

## FROM ZÜNFTEN TO NAZISM

German Handwerk to 1939



**T**wo central ideas will concern us throughout the course of this study. The first is the ability of German artisans, *Handwerker*, to adapt to the process of industrialization. The second is how the organizational structure—its coherency, legal authority, and economic influence—affected that adaptation and how it shaped handwerk as a social group, a *Stand*, with a distinct identity. The outcome of these developments was to have enormous implications for the political and social stability of Germany—and of Europe—in the twentieth century.

### Handwerk in the *Kaiserreich* and World War I

By the start of the nineteenth century the golden age of German handwerk had long faded into memory and myth. Handwerk's great late medieval flowering, with its powerful guilds (*Zünfte*),<sup>1</sup> was followed, with great variations by region and trade, by a long period of uneven decline so that by 1800 average income was only about one-third of what it had been three hundred years earlier, and many handwerker numbered among the poorest in the population.<sup>2</sup> This economic decline was reflected in the state of the guilds. Over the course of the nineteenth century these by then ossified institutions were gradually stripped of their organizational monopoly and regulatory authority, culminating with the passage of general freedom of trade (*Gewerbefreiheit*) in the North German Confederation in 1869, extended to the full Reich in 1871. This legislation abolished the guilds' remaining public law regulatory authority, including the right to set standards for

and restrict entrance to the trades.<sup>3</sup> Thus the culmination of economic liberalism in Germany represented the low point of handwerk's institutional power.

Accelerating industrialization from the 1860s and the shifting political constellation of the Reich presented handwerk with new challenges. Because industrialization affected the multiplicity of trades so variously, it is useful to divide them into three groups: (1) those trades unaffected by industrialization, (2) those in which industry gradually came to dominate production, and (3) those that coexisted with industry in a state of symbiosis.<sup>4</sup>

First, trades such as baking and butchering, above all, and service trades like barber and hairdresser remained unaffected by technological innovations and indeed prospered due to the side effects of industrialization like the growth of cities and the shift in household patterns of consumption.

In trades of the second group the impact of technology was devastating. In textiles, shoemaking, pottery, and soap-making, production was gradually transferred almost entirely into factories. Those masters who survived at all did so either by concentrating production on a custom, often luxury, market, or by shifting to repair, the latter generally entailing an appreciable loss of income.

Trades in the third group developed various modes of adaptation. In the light metal trades, for example, simpler items came to be mass-produced in factories, while masters concentrated on high-quality goods. Many in the construction trades shifted from workshop production to on-site building and the installation of factory-produced equipment, such as heating and plumbing.<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile, market expansion and shifting patterns of distribution brought wholesalers between shop owners and their customers, and the new department stores confronted retail handwerk with intense competition.<sup>6</sup>

These developments contributed to a growing sense of redundancy and unease among handwerker that was to have important political repercussions. Indeed, few contemporaries doubted that the artisanal mode of production would eventually be made superfluous by more-efficient industry. The tone for all discussion on this widely debated subject had been established already in 1848 by Marx and Engels who asserted that capitalism had set in motion the historically necessary and inexorable polarization of the social forces of production and that all "small tradespeople" were bound to "sink gradually into the proletariat."<sup>7</sup>

This grim forecast for the survival of the small proprietor was echoed in the non-Marxist research by economists throughout the nineteenth century. Gustav Schmoller, Karl Bücher, and Werner Sombart each carried out important and influential studies that were more extensive and differentiated than Marx's on the subject and were careful to stress that the small producer could never vanish entirely. Nonetheless, each concluded, with varying degrees of pessimism, that handwerk's chances of adapting to the new conditions created by industrialization were slim.<sup>8</sup> Other theorists agreed, arguing further that handwerk had lost its former importance as a means of social mobility and thus the state should not squander resources attempting to prop up this unproductive sector.<sup>9</sup>

The predominant scholarly and scientific judgment that the artisanal mode of production could not hold its own in a free capitalist marketplace was widely shared in Wilhelmine society, where ambivalence regarding industrialization and nostalgia for lost artisanal traditions evoked a deep resonance. Conservatives and social Catholics shared with the left a moral condemnation of the dislocations brought about by industrialization. Unlike Marxists, however, they celebrated the small proprietor as a necessary locus of social stability and believed that these dislocations could be ameliorated, if not reversed, by the reinforcement of traditional hierarchical social relations and institutions.<sup>10</sup>

The latter part of the nineteenth century also saw the gradual, if incomplete, reestablishment of a handwerk organizational structure in Germany. In the 1880s a number of Reich laws were passed that granted guilds (*Innungen*) the legal status of corporations of public law with certain regulatory authority, granted to guild masters the exclusive right to train apprentices and permitted guilds to tax handwerker who were not members for services like vocational schools and hostels for traveling journeymen. Yet because the Reich legislation made the actual conferring of the authority contingent upon the discretion of local authorities, who in practice often refused to grant it, the actual gains were limited.<sup>11</sup> In any case, such protectionist legislation was consistent with a turn away from free market liberalism in the Reich generally, emblemized by the tariffs of 1877 (the “marriage of rye and iron”) and the growth of cartels in industry.

The more solid, lasting gains came at the turn of the nineteenth century with two long-sought pieces of legislation. The handwerk law of 1897 provided that handwerk could establish its own chambers (regional associations including all trades) and permitted the institution of obligatory membership in local guilds (which represented one trade only) when a majority of masters so chose, which increased their organizational clout. Then the law of 1908 established the so-called *kleine Befähigungsnachweis* (or minor certificate of competency) that stipulated that only licensed masters could take on or train apprentices.<sup>12</sup>

As important as these legislative achievements were to prove—indeed, leaders later came to regard the 1897 law as the “basic law” of modern handwerk—organizational structure in the *Kaiserreich* never attained real coherency and remained limited in its authority and divided in purpose. Two divergent sets of organizations competed for handwerker loyalty, neither with particular success. The regionally organized Handwerker Bund was founded in 1882 with close ties to the Catholic Center Party and had a leadership that represented an ideological mixture of Social Catholicism and Protestant social conservatism. With headquarters in Munich, the Bund was primarily interested in reestablishing guild controls as a means of preserving handwerk’s precarious social status by restricting the number of new masters coming into the trades. Meanwhile, centered in Berlin, another movement developed whose leaders hoped to build up a reinvigorated guild system as organs of self-administration to protect the masters’ economic position and as a mechanism of control over both masters and journeymen. Both, how-

ever, remained weak and unable to present a unified position on virtually any issue.<sup>13</sup>

Moreover, the movement's political goals remained narrowly protectionist, confined to preserving handwerk's precarious social status primarily by restricting the number of new masters entering the trades. It is true that many masters developed a more pragmatic, accommodationist view of industrialization and opposed a return to an era of strict guild controls as a hopeless illusion. They argued instead for the establishment of organizations with legal rights of self-administration, guided by principles of interest representation and self-help within a market economy. It is also true that a group of educated, scientifically oriented functionaries and masters of larger shops succeeded in introducing a certain amount of rationalization into handwerk and worked to isolate the more traditional conservative one-man-shops.<sup>14</sup> But this view was still in the minority, and effective progressivism lay far in the future.<sup>15</sup> Even as many continued individually to adapt to industrialization—the introduction of the electric motor after 1900 was a big step in this direction—protectionism remained the reflex response of most masters who had no clear concept of their role in an industrial economy.<sup>16</sup>

Nor were matters helped by handwerk's alienation from the political system of the *Kaiserreich*. As for the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands; SPD), which held the inevitable relegation of all small proprietors to the proletariat as a matter of doctrine,<sup>17</sup> there was never any expectation of cooperation. But handwerk's relations with other social-political groups were scarcely more congenial. By the latter part of the nineteenth century, handwerk had moved away from its earlier political liberalism. Conservatives appealed to handwerk's fuzzy sense of nostalgia for a lost golden age, but given the wide social and cultural gap separating them, handwerker were slow to move into the conservative camp, and the alliance was never a comfortable one.<sup>18</sup> The fact is that, although Conservatives and Liberals alike sought handwerk as allies against the perceived growing threat of the socialist working class, they refused to support handwerk demands when the latter conflicted with industrial or agrarian interests.<sup>19</sup> In addition, the fact that handwerker at once believed in the necessity of holding back the changes of industrialization and recognized the futility of doing so often gave their politics a desperate, reactionary, and sometimes anti-Semitic character.<sup>20</sup>

The experience of World War I brought important but partial and incomplete changes to handwerk, which were to contribute to its instability in the 1920s. Yet in the longer term the trends begun or accelerated under the pressure of war were to prove a harbinger of its future integration in the economic system of industrial capitalism. Firms fared variously during the war according to their individual productivity and the demand for their products. Handwerker suffered a number of disadvantages relative to industry. They were drafted into the military in large numbers (about 46 percent of masters and 66 percent of journeymen), as opposed to an average for industry of 25 percent, while shops lost additional workers to higher-paying industry. Handwerk also generally came up short in the allocation

of raw materials relative to industry and was hurt by the restricted availability of cheap credit. Small shops, especially in trades not directly involved in war production, were much more vulnerable to forcible closure.<sup>21</sup> Yet at the same time handwerk production proved indispensable to the war economy. Wagon building, metal work, saddle making, and carpentry headed the list of trades on which the armed forces relied. Makers of medical supplies and of orthopedic and prosthetic devices also enjoyed an unprecedented demand.<sup>22</sup>

