

# INTRODUCTION

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Being Jewish, in Europe, in Diaspora, as a minority, today: these themes are at the centre of *Turning the Kaleidoscope – Perspectives on European Jewry*. The contributions to this book address, more particularly, the following questions. How can we delineate our collective Jewish identity while honouring the differences in the ways we live as Jews? What does living in Diaspora, and choosing to do so, mean for us? How do we perceive ourselves as European Jews, as distinct from Israeli or North American Jews? How has European Jewry developed since the rupture of the *Shoah*? How do we relate to our non-Jewish surroundings? How have we experienced living as part of a minority in different parts of Europe? Are our experiences comparable to those of other minorities? What does living in Europe, with its history of persecuting Jews, mean for us today, sixty years after the *Shoah*, whose after-effects we still experience, but which does not have the same central and defining position in our lives as it did and still does for our parents' and grandparents' generations? What are the effects on the European Diaspora of the collapse of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe? What forms and significance does our relationship to Israel have? How has that relationship changed due to the Middle East conflict in recent years, and how has that conflict influenced the way Jews and others in Europe view and interact with each other? What effect does it have for those of us who are engaged in creative work, be it artistic, musical, writing, or research, that we live in Diaspora in Europe, in places where the *Shoah* was planned and executed, shattering so much of our Jewish heritage and culture? What consequences may all this have today and in the future?

*Turning the Kaleidoscope – Perspectives on European Jewry* is based on the premise that the history, current situation, and development of Jewry in Europe are distinctive enough to characterise European Jewry as a collective entity. This view is not at all commonplace; on the contrary. Especially from outside Europe, the continent is often seen as a place basically devoid of Jews; many assume that European Jews all emigrated or perished in the *Shoah*. However, the approximately two million Jews in

Europe today form a meaningful fraction of world Jewry, compared with five million in Israel, 5.5 million in the United States, and smaller Jewish populations elsewhere. In terms of Jewish culture, Europe is sometimes termed a void, overlooking the fact that Jews have been keeping Jewish culture alive here, even in the difficult years following the *Shoah*. At times, the Jewish view from outside Europe even seems to be that Europe is a place to be avoided because of its bloody history. This applies especially to countries like Germany and Austria because of their active roles in the *Shoah*. Europe thus seems to be alternately a blank space on the map, or a black hole. For example, the Institute of the World Jewish Congress published a special edition of *Gesher – Journal of Jewish Affairs* entitled ‘The Jewish People at the Threshold of the New Millennium’, which discusses various issues in Israel and the U.S., but does not even mention Europe as such, and only two articles out of the twenty-eight published in this edition are about individual European countries (Shafir 2001).

Such a negative stance towards Europe ignores the fact that Judaism is to a considerable extent a European religion; much of Judaism and Jewish culture was developed in Europe. Haskalah, Ladino, klezmer, Reform Judaism, Yiddish, Bundism, Hasidism, gefilte fish, and the Frankfurt School were all created in Europe. Indeed, two of the largest cultural groups of Jews – Sephardim and Ashkenazim – are both of European origin. Jewish culture blossomed in various places across Europe through the centuries: medieval Spain, nineteenth-century Salonika, and the great centres of learning in Germany, Poland, and Lithuania, to name just a few examples.

In fact, a substantial percentage of the world’s Jewry actually is European or of European descent. Going back just a very few generations, many Jews have European ancestors. Of course, there was migration and emigration, and Jews left Europe for good reason. They took their European heritage with them, and handed down more or less of it to the following generations, in the form of language, forms of religious practice, humour, cuisine, ethics, artefacts, and so on. But Jews have continued to live in Europe; not all of them are gone. Some parts of Europe house the fractured remnants of a sometimes glorious Jewish past, still struggling more or less successfully to rebuild Jewish life. Other places in Europe were spared the destruction wrought in the *Shoah*, and Jewish life there could continue with less difficulty. And Jews have migrated across Europe and to and from other parts of the world.

The discussions in this book are founded on the premise that European Jewry can and indeed should form a third pillar of Jewry alongside the pillars of Israel and North America. For this, the combined Jewish population is large enough and shares a common European heritage and culture. Yet, if European Jewry is to form a third pillar of Jewry next to Israeli and North American Jewry, it will have to be a pillar of a different nature. Diversity is and must be the defining feature of European Jewry, to

a far greater extent than elsewhere: after all, Europe itself is home to a host of different cultures, each rooted deep in time. The Jewries in each of those cultures embody unique combinations of Jewish culture and the culture around them. Diversity among Jews, too, can be found in even the smallest communities in Europe. (Five very different European Jewish communities are sketched out by the panellists in Chapter 6, the panel discussion 'Left Over – Living after the *Shoah*: (Re-)Building Jewish Life in Europe'.) Viewed close up, the diversity may seem so great that it obscures commonalities. But from a bird's-eye view, European Jews' Europeanness becomes visible (for instance, as discussed by *Clive A. Lawton*, especially in regard to forms of organising Jewish communities), and the quality of being European does set them apart from Jews in other places in the world. Therefore, Europe should be regarded as a meaningful entity for Jewry. The contributors to this book explore what that might entail.

Of course, Israel's Jewish population is diverse, too, but Israel is a largely Jewish society, unlike any society in Europe. In North America there are many places with substantial numbers of Jews, and there are no fewer than nine cities with a Jewish population greater than all of Germany's, which is Europe's fifth largest, at more than a hundred thousand. With large numbers of Jews present, like-minded Jews can form and run congregations and other organisations of their own that can coexist with each other (on better or worse terms). In places with fewer Jews, like most places in Europe, that is far more difficult, if not impossible. Both in Israel and in North America there are unifying cultures: Jews may be Reform or Orthodox, for example, but they are all Israelis or Canadians or U.S. Americans. In Europe they may be Conservative and French, or Orthodox and Greek, or secular and Russian, and so on, and many more combinations do exist. In Israel, Jews speak Hebrew as their everyday language; in North America they speak English (or French, in Francophone Canada). But in Europe a unifying language is lacking. Neither Hebrew nor Ladino nor Yiddish are commonly spoken. English is often the lingua franca, but for most it is a foreign language, and many Europeans do not speak English fluently. Even simple communication between Jews in Europe is not easy.

