



Introduction

On a sunny Saturday morning in September 2007 the Park School celebrated its annual New First-Graders reception.¹ More than sixty proud six-year-olds with huge school bags, new clothes, and the obligatory colorful large cardboard cone stuffed with small gifts and sweets (*Schultüte*), accompanied by parents, relatives, and friends walked across the school yard toward the school's gym. More than 250 people crowded into the gym, many standing along the walls for lack of seating. As the crowd settled, the school's principal, Ms. Bauer, dressed in an elegant dark red suit with a necklace of matching large beads, greeted children, parents, and guests and emphasized the importance of the day. After her introductory remarks, she presented the next set of speakers: a Protestant Minister, a Muslim Imam, and a lay representative of the Catholic Church. The three religious representatives greeted the children and their families and said a few words about the importance of learning for life, and the special nature of this day as a turning point in the lives of the new first graders. The three men were dressed in suits and ties. After their brief remarks, each spoke a prayer and asked for God's/Allah's blessing for these young children in their new environment. Next the fourth graders performed a short play and sang some songs. Overall, this was an event like many others in Germany. Fanciful parties and receptions for first graders have in recent years gained social importance in Germany. Especially among the middle classes, they are celebrated with relatives and friends and often include an outing to a restaurant. In a highly secularized environment, where increasing numbers of the population officially left the churches, for some families these lavish celebrations replace earlier religious rites of passage such as first communion or confirmation. Traditionally in Germany, the first day of school starts with a non-obligatory church service in a local church. The service is followed by a festive reception in the school.

For many years the Park School, which is located in Stuttgart-Nordbahnhof, a multi-ethnic working-class neighborhood had a similar program with an ecumenical Christian service in a nearby church, and the school reception afterward. In 2006, however, less than ten people attended this service. This embarrassingly low attendance triggered a rethinking of the event and its religious components and resulted in a new mode of celebration. Instead of canceling the service, those in charge chose a different solution: religious elements were added to the (secular)

school event. In the Nordbahnhof quarter, Muslims account for approximately one third of the population. Obviously, Muslims or atheists had no interest in a church service. German, Italian, Portuguese, Serbian, Croatian, Russian, and other Christians either lived at a distance to their religion, or did not feel represented by this particular church service. Others preferred to skip this 9 A.M. service and only attend the school celebration an hour later. The redesigned celebration in 2007 addressed Muslims needs and integrated religious elements into the secular celebration without overly stretching the patience of atheists, non-Protestant or non-Catholic Christians, and others. The new event represented a suitable compromise for most local families.²

The Park School's New First-Graders celebration is a cultural innovation negotiated in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious urban quarter. The presence of an Imam at this public school celebration exemplifies cultural changes that unfold in an urban quarter where successive waves of ever more diverse residents and immigrants have for more than a century been remaking local cultural forms and practices, and by extension elements of the larger urban culture. In recent decades Muslims have become an important constituency in Nordbahnhof. They have been playing a significant role in the quarter's cultural transformations. At a moment of rupture when the established practice of a Protestant/Catholic service in a local church was no longer viable, parents, teachers, the school's administration, and representative of churches and mosques negotiated a mode of celebration that reflected changing local constituencies and dynamics.

The reorganization of this First Grade celebration is not an isolated instance of creative cultural production, but exemplifies larger changes underway in Nordbahnhof and similar multi-ethnic working-class neighborhoods in Stuttgart and other German cities. In small urban spaces ordinary residents constantly remake local cultures to best accommodate their diverse habits, practices, beliefs, and sensitivities. The Imam's presence at the school celebration symbolizes larger dynamics of localization, cultural creativity, civic participation, and inclusion of Muslims and their lifeworlds in German cities. However, not all debates and negotiations involving Muslim needs are as smooth and successful as the Park School First Grade celebration. Other instances of Muslim participation are met with resentment and prejudice, or outright rejection and hostility. The question arises, why do some urban cultural transformations unfold smoothly, while other similar attempts end in bitter controversies? What are the elements and dynamics that account for the success of some negotiations and the failure of others? How does a religion become local? How do believers insert their beliefs and practices into contemporary cityscapes?

The dynamics of Muslim localization, participation, and inclusion in German cities unfold in multilayered contexts of national legal frameworks, specific forms of secularism, powerful landscapes of popular sentiments and media images, grass roots activities, global political and religious dynamics, and everyday urban

practices and cultures. Reactions of dominant society and political elites to the presence of Muslims and the emergence of urban German Muslim identities, religiosities, and cultures alternate between neglect, ignorance, paternalistic accommodation, prejudice, resentment, hostility, support, recognition, and accommodation. Some communities were able to build a mosque without much opposition and debate. Others fought long and painful battles to build a mosque. Yet others were prevented from doing so altogether. A few pious Muslims have become recognized and respected participants in the urban public sphere; their interventions are heard and honored. Simultaneously, “Muslims” are frequently accused of a predictable list of shortcomings (forced marriages, oppression of women, blind following of Islamic law, putting Islamic law above national laws/constitutions) that are said to prevent them from ever becoming full-fledged citizens in a liberal democracy. What accounts for this highly unpredictable atmosphere with regard to Muslims and their religious, cultural, and civic role, needs, and demands? Why is it, on the one hand, so difficult for Muslims to build a mosque and become visible and vocal participants and creative cultural producers in Germany, when, on the other hand, Muslim localization is successfully underway in contexts like the Park School celebration?

This book explores pious Muslim lifeworlds, religiosities, civic participation, and cultural production in the southern German state capital of Stuttgart (state of Baden-Württemberg). I illustrate that the localization and inclusion of pious Muslims is a complicated process that reacts to different dynamics and unfolds on a multitude of platforms. It is mediated by national debates about the role and rights of religion in general and Islam in particular in society, culture, and politics, discussions about the definition of citizenship, and controversies over the loyalty of Muslims to the German Constitution (*Grundgesetz*). These debates are politically charged and controversial. Concrete points of contention question if and how a “new” religion can be inserted into existing political, social, and religious structures. How much religion is good anyway? How is “good” religion practiced? What exactly is Islam? Who are Muslims? Can they be part of a secular liberal society? Can they live under the German constitution? How many mosques should be built? What is the place of Islam, Muslims, Muslim religiosities, and pious Muslim lifestyles and practices in the context of a twenty-first-century globalized metropolis? These abstract debates, local and global dynamics, and individual lifeworlds converge in concrete urban spaces where diverse individuals and groups try to create meaningful lives for themselves, their families, and communities. In order to understand the inclusion of immigrant cultures and religions it is paramount to examine the minutiae of everyday lives and transformations in spaces like the Park School where diverse individuals meet and create cultural compromises. Emerging urban practices, while rarely publicly recognized often become models for others to follow.

Since 9/11, debates about Islam in Germany and Europe have taken on an unprecedented urgency. In public debates, local issues (e.g. mosque construction,

debates about the *hijab*/headscarf) are often conflated with global concerns about terrorism and militant Islam. The resulting atmosphere of fear, mistrust, and resentments has produced serious setbacks for Muslims' civic participation (Cesari 2010b; Monshipouri 2010; Spielhaus 2013; Yıldız 2009). At the same time, the precarious economic situation of some individuals and families as a result of the economic restructuring in Europe has produced a situation where immigrants or other seemingly "superfluous" populations are targeted as the scapegoats for various political, social, and economic ills (Bauman 2007: 29). Already caught on the margins of society, with lower than average incomes, education, and housing (Cesari 2010b: 19), many Muslims have in recent years felt the brunt of governments' and citizens' anger and resentment in the face of global political insecurity, and neoliberal economies' local fallout (Cesari 2010a; Bauman 2007; Yeğenoğlu 2012). Sharper immigration regulations, citizenship tests, discrimination, and prejudice are just a few of the issues Muslim immigrants and citizens have been facing in the early twenty-first century (Monshipouri 2010; Spielhaus 2011). As the overall picture often appears difficult for Muslims in Europe, the question arises whether different spaces and experiences exist? Are there moments and spaces of mutual respect, social and cultural recognition, civic participation, and creative cooperation? How are pious Muslims and their communities woven into existing urban cultural and religious geographies? Are there spaces that produce cultural transformations that reflect Muslim needs and participation? Do certain urban changes benefit pious Muslims? What concrete contributions, interventions, and models are being articulated in small urban spaces?

John Bowen (2010) asked "Can Islam be French?" and examined debates about Islamic law and its possible convergence with French secular law. He illustrates that Muslim legal scholars in France and Muslim majority contexts have engaged in lively discussions about the possibility of making Muslim law work for Muslims in France from within the "Muslim realm of justifications" (ibid.: 157). Bowen asks how individuals and communities can simultaneously abide by Muslim and French law. He identifies processes that would allow for a convergence of legal understandings where both sides could remain within their respective religious or philosophical realms of justification. Bowen concludes that such a convergence could be reached if all parties were willing to revisit legal debates with an open eye to social realities and intended legal consequences. He concludes that Muslim legal scholars in France and elsewhere have already gone a long way to address some legal problems and dilemmas that pious Muslims face in Muslim minority contexts. He encourages the French legal establishment to follow suite and do their homework of reworking, with their tools and justifications, a number of legal issues pertaining to current disputes that involves Muslims. In this book I ask related questions: How is Islam lived in German cities? How does Islam work as a guiding principle in urban lifeworlds and cultures? Under which conditions do Muslims and their communities join the larger landscape of urban religions? How

is Islam made into a German religion in minute everyday interactions? What does a German Muslim urban culture look like? What processes and transformations are underway, which facilitate the creation of vibrant Muslim spaces, practices, and lifeworlds? What are the concrete steps, experiences, and contributions of pious Muslims and their communities to the making and remaking of urban cultures and public spheres? How are Muslims practices woven into an increasingly diverse urban cultural fabric? How do largely secularly defined cityscapes change in the process of such transformations? My central question is how do pious Muslims, as individual and communities, negotiate meaningful urban lives, spaces, cultures, and public spheres that they can inhabit both as believers and involved citizens? How can spaces, events, identities, encounters, or civic activities be simultaneously piously Muslim (lived and legitimated within the Islamic tradition) and part of urban liberal cultural and public spheres?