The context of this engagement is important. Before the war, handwerk and its organizations had been pulled in two opposite directions. On the one hand, many called for protectionism in the form of state help, obligatory guild membership, and measures to restrict entrance to the trades. But on the other hand, there were voices more accepting of the competitive marketplace that advocated a program of self-help organized by their institutions.<sup>23</sup> But during the war the protectionist tendencies appear to have receded in favor of the progressive. The anticapitalist, anti-big business, anti-freedom of trade polemics of the handwerk press before the war were replaced by a new spirit of accommodation.<sup>24</sup> Several developments drew industry and handwerk closer together. The necessity for wartime cooperation in production combined with a mutual fear of the growing militancy among the working class caused masters to identify more with industrialists as fellow entrepreneurs.<sup>25</sup> Though resentments against the advantages enjoyed by industry in the procurement of war contracts hardly disappeared,<sup>26</sup> especially among the smaller more marginal handwerker, and indeed was to reappear after the peace, tendencies in the direction of self-help were reinforced.<sup>27</sup>

But the more enduring outcome of the war was the strengthening of handwerk institutions and a deepening of the ties to their members. Because it was cumbersome for government officials to deal with many individual small shops in the procurement of war materials, the guilds and chambers gradually assumed the task of negotiating orders for their member firms and then distributing orders and raw materials to them.<sup>28</sup> By the summer of 1915 the system was well centralized, and single firms were able to improve their economic efficiency while their organizations assumed certain managerial functions. As a consequence, guild membership shot up (from 36% in 1907 to 51% in 1919) as masters recognized its real economic advantages, and the number of cooperatives (which afforded small shops some of the economies of scale available to larger enterprises) almost doubled.<sup>29</sup> Especially effective were credit cooperatives both in supplying capital and in attracting handwerker as members.<sup>30</sup>

## **Handwerk in Weimar and the Drift to the Right**

Handwerk's path to Nazism was a long and twisted one. The political migration of handwerk voters started with support for the middle class liberal parties in early Weimar; then, with an increasing sense of political uprootedness, they drifted to the splinter parties, and finally to the Nazis. Handwerker, as voters and

as joiners, had been overrepresented in the Nazi movement from the very beginning, but their increasing support over the course of the interwar period was the product of a complex mixture of social, economic, and political factors.

We have seen how before 1873 handwerker generally supported liberal political goals while favoring economic protectionism that liberals strongly opposed. They then drifted into an uneasy alliance with conservative agrarians and sectors of industry, united by opposition to labor, a desire for protectionism, and a belief in an authoritarian *Herr im Haus* (master of the house) work and social structure. A wide social gulf and divergent interests prevented this coalition from ever being truly stable, however, and handwerk remained socially isolated, increasingly frustrated in its demands, and retreating into ugly anti-Semitism. Within handwerk a shifting but perpetual split existed between individuals who looked to the state for protection and those who stressed self-help and rationalization, as well as between the trades that had adapted to industry and those whose existence was threatened by it. Then, during World War I a congruence of interests drew handwerk closer to industry; yet this situation proved ephemeral, and handwerk was never able to reestablish even the uneasy alliance with conservative agrarians and sectors of industry it had maintained in the *Kaiserreich*.

After the war's end the first shock to handwerk was the conclusion of the Stinnes-Legien Pact of November 15, 1918 in which heavy industry, fearful of the workers' council movement, agreed to accept the unions as an instrument of social order. Thus handwerk quickly lost much of the significance as a social buffer between capital and labor that it had enjoyed before the war. Handwerker were further embittered by the new government's social policies, especially its antiprofitereing price controls, which they believed fell exclusively on them, and by the anti-handwerk trade tax that aggravated tensions between handwerker and their customers.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, masters remained as divided as ever. Many continued to advocate an alliance with industry, pointing out that despite the great contradictions between them, industry and handwerk both believed in an authoritarian work relation and should therefore unite in the face of the greater threat of socialism. But typical of their yearning for a lost golden age, they also persisted in looking backward, with their nostalgia for the more authoritarian and less fluid days of the *Kaiserreich* when they (supposedly) had a set place in society and their socialist enemies had been kept firmly out of power. Thus many handwerker were alienated from the republic from its very inception.<sup>32</sup>

Protestant handwerker began their Weimar electoral odyssey with the liberal parties. In the first elections of the new republic in 1919, many voted for the left-wing German Democratic Party (Deutsche Demokratische Partei; DDP), partly for tactical reasons as a balance to the SPD. But the liberal DDP could not for long hold the loyalty of conservative, anxious handwerker. After years of worker revolution and counter-revolution, then, many moved to the more right-wing German People's Party (Deutsche Volkspartei; DVP) in the 1920 election.<sup>33</sup> But since, as Larry E. Jones has pointed out, this period was "characterized by the general instability of the bourgeois middle parties and by the increasing disaffec-

tion of the German middle strata from those parties which had become either directly or indirectly identified with the Weimar Republic,<sup>34</sup> this affiliation would not last.

If handwerk's initial commitment to the Weimar system was shallow at best, it received a heavy blow with the inflation/stabilization crisis of 1922–1924. The hyperinflation hit small proprietors especially hard by wiping out their savings (including those they had set aside for retirement), while costs rose and credit tightened. The conditions of the monetary stabilization in late 1923 only made their situation worse in the short term. With credit tightened, thousands were driven into bankruptcy and downward into the proletariat, a trend that continued through 1924. Whatever the exact degree to which handwerker were actually hurt by the inflation/stabilization crisis,<sup>35</sup> they felt embittered and betrayed by the new government. The prosperity of factories and the continued growth of department stores and consumer cooperatives, all of which competed with them and squeezed their profits, only sharpened their alienation.<sup>36</sup> Throughout Saxony, for example, at numerous *Mittelstand* protest rallies speakers bitterly excoriated the government's tax and credit policies, one crying that the latter were "squeezing the *Mittelstand* like a lemon."<sup>37</sup> The movement to the right is evidenced in the substantial number of handwerker who turned to the conservative German Nationalist People's Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei; DNVP) in the May 1924 elections as a protest against the industry-oriented liberal parties in the coalition government,<sup>38</sup> and the many who voted for the Nazis. While handwerker who had been hurt economically by the war had joined the Nazis already in 1920 in disproportionate numbers,<sup>39</sup> after the inflation many now saw no other hope. In the words of a master organ maker who bitterly turned away from the government to the Nazi Party,

With a great deal of work I succeeded in getting a few contracts, but all my hopes were in vain. The inflation put an abrupt end to all my efforts. I could no longer pay my people and my assets dissolved. Hunger and deprivation moved in with us. I cursed a regime that permitted such misery, for I had the feeling that an inflation of these dimensions was not necessary. . . . But the objective was attained. The *Mittelstand* that was still modestly prosperous was wiped out—that middle class that was still the enemy of Marxism, even though [because of government policy] it hadn't the faintest chance of fighting successfully.<sup>40</sup>

The disillusionment with Weimar democracy went deeper and broader than might be construed from the small numbers of handwerker (overrepresented though they were) who voted for the Nazi Party in May of 1924. Already in 1923, without apparently having any particular party in mind, an important handwerk newspaper expressed an ominous yearning for authoritarianism: "If we don't fully come out of these endless government crises, if finally a strong man doesn't come who takes care of the devil of confidence and no-confidence of the parties and finally cleans things up from the very bottom, then we in Germany might as well just pack it in."<sup>41</sup> Coming to the fore again was the traditional moral antipathy to industry. According to the Flensburg chamber history, industry in this period

assumed for handwerk “the same position that Jews did for the Nationalists. From handwerk’s ideological point of view, industry was ‘degenerate,’ alien in its essence, and detrimental to the perfection of quality work.”<sup>42</sup>

Perceiving this discontent, the Nazis aimed heavy amounts of propaganda at handwerker as well as other elements of the *Mittelstand* both “old” (small proprietors) and “new” (white collar employees). They directed their attacks not only at the Communists and Social Democrats (which the bourgeois parties did as well), but also at the parties of the right and center—the DDP, DVP, and DNVP—for their ties to big capital and “international Jewry.” In their anticapitalist rhetoric, however, the Nazis were careful to distinguish between small private property, which they supported, and the “parasitic” property of cartels, syndicates, and trusts. Only a true peoples’ community (*Volksgemeinschaft*), they declared, would be capable of ending the oppression of finance capital and the threat of bolshevism and of overcoming class conflict in a unified German nation.<sup>43</sup>

These generalizations of handwerker voting patterns are valid for primarily Protestant handwerker, those who moved from the liberal parties to the racialist (*völkisch*) DNVP and the Nazis in 1924; for now, by and large, Catholic handwerker remained loyal to the Center Party. It should be noted, however, that even as the Center Party denounced Nazism as hate-filled and anti-Christian, its own propaganda echoed much of the latter’s language of opposition to both socialism and liberalism and of overcoming class conflict in an authoritarian “people’s community.” Over the course of the Weimar period, the Center Party, too, drifted steadily to the right.<sup>44</sup>

The period after the stabilization until the onset of the Depression marked a time of improved economic conditions for handwerk and a participation in this interlude of relative prosperity. This was also a period in which the durability of handwerk received a new recognition in the academic literature. Werner Sombart partially reversed his earlier view that handwerk was fated to be absorbed into industry and acknowledged that many trades had impressively modernized their production, and management, methods and clearly had a place in an advanced capitalist system.<sup>45</sup> A multivolume government study confirmed handwerk’s staying power in greater detail.<sup>46</sup> At the same time, the Prussian Trade and Reich Labor Ministries, recognizing handwerk’s role in training over two-thirds of all skilled workers, worked to join it and industry in an integrated nationwide system of vocational counseling and training.<sup>47</sup>

