alism that Billig examines, and the types and periods of "hot nationalist passion" (Billig 1995: 43–44) he contrasts them to. That difference is also, importantly, a difference in the kind or depth of cultural-political consciousness implicated and draws attention to the wider circumstances giving rise to one or the other type of nationalism. Examples of explicit, aggressive nationalist "pointing" abound in the materials examined below, thereby emphasizing this key question as to how to theorize the relationship between "hot" and "banal" nationalisms respectively. While this can only be answered through my later empirical discussions, Billig's outline above serves the more immediate theoretical purpose of illustrating how discursive activity can be approached as social closure in action.

Boundaries create categories, and the latter pose the follow-up question as to how the relationship between the categories in question is (con)textually defined. This opens up a second avenue to be pursued in the discussions to follow. In a contribution to social and anthropological theorizing, Gerd Baumann and André Gingrich (2004) identify different "grammars of identity." The insight that all identifications require otherness—or that any ingroup self-constitutes through the construction of boundaries and difference—is well established and, as such, also underpins nationalism studies in their entirety. Building on seminal works by Edward Said, Edward Evans-Pritchard, and Louis Dumont, and connecting them to contemporary ethnographies, Baumann and Gingrich take a vital next step: not content with recording discourses of otherness, they pose the question as to how the relationship between "self" and "other" is defined in a given political discourse, cultural practice, or social setting. Retranslated into my present concerns, this enables us to subject processes of social closure to further scrutiny. While nationalist closure, like all social closure, effects the exclusion of some "other" in facilitating a monopolization of certain rights and resources for the (national) ingroup, I will also ask the following questions of different nationalisms: who is the "other" they construct? Is there only one outgroup, or are there several? In the latter scenario, are all outsiders "othered" in identical ways? Does the discourse in question posit a degree of absolute or relative, permanent or temporary, difference between "self" and "other"? In a given context, does nationalist discourse enable, demand, or prohibit the other's potential assimilation into the "national community"? Put differently, how context-specific or diachronically enduring are particular discursive constructions of difference and hence exclusion?

Baumann and Gingrich (2004) distinguish three grammars of identity: the first, which they derive from Said and term "orientalization," constructs categories of "self" and "other" as permanently, mutually exclusive, diametrically opposed, negative "mirror images" of one another (i.e., along the pattern of "everything we are, they are not and will never be"). The second grammar, constructed on the basis of tribal affiliations first recorded by Evans-Pritchard, is defined as "segmentary" and regards identifications, alliances, and oppositions as context-bound, on a sliding scale of successive inclusions and exclusions; the pattern here

is to turn local enemies into allies when confronted by an external, common enemy; the latter may in turn become an ally when faced with yet another group of outsiders on a larger geographical scale, and so on. Finally, a third grammar, building on Louis Dumont's work on the Indian caste system, detects identifications of "encompassment" whereby an overarching category of belonging is held to subsume various categories of people, albeit without their necessary agreement and allocating them places of hierarchical inferiority (i.e., following the pattern of "you are really one of us, whether you recognize it or not, but your status is lower than mine").

As we discover later, it bears analytical dividends to interrogate the discursive form nationalist discourses can take also for their grammars of identity, for the way(s) in which they not only draw boundaries but also define the relations between "self" and "other(s)." Echoing the question posed earlier about the cultural assimilation dominant majorities have demanded of "the other" in some contexts, there may indeed also be other "grammars of identity" at work in some political positions; Baumann and Gingrich's list of three grammars should therefore not be seen as exhaustive but as merely a theoretical starting point. In any case, the notion of grammars of identity, and the kinds of analytical questions they facilitate, will help sharpen our lens for the workings and various dimensions of different forms of nationalist closure. Put more simply, a strongly assimilationist nationalist discourse, for instance, which demands that minority communities lose all markers of cultural distinctiveness and be subsumed by the dominant majority, does not cease to be nationalist; but its discursive "logic" and ideological demands are clearly different from other nationalisms that construct "the other" as fundamentally different and permanently "alien." Finally, while identity grammars are tied to boundary-construction and hence a feature of what I term *discursive form*, they also implicate—as we have just begun to discover—the larger claims and interpretations articulated in the discursive materials with which I concern myself in this book. Repeating what has been said, our different analytical levels—form, content, and context—are closely intertwined and will have to be approached in tandem. With this mind, I turn to my second, closely related, analytical layer.