In recent years, much ink has been spilled (and sound bites and images produced) in the German media about Islam and Muslims. Favorite topics include women and Islam (how oppressed are they?), political Islam (will Germany one day be run over by political Islam?), or the legal problems of being a Muslim in Germany (is *halal*—in accordance with Muslim law—butchering violating animal rights?). Debates about whether pious Muslims can be loyal German citizens, and whether they really intend to respect the *Grundgesetz* are in full swing. Simultaneously, there are debates and images circulating that aim to “disclose” aspects of Islam and Muslim lives that supposedly make it hard, if not impossible, for many pious Muslims to become loyal German citizens. Focusing on, or at times even obsessing with, subjects such as women, honor killings, forced marriages, terrorism, and the role of violence in Islam, popular media and often also serious media experts insist on being able to identify the dangerous features of Islam and Muslims, and hence warn non-Muslim society of the hidden dangers of Islam in Germany. Some pundits offer their expertise to distinguish between “good” Muslims (those who are not too insistent on their religious practices and affiliations) and “bad” Muslims (those who tightly hold on to religion and its supposedly anti-liberal features; see Mamdani 2004). Considerable parts of such debates remain stereotypical and ideological.³ They feed on simplistic opposites of “us” versus “them,” or “insiders” versus “outsiders” (see Shooman and Spielhaus 2010). Concerned citizens are provided with images that tend to enhance fears, and reinforce stereotypes and prejudices they were harboring all along. Differences are frequently stressed while relative silence prevails about commonalities and shared lifeworlds.

Ordinary pious Muslims, their lifeworlds, voices, civic participation, and cultural production rarely figure in public debates. Muslims are seldom depicted as active debaters of their own lifeworlds, traditions, subjectivities, and religiosities. Rarely are they identified as creative producers of local cultures. Muslims are seldom portrayed as regular citizens, workers, students, discussants in the public sphere, or individuals, who like everybody else suffer the consequence of

environmental pollutions, increases in sales taxes, cuts in health insurance benefits, bad weather, or icy roads. Instead, occasional warnings are issued about the pending danger of ethnic ghettos where “generic” Muslims supposedly live lock-step by the outdated teachings of the Qur’an, or where Muslims might uncritically consume the hateful teachings of fanatic import-Imams. Muslims appear in public only with regard to Muslim issues (Spielhaus 2011: 156). If at the other end of the world a Muslim commits an atrocity, local Muslims are called in to explain, or worse to collectively apologize.

In this book I examine the lives of ordinary urban residents, neighborhoods, and mosque communities. I examine how they debate and configure subjectivities, religiosities, lifeworlds, and urban cultures. I analyze moments and spaces where Muslims and non-Muslims engage each other and create cultural forms and everyday practices that accommodate their respective needs and sensibilities. I ask: How have pious Muslims and their communities, in the face of resentment and discrimination, managed to create meaningful lifeworlds and become creative participants? How do Muslims participate in the city? What new forms, practices, and spaces have Muslims created to accommodate their needs and sensitivities? How have they inserted Islam into the urban religious topography? My central argument is that the localization of Islam and Muslims is a process rooted in concrete urban contexts where individuals, groups, associations, communities, and institutions debate ideas and practices, configure identities and religiosities, and create lifeworlds that reflect the needs of all involved constituencies. The point is not whether Islam is compatible with liberal German democracy or the German Constitution, but “rather under what conditions Muslims can *make* them compatible” (Bayat 2007: 4; emphasis in the original). I am interested in the concrete situations and processes where individuals and groups negotiate practical solutions and design ways to be involved citizens.

Instead of questioning whether Islam can have a space in German cities, I demonstrate that Islam and Muslim religiosities are already integral parts of German cities, as the process of their localization has been underway for decades. This localization can best be understood from a micro-level perspective. Like Lara Deeb noted for the case of a pious Shi’a community in Beirut, “we need ethnography to understand local dynamics of what has variously been called ‘Islamization,’ ‘Islamic fundamentalism,’ ‘Islamism’” (2006: 5), the localization of Islam in German cities is best examined by way of ethnographic work. Considerable aspects of Muslim cultural negotiation and production are overlooked by dominant society, because they unfold in places that either go unnoticed or are not recognized as “public” spaces, or locations of public debate. Moments of urban conflict, neighborhood talk, negotiations of individual identities, modes of participation, and associational lives illustrate the complex interactions of pious individuals with each other and with diverse urban constituencies.

While Islam does not have old historical roots in Germany, it has in recent decades become a constituent element of urban cultural and religious landscapes. In the process Islam and Muslims have become deeply and solidly rooted in cities and their cultural and religious geographies. Muslim participation and the creation of new urban cultures happened less by way of grand political projects, but by way of minute steps and compromises that paved the way for more visible and established religiously inspired practices. In their everyday encounters Muslims of diverse ethnicities and religiosities and their diverse neighbors, friends, and colleagues (ethnic German and others, Christians of varying denominations and religiosities, atheists, or individuals of other religious beliefs and backgrounds) negotiate individual identities and positions in society. Nobody remains unchanged, as new identities, manners of participation, and social and cultural configurations and practices emerge. Individual and collective everyday efforts, experiences, and transformations comprise the foundations of well-established and diverse life-worlds, subjectivities, religiosities, everyday cultures, spatialities, and religious topographies (Göle and Ammann 2004; Jonker and Amiroux 2006; Al-Hamarneh and Thielmann 2008). The inclusion of the Imam in the Park School celebration bears witness to debates among parents, teachers, and students about how to best adjust the daily life of a school to accommodate the needs of diverse stakeholders. In such minute and mundane interactions, individuals, informal groups, and formal associations articulate practices, invent new forms, design compromises, discard some practices, and find friends and allies. The key concerns of the majority of urban dwellers are not philosophical questions of how state and religion relate to each other. Instead people strive to give religion the space in their lives and the city that they deem most desirable.

My goals in this book are to show that (1) Islam and Muslims are integral, inseparable, and creative parts of a city like Stuttgart. Pious Muslims do not stand or act apart from urban society, but are constituent members of the latter. They are insiders and act from within and not without. Like all urbanites, Muslims and Muslim communities shape the city and are shaped by it. (2) Muslim Stuttgart is not monolithic. It is a vastly diverse community with regards to ethnicity, culture, politics, education, gender, age, class, and religiosity. (3) Muslim Stuttgart is a dynamic religious and cultural field, where Islam, diverse lifestyles, practices, and religiosities are under constant debate. This field, in turn, is further engaged in complex processes of negotiating local pious Muslim identities and practices that interact with believers' countries of origin and the global *ummah* (community of believers). I illustrate that Muslim Stuttgart's social and cultural wealth, dynamics, and future potentials are rooted in its diversity, which sets the community apart from urban contexts in Muslim-majority contexts. (4) I demonstrate how public and media images continue to reproduce stereotypes about Islam and Muslims that burden and obstruct efforts of individuals and communities at equal and

creative participation. Indeed these images considerably hinder the public recognition and subsequent appreciation of Islam, Muslims, and Muslim activities as constructive and constituent urban elements. (5) I unpack the complex nature of the ongoing construction and negotiation of urban Muslim lifeworlds, practices, and religiosities. These negotiations are situated at complex personal and communal intersections of multilayered local, regional, national, and global networks and dynamics. (6) The book portrays elements of the everyday lives of individuals and communities, their religiosities, debates about selves and identities, communities, society, and politics and their participation in the city. Pious Muslims in Stuttgart, like elsewhere in Europe, are engaged in debates about their role and future in the city, nation, and global *ummah*. (7) On a theoretical level, I seek to resituate debates about Islam in Germany in the context of discussions about urban religions. In recent years the discussion of Islam and Muslims in Germany (and Europe) has been conducted in isolation from emerging debates about urban religions, or religion in and of the city, creating a sense that Muslims are the only new religious group, or the only group that seeks to configure their urban participation in a religiously inspired manner. Similarly, I depart from debates about “integration” of Muslims, which imply the recent arrival and foreign nature of Islam and Muslims. My point is to analyze pious Muslim lifeworlds within a framework of contemporary urban religious studies. Central here is the understanding that pious Muslims are one among other (new and old) urban religious groups that vie for adequate spaces, respect, recognition, and participation in European cities in the early twenty-first century.

Migration, Culture, and Religion

Muslims have lived in Germany in small numbers for more than a century. King Friedrich Wilhelm I established the first documented Muslim prayer room almost 200 years ago in 1731 for Turkish soldiers in his troops (Ceylan 2006: 123). The first formal mosque was constructed and opened in Berlin in 1925 (Abdullah 1981: 29). In the 1950s increasing numbers of students from the Arab World, Iran, and Africa came to study at German universities. Many of them were Muslims. Plans for the first post–World War II mosque in Germany, the Islamic Center in Hamburg (Imam Ali Mosque, a predominantly Iranian Shi’a mosque), date back to this era. The cornerstone for this mosque (with a dome and two minarets) was laid in February 1961. The first prayers were held in 1963 (Kraft 2002: 91).

Starting from the mid-1950s Germany signed labor treaties with southern European and northern African states (e.g. Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia). With the signing of a treaty between Germany and Turkey in 1961, thousands of Turkish men and some women arrived. Planning to stay for only a few years, most men left their wives and children back home. In the

following years Moroccan, Tunisian, and Yugoslavian Muslims signed labor contracts in Germany.⁴ By the mid-/late 1960s as some workers had already been in Germany for a few years and their initial dreams of a speedy return were increasingly put on hold, small groups of men organized themselves to accommodate their religious needs. Talking to older individuals, these “founding” stories were often surprisingly similar. Planning for a short stay, these informal groups rented premises that were first and foremost affordable and within the geographical reach of many men. Initially, the quality of facilities, their public visibility, or access to a larger public were of little concern to these groups (Schmitt 2003: 18; Ceylan 2006: 130).⁵ They invariably ended up in backyards, defunct workshops, or the attics of workers’ dormitories—out of sight of mainstream society (Schiffauer 2010: 36). In places that came to be referred to as *Hinterhofmoschee* (backyard mosque), men met for daily, Friday, and holiday prayers (Mandel 1996). Internal political or religious differences remained secondary in these small communities. Not very much in touch with their larger urban and social environments, the men were concerned with practicing their faith quietly and not attracting much attention (Schmitt 2003: 18; Kraft 2002). Interaction with dominant society, and political or social participation were not on their agenda (Ceylan 2006: 126; Jonker 2002: 119; Schiffauer 2000: 246). Regardless of their attempts at keeping a low profile, occasional smaller controversies emerged in some early prayer rooms. Neighbors were prone to complain about noise and traffic that resulted from tens of men coming for Friday or holiday prayers. “The neighbors complained and then we moved,” is almost a standard element of narratives about early mosques. But tensions remained local and limited to particular facilities. In the political climate of the 1960s and early 1970s, a few “guestworkers” performing their prayers were seen as politically irrelevant, if they were noticed at all by dominant society. Many Muslim migrant workers had no contact with these religious spaces, as some men organized along ethnic or also political lines (e.g. in labor unions).