But this 1924–1928 interlude of relief brought no reconciliation with the Weimar government. A constant stream of complaints poured forth from handwerk circles. Masters protested vehemently that the government’s tight credit policy after stabilization made it impossible to rebuild, and that taxes fell especially onerously on them. In addition, they resented the high amount of government expenditure, especially such state welfare programs as the unemployment insurance introduced in 1927 for which they footed the bill yet that brought them no benefits.<sup>48</sup>

Handwerk reacted politically during these years not by a return to the DNVP, which they associated with big agriculture and high food prices, nor to the two



liberal parties with their connections to big business. Rather, for many this was a period of rootless experimentation with the innumerable splinter parties that littered the Weimar political scene. The Business Party (*Wirtschaftspartei*), founded in 1919 and after 1925 renamed the *Reichspartei des deutschen Mittelstands*, attempted to appeal to small proprietors and especially to those who had been hurt in the inflation.<sup>49</sup> Many handwerker, attracted by its support of corporatist and protectionist proposals as well as its strong anticapitalist and antisocialist rhetoric, cast their votes for this narrow interest party, especially after the onset of the Depression. But even as the Business Party leaders did succeed in organizing massive *Mittelstand* protest demonstrations in 1928 under the slogan “Mittelstand im Not” (Mittelstand in need), the party never gained a truly broad appeal.<sup>50</sup> *Mittelstand* protest and alienation were also expressed throughout the 1920s in more roundabout ways. In Lower Saxony, for example, the Guelph Party, whose defining characteristic was loyalty to the Hanoverian dynasty, enjoyed a surprising resurgence, and in areas well outside its traditional bases of support. Its new appeal may be explained not as a sign of nostalgia for the lost royal house, but rather as an expression of resentment against the encroachment of the modern state, epitomized by Prussia, and the commercialization and industrialization that had debased local culture.<sup>51</sup> Elsewhere, too, votes for special interest or separatist parties represented more a protest against the dominance of Prussia and against modernity in general than as support of a particular program.<sup>52</sup>

With the onset of the Depression, the economic situation for handwerker deteriorated rapidly. Using 1928 as a base index (1928 = 100), their income levels fell to 96 in 1929, 86 in 1930, 69 in 1931, and 50 in 1932, only one-half of what they had taken in four years earlier.<sup>53</sup> By 1932 handwerk bankruptcies accounted for 17 percent of the total nationwide.<sup>54</sup> Even in areas where handwerker themselves were scarcely affected, they reacted with alarm and anxiety. William S. Allen reports in his case study of the rise of Nazism that, while in Nordheim in 1932 only a few marginal shops were driven into bankruptcy, handwerker were quick to see the specter of larger disaster. Guild masters demanded public works projects from the government and issued condemnations of illegal competition and capitalism generally. Even though in this region direct suffering was thus far restricted to the workers, the middle classes lived in perpetual fear of social demotion.<sup>55</sup>

Only the Nazis, however, were able to articulate the demands and frustrations of handwerk with any real success. While the Brüning government (March 30, 1930 to June 1, 1932) decreed several measures to ameliorate their hardship (chiefly lowering taxes on small shops while raising those on department stores—the latter being resented not just by retailers but also by those handwerk trades with a retail business), masters remained alienated and unimpressed. They merely escalated their demands for still lower taxes, a reduction of social welfare, and economic corporatism.<sup>56</sup> Striking, too, is the anticapitalist character of their response. A resolution passed in 1931 by a peak association cried, “There prevails in handwerk a bitterness and desperation [rooted in] the one-sided preference of

capitalist and trade union forces [by state policy]. The survival of the commercial *Mittelstand* is decisively dependent upon the breaking up of the centralized predominance of all collective economic forces, be they capitalist, trade union, or state-economic.”<sup>57</sup> Only the Nazis—with their incessant denunciations of consumer cooperatives, department stores, finance capital and greedy banks, liberals, Jews, communists, all contained in a continuous barrage of leaflets, meetings, parades, and speeches—succeeded in gaining the votes of German handwerker in the two elections of 1932.<sup>58</sup>

## Handwerk and Nazism

In the massive and contentious historiography of the sociology of Nazism at least one thing has remained constant: virtually all who write on the subject agree that, in the words of Thomas Childers: “The nucleus of the NSDAP’s following was formed by the small farmers, shopkeepers, and independent artisans of the old middle class, who constituted the most stable and consistent components of the National Socialist constituency between 1924 and 1932.”<sup>59</sup> What has changed in the literature is the estimation both of the extent of the participation of other social groups, especially the working class and the upper-middle classes, and consequently of how National Socialism as a party and as a movement may be characterized.<sup>60</sup>

The analysis of National Socialism as, in essence, a reactionary response of the lower-middle class has a long and distinguished pedigree. Already in 1930 Theodor Geiger perceived a reaction of “panic” on the part of *Mittelstand* voters anxious that their precarious status as small property owners would be further eroded by the economic crisis.<sup>61</sup> Then during and after World War II a series of studies by American sociologists and social psychologists (often European refugees) attempted to work out a typology of the petite bourgeois authoritarian personality. The psychologist Erich Fromm, for example, argued that the lower-middle class was gripped by a “feeling of powerlessness, anxiety, and isolation from the whole” that gave it a “sado-masochistic” character, a “craving for submission” together with a “lust for power” to which Nazism appealed.<sup>62</sup> The most influential sociological study, by Seymour Martin Lipset, argued in the 1950s that, because small proprietors by virtue of their position relative to big business must live with the perpetual pressure of concentration and centralization, “they are *always* disaffected” and “reactionary.” The explanation for the appeal of Nazism to the German lower-middle class was to be sought neither in the economic crisis of the 1930s nor even in the longer term “anomie and the general rootlessness of modern industrial society.” Rather, on one level, the lack of education and “isolation from varied experiences” predisposed the small town shop owner “toward an extremist view of politics.” But even more deeply, the productive redundancy of the small proprietor made him fundamentally opposed to big industry, labor unions, and state regulation (all being “necessary for a stable, modernized social

structure”) in a way that was both “unrealistic” and “irrational.”<sup>63</sup> Thus their contempt for parliamentary democracy is never far beneath the surface and can “under certain circumstances” manifest itself as fascism.<sup>64</sup>

The next generation of those studying the German lower-middle classes included historians who moved away from structural explanations of fascism and the view of the necessary alienation of the small proprietor. Writing in the late 1960s and early 1970s, they stressed both historical contingency in tracing the stages of political radicalization of the *Mittelstand* as well as its heterogeneity, even acknowledging the existence of progressive elements that sought accommodation with industrialization. Peter Wulf, for example, in a regional study emphasized the effect of the Depression in Schleswig-Holstein in shaking the confidence of handwerker in the middle-class parties and in the Weimar system as a whole.<sup>65</sup> Martin Schumacher examined the German Mittelstand Party as a locus of deep *Mittelstand* discontent with the republic.<sup>66</sup> The most extensive and still indispensable study of the *Mittelstand* in the Weimar period is Heinrich August Winkler’s *Mittelstand, Demokratie und Nationalsozialismus*. Winkler, in this book and in his many articles, also stressed the devastating impact of the inflation/stabilization crisis and the depression but put them in the context of what he argued was the old *Mittelstand*’s long-term preindustrial outlook. Fearing competition, many masters and their institutions called for economic protectionism and a corporatist political structure. The disappointment of their aspirations aggravated antidemocratic tendencies already widespread among them and undermined their already tenuous support for the Weimar state. The turn to the NSDAP was the result.<sup>67</sup>

Historical research since the 1970s has deepened our understanding of the old *Mittelstand*<sup>68</sup> and of support for Nazism in several ways. First, Nazism is no longer regarded exclusively as a movement of the lower-middle class, or “extremism of the center,” in Lipset’s phrase.<sup>69</sup> Based on new voter research and more-sophisticated techniques of statistical and electoral analysis, the overwhelming consensus now is that Nazism appealed, in Thomas Childers’s words, to “a significantly wider range of social and demographic groups than previously believed.”<sup>70</sup> Members of the upper industrial bourgeoisie, agrarians, white-collar workers, civil servants, even workers, were all drawn to the Nazi movement, especially after 1930, in significant numbers.<sup>71</sup> Therefore, what was unique about the Nazi Party was not its *Mittelstand* character, but rather that it was the first “modern absolutistic integrationist or people’s party in Germany.”<sup>72</sup>

The second innovation in research on the *Mittelstand* has been the expansion of inquiry from primarily the political to the economic and social. Coming in the context of a wider reexamination of the European petite bourgeoisie in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,<sup>73</sup> this work takes as its starting point a more intensive examination of the differences among the various trades and individual firms, as well as the relations of handwerker with their organizations and the implications of these for politics. For example, a number of social historians have looked at the daily life of handwerker, their economic practice and attitudes, as well as patterns of socialization, marriage, inheritance, and social mobility in

order to assess the influence of preindustrial traditions in the modernization of handwerk.<sup>74</sup> Tensions between the owners of one-man shops and the more prosperous shop masters who considered the former to be undertrained bunglers who diminished the prestige of the trades have been the object of some research,<sup>75</sup> while others have argued that the social connections between handwerker and the working class were much deeper than have been assumed.<sup>76</sup> More-differentiated research into Nazi electoral support and the social origins of Party functionaries has demonstrated that those often came from owners of the more marginal and precarious firms.<sup>77</sup> Indeed, more controversially, other scholars have argued that the strength of the “backward” or anti-industrial element has been much exaggerated, and that from the Wilhelmine period on many leaders as well as individual masters were committed to a course of economic modernization and accommodation to industry.<sup>78</sup> Yet this research, too, confirms the view that, in von Saldern’s words, “The petty bourgeoisie—and especially the artisans—were over represented in the Nazi party.”<sup>79</sup>

In sum, the new research has discarded the view of the NSDAP as a *Mittelstand* party, one that expressed first and foremost the antimodernist frustrations and class antagonisms of the lower-middle classes, and has established the differentiated character of handwerk allowing that its relationship with industry was far more complex than previously assumed. Yet, if the NSDAP was not a party of the old *Mittelstand*, the most recent research, local and general studies alike, confirm that the old *Mittelstand* formed the backbone of party voters and members prior to 1933.<sup>80</sup> But if handwerk supported the Nazis with the expectation of economic and social protection, what they actually got was another matter.

