un-American.”

Andrew Ross and Kristin Ross’s Anti-Americanism, meanwhile, gathered several think pieces from New York University scholars who emphasized—with more sophistication than did Hollander—the view from the left that there has been no “hate” for what the United States is. Instead, anti-Americanism has been well-deserved resentment for what the United States does: denies freedom to the oppressed, chooses war over peace, exploits the world’s poor, and so on. The Rosses’ discussion of Latin American anti-Americanism emphasized that the region epitomized the most “organic” and “purest” resistance given the record of US domination. Much as authors on the left had done before, contributors to Anti-Americanism focused so much on US misdeeds that they barely analyzed the criticisms of those deeds. Anti-Americanism also inverted the rhetoric of Hollander by briefly admitting that some criticisms of the United States may be emotional or prejudicial, then promptly ignoring them. The Rosses allowed, for instance, that “caricature is intrinsic to the standpoint known as anti-Americanism,” but then returned to listing what the United States had done to deserve the caricature. Siding too easily
with the critics, *Anti-Americanism* often ended up joining anti-US discourse rather than engaging it.

Despite the lingering politicization, the events of September 11th allowed more moderate and diverse scholars to delve into the complexities of anti-Americanism. More rigorous, comprehensive, and detached scholarship now existed alongside the usual fire and brimstone. Some of the best scholarship on anti-Americanism to emerge after September 11, 2001 was more balanced between US and foreign sources, based on quantitative data, attuned to personal narratives, realistic about political opportunism, attentive to generational shifts, and sensitive to anti-Americanism’s cultural and social meanings. While some intellectual sins of the past remained—the generalizations, dismissals, polarizations, and the distortion of evidence—a new opening had been breached for a public seemingly awakened to the importance of foreign opinion to US international relations. Jean-François Revel’s work on French anti-Americanism, translated and abridged, even became a hit in the United States in 2003. No longer did one need to be a zealot for US influence in the world nor a sworn enemy of it to be interested in anti-Americanism. Since the extreme versions of anti-Americanism now concerned everyone in the United States—and, arguably, the world—the public seemed willing to explore not only the extreme but the less harmful forms of hostility, and to inquire about the roots and branches of both.

**The Phenomenon: A Brief History of Hostility, 1783–2005**

Keeping the distortions of past scholarship in mind, the task of painting the broad strokes of anti-US hostility in Latin America and the Caribbean should involve great care in giving equal attention to shifts in the following three elements: US actions that prompted resistance; elite and popular groups who led anti-US arguments; and movements and policies championed by those groups. Causes, sentiment, and strategy: these three pillars help to define six periods in the history of anti-Americanism in Latin America and the Caribbean—1783 to 1830, 1831 to 1897, 1898 to 1933, 1934 to 1958, 1959 to 1990, and 1991 to 2005. The metaphor of a tree of anti-Americanism aptly expresses the narrative arc during these periods. Roots and nutrients were buried deep at the outset of the late eighteenth century, when anti-Americanism remained a shrub. But it took nurturing, the right climactic conditions, and the capricious winds of history to plunge the
roots deeper, thicken the trunk, and grow the branches. Throughout it all, the causes of anti-Americanism increasingly became concrete abuses of US power, its sentiment grew to integrate the cultural and political, and its strategy became increasingly effective at countering US power.

1783–1830: Independence and Disappointment

During this first period, Creole leaders of the republics newly freed from the moribund Spanish empire saw their hopes of a New World alliance with the United States dashed. This disappointment was perhaps the greatest driver of anti-Americanism in the decades following the victory of the thirteen North American colonies over England. It was rooted in the fact that US help to Latin America against Spain remained paltry and tied to US self-interest.

The US founding fathers, to be sure, were glad to see others rebelling against European monarchies. They also had long traded with Latin America—often smuggling around Spanish monopolies—and, during the revolutions against Spain, they continued to build ships for Latin America and to sell wheat, flour, and slaves there. Yet the founders remained suspicious of the self-governing ability of those who had remained for so long under the rule of an empire that was brutal yet neglectful, Thomistic yet unruly, devoutly Catholic yet unable to proselytize natives. They judged the Creoles who emerged from that rule as lazy, fractured, and superstitious. As a result, US leaders only offered cooperation or protection if it corresponded to their own interests. President James Monroe’s “doctrine” of 1823, for instance, clearly meant to open Latin America to more US shipping as much as it warned Europeans not to re-colonize it.

Latin American views of the United States during these years, good or bad, were largely confined to the Creole elite. They were the ones who traveled to the United States, traded with it, or read its news and novels. Within these small groups, hope of a hemispheric rebirth had taken root. Creoles admired the success and moderation of the American Revolution and foresaw the making of a continent-wide “America” united against an outdated Europe. As the Lima daily El Satélite del Peruano exuded in 1812, “the whole vast extension of both Americas is what we conceive of as our fatherland. . . . All of us who inhabit the New World are brothers . . . worthy of constituting a nation.” Creoles also shared the goals of the US founding fathers: ending monarchy and solidifying republicanism, spreading citizenship to white men of property, and gaining wealth through freer commerce. Finally, Latin Americans sought a military alliance with the prosperous neighbors to the north. For this reason,
the majority may have welcomed the Monroe Doctrine even though they may not have expected much to follow from it. Venezuela’s Francisco de Miranda typified Latin America’s early optimism. Traveling from South Carolina to New England in 1783–84, he was perhaps the first Creole to visit the new union, and the only independence leader to also participate in the American and French Revolutions. In his travelogue, Miranda expressed admiration for the prosperity, strong health, and constitutional politics of the United States.43