Since the early 1990s, Judaism and Jewishness seem to have become fashionable, with a plethora of books, conferences, films, TV series, festivals, and other events on some sort of Jewish theme. This has given rise to another misperception of the state of Jewry in Europe, namely that Jewish life is blossoming, that the tense relations between Jews and non-Jews in the aftermath of the *Shoah* have relaxed into a state of mutual goodwill, and that anti-Semitism has been overcome. Unfortunately, this view is too rosy. The third section of this book, 'The Jewish Space in Europe', is devoted to the complex relations between Jewry and our non-Jewish surroundings in Europe today. Despite the attention paid to Jewish themes, there has been little discussion about the state and future of Jewry

in Europe as a whole. What discussion there is appears to have been confined largely to strategic thinking by the official bodies representing Jewry (e.g. anon. 1997). A few books with chapters on current-day Jewish communities in different places in Europe (Tye 2001; Ungar-Klein 2000)<sup>1</sup> or with a more anecdotal, journalistic approach (Kurlansky 1995) do exist, but there is nothing comprehensive. The editors of this volume have identified just three books concerned with Jewry in Europe today: *Jewish Identities in the New Europe* (Webber 1994), which is based on a conference in 1992, *Jewish Centers and Peripheries: Europe between America and Israel Fifty Years After World War II* (Troen 1999), and *New Jewish Identities. Contemporary Europe and Beyond* (Gitelman, Kosmin, and Kovács 2003).

The themes of diversity and change over time captured in the title of this book are currents that run through European Jewry in the past as well as the present, and we believe they will continue to do so in the future. But how to describe these themes succinctly? ‘Hodgepodge’ is just a jumble and lacks the positive connotations we believe are essential, and ‘mishmash’ is definitely too negative. ‘Mosaic mosaic’ may be catchy, but conveys a static image, one set in stone. ‘Patchwork’ might fit, yet much of the stitching has come apart, and some of the pieces have been worn thin, while others are woven strong. Furthermore, Europe is certainly no ‘melting pot’. The kaleidoscope metaphor conveys a positive, colourful, ever-changing image, as the pieces inside move, mirror, and bounce off each other, representing the diversity of European Jews’ customs, traditions, languages, and so on, as well as the variety of their interactions. One might even discuss whether the force that makes the kaleidoscope turn is a deity, or the actions of human beings, or simply the passing of time. Judaism allows room for all these interpretations.

The kaleidoscope metaphor applies to this book as well, in several ways. A kaleidoscope of topics is discussed, most of them with a pan-European view of a particular issue. The chapters are organised in three sections, as follows.

**Overarching Questions** are asked in the first section and set the stage for the discussions that follow. Diana Pinto explores ‘A New Role for Jews in Europe: Challenges and Responsibilities’; Clive Lawton takes up Jews’ models of community organisation in Europe in comparison with those in Israel and North America; Michael Galchinsky examines ‘Concepts of Diaspora and Galut’; Lars Dencik investigates ‘“Homo Zappiens”: A European-Jewish Way of Life in the Era of Globalisation’; and Göran Rosenberg discusses ‘Israel and Diaspora: From Solution to Problem’.

**Inner-Jewish Concerns: Rebuilding and Continuity** are the subject of the second section. The first chapter in this section documents a panel discussion held at the Bet Debora conference in 2001 on the theme ‘Left Over – Living after the *Shoah*: (Re-)building Jewish Life in Europe’, chaired and edited by Sandra Lustig. It is followed by Elisa Klapheck and Lara Dämmig illuminating how they came to initiate the Bet Debora

conferences which bring together women rabbis, cantors, Jewish scholars, and activists from across Europe, and what the conferences have achieved. Finally, Y. Michal Bodemann poses the question, 'A Jewish Cultural Renaissance in Germany?'

**The Jewish Space in Europe** examines the relationships between Jewry and our non-Jewish environment. This section takes the form of a debate between Diana Pinto and the editors of this volume. Pinto's chapter 'The Jewish Space in Europe' inspired Ian Leveson and Sandra Lustig to develop their thoughts in their co-authored chapter 'Caught Between Civil Society and the Cultural Market: Jewry and the Jewish Space in Europe'. Sandra Lustig separately analyses a single dispute to illuminate for an English-language audience the intricacies of the relationships between Jews and non-Jews in Germany in "'The Germans Will Never Forgive the Jews for Auschwitz". When Things Go Wrong in the Jewish Space: the Case of the Walser-Bubis Debate'.

The authors, too, form a kaleidoscope of sorts. With one exception (Michael Galchinsky) they live in Europe, but in many different countries. Indeed, many of them have lived in more than one country, something not at all unusual for current-day Jews in Europe. And their parents and grandparents are often from different countries yet again. The countries where the authors (and discussion panellists) live or have lived include Sweden, Hungary, France, England, Germany, Denmark, Italy, Scotland, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway, Ireland, and Austria, as well as Israel, Canada, and the United States. Including their parents' former countries of residence, this extensive, but presumably incomplete, list expands to include Slovakia, Poland, Russia, and Argentina.

The authors' disciplinary backgrounds cover a broad spectrum, including sociology, intellectual history, urban planning, social psychology, economic geography, rabbinic training, public policy, and library science. Just as varied are their current professional occupations: research, administration, writing, environmental policy consulting, academic teaching, journalism, and network services management. Accordingly, this book features a kaleidoscope of writing styles and forms, ranging from essays to polemics, fully referenced academic papers, and a panel discussion. The authors were asked to pitch their pieces to a generally educated reader who is not a specialist in the contributor's field. Their individual styles also reflect different intellectual traditions and ways of thinking typical of the various cultures of Europe, as well as their diverse academic backgrounds.

The authors live their Judaism in a variety of ways, in a religious sense, but also in terms of dealing with Jewish issues professionally. Some work for Jewish organisations. Some are activists outside the mainstream Jewish establishment, and some write on Jewish themes from time to time. Accordingly, the authors view Jewish issues in Europe from various perspectives and in diverse contexts. All share a passionate concern for

Jewry and Judaism today and in the future, and all enjoy lively discussion about this issue.

Of course, *Turning the Kaleidoscope* cannot claim to cover the entire spectrum of views and issues concerning Jewry in Europe, nor is that the goal of this book. Rather, it seeks to open up new avenues of thought about the many questions relating to European perspectives on Jewry and to spark discussion and debate. The editors hope that others will be inspired to write on European Jewry, and that more and more voices will be heard. Only if we know more about each other as Jews in Europe, and only if we understand the diverse situations in which Jews live and their multitude of opinions and ways of thinking, can we begin to strengthen Jewry as a European entity.