## Ideological Content, Argumentative Structures, Narratives of History

Much of what has been outlined calls for more elaborate definitional remarks concerning key terminology employed in this book. This applies particularly to the notion of ideology. There is an important link to be mentioned between discourse and ideology; as Bo Stråth and Ruth Wodak (2009: 28) emphasize in their outline of critical discourse analysis, "speaking and writing always represent,

produce and reproduce attitudes, beliefs, opinions and *ideologies*" (italics added). What, then, are the latter? How is ideology, a term that has already featured in this introduction and will recur throughout this book, defined here?

*Ideology* lies at the heart of much scholarship in the intellectual (sub)disciplines on which I here draw, including (political) linguistics, sociology, cultural studies, anthropology, history, and political science. The term demands definitional clarity, particularly since it is also part of everyday language and political rhetoric, where it is often left undefined, invoked vaguely, yet put to a range of subtle though important argumentative purposes. To avoid complicity in such unreflected rhetorical trickery, I propose to follow Martha Augoustinos's (1998) definition of the "ideological" as comprising all language and (other) social practices that contribute to the reproduction or contestation of existing relations of power. Thus defined, the concept avoids pronouncing on the veracity or otherwise of what people say and do; ideology, in this definition, can be either dominant or resistant, which makes it conceptually particularly pertinent to nationalism as a form of politics that has variously found itself in power and opposition. Either way, ideology is understood as words or actions that are socially situated and politically consequential. This feeds into this book's epistemological core: I here work with the premise that in paying analytical attention to the contexts, meanings, and workings of written and spoken language and other sign systems, one can help illuminate wider processes of institutional reproduction and transformation and the implicated self-identifications and boundary negotiations.

An important practical question remains: namely, how to operationalize this conceptualization of ideology, as a process, in research focused on various texts. In other words, how will nationalist ideology be detected, captured, and made sense of in the following discussions? Two concepts, one also derived from critical discourse analysis, the other from seminal contributions to nationalism studies, will prove vital here. The first is the notion of the *topos*. CDA defines topoi as "structure[s] of argument" (e.g., Krzyżanowski, Triandafyillidou, and Wodak 2009: 9)—that is, those "parts of argumentation," the "explicit or inferable premises . . . [that] connect the argument . . . with the . . . claim" (e.g., Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 74–75). Described as "obligatory premises," topoi (e.g., of purported threats, dangers, decline, etc.) are "central to . . . seemingly convincing fallacious arguments . . . widely adopted in prejudiced discourse" (Krzyżanowski and Wodak 2009: 22). Relevant topoi captured in the literature, to which the ensuing discussions will add, include argumentative structures centered on alleged "threats and dangers" (Krzyżanowski and Wodak 2009: 112), giving rise to a shared and heightened sense of cultural anxiety that, as will be shown, has a long record of driving nationalist sentiments; topoi of "national unity" (Kovács, Horvaáth, and Kinsky-Müngersdorff 2009) encountered in politically top-down or bottom-up invocations of an allegedly homogenous

national community; but also various topoi of national or indeed transnational "solidarity" and "history" (Krzyżanowski 2009). Relying on a priori assumptions rather than open-minded engagement with all available evidence and counterevidence, topoi effect circular, ideologically "naturalized" arguments in which conclusions are presupposed and unreflexively asserted rather than arrived at in the course of a critical, dispassionate examination of diverse sources and data.