From the 1960s to the 1980s German authorities largely neglected the social, cultural, and religious affairs of migrants. The government relegated such questions to other institutions. For example, the Catholic Church provided services for Catholic migrants (e.g. from Italy, Spain, or Portugal). Many Italians joined local Catholic churches, which if there were sufficient numbers, would offer additional Italian language services.⁶ In 1960, the Protestant Church in Baden-Württemberg entered an agreement with the Greek Orthodox Church to provide support for Greek migrants (*Diakonie Württemberg* 25.2.2010). Local chapters of the secular and leftist AWO (*Arbeiterwohlfahrt*; Workers’ Welfare) provided some social services for Turkish workers in the 1960s. A religious vacuum remained for pious Turks, hence their informal religious associations.

The recruitment stop for foreign labor in 1973 dramatically remade the lifescapes of many migrants. Afraid that re-entry would be denied after summer vacations in their home countries, and still far from their ambitious goals of saving

large sums of money, many workers decided to bring their families to Germany. Some Turkish, Moroccan, or Yugoslavian/Bosnian men had already spent a decade in Germany; and with the growing number of women and children, demands on religious spaces and services transformed. Whereas small, simple, and largely non-descript prayer spaces had been sufficient in the men's first decade in Germany, more was needed now. Ergun Can,⁷ a member of the Stuttgart city council (*Gemeinderat*) and keen observer of the local mosque-scape argues that this early period indeed constituted a missed chance where authorities could have facilitated the construction of a larger mosque, which would have possibly avoided some of the subsequent segmentation into numerous smaller communities, and the spatially hidden nature of many mosques.⁸

In the 1970s many Muslim communities started to consolidate into larger and more organized congregations, which became increasingly differentiated in their theological outlook and also political loyalties. Among them were the communities that later organized as the VIKZ (*Verband der Islamischer Kulturzentren*; Association of Islamic Cultural Centers), and the Nurçuluk communities (Schiffauer 2000: 51; Jonker 2002: 91). Both were more mystically and spiritually inclined and at the time were illegal in Turkey (Schiffauer 2000: 52). In Stuttgart, the first such community, the predecessor of today's local VIKZ chapter, was founded in 1968. The outlines and organizational structure of what later became the Milli Görüş communities also emerged in the late 1960s (Schiffauer 2010: 63). These early processes of religious community formations in Germany irritated secular authorities in Ankara that controlled religious matters in Turkey. In 1984 the "Turkish-Islamic Union of the Presidency for Religions" (*Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e. V.*; Turkish: *Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği*; short: DİTİB) was founded in Germany as a local extension of the Turkish Presidency for Religious Affairs, a government body under the direct control of the Prime Minister. Motivated by concerns about the spiritual lives of Turkish migrants, but also alarmed by the growing number of mosques and mosque associations in Europe that represented groups that were either illegal or watched with suspicion by the Turkish government, the German branch of DİTİB was to provide religious and cultural support, services, and guidance for Turks. Simultaneously DİTİB and its sponsoring agency in Ankara hoped to maintain a vague control over Turkish Muslim affairs in Germany. The existence of DİTİB absolved German authorities of the need to reflect about the spiritual needs of Turkish Muslims. DİTİB started to organize local mosque communities and the Turkish state sent and paid their Imams. More recently many mosques also include female theologians or teachers of religion sponsored by the Turkish state. Turkish consulates and DİTİB subsidiaries became informal representatives and partners of German public institutions and political bodies. At present DİTİB oversees almost 900 mosques in Germany.⁹

Based on the religio-political movement headed by Necmettin Erbakan (who was the Turkish Prime Minister in 1996/97; Schiffauer 2000, 2010), the Islamic

Community Milli Görüş (*Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş*; IGMIG) represents what could vaguely be termed Turkish nationalist Islam. Set on a political march through the institutions, Milli Görüş favors a strict interpretation of the Qur'an and a parliamentary type of Islamic politics. The first communities vaguely based on Erbakan's ideas were founded in the mid-1970s in Germany (some used this initial name of Turkish Islamic Union). After a series of organizational and name changes, the community configured under the national umbrella organization of *Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş* in 1995.¹⁰ Popularly known as Milli Görüş, this IGMIG is viewed with suspicion by German authorities. The association is on the watch-list of state security (Schiffauer 2010). Therefore, the association and its individual mosques are often overlooked or outright boycotted with regard to inclusion in civic circuits and public events.

Consolidating Turkish mosque communities and emerging national umbrella associations increasingly came to reflect the outlines and controversies of Turkey's political and religious landscape (Tietze 2001: 36; Ceylan 2006: 139; Schiffauer 2000). Some older Turkish individuals related stories of veritable political "take-overs" or minor "mosque-wars" in this period of political and religious articulation (e.g. Ceylan 2006: 140; Schiffauer 2000, 2010).¹¹

Arab, Bosnian, or later Afghan and other mosques similarly represent articulations of local, home country, and global dynamics. These developments unfolded quietly and never produced much public attention and debate. The largest predominantly Arab mosque association is the *Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland* IGD (Islamic Community in Deutschland), which is part of the *Zentralrat der Muslime* (ZDM, Central Council of Muslims). Founded in Munich in 1958, the IGD is among the oldest German Muslim associations.¹² Loosely framed by aspects of the teaching of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the IGD is less invested in the national politics of any Arab country, and more focused on the construction of a German Islam, German Muslim platforms, the teaching of their theology and practices, and the construction of individual pious identities in the context of the global *ummah*. More than other associations the IGD attracts converts to Islam.

Under the umbrella of national organizations, local communities started to search for larger and more appropriate facilities (see Schmitt 2003: 18). They also recognized the material needs of their members and visitors with regard to ethnic and religious merchandise, such as *halal* food products (Ceylan 2006: 137; Haenni 2005; Mandel 1996: 151; Fischer 2009). Some new and larger mosque complexes started to include grocery stores and other businesses (e.g. barber stores, travel agents, undertakers). Becoming more settled and institutionalized, allowed communities a minimum of public recognition. Some gradually presented themselves as partners for municipal authorities and other civic associations (Tietze 2001: 36).¹³ Becoming more established and locally rooted, growing in size, claiming a voice in public, and searching for better and possibly more visible spaces, mosque communities faced new problems. In their early years, mosque associations, as

disenfranchised groups that largely consisted of (invisible) immigrants had produced few reactions from dominant society. Their attempts, however, to rent, and starting from the 1990s, buy larger premises were often met with opposition, prejudices, and rejection. At the same time the cast of players was changing in many mosque associations. Increasingly the leadership of mosque associations included members of the second generation with professional training or university degrees who were no longer willing to gratefully take handouts from dominant society. Instead, as educated and vocal citizens they were socially and legally savvy and claimed their legitimate right to acquire appropriate spaces to worship and adequate spaces from which to join and interact with the urban public.

These changes reflect larger European developments as many younger Muslims turned away from their parents' countries of origin toward participation in the societies where they had lived all or most of their lives (Ceylan 2006: 147, 2010; Schiffauer 2010). New political and religious issues emerged, like the shape and future of Muslim minority communities and the role of religious individuals and communities in civil society, culture, and politics (Nökel 2002: 160; Jonker and Amiraux 2006). This coincided with the emergence of a new cultural and intellectual pious Muslim elite and their increasing visibility (Göle 2004: 11; Klausen 2005; Schiffauer 2010; Kandemir 2005), and a new Muslim "public sphere and market" (Göle 2004: 13, Haenni 2005; Pink 2009; Kuppinger 2011a). Regardless of discrimination, disrespect, and ignorance about their existence and constructive participation in the last half century, pious Muslims made a home for themselves in German and European cities (Al-Hamarneh and Thielmann 2008; Nökel 2002; Mannitz 2006; Tietze 2001; Bowen 2007; Werbner 2002).

Belonging, Citizenship, and Identity

Discussions about belonging and citizenship in Germany are rooted in the nineteenth century when larger groups of labor migrants arrived in particular from Poland to work in newly established mines and factories, or in railroad or urban construction in the emerging German nation-state (Sassen 1999: 55). At a historical moment when hundreds of thousands of Germans left for the Americas, internal migration and increasingly migration from outside the consolidating borders of the new nation-state gained in importance. The new nation-state quickly drew a line between its nationals and incoming laborers, who were labeled as temporary (*ibid.*). Saskia Sassen explains that "long before any Turkish workers appeared on the German scene, these East European masses were treated as the nation's 'guest workers'" (*ibid.*: 57). The movement and settlement of incoming workers was closely controlled by residence and work permits (*ibid.*). The treatment of this first wave of im-/migrants reflects the conceptualization of the nation as a fixed community of "insiders" who share "a common 'blood,' as though a nation were a

biological inheritance rather than a cultural acquisition” (ibid.: 61). *Jus sanguinis* became a basic tenet of German citizenship law, and very importantly also of political discourses and popular sentiments about migrant workers and immigrants. The myth of common descent became deeply engrained, or naturalized into the understanding of Germanness. Consequently, it was easier for the children of past emigrants to regain German citizenship, than for long-term immigrants to receive citizenship. For much of the twentieth century, the notion of the German nation as a neatly circumscribed community of descent remained unchallenged in the political realm and popular imagination. Even after millions of migrant workers and their families had arrived starting in the 1950s, few observers asked for changes in citizenship laws until the 1990s. Even individuals who became German citizens were frequently reminded that they simply were not “as German” as ethnic Germans. Until recently, most politicians denied the reality of Germany being an immigrant nation. Rauf Ceylan noted, that Germany for too long has been an immigrant nation without an immigration policy (2006: 93).

In the 1990s, in particular with the arrival of waves of war refugees and political asylum seekers, debates about the unwieldy and discriminatory German citizenship laws became more pressing. In 2000 (under a Social Democrat and Green coalition), citizenship laws were reformed to ease the way into citizenship for long-term residents and their children (Ewing 2008: 16). Inserting aspects of *jus solis* legislation, the reformed law stipulates that children who have at least one (non-citizen) parent, who had lived for more than eight years legally in Germany, could automatically get German citizenship at birth. While much remains to be done with regard to allowing easier access to citizenship, first significant steps were taken with this law.