Events, however, soon brought these broadly defined “American” hopes crashing down. In 1806, Miranda organized raids against the Spanish, but US Secretary of State James Madison failed to support them. Four years later, when the Caracas elite declared its independence, again the US government refused to second it. One Venezuelan diplomat expressed the bitter lesson learned: “Every day I am more persuaded that it is necessary for each country to rely on its own resources; foreign aid always depends upon the rewards that are expected.”44 Naked expansionism, racism, and cut-throat trade practices were giving US citizens a bad reputation. As far back as 1787, in fact, Mexicans may have taken to referring negatively to US citizens as gringos.45 In 1819, Antonio José de Irisarri, Chilean minister to London, resented “the contempt with which . . . the United States have viewed us; they send their merchant ships to our ports as they would send them to an uninhabited coast, threatening it with their warships as they would they would to an uninhabited coast, threatening it with their warships as they would the blacks of Senegal.”46

In one of the earliest characterizations of the United States as a “colossus,” a Cuban economist in 1811 summarized the interlaced fears of the elite that lay behind anti-Americanism. “We see rising up . . . in the northern portion of this world a colossus which has been constructed by all castes and languages and which threatens to swallow up, if not all our America, at least the northern portion. . . . This precious isle [Cuba] is exposed to the terrible risks of proximity to the Negro King Enrique Cristobal and to the United States.”47 Unwittingly perhaps, the Cuban expressed the three fundamentals that made up anti-Americanism in this first period: fear of US expansion; fear of diversity; and fear of uprisings by the masses of poor, dark-skinned peoples in Latin America and the Caribbean who might take seriously the exhortations of the founding fathers and undertake a radical social revolution.

From this turn of events, some Creoles took the lesson to harden their hearts while others closed their political systems to the Yankee. Among his peers, Venezuela’s Simón Bolívar, bitter at the scant support he received from Washington, stood out for his suspicion that the Monroe Doctrine was a harbinger of US expansionism. In
1825, Bolívar advocated a military alliance with London rather than with Washington, and in 1826, he kept US diplomats at arm’s length during that year’s inter-American conference. “The North Americans . . . are foreigners to us,” Bolívar warned. He feared that, for “selfish” reasons, US citizens would be his “greatest opponents.”48 In 1829, not only had Bolívar lost all faith in any union in either his continent or between it and the north, but he warned of the unusual peril that grew out of US hypocrisy. “The United States appears destined by Providence to plague our America with misery in the name of Liberty.”49

1831–1897: Filibustering and Fury

Concern that the hunger for land of the former British colonies would be satisfied only at the expense of Latin America characterized this second period. Early evidence of US rapaciousness came out of Texas. There, white settlers’ demand for statehood led to the Mexican War, at the end of which the US government took as its spoils almost all Mexican lands north of the Rio Grande. Simultaneously, fueled as much by greed and racism as by nationalism, pro-slavery advocates pursued expansion southward. In 1854, after one US envoy thought he had been insulted by locals in Nicaragua, he ordered the destruction of their small village of San Juan del Norte. More common than this brutal shelling by gunboats were the filibustering expeditions of the antebellum period. The boldest of these was William Walker’s war against Nicaragua, which installed him as president from 1855 to 1857. The US building of a railroad on the Isthmus of Panama from 1850 to 1855 was another milestone in blending anti-expansionist feeling with anti-Americanism.

In response to this expansion, the idea spread in cities and small towns of Latin America that US ambitions for the hemisphere went beyond self-interested relations between equals and toward outright piracy and domination. More than ever, animalistic metaphors seemed to apply to the Yankee. In 1856, Chile’s Francisco Bilbao used simultaneous images of eagles and snakes to illustrate rapacity. The United States “extends its talons . . . against the south,” he wrote. “Already we see fragments of America falling into the jaws of the Saxon boa . . . as it unfolds its tortuous coils. Yesterday it was Texas then it was northern Mexico and the Pacific that meets a new master.”50 Walker’s efforts to turn Nicaragua into a Southern colony for slavery, though they met a fatal end in 1860, left a particularly bad taste with Latin Americans. Few had expected such bare-bones racist aggression from the north; this fully contradicted the democratic ethos of a perennial Latin American favorite, Walt Whitman. It was mostly in response to
Walker’s adventures that Latin American leaders called a special congress in Lima in 1856.

Resistance now expanded from the Creole elite to two separate groups. The first consisted of the second-generation leaders, well bred, often in Europe. This group broadened its anti-Americanism by disdaining US materialism while predicting a political confrontation with the North Americans. Before the Civil War, elite anti-Americanism aimed criticisms at US society because of the widespread dislike of Southern slavery and the filibustering it encouraged. After the war, that argument largely disappeared, even if a disapproval of Jim Crow racism remained. Taking center stage was revulsion against the US love of the dollar. Material pursuits seemed to many Latin Americans to have become the sole measure of success in the “Colossus of the North” and the root of its insatiable expansion.51

A second, newer group joining the chorus of disapproval consisted of the occupants of land—the small farmers and cattle ranchers—who, faced with US expansion, developed a more violent, ground-level resistance. The Mexican War and the laying of the railroad in Panama sparked some of the most violent backlashes by ordinary Latin Americans. Much of the fighting against US invaders in Mexico City in 1847 and 1848, for instance, did not come from the elite or even Mexican regulars, but from urban poor and peasants who organized guerrilla warfare.52 And as the number of US merchants and Marines who landed in Latin American ports increased, so did the commonness of scuffles, rumbles, and bar fights. Latin American and US men fought over money, women, and real or perceived slights. In 1891, one of these incidents sparked a major international scandal when two US sailors from the vessel Baltimore were killed during a saloon brawl in the Chilean port of Valparaíso.

