INTRODUCTION

The era of confrontation and division in Europe has ended. We declare that henceforth our relations will be founded on respect and cooperation. Europe is liberating itself from the legacy of the past. The courage of men and women, the strength of the will of the peoples and the power of the ideas of the Helsinki Final Act have opened a new era of democracy, peace and unity in Europe.

—Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 21 November 1990

When thirty-four heads of states from Europe, the United States and Canada formalized the end of the Cold War and the division between East and West by signing the Charter of Paris, the effects of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 were declared to have been both part of and catalyst for the chain of events leading towards the fall of the Berlin Wall. According to the charter, the interplay between the ‘power of the ideas’ and the courage and ‘will of the peoples’ of Eastern Europe had paved the way for lasting peace. The epic year of the old continent in 1989 had not become one of violence and bloodshed, as feared by many contemporaries. Instead, it entered the history books as a chapter on peaceful revolutions, causing optimists like Francis Fukuyama to proclaim the ‘end of history’.

Decision makers all over Europe acknowledged that the bloc-to-bloc confrontations epitomizing the Cold War had been overcome peacefully with the help of the so-called spirit of Helsinki. Ambassador Rolf Ekéus gave a similar verdict in a 2002 Swedish government report. Produced by a task group comprising two ambassadors, several assistant deputy under-secretaries from two ministries, several military experts and numerous researchers, the report shared the sentiments expressed in the Charter of Paris. According to the Ekéus report, the Helsinki Final Act had ‘created and shaped thoughts and ideas which through their implicit political and moral relevance eventually led to the collapse of the Soviet Empire and
communism’. However, the road from Helsinki in 1975 to Paris in 1990 was not a straight one. Nor did the idea of causality, established by the heads of states at Paris and acknowledged by the Swedish officials in the Ekeus report, immediately find its way into the historical narrative.

In January 1977, seventeen months after the grande finale at Helsinki’s Finlandia Hall, TIME magazine reported on a crackdown campaign carried out by Czechoslovakian authorities against the signatories of Charter 77, a civic movement pushing for human rights as decoded in the Helsinki declaration. Against the background of general defiance of the Final Act’s human dimension in communist countries, the TIME journalist asked a pointed question: ‘Spirit of Helsinki, Where Are You?’ Three years later, this question was answered in another article, with a headline claiming, significantly, that the Kremlin was ‘killing the Spirit of Helsinki’. The article argued that diplomats struggled to ensure the survival of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) at the follow-up meeting to the Final Act held in Madrid, while Eastern European dissidents, Jews and human rights groups were targeted more directly than ever before. The hopes of these latter groups, once invested in the Final Act, now lay ‘in ruins’.

The lack of faith in the value of the negotiations carried out in Geneva and Helsinki between 1972 and 1975 prevailed widely in both East and West, from the time of ratification of the Final Accords until the second half of the 1980s. Few believed that détente would bring about real change, and reports of repressions carried out by Eastern European regimes seemed to confirm this pessimism. Only when the citizens of the Soviet Union and its allies experienced the first gentle breezes of what would develop into a stormy wind of change in the form of glasnost and perestroika did opinion start to shift.

These early reassessments of political realities all over Europe were soon followed by the bursting of a dam when the world witnessed the rapid collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipartite system of worldwide political reality after a half-century of all-embracing antagonism between communist one-party rule in the East and liberal democracies in the West.

Over the following decade, attempts to explain the quick collapse of the Soviet empire tended to focus on ‘hard power’ and the effects of the arms race on the Soviet economy. The result was a triumphalist Western narrative of what had happened, claiming a victory of good over evil. Eventually, increasing access to archival sources in Eastern Europe resulted in more nuanced accounts of the developments in the late 1980s as multilayered processes with origins in the era of détente. The history of the Cold War had not been exclusively a superpower game – ideas had indeed mattered.
With the wisdom of hindsight, many Europeans had to come to terms with their recent past. In Sweden, change appeared imminent in February 1985 during a heated parliamentary debate on foreign policy in the Riksdag (the parliament of Sweden) in Stockholm. After decades of rather solid consensus building in the realm of foreign policy established by the Social Democrats, years of controversy surrounding foreign violation of Swedish maritime territory caused the conservative opposition to openly question that policy. To Swedish prime minister Olof Palme, the harsh public criticism was nothing less than an attempt by the opposition to ‘demolish bridges’ and seek ‘confrontation all over the battlefield of security policy matters’. After the end of the Cold War, neutrality itself was put on trial when a controversy broke out on its real nature and practices in the early 1990s.

In October 2000, the Swedish government reacted to the persistent debates on this foreign policy matter when Foreign Minister Anna Lindh appointed Ambassador Ekéus as head of the abovementioned investigation committee that would account for the country’s foreign policy during the second half of the Cold War. Ekéus was assigned the task of conducting an in-depth study of Sweden’s political and military policies at the time. In its directives, the government defined two explicit tasks to be performed by the ‘Inquiry on Security Policy’ – its official name.

First, it would give an account of the development of general realities during the Cold War in order to provide an understanding of the world to which decision makers in Stockholm had to adapt. Second, it would give an account and produce an analysis of politicomilitary aspects of Swedish security policy during that period. The report, as mentioned above, emphasized the importance of the CSCE and its final declaration. Yet, regardless of this, academic and public debates on Sweden’s role in the Cold War have continued to restrict analysis of the European sphere to the process of European integration and its economic aspects. The relevance of European security and the making of the Final Act of 1975 to Sweden remains excluded from the narrative.

The disregard of the question of European security in the historiography of Cold War Sweden has created two interlinked research gaps. First, Europe has been left out of the narrative of the so-called activation of Swedish foreign policy in the 1960s, with emphasis placed instead on international solidarity about which scholarly consensus prevails. Second, and as a consequence, the country’s role has not been fully explored by CSCE scholars, mostly due to the predominant interest in Sweden and Europe from an almost exclusively economic perspective.

This book focuses on the reciprocal relationship between Sweden and the early Helsinki Process, starting with the establishment of a continental
security conference on the international agenda through the so-called Budapest Appeal of the Warsaw Pact states in early 1969 until the signing of the Final Act on 1 August 1975. It analyses Sweden’s contribution to the making of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the significance of the CSCE to Swedish foreign policy between 1969 and 1975 in general. In consequence, the book considers how a historical re-evaluation of these matters would affect the established paradigm of an active Swedish foreign policy during that period.