The adaption of legal contexts to existing realities, however, neither produces widespread knowledge of these changes, nor does it result in the automatic reconsideration of popular ideas about citizenship and belonging. For conservative politicians (who had opposed this legislation) and considerable segments of dominant society, this law did not alter their assumptions about the nature of the nation, its “legitimate” members, and the high stakes for those who wanted to join. Germany in this widespread understanding continued to be a nation of ethnic Germans. Those who wanted to become citizens would have to become “Germans” as defined by rather narrow characteristics. Citizenship in the popular imagination remained closely linked to an adherence of rather ill-defined notions of German culture.

On October 18, 2000, Friedrich Merz of the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) announced in an interview that “immigrants who [want] to live here permanently must adapt to the evolved German *Leitkultur*” (quoted in Ewing 2008b: 212). His utterance and the concept of *Leitkultur* (guiding culture, main/dominant culture) sparked considerable debate. What was Germany’s *Leitkultur*? Who defined the tenets of this culture? On the political left, Merz’s

statement produced surprise, which quickly turned into mockery and ridicule. Leftist commentators, blogs, and cyberspace debates were flooded with lists and images of this *Leitkultur* as a collage of beer, *Sauerkraut*, *Wurst* (sausages), soccer, Neuschwanstein, Goethe, and Beethoven. The term quickly deteriorated into the butt of jokes and was largely avoided in broader debates. An eager CDU bureaucrat in Baden-Württemberg, however, took the task of creating *Leitkultur*-tested new citizens to heart and designed a test to verify that those who applied for citizenship were indeed infused with the spirit of German culture. In 2006 this test was implemented in Baden-Württemberg.¹⁴ Other federal states have since instituted similar tests. These tests have been criticized for their discriminatory contents such as questions that conflict with some pious Muslim sensitivities.

In the face of the more self-conscious and outspoken presence of young and educated German Muslims and debates about Islam in the wake of 9/11, many otherwise secular individuals increasingly insisted that Germany was a Christian nation and as such part of a larger Christian-Jewish-European cultural context and civilization. The presence of large numbers of Muslims not only intensified debates about citizenship and cultural belonging but also kindled debates about the role of religion in the secular state. Ensuing discussions incited considerable fears of Islam and Muslims, which produced further resentment with regard to legal inclusion and participation of Muslims (see e.g. Ammann 2004: 66; Modood 2007: 128).

From *Gastarbeiter* to Migrant to Muslim

When Southern European and North African workers first arrived in the 1950s and 1960s, their stay was deemed temporary and they were subsequently called *Gastarbeiter* (guest worker), a designation that stresses the temporal limits of their stay and their distinct outsider position. Guests do not belong and should not overstay their welcome.¹⁵ The term guest implies the clear lack of rights to interfere with the lives of hosts, demand major cultural accommodations, become active participants in society, or creatively shape local culture (Yeğenoğlu 2012; Derrida 1992). Once the myth of the temporary stay of migrant workers was debunked (at least for those with a willingness to recognize and understand political realities), and the sons and daughters of the first generation became more outspoken and increasingly demanded their rights of inclusion and creative participation in society, the term *Gastarbeiter* was reluctantly replaced by *Ausländer* (foreigner, often used in a derogatory way) in general, or Turks, Italians, and Greeks in particular starting in the mid to late 1970s. Once more this set of terms drew clear lines of exclusion. Foreigners might live in Germany, but they did not belong and could not claim the same right as citizens. Simultaneously, a silent social contract existed that gave migrant workers and their families full access to health insurance, retirement, schooling, and other social benefits, at the price of not asking for political

rights and relevant civic participation. In this earlier phase in the construction of a multi-ethnic society, religion took a backseat. Individuals and groups were largely identified by their nationalities. They were Turks, Italian, Portuguese, Moroccans, or Yugoslavians, and as such, separate from and outside of the German nation.

Starting in the 1990s growing numbers of immigrants, among them many Turks, started acquiring German citizenship which triggered yet another relabeling of groups of immigrants and increasingly also citizens. The term *ausländische Mitbürger* (foreign co-residents or co-citizens) made an appearance. Faced with a wave of immigrants from eastern European countries and war refugees from the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Afghanistan labeling became increasingly difficult. Understanding national and especially immigration affairs progressively more in larger European terms (the Schengen Agreement went into effect in 1995), terminologies across Europe also became increasingly similar. In the late 1990s the term migrant (and increasingly also immigrant) came to describe the vastly diverse population of non-ethnic German residents. The constant German quest or obsession to define, label, and re-label the latter groups signifies a concern with maintaining clear boundaries between “us” and “them.” Labels betray the sense that “outsiders” become ever closer to be “insiders,” a circumstance that many politicians and ethnic German deeply resented. These labels and the boundaries drawn by them illustrate irrational fears of outsiders becoming equals in the nation-state. Hence ever-changing labels first and foremost served to maintain lines of difference and exclusion. The third or even fourth generation of descendants of the *Gastarbeiter* continued to be labeled as outsiders in ever more hair-splitting and often demeaning ways.

The change of German citizenship law in 2000 made it much easier for long-term residents to acquire German citizenship, and for the first time allowed children born in Germany to automatically receive a German passport. This first shift away from an almost exclusively *jus sanguinis* (descent/blood-based law) to a mixed form of *jus soli* (born in the country) and *jus sanguinis* citizenship further complicated the position and terminology with regard to the new German citizens. Instead of simply referring to naturalized citizens as Germans or German-Turks or Greek-Germans, more terms were invented to signify the fine-tuned exclusion of what were now national citizens. The label of individuals *mit Migrationshintergrund* (with a background of migration or migratory roots) was invented to refer in particular to the younger generations of naturalized citizens, but also those of mixed parentage. An individual *mit Migrationshintergrund* is a person who either was not born in Germany, or has at least one parent that was not born in Germany.¹⁶ In 2012, about 20 percent of the country’s population (about 16.3 million out of 81.9 million) was identified as having migratory roots (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013: 7).

In the wake of the twenty-first century ongoing processes of exclusionary labeling coincided with a dramatic wave of Islamophobia after 9/11. A dramatically diverse

population of migrants, refugees, and (long) naturalized citizens who were from Muslim majority countries were rapidly re-labeled once more: this time as “Muslims.” (Peter 2010: 127). At the same time the citizenship law of 2000 and ongoing processes of naturalization were producing ever larger numbers of German Muslims, a circumstance that struck segments of the dominant population as problematic.

Religion, which in the 1970s and 1980s had played a negligible role in debates about migration, suddenly moved to the forefront of public and political debates. Italians, Portuguese, Serbians, or Croatians largely remained “migrants” and their religions secondary. Turks, Moroccans, Egyptians, or Bosnians, in contrast, were increasingly and indiscriminately labeled as Muslims. The label “Muslim” came with resentment, fear, suspicion, and the assumption that Muslims were inherently different; and often unwilling to become loyal citizens in a liberal democracy. The term furthermore drew yet another line between (“real”) Germans and Muslim Germans. The emergence of “Muslims” as a constituency and simultaneously as a “problem” is a national and European phenomenon.

Religion, Religiosity, and Ethnicity

Muslims practice their religion and traditions in a multitude of ways from a very committed religiosity to atheism. For some, every letter of the religion must be respected, while others do not care at all. Some practice their religion because their families have always practiced. Others practice by their own personal decision, and seek to learn more about Islam and become more pious. Yet others were born Muslims and do not practice on a daily basis, but celebrate Muslim holidays. For some being Muslim is a cultural aspect of their lives, for others it is a political commitment. There are no dividing lines between these diverse individuals. Regardless of this vast specter of possibilities and blurred lines, there are individuals and groups who, in particular in the last two decades, have increasingly adopted Islam, Muslim theology and practice as defining elements of their lives, and very importantly also their public identities and engagements (Deeb 2006; Ismail 2006; Keaton 2006; Bullock 2005; Werbner 2002; Tarlo 2010; Backer 2009; Kandemir 2005; Wilson 2010). Political adversity toward all things Muslim has led some individuals to re-/claim Muslim cultural and religious identities (Modood 2007: 134).

In addition to diverse religiosities, concrete lifeworlds unfold on the background of specific ethno-cultural traditions which are in constant flux (Werbner 2002; Nökel 2002; Gerlach 2006). To be a Turkish Muslim in an Anatolian village in the 1960s differed from being the grandchild of that person in Germany in the twenty-first century (Schiffauer 1987, 1991, 1992, 2000). These lifeworlds, in turn, differ from those of war refugees from Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, or Syria. Each individual or group is involved in cultural, religious, and social negotiations and transformations as they encounter concrete lifeworlds and situations. Living in a

society which views Muslims with suspicion, even the most secular and atheist Muslims who might care little about Islam, its teachings and practices are routinely reminded of their (ill-defined) Muslim identity. The category “Muslim” sticks to individuals and they have to maneuver its assigned characteristics.¹⁷ Being Muslim in Germany is a complex position, where assigned, inherited, and chosen elements of identity and religiosity interact in intricate manners (Brubaker 2012).

Dominant German media and political discourses have little understanding of Muslim diversity and the complexity of Muslim identities and religiosities. One frequently reads reports about *der Islam* (“the” Islam)¹⁸ and *die Muslime* (“the” Muslims). *Der Islam* is often depicted as a stagnant religion, that tends to foster violence and war (the little understood concept of *jihad* is said to be central here), that oppresses women, and resists change and modernization.¹⁹ *Die Muslime* are said to often be unwilling to integrate into German society (*integrationsunwillig*), occasionally practice forced marriage (*Zwangsheirat*), sometimes they are even suspects to terrorism. Some Muslims are said to conspire to Islamize Germany and set up an Islamic state based on the *sharia* (Muslim law/legal system).²⁰ Such simplistic representations and arguments create images of Muslims as a surprisingly coherent or monolithic group that blindly and lock-step follows Islam—however defined—and is thus hard to “integrate” into liberal German society. These images suggest that Muslim lives are narrowly circumscribed by religious laws and customs and leave little room for individual religiosities, religious transformation, and cultural creativity. Some pundits insist that Muslims withdraw into isolated and socially disconnected *Parallelgesellschaften* (parallel societies). Nothing could be further from the reality of ordinary Muslims’ lives. In fact, in German cities there are no ethnic or religious ghettos where one ethnicity or religion dominates all else. There are multi-ethnic quarters like Nordbahnhof in Stuttgart, Hochfeld in Duisburg (Ceylan 2006), Wilhelmsburg in Hamburg (Tietze 2001), or most famously Kreuzberg and Neukölln in Berlin (Mandel 2008; Ewing 2008b; Kaya 2001),²¹ which in the popular imagination might be the homes of Muslim “parallel societies,” but in reality are multi-ethnic quarters that include ethnic German and diverse other residents. In Stuttgart, quarters like Hallschlag, Nordbahnhof, Zuffenhausen, or Bad Cannstatt are sometimes referred to as problematic. What sets these quarters apart from others is their larger percentage of migrant populations (51.3 and 49.1 percent for the latter two quarters; Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart 2013: 300; 96),²² their working-class histories (less so for Bad Cannstatt), and their relatively larger number of families with children, lower average household incomes, and higher rate of recipients of social welfare (*ibid.*). None of these quarters are self-contained or disconnected from the other quarters and urban circuits.