Such incidents of anti-Americanism “from below” still remained largely isolated from each other and, except for particularly public episodes such as the Baltimore affair, ignored by Latin American leaders and by Washington. Perhaps because of this persistent lack of cross-class collaboration, no government declared itself openly hostile to what the United States did or was, so anti-Americanism did not yet shape policies in any comprehensive way. As a result, Cuban patriot José Martí’s 1890 declaration that “the time has come for Spanish America to declare her second independence” sounded hollow to many.53 Still, hostility had now spread beyond the elite, beyond the ports, and beyond one or two particularly aggrieved countries. By 1893, one Brazilian could plausibly claim, “There is no Latin American nation that has not suffered in its relations with the United States.”54
1898–1933: Bad Neighborliness and Backlash

During this third period, the relatively easy defeat of Spain in 1898 and the hegemony the United States exercised over Cuba and small neighboring republics in the decades that followed sparked perhaps the most virulent hostility in the history of US-Latin American relations. In 1901, the United States set the pattern for twentieth-century informal control by coercing Cuba into passing the Platt Amendment, which codified US control of the island’s revenue, treaties, and politics. Then, in 1903, Washington encouraged a nationalist revolution in the department of Panama against Colombia and in return demanded the right to build and operate there a waterway between the oceans.

The Panama Canal opened in 1914, coinciding with the outburst of hostilities in Europe. Both of these events set in motion further developments. For the next twenty years, US governments occupied Cuba, Panama, Mexico, Nicaragua, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and other republics at one time or the other. Preceding or following the Marines were great capitalists such as Minor Keith, who converted Guatemala into a massive plantation for the United Fruit Company by bribing local autocrats, building monopolistic infrastructures, and forcing small banana growers out of the market. Direct US investment in Latin America grew from $50 million in 1896 to $1.3 billion in 1924.55

In reaction, Latin Americans lost much of the admiration for the United States that remained. While some agreed that temporary US interventions might bring some stability and even prosperity to the circum-Caribbean, long-term occupation was just too much of a humiliation to accept. Washington showed little respect for national sovereignty or international practices, and occupiers were often brutal and racist. Colombian novelist José Vargas Vila summarized how many Latin Americans now contrasted US expansion unfavorably with the European variation:

[US presidents Woodrow] Wilson and [Theodore] Roosevelt have torn the glorious flag; they flaunt the insolent rage over the affliction of the Latin race of America, which they dream of exterminating, in the savage ferocity of their barbarous souls! English imperialism makes for civilization. Proof of this may be seen in great and prosperous India, in Egypt, in Australia and in Canada, rich and almost free. American filibusterism makes for brutality. Proofs of this are soon in the Filipinos, hunted like wild beasts; in the disappearing Hawaiians, in the despoiled natives of Panama and in the Porto Ricans, compelled by oppression to emigrate. . . . Wherever the Englishman goes, a village is born; wherever the Yankee goes, a race dies.
Vargas Vila had an explanation for this behavior that embraced the racial determinism of the time. US citizens were, he wrote, “A lustful race, hostile and contemptuous; a countless people false and cruel, insolent and depreciatory toward us, with monstrous ideas of their superiority and an unbridled desire for conquest! . . . Such are the men of the North, descendents of the Norsemen, pirates of the Baltic who in crudely built boats crossed black water, under misty skies, to pillage peoples.”

The educated elite coalesced around one book in particular: *Ariel*, by Uruguayan author José Enrique Rodo. The turgid but influential tome argued that US citizens were blindly materialistic and individualistic, whereas Latin Americans were more attuned to “spiritual” matters and the finer things in life. *Ariel* influenced modern (and modernist) writers from Nicaragua’s Rubén Darío to Manuel Ugarte of Argentina, José Vasconcelos of Mexico, and José Carlos Mariátegui of Peru. Arielism became quickly institutionalized into scholarly journals, newspapers, poetry, literature, and theater. Given the Social Darwinism and racial theories popular at the time, some Latin Americans such as the poet José Santos Chocano imagined cultural differences to foreshadow a full-blown racial clash between “Anglo-Saxons” and “Latins.”

Far more balanced and informed than *Ariel*, but stemming from the same tradition of European-influenced elite anti-Americanism, was Manuel Ugarte’s *The Destiny of a Continent*, published in 1923. The Argentine writer left for Paris right after college around the time of the War of 1898. He then visited the United States and Mexico in 1900–01, apparently knowing “nothing of imperialism” at the time. His time in Texas and Mexico, especially, was educational. In Mexico, he was shocked that “among the people . . . and especially among the younger men, there was a feeling of keen resentment and marked hostility against the gringo. In hotels, cafés, and theatres could be noticed an obvious antagonism which was arising as great collective sentiments do arise, without logic or reflection from confused memories and instinctive perceptions.” He added, “The more humble the rank in society, the more clearly did this sentiment appear.” Ugarte ended by drawing broad conclusions about US character. “With the exception of the group of intellectuals,” he said, “the mentality of the country, from the point of view of general ideas, smacks of the rough-and-ready morality of the cow-boy, violent and vain of his muscles, who civilized the Far West by exterminating simultaneously the virgin forest and the aboriginal races in the same high-handed act of pride and domination.” Disillusioned, Ugarte returned to France, and there,
for the next few decades, produced pamphlets, articles, and speeches against US expansion.

*Destiny* added specific warnings against US expansion in Latin America to *Ariel*’s general indictment of materialism. Ugarte presciently argued that US power was not at all crude but in fact more sophisticated than the European kind because it insinuated itself into the society and culture of the countries under its control. What made matters worse, said Ugarte, was that US imperialists refused to annex nonwhite nations, thus leaving them to their own devices once the US military had built bases, US administrators had taken over customs, and US corporations had bought up land. Finally, as many other Latin Americans had done and would do, Ugarte denied harboring any prejudice against the United States. “In spite of the reputation of a Yankee-hater which has been ascribed to me—a legend as false as many others—I have never been an enemy of this great nation. . . . If I have spoken of resistance it was with a view to the exigencies of the future—and this apart from all animosity, and on the firm ground of patriotism.” Staking out what historians of foreign relations would call a realist position, Ugarte called for all “Latin” peoples—whether from the Americas, France, Italy, or Spain—to collaborate against the United States rather than hate it. “The United States have done and will continue to do what all the strong peoples in history have done, and nothing can be more futile than the arguments used against this policy in Latin America. To invoke ethics in international affairs is almost always a confession of defeat.”