### **Handwerk under Hitler, 1933–1939**

The task of assessing the experience of handwerker under the Third Reich is made complex by a number of contradictory factors, including the differing expectations within handwerk and the apparently mutually exclusive goals of Nazism. Historical interpretations may also be affected by the chronological perspective one takes. If one’s primary vantage point is the Weimar period, when the expressed demands of masters tended toward social protectionism and when handwerk’s future for a permanent integrated position in a capitalist political economy seemed uncertain, then the Nazi period may be seen as a defeat. The Nazis had no intention of shielding unproductive enterprises, and most historians have assumed that the war represented the final triumph of industrial capitalism over handwerk. If, on the other hand, we look backwards from the Federal Republic, when handwerk emerged vital and fully integrated into a liberal capitalist political economy, the impact of the Third Reich on handwerk may appear in a quite different light. This study will take the latter perspective and argue that Nazism had a strongly modernizing effect on handwerk and thus contributed to its post-war success.

The consolidation of Nazi power brought two types of changes to handwerk, organizational and programmatic. For the former the Third Reich was to represent the fulfillment of handwerk aspirations, but hopes for the latter were to be unequivocally disappointed. In the months following the seizure of power on January 30, 1933, the many pro-Nazi handwerker, led by the Nazi Fighting League of the Commercial Middle Class (Kampfbund des Gewerblichen Mittelstands, or Kampfbund) and the SA storm troopers, participated enthusiastically in boycotts and terrorist attacks against department stores, Jewish-owned businesses, and consumer cooperatives. By that summer, however, a shift in policy took place in conjunction with the regime's program of *Gleichschaltung*, the "coordination" of all institutions in the Nazi state. Under pressure from business, from the state bureaucracy, from the Party itself (that wanted to bring such outbursts from below under control), as well as pressure from abroad, spontaneous actions like these were brought to a halt.<sup>81</sup> The less-disciplined Kampfbund was dissolved and replaced by two new compulsory organizations: the National Socialist Artisan, Trade, and Commerce Organization (Nationalsozialistische Handwerks-, Handels- und Gewerbeorganisation; NS-Hago) and the National Artisan, Trade, Commerce Federation in the German Workers' Front (Gesamtverband des deutschen Handwerks, Handels und Gewerbes in der Deutschen Arbeitsfront; GHG), under the control of the German Labor Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront; DAF) that served as instruments of Party control of all *Mittelstand* groups.<sup>82</sup> The most important and far-reaching of the organizational changes took place at the level of the guilds and chambers. The guilds and chambers continued to exist but membership was made obligatory for all masters and journeymen, and the hodgepodge of local jurisdictions was systematized and centralized at the regional and national levels. In addition, their leadership was no longer democratically elected but subjected to the leadership principle (*Führerprinzip*)—that is, named from above according to criteria of Party loyalty.<sup>83</sup>

This process of *Gleichschaltung* meant several things for handwerk. It removed the possibility of spontaneous actualization of handwerk aims from below and made them the responsibility of Party functionaries. While some of these goals, such as the expropriation of Jewish property owners, were later carried out from above, the economic substance of handwerk wishes was not.<sup>84</sup> Neither department stores, which to many epitomized the unfair competitive advantage enjoyed by big business, nor purchasing cooperatives, which squeezed handwerk prices from the consumer side, were discriminated against or banned. Thus from the beginning an important feature of handwerk's hopes for a protectionist, corporatist (*ständisch*) society was disappointed.<sup>85</sup> As for the mechanism of *Gleichschaltung* itself, however, since so many handwerker were sympathetic to the Nazis, the takeover of the organizations proceeded quite smoothly and with the positive support of most members.<sup>86</sup> In contrast to the trade unions, which were completely destroyed (and many of their leaders imprisoned) and replaced by entirely new organizations, the guilds and chambers required no such drastic measures to be brought under Party control. Their membership was politically

reliable, and their structure compatible enough with Nazi rule, so that only the replacement of top individuals was necessary to bring them into line.

By far the most important and far-reaching accomplishment of handwerk in the Third Reich was the realization of its legislative ambitions. Its significance, however, is ambiguous because, as we shall see, the uses to which this legislation was put were quite contrary to what those most desperately calling for it had expected. The first years of Nazi rule brought the accomplishment of the legal gains, so long sought after and so long denied that most handwerker had given up hope of ever realizing them. The restructuring of handwerk organizations contained in three laws promulgated in 1934 and 1935 came to be regarded in the postwar period as the foundation of modern handwerk politics, with economic effects that remain controversial down to the present day.

The First Decree for the Provisional Reconstruction of German Handwerk of June 15, 1934 contained the following provisions that formalized the process begun by *Gleichschaltung* of establishing a hierarchical, centralized system of handwerk organizations.<sup>87</sup> First, it defined seventy-two trades that could be legally practiced as handwerk. Thus boundary disputes with industry, trade, retail, and even art were either settled or a mechanism for their resolution was set in place. Second, guild (*Innung*) membership was made obligatory (putting the guilds on a secure financial basis), their tasks were clearly delineated, and they were subordinated to the chambers (*Kammern*). Third, the *Führerprinzip* became the selection process for the leadership, and clear lines of authority were established among the local guilds and chambers, and their peak organizations. Finally, a court of honor (*Ehrengericht*) was established to adjudicate offenses to handwerk “honor,” among them “unfair competition and the cheating of customers.”

The Second and Third Handwerk Decrees followed on January 18, 1935.<sup>88</sup> The Second Handwerk Decree extended the leadership principle to the chambers (and thus abolished the elected assemblies as the bodies that chose the leaders) and assigned authority to select officials at all levels to the Reich Economics Ministry (Reichswirtschaftsministerium; RWM). Finally, the Third Decree gave handwerk its most sought-after goal since 1848: the so-called major certificate of competency (*Großer Befähigungsnachweis*). According to this law, only those who had received their master title would be permitted to open up and operate a shop in any one of the trades now legally defined as handwerk. The master title, which the chambers would issue, was received at the end of a course of training, set and supervised by them; it entailed a period of apprenticeship (generally three to three and one-half years, depending on the trade), the completion of a journeyman’s piece, a period of journeymanship (of similar length and including both practical and theoretical training), and finally a masterpiece and a master examination.<sup>89</sup>

Handwerk supported this long-sought legislation in almost all its aspects. The institution of the certificate of competency was universally regarded as a great victory, as was the creation of a unified institutional structure, although there were later to be some complaints about handwerk being “over-organized.”<sup>90</sup> The court of honor was applauded as a mechanism of self-discipline and of rooting out the

dishonest and incompetent. Although the extent of subordination to the state did not meet with wishes of those handwerker fixated on a strict ideal of “self-administration,” such measures as the leadership principle were accepted under the circumstances, and the laws were generally seen as an epochal achievement.<sup>91</sup>

A matter of central importance in this study will be whether the certificate of competency, the centerpiece of this legislation—originally demanded by most handwerker for reasons of protection and granted by the Nazi state to appease a loyal constituency but, more importantly, as a mechanism of “coordination”<sup>92</sup> and political control<sup>93</sup>—was used as a progressive instrument or as a reactionary one. It seems clear that at the time of its promulgation both motives could be found among handwerker. Some wanted this corporate authority primarily as a way to exclude competition,<sup>94</sup> while others saw it, along with the solid organizational structure, as a means to enforce higher standards of workmanship and to introduce techniques of modernization and rationalization in order to improve handwerk’s competitive position in the marketplace.<sup>95</sup> Certainly raising productivity was the high priority of the Nazi regime intent above all on rapid rearmament. Thus the formalization of the handwerk apprenticeship system was introduced as part of a broader reform in vocational training in Germany designed to raise skill levels in all economic sectors.<sup>96</sup> In addition, leaders expected to use the integrated organizational structure in order to build up their power as an effective political interest group.