Some themes could be touched on only briefly in this volume, and others had to be omitted entirely. Both Israel-Diaspora relations and gender issues could fill volumes on their own, for example. While neither spirituality nor religion per se are discussed, several authors did link their thoughts to these themes: Michael Galchinsky goes into traditional understanding and meanings of Diaspora and galut. In 'Debora's Disciples', Lara Dämmig and Elisa Klapheck show how, in exploring new and old forms of practising Judaism, they rediscovered parts of Jewish heritage they had been unaware of before. Anti-Semitism, too, is discussed only briefly. Ian Leveson and Sandra Lustig touch on some aspects of anti-Semitism in 'Caught Between Civil Society and the Cultural Market: Jewry and the Jewish Space in Europe', and Sandra Lustig dissects an instance of intellectual anti-Semitism in "'The Germans Will Never Forgive the Jews for Auschwitz'". When Things Go Wrong in the Jewish Space: the Case of the Walser-Bubis Debate'. Unfortunately anti-Semitism has come to be of more immediate concern to Jews in Europe, too, since the second Intifada began in 2000 and also since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Analyses of the forms that present-day anti-Semitism takes (including Islamicist anti-Semitism, which is growing in Europe) and of different ways Jews and society at large might respond to it would be worth more detailed discussion as well as effective action. While Lars Dencik does touch on these issues in his chapter, further in-depth work is necessary.

Whether or not Jews constitute a minority in the European context is ambiguous. In terms of numbers, Jews are clearly a minority and, in most places in Europe, a very small one at that. In terms of belonging or not belonging to the majority, and of being singled out for discrimination or not, the situation is more complicated. Since the Enlightenment, many Jews have chosen the strategy of trying to blend in with the majority and to take full part in society as citizens who happen to be of a particular religion. That strategy is beginning to be questioned, for instance in a position paper by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research in London, which suggests that Jews should define themselves as an ethnic group in a multicultural society, that is, that they give up the position of being

invisible in terms of difference or of being part of the privileged majority (Institute for Jewish Policy Research 2000, recommendation 1). Sweden, for example, has granted Swedish Jews the status as one of five national minorities (see Chapter 4). It would be interesting to survey across Europe how Jews feel about being considered a minority – officially or unofficially – and what effects this might have on their self-identification and identification by others, as well as on Jewish life, for example, through financing and management of Jewish institutions.

Another issue not discussed in this book is whether the Jews can or should be considered a small nation, comparable to the historically resilient nations like the Scots or the Basques, for the simple reason that the editors were unable to find a contributor for this subject. Unfortunately, this volume omits analysis of Central and Eastern Europe and chapters by authors living in the postsocialist societies there, though panellist Andrea Petö does speak about Hungary in Chapter 6. Likewise, countries with very small Jewish populations are largely unrepresented, although their perspectives would also be necessary to gain a more comprehensive image of Jewry in Europe today.

A comprehensive sociological survey of European Jewry since 1945 would have been a valuable addition, but too voluminous to be handled in a single chapter. The editors hope that others will undertake such research and publish the results. To date, there is no publication that systematically examines not only the numbers of Jews in various places across Europe since 1945 and their migrations, but also how the Jews integrated into their new environments, their ways of practising Judaism, their concerns relating to a multitude of Jewish issues, and the changing nature of Jewish organisations over time in various places.<sup>2</sup>

Clearly, European Jewry will be a rewarding subject for research for years to come. We encourage others to fill the gaps that *Turning the Kaleidoscope* has made apparent.

## European Jews and Jewry

The development of Jewry and Judaism in Europe since 1945 is the story of the salvaging of remnants of a destroyed civilisation, the rebuilding of institutional structures which collapsed when their members fled or were murdered. (When we write of ‘rebuilding’ or ‘recovering’ Jewish life and Jewish institutions in this introduction, we do *not* mean to imply that what was destroyed in the *Shoah* is to be replicated. What was destroyed is gone. What is rebuilt draws on what was destroyed, but is not the same. It is something new and should be appropriate to today’s circumstances.) But it is also an informal story of families, of survivors and their children dealing individually and collectively with the trauma of losing relatives,

friends, home towns, and homelands, and of their experiences and emotions. While post-war Europe was able to revive fairly quickly (at least in the West), Jewish life recovered much more slowly because of the extent and nature of its destruction. Therefore, Jewish history follows different time patterns and scales than that of the European population at large. Of particular relevance to Jews have been the attempts by successive generations to deal with the *Shoah*, the founding and 'coming of age' of the state of Israel, and the changes in the composition of Jewry in Western Europe because of the new Diasporas which have moved here from various and diverse places.

Since 1945, the most immediate concern for European Jewry has been to rebuild or re-found families and communities shattered by the *Shoah*. In the first post-war decades, survivors, especially those who remained in Europe, were predominantly concerned with rebuilding their lives. This rebuilding process is a defining feature of those Jewish Diasporas in Europe which were affected by the *Shoah*, and it is far from complete. The task of rebuilding not just religious life, but Jewry in its entirety, including centres of learning and teaching, intellectual life, and non-religious traditions and organisations will remain a task for generations to come. Many aspects of rebuilding Jewish religious, community, and secular life were covered in the panel discussion 'Left Over – Living after the Shoah: (Re-)Building Jewish Life in Europe' (Chapter 6). Speaking about their experiences in five different places and types of communities, the panellists addressed a number of questions, including: what were their experiences in initiating new communities or founding groups, how might one confront myths, and how might Jewish schools actually endanger the development of homegrown Jewish leadership?

Indeed, the debates we are reopening in terms of European Jews and Jewry have a long history, despite having been silenced for a time by the *Shoah*. Following the Enlightenment and Emancipation, Jewry confronted the dilemmas of combining life outside the kehillah with the laws of the Torah. Jewry later also confronted the issues of modernism, socialism, and nationalism. The results of these confrontations were the development of various movements – including the religious Reform and *Haskalah* movements, Modern and Neo-Orthodoxy, Zionism and Bundism, as well as assimilation, if not conversion to Christianity – and vigorous discussions between their respective adherents. Today we must incorporate into those debates the experiences of the *Shoah*, as well as those of the period since then, and we must attempt to bridge the rupture that the *Shoah* caused in the discussions themselves.

Six decades have passed since the *Shoah*, and two generations have been born. As representatives of the 'second generation', our concern has been to establish ourselves and, after deciding to stay here in Europe, to start to think, together with the 'third generation', about what sort of Jewish life we wish to see here now and in the future. Since the Iron Curtain was



drawn back, the generation that experienced the Second World War and the *Shoah* as young adults or at least as teenagers has handed over power to a generation without personal experience of that time. This generational transfer, common to the political and religious communities, introduces a new quality into the debates (about the *Shoah* and other issues), both within the Jewish community and between it and the non-Jewish world. Essentially, the *Shoah* does not have the same central place in our lives that it did for our parents' and grandparents' generations; nonetheless, it has a stronger influence on us than on coming generations, because of our closer personal contact with our parents and grandparents.