This is the first comprehensive analysis on the subject, and it offers a narrative that allows a profound understanding of what influence Sweden had on the making of the Helsinki Final Act, and vice versa, based on the first thorough examination of the Swedish role in the CSCE process. In this analysis I have four fundamental purposes: first, to outline and explain the reasons behind the contribution that Swedish decision makers and diplomats of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs made to the design of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975; second, to assess the significance of Swedish engagement at the CSCE to the established notion of the country’s foreign policy as ‘active’; third, to summarize public and media reactions to this engagement or explain the lack thereof; and finally, to give an account of how Sweden and Swedish policy at the CSCE were perceived abroad. The result of this analysis forces us to reconsider the activism paradigm.

My interest lies not exclusively in international (diplomatic) history but also in exploring how Swedish foreign policy identity was manifested in international negotiations on a multilateral level as well as in considering its repercussions for the domestic ‘lowest levels’, that is, in reactions to that policy. The research expounded in the body of the book will thus allow an analysis of how ‘Swedish’, ‘Nordic’, ‘European’ or ‘global’ Sweden was, or should have been, in the eyes of diplomatic and political elites and other actors at the time.

I argue that Sweden’s policy towards Europe must be integrated into the narrative about the country’s ‘active’ role in international politics during the period of détente. Regardless of dissimilarities between Swedish and wider European policy, such as economic and security preferences, and despite the CSCE being a reflection of the Cold War conflict between East and West, whereas European integration was an exclusively Western European process, a similar Berührungsangst (fear of contact), as Klaus Misgeld has called it, limited the development of a more European Sweden. Accordingly, Sweden’s response to the ‘European challenge’ was trade facilitation.

The Swedes remained the most passive of all European neutrals during the preparatory phase of the CSCE, perceiving the conference to be a Soviet tool, and therefore refrained from designing or cosponsoring any
initiatives. For this they were criticized harshly by Eastern, Western and neutral states alike. Because it was feared that heavy involvement in European affairs could lead to limited freedom of action and a decline of Soviet trust in Sweden’s political position, such engagement was consequently refused by the government in Stockholm, with reference to the policy of neutrality. Instead of a controversial but domestically appealing change-oriented policy carried out on a global level, the Swedes decided on a conservative approach towards Europe. This paradox, between Sweden’s active commitment to global issues and its simultaneous reluctance to engage in European affairs, continues to prompt general questions about the pervasive view expressed in the ‘active foreign policy’ of the first Palme government.

In the empirical analysis to come we will see that human rights were of low priority in Sweden’s European policy and that international solidarity served as a guiding principle exclusively along the North-South axis. In global affairs, Sweden played the role of the advocate of the weak, highlighting human rights and international justice; in Europe, however, the Swedish government advocated realpolitik. As a consequence, Sweden’s European policy could not be as active or solidarity based as it was on the global level. My broad analysis of Swedish-European engagement is, then, to see it as one of European paradox.

Scholars have considered the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 as ‘a turn’ leading to the end of the ‘short twentieth century’ and even, as mentioned above, the end of history itself. The ever-expanding number of declassified files from numerous archives all over the world has provided historians with new source material for fundamental research over the course of the past two decades. Geir Lundestad of the Norwegian Nobel Institute is correct in asserting that we are not yet in the position to give a definitive historical account of the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, certain causalities explaining the demise of communism have gained momentum in recent years. Shifting from actor-centred explanations towards greater focus on structure and processes, the CSCE has become one of the most prominent objects of study in this respect. It is mostly praised for its contribution to the demise of communism and has been defined as ‘the most evident culmination’ of the détente period. In 2001 Daniel Thomas argued that the Final Act sparked off human rights activism and networking in Eastern Europe, the so-called Helsinki Effect. More recently, American historian Sarah Snyder has demonstrated in detail the influence of the transnational network that devoted itself to the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act after 1975.

Over the course of the past three decades, the reception of the CSCE has undergone severe changes. A decade after the ratification of the Final
Act, most contemporaries in the West were still unaware of the implications of the Accords, because Moscow’s military power drove the transformation dynamics it had sparked off into the shadows. Many would have signed their agreement to the conclusion of Jonathan Luxmoore’s 1986 study, which was characteristic of the time: ‘After more than a decade, there is no evidence that world opinion has been moved by the Helsinki process to any significant extent, nor that fear of being held to account by Western diplomats has had any significant or lasting impact upon Soviet policy.’ Only a few believed anything positive would come out of Helsinki. One exception was Vojtech Mastny, an American historian of Czech descent, who, as early as 1986, stressed that the institutionalization of human rights as a subject in high-level affairs was of exceptional value in itself.

A few years later, everything changed with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the consequent political and social transformation of Eastern Europe. Naturally, 1989 also came to mark a watershed in the development of the historiography of the Cold War era. Working on new documents from declassified archives, and increasingly cooperating across national boundaries, historians quickly understood that there was much to learn about the years that just had passed, and so they developed a ‘new’ history of the Cold War (as labelled by Odd Arne Westad as early as 1995). Scholars realized a need for greater focus on the Soviet Union as well as making ‘a noteworthy shift from an emphasis on geopolitics to a stress on ideology, from a concern with interests to a preoccupation with culture’.

Recognizing this turn in scholarship, Melvyn Leffler pointed out, ‘Not long ago, few of us would have focused on Coke™ and Reeboks, on jazz and rock, on Sesame Street and Donald Duck, but we now know that their appeal perhaps counted for more than the Pershing missiles and the neutron bombs that seemed to dominate the diplomacy of the 1970s.’ The reassessment of the years of détente elucidated the idea that soft powers at work in the 1970s had contributed substantially to the course of events in the decade that followed. Swedish historian Alf W. Johansson argues that détente changed the monochrome worldview that had dominated during the 1950s and now turned the Cold War more than ever into a ‘struggle about people’s hearts and minds’. As part of this, how the CSCE itself was perceived underwent a shift: from being totally disregarded to being considered one of the most essential elements in understanding the history of the Cold War. Some scholars have praised the CSCE as ‘revolutionary’ and a ‘milestone’ in international affairs.