Contrary to such simplistic images, Islam, Muslims, and Muslim practices and religiosities constitute a religious and cultural field that is part of a larger discursive tradition (T. Asad 1986) where individuals, formal, and informal groups inter-/act on many stages. In daily encounters, these participants formulate the outlines of

a Muslim public sphere, which overlaps and is linked with other spheres, such as ethnically based ones (e.g. Turkish, Arab, or Bosnian), those based on shared histories of migration (cross-ethnic associations), and those based on non-religious and non-ethnic issues (e.g. sports, unions, professional associations). People of diverse backgrounds interact in these fields in planned and unplanned, conscious and unconscious, harmonious and confrontational ways. In minute encounters, ordinary people configure identities and practices; they voice content or discontent, argue and formulate compromises.

The boundaries of religiously inspired civic participation and cultural production are blurred. When does an encounter include religion? Do Muslims exclusively interact as Muslims? When does Islam become a factor in a situation or interaction? Certainly, there are central actors (Imams, mosque association members, active mosque goers) and spaces (mosques), but there are many others who are much harder to categorize. Pious individuals are also citizens, workers, students, housewives, parents, and neighbors and they spend more time in these capacities than in their houses of worship and religious centers. Obviously, not all Muslims are mosque goers. Some never set foot in mosques. There are those who are pious, but practice their faith at home. And there are those who are neither pious nor attend mosques, and prefer spaces of popular entertainments like soccer fields and bars. Anybody who claims to be a Muslim, or claims to have been born Muslim vaguely falls into this field of interaction. Non-Muslims play a role as interlocutors of Muslims. When Muslims bring gifts of food to non-Muslim neighbors for holidays, and receive gifts in return for Christian feasts, this is an important interaction that affects both parties. When a non-Muslim woman complains that she feels embarrassed about sitting on her balcony in her bikini in the summer, as the Muslim neighbor whose wife wears a headscarf, or even the wife herself, might peek over, then this encounter is similarly situated in the larger urban cultural field of Islam, as Muslim notions (modesty) and practices (to cover the female body) are at stake.

Understanding that the field of Islam, Muslims, and Muslim cultures and religiosities is a vast one with blurred boundaries, I will in the following largely limit my analysis to individuals and groups who take religion and religiosities as central features of their lives. My interest more specifically is in the creation and negotiation of urban religious lives, spaces, interactions, and identities. My goal is not to chronicle the “integration” of Muslims, but the configuration of urban Islam and Muslim lives as part of a larger geography of urban religions and religiosities.

Urban Religions

The study of urban religions, urban religious cultures, immigrant religions, the role of religiosity in the lives of ordinary urban dwellers, and the overall role of religion in cities, has gained momentum since the turn of the twenty-first century.

Based on earlier work, often conducted by scholars of religion and cultural geographers, a growing number of scholars of a variety of disciplinary backgrounds have in the last decade taken a keen interest in religion, and the contribution of faith-based organizations to urban cultures and transformations.

Robert Orsi (1985, 1999, 2005), a historian of religion, insists on the significance of religion, religiosity, and religious practices for many ordinary urbanites, and identifies the role of religion as a critical element in urban processes. Orsi's *The Madonna of 115th Street* (1985) inserts religion into debates of urban cultures. Similarly, the contributors to *Gods of the City* (Orsi 1999; among them two urban anthropologists, Brown 1999; Kugelmass 1999) assert that religion is not only *in*, but very crucially *of* the city. Orsi points the importance of religion beyond houses of worship noting that urban religion "do not exist in a sacred space apart, but in the midst of social life" (1999a: 57). Lily Kong, an urban geographer, has been instrumental in "mapping new geographies of religion" pointing to the role of religion in contemporary cities (2001; see also 1990, 2010). She argues that religion, religiosities, and religious practices are dynamic components in the negotiation of urban lives and spaces (Kong 1993).

More recently, a number of anthropologists have studied the role on Islam in urban transformations in contemporary Muslim-majority cities (Deeb 2006; Deeb and Harb 2013; White 2002; BouAkar 2012; Henkel 2007; Fawaz 2009; Harb and Deeb 2011, 2013). Others analyze Muslim religiosities and everyday religious practices and their spatial impact on cities (Desplat and Schulz 2012), paying attention to social tension and conflict (Keaton 2006; Asher 2012; Zöllner 2012). Some examine the role of Muslim communities in recent transformations in European cities (Ghodsee 2010; Ceylan 2006; Mattausch and Yildiz 2009). In Europe announcements to construct a mosque have frequently caused controversies about the role of Islam in cities and Europe at large (Cesari 2005; McLoughlin 2005; Astor 2012; Hüttermann 2006; Lauterbach and Lottermoser 2009). Such controversies often initiate broader debates about Islam and religion in secular cities (Beaumont and Baker 2011; Molendijk et al. 2010; Wilford 2010; Olson et al. 2013).

Debates about the position of Islam have in recent years dominated popular and scholarly debates about religion in many European cities. Less has been said and written about other (immigrant) religious communities. In order to analyze the inclusion of Muslims into German cityscapes, it is helpful to take a broader analytical look at urban religious transformations. In the process of large-scale immigration, German cities have experienced considerable religious transformations that are largely neglected and have not been sufficiently analyzed. If urban religions are discussed in the case of Germany, the debates focus on the declining membership of traditional Christian churches (Lutheran-Protestant and Catholic) and the rise of Islam. Little attention is paid to the broader transformations of the urban religious topography that include the arrival and localization of other

religions, like Hinduism, the recent growth in Jewish communities (immigrants from the former Soviet Union), and the rapidly growing numbers of Orthodox and other Christian churches (Costabel 2009).

Since the turn of the twenty-first century, a growing number of scholars have explored immigrant religious associations in Europe and North America (Bardillo 2006; Foley and Hodge 2007; Jeung 2004; Cesari 2010; Bowen 2010). They asked questions about the role of religion in (secular) cities (Stepick et al. 2009; ter Haar 1998; Livezey 2000; Tweed 2002), reflected about the neglected role of space in the study of religion (Knott 2005; Tweed 2008), and analyzed place-making aspects of religious practices (Smith 1987). Drawing on theoretical debates about the history, definition, and validity of the concept of the secular (T. Asad 1993, 2003; Calhoun et al. 2011; Habermas 2006; Casanova 1994; Butler et al. 2011), and discussions about the role of religion in urban processes (Cloke and Beaumont 2010; Kong 2001; Hervieu-Léger 2002), researchers examine faith-based associations and their impact on urban spatialities and transformations. Examining especially the expanding landscapes of immigrant faith-based organizations, some voice doubts about the (imagined) secular nature of US and European cities. However, to speak of post-secular cities and spaces, does not imply “an epochal shift from a *secular* age . . . to a *postsecular* age” (Cloke and Beaumont 2012:3; emphasis in the original), but “might usefully be understood as marking some limitations of the secularization thesis” (ibid.). The growing number of faith-based organizations (including soup kitchens or food banks) represents broader negotiations of post-secular cityscapes. Faith-based associations and their religiously inspired place-making and participation (e.g. Levitt 2008) need to be examined in the broader framework of the “encroachment” of the religious onto dominant (often incompletely) secularly defined European cityscapes (Butler et al. 2011). This is not a new phenomenon, but represents the renewed and more self-conscious acts of religiously inspired actors and faith-based institutions which have always existed in western cities, but have gained new prominence in the face of large scale immigration. Comparing the experiences of different immigrant religious communities (e.g. Shah et al. 2012; Peach and Gale 2003) it becomes quickly apparent that some problems that Muslim communities face (especially with regard to mosque constructions) are not unique but are shared with other new urban religions.

Taking evidence and inspiration from vibrant debates in the field of the study of urban religion, I seek to reposition the study of Islam and Muslim in Stuttgart in these debates. Instead of focusing on Islam as the singular “foreign” religion that impinges of an otherwise religiously well settled cityscape, I understand pious Muslims as one group of believers that configure a place and home for themselves of dynamic urban religious topography where many different groups and congregations work to define their spaces, practices, and forms of participation.

Urban Culture and Small Spaces

In his otherwise pessimistic account about the “liquid times” of the early twenty-first century, Zygmunt Bauman identifies cities and in particular neighborhoods and small urban spaces as possible sites of hope and inspiration (2007: 79). Urban quarters, and here especially, multi-ethnic working-class neighborhoods, which often carry a heavy share of social problems, nonetheless are always communities “in the making” (P.M. Smith quoted in Bauman 2007: 79). In neighborhood spaces, global trends and dynamics are lived and negotiated by ordinary people in minute encounters. It is worth quoting Bauman’s understanding of such spaces at length:

It is around places that human experience tends to be formed and gleaned, that life-sharing is attempted to be managed, that life meanings are conceived, absorbed and negotiated. And it is *in* places that human urges and desires are gestated and incubated, that they live in the hope of fulfillment, run the risk of frustration—and are indeed, more often than not, frustrated and strangled.

Contemporary cities are for that reason the stages or battlegrounds on which global powers and stubbornly local meanings and identities meet, clash, struggle and seek a satisfactory, or just bearable, settlement—a mode of cohabitation that is hoped to be a lasting peace but as a rule proves to be only an armistice; brief interval to repair broken defences and redeploy fighting units (2007: 81, emphasis in the original).