In the decades following the establishment of the state of Israel, European Jewry devoted attention and resources to supporting the fledgling state. In the aftermath of the *Shoah*, the future of Jewry in Europe was unclear, and the image of 'living with packed suitcases' was not an exaggeration. This was particularly true in Germany, where the prevailing view was that it was wrong to stay in the land of the perpetrators, and indeed most Jews left for Israel or other countries. A generation of post-war Jews grew up focusing on *aliyah*. Their creative energies were lost for the European Jewish communities (see Chapters 1, 5, and 8).

Half a century later, in the 1990s, and with the Oslo peace process looking promising, Israel had become securely established, had a mature independent economy, and its status had become more or less recognised by the surrounding countries, making it seem less reliant on support from the Diaspora. It was stated frequently that the suitcases were now unpacked, both in the literal and the figurative senses, whether or not that was true. European Jews' concentration on Israel decreased (see Chapter 5). Slowly, the Diaspora communities in Europe, no longer eclipsed by Israel, began coming into their own and shifted their priorities towards their own development (anon. 1997). Things have changed again since the second Intifada began in 2000. There again seems to be more of a view that Israel needs support from the Diaspora. Yet it seems less and less a viable option for most Jews to make *aliyah*, given the serious security situation and the resulting faltering economy. With this in mind, strengthening Jewish life in the European Diaspora is apt to remain a priority for European Jewry.

The difficulties of reconstructing Jewish communities have been most dramatic in Eastern Europe. Not only were the numbers of Jews lost there much greater than in Western Europe, but during the era of state socialism that followed the *Shoah*, religious activity was made difficult. The consequence was a deeper breach of the connection with the vibrant Jewish culture of the past, a theme developed in more depth by Diana Pinto in Chapter 1. The collapse of the state socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe has provided Jews there with opportunities to live more openly as Jews and to (re)create Jewish communities and institutions that have not existed since the *Shoah*. The challenge of rebuilding poses

questions of Jewish identity in new ways, and many Jews in Central and Eastern Europe are only now discovering their Jewish backgrounds and developing their Jewish identities. For most of the Jews living there today, this is a very new situation.

The former Soviet Union is a somewhat different case. While the very large Jewish population in the former Pale of Settlement, which was largely overrun by German troops in the Second World War, shared a history of destruction with Eastern Europe, Jews in the rest of the Soviet Union did not suffer the annihilation of the *Shoah*. In addition, the difficulties which the Soviet system made for the continuation of Jewish religious life, particularly under Stalin, lasted a generation longer than in other parts of Eastern Europe. Even today, the situation of Jews in the Commonwealth of Independent States remains difficult.

One of the major challenges in those parts of Europe affected by the *Shoah*, and particularly in Eastern Europe, has been finding the expertise and teaching support needed to reestablish Jewish traditions, especially in the variety which would be necessary to ensure that the previous cultural and religious diversity is reflected in what is being rebuilt. Given the lack of professionals trained in many of these European traditions and the paucity of training facilities in Europe, rabbis and cantors from North America and Israel have assisted Europe's Jews with reconstruction, and they have brought their non-European traditions with them. One might ask whether the help offered by agencies based in the U.S. or Israel is always appropriate in meeting local needs. Outside agencies would be in the best position to succeed if they respected the local situation and offered help tailored to it. A partnership model may be appropriate here, where the individuals and organisations offering support are also prepared to learn from the communities that they assist. In any case, simply transposing concepts, forms of Jewish life, ready-made solutions, or even conflicts between Jewish religious movements from one country to another, whether within Europe, or from the U.S. or Israel to European countries, may not be adequate to nurture the development of (possibly new) local traditions.

Today it is virtually impossible to identify a specific mode of being a European Jew, much less a specifically European Judaism. Both 'European' and 'Jewish' are categories that display rich variety. Thus diversity constitutes a defining characteristic of European Jewry. Consider, for example, the Bulgarians, the Irish, the French, and the Finns – all European nationalities; Hanseatic, Mediterranean, state socialist, Celtic – all European cultures; as well as the Hungarian *Neolog*, the secular, the Liberal, and the Haredi – all Jewish religious convictions; Mizrachim, Sephardim, Ashkenazim – all Jewish cultural groups. Where such categories intersect, the kaleidoscope of Jewish Europeans and European Jews appears.

There are the old established Sephardi communities in the Netherlands and Britain, constituted by direct descendants of the Spanish and Portuguese Sephardim. There are the remnants of the Western Ashkenazi communities still present in Germany, France, and Italy. In Britain and France, there are the descendants of the Eastern Ashkenazi who came at the end of the nineteenth century. There are the vestiges, following the *Shoah*, of the Ashkenazi communities of German-occupied Europe, either still in Central and Eastern Europe or further west, where Displaced Persons or their descendants settled. Among the more recent arrivals are the large north African Sephardic community in France, the Jews from the former Soviet Union who have arrived in Germany in the last ten years – be they observant Uzbeki Mizrachim or assimilated secular Moscovites – the Israelis, many of whom live also in Germany, and others such as Polish Jews who left Poland in the mid-1950s and late 1960s, as well as Iranians who moved to Europe following the Iranian Revolution. In addition, there are those refugees to other parts of the world who returned to Europe.

These communities defy easy categorisation as well. For example, some have a strong and living Jewish tradition, while others have lost their connections to it or were weakened by the *Shoah* to such an extent that their tradition has died out. Some were affected directly by the *Shoah*, while others were not. The communities' forms of religious practice vary, as do the ramifications of such practice, for example, with regard to the roles of women in the Jewish community. (Incidentally, the Hasidic movement is neither the norm nor do its adherents constitute the majority for any of the communities mentioned here.) Some of these communities lived under state socialist regimes while others did not. Some lived in the developing world, while others experienced industrialisation generations ago. The importance and tradition of secular education varies for the different communities as well.

That diversity is a defining feature of European Jewry is nothing new. Before the *Shoah*, the majority of the world's Jews lived in Europe and had developed clear-cut and lively traditions with many local variations. The adherents of many of these traditions were killed in the *Shoah*, leaving individual survivors who could neither reconstruct those traditions as a whole on their own, nor hand them on to the next generation in a living form. In many places in Europe, the Jewish population is so small that in any given town or city there are only enough Jews to support at most a single minyan, for example, rather than both a Liberal and an Orthodox one. In places where the Jewish population is large enough to support a diversity of communities, each of those communities is made up of fairly like-minded Jews. But where there are fewer Jews, people with greater differences in their practice of Judaism have to join forces to create a Jewish community at all. One consequence of this is that some Jews do not feel that they can belong to the local Jewish community as it represents an interpretation of Judaism that is not theirs.

