Introduction

Headlines of Nation, Subtexts of Class: Working-Class Populism and the Return of the Repressed in Neoliberal Europe

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This is a book about the emergence and spread of mostly right-wing populism in contemporary Europe. Since about 1989 neo-nationalism has grown as a volatile political force in almost all European societies. This book does not so much look at the movements, political entrepreneurs and formal ideologies, as is done by political scientists and social movement researchers. Our focus is rather on the social groups that comprise their key constituencies. In a broad sense, these are working-class people. We study them in their natural habitats – factories, offices and neighbourhoods. And we study them as they are affected by longer run processes of social change commonly associated with neoliberal globalization. This book is therefore also a book about class and class formation(s). Because of this, we also look at capital, the state and the transnational capitalist order in the making, and how these forces impact on locales and sites. We make the anthropological case that working-class neo-nationalism is the somewhat traumatic expression of material and cultural experiences of dispossession and disenfranchisement in the neoliberal epoch. We argue that such experiences cannot be so easily signified in other than nationalist ways within the new neoliberal Europe, largely because capital, the upper middle classes and political, professional and managerial elites have become ‘cosmopolitanized’ and have lost their interest in the language of class and the nationally guaranteed social rights that it entails. Their class interests do not conjoin anymore with the project of welfare-state formation. We suggest that nationalist populism is in fact a displacement of experiences of dispossession and disenfranchisement onto the imagined nation as a community of fate, crafted by new political entrepreneurs generating protest votes against neoliberal rule. In Europe, such class experiences are silenced
and hegemonized by discourses of ethnicity, immigration and integration in Western Europe, and by a precarious anti-communist consensus among elites and wider populations in Central and Eastern Europe. This book focuses on the dispossession, the silencing and the displacement – complex and entangled processes that accumulate through time and that are now shaking the established political landscape in the continent.

Since the collapse of the Western financial sector in 2008, many of the parameters of globalization that shaped the preceding three decades have shifted and turned dramatically. This sometimes seems to render recent core concepts such as ‘neoliberalism’ and the ‘Washington consensus’, which have anchored much of the academic and political debate on globalization since the emergence of the anti-globalization movement in 1999, less stable and illuminating than ever.1 Nevertheless, few analysts, either in economics, political science or anthropology, would disagree with the basic expectation that worker-citizens in contemporary transnationalizing states will continue to feel the competitive heat of the one billion new workers that have been added to the capitalist system since 1989, further reinforced by the two billion that might well be added in the next two decades. This dramatic expansion of the global working-class in the stretch of just a few decades will remain one of the basic determinants of the current epoch, both at a private and intimate level, as well as on a world historical one, whatever the exact paradigms under which it will be signified.2

The consequences of the tripling of the proletariat directly subjected to world capitalism will persist for quite a while and be a core concern of political and social reality anywhere, pace Immanuel Wallerstein’s often repeated prognosis that the end of capitalism-as-we-know-it is finally in sight (Wallerstein 2003). This is a proletariat that is now more fragmented and spread over a wider array of all-but-converging nation-states than ever before, states that are inserted into very differently endowed slots of the global division of labour, power and culture. Moreover, the interminable spread of global capitalism has not yet erased the overwhelming heterogeneity of its wage-dependent classes. And that heterogeneity might well be further magnified before it gets reduced.

Within anthropology, Jonathan Friedman has suggested that under a regime of the decentralization of capital out of the old cores, states and state elites in the regions of capital flight will find their popular legitimacy inevitably under downward pressure (Friedman 2003; Friedman and Friedman 2008). This is as true for historical global systems as a whole, the Friedmans suggest,