In a world of global links and processes, the lives of most people remain surprisingly local and indeed neighborhood and small urban spaces remain the most feasible for individuals and groups to participate in and to possibly change. Bauman explains: “For most of us and for most of the time, local issues seem to be *the only* ones we can “do something about”—influence, repair, improve, redirect. It is only in local matters that our actions or inaction can be credited with “making a difference,” since for the state of those other “superlocal” affairs there is (or so we are repeatedly told by our political leaders and all other “people in the know”) “no alternative” (ibid.: 82; emphasis in the original).

Neighborhoods, where strangers share permanent and transient spaces (apartment buildings, streets, stores, public transportation) harbor great potentials for cultural negotiations and changes. Constant proximity and interaction with neighbors and strangers is a “permanent *modus vivendi*” (Bauman 2007:86), where participants constantly observe each other. Old and new forms and practices are “experimented with, tested and retested, and (hopefully) put into a shape that will make cohabitation with strangers palatable and life in their company livable” (ibid.). Arguing for urban spaces and processes that foster “mixophilia” (versus “mixophobia”; ibid.), Bauman hopes for shared experiences and creative encounters of difference.

Resented Inclusion

Examining pious Muslim participation and citizenship, and the cultural creativity of multicultural neighborhoods, it is paramount to recognize the reality of everyday discrimination, adversity and prejudices that Muslims often face.²³ I am acutely aware of the existence of xenophobia, racism, and Islamophobia in Germany—on private, public, and institutional levels. Without exception, Muslims (and other migrants) who I worked with had stories about negative, offensive, and hateful experiences. From being spat at, to rude remarks (“why do you people have so many children?”), to insulting ignorance/curiosity (“why do you wear a headscarf?”), to continued questions about their origins (“no, really what country are you from?”), being a (visible) Muslim/a in the German public sphere can be a daunting experience. Several individuals related particularly harsh experiences when looking for apartments (“no headscarves in this building,” or “if your wife wears a headscarf, you cannot move in here”). Several scholars have chronicled the at times deeply humiliating and offensive experiences of in particular Turkish immigrants (Ewing 2008a, 2008b; Mandel 2008; Partridge 2012). My intention is not to add another account about discrimination and xenophobia in Germany. Instead I examine creative, yet at times painful processes of inclusion, participation, and cultural production. Examining inclusion and participation, necessarily illustrates processes of exclusion. Turkish immigrants in particular, but pious Muslims at large have often been targeted for their alleged unwillingness to integrate and participate.²⁴ There is no blame for social ills that would not be piled onto Turks and Muslims. Whether taking jobs away from native populations, abusing the welfare system, fostering Islamic extremism, militancy, and fanaticism, to abusing and locking up their wives and daughters, forcing their daughter to marry obscure cousins, refusing to learn German, not supporting their children’s schoolwork, raising sons prone to violence and crime, withdrawing into their parallel societies, or practicing animal cruelty, Muslims are blamed for numerous social problems. Despite this flood of blame, accusation, disrespect, resentment, suspicion, rejection, and discrimination, there are tens of thousands individuals who disregard such sentiments and wholeheartedly plunge into work places, schools, universities, institutions, and the public sphere and participate in a plethora of activities and debates.

Islam is a German religion and an integral part of complex cityscapes (Ceylan 2006; Schiffauer 2008; Mannitz 2006; Tietze 2001: 219). The central lens through which to understand diverse Muslims is not “integration,” but participation and citizenship (T. Ramadan 2003a, 2003b; Modood 2005). Thus my analysis proceeds from the assumption that societies are dynamic fields where actors and concepts are under constant negotiations (see Modood 2007: 146). Nations, national identities, and notions of good citizenship are flexible and often most successful when they are able to respond to social transformations and global challenges (*ibid.*).

Citizenship is not written in stone as a priori characteristic of some individuals (e.g. those who carry the national passport) but is up for grabs for all those who share the fate of the community and wish to responsibly participate in the making of a shared future. While passports play a role in the making of national politics, on the level of local participation and debates, the actual dedication, involvement, and participation in the locality, in this case the city, are more important.

Equal participation is based on recognition. With regard to Muslims this means that differences that are often viewed with suspicion and fear need to be recognized as legitimate and positive difference. Recognition would ideally turn negatively perceived difference into positive difference that could be instrumentalized for the benefit of society (Modood 2007). Recognition can be manifold and might imply different aspects for diverse constituencies. For Muslims, this implies not only the creation of yet another space that duplicates those created for other groups, but also involves the rethinking of the concept of the secular (*ibid.*). This will not happen overnight. Instead “recognition . . . must be pragmatically and experimentally handled, and civil society must share the burden of representation” (*ibid.*: 82). Notions of citizenship need to include engagements with society that transcend ownership of passports and voting in elections (Soysal 1994; Sassen 1999). Active citizenship is the conscious sharing of the responsibility to maintain and improve society (Modood 2005, 2007). Social or cultural citizenship (Sassen 1999: 123) is lived in multiple relationships and civic participation.

Small transformations like the Imam’s presence in the New First-Graders celebration need to be analyzed in their larger urban, national, and global framework. There are dominant and much-celebrated images of globalizing cities and their high-tech and globally linked landscapes and super-productive upscale generic modern citizens (Sassen 2001). These cities are caught in an ever faster race for global recognition and financial investments. In order to become or remain a valued location, cities have to invest in infrastructure and very importantly also in cultural features. They need to join the circus of national and global spectacles to prove that they can live up to globalized standards of organization and representation. Cities spend millions to accommodate first rate theaters, art shows, film or music festivals, and very importantly also global sports events. In addition to fulfilling this catalogue of cultural and financial conditions, a “truly” globalized city needs to flaunt its cultural vibrancy, and the diversity of its citizenry. This diversity is celebrated in politicians’ statements or municipal brochures. International cultural fairs, visiting artists and official cultural exchanges are the pride of municipalities and urban elites (Schuster 2006). These often provide a sanitized and depoliticized version of diversity, in which the difficult reality of multicultural neighborhoods does not play a role (Modan 2007, 2008; Cahill 2007; Newman 2011; Ingram 2009). Official celebrations of cultures and diversity contrast the lived realities of neighborhoods like Nordbahnhof where every apartment building, classroom, or line at the supermarket’s cash register is globalized

or multicultural. Thus an Imam might easily fit into a local (if not to say quaint) celebration. Nobody would object to that. Indeed Nordbahnhof as a multi-ethnic neighborhood might be a perfect location for such an event, but most observers would not take this as a model for dominant society. The glittery globalized city of international fairs and artists is heralded as the multicultural or global future, whereas existing globalized neighborhoods or institutions like backyard mosques are relegated to the (ironic) status of local and hence not worthy of being a model for the (globalized) future. Places like Nordbahnhof are central sites in the making of multi-ethnic twenty-first-century German cities. An Imam at a public celebration is not a quaint expression of an irrelevant local quarter or a dangerous parallel society, but a cultural detail that foreshadows tomorrow's cityscape. Inclusion of pious Muslims might be an increasingly normalized feature in small contexts and localized platforms. Yet, they remain rare on larger political and cultural stages.²⁵

(Muslim) Stuttgart

The city of Stuttgart is one of the wealthiest in Germany. The larger Stuttgart Metropolitan Area, the so-called Mittlerer Neckarraum, counts among the wealthier urban regions in Europe. With 600,000 residents Stuttgart is the sixth largest city in Germany after Berlin (3.4 million), Hamburg (1.75 million), Munich (1.3 million), Cologne (1 million), and Frankfurt (680,000). Stuttgart does not have the concentration of political power and innovative cultural production like Berlin, the financial power and centrality of Frankfurt, or the powerful fashion and film industries like Munich, or an ocean port and a concentration of the press like Hamburg, instead it is a high-tech, car, and banking city. In the early twenty-first century, Stuttgart—in the competition of German cities—scores by its global industries (most famously Mercedes, Porsche, and Bosch) and growing banking sector (second only to Frankfurt). Overall unemployment rates (5.8 percent, only Munich's rates is lower; Borgmann SZ 28.6.2008) are among the lowest in Germany and social programs and projects receive, not lavish, but good funding. While Stuttgarters experiences considerable differences in wealth, income, and size and quality of housing, the differences are less pronounced than in other Germany cities (e.g. Berlin), and indeed seem benign when compared to many global cities.

At the turn of the twenty-first century, Stuttgart is the German metropolis with the largest share of residents who are either immigrants themselves or have backgrounds of migration (*Migrationshintergrund*).²⁶ In 2012, 39.9 percent of all Stuttgarters had a *Migrationshintergrund*. For those under the age of three years, the figure was 57.5 percent (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart 2013: 12). About one fifth of Stuttgart's residents are foreign nationals (*ibid.*).

Examining the localization of Islam in Stuttgart, economic aspects without doubt play a role, but this process is not centrally marked by a fierce struggle over

economic resources. It is much more of a cultural and political struggle. For instance, controversies over the construction of mosques are not about whether or not a community owns the funds to buy adequate real estate, but whether this real estate is made available to them. The position of Islam and Muslims in Stuttgart is neither characterized by ghettoization and grossly substandard housing conditions, nor dramatically high rates of unemployment. While some Muslims occupy the lower end of Stuttgart's rental market and experiences higher rates of unemployment, Stuttgart does not share the social problems of some Parisian housing projects or British cities (e.g. Keaton 2006). In addition to the relative absence of severe poverty, Stuttgart has a reasonably well-funded landscape of social and cultural projects. Some cultural and social neighborhood centers are model projects that bespeak the city's financial circumstances and an overall willingness to support intercultural projects.

Despite its considerable Muslim population (almost 10 percent of the population, that is almost 60,000 people; Baden-Württemberg 2005: 10), Stuttgart, unlike other regional (e.g. Sindelfingen, Mannheim), German (e.g. Cologne, Duisburg), or European (e.g. Dublin, Rotterdam) cities, does not have a purpose built mosque. None of the city's mosques remotely has the exterior architecture of a mosque. Mosque architecture does not require many special features, indeed only a *mihrab* (niche to indicate the direction of prayer) and a possibly a *minbar* (pulpit) are necessary (Serageldin 1996a: 9). Yet, mosques in the Muslim world and in Muslim minority contexts frequently use an architectural grammar that makes mosques recognizable as such. Holod and Khan noted that mosques in the West often become symbolic statements that bespeak "the Muslim presence in non-Muslim countries" (1997: 227), and thus are distinct from their counterparts in the Muslim world. While prayer spaces can be arranged almost anywhere, mosques nonetheless are symbols of political contexts, history, community, and of money and power in both Muslim majority and minority contexts. Stuttgart's mosques offer little in terms of external architectural beauty, symbolic representation, or prestige. Situated in less than attractive quarters or industrial zones, these mosques are neither recognizable as such, nor can they serve as physical markers of communal pride, or foster social recognition.