It is not uncommon for Jews in Europe not to be community members. In the Netherlands, for example, just 27 percent of the country's forty-five thousand Jews are community members (Kruyer, in Chapter 6). Sociologist Y. Michal Bodemann estimates that in Berlin alone, there are about ten thousand Jews or people of partly Jewish origin who are not community members, compared with more than eleven thousand members of the Jewish Community. It is estimated that 'membership in the Jewish Community is merely a third of what it would be if all those eligible for membership in the Stockholm area were to join' (Narrowe 1999: 181). In countries like Hungary, where 90 percent of the Jewish community describes itself as non-religious (Petö, in Chapter 6), the numbers of community members are apt to represent just a small minority of the total number of Jews. The reasons for not joining the local Jewish community may vary, for example: a self-identification as being Jewish, but not in the religious sense; the absence of a rabbi of one's own persuasion; a dislike of the politics within the Jewish community; a fear of having one's name on a list of Jews, in case Jews are persecuted again; or the cost of membership, which may be fairly high. Yet Jews who decide not to join a Jewish community do not necessarily lack interest in Jewish life, in having Jewish friends, or in undertaking Jewish religious or cultural activities. If there were more Jewish activities independent of the Jewish communities, these Jews may become more involved than they are now. Apparently, with a substantial fraction of Jews choosing not to be members of the Jewish communities, the communities are failing to meet the needs of these people. Maybe the communities need to change to meet those needs; perhaps those Jews are happy not to be affiliated with an official Jewish community, but would nonetheless like to be part of Jewish life.

Many of Europe's Jewish communities face a common issue: continuity. This is partly an issue of sheer numbers: the birth rate is often far lower than the death rate in communities small and large. Especially those countries with a small Jewish population cannot 'provide' marriage partners for all those Jews wishing to marry Jews, and in close-knit communities, people may be reluctant to marry someone they met in kindergarten. Here, too, diversity complicates things. Not only are the numbers of potential partners small, but singles who live their Judaism in very different ways, for example, as secular Jews and as devout Jews, are unlikely to make good matches. This is one reason why intermarriage is a common phenomenon. Bernard Wasserstein considers the demographic development of post-war Jewry in Europe to be so threatening that he titled his book on the subject *Vanishing Diaspora* (Wasserstein 1996). Because of high rates of intermarriage, there are many children with one Jewish parent, and Wasserstein asserts that most of them do not and will not consider themselves Jewish. In the past, emigration from Eastern Europe to Western Europe buoyed the numbers of Jews there, but he doubts that that will occur at meaningful rates in the future. He concludes

that European Jewry is 'fading away' (p. 290), that this is 'the last act of more than a millennium of Jewish life in Eastern Europe' (p. 283) and 'the end of an authentic Jewish culture in Europe' (p. 284).

That the number of Jews living in Europe today is much, much lower than before the *Shoah* cannot be disputed, and that their numbers are dropping appears to be a reality as well. But continuity is not just a matter of numbers. It is also a question of keeping Jews interested in Judaism – or engaging their interest in the first place. It is a matter of the Jewish communities and other Jewish organisations recognising the realities of today's Jews' lives and adapting to their needs. Jewry cannot afford to close out Jews; we need each and every Jewish person if Jewry is to prosper. Jewish organisations should consider whether their programmes to reach out to unaffiliated Jews – insofar as such efforts exist at all – are attractive to their target group. A particularly contentious issue in this context is intermarriage, especially in those parts of Europe where intermarriage tends to mean that *Shoah* victims' descendants marry *Shoah* perpetrators' descendants. Compared to the situation in the U.S., for example, where many Jewish families were not directly affected by the *Shoah* and many non-Jewish families have no connection to it whatsoever, this situation can make intermarriage much more contentious for the families and communities on both sides. At the same time, some Jews feel they have no alternative to intermarriage, given the paucity of Jewish potential marriage partners. Furthermore, whether or not a person is Jewish is but one criterion among many – albeit an important one – when choosing a partner. Love certainly can flower across religious, ethnic, and/or cultural boundaries; intermarried couples need to find ways to deal with the issues that arise. How the Jewish communities respond is critical for Jewish continuity. Are the non-Jewish spouses required to convert? Are they welcomed into the Jewish community in some way, whether or not they convert? Are their children welcomed? Or are they not recognised as proper Jews and discriminated against for that reason? Even when the mother is Jewish and the children are thus halachically Jewish, the answers to these questions are not at all clear. These are tricky issues for everyone involved, and if they are not handled very carefully, they will result in some Jews feeling alienated and even turning away from involvement in things Jewish. That cannot be the desired result.

Finally, at issue in Europe today is not only continuity of population or continuity of Judaism as a whole, but continuity of the kaleidoscope of European Jewish traditions. When conceiving efforts to maintain continuity, for example Jewish education for children, youth, and adults, it is essential to keep in mind the large variety of traditions of the Jews in most places.

At present there seems to be a lack of awareness among ordinary Jews, that is, Jews who do not hold any official position, about their representation at the European level. Of course, pan-European Jewish

representative bodies do exist, for example the European Council of Jewish Communities (ECJC) and the European Jewish Congress (EJC), a branch of the World Jewish Congress. Yet it is not widely known what they do. Indeed, many Jews are unaware of even the most basic information about them, if they have ever heard of them at all. The ECJC's mission is to support social development in Jewish communities across Europe, and the EJC is the representative body of Europe's Jews. One reason for the lack of awareness on the part of ordinary Jews is that they vote only for the representatives at the level of their own community. In Germany, for example, it is then the community representatives who elect their representatives to the Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland (Central Council of Jews in Germany), and the Zentralrat, in turn, elects representatives to the EJC. Only if a community's representative to the Zentralrat reports on matters discussed by that body are community members even informed of what their representatives at the national level do, since the Zentralrat's meetings are closed to the public, as are the minutes of its meetings and even their agendas (Klapheck 2002). The activities of the European bodies seem even more remote. Elazar describes them as 'weak to moderately functioning pan-European leagues' (Elazar 1999: 424). Also, they represent only those Jews who are community members.