Among the most prominent argumentative schemes to be analyzed with the help of the discourse analytical notion of the topos are those pertaining to a nation's purported history. I will here build on a core insight in the existing nationalism studies literature that pertains to nationalist historiography or "myth making" (Bell 2003). The workings of nationalist ideology across Central Europe (as indeed elsewhere) will thereby be shown to consistently approximate John Hutchinson's (1987: 13) seminal outline of the "moral regeneration" theme, or trope, typical of (cultural) nationalism:

> Nationalist historians—Palacky of the Czechs, Michelet of the French, Iorga of the Rumanians, Hrushevsky of the Ukrainians—are no mere scholars but rather "myth-making" intellectuals who combine a "romantic" search for meaning with a scientific zeal to establish this on authoritative foundations . . . [O]nly by recovering the history of the nation through all its triumphs and disasters can its members rediscover their authentic purpose. These histories typically form a set of repetitive "mythic" patterns, containing . . . a founding myth, a golden age of cultural splendour, a period of inner decay and a promise of regeneration.

As an interpretative schema (Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov 2004) that offers a ready-made, frequently encountered, ideologically motivated and mobilizing reading of history, such narrative patterns postulating a nation's long-distant "golden age," followed by its subsequent decline, while awaiting its promised "re-awakening," is well established in the literature (e.g., Karner 2006; Smith 2008). The following analyses build on this in tracing such topoi of a (national) golden past, a present decline, and a future revival across long stretches of time, in a range of sources, as well as their manifold political uses and their contestation by those offering alternative constructions of history.

In addition to this characteristically nostalgic yet hopeful narrative of history, nationalist discourse also revolves around concerns about (perceived) social (dis)order. As we will discover, the two components—nationalism's often damning judgments of the present (premised on perceptions of a "disorderly" or "unjust" here and now) in contrast to its views of both the past and the anticipated future—tend to go hand in hand. Underlying its glorifying constructions of a particular past, though not one inevitably located in the national community's distant history, and its disgruntlement with the present is the nationalist tendency to conceive of "communities" in *functionalist-organic* terms; what Ernest Gellner

(1998: 76) detects among the early romantics will be shown to have recurred, in different forms, across contexts and generations since:

> They taught that the organic unity of a traditional, rural community was preferable to the extreme division of labour, the functional specificity, of a modern urban society. They set out to codify the old peasant cultures, and use them as the basis of a new ethnically defined . . . nationality, which was to become the new basis of politics, replacing dynastic loyalty, religious identification, and pride of status by pride of culture.

Such *romantic organicism*—defining "the community or the ongoing tradition as the real unit, transcending the individual, who only finds the possibility of fulfilment[,] creativity and thought . . . [and] identity . . . within that community" (Gellner 1998: 181)—provides many nationalisms with their social ontology. Such ontological assumptions will be shown to have shaped Central Europe profoundly, albeit in contextually variable ways, since the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

In parts of what follows, I also touch on how (Far) Right/nationalist discourses offer a characteristic juxtaposition and synthesis of what social scientists recognize as functionalist and conflict theories of society. The crux of each is already contained in the "label": functionalists conceive of social life as a well-oiled machine, in which different components (e.g., institutions) perform mutually complementary roles to ensure the successful reproduction of the whole (i.e., "the community"). By contrast, social conflict theorists detect antagonisms, oppositions, and exploitation in social life. What are mutually exclusive positions on the level of social theory turn out to sometimes be mutually complementary components for political discourse. Nationalists typically extol ideal visions of "their" communities—ones first located in the past, sorely missed in the present, but promised for the future: back then, or soon again, according to the subtle or often explicit nationalist claim, things "worked," were "just," or will be "made right" and "make sense once more." However, while internally functionalist (i.e., with regard to the assumed, naturalized workings of "our" community), nationalists tend to conceive of external, intergroup relations through a conflict paradigm: whether informed by forms of sociobiological evolutionism or other interpretative frames, at the heart of nationalism's ontology is the assertion—prominent among its defining topoi—that conflict between culturally diverse groups is inevitable (or even desirable).