Over the years Stuttgart's Muslim spiritual geography has consolidated. Starting from late 1980 and gaining momentum in the 1990s some communities bought facilities. Stuttgart's mosques are predominantly located in defunct industrial facilities in marginal, distant and largely non-residential areas; many use less than perfect spaces. The search for the best-possible facilities continues to create a certain movement among communities. For instance, in 2007 a Moroccan community moved from rented to owned premises. In 2008, a Bosnian association moved from a smaller owned to a larger owned location. Another Bosnian association moved to larger facilities in the same year. A look at the metropolitan region indicates that Stuttgart might be a particularly resilient location with regard

to mosque constructions, because several regional towns and cities boast purpose-built mosques. One of the largest mosques in the state is located in Sindelfingen, not far from the central Mercedes-Benz plant where migrant/immigrant workers have been employed for over half a century (Buchmeier SZ 15.12.2006). On a regular Friday about 1,000 men pray in this mosque's large prayer room (830 square meters), which is topped by a dome (14 meters in height; *ibid.*). The town of Schorndorf also has a purpose-built mosque complete with a minaret and 1,500 square meters of facilities (*ibid.*).

The topography of Stuttgart's mosques illustrates the position of Islam and Muslims in the city. At present the city has about twenty-five mosque associations. The mosque count remains imprecise as smaller associations come and go, and other associations avoid terms like Islam, Muslim, and mosque in their names. For example, one (Sufi-based) group is officially known as "Association of Turkish Parents." There is a core of about a dozen well-established communities (some in their third or fourth decades of operation) with larger premises and an array of services, activities, and programs for members and non-members. Marking these twenty-five associations on the map, one finds the not surprising pattern that, with one exception, they are located on the vague crescent of older industrial, now turned multi-ethnic quarters that curve around downtown.²⁷ Bad Cannstatt is the undisputed center of Muslim Stuttgart with eight mosques. Feuerbach has three, Zuffenhausen, Obertürkheim, Ost, Wangen, Süd, Mitte each have two. Stuttgart-Nord has one, which is located in the dense urban part of the quarter and not in its upscale hill section (Killesberg). Only an Afghan mosque, situated in Stuttgart-West, is outside the crescent pattern. Wealthier quarters like Sillenbuch, Möhringen, or Degerloch do not have mosques.²⁸ Stuttgart's mosques are almost exclusively situated in multi-ethnic working-class quarters. Of the six city quarters with the highest purchasing power, five did not have mosques. Of the eight quarters with the lowest purchasing power, six had mosques. Seven of the eight quarters with the highest rates of unemployment had mosques; the eight quarters with the lowest rates of unemployment did not have mosques. Similarly, the quarters with mosques have higher rate of social welfare recipients and lower rates of transfer to schools that prepare for university studies (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart 2013). The quarters with mosques are the socially and economically more disadvantaged ones.

Stuttgart's mosque associations are registered legal associations (*Verein*). This status conveys advantages as German law favors this format of public organization. Associations are given certain privileges (e.g. access to facilities, possibilities of funding). Stuttgart's largest mosque (by space/size) is the Salam Mosque complex in Stuttgart-Feuerbach (Kuppinger 2010a, 2011b). Administered by the Turkish Presidency for Religious Affairs, this mosque is funded and organized by the Presidency's subsidiary, the DİTİB. Imams and female theologians or teachers of Islamic studies are sent and paid by the Turkish state. With its superior funding

and vast spatial complex that yields considerable rental income from numerous stores, the Salam Mosque can—more than any other local mosque—engage in civic activities, invite visitors and delegations, and participate in the public sphere. Because of its size, activities, relative visibility, and its politically uncontroversial affiliation with the Turkish state, the Salam Mosque has emerged as “the” mosque in Stuttgart.

The Medina Mosque, run by the Milli Görüş (IGMG) association, claims to be the largest association (by membership) in Stuttgart. Because the IGMG is on the watch list of state security (Schiffauer 2010), the Medina Mosque is largely overlooked or outright boycotted with regard to inclusion in civic activities and events. Less political is the *Verein Islamischer Kulturzentren* VIKZ (Association of Islamic Cultural Centers). This association favors personal piety situating itself in a broader mystic tradition. The VIKZ or its regional LVIKZ (*Landesverband Verein Islamischer Kulturzentren*) provides the frame for the Hussein and the Takva Mosques.

Stuttgart has two Moroccan mosques, which in part has to do with the early and numerous arrivals of Moroccan workers in the 1960s. These mosques are not affiliated with national mosque associations. The largest Arab, but increasingly international mosque, is the Al-Nour Mosque. With a core of Palestinian, Egyptian, Syrian, and Lebanese members, this community is organizationally linked to the *Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland* IGD (Islamic Community in Deutschland). The fourth Arab mosque, the Yassin Mosque, has common origins with the Al-Nour Mosque, but the two eventually split over theological questions. The Yassin Mosque, which is predominantly frequented by North Africans, in particular Algerians, tends to be stricter in some of their theological interpretations (e.g. with regard to gender segregation). Some of its members self-identify as *Salafi*. Their aim is to closely and literally follow the life and practices of the Prophet Muhammad in all aspects of their lives. The Yassin Mosque is not part of a national mosque association.

There are smaller congregations: some are well established (e.g. a Bosnian mosque), others are more recent (e.g. an Afghan mosque). Some only maintain a prayer room for men (e.g. a group from Bangladesh). Some communities are in flux as they articulate, improve, and enlarge their communities, activities, and facilities. One smaller Bosnian community recently moved to more spacious premises, which some of my interlocutors (in different contexts) agreed had been nicely renovated considering that this former warehouse facility has no windows. Figuring a well-liked ethnic German preacher, several people remarked in late 2008, that they liked to go there especially for holiday prayers. A small but growing number of younger, more savvy, mobile, and ethnically flexible individuals attend activities in two, three, or even four mosques (not including prayers that they might attend anywhere they happen to be).

In the wake of 9/11, Muslims were identified as a group that needed to be watched. In 2002 the Stuttgart police (*Polizeipräsidium Stuttgart*), added a special

unit for Islamic affairs. In addition to regular criminal affairs, this unit was supposed to maintain contacts with mosques, identify problems, and cooperate with congregations. Simultaneously, local police departments established ties with mosques, where they offered programs about juvenile delinquency, drugs, or the dangers for youth on the Internet.

Even before 9/11, Muslims and non-Muslims, who worried about widespread Islamophobia formed platforms for more respectful dialogue. The Christian-Islamic Society (*Christlich-Islamische Gesellschaft Stuttgart e.V.*, CIG) was founded in 1998. This society folded in 2013 as leading members thought that some of their goals had been achieved, but even more so because these activists had moved in to other engagements, and there continue to play central roles in debates about Islam and religion in Stuttgart. A year later in 1999 the Society for Christian-Muslim Meeting and Cooperation (*Gesellschaft für Christlich-Islamische Begegnung und Zusammenarbeit e.V.*, CIBZ) followed. In 2003, the Coordination Council for Christian-Muslim Dialog was founded in the Stuttgart region (*Koordinationsrat des christlich-islamischen Dialogs e.V.*) which was to function as a national umbrella organization for Christian-Muslim interfaith dialog. There is an overlap of activists between these organizations.

These organizations organize activities, meetings, and lecture programs to disseminate information, and bring Muslims and non-Muslims together. Members or representatives of DİTİB, the LVIKZ mosques, the Al-Nour Mosque, the Milli Görüş Mosque, and the larger Bosnian mosque are involved in interfaith dialogue activities like a revolving *iftar* circle (organized by CIBZ). Some mosque representative and other activists are very visible and known in Muslim and non-Muslim circles and are frequently invited to public events and debates. They form the small informal core of the local pious Muslim public sphere and operate as Muslim contacts or spokespeople on cultural or political platforms. Most know each other.

Urban Fieldwork

This research is part of a longer intellectual and personal journey. I grew up in, what was in the 1960s and 1970s, a rural village that has since turned into a suburban town outside Stuttgart. I left the area in the 1980s to study and live first in Egypt and later in the United States. In Egypt I conducted many years of research on questions of urban communities, urban cultures, colonial urban histories, and globalizing urban transformations (e.g. 1998; 2001; 2004; 2006a, 2006b; 2014). I have also worked on emerging global Muslim consumer cultures (2009). In the summer of 2005 on a visit to my parents, I met up with three classmates with whom I had gone to school in the 1970s. We spent a long evening in a coffee shop under the open summer skies discussing all sorts of things, among them the role of Islam in Germany. As we stayed—past the coffee shop's closing time—I realized

how urgent this debate was. I decided to refocus the project for my upcoming sabbatical from urban issues in Cairo to questions of Islam in Germany, or more specifically in nearby Stuttgart which combined my interest in urban cultures and my newfound quest to reconnect to political and cultural debates in Germany after an absence of twenty years.

To examine a phenomenon as complex as processes of participation and cultural creativity of pious Muslims in Stuttgart, multiple methodological tools and a number of research sites are necessary. I chose several central and more permanent field sites and some others where I conducted occasional or random observations, or where I attended specific events or activities. In these research venues I met many individuals. Some became close interlocutors, others became friends, and a few became very close friends. By way of these many helpful and open-hearted people, I met yet others and gained access to additional groups and spaces. Ultimately I was in the field wherever I was and went in the city at all times.

Before I moved to Stuttgart I conducted preliminary research to find the most suitable neighborhood to live in, and take as a central research site. My conditions were that it had to be a multi-ethnic neighborhood with available rental apartments. I narrowed my choice down to Nordbahnhof and Bad Cannstatt. In January 2006 I went to tour both neighborhoods and decided to go with Nordbahnhof as it was smaller and seemed more child-friendly, especially with regard to traffic, street spaces, and available greenery. In September 2006 we moved to Nordbahnhof. I registered my daughters, Tamima and Tala (eight and five years old in 2006) at the Park School. Several people warned me against sending them there, as the Park School has a “bad” reputation and middle-class parents are wary of this institution. This wariness in part bespeaks middle-class fears of immigrants (more than 80 percent of the school’s students have backgrounds of migration). The girls started their German school career in September 2006 and had an excellent experience at the Park School. Nordbahnhof, its residents, its streets, playgrounds, stores, apartment buildings, the Park School, and the “Kulturhaus” (a successful multicultural neighborhood center) became some of my central field sites. Through the girls it was easy to meet some of their friends’ parents. Early on I informed individuals and institutions that I was not only living in this neighborhood, but also conducting research about the neighborhood. In the Park School I served for one year as the parents’ representative in Tala’s class which gave me a better understanding of the school, and also allowed me to contribute and help with some school activities. I joined the Kulturhaus as a tutor in the afternoon homework program for students from fifth to ninth grades. Through this volunteer work I became familiar with the center’s work and was later invited to help with other projects.