Given that the official representative bodies appear not be linked well to the Jewish populations that they represent, they cannot perform the function of helping to forge connections between ordinary Jews across Europe. Perhaps they do not see that as their responsibility. It seems to have taken until 1997 for the two biggest Western European Jewish communities, those in France and the U.K., to realise that there was a European perspective waiting for them, despite the fact that twenty years had passed since the U.K. had joined the European Communities (anon. 1997 and untitled article on the first encounter of French and British Jews. *JPR News*. Institute for Jewish Policy Research. [Summer 1998]). Yet such linkages between Jews in different countries in Europe are desirable, even essential, for furthering Jewish life in all its varied manifestations. If that is an agreed goal, then networking among Jews should become a focus of activity for rebuilding Jewish life in Europe. The international contacts that have been developed in post-war Europe are the formal ones of national organisations, not the informal ones of business, friendship, marriage, or mutual interest. Such less formal networks, however, are the ones that would create meaningful contact between ordinary Jews. Finally, the existence of informal networks would be a way of encouraging those Jews who are not members of Jewish communities to be more involved in Jewish life. One example of a place where Jewish people could potentially form a network is the Bet Debora conferences, where ordinary Jewish women as well as Jewish professionals used the opportunity to meet and connect (see Chapters 6 and 7). Another example is the Limmud<sup>3</sup>

conferences in Britain: the annual five-day conference is open to all Jews, and about two thousand of them participate in literally hundreds of workshops, lectures, and so on, on a wealth of topics, and meet and network with other Jews and Jewish organisations. There are also smaller Limmud meetings in various parts of the country.

## **Relationships between Jewry and the Non-Jewish Environment**

Not only are there many Jewish Diasporas in Europe with few links between them, but there are also many different non-Jewish environments in which Jews live. European countries' cultures, histories, and general attitudes towards Jews, as well as languages, customs, etc., vary, as do Jews' relationships with those non-Jewish environments. In the early years following the *Shoah*, and when the state of Israel was still fighting for its existence, many European Jews focused on Israel and paid less attention to the non-Jewish environments surrounding them. Now that the attention of European Jews has shifted back towards Europe, their relationships with the cultures around them have become more important.

'Judaism survived for millennia precisely because it grew organically by confronting the challenges of the outside world', writes Diana Pinto in Chapter 9. Interactions with the non-Jewish environment are no less important today, and the fact that many of the chapters in this book discuss these interactions underlines this statement. Only a minority of the authors (Clive Lawton, Michael Galchinsky, and Lara Dämmig and Elisa Klapheck) deal entirely with issues internal to Judaism and Jewry. Two of the most important facets of these interactions today are anti-Semitism and the Jewish Space.

Unfortunately anti-Semitism still taints the relationship between Jewry and its non-Jewish environment in many places. There was state-sponsored or state-tolerated anti-Semitism in Poland and the USSR in the post-war decades. Albeit less virulent anti-Semitism existed in many of the other state socialist regimes in Central and Eastern European countries as well. Today there is open and politically organised anti-Semitism in Russia. In Western Europe there is less open anti-Semitism, although it has been increasing again since the second Intifada began in 2000 and the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. This new wave of anti-Semitism has not stopped short of physical attacks on Jews and firebombing of Jewish buildings. In particular, the rise in such attacks in France has been covered in the media. In addition, less violent forms of anti-Semitism have continued to exist.

There has also been a resurgence of nationalism leading to the re-establishment of extreme right-wing parties as serious and permanent features on the political scene (see Chapter 4). The level of potential

support for these views lies between about 15 and 25 percent in a number of European countries, for example, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Russia, Slovakia, and the Balkan countries. Although not all of those who hold such views actually vote for right-wing extremist parties, the numbers of votes cast for them have reached these levels in some elections. In some intellectual circles, far-right ideology, of which anti-Semitism – overt or not – is a part, has become respectable (again). These developments indicate that there are, unfortunately, severe obstacles to the realisation of such ideas as tolerant democratic pluralism, openness of European societies, and the acknowledgement of multiple cultural identities. While it would be incorrect to say that European societies are permeated by anti-Semitism, it does exist, and it causes tensions in the relationships between Jewry and non-Jews.

A section of this book is devoted to the facet of Jewry's relationship to its non-Jewish environment which has been called 'the Jewish Space'. The Jewish Space is thought to be a fairly recent phenomenon. The term refers to the cultural space in society, open to Jews and Gentiles, where events with Jewish themes – in the widest sense, far transcending the religious – occur. It may be thought of as a row of booths in the multicultural marketplace. Finding niches in that marketplace, or at least positions on how to deal with it, is a challenge to Jewry in Europe today. But the Jewish Space is also where non-Jews acknowledge Jewish history and thought as part of their own European legacy and identity. This seems to indicate a change in the role accorded to Jews and implies that Jewish culture is considered more important than before. 'The Jewish Space in Europe ... [exists] in a context of Jewish and non-Jewish tension, interpenetration, dialogue, conflict and even symbiosis', writes Diana Pinto in Chapter 9. Each of these forms of interaction individually is complex, and in the Jewish Space they may occur simultaneously and overlap. Of course, the emergence of the Jewish Space is only the latest episode in the long-running series of multifarious relations between Jews and Gentiles.

### **Germany as a Special Case**

Germany is, of course, a special case, and we examine it here to illuminate how the issues discussed above play out in this particularly complex setting. We analyse the two facets introduced above in order to provide some background for the chapters in this volume which touch on Germany (Chapter 8 as well as the section on 'The Jewish Space in Europe').

It is important to remember that Jewry in Germany today differs markedly from German Jewry before 1933. Gone is the distinctive pre-war German Jewry, the Jewry which developed the Reform movement, and



which to a large extent consisted of assimilated Jews who identified themselves as both definitely Jewish and definitely German (Mendes-Flohr 1999). Only a few of those Jews and their descendants live in Germany today. Most of the Jews in post-war Germany were Displaced Persons from throughout Eastern Europe who brought their Orthodoxy and their very different cultural backgrounds with them. They and their descendants constituted the majority of the thirty thousand members of Germany's Jewish communities through the 1980s. Thanks to the arrival of tens of thousands of Jews from the former Soviet Union, who have largely lost ties to religious practice and tradition, Jewish community membership has jumped to more than one hundred thousand today (within a total population of eighty-two million in Germany).<sup>4</sup> There is probably an increase in the number of Jews who are not affiliated with the *Einheitsgemeinden*, but the numbers are not known. The Jewish population in Germany is now the fifth largest in Europe, following France (whose Jewish population numbers six hundred thousand), Russia (five hundred fifty thousand), the Ukraine (four hundred thousand), and the United Kingdom (three hundred thousand).<sup>5</sup> This large immigration has made cohesion among Jewry in Germany even more difficult than before, especially with language difficulties now added to all the other existing issues.