In this third period, anti-US movements took shape with more coalition building and military know-how than ever before, but they still remained unable to seize national governments. In the countryside of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, peasant guerrilla armies consisting of a blend of bandits and nationalists went to war against US occupiers. Thousands of *cacos*, *gavilleros*, and *sandinistas*, respectively, put up struggles that lasted years. All failed to bring down US-supported governments, and only the Sandinistas could be said to have prompted the departure of US troops. In the cities, meanwhile, US diplomats now faced political organizations wholly devoted to sending the Yankees back home. Journalists, lawyers, intellectuals, playwrights, writers, and sometimes even burgeoning working-class groups united. Their techniques ranged from diplomacy to international media campaigns, to boycotts of US goods, to the writing of plays and novels. Poor and middling Latin Americans increasingly rejected the “spiritual” focus of Arielist politics and imagined broader social bases on which to build Latin American and Caribbean movements.
One of these bases was Hispanism, or pan-Hispanism. While both *Ariel* and *Destiny* spoke to the continuing influence of French culture upon Latin American elites, a broader social group that included intellectuals, large landowners, and church leaders formulated an anti-US sentiment around a revival of their shared heritage with Spain. Hispanism claimed to unite Latin Americans under the banners of the Spanish language, Catholicism, traditional gender roles, and subordination of racial minorities to a nation-state conveniently managed by Spanish Americans. In this context, adherence to Hispanic rituals and celebrations often equaled the rejection of Anglo-Saxon ways. For instance, after US administrators increased their control of the Dominican Republic in 1907 and again in 1916, the Dominican elite feared the leveling of social differences and creeping consumerism. In response, it adopted Spanish as its official language and invested great energy into parades for its Catholic patron saint.

University students provided another of the new social bases for anti-Americanism. In 1918, Argentine students rose up against administrators to demand greater academic freedom and secularization, and their ultimate ideals were also directed against US imperialism. When the Argentine revolt spread to Peru in 1919 and then to other universities, it influenced the birth in 1924 of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA). APRA was the first truly international anti-US party in the hemisphere.

Still a third base of identity for anti-US movements was indigenism. Indigenism countered US power by stressing the mixed-race distinctiveness of Latin America. Poet Rubén Darío, for instance, saw in Latin America’s indigenous population the moral purity of the continent that stood in opposition to the racially segregated United States. Indigenism grew out of the need to find a unifying cultural identity that celebrated rather than ignored racial mixing in the Americas and that allowed a greater blending of social classes than did Arielism. Psychologically, the impact was similar to Arielism in that it allowed Latin Americans to ignore material inferiority and emphasize moral and cultural superiority to the United States.

Indigenism also offered plans for action. For the Motilón Indians of Venezuela, indigenism in the 1920s justified shooting poison darts at US oil company workers. For Central Americans who looked down on black West Indians toiling on US plantations or on the locks of the Panama Canal, indigenism united descendants of both Europeans and Native Americans against the supposed corruption from these dark-skinned toilers of imperialism. For José Vasconcelos, author of *The Cosmic Race* (1925), indigenism provided the inspiration for his design of an educational system for Mexico that had at its core a “national”
university celebrating the mixed-race achievements of Mexicans while largely ignoring the class and gender differences that still very much divided them. For APRA’s founder, Víctor Haya de la Torre, the concept of “Indoamérica” linked all Latin Americans and distinguished them from both Europe and the United States. Finally, for Augusto Sandino in Nicaragua, indigenism influenced a millennial vision of violent liberation struggle against white invading Marines.

1934–1958: Good Neighborliness and Nationalism

This fourth period, along with the first, was perhaps the freest from anti-Americanism. There are three good reasons behind this. First, the US government explicitly retreated from the practice of direct military intervention in the hemisphere and gave that new policy the winning name of the “Good Neighbor.” Second, as historian Donald Dozer argued, Latin Americans witnessed the Great Depression of 1929 wreaking havoc on the United States and felt considerably less anger—or envy—because of it. Third, the struggle against totalitarianism during World War II reminded the entire hemisphere of its substantial common ideals and interests. As Venezuela’s Carlos Rangel recalled, the confluence of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s policies toward the hemisphere and the advent of war “assuaged our anti-North Americanism for some twenty years.”

In the post-World War II period, however, relations between the United States and Latin America turned awry. Many felt that the United States had taken advantage of Latin America’s raw materials during World War II and that Washington was not prepared to treat its southern neighbors as equals now that the Cold War was heating up. The United States was “detestable in Latin American eyes,” ventured a Mexican statesman in 1945. It “resorts to brute force or proceeds with less skillful methods and . . . it does not show the fruits of intelligence, of perseverance and of wisdom.” Nationalism flowed out of a combination of nation-building during US occupations, urban labor struggles, and World War II’s strengthening of central governments. It also stemmed from a postwar respect for the sovereignty of the smallest republics, represented by the founding of the United Nations in 1945. Latin American nationalists now saw an opportunity to heighten their stature vis-à-vis the United States.