In harmony with the structure of the CSCE, three different schools, highlighting the different topics (the so-called baskets), have appeared. Rooted in early emphasis on the Soviet origins of the security conference,
the impact of the first basket (in which issues of military security were considered) and the recognition of postwar borders have been seen as the most important outcomes of the CSCE by some scholars. As Swedish historian Wilhelm Agrell writes, ‘The central element in the Helsinki Accord was without a doubt the recognition of Europe’s post-War borders’.32 This view is also adopted by Russian historian Vladislav Zubok, who, with regard to the Soviet Union, maintains that:

The outcome of the détente of the 1970s favoured the Soviets. In 1975, the Helsinki Agreement, despite its ‘third’ basket, brought the Soviet rulers to fulfilment of their long-time program of European stability with acceptance of Soviet domination in Central Europe, recognition of post-War European borders, and the expansion of Soviet positions in the developed world. Inside the country, the Soviet repressive machine completely suppressed internal dissent, and most dissenters ‘agreed’ to emigrate.33

Finnish historian Jussi M. Hanhimäki has argued that the Final Act should be viewed as the de facto end of the postwar era. Hanhimäki points out that it actually had negative effects on security during the first decade after the conclusion of the CSCE.34 Acceptance of human rights–related concessions in exchange for territorial security seemed profitable to the Kremlin and initially resulted in the accomplishment of early aims, as hoped for by Leonid Brezhnev and Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov. Nevertheless, Hanhimäki argues, economic aspects were essential:

If Basket III had its unexpected long-term consequences, perhaps even more important in the long term was the role of the economic relations, underlined in Basket II of the Helsinki Accords . . . If the human rights provisions of the CSCE had given a certain legitimacy to Soviet dissidents, Soviet economic mismanagement and the inherent problems of Warsaw Pact Socialism were to provide the socioeconomic background against which the dissidents’ voices would resonate loudly in the 1980s.35

In recent years, however, the emphasis has shifted towards the third basket, which dealt with human contacts, information, culture and education. In Helsinki, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as a basic principle for regulating relations between states was codified in an international agreement for the first time; specifications set out in the third basket added substantially ‘to the power of the revolutionary theme itself’.36 Eventually, Eastern European obligations to effect change outweighed Western acceptance of the status quo.37 In their speeches at the final session in Helsinki on 1 August 1975, communist leaders Leonid Brezhnev and Erich Honecker celebrated the Final Act, as it seemed to them that the original goal of a surrogate peace conference had been
accomplished at a reasonable price. The day after, victory celebrations were followed up with publication of extracts of the Accord in certain Eastern European media, such as Pravda and Neues Deutschland.

After signing the Final Act, Brezhnev told one of his aids, ‘Now, I can die in peace’.38 In internal debates with politburo hardliners, Brezhnev insisted that the concessions the Soviets made to the West in the third basket lacked real substance. Russian scholar Konstantin Khudoley stresses that Brezhnev and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko ‘mistakenly believed that the post–World War II borders in Europe had become inviolable in Helsinki’.39 Yet, the Final Act turned out to be delicate in the long run, as these circulated texts aroused interest among activists and interested citizens in Eastern Europe. Eventually, it was at the grassroots level that the Final Act became a point of reference.40

Swiss historian Thomas Fischer has illustrated the catalytic role of the neutral and nonaligned states, known as the ‘N+N’,41 confirming with comprehensive evidence the earlier claims that the intellectual entrepreneurship of the neutral states enabled the superpowers to maintain dialogue in periods of crisis.42 The role played by the N+N was just as disproportionate, and unexpected, as the long-term effects of the third basket, as the Finnish scholar Harto Hakovirta argued as early as 1988. He suggested that the nonalignment of the N+N states had allowed them to contribute to the success of the CSCE through means of their own, such as by bridge-building, mediating, offering services and generating independent ideas, initiatives or proposals.43

The grouping of the N+N was not unique. At the CSCE, many like-minded actors merged into groups at different points in time. The most prominent were the Warsaw Pact, NATO and the states of the European Communities (or ‘EC Nine’ in CSCE terminology). To the EC Nine, the conference was an interesting platform for early steps taken towards a (short-lived) vision of a common European foreign policy, the European Political Cooperation (EPC).44 Other groups, such as the Berlin Group, the Mediterranean Group and the Nordic states,45 were less significant.46

In recent years, and as a consequence of the emphasis put on the CSCE by the Cold War historians quoted above, the body of literature has grown extensively. National narratives have added to the rapidly growing body of historical literature. As part of a larger research project conducted at the German Institut für Zeitgeschichte, nine researchers have been working on different aspects of the CSCE and the Helsinki Process.47

Wanda Jarzabek wrote an account on Poland;48 Petri Hakkarainen and Tetsuji Senoo carried out their research on West German policy during the 1960s and 1970s, with a focus on Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr, respectively;49 and, in his doctoral dissertation, Takeshi Yamamoto studied
the approaches of France, Great Britain and West Germany to the CSCE between 1969 and 1973.\textsuperscript{50} Other studies with particular focus on Great Britain and France are still in the making or have recently been finished.\textsuperscript{51} In addition to several more limited scholarly accounts, Finland’s role has been described in a book by former diplomat Markku Reimaa.\textsuperscript{52} At a non-governmental level, subjects such as the freedom of religion and the role of churches in the Helsinki Process have been treated.\textsuperscript{53}

Sweden’s role at the CSCE has been studied by Austrian and American political scientists Michael Zielinski and Janie Leatherman and by Swiss historian Thomas Fischer. However, none of these studies has exclusively focused on Sweden, used sources from Swedish archives, or considered in depth the divergent Swedish approaches to European and global affairs. Leatherman concludes that Sweden ‘championed the cause of security measures in the CSCE’ and played a dual strategic role of negotiator and intermediary, together with Finland and, eventually, the other neutral and nonaligned states.\textsuperscript{54} Accordingly, cooperation between Finland and Sweden was a joint effort to overcome the structural disadvantages of neutrality in a confrontational East-West setting and was forged by the general perception of them as mediators and their own understanding of neutrality as the ideal way of ‘maximizing their power resources to achieve their broadest goals in disarmament and human rights’.\textsuperscript{55}

Zielinski, for his part, claims that Sweden failed to exert influence on the negotiations concerning confidence-building measures (CBM) and disarmament in the role of demandeur. He also argues that Sweden advocated on behalf of the interests of developing countries in the second basket and blended a third-party role with criticism of Western policy in human rights–related questions.\textsuperscript{56} Then, in a more recent historical study, Fischer describes Sweden as having been initially passive but then constructive in disarmament negotiations at the conference proper.\textsuperscript{57} All of these conclusions are based on official declarations, interviews with contemporaries and, in Fischer’s case, archival documents from several European countries. But access to recently declassified Swedish archives now allows us to get at the motives and deliberations behind Swedish agency.

Swedish neutrality policy has generally been the subject of intensive study in the past twenty years, which has resulted in a number of overviews of the quickly growing body of literature. In her 1997 research report, Ann-Marie Ekengren noted that there was a shortfall in the number of studies applying a democratic perspective, as most researchers preferred ideological approaches or power-oriented outlooks.\textsuperscript{58} Together with Ulf Bjereld, Ekengren also published an updated account of more recent research in the form of a book chapter in Thorsten Olesen’s anthology on the state of research in the Nordic countries.\textsuperscript{59} Ekengren’s survey con-
cludes that although intensive research has been conducted on Cold War Sweden, only a few syntheses have been produced.\textsuperscript{60}

The analysis of most works centres on Sweden's foreign policy in relation to specific issues, such as Sweden and the Algerian War, or issue areas (for example, Sweden and international disarmament negotiations). Another topic that has been touched upon by a number of studies is the role of specific individuals in the context of the broader debate on foreign policy. Bjereld and Ekengren have noted a shortage of studies on Sweden from a Nordic or a European perspective and emphasized that the body of the literature is still lacking important perspectives and approaches.