1. That does not mean that discussions of neoliberalism have become irrelevant. A stimulating recent example is the debate in the journal Focaal: see Clarke (2008a, 2008b), Little (2008), Nonini (2008) and Smith (2008).
2. Meanwhile it has become clear that another wave of neoliberal reductions of welfare will be pushed onto European populations both in the center and the periphery of Europe, potentially intensifying the trends of dispossession and disenfranchisement discussed here.
citing examples from antiquity, as for the contemporary West. Bob Jessop has added that states under current neoliberal globalization have become locked in a global regime that inescapably works to set them up as ‘competition states’ (Jessop 2002), designed to compete with other states for mobile capital by offering their populations and territories up as profitably exploitable factors for global capital. While this may not necessarily lead to outright social dumping across states, over time it does shift the balance of forces within states and across states from labour and citizens toward capital, and puts downward pressure on the standards of social reproduction at the behest of the incomes of capital. This indeed may also be the deeper underlying cause of the recent financial collapse in the West. As the pool of liquidity in search of valuation grows and grows and the relative social wage shrinks, credit driven consumption and speculation-based life planning in the West has taken the place of social reproduction based on incomes and savings, after which prices bubble and then deflate, and debts cannot be repaid and must be devalued or reinflated with more debt (see Harvey 2010).

This is the conjuncture within which the transition to ‘post-politics’ (Crouch 2004; Mouffe 2005) and the unstoppable rule of experts must be explained. States, in Europe and elsewhere, but in Europe perhaps in particular, have seen a steady narrowing of the domain of the political. Public choice has been hollowed out as law and accountancy has been substituted for politics and experts have taken over ever wider competencies that used to be the object of public deliberation. The whole edifice of the European Union (EU) itself is a case in point and a major cause as well as effect in the spiral of post-politics in Europe. It took over huge chunks of core policy making from democratic national forums and placed them in transnational, technocratic, and officially secret Coreper committees, and imposed elite consensus, both as desired outcome and mandatory procedure, as the only form of legitimate politics (Anderson 2009). Neoliberalism has been a crucial part of the ideological background to the dwindling of the political (Kalb et al. 2000; Harvey 2005), as classically exemplified in the neoliberalization of social democracy in Europe (Giddens 1994, 2000; Caciagli and Kertzer 1996; Sassoon 1996, 1997; Anderson 2009) and the neoliberalization of governance and governmentality in general (Rose 1999; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Peck and Tickel 2002; Clarke 2004; Peck 2004; Ong 2006).

Anthropologists have been certainly aware and critical of the process, in Europe and beyond, but have not entirely escaped its pull. Narotzky and Smith have rightly pointed out that the anthropology of Europe in the

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3. The two winners of global competition, Germany and China, are excellent examples of the process. The financial press regularly emphasizes that Germany since 2000 has lowered its labour costs by some 20 per cent in comparison with its major competitors, while dramatically increasing export earnings and capitalist profits. For a wealth of data on China plus a hugely insightful analysis of the ongoing depression of Chinese social wages over time despite dramatic economic growth, see Ho Fung (2009).
preceding period focused rarely in a straightforward way on the problems of social and individual reproduction under ‘corporate capitalism’s’ regained hegemony (Narotzky and Smith 2006). Anthropology has tended to focus on problems of governance, migration, religion and ethnicity, even though many researchers certainly sensed, to quote Žižek, that capitalism might well be ‘the real that lurks in the background’ (quoted in Smith 2006: 621). The financial collapse in the Western banking sector now perhaps helps to expand the space for anthropologists to face up to that ‘real’. And indeed what we have seen lately is an interesting resurgence in economic anthropology (e.g., Carrier 2006; Hann 2006; Wilk and Cligget 2007; Gudeman 2008; Hann and Hart 2009) and a cross-disciplinary interest in Polanyi and commodification. But Polanyi does not lead immediately to a renewed interest in labour (see also Robotham 2009), capital and class, which is precisely what we are arguing for in this book, both in a wide and transdisciplinary sense and in order to explain the rise of nationalist populism.