Argentina’s view of the United States particularly declined at the end of the war because it remained close to the Axis powers and was ostracized from postwar diplomacy. Starting in 1946, Juan Perón most clearly made the United States Argentina’s opposite as he decried both communism and “Yankee imperialism.” As Perón softened his stance in the later 1940s, other Latin American leaders—some democrats,
some autocrats—increasingly wore the mantle of national pride in their arguments against either US abuse or neglect.\textsuperscript{75}

Unfortunately for them, the Cold War’s intensification in the late 1940s and early 1950s all but eliminated the possibility for serious democratic reform. Very few national governments in the 1950s were openly anti-US in their rhetoric or policies, lest they be conflated with communists. Historian Kyle Longley, for instance, explained the unusual success of Costa Rica during these years owing to the ability of its leader, José Figueres, to “walk the fine line between nationalism and anti-Americanism.”\textsuperscript{76}

In case the danger of overstepping that line was unclear, the CIA’s 1954 overthrow of Guatemalan reformer Jacobo Arbenz brought home the point. Instead of promoting democracy, pro-US dictatorships such as the one that soon replaced Arbenz made a comeback and squelched much of the movement for independence from US power. When anti-US events did arise—for instance, when mobs attacked Vice President Richard Nixon during his South American tour in 1958—they were just that, mobs, largely disconnected from any organized politics of anti-Americanism.

Perhaps in the absence of organized anti-Americanism, one flourishing expression of anti-US sentiment in the postwar period was the novel. Latin Americans, especially from the middle and lower-middle social groups, were increasingly literate, and many had directly witnessed or even suffered the indignities of working for US agricultural corporations or mines during the early century. The midcentury period therefore witnesses a flurry of novels that used the literary technique of social realism to convey the harsh conditions of US labor and racial attitudes in, say, Costa Rica or Guatemala, to the general reader in faraway Argentina or Chile.\textsuperscript{77} There is no telling how much the impression left by these novels influenced the next wave of anti-Americanism, one of the most momentous in the history of US-Latin American relations.

\textbf{1959–1990: Superpowerdom and Socialism}

The Cuban Revolution blasted the political stakes of anti-Americanism into the stratosphere. Within a year or so of Cuban rebels overthrowing a US-supported dictatorship, their most charismatic leader, Fidel Castro, tore Cuba away from its dependence on the United States and aligned it with the Soviet Union. Castro also encouraged anti-US revolutions in surrounding countries. The Spanish-speaking Caribbean had become the focus of anti-Americanism in the world.\textsuperscript{78}

In the 1960s, Washington reacted with a dual strategy to discourage what it labeled “anti-American” socialism. In one hand it dangled
an economic carrot—the encouragement of reform and development through aid programs such as the Alliance for Progress. In the other hand it wielded a military stick—intensified training of hemispheric soldiers and police, direct landing such as the failed invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 and the successful intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and covert campaigns against liberal or Marxist reformers in British Guiana, Guatemala, Brazil, Bolivia, and Chile, among others. As the 1960s ended, Washington largely pocketed its carrot and took out an ever bigger stick. In the 1970s, it supported authoritarian military regimes in Chile and Argentina, and in the 1980s it launched low-intensity wars through proxy militaries in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and elsewhere.

During these decades of US superpower behavior, the core resistance to US interests in the region resided in socialist visions of the “Yankee” as the ultimate capitalist-imperialist Other. Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin argued that Castro’s prediction of socialist revolution in 1962 was “the enshrinement of a new theory of anti-Americanism.” Likewise, Mexico’s former president, Lázaro Cárdenas, declared in 1961 the coming of a “new stage in the liberation of Latin America.” Socialism was not new in 1959 Latin America: Peru’s José Carlos Mariátegui had founded the region’s first socialist party in the 1920s. Sandino rejected capitalism in the 1920s and 1930s. Anarcho-Syndicalism, Marxist-Leninism, Communist parties, and other manifestations of socialism also existed long before World War II. And once the Cold War began in the late 1940s and 1950s, eminent Latin Americans such as poet Pablo Neruda turned to socialism as a tool for criticizing US imperialism. Yet in the 1960s and 1970s, socialism took over nation-states and thus held out the possibility of unfurling integrated anti-US policies. In the 1980s, for instance, the Nicaraguan Sandinistas’ policies of collectivizing the economy, waging war on US-backed contras, and aligning with Havana and Moscow fully followed the logic of their anthem, which declared the United States “the enemy of humanity.”

Such heated rhetoric proved more apocalyptic than was public opinion at the time. Insofar as the polls available from the Cold War era convey popular sentiment, alignment with the Soviet Union was not a well-received option in Latin America. But when “socialism” was defined more moderately as the redistribution of goods and protection from US capital, it proved enormously appealing. If they defined it in this latter way, US observers were not altogether wrong to equate socialism with anti-Americanism. Socialism neatly organized several rationales for opposing US influence into one largely hermetic system of thought. The economic rationale for anti-Americanism was
the most obvious: socialism rejected global capitalism as relegating Latin America and the Caribbean to the status of “dependencies” condemned to extracting (through back-breaking methods) raw materials and providing cheap sweatshop labor on the “periphery” of the world economy. State-directed alternatives could break this dynamic, socialists pledged. As one scholar noted, socialism also bolstered nationalism by ridding it of the “irrational” chauvinism that hampered cooperation across borders. Socialism even strengthened the cultural pillar of anti-individualism built first by Arielism and then indigenism. It did so by promising the destruction of racial, gender, and class inequalities once the capitalist system that had created them in the first place crumbled. This cultural component to socialism was often a uniquely negative attack on social inequalities, and especially racism, within the United States. According to Ana María Dopico, “the critique of racism in the United States has been perhaps the most important critical stream of anti-Americanism that came out of the [Cuban] revolution of 1959.” Socialism, finally, provided an explanation for US “cultural imperialism” in that US media, being dominated by the corporate ethos, distorted humanist values and brainwashed Latin Americans. In all these ways, socialism made sense of anti-Americanism. It swept away the ambiguities and ambivalences of past hostilities and channeled unfocused anger and frustrations into specific explanations for why things were.

It changed the structures of resistance, too. Socialism helped spread import substitution industrialization (ISI), the raising of tariffs and other trade barriers to favor native industry. It also reshaped university—and sometimes even high school—curricula, making “sociology” courses almost exclusively based on Marxism in theory and endless denunciations of US imperialism in practice. Socialism, finally, influenced warfare as guerrilla groups led by the revolutionary Ernesto “Che” Guevara and others drew inspiration from the “foco” theory, which argued that a small group of hard-core devotees could imitate the Russian Bolsheviks and “create the conditions” for revolution even in the midst of politically passive, agricultural societies.