But in evaluating the effects of Nazi policy with regard to handwerk we must also consider what it did *not* get from the regime. We have already seen that certain protectionist demands for limiting competition from big business (closing of, or imposing high taxes on, department stores) were denied. In addition, the guilds were refused the right to control prices.<sup>97</sup> Thus, anticapitalist and protectionist promises were subverted from the very beginning. In addition, the wishes of handwerk and other elements of the *Mittelstand* to establish corporate legislative bodies (*Ständesrat*), where representation would be according to occupational group (giving handwerk more legislative clout and serving to control the working class) was a hope the Nazis exploited but refused to fulfill.<sup>98</sup>

There were also other, more-topical reasons for handwerk discontent during the Third Reich. Complaints were widespread about the high guild dues and constant demands for special contributions, as well as the claustrophobic level of control by the organizations. In trades where business continued to lag, there was disillusionment with the Nazi policy and the regime, but where business was good, attitudes were correspondingly more positive. High taxes and difficult credit terms provoked constant grumbling, and violence by Nazi thugs, especially against the Church, caused offense to a sense of order.<sup>99</sup> Work creation programs affected the trades differently: the construction and metal trades were generally the beneficiaries of government contracts in the building programs of the 1930s, and were therefore without complaint, while trades like cabinetry and upholstery were left behind and embittered.<sup>100</sup> Once preparations for war began with the inauguration of the Four Year Plan in 1936, a new category of complaints arose. As

rationing of raw materials began, handwerk firms often received the short end of allocations, a situation that was especially acute in the metal trades;<sup>101</sup> wage and price restrictions hurt small shops (putting them in a disadvantageous position relative to industry in attracting and keeping labor); and in 1939 2 to 3 percent of all handwerk shops were closed in a “combing out” action designed to free scarce material resources and labor.<sup>102</sup>

Two things should be noted about the material hardships and Nazi policy during this period. First, however constant the grumbling against the regime may have been, it never developed into a real opposition. Loyalty to the Führer remained high throughout, even as people blamed his subordinates. A shop owner might be heard cursing the government one minute and enthusiastically saluting a passing parade the next. Criticism may have been a barometer of economic difficulties, but it never shook a basic commitment to the regime. As Ian Kershaw puts it, “Complaint and compliance were related characteristics of middle-class life in the Third Reich.”<sup>103</sup>

The second notable feature of economic life for handwerk under the first six years of Nazi rule is that, measured both by entire trades and by individual firms, those did well that were the most economically efficient. As von Saldern has shown, by the end of the 1930s a rise of income in handwerk firms was possible if it was accompanied by steps to rationalize.<sup>104</sup> This means that, contrary to assertions that handwerk was defeated in the Third Reich by the interests of big business (see chapters 2 and 3 in this volume), the circumstances of Nazi rule enabled shops to thrive according to capitalistic, market principles. During the combing out of 1939, it was not the efficient firms that were taken out of business, but rather the smallest shops, the one-man-firms, that were the least efficient.<sup>105</sup> These were the most traditional and conservative masters, those who had feared proletarianization the most and who had probably originally voted for Hitler in the greatest numbers. Those who ended up being rewarded under Nazism were benefited not by protectionist programs but rather by a context of market rationality. By 1939 those trades that prospered were the same ones that had been doing well earlier. No artificial mechanism of protectionism had shielded them from the marketplace during the Third Reich.<sup>106</sup>

For some historians the failure to implement the more radical handwerk demands, as well as the poor showing of these weaker trades, has been seen as a victory of the interests of big business over handwerk. Arthur Schweitzer, for example, chronicles the attempts of Robert Ley, director of the DAF, to extend the scope of his authority over its organizations, first by establishing a set of parallel DAF institutions to those of handwerk and then by attempting to install his own people as the heads of both.<sup>107</sup> Handwerk leaders resisted Ley’s attempts to encroach on their authority (this sort of turf war being typical of power machinations under Nazism), but they had to enlist as allies others who were only slightly less dangerous. According to Schweitzer, the goal of the handwerk movement was a corporatist program that he terms *artisan socialism*.<sup>108</sup> This comprised a set of romantically inspired notions of reestablishing an artisanal economy, with



anticapitalist features including opposition to big banks and large-scale industry. Handwerker believed these should be dissolved and their contracts redistributed to small shops. Parliament was to be replaced by a corporate body where representation was to be apportioned according to occupational group, or *Stand*. Membership of all citizens in party organizations representing their *Stand* would be compulsory. Prices would be controlled according to criteria of “fair prices” and “ordered markets,” and entrance to the trades limited in order to protect the livelihoods of those already established.<sup>109</sup>

In order to defeat Ley in his attempt to usurp part of their control, Schweitzer continues, the proponents of artisanal socialism were forced to ally with Economics Minister Hjalmar Schacht, who represented the interests of big business, and high Party functionaries whose interests coincided with those of big business because their primary goal was preparation for war. Schacht’s goals were twofold. First, he wanted to shield the guilds and chambers from the DAF—not in order to protect the autonomy of handwerk institutions, but rather to prevent the DAF from using them against the interests of big business. Second, he wanted to keep them closer to his own control in order to make sure that the ambitions of the artisan socialists were contained so that the economy would operate according to rules favorable to big business.<sup>110</sup> Winkler takes this farther and argues that after 1936–1938 the Nazi Party could politically afford to ignore the aspirations of its handwerk supporters for protective measures. Certain of their support (or at least confident of their quiescence), they could afford to put handwerk demands aside and orient the economy toward war production, which meant big business and placating the more dangerous working class. Handwerk thus became politically “superfluous.”<sup>111</sup>

The problem with these points of view is that they characterize in a blanket fashion the program of handwerker and the aspirations of their leaders as backward-looking, protectionist, and inimical to the interests of big business. They argue that the Third Reich ended up being a defeat for handwerk. But as von Saldern correctly points out, while the goals of many masters may be accurately characterized as economically reactionary, this was not true of many members of the more competitive trades and much of the leadership that tended to come from those trades. Indeed, she continues, contrary to Schweitzer’s and Winkler’s arguments, there was a real overlap of interests between big business and handwerk, especially given the predominant industrial preference for an “organized” economy. Both opposed classical liberalism, socialism, and the unions, supported strong guarantees for private property, and believed in the necessity of organized markets. Both groups supported principles of efficiency and productivity as criteria for economic viability. Handwerk groups actually supported, for example, the combing out actions—which they helped carry out—not just because they reduced competition, but also because they eliminated the least efficient members of their *Stand*.<sup>112</sup>

The next chapter will carry this discussion of how handwerk fared under the Third Reich into the war, which none of the authors discussed above have in-

vestigated. It will argue that these same principles of efficiency and productivity worked not, as most have assumed, for the exclusive benefit of big industry.<sup>113</sup> Rather, handwerk was already positioned—by virtue of its strong organizational structure and its readiness to adopt standards of rationalization and modernization, albeit to the detriment of their weakest members—to profit from the German war economy. Many masters may not have got what they wanted during the Third Reich, but handwerk as a *Stand* got what it needed.

## Notes

1. German has two words for guild. The *Innung* is the modern incarnation and denotes mainly a self-help or interest group, coming into being in the mid-nineteenth century. The medieval form was the *Zunft*, which was, in most places, a much more politically and socially powerful institution than the *Innung* was to be and had extensive authority to regulate every aspect of handwerk economic life and that encompassed an extensive cultural component as well. The *Zünfte* in Prussia were finally abolished during the Stein/Hardenberg reforms on November 2, 1810.
2. For the economic decline of handwerk in the late medieval and early modern periods, see primarily the work of Wilhelm Abel: “Zur Ortsbestimmung des Handwerks vor dem Hintergrund seiner Geschichte,” in *Das Handwerk in der modernen Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Deutsches Handwerksinstitut (Bad Wörrishofen, 1966); and the essays in Abel, ed., *Handwerksgeschichte in neuer Sicht* (Göttingen, 1972); also Rudolf Stadelmann and Wolfram Fischer, *Die Bildungswelt des deutschen Handwerks um 1800: Studien zur Soziologie des Kleinbürgers im Zeitalter Goethes* (Berlin, 1955). For social tensions within handwerk in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, see Mack Walker, *German Home Towns: Community, State, and General Estate, 1648–1871* (Ithaca, N.Y., and London, 1971), 73–103, 329–353.
3. Wolfram Fischer, *Handwerksrecht und Handwerkswirtschaft um 1800* (Berlin, 1955); Dirk Georges, *1810/11–1993: Handwerk und Interessenpolitik: Von der Zunft zur modernen Verbandsorganisation* (Frankfurt, 1993), 91–93; Friedrich-Wilhelm Henning, “Die Einführung der Gewerbefreiheit und ihre Auswirkungen auf des Handwerk in Deutschland,” in Abel, *Handwerksgeschichte*. For handwerk condemnation of the law, see Peter John, *Handwerk im Spannungsfeld zwischen Zunftordnung und Gewerbefreiheit* (Cologne, 1987), 284–285. For the contemporary lament that the movement for occupational freedom in the 1850s and 1860s meant the atomization of economic life and the dissolution of community ties, see Walker, *German Home Towns*, 411–417.
4. See Volkov, *Rise of Popular Antimodernism*, 53–56.
5. Abel, “Zur Ortsbestimmung des Handwerks”; Wolfram Fischer, “Die Rolle des Kleingewerbes im wirtschaftlichen Wachstumsprozess in Deutschland, 1850–1914,” in *Wirtschaftliche und soziale Probleme der gewerblichen Entwicklung im 15.–16. und 19. Jahrhundert*, ed. Friedrich Lütge. (Stuttgart, 1968). For a summation of research and an overview, see Friedrich Lenger, *Sozialgeschichte der deutschen Handwerker seit 1800* (Frankfurt, 1988), 114–142. For a comparative view, see Geoffrey Crossick and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, eds., *Shopkeepers and Master Artisans in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (London and New York, 1984).
6. Lenger, *Handwerker seit 1800*, 141–142.
7. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (New York, 1992), 27.
8. Gustav Schmoller, *Zur Geschichte der deutschen Kleingewerbe im 19. Jahrhundert* (Halle: 1870), 661–671. While by the end of the nineteenth century Schmoller had come to believe that cer-