The analyses developed across the ensuing chapters also take the long-established, obvious insight that studies of nationalism require careful contextualization one step further: we will repeatedly discover that nationalisms are often best analyzed in tandem with their ideological competitors, in wider political fields of disagreement and struggle for dominance (e.g., King 2002). With regard to the topoi and social ontology sketched above, it is already worth noting how nationalism's obvious political "other"—the political Left—differs with regard

to their competing and constitutive argumentative structures. As written into the very foundations of the political Left, it regards "the history of all hitherto existing society [as] the history of class struggles" (Marx and Engels 1967 [1848]: 79). To restate the obvious, at the root of a Marxist social ontology lies a conceptualization of societies as internally ruptured by exploitation and (class) antagonism. Yet this conflictual paradigm can—as in the case of some anti-nationalist/anti-racist discourses recorded among the contemporary Left and mentioned in later chapters—sit alongside remarkably functionalist interpretations of external, intergroup relations; ethnocultural pluralism is thereby seen as facilitating forms of invariably enriching and, unless or until disrupted by nationalist interference, effortless forms of "convivial" (Gilroy 2004) diversity and boundary crossings.

Put more simply, I explore in parts of what follows just how these competing interpretative frames applied to social life—"internally homogenizing" and "externally antagonistic" (van der Veer 1994: 105) in the case of nationalism, and internally conflictual and externally functionalist in the case of some discourses on the Left—have manifested in parts of Central Europe at particular moments over the last two centuries. Both frames offer ready-made "explanations" of history, the present, and the future; both positions purport to offer (anecdotal) evidence supporting the veracity of their claims; and, typical of topoi, both can be remarkably reluctant to acknowledge counterevidence.

Methodological lessons follow from this. As with all social science, contextualization plays the central role in the following discussions—on at least four levels. First, as has already been hinted, the study of nationalist politics generally demands careful contextualization, which is the *conditio sine qua non* for scholarship to generate empirical insights, which are of course inevitably context-bound, and wider conceptual-theoretical momentum. Second, as one of my main analytical drivers, critical discourse analysis demands, as we have also seen, careful contextualization of texts or utterances in the wider contexts, out of which language—here understood as "social practice"—emerges, and upon which it in turn acts. Third, the introductory outline of particular topoi above provides a first indication of the divergence between complex social realities (in the plural), on one hand, and their ideological-interpretative simplifications, on the other. Some of the most seminal scholarship in Habsburg/Austrian/Central European Studies (e.g., Cohen 2014; Feichtinger and Cohen 2014; Judson 2006; Judson and Rozenblit 2005; Judson and Zahra 2012; King 2002; Wingfield 2003) has explored such divergences between historical realities and their ideological distortions, particularly with regard to nationalist attempts to reshape social life in line with its own visions. The success of the present book will need to be judged by whether or not it can further develop insights generated by these just-mentioned authors. Building on their work—thorough contextualization of nationalist discourse, including the use of a wide range of sources for the purposes

of triangulation and to be able to "read" any one discourse "against the grain"—will prove vital.

Finally, there is a fourth, even broader but equally important, dimension to contextualization, to which I turn next. This concerns the macroprocesses of modernization, industrialization and, more recently, of postmodernity and postindustrialization, out of which nationalisms and contemporary neo-nationalisms have emerged.

## Modern and Postmodern Contexts to Nationalist Closure

Crucial parts of the contexts to the following analyses are to be found in defining events and phases in (Central) European history (see Okey 2001) since the French Revolution. These have included the impact of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and the end of the Holy Roman Empire; the Congress of Vienna, the eras of the Vormärz (Pre-March) and of the German Confederation (see Gruner 2012); the Revolutions of 1848/1849 (e.g., Sperber 2005) followed by successive periods of neo-absolutism and constitutional monarchy; a gradual shift from liberalism to the "nationalization" (e.g., Judson and Rozenblit 2005) of Central European societies toward the end of the nineteenth century and in the first decades of the twentieth; World War I and the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire; the interwar period as an age of (new) nation-states, of economic crises, the rise of fascism and Nazism; World War II and the Holocaust; the period of the Cold War and superpower rivalry from the second half of the 1940s until 1989/1991; the age of European integration; and our current era of an apparent "renationalization."