For Washington, guerrillas were rarely a threat. The more dangerous regimes were perceived to be those of Salvador Allende in Chile (1970–1973) and of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua (1979–1990). These triumphs of socialism were largely independent from the Soviets, yet they won elections. They showed, in other words, that socialist regimes in Latin America and the Caribbean could erect anti-US policies by using the core political process of the United States—elections. The contradiction threw Washington into confusion, and the
CIA, the Pentagon, and the State Department lashed back until socialist regimes ended from exhaustion around 1990.


During this sixth period, the Western Hemisphere drew inspiration from a sudden historical turn as the Cold War ended, democratic regimes displaced autocrats, and Washington lost interest in intervening in Latin American affairs. Yet by the turn of the twenty-first century, anti-Americanism returned as a major part of foreign and domestic policy.

In 1990, the term “Washington consensus” came to qualify the new orthodoxy in favor of free-market policies, also called neoliberalism. Many in the United States and Latin America blamed ISI-type protectionism for the continuing stagnation of Latin American economies. They acted through newly emboldened bureaucracies such as the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the US Office of the Special Trade Representative to open up markets to global competition the way Asian countries had. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Mexico, the United States, and Canada, which went into effect in 1994, epitomized this process. So did the spread of maquiladoras along the Mexican border with the United States and in “free zones” in the Caribbean Basin. Washington’s integration of the hemisphere did not stop with trade. The Drug Enforcement Agency increasingly attacked narcotraffickers with multinational coalitions. The State Department, meanwhile, encouraged the spread of democracy, and even designed the 1994 military intervention in Haiti to restore President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to office. And finally, cheaper airfares and telephone connections, cable television, and the Internet pried open the hemisphere even further for US culture. Throughout the 1990s, polls indicated a high regard for the United States in Latin America.87

Following the September 11th attacks, however, the numbers changed significantly. In December 2001, 58 percent of “influential” Latin Americans agreed that US policies had caused the attacks, and 71 percent said it was “good for [the] US to feel vulnerable.”88 As one Brazilian student explained, “I’m not against the American people, but the United States got what it deserved.”89 Adopting the same tone, human rights activist Hebe Pastor de Bonafini notoriously celebrated the fact that “now [North Americans live] the same fear that they produced in us, with persecution, disappearances and torture.”90

When the administration of George W. Bush turned the sub-rosa struggle against terrorism into overt wars in Afghanistan and especially Iraq, anti-Americanism swelled. Seventy-nine percent of Brazil-
ians opposed a retaliatory attack even against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{91} Polls conducted in eight Latin American countries in 1999/2000 and 2002 showed a significant drop in the “US image” in all countries but one.\textsuperscript{92} And perhaps the most comprehensive poll indicated a strong downward trend in “very good opinions” and “good opinions” of the United States. After they reached a combined peak of 73 percent in 2001, they sank in 2002 to 71, dropping further in 2003 to 60 percent. By that time, only 23 percent agreed with “how the US [was] managing world conflicts,” and a mere 15 percent agreed “with the US actions in Irak [sic].”\textsuperscript{93}

Polls became far bleaker for the United States before and after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. One poll of Brazilians taken in May and June 2003 asked, “In general how would you say you feel towards America?” Forty-three percent said “fairly unfavorable,” and another 23 percent answered “very unfavorable.” Only 24 percent felt either “very” or “fairly favorable.” Brazilians disagreed with most US foreign policies, called US citizens “arrogant” and “antagonistic,” and three out of every four had no desire to move to the United States.\textsuperscript{94} After similar results were found in January 2005, the Pew Global Attitudes project concluded that “anti-Americanism is deeper and broader now than at any time in modern history.”\textsuperscript{95}

Reflecting this mass discontent, the most potent form of resistance in Latin America was of a populist flavor. Populism was difficult to describe. Its economics were more on the left than on the right since they included the protection of native industries and redistributive policies, but they respected basic tenets of the free market. More to the point, populism fought back against social inequalities. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, Latin America was the most unequal society on the globe, and many blamed that state of affairs on US neoliberalism.

In response, no longer were indigenous and women’s groups satisfied with never-realized socialist promises of proletarian rule or with vague Arielist claims to “spiritual” contentment. Those long left out wanted in. They wanted to make decisions at the highest levels. Many perceived that the United States behaved with typical hypocrisy when it called for full democracy in Latin America without offering policies that could empower the poor. At times, too, given the strong indigenous participation in populist policies, anti-US visions seethed with racial resentments. As a Bolivian leader nicknamed “the condor” declared, “Whites are here as renters on our land, and we need to put a giant fence around them, a reservation, a safe place for white people to be.” He was at war “against gringo neoliberalism and racism, and [wished] to change our government to an Indian one.”\textsuperscript{96}
Bolivian and Ecuadorian indigenous groups organized so effectively that, by 2005, they stood on the verge of doing just that. At the very least, said Bolivian indigenous leader Evo Morales, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), an extension of NAFTA, was sure to go down in flames. He described the FTAA as “a neocolonization project. . . . If it is approved it would be a policy of economic genocide.” He foresaw that “for the first time in Latin America the Empire could be defeated.”