*Anti-Semitism.* Beginning in 1933, German Jewry was killed or forced into emigration – by Germans. The '*Ostjuden*', who did not have German citizenship, were summarily expelled. The after-effects of the *Shoah* linger in Germany, on both the Jewish and the non-Jewish sides, and they explain the tensions which we discuss below.

The relationship between non-Jewish Germans and Jews is complicated by psychological difficulties on both sides, and every generation puts a new twist on it. On the non-Jewish side are often feelings of guilt, the trauma of their own losses, distrust, lingering – and frequently subconscious – anti-Semitism (more on this below), and denial of any difficulties existing at all – but also a genuine desire by some to make amends. All this occurs in a situation of extreme unfamiliarity with Jews and Judaism: most Germans born since the Second World War have never spoken to a Jew and know next to nothing about Judaism. As a result they receive their mental images of Jews either filtered through the media and history textbooks, or unfiltered from teachers and family sources who lived through the Nazi era. Predominant themes are the *Shoah*, Woody Allen's film characters, images of the ultra-Orthodox, and clichés about Israel. Germany as a nation and many Germans as individuals have difficulties with their own national identity – and the issues have changed again with the unification of the country. Germany and the Germans are at times still regarded with suspicion by other European states and peoples, not just by Jews, and some Germans resent having to face this. Most Jews

in Germany have to deal with the trauma of the *Shoah* in their own lives or the lives of their families, with feelings including grief, resentment, defiance, vengefulness (as a taboo),<sup>6</sup> fears, sadness, and numbness. Like it or not, since they live among a population that includes the perpetrators and their descendants, as classmates, co-workers, neighbours, and so on, they must develop ways of coping with the situation on a day-to-day basis.

What complicates the issue further is that many German Gentiles seem to have – unknowingly – redefined anti-Semitism as denoting only the murder of Jews in concentration camps. Anyone who did not personally murder a Jew in the *Shoah* is not considered an anti-Semite by this unspoken, but widely used, redefinition.<sup>7</sup> Most people in Germany agree that anti-Semitism is unacceptable, even evil. But since most people do not consider themselves evil, they do not believe they are anti-Semitic, even if they hold views that clearly are anti-Semitic. They would feel insulted to be called anti-Semitic, responding as though they had been wrongly accused of murder.

Thus redefined, anti-Semitism (as murder) remains unacceptable. However, statements using negative stereotypes of Jews are not considered anti-Semitic (since they are not acts of murder), and thus seem permissible. Such statements are frequently uttered in code, using innuendo and allusion, rather than explicitly. This is because people feel they have the right to make anti-Jewish comments, even though they do not consider them anti-Semitic themselves, but fear or resent being called anti-Semitic by others, especially Jews, if they make openly anti-Semitic statements. For instance, Rudolf Augstein, editor of *Der Spiegel* until his death in 2002, used the term ‘New York lawyers’ in a commentary (Augstein 1998) to refer to the fact that these lawyers – representing Jewish *Shoah*-related claims against Swiss banks – were Jewish. He also wrote of the ‘New York press’ and ‘sharks in lawyers’ clothing’ to explain why German Gentiles would not dare to openly oppose building the Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin, and used a number of other anti-Semitic patterns of argument such as blaming Jews for anti-Semitism.<sup>8</sup> Other instances in which coded language was used to convey a sometimes anti-Semitic subtext include the *Historikerstreit* (the Historians’ Debate in the late 1980s about whether the *Shoah* was unique in history), the more than ten years of debate about the Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin, Martin Walser’s speech when accepting the Peace Prize of the German Booksellers’ Society in 1998, and the ensuing controversy with Ignatz Bubis, which triggered a broader debate (see Chapter 11). Of course, anti-Semitism is also evident in regard to specific concrete issues such as the long resistance to actually paying compensation for forced labourers in the Nazi era, even though most of those who survived forced labour are not Jewish. These examples underline that anti-Semitism is present not just among neo-Fascist thugs, but also among parts of the

intellectual, political, media, and business elites, as well as mainstream society.

The difficulties that many Germans have with Jews take on many forms. In contrast to the anti-Semitism described above, for some German Gentiles, anything and everything Jewish is a taboo. They feel uncomfortable about saying anything at all about Jews, and may even avoid using the word 'Jew'. They are reluctant to question anything related to Jewry or Israel for fear of being labelled anti-Semitic, regardless of the basis or justification for their comments. While bending over backwards in an attempt not to offend Jews, they may take an extraordinary interest in things Jewish and, as philo-Semites, place Jews on a pedestal to view them as a moral authority due to their suffering throughout history. At the same time, they may resent – consciously or not – that (in their view) Jews are on that moral pedestal. With this in mind, many Jews become cautious when confronted with philo-Semitism. They view it as suspect, shallow, possibly dishonest, and therefore not to be taken at face value, even if it is only an expression of tension in the company of Jews.

Jews in Germany, particularly those who have been here for decades, are highly sensitive to these issues, as if, crossing a frozen lake, they can never know how thick the ice is under their feet. One can never know when anti-Semitism might suddenly pop up in everyday situations or when people one thought were not anti-Semitic unexpectedly express such sentiment.<sup>9</sup> All this notwithstanding, it is necessary to underline the fact that there certainly are German Gentiles whose attitudes and behaviour reflect sensitivity towards Jews.

*The Jewish Space in Germany.* The Jewish Space in Germany has grown very large, encouraged by government support and media attention. A multitude of events draw substantial audiences, but the 'dialectics of dialogue' (*Pinto*) are perturbed because of the awkwardness between Jews and Gentiles. Jews tend to be fairly sceptical about the roles that some Gentiles take on in the Jewish Space in Germany. Despite the population increase by virtue of immigrants from the former Soviet Union, the number of Jews in the Jewish Space in Germany is small, not least because the new immigrants tend to be less involved. The preponderance of Gentiles at Jewish events can be overwhelming at times. Gentiles who assume that synagogue attendance is a legitimate activity for anyone may on occasion outnumber Jewish worshippers in a synagogue. Jews may feel that regular attendance as 'tourists' on the part of Gentiles at a synagogue is neither legitimate, nor that religious services are part of the Jewish Space. (For a more detailed discussion of these issues see Chapter 10.)