Thus sketched, the large and complex historical terrains to be covered make the task of contextualization a very formidable one. The challenge assumes even greater dimensions once we look beyond historical key dates to capture deeper social changes and structural shifts that were their conditions of possibility. To trace nationalist closure in former Habsburg Central Europe since the nineteenth century, one needs to engage with profound social transformations generally subsumed under the term *modernization*. Its many dimensions comprise the Enlightenment as well as reactions against it, and, arguably yet more centrally, the fundamental changes to the social fabric brought about by industrialization and urbanization, their geographically wider, yet unequal impact enabled by the railway, educational reforms, and new technologies of communication (e.g., Judson 2006: 7). Modernization further entailed democratization, the rise of mass politics, and both the growth of vibrant public spheres and the expansion of state bureaucracies. It involved increasingly global markets dominated by European/Western powers, and long-distance connections of supply, production, and distribution. What is more, modernity is associated with cultural shifts generally

attributed to the secularization and individualization of social life. Yet, modernity has also seen the persistence, often indeed an exacerbation, of steep social inequalities (e.g., Piketty 2014), extreme ideological polarization, including politics of hatred and racism, and the technological capacity to conduct warfare on a global scale.

As we move from a discussion of modernity to postmodernity, its much-debated successor, we face yet other profound shifts. For formerly industrialized parts of the world, this has often entailed a postindustrial shift (Bell 1973) leading to significant loss of previous working-class employment to service-sector jobs or indeed to permanent "redundancy" (Bauman 2000; 2004). Culturally, the postmodern loss of faith in modernity's "meta-narratives" (Lyotard 1984)— that is, science, the Enlightenment, a belief in progress—seems to be matched by growing political apathy or a generic distrust in elites, authorities, and established structures. The digital revolution since the 1970s, meanwhile, has given rise to a "network society," indeed a new "mode of development," defined by global flows and interconnections as well as by new exclusions and resistance identities (Castells 1996, 1997). As we discover in later chapters, some such resistance identities assume distinctly neo-nationalist forms and need to be understood as symptoms of our postindustrial, digital age.

The following chapters examine a wide range of materials that illustrate that nationalist rhetoric, organizations, and politics have emerged—as prominent forms of social closure—from some of the very contexts and experiences most profoundly shaped by modernity and postmodernity. Two related points need to be made already at this stage. The first is to emphasize that nationalism cannot be explained away as merely a reactionary force of anti-modernity or of parochial traditionalism. As we will discover, nationalism's and neo-nationalism's relationship with core dimensions of (post)modernity is considerably more complex. One particularly well-documented illustration of this is the fact that nationalist associations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries utilized "a new and universal education system"; they emerged from contexts reshaped by "new transport and communication infrastructures and . . . the growth of interregional commerce" and self-defined as the vanguard of modernity and "progressive change" (Judson 2006: 67–68). Similarly, as we shall also see, in the early twenty-first century, prominent politicians on the neo-nationalist Right have been quick and adept at embracing digital communication technology and social media, for which growing sections of the electorate, notably including many young voters, have rewarded them at the ballot box. Put simply, (neo)nationalisms are not anti-modern but need to be understood as part of (post)modernity. Related to this, "modernity" needs to be shorn of any lingering utopian connotations; rather than delivering on the Enlightenment promise of progress and equality for all (see Malik 1996), (post)modernity has seen new forms of social closure, many of which have taken nationalist forms.

The second point to be anticipated concerns a core theoretical issue explored in this book and mentioned earlier: contextualization of nationalist rhetoric and politics demands their analysis in conjunction with their ideological competitors and opponents. Repeatedly and across very different contexts we will discover that nationalism is never an uncontested ideological force, but one among several mutually competing political blueprints. It follows that we need to include the wider circumstances that trigger political-discursive contests. An important, though underused, passage in the early work by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1977) will prove important here. Bourdieu argued that at certain moments of crisis people subject a previously taken-for-granted cultural common-sense, the "universe of the undiscussed" or *doxa*, to critical examination. The result of such crisis-induced cultural reflections, Bourdieu predicts, is never consensus; instead, crises trigger heightened consciousness and result in a "universe of [competing] discourse[s]" (Bourdieu 1977: 166–171; also Vertovec 2000; Karner 2005b, 2007b, 2011). What, then, triggers such consciousness-raising, politicizing, and ultimately polarizing or fragmenting crises? Bourdieu's (1977: 168) answer lies in the "objective crises" brought about by "culture contact" or by "the political and economic crises correlative with class division."