By the early twenty-first century, populist ideas put in power national leaders who directly threatened neoliberalism. Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (first elected in 1998), Ricardo Lagos in Chile (2000), Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil (2002), Lucio Gutiérrez in Ecuador (2002), Néstor Kirchner in Argentina (2003), and Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay (2004) all promised to roll back policies championed by either the United States or the International Monetary Fund. In addition to domestic anti-US policies, they also developed international organizations free from US oversight such as Mercosur, the South American free trade accord. There was even talk of military and petroleum alliances that would exclude Washington. The most radical of these populist leaders was Chávez, who disagreed with almost every foreign policy of Washington, publicly partnered with Castro’s Cuba, and threatened to cut off his significant oil flow to the United States. Unlike other leaders, he showed little restraint in public. He roused the participants at the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in early 2005 by reviving some apparently discarded language: “Imperialism is not invincible,” he said. “Capitalism must be transcended.” By 2005, three quarters of South America’s 350 million people were now in the hands of populists. As historian Greg Grandin wrote in 2004, “Latin American-US relations appear to be on the cusp of a new period of antagonism.”

The Contributions: Chapter Summaries

This volume gathers research-based, never-before-published essays on anti-Americanism in Latin America and the Caribbean. These scholars of inter-American relations—eight historians, one political scientist—are all from or based in the United States, Canada, or the United Kingdom. Together they represent an effort by Anglo-American scholars to apply multinational perspectives to the newly prominent topic of anti-US hostility. Each of their contributions combines a broad view of culture with a special effort to view anti-Americanism
from the perspectives of both critics of the United States and US observers reacting to those criticisms. Each contributor also set out to link the present to the past.

The chapters that follow are a testament to the potential for anti-Americanism to act as a complex yet unifying concept within narratives of resistance. That narrative rejects the definition of antiyanquismo as the emotional, irrational, scheming disease that US patriots have been eager to deride since they coined the term “Yankeeophobia” in the early twentieth century. It equally refuses to see anti-Americanism as the keen-eyed, righteous, spontaneous heroism that many in the hemisphere, north and south, wished it were. The contributions to this volume begin the work of providing case studies of attempts, scheming and heroic, to resist US power, real and perceived.

Most contributors focused on country-specific campaigns of opposition to US influences. This choice speaks not only to the power of nationalism within anti-Americanism but to the importance of central national governments as conveyors of political and cultural resistance to US power. The national politics of anti-Americanism—the theme of Part I—shaped attitudes, but the institutions of the state such as embassies, ministries of foreign relations, party newspapers, and state-run unions may have been even more powerful in stirring up a good anti-US fight than were international organizations such as the Comintern or the Organization of American States.

Chapter 1, by John Britton, emphasizes that the Mexican contribution to anti-Americanism lay in uncovering US intervention in the most subtle of places. Britton focuses on outspoken Mexican leaders who shifted their anti-US targets from the direct military intervention of 1914 to 1916 to the diplomatic intimidation and economic penetration that followed. While José M. Puig Casauranc denounced the international banking system, Jesús Silva Herzog targeted oil companies. Mass rallies demonstrated how this broadened suspicion of intervention resonated with the Mexican public. Redirecting criticism at “softer” instruments of empire might have been most likely to work in Mexico, whose long history of subjection to US intervention conditioned it to expect the worst from the gringos.

Glenn Dorn relates a more outwardly ambitious Argentine anti-Americanism in Chapter 2. In Argentina, Juan Perón fancied himself the new regional leader in South America in the post-World War II era. Needing to displace both US and Soviet influences to do so, Perón defined his foreign policy as encouraging state-directed social and economic development that were opposed to both communism and capitalism. Perhaps an important lesson in national narratives
of anti-Americanism lies in Dorn’s conclusion that Perón was far less successful in challenging US power outside his borders than Mexicans had been in cutting it short within theirs.

Darlene Rivas’s Chapter 3 serves as a useful reminder that the anti-Americanism of Hugo Chávez in the 2000s operated within the confines of a dilemma deeply embedded in Venezuela’s political culture. Throughout the twentieth century, Venezuelans saw their major resource, petroleum, as a godsend and a curse. Oil allowed one of the highest standards of living in Latin America, yet it also created dependency on foreign investment, exports, and goods. In confronting this dilemma, many put pressure on their main foreign partner, the United States, a pressure that at times gave way to violent outbursts in the 1950s and 1960s.

Jeffrey Taffet’s study of Chile in the 1960s offers a story of a friendship gone wrong that serves as an object lesson for all US allies. In this case, US aid was the problem as well as the cure. The moderate president Eduardo Frei benefited from an infusion of dollars when he won the 1964 elections in spite of the rising popularity of his socialist counterparts, and he expressed gratitude. Yet afterwards, the administration of Lyndon Johnson demonstrated traditional US hegemonic assumptions by making unreasonable demands on Frei. Chapter 4 surveys Chilean cartoons and violent demonstrations to show how too much economic micromanaging by Washington might backfire.

Chapter 5 by Kirk Bowman rounds out Part I with a study of anti-Americanism in Brazil. Bowman’s provocative thesis is that the election of Lula in 2002 culminated a process by which the social and political elite in Brazil and the United States suddenly ran out of common interests after the Cold War. Based on more than 120 interviews conducted in 2003 and 2004 and on surveys of polls and media images, Bowman’s contribution suggests that Brazil’s new boldness may carry abiding drawbacks for the United States.

While these national narratives argue that national political leaders were key in forging anti-US strategy out of sentiment, they also have international implications. One of these implications is that campaigns of resistance spilled over into neighboring states, for instance when Perón tried to compete with the Truman administration in South America or when Lula placed his own “heavyweight” country against the US “colossus” in South America. Part II of this volume explores transnational and comparative connections.

In Chapter 6, Jason Parker’s contribution leaves Latin America proper to observe the ambivalence and strategies of West Indians during World War II. There, political leaders sharing an African heritage identified the United States as unique in two ways: one, it was not
Britain, and so could act as a lever against British colonialism; two, there were African Americans in the United States who joined West Indians in forming a diaspora in the Americas that might cooperate on the basis of race rather than nationality. Whatever anti-Americanism existed in the West Indies—and it did exist—was therefore tempered by the need to counterbalance hegemonic powers.