- tain sectors of handwerk could survive beside industry, his overall view remained pessimistic. See also his *Grundriß der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre*, vol. 1 (Munich and Leipzig, 1919), 479–480. His nine-volume study published by the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* concluded similarly that, although industry affected the trades differently, their obsolescence seemed inevitable: *Untersuchungen über die Lage des Handwerks in Deutschland mit besonderer Rücksicht auf seine Konkurrenzfähigkeit gegenüber der Großindustrie*, published in the series *Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik*, vols. 62–70 (Leipzig, 1895–1897). One problem with this study was that it focused primarily on traditional crafts, which indeed were often being superseded by industry, rather than on newer, dynamic crafts. A summary of these studies may be found in Hans Grandke, “Die vom ‘Verein für Sozialpolitik’ Veranstalteten Untersuchungen über die Lage des Handwerks in Deutschland,” *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich* 21 (1897): 1031–1088. The series’ editor, Karl Bücher, foresaw a number of effects on handwerk as the result of industrial competition, among them a squeeze on profit margins as industry took over more and more stages of production, impoverishment through shifts in demand, takeovers by larger firms, and increasing dependency on wholesalers. See “Der Niedergang des Handwerks,” in *Die Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft, Vorträge und Versuche*, ed. Bücher, 3rd edition (Tübingen, 1901), 215–248.
9. Paul Voigt, “Die Hauptergebnisse der neuesten deutschen Handwerkerstatistik von 1895,” *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich* 21 (1897): 997–1030; also Eugen von Philippovich, *Grundriß der politischen Ökonomie*, 13th edition, vol. II, part I (Tübingen, 1918), 179–188.
  10. Kenneth D. Barkin, *The Controversy over German Industrialization 1890–1902* (Chicago and London, 1970), chapter 4; Volkov, *Rise of Popular Antimodernism*, 203–211.
  11. Valentin Chesi, *Struktur und Funktionen der Handwerksorganisation in Deutschland seit 1933* (Berlin, 1966), 18–19; Volkov, *Rise of Popular Antimodernism*, 273–274.
  12. For the law of July 26, 1897, see *Reichsgesetzblatt* (hereafter RGBl), 663; for the law of May 30, 1908, see RGBl, 356.
  13. Winkler, *Mittelstand*, 54.
  14. Rather than adopt the more gender-neutral one-person shop, I have chosen to keep the flavor of the original German, customary during this period, and use one-man shop (*ein-Mann-Betrieb*) throughout.
  15. Adelheid von Saldern, “The Old *Mittelstand* 1890–1933: How ‘Backward’ Were the Artisans?” in *Central European History* 25, no. 1 (1992): 35. Hal Hansen stresses the role of the states in southwest Germany in promoting artisanal progressivism; “Rethinking the Role of Artisans in Modern German Development,” *Central European History* 42, no. 1 (April 2009): 1–32. On the efforts of the German state to encourage this tendency as a means of augmenting the skills of the labor force, including strong support for the 1897 law as a means to that end, see David Meskill, *Optimizing the German Workforce: Labor Administration from Bismarck to the Economic Miracle* (New York and Oxford, 2010).
  16. On the varied, conflicted character of lower-middle-class patterns of social mobility, politics, and values in the *Kaiserreich*, see David Blackbourn, “Between Resignation and Volatility: The German Petite Bourgeoisie in the Nineteenth Century,” in Crossick and Haupt, *Shopkeepers and Master Artisans*.
  17. See Karl Kautsky, “Der Untergang des Kleinbetriebs,” in *Das Erfurter Programm*, 12th ed. (Stuttgart, 1919), 3–10.
  18. Volkov, *Rise of Popular Antimodernism*, 163–171, 203–211, 221–223, 252–253, 282–283, 287, 313–319.
  19. For example, obligatory guild membership (*Pflichtimnung*), long a goal of handwerk, was opposed by liberals as an obstacle to technological innovation and to the capacity of industry to recruit journeymen skilled labor. See Winkler, *Mittelstand*, 50, 54–58.
  20. Anti-Semitism was often part of their response. See Shulamit Angel-Volkov, “The Social and Political Function of Late 19th Century Anti-Semitism: The Case of the Small Handicraft

- Masters,” in *Sozialgeschichte Heute; Festschrift für Hans Rosenberg zum 70. Geburtstag*, ed. Hans Ulrich Wehler (Göttingen, 1974).
21. Lenger, *Handwerker seit 1800*, 166–167. Jürgen Kocka, “The First World War and the ‘Mittelstand’: German Artisans and White-Collar Workers,” in *Journal of Contemporary History* 8 (1973): 100–123. Although in the early years of the fighting the War Office had a policy of spreading war contracts and raw material allocation around, partly for reasons of internal social stability, during the coal shortage of the winter of 1916 General Groener ordered, as he later explained, that “all enterprises without work must be closed down, regardless of the consequences. In the same way, all small enterprises must be removed because they make uneconomic use of coal and manpower.” Kocka estimates that by late 1917 50 percent of all handwerker had been drafted and 33 percent of all shops closed down. But despite the directive of the High Command, as well as the prejudices of the industry-dominated War Committee of German Industry (Kriegsausschuss der Deutschen Industrie), many sympathetic war procurement agencies did not discriminate against handwerk in the allocation of raw materials. See Kocka, *Facing Total War: German Society 1914–1918* (Leamington Spa, 1984), 102–104; *Handwerkskammer Flensburg 1900 bis 1975: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Handwerks in Schleswig-Holstein* (Flensburg, 1975), 111; *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Osnabrücker Handwerks: anlässlich des 75jährigen Bestehens* (Osnabrück, 1975), 401.
  22. Rainer S. Elkar and Werner Mayer, *Handwerk—eine Karriere: Handwerk an Rhein und Ruhr im 20. Jahrhundert* (Düsseldorf, 2000), 31; Wilhelm Wernet, *Handwerkspolitik* (Göttingen, 1952), 237. Additional trades which furnished goods directly to the armed forces included cooper, brush maker, glazier, plumber, painter, rope maker, tailor.
  23. Gunther Mai, *Kriegswirtschaft und Arbeiterbewegung in Württemberg 1914–1918* (Stuttgart, 1983), 80.
  24. Jürgen Kocka, *Klassengesellschaft im Krieg: deutsche Sozialgeschichte 1914–1918* (Göttingen, 1973), 91.
  25. A shared opposition to the expanded powers of the state in directing the economy as well as to the growth of consumer cooperatives only strengthened this bond. See Kocka, “The First World War and the ‘Mittelstand,’” 116–120; Kocka, *Facing Total War*, 111–112.
  26. Mai, *Kriegswirtschaft*, 89; Kocka, *Klassengesellschaft im Krieg*, 89.
  27. In addition, the state’s recognition of the need for skilled workers after the war, as well as handwerk’s leading role in producing them, were sharpened by the war experience; Meskill, *Optimizing the German Workforce*, 83.
  28. Wernet, *Handwerkspolitik*, 237.
  29. Kocka, *Klassengesellschaft im Krieg*, 88–89; *Handwerkskammer Flensburg 1900 bis 1975*, 111; *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Osnabrücker Handwerks*, 403–404, 406. Moreover, the trend toward stronger membership commitment continued. Whereas in 1914 only 38 percent of handwerker were organized in guilds or other handwerk associations, in 1925 the figure had shot up to 75 percent. Mai, *Kriegswirtschaft*, 89.
  30. By the war’s end more than one-third of all handwerker had joined a credit cooperative. The commitment to other forms of cooperatives, however, was still weak—less than 10 percent by 1918—even though this represented a doubling of the prewar figure. Mai, *Kriegswirtschaft*, 91.
  31. *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Osnabrücker Handwerks*, 412; Thomas Childers, *The Nazi Voter: The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany, 1919–1933* (Chapel Hill, N.C., and London, 1983), 64; Larry E. Jones, *German Liberalism and the Dissolution of the Weimar Party System 1918–1933* (Chapel Hill, N.C., and London, 1988), 113.
  32. Winkler, *Mittelstand*, 66–67, 70, 74.
  33. Heinrich August Winkler, “From Social Protectionism to National Socialism: The German Small-Business Movement in Comparative Perspective,” *Journal of Modern History* 48 (March 1976): 7–8; Jones, *German Liberalism*, 24–25, 49.
  34. Larry E. Jones, “The Dissolution of the Bourgeois Party System of the Weimar Republic,” in