Jews in Germany have reason to ask about the motivations of Gentiles who enter the Jewish Space. 'Jews will confront "others" [in the Jewish Space] whose religious mindcast still shapes European culture and whose

institutions played a role in the *Shoah*', writes Diana Pinto. She makes this statement in the European context, and it holds true all the more in Germany. Questions may arise about those who seek to take leadership roles, for example as rabbis, shortly after conversion. There is also an issue concerning uncertainty about who might be trying to pass as Jewish. Unfortunately a handful of Gentiles try to concoct a false Jewish identity for themselves, for psychological reasons of their own, or to gain other, possibly political, advantages. This may result in very destructive behaviour directed – consciously or not – against Jews. Jews in Germany have little interest in bearing the brunt of such behaviour. They feel that some Gentiles in the Jewish Space may be using Jews to deal with problems of their own. Especially those Jews who have experienced such behaviour themselves, in particular at a more personal level, become reluctant to participate in Jewish-Gentile activities: they simply feel that protecting themselves must take priority over promoting Jewish-Gentile relations until they can be certain that participating in them will not result in their being hurt. As a consequence, the number of Jews participating actively in the Jewish Space may dwindle, and the potential for dialogue may be reduced. A further result is that the Jewish Space may have little Jewish involvement.

Jewry in Germany faces some of the same challenges faced by Jewry in the rest of Europe: rebuilding, diversity, continuity. Another issue particularly poignant in Germany is dealing on a day-to-day basis with the aftermath of the *Shoah*, including the sometimes uncanny fascination with the Jewish Space on the part of non-Jews. The structure of Jewish communities plays a pivotal role, and their development in the coming years will be of critical importance.

## **Turning the Kaleidoscope – European Perspectives for Jewry**

European Jewry today bears little resemblance to what it was before the *Shoah*. With just a few exceptions, it is still in a state of recovery from the destruction wrought in the *Shoah* and/or the suppression by the state socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. Rebuilding Jewish life in all its variety and vitality, and with all its religious and secular institutions, will remain a major task for some generations to come. The rebuilding of Jewish communities and institutions in Central and Eastern Europe will change the orientation of Jewry in Europe from Western European to pan-European, whereby the enlargement of the European Union may foster this process.

Diversity is the defining characteristic of European Jewry. The great variety of Jews scattered across Europe indeed forms a kaleidoscope,

with the colourful glass chips inside representing the varied traditions of religious practice, culture, place of origin, and so on, tumbling and forming ever new patterns over time as the kaleidoscope turns. How this diversity will develop in coming decades is an open question. Continuity of Jewish life is a common concern as much in larger communities as in small ones; it is also a prerequisite for productive exchange with the non-Jewish world. European Jewry also needs to develop the self-confidence necessary to take its rightful place alongside other Europeans, whether they belong to large nations or smaller minorities, in determining Europe's future. European Jewry is just beginning to explore its collective European dimension.

It may come to pass that Jewish traditions coalesce in Europe while they stand separate in the U.S. and Israel. European Jewry's future may involve crossover between Jewish traditions which remain distinct in the U.S. and Israel. This might happen if Jews of different traditions decide that Jewish continuity depends on their uniting to ensure their existence into the next generation. Alternatively, the traditions may remain distinct, with networks between like-minded communities across Europe providing mutual support for small communities. For the often tiny populations of Jews with a particular tradition in any one place, connection to like-minded Jews elsewhere in Europe is of vital importance. Yet the small communities, for whom networks are most important, each need a critical mass of active members (especially in the absence of paid staff) to sustain themselves individually, to join in piecing together networks, and to maintain their participation in them. A third possibility is that neither of these two scenarios will come about. Then, outside Europe's major Jewish population centres, the few Jews left will be unable to maintain self-sustaining Jewish communities.

Continuity of Jewry in Europe is thus also a question of the development of the institutional structure of organised Jewry. How to effect development in Jewish institutions in such a way that they adapt to the totality of Jews' needs, interests, and traditions is a major challenge for the coming years. Fighting against anti-Semitism is the one thing all Jews seem to agree on – at least in principle. But Jews need to harmonise their efforts far beyond this lowest common denominator – we have much more on our common agenda, like it or not. European Jewry may well diverge from the established coordinates of the Jewish world (on less or more friendly terms), finding its own path, kaleidoscopically turning further to generate new patterns. Some kernels will remain distinct as they tumble, some will be mirrored, and others will be overlaid, creating new patterns. It is up to us to keep the kaleidoscope turning.

## Notes

The authors wish to express their gratitude to Dr Steven Less for his painstaking editing of this introduction as well as Toby Axelrod and Dr Jael Geis for their thoughtful comments on earlier versions of it.

1. Four of the seven communities Tye portrays are in Europe: Düsseldorf, Dnepropetrovsk, Dublin, and Paris.
2. Although Gitelman et al. (2003) gather in one volume a number of fascinating surveys of developments in social organisation and attitudes in European Jewish populations, a single volume cannot cover this entire field of research.
3. [www.limmud.org](http://www.limmud.org).
4. The number of immigrants from the former Soviet Union who held Soviet passports with the nationality 'Jewish' and who entered Germany between 1989 and mid-2000 totals about 127,000 (letter dated 11 July 2000, Bundesministerium des Innern). Between 1990 and 2002, 83,603 of them joined Jewish communities in Germany. It is unknown how many have left Germany for other countries. Without this immigration, membership of Germany's Jewish communities would have dropped from 29,089 in 1990 to 14,732 in 2002. Between 1990 and 2002, the number of births in all the communities represented in the Zentralrat varied between 99 and 151 per year, while the number of deaths per year rose from 431 in 1990 to 1,000 in 2002, reflecting the age distribution where 35 percent are over sixty years of age. Deaths outnumbered births 8,758 to 1,641 for the 1990 to 2002 period. (All other figures from Zentrale Wohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland e.V. 2003.)
5. Source: <http://www.virtual.co.il/communities/wjcbok/chartmap.htm> (World Jewish Congress web site), as of June 2000.
6. Profound insights into this issue for the years immediately following 1945 are provided in Geis (1998).
7. We are indebted to Salomea Genin for formulating this thought so clearly.
8. For an analysis of the historical development of the connections between anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism in Germany, see Diner 1992 (in English translation: Diner 1996).
9. A frequent trigger for anti-Semitic remarks is commenting on current events in the Middle East.

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- europäischen Juden im unmittelbaren Nachkriegsdeutschland' ["Yes, one must forgive one's enemies, but not before they are hanged." Thoughts on revenge for the annihilation of the European Jews in immediate post-war Germany'.] In *Menora – Jahrbuch für deutsch-jüdische Geschichte* 1998. Bodenheim, Philo-Verlagsgesellschaft: 155–80.
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