This book develops this line of argument further by postulating that modernity and postmodernity, in their entirety and their multiple dimensions summarized above, can be read through Bourdieu's lens: far-reaching structural shifts and cultural changes associated with these successive historical epochs are thus seen as dislodging previously taken-for-granted life-worlds, triggering collective debate and disagreement about formerly undisputed, now rapidly changing, cultural environments, and in some contexts as generating endemic crises that are met by competing political responses, of which nationalism is but one. Seen from this theoretical vantage point, nationalist social closure can be related to its wider historical/structural contexts and examined alongside its ideological opponents. While the relevance and value of this thus-refined conceptual framework will be demonstrated throughout the following discussions, we also need to remember that nationalisms should themselves not be reified: for example, the difference between "hot" and "banal" nationalisms, in Billig's terminology, and the transformation of one into the other (Skey 2009), will also be examined across a range of contexts.

Synthesizing these conceptual strands, my challenge lies in capturing forms of nationalist rhetoric and mobilizing in specific parts of (former Habsburg) Central Europe, latterly in present-day Austria in particular, and across time. This requires an analytical strategy that combines thorough contextualization with attention to the argumentative-discursive details in the textual materials to be examined. Each of the theoretical strands thus outlined (i.e., social closure, deixis, identity grammars, topoi, the effects of modern crises) will recur throughout the following chapters and guide the analyses they offer. In turn, this will provide

insights into the workings of different forms of nationalist social closure, in part also through contrast with its political competitors.

## Concluding Introductory Remarks

By way of a conclusion to this introductory chapter further remarks concerning the approach taken in the following discussions, as well as their geographical scales and foci, are in order. As has been outlined, this book follows a qualitative trajectory in examining a wide range of historical and contemporary materials pertaining to nationalism in (former) Habsburg Central Europe, with particular foci on parts of Cisleithania and, subsequently, contemporary Austria.

Conceptually, I build on (neo-)Weberian "closure theory" to explore how social closure can be recognized, captured, documented, and analyzed. More specifically, the emphasis lies here on nationalist social closure, which we will find to be a historically recurring process with context-specific, and hence rhetorically and institutionally variable, manifestations. This entails asking the prior question as to when and how social closure acquires nationalist contours. Key to my methodological operationalization of closure theory is a discourse analytical focus on (written and spoken) language of diverse registers and in manifold settings. The critical discourse analytical approach to investigating all language as "social practice," shaped by and in turn impacting its contexts, will be shown to be ideally suited to examining the linguistic manifestations of nationalist closure and its articulation by different political and social actors in specific institutional settings and through various cultural practices.

Put simply, this is a book that examines the traces of nationalist social closure in a particular part of the world and over the (relatively) *longue durée*. Much hinges, of course, on the choice of settings and materials involved in this endeavor. It is therefore useful to compare my approach to two of the most significant contributions to Habsburg/Central European Studies of recent decades. Jeremy King's (2002) "local history of Bohemian politics" provides an important point of reference, insofar as it masterfully moves between geographical scales, from the wider regional and (trans)national contexts to the particular locality—that is, Budweis/Budějovice—that constitutes King's focus. King thereby offers wider contextualization of local events and political shifts in Budweis/Budějovice over the entire troubled century between 1848 and 1948. What follows seeks to emulate this long historical lens and its insistence on relating local developments to their considerably wider contexts. Yet, while King remains singularly focused on Budweis/Budějovice, my approach is geographically broader and more eclectic.