Another detailed overview, authored by historians Magnus Petersson and Olof Kronvall, defines the dichotomies ‘deterrence versus reassurance’ and ‘integration versus screening’ as guiding themes of Swedish security policy. The first is used to explain Stockholm’s policy towards the Soviet Union and its satellite countries, the latter to describe the behaviour towards NATO and the great powers in the West. Kronvall and Petersson maintain that the early period, up until 1970, is well researched, whereas the last two decades of the Cold War remain less explored.\textsuperscript{61} They also highlight that most studies have dealt with Sweden’s relations with the United States and other Western states, while those with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have been neglected. Two main areas are explicitly pointed out as highly promising for future research in terms of analytical perspectives: first, foreign policy-related bureaucracies; second, the interplay between domestic and foreign policy.\textsuperscript{62}

Kjell Engelbrekt divided the post-1991 literature into three schools, following Mikael af Malmborg, who adopted the internationally established labels traditionalist, revisionist and postrevisionist.\textsuperscript{63} Mikael Nilsson, who argues that all three schools are revisionist to some extent, has rejected this categorization. Nilsson instead suggests using the categories moderate, critical and radical. Accordingly, the moderate school admits the existence of a democratic deficit as a consequence of secret cooperation with NATO, which the Swedish government saw as an obligation in order to safeguard the country in case of war. Nevertheless, it never pledged any binding commitment.\textsuperscript{64}

A useful overview of more up-to-date research can also be found in the relevant chapters of Robert Dalsjö’s doctoral dissertation, published in 2006.\textsuperscript{65} During the 1990s, a number of journalists and scholars revealed that Sweden had secretly been pursuing cooperation in military matters with the West, and the United States in particular. According to some voices in the ensuing debate, this cooperation implied that Sweden would not have followed its declared policy of neutrality in case of war but, rather, would have sided with NATO and the West. Dalsjö argues that
the Swedish government in the 1950s understood that neutrality would fail but hoped to stay out of the initial nuclear exchange. The overall conclusion offered by Dalsjö and journalist Mikael Holmström is that neutrality in itself had been an illusion. In reality, these commentators argued, Sweden had always been a de facto member of NATO. Some would even come to argue that there had been a ‘general conflict between the Social Democratic government and the NATO-linked national security elite’.

During the first decade of the post–Cold War era, government commissions investigated such controversial issues regarding the country’s recent past in the hope that they could be clarified. Consequently, when the clash between traditionalist and revisionist scholarship resulted in an ever more heated debate by the summer of 1992, the government in Stockholm decided to appoint a commission with the task of examining classified documents on preparations to receive military assistance from the Western bloc during the first two decades of the Cold War. Two years later, results were presented to the public in a report titled Had There Been a War . . . The commission found, among other things, that the Swedish defence staff had been involved in intelligence collaboration with Norway and Denmark early on. Later, similar cooperation had developed with Great Britain and with US Army and Air Force units based in Europe. From 1949 onwards, a number of measures had been taken to strengthen military cooperation with Denmark and Norway, both signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty.

These measures included coordination of air surveillance, interceptor control, air force search and rescue, and a joint military weather service. Over the years, interest in inter-Scandinavian cooperation subsided as direct contact evolved between Sweden and the United States. By the beginning of the 1960s, Sweden had established extensive and close cooperation on military technology with the United States. In its concluding remarks, the commission argued that Sweden’s political and military leadership, being responsible for the country’s survival, simply had to prepare for receiving Western assistance in the event of a Soviet attack.

But none of these preparations implied any commitment to taking sides if a war had broken out in its vicinity. According to the commission report, all actions taken in secret were fully compatible with the definition of the concept of neutrality established in international law. Those who had denied that there was close military contact with the West were thus proven wrong – but so were those who had argued that Sweden really had given away its choice to stay neutral in the case of war, thereby misleading the public.

Research projects conducted by historians Charles Silva, Juhana Aunesluoma, Magnus Petersson or Simon Moores over the past three
decades have studied documents from Norwegian, British and American archives and provided further details on the scope of Swedish military contact with members of NATO, corroborating the commission’s conclusion that the option to choose the path of neutrality always existed and that Sweden was not a ‘secret ally’, as has been asserted.\textsuperscript{70} Detailed accounts of Swedish-American security relations have been presented in the work of Mikael Nilsson – who, in contrast to the abovementioned authors, argues that these relations limited Stockholm’s ability to maintain Swedish neutrality in case of war – and that of Jerker Widén, who argues that the Americans viewed Sweden as guardian, political ombudsman and critic.\textsuperscript{71}

Several studies have dealt with Swedish active foreign policy of the 1960s and 1970s. In 2000 Karl Molin offered an interpretation of ‘activation’ (of Sweden’s foreign policy) as a strategy that aimed at counterbalancing the critics who saw a moral deficit of the neutrality policy.\textsuperscript{72} Eight years later, Molin published a synoptic volume on Swedish foreign policy during the Cold War together with Ulf Bjereld and Alf Johansson that concluded SUKK (Sverige under kalla kriget [Sweden during the Cold War]), a decade-long research collaboration between the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg, Stockholm University’s History Department and the Institute for Contemporary History at Södertörn University.

The authors suggest that Palme’s active foreign policy can be interpreted as an attempt to meet the challenge of three basic lines of conflict: between national sovereignty and international dependence; between ideological closeness to the West and nonalignment; and between democratic openness and military readiness.\textsuperscript{73} Although Bjereld, Johansson and Molin point to the fact that the designation ‘active’ is ‘somewhat misleading’, they choose to hold on to the accepted terminology and do not elaborate on it in their criticism.

Political scientist Douglas Brommesson, quoting Palme’s first government declaration in 1970, states that the Swedes saw no space for activism in Europe, due to the Cold War conflict. Brommesson argues that Swedish foreign policy was not simply a reflection of a radical leftist position, as pictured by some scholars. He does not, however, regard this as reason enough to put a general question mark on the widespread description of this foreign policy as active and the outcome of an approach based on international solidarity.\textsuperscript{74} Sunniva Engh has claimed that there was a special relationship between European welfare states and international solidarity.