- Social Change and Political Development in Weimar Germany*, ed. Richard Bessel and Edgar J. Feuchtwanger (London, 1981), 268.
35. The still important study of the social effects of the inflation by Franz Eulenburg, "Die sozial Wirkungen der Währungsverhältnisse," in *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik* 122 (1924): 714–778, showed that government policy during the crisis had made inflation's impact on handwerk much more devastating than on many other groups. Winkler has modified this to argue that those handwerker with real property and debts that could be discharged with the worthless currency (especially home owners) were somewhat cushioned from the inflation's full effect. Worse off were pensioners and others on fixed income, among whom he concedes were many handwerker, while big industry suffered the least; *Mittelstand*, 28, 109. In the opinion of many contemporaries, masters were less sophisticated about turning cash assets into capital goods, which would have shielded them from inflation, and thus more often came out the losers; see Lenger, *Handwerker seit 1800*, 168.
  36. Michael H. Kater, *The Nazi Party: A Social Profile of Members and Leaders, 1919–1945* (Cambridge, MA, 1983), 23–24.
  37. Quoted in Benjamin Lapp, *Revolution from the Right: Politics, Class and the Rise of Nazism in Saxony, 1919–1933* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1997), 160–161.
  38. Winkler, *Mittelstand*, 129. See also Jeremy Noakes, *The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, 1921–1933* (London, 1971), 117–118.
  39. See Kater, *Nazi Party*, 23–24, 241–243.
  40. Quoted in Childers, *Nazi Voter*, 65.
  41. *Nordwestdeutsche Handwerks-Zeitung* (27:48), November 29, 1923; cited in Winkler, *Mittelstand*, 78. For a more general study of feelings of this kind in Weimar fiction, see Peter S. Fisher, *Fantasy and Politics: Visions of the Future in the Weimar Republic* (Madison, Wisc., and London, 1991).
  42. *Handwerkskammer Flensburg 1900 bis 1975*, 135.
  43. Childers, *Nazi Voter*, 68–69.
  44. Childers, *Nazi Voter*, 113–114.
  45. Werner Sombart, *Der moderne Kapitalismus*, vol. 3.2 (Munich and Leipzig, 1927), 957–966. For his earlier view, see Sombart, *Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 1913), 279–281.
  46. *Ausschuß zur Untersuchung der Erzeugungs- und Absatzbedingungen der deutschen Wirtschaft: Das deutsche Handwerk*, vols. 1–4 (Berlin, 1930).
  47. Meskill, *Optimizing the German Workforce*, chapter 4.
  48. Kater, *Nazi Party*, 38; Noakes, *Nazi Party in Lower Saxony*, 109–110.
  49. On the Business Party, see Martin Schumacher, "Hausbesitz, Mittelstand und Wirtschaftspartei in der Weimarer Republik" in *Industrielles System und politische Entwicklung in der Weimarer Republik*, ed. Hans Mommsen, Dietmar Petzina, and Bernd Weisbrod (Düsseldorf, 1977), 823–835; also Schumacher, *Mittelstandsfrent und Republik in der Weimarer Republik* (Düsseldorf, 1972).
  50. Heinrich August Winkler, "Vom Protest zur Panik: Der gewerbliche Mittelstand in der Weimarer Republik" in Mommsen, et al., *Industrielles System*, 789; Jones, *German Liberalism*, 257–259, 297–298.
  51. Noakes, *Nazi Party in Lower Saxony*, 113–114.
  52. For example, in the neighboring province the *Schleswig-Holsteinische Landespartei* appealed to the same constituency as the Guelph Party and for similar reasons; Noakes, *Nazi Party in Lower Saxony*, 113–114.
  53. Rembert Unterstell, *Mittelstand in der Weimarer Republik: Die soziale Entwicklung und politische Orientierung von Handwerk, Kleinhandel und Hausbesitz 1919–1933* (Frankfurt, 1989), 34.
  54. Winkler states unequivocally that handwerk along with retail were very hard hit by the Depression and puts 1932 profits for handwerk at one-third their 1928 levels; *Mittelstand*, 34. See also Childers, *Nazi Voter*, 212.

55. William Sheridan Allen, *The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town, 1922–1945* (Chicago, 1984, rev. ed., first published 1965), 43, 109, 140. Noakes also stresses that more important than their actual economic situation was that people “considered themselves to be in a crisis in which they were particularly affected”; *Nazi Party in Lower Saxony*, 111 (emphasis in original).
56. Childers, *Nazi Voter*, 214.
57. Reichsverband [deutschen Handwerks], Resolution of November 25 1931, cited in Chesi, *Struktur und Funktionen*, 25.
58. Kater, *Nazi Party*, 56–57; Noakes, *Nazi Party in Lower Saxony*, 121–138; Allen, *Nazi Seizure of Power*, 140–143. See also Peter Wulf, *Die Politische Haltung des Schleswig-Holsteinischen Handwerks 1928–1932* (Cologne and Opladen, 1969).
59. Childers, *Nazi Voter*, 264.
60. For useful reviews of the literature, see Brian Ault and William Brustein, “Joining the Nazi Party: Explaining Political Geography of NSDAP Membership, 1925–1933,” *American Behavioral Scientist*, 41, no. 9 (June/July 1998): 1304–1323; Conan Fischer, “Workers, the Middle Classes, and the Rise of National Socialism,” *German History*, 9, no. 3 (October 1991): 357–373.
61. Theodor Geiger, “Panik im Mittelstand” in *Die Arbeit* 7 (1930): 637–654.
62. Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (New York and Toronto, 1941), quotes from 218, 163, 212. The lower-middle classes were, in Fromm’s view, particularly susceptible to psychological influences when making political choices, whereas support for Nazism among industrialists and Junkers was rooted in their perception of their economic interests. Hitler “was the typical representative of the lower middle class, a nobody with no choices or future.” Moreover, the failure of Nazism in power to deliver on its promises to them did not diminish its appeal, for they were compensated by the “circuses” of the “sadistic spectacles” of Nazi brutality and “by an ideology which gave them a feeling of superiority over the rest of mankind.” Quotes from 217, 218–219, 212, 220, respectively.
63. Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City, N.Y., 1960), 132, 144, 137, 133. Emphasis in original.
64. See also the work of Talcott Parsons, “Some Sociological Aspects of the Fascist Movement,” in *Essays in Sociological Theory* (Glencoe, IL, 1954). For critiques of these ideas, see Val Burris, “The Discovery of the New Middle Class,” *Theory and Society* 15, 3 (1986): 324–343; and Richard F. Hamilton, *Who Voted for Hitler?* (Princeton, N.J., 1982), 25–32.
65. Wulf, *Die politische Haltung des Schleswig-Holsteinischen Handwerks*.
66. Schumacher, *Mittelstandsfrent und Republik, 1919–1933*; see also his “Hausbesitz, Mittelstand und Wirtschaftspartei,” 834.
67. Winkler, *Mittelstand*.
68. The term *old Mittelstand* customarily refers to small proprietors—artisans, shopkeepers, and farmers—whereas the term *new Mittelstand* refers to white-collar workers and civil servants.
69. Lipset, *Political Man* 133.
70. Thomas Childers, introduction, in *The Formation of the Nazi Constituency 1919–1933*, ed. Childers (London and Sydney, 1986), 7. Childers points out the social breadth of Nazi support but also stresses its volatility and contingency, while artisans and retailers formed the core constituency; see Childers, 1–2.
71. Most importantly, see Childers, *Nazi Voter*; Hamilton, *Who Voted for Hitler?*; Jürgen Falter, *Hitlers Wähler* (Munich, 1991).
72. Unterstell, *Mittelstand in der Weimarer Republik*, 133.
73. See Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, ed., “*Bourgeois und Volk zugleich?*” *Zur Geschichte des Kleinbürgertums im 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt and New York, 1978); Frank Bechhofer and Brian Elliott, eds., *The Petite Bourgeoisie: Comparative Studies of the Uneasy Stratum* (New York, 1981); Crossick and Haupt, *Shopkeepers and Master Artisans*; Crossick and Haupt, *The Petite Bourgeoisie in Europe 1780–1914: Enterprise, Family and Independence* (London and New York,

- 1995); Rudy Koshar, ed., *Splintered Classes: Politics and the Lower Middle Classes in Interwar Europe* (New York, 1990); Horst Möller, Gérard Raulet, and Andreas Wirsching, eds., *Gefährdete Mitte? Mittelschichten und politische Kultur zwischen den Weltkriegen: Italien, Frankreich und Deutschland* (Signaringen, 1993); see also David Blackburn's conference report on one of a series of round tables of the European Research Group: "Economic Crisis and the Petite Bourgeoisie in Europe during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," in *Social History* 10, no. 1 (January 1985): 95–104. See also the edited volume that came out of the second colloquium on handwerk history held at Schloß Raesfeld in January 1995: *Handwerk, Bürgertum und Staat: Beiträge des zweiten handwerksgeschichtlichen Kolloquiums auf Schloß Raesfeld, 12. Bis 14. Januar 1995*, ed. Wilfried Reininghaus and Ralf Stremmel (Dortmund, 1997): 99–117.
74. For example, Josef Ehmer, *Soziale Traditionen in Zeiten des Wandels: Arbeiter und Handwerker im 19. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt and New York, 1994); Klaus-Dieter Krohn and Dirk Stegmann, "Kleingewerbe und Nationalsozialismus in einer agrarisch-mittelständischen Region. Das Beispiel Lüneberg," in *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 17 (1977): 41–98; Hansjoachim Henning, "Handwerk und Industriegesellschaft. Zur sozialen Verflechtung westfälischer Handwerkermeister 1870–1914," in *Rheinland-Westfalen im Industriezeitalter*, ed. Kurt Düwell and Wolfgang Köllmann (Wuppertal, 1984).
75. David Blackburn, "Mittelstandspolitik im Deutschen Kaiserreich," in *Deutschland und Europa in der Neuzeit*, ed. Ralph Melville, Claus Scharf, Martin Vogt, and Ulrich Wegenroth, vol. 2 (Stuttgart, 1988), 556.
76. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, "Der Bremer Kleinhandel zwischen 1890 und 1914. Binnenstruktur, Einfluss und Politik," *Geschäft. Teil .1 Der Bremer Kleinhandel um 1900 (Beiträge zur Sozialgeschichte Bremens)*, vol. 4, part 1 (Bremen, 1982), 34.
77. On voters, see Thomas Childers, "The Social Basis of National Socialist Vote," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 11 (1976): 17–42; on Nazi Party functionaries, see Kater, *Nazi Party*, 229.
78. See von Saldern, "The Old *Mittelstand* 1890–1939," 27–51. See von Saldern's exchange with Winkler on this issue in *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 12 (1986). Winkler, too, who has offered what is certainly the most elaborated view of handwerker backwardness in Weimar, has recognized the appearance of the progressivism among the organization leadership; *Mittelstand*. 48. Also see Bernd Holtwick, "Panik im Mittelstand? Handwerker in Lippe und im Regierungsbezirk Minden 1929 bis 1935," in Reininghaus and Stremmel, *Handwerk, Bürgertum und Staat*. The issue of handwerk progressivism and when it came to dominate handwerk's outlook is central to this study and will be explored extensively in subsequent chapters, where I will argue that it did not happen until after World War II. Here it can be said that, while it cannot be denied that a group of reform-minded leaders in the 1920s sought to bring to handwerk the principles of competition and especially of sound management, it is far from clear how deep such convictions went, especially when one considers the still predominately local orientation of most guilds and how far such principles of market competition were accepted, or even understood, by the average master, given that those working alone (typically the most conservative) still made up 63 percent of all shops in this period.
79. Von Saldern, "The Old *Mittelstand* 1890–1939," 39. In any case, a focus on economic views in explaining *Mittelstand* attraction to Nazism may lose sight of the fact that a key factor was probably the persistent anxiety of demotion into the proletariat. The prospect of losing one's shop, and with it the small piece of property that conferred social respectability, as well as the reality that handwerker earnings were often lower than a factory worker's wages, all upset a deep-seated sense of social and psychological order.
80. Paul Madden and Detlef Mühlberger, *The Nazi Party: The Anatomy of a People's Party, 1919–1933* (Frankfurt, 2007), 284; Hellmut K. Anheier and Friedhelm Neidhardt, "The Nazi Party and Its Capital: Analysis of the HSDAP Membership in Munich, 1925–1930," *American Behavioral Scientist*, 41, no. 9 (June/July 1998), 1231; Oded Heilbronner, *Catholicism, Political Culture, and the Countryside: A Social History of the Nazi Party in South Germany* (Ann Arbor, Mich. 1998), 60–61; Detlef Mühlberger, "A Social Profile of the Saxon NSDAP Membership