Pieter Judson (2006), meanwhile, traces the workings, frustrations, and "successes" of nationalist activists in a way that is historically more narrowly delineated than King's study—that is, stretching from the 1880s to the 1920s—yet

geographically wider and more comparative, bringing together research on Bo-hemia, southern Styria, and, to a lesser extent, Tyrol and Trentino. Methodologi-cally, the present book shares Judson's eye for a wide range of relevant sources and his multiregional approach. At the same time, *Nationalism Revisited* re-widens the historical focus considerably—to stretch from the Romantics' "national re-vival" (Timms 1991: 901) to the digital age of the early twenty-first century—and is, in geographical terms, not confined to the "language frontiers of Imperial Austria" (Judson 2006).

The (broadly) discourse analytical perspective adopted considers careful con-textualization of all data a methodological imperative. While the present book's historical depth and geographical breadth underscore the importance of con-tinuous contextualization, they also demand that in each case the relevance of the particular historical and geographical context and of the particular discursive data examined are made clear. Put differently, the selection of particular sources and documents to be analyzed will require justification. Contextualization and a rationale for the inclusion of particular data will be core tasks. One obvious selection criterion for many of the materials discussed in what follows is that they reveal the discursive crystallizations of nationalist closure. However, across the ensuing chapters it will transpire that this does not by itself suffice. Nationalism, as has been mentioned, needs to be understood as part of ideologically broader discursive fields; for those to be captured more fully, as this book strives to do, a wider range of political positions needs to be examined. Reiterating another point already anticipated, nationalisms themselves need to be recognized in their discursive plurality. To do so, the materials examined in what follows will there-fore include well-known "top-down" textual impositions of nationalist political agendas, the articulation of nationalist *and other* positions in media and other forms of public discourse, as well as their everyday, "bottom-up" negotiation by the less prominent, often problematically labeled "ordinary social actors."

In each case, a rationale for the selection of the particular voices captured and discussed will prove important. Their analysis further develops empirical-historical scholarship on the political contests and shifts that have shaped Central Europe, and Austria more narrowly, over a period of more than two hundred years. What is more, the theoretical apparatus applied and refined in the present book provides new insights into the workings of nationalist discourses per se. Finally, there are additional empirical questions and conceptual angles particular to single chapters, rather than applicable to this monograph in its entirety, which have not yet been mentioned but which are introduced when relevant. These ad-ditional questions are also meaningfully addressed by the conceptual perspective and its methodological operationalization (i.e., nationalist closure to be exam-ined with the help of CDA and other pertinent theoretical "leads") adopted here.

The likelihood remains that my selection of particular texts and other data for analysis will be questioned by critical readers. Selection is of course inevitable. It

is my contention that the following discussions achieve analytical coherence and manageability through a consistently applied strategy. In each historical context, my focus will be on two types of texts and statements: first, discursive turning-points that altered the broad course of events or reflected a change in prominent ways of talking, thinking, and acting; second, recurring (or typical) texts and statements representing widely-circulating, frequently encountered patterns of argumentation and mobilization.

Each thematically and historically focused chapter explores its core issues through carefully researched textual examples and their settings from within the (former) Habsburg Empire, especially from present-day Austria. In addition to close engagement with relevant historical and social scientific scholarship, *Nationalism Revisited* is underpinned by detailed analyses of a wide range of pertinent discursive materials: these include philosophical/literary writings (especially in chapter 1), political manifestos and media discourse (i.e., parts of chapters 2 to 7), biographical writings (especially in chapter 3, parts of which discuss select life histories of Holocaust survivors), other relevant cultural and media representations (especially chapters 4 to 6), and readers' letters to tabloid newspapers (especially chapters 6 and 7). Each chapter thereby follows a similar analytical structure: an outline of the wider historical context is followed or accompanied by the selection and analysis of particular discursive data that reflect the workings of (nationalist) social closure in its respective contexts. As the discussion unfolds, and alongside such structural commonalities, the relative analytical weight to be placed on secondary literature and primary materials will also noticeably shift. In chapters 1 to 3, the emphasis will lie on secondary literature, which will meet the crucial purpose of providing the historical contextualization needed for a *longue durée* analysis. This having been said, these earlier discussions will also already be complemented by relevant primary data (i.e., philosophical texts, political statements and speeches, prominent cultural representations, and the aforementioned life histories) that will be presented as some key formulations of proto-nationalist and early nationalist discourse or, conversely, as reflections on experiences of enduring extreme discursive and social closure. From chapter 4 on, the relative analytical emphasis will gradually shift toward a more systematic focus on primary materials, to be found in a wide range of relevant sources, which are analyzed as instances of nationalist rhetoric and mobilization since the postwar era. Secondary literature will of course continue to play a vital contextualizing function in those later chapters as well. However, new data will occupy a (relatively) more prominent place there, through which both continuities and some discontinuities with nationalist discourse and social closure in earlier eras will be traced.