My own Chapter 7 compares anti-Americanism in Cuba and Panama, two equally dependent, small, Spanish-speaking countries that were traditionally of great value to the United States. Applying the concept of political culture to anti-Americanism, it identifies major differences between the two countries that existed before US control during the twentieth century and that continued to exist at the turn of the twenty-first century. In Cuba, nationalist radicalism sought the rejection of foreign influence not only out of pride but to achieve greater social justice. In Panama, meanwhile, leaders long accepted the role of foreigners in bolstering the nation’s identity as a hub of commerce. Both nations rejected or welcomed US influence based on these fundamental principles.

David Ryan’s Chapter 8 concludes Part II by surveying the transnational buildup of the anti-US tenets of liberation theology in the 1970s and 1980s. Ryan argues that liberation theologians did not feed upon prejudices as suggested by the “ism” of anti-Americanism, but rather came to terms with the evidence that US-led global capitalism exacerbated poverty in Central America. Focusing on El Salvador, he recalls how these theologians became the “voice of the voiceless” in arguing for the inhumanity of the local and international economy and the immorality of the national security state, its ideology, and its impact on human rights.

The sole contribution in Part III contrasts with the rest of the volume in that it argues for a minimal presence of anti-Americanism—in one country at least. In Chapter 9, William O. Walker III questions whether anti-Americanism had much of a role in the context of illegal narcotics gradually devouring public life in Colombia from 1984 to 2004. Walker’s study of “quiet” anti-Americanism argues that Colombian policymakers mostly resented how the drug war, as fought by Washington, weakened the nation-state, thus not only endangering counterinsurgency efforts but the very existence of Colombia. The victory of a hard-line candidate such as Álvaro Uribe in 2002 sprang more from the desire for a strong central government than from any pro- or anti-Americanism.

As these chapters demonstrate and as this introduction has argued, the writing of the history of anti-Americanism in Latin America and
the Caribbean is very much a work in progress. Like anti-Americanism itself, it is a tree of sorts, whose branches have more growing to do. The contributors to this volume endeavored to explore in greater detail a few limbs of the story briefly outlined in this introduction. What inspired them were the rich traditions of Latin American and Caribbean history, the growing method of combining US and multinational archival sources, and the concern with using cultural insights and cultural sources that the inaugural volume of this series showed could be central in understanding the meanings, articulations, and implications of power in international history.

Notes

12. For institutional background, see Berger, Under Northern Eyes, chapter 2. An early study, which bridged the first two waves, was M. P. Chapman, “Yankeephobia, an Analysis of Anti-United States Bias of Certain Spanish South American Intel-


43. Rangel, The Latin Americans, 25.


45. J. C. Merrill, Gringo: The Americans as Seen by Mexican Journalists (Gainesville, 1963), vii. There is some disagreement on the first use of the word. The Oxford English Dictionary 2nd ed. (online, 1989) and others have found it rather in 1849 after the Mexican War. There is more agreement on its etymology. The epithet most likely derived from “griego,” which in nineteenth-century Spanish meant gibberish, as in “all Greek to me.” Linguists also agree that, while South Americans still attach the word to most white foreigners, Mexicans reserve it for white US citizens. For various interpretations, see A. A. Roback, A Dictionary of


49. Translation by the author. Cited in Rama, La imagen, 53.

50. Bilboa in America in Danger, cited in Rubin and Rubin, Hating America, 104.

51. Examples of late nineteenth-century literature are Cuban J. M. Céspedes’s La Doctrina de Monroe (Havana, 1893), and Brazilian E. Prado’s A Iluçao Americana (Paris, 1895).


53. Translated by author. Martí cited in Rama, La imagen, 85.

54. E. Prado cited in Rubin and Rubin, Hating America, 105.


58. Rubin and Rubin, Hating America, 105.

59. Ugarte, Destiny, 19, 20. He added that, while Argentines used the term “gringo” against all foreigners, Mexicans had reserved it uniquely for US citizens.

60. Ugarte, Destiny, xx, 12, 125.


62. Apart from Ugarte, R. Darío, Peru’s C. Vallejo, and Mariátegui also all lived in Paris. Guatemala’s M. A. Asturias was his country’s ambassador there.

63. Rippy, “Pan-Hispanic Propaganda.”


65. V. R. Haya de la Torre, ¿A donde va Indoamérica?, 2d ed. (Santiago, 1935).
69. Haya de la Torre, *¿A donde va Indoamérica?*, esp. 23, 153.
70. According to Rubin and Rubin, “Sandino . . . expressed a racist anti-Americanism that was consistent with the most reactionary traditionalist forces in the region. His view of the United States as evil, innately aggressive, and inhumanly greedy made him identify all Americans as the enemy,” in *Hating America*, 113.
71. Dozer, *Are We Good Neighbors?*, 16.
75. On neglect, see Chile’s C. Dávila, *We of the Americas* (Chicago, 1949).

78. Rubin and Rubin agree that, “while Europe was the area of the world where anti-Americanism was most comprehensively developed, South America was the place more identified with that doctrine, especially between the 1950s and 1980s,” in their *Hating America*, 101.
80. Translated by author. Cárdenas cited in Rama, La imagen, 128.
81. Before the Cuban Revolution, other popular socialist writings included those of Cuba’s N. Guillén and Argentine D. Ayres’s Estados Unidos: una mentira (Buenos Aires, 1956).
83. Rama, La imagen, 36.
85. T. Saraví, Imperialismo y dominación cultural, por que pensamos y nos comunicamos “en extranjero” (Buenos Aires, 1974).
87. USIA poll cited in Rubin and Rubin, Hating America, 123.
89. Cited in “Take That, Gringos,” Newsweek, 8 October 2001, 44.
100. The fact that no Latin American scholar has contributed an essay was not a conscious decision by the editor. Some scholars from both Latin America and the Caribbean were asked, but declined for practical reasons.