- before 1933,” in *Nazism in Central Germany: The Brownshirts in “Red” Saxony*, ed. Claus-Christian W. Szejnmann (New York and Oxford, 1999), 213; Dirk Hänisch, “A Social Profile of the Saxon NSDAP Voters,” in Szejnmann, *Nazism in Central Germany*, 220, 231; Jürgen Falter, “Economic Debts and Political Gains: Electoral Support for the Nazi Party in Agrarian and Commercial Sectors, 1928–1933,” *Historical Social Research*, 17, no. 1 (1992): 4; Jürgen Falter, “The Young Membership of the NSDAP Between 1925 and 1933: A Demographic and Social Profile” in *The Rise of National Socialism and the Working Classes in Weimar Germany*, ed. Conan Fischer (Providence, R.I., and Oxford, 1996), 91. One exception is Peter Manstein, who finds the *Mittelstand* only slightly overrepresented; see Manstein, *Die Mitglieder und Wähler der NSDAP 1919–1933: Untersuchung zu ihrer schichtmäßigen Zusammensetzung* (Frankfurt, 1999), 57–58, 200.
81. Lenger, *Handwerker seit 1800*, 195.
  82. Peter John, *Handwerkskammern im Zwielicht: 700 Jahre Unternehmerinteressen im Gewande der Zunftidylle* (Cologne and Frankfurt, 1979), 136.
  83. Schweitzer, *Big Business*, 137–138; Chesi, *Struktur und Funktionen*, 25–38.
  84. For anti-Semitism in handwerk, see von Saldern, *Mittelstand im “Dritten Reich”: Handwerker-Einzelhändler-Bauern* (Frankfurt and New York, 1979), 202–207.
  85. Some of these discriminatory measures against big business were attempted at the local level by sympathetic officials, however; see Lenger, *Handwerker seit 1800*, 196.
  86. See, for example, the account in Allen, *Nazi Seizure of Power*, 225. Even given their support, many guild members feared that a corrupt Nazi officialdom would siphon off their funds, so they threw themselves big drinking parties to empty their treasuries before the new leadership assumed control. See also Bernhard Keller, *Das Handwerk im faschistischen Deutschland* (Cologne, 1980), 64–65.
  87. Erste Verordnung über den vorläufigen Aufbau des deutschen Handwerks, June 15, 1934; RGBl. I, 493.
  88. Zweite und Dritte Verordnung über den vorläufigen Aufbau des deutschen Handwerks, January 18, 1935, RGBl. I, 4; RGBl. I, 15.
  89. See Keller, *Handwerk im faschistischen Deutschland*, 71–75; Chesi, *Struktur und Funktionen*, 39–47.
  90. See below in this chapter.
  91. Keller, *Handwerk im faschistischen Deutschland*, 73–75.
  92. While the Nazis granted handwerk these corporate powers partly to reward a loyal constituency, they represented no real concession to protectionism. Besides facilitating the control of corporate bodies by the state (*Gleichschaltung*), handwerk corporatism, and especially the certificate of competency, were seen as being consistent with, indeed a means toward, Nazi goals of increasing handwerk productivity and facilitating economic planning. See von Saldern, *Mittelstand im “Dritten Reich,”* 37. Economics Minister Hjalmar Schacht as well as industry, which had until then always opposed the granting of such powers as a hindrance to labor mobility and technical innovation, considered that the structure (and presumably the attitudes) of handwerker had changed; therefore, they now favored the certificate of competency precisely because they believed it would contribute to increased productivity in handwerk.
  93. Boyer, *Zwischen Zwangswirtschaft und Gewerbefreiheit: Handwerk in Bayern 1945-1949* (Munich, 1992), 31–32.
  94. Keller, *Handwerk im faschistischen Deutschland*, 76; Bernd Holtwick, “Krieg, Kontrolle, Konkurrenz: Handwerkswirtschaft in den Jahren 1939 bis 1945,” Werner Abelshausen, ed., *Die etwas andere Industrialisierung: Studien zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Minden-Lübbecker Landes im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Essen, 1999), 229.
  95. For a brief review of this debate, see Boyer, *Zwischen Zwangswirtschaft und Gewerbefreiheit*, 30.
  96. See Theo Wolsing, *Untersuchungen zur Berufsausbildung im Dritten Reich* (Kastellaun, 1977); John Gillingham “The ‘Deproletarianization’ of German Society: Vocational Training in the



- Third Reich" in *Journal of Social History* 19 (1986); Werner Abelshausen, "Germany: Guns, Butter, and Economic Miracles," in *The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison*, ed. Mark Harrison (Cambridge, UK, 1998); Meskill, *Optimizing the German Workforce*, 141–165. Nazi reform in vocational training will be examined more thoroughly in the next chapter.
97. The setting of prices, until the imposition of economic controls by the state in connection with war preparations, was to be left to the market; Lenger, *Handwerker seit 1800*, 196.
  98. Keller, *Handwerk im faschistischen Deutschland*, 60–70.
  99. Ian Kershaw, *Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich, Bavaria 1933–1945* (Oxford, 1983), 122–132.
  100. Von Saldern, *Mittelstand im "Dritten Reich,"* 95–104; on building programs, see Michael Wolffsohn, *Industrie und Handwerk im Konflikt mit staatlicher Wirtschaftspolitik? Studien zur Politik der Arbeitsbeschaffung in Deutschland 1930–1934* (Berlin, 1977), 353–365.
  101. Timothy W. Mason, *Sozialpolitik im Dritten Reich: Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft* (Wiesbaden, 1977), 235–236.
  102. Lenger, *Handwerker seit 1800*, 200.
  103. Kershaw, *Popular Opinion*, 155; see also 120–127. See also von Saldern, *Mittelstand im "Dritten Reich,"* 176, 182; more generally, see Detlev J. K. Peukert, *Inside Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition and Racism in Everyday Life* (New Haven, Conn., and London, 1987), chapter 6.
  104. Von Saldern, *Mittelstand im "Dritten Reich,"* 125–126.
  105. Von Saldern, *Mittelstand im "Dritten Reich,"* 227; Lenger, *Handwerker seit 1800*, 200. I will offer a more differentiated picture of Nazi closing policy as it operated in practice in the next chapter.
  106. Von Saldern, *Mittelstand im "Dritten Reich,"* 101. For example, traditional trades like shoemaker and cartwright, which had been under assault from industry for decades, continued to have little prospect of expansion, while building and metal trades did well.
  107. For other accounts of the DAF-Handwerk conflict, which do not differ in the basic facts, see Keller, *Handwerk im faschistischen Deutschland*, 85–87; and Chesi, *Struktur und Funktionen*, 105–110.
  108. Schweitzer, *Big Business*, 110–238.
  109. Schweitzer, *Big Business*, 110–177.
  110. Schweitzer, *Big Business*, 171.
  111. Heinrich August Winkler, "Der entbehrliche Stand. Zur Mittelstandspolitik im 'Dritten Reich,'" in *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 17 (1977): 1–40; and his "Ein neuer Mythos vom alten Mittelstand," in *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 12, no. 4 (1986). For von Saldern's rebuttal, see "Alter Mittelstand' im 'Dritten Reich,'" in *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 12 (1986): 235–243.
  112. Von Saldern, *Mittelstand im "Dritten Reich,"* 126, 127, 187, 227.
  113. The assumption that the push to wartime efficiency worked to the disadvantage of handwerk is virtually universal; for example, see Dietmar Petzina, *Die Deutsche Wirtschaft in der Zwischenkriegszeit* (Wiesbaden, 1977), 142. Petzina argues that the drop in the total number of handwerk firms in the 1936–1939 period speaks most eloquently about the net effects of Nazi policy on handwerk. See also von Saldern, *Mittelstand im "Dritten Reich,"* 214. I will be arguing that what was really important was not so much the fate of individual masters, but rather the economic health of those remaining firms and thus that of the *Stand* as a whole.