Further, my moves in and out of different local and regional contexts are a deliberate and necessary part of the analytical strategy employed. It is precisely by departing from exclusively and a priori national units of analysis that this book helps illuminate the political-discursive work invested, across complex and highly

heterogeneous historical contexts, in processes of nationalist closure. Where much political and some academic discourse works with the circular assumption that nationalisms merely reflect the purportedly inevitable "convergence"—in Ernest Gellner's seminal paraphrasing (1983)—of "political and cultural units," *Nationalism Revisited* develops the constructivist counterargument (e.g., Cohen 2003; Wingfield 2003) further. It does so, first, by employing its discourse analytical strategies to capture processes of social closure as manifest in a wide range of empirical data; second, the book's *longue durée* perspective demonstrates how different, yet broadly comparable, institutional and discursive mechanisms of boundary-definition and entrenchment can be discerned from the late eighteenth/early nineteenth to the early twenty-first centuries across a diversity of localities, regions, and often distinctly "pluricultural" (Feichtinger and Cohen 2014) life-worlds.

The value of the diachronic approach adopted here thus manifests in its sustained attempt to highlight how (nationalism's) discursive and organizational features recur, or rather have been reappropriated, over time and across contexts, yet in context-specific fashion. We discover that argumentative structures and mobilizing strategies hark back, albeit often undoubtedly inadvertently, to older claims and ways of arguing and organizing. The latter are thereby remolded to fit new circumstances. I will capture the discursive dimensions of this through the heuristic category of the palimpsestic rewriting of older textual and ideational strands (Karner and Kazmierczak 2017).

Adopting a broad and ambitious historical perspective, then, this book builds most directly on Pieter Judson's (2006: 17) seminal study of the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century "process[es] of attempted nationalization," which were driven by nationalist activists and organizations and their "hard ideological labor" dedicated to creating "frontiers" and to imposing reified, singular, distinctly *national* identities. In his conclusion, Judson (2006: 257) raises the possibility that "we may perhaps liberate ourselves from the unnecessary discursive prison that nationalists around us continue to re-create." Current developments across and beyond Europe reveal that renewed nationalization has become a hallmark of the early twenty-first century. As later chapters show, boundaries are currently rehardening, identities are being re-reified, and calls for national frontiers to be protected or closed are louder than they have been for decades. Nationalist social closure is, once again, with and all around us. In what follows, I pay close attention to how exactly, on the linguistic/discursive and organizational levels, such nationalist "prisons" have—across different contexts and during successive eras in Central Europe's, especially in Austria's, experiences of modernity and postmodernity—been created, institutionalized, and experienced, but also contested.

## Notes

1. Instead of engaging with ongoing debates (e.g., Piontek 2018) as to the precise outer limits of Central Europe, I start from the premise that as an internally highly diverse area it includes—but is not limited to—the territories that constituted the Austro-Hungarian Empire from 1867 until 1918.
2. It is worth noting that in his most recent work, Andreas Wimmer (2018) explores issues of "nation building" in particularly impressive historical and geographical breadth, posing the question as to *Why Some Countries Come Together while Others Fall Apart*.
3. More recently, Ruth Wodak (2016: 19) has returned to the distinction between "form and content," insisting that an analysis of contemporary right-wing populisms must span both of these dimensions. I here draw on this important argument, while developing it in novel empirical and conceptual directions.