Accordingly, Swedish policy, as proclaimed by Palme, was aimed at supporting the peoples of the Third World in ‘choosing their own way’,
with reference to Sweden’s duty to be active in world affairs and criticize other nations’ policies. Engh does not, however, discuss why the solidarity approach did not apply to the peoples of Eastern Europe. In his 1999 doctoral thesis, Hans Lödén acknowledges that, through the implementation of its foreign policy, Sweden sought greater security for itself. Nevertheless, he does not regard this as reason enough for a reappraisal of the label ‘active’. Following up on the criticism of Bjereld, Johansson and Molin, and by acknowledging the positions of Brommesson, Engh and Lödén, we will see the role that solidarity played – amongst other aspects – and its implications for a historical assessment of Sweden’s active foreign policy. In such a reappraisal, Europe takes a central position.

Historian Mikael af Malmborg has argued that Sweden’s position during the Cold War era ‘cannot be captured with the simple dichotomies of “neutral”/“not neutral”, or “aligned”/“nonaligned”’. Rather, if one wishes to reach a comprehensive understanding of the development of Swedish foreign policy during this era, the focus should be on ‘interaction, on how neutrality was transformed’. According to af Malmborg’s definition, Sweden’s foreign policy consisted of four elements during the years of détente treated in this study (as illustrated in Figure 0.1): national neutrality, Nordic cooperation, a commitment to UN collective security and a nascent association with the European community and the CSCE. National neutrality meant that Sweden would stay away from both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Nordic cooperation was aimed at maintaining the so-called Nordic balance. Offering a platform for work moving towards collective security, the UN was the most important arena in Swedish foreign policy. Europe, however, did not have a natural place in this concept.

![Figure 0.1. Sweden’s foreign policy in the era of détente.](image-url)
The study of Europe, defined as the ‘fourth concentric circle’ by af Malmborg, has been limited to the subject of European integration. The CSCE remains widely ignored by historians, although it was explicitly regarded as an important part of Swedish foreign policy, as emphasized by Foreign Minister Krister Wickman in the 1972 government declaration. This was also declared to the staff of the Swedish Foreign Ministry in July 1973. Instead, scholarly emphasis has almost exclusively centred on the discussions of whether, and how, Sweden should associate with the EC, overlooking the fact that the idea of a European Security Conference, which would ultimately develop into the CSCE, gained importance among the Foreign Ministry’s political strategists almost simultaneously with the ongoing negotiations on Swedish EC membership. It was also during this period that the Swedish government reconsidered EC membership but eventually decided against it on 18 March 1971. In this book, I add to earlier research the missing element of the fourth concentric circle in af Malmborg’s conception.

Before proceeding to set out the broader introduction to the analytical framework, the vital question of the use (or lack thereof) and benefits of theory in international history must be addressed. This use has been at the centre of a decade-long debate on the demise of international history in the English-speaking academy but has hardly been discussed with regard to Sweden or Scandinavia.

Starting in the 1960s, expansion and diversification of the discipline and the rise of the French Annales School caused a shift away from the traditional focus on diplomacy and relations between states (or their white male elites) towards social and economic history. Influenced by Marxism, these new trends favoured social science approaches over the classical Rankean exegesis of historical sources and rejected traditional notions of rigorous objectivity and rigid empiricism. Within a short time, diplomatic history would be labelled ‘the most arid and sterile of all the sub-histories’. At the same time, realists from the field of international relations (IR) attacked earlier interpretations of how the international system worked, thereby contributing further to what Zara Steiner has called a ‘dramatic change’ in history. Many traditionalist historians remained puzzled over the new ‘wonderlands’ of approaches and theories borrowed from political science or sociology.

Despite efforts to broaden their focus in the following years, international historians received renewed and constant critiques from prominent colleagues such as Charles Maier, who argued that international history was still ‘marking time’ and simply lagging behind theoretical developments elsewhere in the discipline. The cultural turn of the 1990s further compounded the marginalization of international history from
history departments everywhere. And, in spite of striking similarities to the international development of the role and evolution of political and diplomatic history, no pertinent debate has appeared in Sweden. The majority of Swedish historians regard säkerhetspolitisk historia as obsolete and theoretically weak. As a result, as observed by Stefan Ekecrantz, it has become monopolized by political scientists.

More recently, a number of leading historians have started to argue that international history is on the brink of a renaissance, as interest in ‘life-and-death governmental decisions for peace or war’ is rising again. A gender and cultural historian, then president of the American Historical Association, Lynn Hunt, discussed this as early as 2002. Viewing the trend towards a revival of international history as problematic, Hunt wondered, ‘Where have all the theories gone?’ as historians, and their readers, again became all the more concerned with truthfulness and historical objectivity. Drawing on Hunt’s notion of international history as the possible ‘next big thing’, her successor Michael Hogan elaborated two years later that the field still remained too isolated from postmodern scholarship and needed to keep breaking down disciplinary boundaries through greater incorporation of the cultural turn towards international relations. Cambridge historian David Reynolds agrees:

I think there has been a recurrent ‘diplomatic twitch’ in the saga of international history. And that is because, at its core, this sub-discipline tries to address socially important questions – literally matters of life and death – in a historical way, often near the cutting edge of contemporary events . . . The diplomatic twitch must take full account of the cultural turn. But my hunch is that future generations will keep twitching back to issues of war, peace and decision-making long after our current culture wars have turned into history.

It has also been argued that historians of international relations must not limit their focus to diplomacy but should take into account matters such as human rights, international women’s movements and religious movements and should generally be looking beyond the traditional boundaries of the nation-state. According to the definition of Akira Iriye, the ‘history of international relations need not to be the history of government relations, or even the history of individuals and organizations acting on behalf of their governments or in the context of government policy’. Karl Schweizer and Matt Schumann, for their part, advocate a deeper appreciation of Michel Foucault, Benedict Anderson and Edward Said. Indeed, theoretical awareness is a necessary complement to the thorough study of archival documents, which in itself does not reveal how actors thought and felt, as Hanhimäki and Westad remind us:
It is important to note, however, that while access to new sources is of crucial importance to historians, it is the accumulation of historical evidence that makes a breakthrough in terms of understanding possible. There has been, and still is, a danger that while we rush to study newly opened archival collections, we fail to put enough emphasis on crucial materials that have been available for decades. Some of these sources include non-archival evidence, and evidence that does not come from levels of high diplomacy but rather documents how people in other positions thought, felt, and acted with regard to the Cold War.101

Hence, the new international history should certainly draw upon these notions and observations, as a variation in approaches allows the scholar a differentiated and productive (re)interpretation of documents.102

The pursuit of such ideals has produced valuable studies on gendered language, in addition to different categories of analysis such as the role of emotion in foreign policy decision-making.103 In general, theories enable historians to turn implicit understanding into explicit findings. With this background, it is natural to include foreign perceptions within the scope of this study and take a theoretically grounded approach to internal and external actors.