My arrival in Nordbahnhof coincided with the beginning of Ramadan. In search of public Ramadan events (mosques have some), I started calling mosques. As local mosques do not employ permanent personnel, this was not an easy task. I

was lucky to establish a few contacts, had a first longer meeting with the president of a mosque association which eventually led to an invitation to an *iftar* (evening meal to break the fast). From this first contact and people I had met at this *iftar*, more contacts developed. For a while I worked to further all initial contacts, until three mosques emerged as particularly suitable research sites. I chose the Salam Mosque, the Hussein Mosque, and the Al-Nour Mosque as central research sites. These communities cover a broad specter of ethnic, religious, political, and local aspects, different types of spatial settings and contexts, and types of local involvement and participation. While these mosques and their congregations are not representative of all mosques, they provide a broad overview of sites, communities, and activities. In each mosque I focused my research on different aspects of communal lives and activities.

In addition to my neighborhood and mosque research, I tried to attend all/most larger public events to do with Islam and Muslim issues. At numerous lectures, panels, and conferences I met more individuals (Muslims and non-Muslims) who shared my interests. They guided me to other events, venues, and individuals. After a year of fieldwork I knew most of the central actors in the Muslim public sphere and non-Muslim activists involved in interfaith dialogue.

Overview

In the following chapters I analyze pious Muslim Stuttgart. I describe and examine individuals I met, and spaces that I regularly visited. In each chapter I take a concrete urban context and analyze one element of Muslim lifeworlds, participation, and cultural production.

Chapter 1 chronicles the conflict over a planned mosque project in Stuttgart-Heslach. In 1999 the VIKZ bought a defunct factory and planned to convert it into a mosque complex. The announcement of these plans sparked a bitter controversy that involved numerous urban, regional, and even national constituencies. As Stuttgart's first mosque conflict, this encounter constitutes the first larger public debate about the role and position of pious Muslims in the city. Residents did not want a mosque in their neighborhood. The mosque association, used to decades of relative neglect, was ill-prepared to handle such public attention and controversy. Ultimately, despite the project's failure, this conflict made pious Muslims visible as a constituency and stakeholders in Stuttgart.

Chapter 2 focuses on the Al-Nour Mosque and examines experiences of pious individuals who are strengthening their faith, improving their pious and mundane lives and activities in the context of the mosque and beyond. I show how piety for most does not imply a withdrawal into a private world of mosques and worship, but involves the construction of a visibly pious persona and distinctly pious mode of public engagement. The construction of pious selves is not a hidden exercise.

Ensuing practices are eventually carried into public spaces (e.g. school, work) where they are lived, and defended against prejudices in the secular public sphere.

Chapter 3 introduces six individuals who act as pious Muslims in their daily lives and different public contexts. Often unnoticed by dominant society, pious Muslims have carved out spaces for themselves, their families, and communities that are locally shaped and connected. I challenge stereotypes of “the Muslim” who stands at a distance to mainstream society. The men and women introduced in this chapter represent the diversity of Muslim Stuttgart with regard to gender, age, class, education, ethnicity, religiosity, and types of social and political engagement and participation. These individuals illustrate that Islam is a German religion, and that many pious Muslims are engaged civic participants.

Chapter 4 examines widespread fears and resentment of Islam. I describe and analyze an exhibition entitled “The Abused Religion: Islamists in Germany” that was on display in Stuttgart in 2007. This exhibition claimed not to speak about ordinary Muslims, but only aimed to depict the dangers of Islamists. However, its design and implicit message were more far-reaching. The chapter chronicles a walk through the exhibition and analyzes its overt and subtle messages. Examining the fine-tuning of the exhibition, I demonstrate the powerful nature of such informational tools. I further discuss the controversial remark of the German President that “Islam in part of Germany” which causes considerable debate and controversy in the fall of 2010. Analyzing these concrete examples I illustrate how pervasive Islamophobia is in Germany, and how easily anti-Muslim sentiments can be mobilized in the public sphere.

Chapter 5 examines the localization of the Hussein Mosque. I introduce the old village of Zuffenhausen and illustrate how it has over the centuries witnessed travelers and armies passing through, and absorbed diverse newcomers. I chronicle the village’s transformation in the late nineteenth century into an urban industrial quarter. Next, I introduce the Hussein Mosque, its larger historical and religious context, and some of its activities. I describe how the mosque came to be seen as “our mosque” by many in the quarter. I illustrate how processes of localization were neatly negotiated to ensure long-term acceptance and civic inclusion. I argue that Hussein Mosque’s success is not based on a dramatically altered public opinion about Muslims and mosques, but on the mosque president’s, board members’, and community members’ close cooperation with the local council and active participation in the quarter.

Chapter 6 introduces the neighborhood of Nordbahnhof and illustrates how this multi-ethnic working-class quarter has for more than 100 years been a place where new cultural practices were initiated and notions of what it means to be a Stuttgarter were negotiated to become more inclusive. Urban quarters bring diverse residents together as neighbors, shoppers, parents of school children, and users of public spaces. “Talking” and “testing” Islamic practices on a neighborhood level is an overlooked crucial element in the configuration of pious Muslim

lifeworlds. I introduce and examine mundane moments of cultural negotiation and production where Muslims and other remake existing neighborhood cultures.

As a conclusion I examine the role of individual mobilities in the articulation of the city's pious Muslim geography. I illustrate how younger individuals by way of their mobilities create multilayered connections, moments of cooperation, and shared platforms that consolidate nascent urban Muslim spiritual geography. The urban mobility of these young people brings the earlier globalized mobility of their migrant parents and grandparents full-circle as they inscribe pious Muslim practices and circuits into the contemporary cityscape. While still a work in progress, pious Muslims have found a home and space for themselves in Stuttgart. They have become Muslim Stuttgarters.

Notes

1. All personal, place, and mosque names (unless otherwise indicated) are pseudonyms. I use the real names of city quarters.
2. The remade celebration was a success and became normalized. I attended another such celebration in 2010.
3. An example of such writing is Thilo Sarrazin's *Deutschland schafft sich ab* [Germany eliminates itself, 2010].
4. David McMurray (2000) neatly chronicles the experiences of a Moroccan migrant in Germany, and his family back home in Morocco.
5. Haider noted for a makeshift arrangement in England "it was the practice that mattered" (1996: 36).
6. A Catholic church close to Nordbahnhof for several decades had both German and Italian services. Only recently they "reunited" the two communities for lack of sufficient members on both sides.
7. Not a pseudonym. Interview July 30, 2007.
8. A visit to the large mosque in Dublin proves Mr. Can right: on the *Eid el-Fitr* holiday I encountered thousands of multicultural worshippers at this mosque located in a middle-class residential neighborhood.
9. <http://www.ditib.de>.
10. <http://www.igmg.de>.
11. I am grateful to Ayşe Almıla Akça for providing examples of this.
12. <http://www.igd-online.de>.
13. This representation has not been undisputed. Many—less pious—Muslims resent the relative monopoly of mosques and mosque associations to speak for (all) Muslims.
14. The Green and Social Democratic state government that took office in 2011 abolished the test in the same year.
15. The following discussion centrally draws on the works of Riem Spielhaus (2011, 2013) and Yasemin Yıldız (1999, 2009).
16. The bureaucratic definition of an individual mit Migrationshintergrund reads: "alle nach 1949 auf das heutige Gebiet der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Zugewanderten, sowie alle in Deutschland geborenen Ausländer und alle in Deutschland als Deutsche Geborenen mit zumindest einem zugewanderten oder als Ausländer in Deutschland geborenen Elternteil" (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013: 6).

17. The Chair of the Green Party, Cem Özdemir, is a good example. Starting his career on a distinctly secular platform, he has over the years, nevertheless, been consulted or interviewed on topics concerning Islam. (See also Özdemir 1997, 1999, 2002.)
18. Religions take a definite article in German, hence *der Islam*, also *das Christentum* (Christianity) und *das Judentum* (Judaism).
19. Udo Ulfkotte has been notorious for fostering such fears. The titles of some of his books *Prophets of Terror* 2001; *The War in our Cities* 2003; *Holy War in Europe* 2007) speak for themselves.
20. See the cover of *Der Spiegel* No.13 on March 26, 2007, which reads: “Mecca Germany: The Silent Islamization.”
21. Kreuzberg has in recent years undergone rapid gentrification.
22. Nordbahnhof and Hallschlag are subsections of larger quarters (*Bezirk*). No numbers for individuals with migratory backgrounds are available for these quarters. There are however figures for the share of foreign residents. In Hallschlag 45.8 percent of the residents hold foreign passports, in Nordbahnhof the figure is 48.9 percent. The figure for Stuttgart is 16.7 percent (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart 2006: 107; 59; 16).
23. Damani Partridge coined the term “exclusionary incorporation” (2012: 21). Conceptually I follow his lead, but I prefer to use the term “resented inclusion.”
24. Keaton uses the term “suitable enemies” for the case of French Muslims of North/West African descent (2006: 7).
25. Klausen’s (2005) study about the new European Muslim elite (political and other) predominantly includes more secularly inclined individuals. There are numerous Muslims (e.g. Cem Özdemir, Lale Akgün) in German politics, art, and public life (e.g. Fatih Akin, Feridun Zaimoğlu, Serdar Somonçu), but most operate on a secular platform. (See also Akgün 2008; Zaimoğlu 1998, 2000, 2003, 2005; Somonçu 2004, and Akin’s well known movies, e.g., *Kurz und schmerzlos*, 1998; *Gegen die Wand*, 2004; *Auf der anderen Seite*, 2007).
26. While this category (*mit Migrationshintergrund*) remains problematic, it is frequently used in public debates.
27. This mapping is based on locations in 2007.
28. In 2008 a smaller Bosnian mosque moved to the outskirts of the wealthier quarter of Botnang, which constitutes a break with the crescent patterns of the local mosque-scape.