**Analytical Framework**

The analytical framework of the book is based on the integration of the role of theory in the study of foreign policy. Centred on states as bearers of roles in the international system, it allows an understanding of Swedish agency in the context of the CSCE as an expression of conception(s) of the national role, abbreviated as NRC, as carried out by decision makers and diplomats of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Utrikesdepartementet, UD), as perceived by agents of other states and as reacted to by nonstate actors in Sweden. It integrates these levels of analysis into one expository approach, allowing a deeper understanding of the reasons for and motives behind Swedish decision making in the political and diplomatic process leading to the ratification of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.

Role theory has been placed in the category of constructivist, reflexive-interpretative approaches.104 Originally grounded in the sociological and sociopsychological study of human agency, role theory was first introduced into foreign policy analysis (FPA) in a seminal essay by Kalevi Holsti in 1970. Holsti suggested using collective national roles as causal variables in foreign policy decision making and argued that the foreign policy of states can be considered an expression of collective identity, that is, a set
of norms and values generally acknowledged by the relevant actors.\textsuperscript{105} His work is considered to have broken new ground in the conceptualization of role in foreign policy due to its inductive approach to role conceptions as perceived and defined by decision makers themselves.\textsuperscript{106} Holsti’s original definition holds:

\textit{A national role conception includes the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate systems. It is their ‘image’ of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment.}\textsuperscript{107}

His focus on the actor followed an approach introduced to IR in the early 1950s by Richard Snyder, Henry Bruck and Burton Sapin, a circle of theorists based at Princeton University who argued that foreign policy must be studied from levels below the nation-state. Ergo, scholars need to look at the human beings who are actually responsible for the actions of states. This important suggestion inspired a new generation of scholars and resulted in the establishment of FPA as an independent subcategory within IR.\textsuperscript{108} As a result, focus shifted from the outcome of foreign policy towards foreign policy decision making.

Political scientists Margaret Sprout and Harold Sprout, also based at Princeton’s Wilson Center, elaborated on the suggested actor-oriented focus by arguing that the ‘psychomilieu’ – that is, how individuals and groups behind foreign policy decisions perceived the international and operational environment surrounding them – is a crucial rationale. The Sprouts noted that flawed decisions resulted from incongruence between the real environment and how actors perceived it.\textsuperscript{109} James Rosenau, in turn, critically remarked that although a necessary shift in the study of foreign policy had been accomplished, the field still lacked theory that would allow a deeper understanding of the subject.\textsuperscript{110} All three studies together created fertile ground for new theories and are considered the ‘paradigmatic works’ of FPA.\textsuperscript{111}

NRCs are based on a collective, or shared, sense of the appropriate position of a nation in the international system that is influenced by two elements, \textit{ego} and \textit{alter}. Although most often applied to elites,\textsuperscript{112} even nonstate actors, societal groups and the wider civil society can adopt roles.\textsuperscript{113} This is of specific interest to this book, as reactions to the policy carried out by the political and diplomatic elites are considered reflections of a broader perception of what role Sweden was expected to play at the CSCE.

Naomi Wish and Stephen Walker of the first ego-oriented generation of scholars contributed to the validation of Holsti’s original model.\textsuperscript{114} The
second generation of role theorists put stronger emphasis on the integration of the alter. The ego is the actors’ collective self-perception vis-à-vis others, based on shared and historically grounded values and norms – in our case, encompassed by notions of Swedish identity and Swedishness.\textsuperscript{115} The alter – or \textit{role prescription} – refers to expectations of other actors at the systemic level, that is, agents of other states as well as nonstate actors of foreign countries.\textsuperscript{116} German theorists Knut Kirste and Hanns Maull have argued that the actual foreign policy \textit{behaviour}, or \textit{role performance}, of a state is under stronger influence from the ego part than from the expectations of other actors.\textsuperscript{117} The role performance consists of repetitive action patterns rather than individual decisions and is defined as \textit{‘the output of foreign policy and depended variable in FPA, and one input into the international system and independent variable in system analysis’} (see Figure 0.2).\textsuperscript{118}

\textbf{Figure 0.2. Role theory and foreign policy.}\textsuperscript{119}
NRCs affect foreign policy in three ways: they prescribe which behaviour and goals are appropriate and proscribe which are not; as a result they induce a certain style in foreign policy making. Ulrich Krotz asserts that they are ‘products of history, memory and socialization’ and that the more integral a part of a country’s political culture they become, the stronger they influence its interests and policies. The composition of values, norms, principles and ideals materializes as a certain national political culture. In the context of my own work, I examine this political culture as based on the implications of Swedish neutrality policy. Notions on the meaning of concepts or norms such as ‘nonalignment’, ‘Nordic balance’ or ‘solidarity’ with reference to a certain history or ‘traditions’ are taken to be key elements of role conceptions that were assembled under the overarching concept of neutrality. In our context, Swedish NRCs and foreign expectations were both bound to neutrality.

Roles are not static but change as actors learn and adapt in the context of political and diplomatic processes. States maintain several parallel roles. This holds potential for conflict, as roles can be contested in cases when elites fail to enshrine them. Possible sources of such conflict are ambiguities surrounding a role, lack of integration of multiple roles or the fluctuating nature of identity. Change and conflict can occur within a role (intrarole conflict) and between roles (interrole conflict). Conflict is often the result of contradictions between role performance and identity, or between role and norms, resulting in what has been called role distance. Acknowledging the complexity of reality, theorists point to the fact that we must avoid oversimplified analyses. Therefore, role performance must be understood as role sets that actors enact on the basis of (their national) role conceptions. In conclusion, according to role theory, policy originates in identity construction, and its scope is limited by generally (and implicitly) acknowledged boundaries because roles are prescriptive and proscriptive.

The NRC typology offered in Holsti’s original work (see Figure 0.3) will be applied deductively in the empirical chapters of this book. Several earlier studies have demonstrated that NRCs can also be generated inductively, but I have opted for the earlier method for two main reasons. First, I consider Holsti’s typology as particularly useful and authentic, as it is based on an analysis of the international system during the period treated here. Second, the multitude of roles resulting from inductive research makes valid comparisons between different cases more difficult, which subsequently hampers the generalizability of results.

In order to serve the purposes of this study, role theory is applied as a hermeneutic tool, allowing me to typecast state agency in the context of multilateral diplomacy. Methodologically, the application of the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Character</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Bastion of revolution – liberator</td>
<td>‘[…] have a duty to organize or lead various types of revolutionary movements abroad’.</td>
<td>active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Regional leader</td>
<td>‘[…] special responsibilities that a government perceives for itself in its relation to states in a particular region with which it identifies […]’.</td>
<td>active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Regional protector</td>
<td>‘[…] providing protection for adjacent regions’.</td>
<td>active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Active independent</td>
<td>‘[…] emphasizes at once independence, self-determination, possible mediation functions, and active programs to extend diplomatic and commercial relations to diverse areas of the world’.</td>
<td>active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Liberation supporter</td>
<td>‘[…] does not indicate formal responsibilities for organizing, leading, or physically supporting liberation movements abroad’.</td>
<td>active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Anti-imperialist agent</td>
<td>‘[…] see themselves as agents of ‘struggle’ against this evil’.</td>
<td>active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Defender of the faith</td>
<td>‘[…] defending value systems (rather than specified territories) from attack’.</td>
<td>active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Mediator-integrator</td>
<td>‘[…] perceptions of a continuing task to help adversaries reconcile their differences’.</td>
<td>active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Regional-subsystem collaborator</td>
<td>‘[…] far-reaching commitments to cooperative efforts with other states to build wider communities, or to cross-cutting subsystems such as the Communist movement’.</td>
<td>active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Developer</td>
<td>‘[…] special duty or obligation to assist underdeveloped countries’.</td>
<td>active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Bridge</td>
<td>‘[…] communication function, that is, acting as a “translator” or conveyor of messages and information between peoples of different cultures’.</td>
<td>active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Faithful ally</td>
<td>‘[…] makes a specific commitment to support the policies of another government’.</td>
<td>active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Independent</td>
<td>‘[…] the government will make policy decisions according to the state’s own interests rather than in support of the objectives of other states’.</td>
<td>passive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Example</td>
<td>‘[…] promoting prestige and gaining influence in the international system by pursuing certain domestic policies’.</td>
<td>active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Internal development</td>
<td>‘[…] most efforts of the government should be directed toward problems of internal development’.</td>
<td>passive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Isolate</td>
<td>‘[…] a minimum of external contacts of whatever variety’.</td>
<td>passive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Protectee</td>
<td>‘[…] allude to the responsibility of other states to defend them’.</td>
<td>passive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 0.3. Holsti’s NRC typology
analytical framework consists of establishing a linkage between expressions of motives behind, and behavioural patterns in, decision-making found in archival sources and set out in the definitions of roles as offered in Holsti’s typology. Two concrete examples illustrate how role theory will be implemented. References to values and norms made by Swedish actors during negotiations with representatives of other states will be viewed as ‘defending value systems . . . from attack’ and interpreted as the role performance of a defender of the faith (role 7); efforts to restructure proposals offered by opposed parties, for example by combining elements from both sides, will be linked to ‘perceptions of a continuing task to help adversaries reconcile their differences’, which Holsti gives as the definition of a mediator-integrator (role 8).

Foreign policy role analysis and the hermeneutic-deductive approach correspond with the research questions and purpose of my analysis, as they allow a structured, in-depth analysis of sources relating to Sweden and the CSCE. The integration of individuals and the state as actors enables us to contrast new results with both earlier role analyses of official documents and related historical studies.127

Sources and Structure

This study is based on multilingual and multiarchival research and draws on documents from eight archives in five countries. The main body consists of about one hundred dossiers of recently declassified files from the Archive of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs that deal with Sweden’s involvement in the CSCE between 1969 and 1976. The series contains a variety of relevant sources, such as diplomatic correspondence, minutes of meetings, political memoranda and strategic papers, and, to a lesser extent, media reports. Similar sources have been consulted in the archives of the foreign ministries of Austria, Germany, Great Britain and Switzerland for the purpose of studying how foreign diplomats perceived Sweden’s approach to the CSCE. Archival research has also been conducted in the Olof Palme Archives at the Labour Movement Archives and Library in Stockholm, the Willy Brandt Archive in Bonn and the Bruno Kreisky Archives Foundation in Vienna in order to explore the influence of Prime Minister Olof Palme’s personal relations and networks.

These sources have been complemented with memoirs of key actors and official publications, such as Världspolitikens Dagsfrågor. Furthermore, this history draws upon interviews with contemporary witnesses, among them politicians, diplomats and scholars, who followed Sweden’s policy and the reception of the CSCE in Sweden at the time.
The book comprises seven chapters; along with the introduction and conclusion there are five empirical chapters. The introduction sets out the aims of the study and the research questions as well as providing information on primary sources and previous research. The five empirical chapters of the book form the main body. They deal with the origins and evolution of the Swedish role in the making of the Helsinki Final Act in the years between 1969 and 1975. They have been organized chronologically rather than thematically, as a diachronic narrative is more suitable for a concentrated role analysis. Chapter 1 presents a concise overview of Sweden’s foreign policy between 1945 and 1969, with particular focus on Europe. Chapter 2 illustrates early Swedish reactions to the establishment of the conference as part of the agenda of international affairs in 1969–1971. Chapter 3 explains the transformation of the Swedish position from reluctance and passive adjustment to greater flexibility between 1971 and 1972. Chapter 4 discusses Swedish agency at the multilateral preparatory talks (MPT) between November 1972 and June 1973, and the growing interest of public and nonstate actors. Chapter 5 outlines the Swedish policy carried out at the conference proper, mainly in Geneva, between July 1973 and August 1975. A summary and final remarks are presented in the concluding chapter. The appendix comprises a Swedish summary and a register of persons and an index.

Notes

11. Rolf Ekéus is one of Sweden’s most prominent diplomats. He has held a number of diplomatic posts, including chair of the UN Special Commission on Iraq (1991–1997), ambassador to Washington (1997–2000) and High Commissioner on National Minorities at the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) (2001–2007).
16. Scholars have already pointed to the contrast between active global engagement and a cautious and self-serving regional policy. Most often, however, they have defined Scandinavia (or Northern Europe) as a regional space distinct from continental Europe or the whole of Europe. See, for example, Kent Zetterberg, ‘Introduktion’, in Kent Zetterberg (ed.) *Hotel från öster: tre studier om svensk säkerhetspolitik, krigsplanering och strategi i det kalla krigets första fas 1945–1958* (Stockholm: National Defence College, 1997), 34. For an exception with explicit reference to Europe, see Fredrik Bynander, ‘Utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik’, in Tom Bryder, Daniel Silander and Charlotte Wallin (eds.), *Svensk politik och den Europeiska unionen* (Stockholm: Liber, 2004), 195–96. See also Aryo Makko, ‘Sweden, Europe and the Cold War: A Reappraisal’, *Journal of Cold War Studies* 14(2), 2012, 68–97.

19. Lundestad, *East, West, North, South*, 102. Some argue that there cannot be such a thing as a ‘definitive record’, as historical knowledge is necessarily the result of questions addressed by the asker. For a response to John Lewis Gaddis’s triumphant record related to the Nordic Cold War context, see Nikolaj Petersen, ‘‘We now know’. The Nordic Countries and the Cold War’, in Thorsten Borring Olesen (ed.), *The Cold War— and the Nordic Countries: Historiography at a Crossroads* (Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2004).


28. Ibid., 46.

29. The concept of power in international politics has often been applied to US foreign policy. For an introduction of ‘hard power’, ‘soft power’ and ‘smart power’, see


35. Ibid., 336–37.


37. Loth, *Overcoming the Cold War*, 130.


40. Ibid., 1–10.

41. Fischer, *Neutral Power.*

42. Janie Leatherman, *From Cold War to Democratic Peace: Third Parties, Peaceful Change, and the OSCE* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2003), 13, 156.


46. John J. Maresca, an American negotiator who produced a valuable account in the mid-1980s, even points to the Executive Secretariat as a group, although its role was


55. Ibid., 429, 425.


57. Fischer, Neutral Power.

58. The Swedish categories were democracy (demokratiperspektivet), ideology (ideologiperspektivet) and power (maktperspektivet); see Ann-Marie Ekengren, Sverige under kalla kriget 1945–1969: en forskningsöversikt (Gothenburg: Grafikerna i Kungälv, 1997). For a recent discussion of research trends and potential areas of research, see Cecilia Notini Burch, Karl Molin and Magnus Petersson (eds.), Svensk säkerhetspolitik under det kalla kriget—öppen för olika tolkningar? (Stockholm: Stockholm University, 2011).


60. Magnus Petersson, who points to comparable Nordic research, has also emphasized this more recently in Notini Burch et al., Svensk säkerhetspolitik, 26.

61. Sweden’s forty-year rule on secret records is one important reason for this.


66. For a recent account of this position, see Mikael Holmström, Den dolda alliansen: Sveriges hemliga NATO-forbindelser (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2011).


78. Af Malmborg, Neutrality and State-Building, 151.

79. The ‘Nordic balance’ was a widespread notion developed into a theoretical concept by Norwegian political scientist Arne Olav Brundtland in 1961. He argued that Northern Europe reached stability through balance between the Nordic states’ relations with East and West. In this model, the NATO membership of Denmark, Iceland and Norway, together with Sweden’s status as a neutral country, outbalanced Finland’s special relationship with the Soviet Union. Maintaining this balance would guarantee that the region remained an area with reduced tension and with no foreign troops on Nordic soil. See Arne Olav Brundtland, ‘The Nordic Balance. Past and Present’, Cooperation and Conflict, (4), 1965, 30–65.


81. ‘It is the opinion of the foreign minister that our CSCE commitment is an important part of Swedish foreign policy at this point and that we, considering Sweden’s neutral position and based on our interest in a comprehensive European cooperation, can and should target an active effort in Geneva by presenting a number of concrete proposals among others’. See Sverker Åström, ‘Inför ESK 2’, 9 July 1973, File 43, Vol. 40, HP (Politiska ärenden 1953–1974), HP79 (Konferenser och kongresser 1953–1974), 1920 års dossiersystem 1920–1974, Utrikesdepartementet [UD], Riksarkivet [RA].

83. Sweden is by no means an exception. British historian Piers Ludlow has highlighted the problematic relationship between national historiographies of European integration and the Cold War. According to Ludlow, ‘European integration and the Cold War were separate but intertwined’, but nevertheless ‘have been studied in near total isolation from one another, the subject of separate journals, academic conferences and books, and the primary interest of two distinct groups of specialist scholars who have rarely exchanged ideas’. Ludlow explains the divergence between the two histories by stating the fact that political and military cooperation did not become part of the success story of European integration. Instead, the European Economic Community (EEC) has been the ‘dominant manifestation of European integration’. See Piers Ludlow, ‘European Integration and the Cold War’, in Leffler and Westad, _Crises and Détente_, 179.

84. The term has become popular in recent years. Many American historians still prefer the term ‘diplomatic history’ over ‘international history’, although the latter evolved from the former as new elements such as economics, strategy, domestic sources of foreign policy and propaganda, and ideology and intelligence were added to diplomacy and statecraft in the study of the relations between states. See Patrick Finney, ‘International History’, www.history.ac.uk/makinghistory/resources/articles/international_history.html (accessed 23 October 2015). As I wish to address the distinction mentioned above, I will myself refer to the field as ‘international history,’ although it has been criticized as ‘so broad a term that it loses its usefulness’ by Thomas G. Paterson, ‘Defining and Doing the History of American Foreign Relations: A Primer’, _Diplomatic History_, 14(4), 1990, 585. The Swedish equivalents are, due to the rather strict focus on Sweden, _utrikespolitisk historia_ (history of foreign relations) and _säkerhetspolitisk historia_ (security policy history).


98. The emphasis on the nation and its boundaries as problematic was also the theme of the 2011 Meeting of Swedish Historians in Gothenburg.


102. In early 2012 a ‘network for the New Diplomatic History’ was founded by a group of young scholars from different European countries. Its declared aim is to add perspectives and methodologies such as prosopography, the sociology of knowledge, gender theory and network analysis to the established political and economic approaches. See www.newdiplomatichistory.org (accessed 22 November 2015).


104. Ibid., fn. 8; Kirste and Maull, ‘Zivilmacht und Rollentheorie’, 285.


108. It was first published as a small, stand-alone monograph at Princeton University in 1954 and reprinted as part of an edited volume eight years later. I have used the commemorative edition of 2002: Richard C. Snyder, HW Bruck and Burton Sapin, Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics, in Richard C. Snyder, HW Bruck and Burton Sapin; with new chapters by Valerie M. Hudson, Derek H. Chollet and James M. Goldgeier, Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revisited) (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 21–152.


118. Holsti, ‘National Role Conceptions’, 307; emphasis in the original.


121. Ibid., 6–7.
123. Krotz, National Role Conceptions, 9.
124. See, for example, Widén, Väktare, ombud, kritiker and Zielinski, Die neutralen und blockfreien Staaten.
125. ‘Hermeneutic’ designates the process of the interpretation of sources. For an introduction, see Philip Gardner, Hermeneutics, History and Memory (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 36.
126. This definition has been offered by Zielinski, Die neutralen und blockfreien Staaten, 171.
127. In Holsti’s original essay, Sweden is mainly described as mediator-integrator, switching to the roles of regional-subsystem collaborator, independent and developer when necessary. See Holsti, ‘National Role Conceptions’, 276. Other roles performed by Sweden, to a lesser extent, were bastion of revolution-liberator, regional leader, regional protector, active independent, liberation supporter, anti-imperialist agent, defender of the faith, bridge, faithful ally, example, internal development, isolate and protectee. Ibid., 260–71. On the earlier role analyses of Leatherman and Zielinski, see pp. 22–23.