Populists would certainly argue that the decline of politics is a conspiracy against the people, and they would blame incumbent politicians. We argue that it is a bit more systematic and robust than that. It is driven by an identifiable and large-scale material process: the globalization and financialization of capital (Arrighi 1996; Kalb et al. 2000; Friedman 2003; Harvey 2003, 2005; Kalb 2005; Sassen 2007; Friedman and Friedman 2008) and the consequent collective transformation, with few exceptions, of national welfarist, socialist and developmentalist states into Jessop’s competition states starting in the late 1970s as a response to, among other things, labour activism and popular insurgencies in the West (Silver 2003) and industrial overproduction in the core (Brenner 2003). Again, this general process did not hit every polity in Europe and elsewhere with similar force: Different locations, different stages of development, different histories of citizenship and the histories of the modern res publica facilitated different outcomes and different emphases within what was nevertheless quite a universal process. Also, the proximity or distance of national state elites to the sources of global capital made a significant difference. This included the differential pressure towards neoliberalization in, for example, the Anglo-Saxon countries and the Netherlands (with large globalized financial sectors) on the one hand, and Germany, Italy and Austria on the other. The capacity of neoliberalizing elites to buy-off their constituencies also differed hugely, with Third Way social democrats in the U.K. and the Netherlands retaining support for quite some time despite their abandonment of social-rights activism, while similarly spirited elites in Poland and Hungary were punished in the polls without much delay. But despite differences in varieties of capitalism, states and processes of commodification, the general rule, above all in Europe,

4. The European Association of Social Anthropologists dedicated its meetings in 2010 to ‘Crisis’ and its first invited session was a panel on rethinking issues of class in anthropology convened by James Carrier and myself.
has been and will very likely continue to be downward pressure on social rights, solidarity and welfarism; a reduction of the space for purely domestic accumulation policies; and downward pressure on the legitimacy of state elites and political classes. This will also imply, as Friedman has argued repeatedly, a continued exhaustion of the liberal and modernist narratives of nation-state building and social engineering that have flanked the making of the modern state (e.g., Friedman 2003).

As a combined consequence of the rule of post-politics and the reinvigorated capitalism that has visibly been lurking in the background, as Paul Piccone (1993) was among the first to foresee, Europe (like other places) has witnessed the spread, generation and regeneration of new hybrid and volatile populisms (see, e.g., Betz 1994; Westlind 1996; Di Tella 1997; Canovan 1999; Mudde 2007), something which commenced somewhere around 1989 (Berezin 2009). Such populist sensibilities and discourses reject some of the foundations of liberal rule and are composed of ethno-national or ethno-religious symbolic sources eclectically combined with items of the classical Left. As Piccone observed regarding the National Front in France, ‘The French New Right seems to be onto something when it counterposes a universalizing New Class seeking to impose an abstract liberal agenda on everyone, and populists wanting to live their lives in their communities, with their particular cultures, institutions, religions etc.’ (Piccone 1993:21).

Piccone, however, for all his foresight, failed to note that the abstract liberalism of the new class had become firmly wedded to the globalizing agenda of the capitalist competition state, a shift that certainly contributed to its accelerating loss of legitimacy and to the rapidly proliferating ‘culture talk’ that anthropologists described at the time (Stolcke 1995; Kalb 2005). But his prediction that the dialectics of local, communal, cultural particularity versus abstract liberal cosmopolitanism would increasingly characterize intra-state conditions in the new era of the ‘One World’ turned out to be very right. A new political divide emerged as a little-noted close (‘Northern’) kin to the oft-noted spread of intra-state conflict in the global South in the post-1989 period (see Kalb 2005). Both were characteristically overlooked by the lofty philosophers of ‘the end of history’ and the theorists of ‘the clash of civilizations’ who monopolized public attention in those days. They were also ignored by the sociologists of ‘alternative modernities’ (see Cooper 2005), who kept talking about large civilizational blocs and ignored the cross-civilizational rifts of class within those blocs.

By 2010, spreading populist movements in Europe had stirred and scared the established political classes in all European states. If we leave (unjustifiably) Yugoslavia aside, these started in France, Italy and Belgium in the very early 1990s, but quickly affected classical examples of historically strong liberal democracies such as Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and finally the U.K. (long immune to such things because of its non-proportional voting system). And the populist wave affected postsocialist states supposedly underway on a guided tour back to ‘Europe’ throughout. The literature of
the 1990s reflected on the first wave of rightist and xenophobic anti-elite mobilizations in the West. Canovan concluded that these were perhaps unpleasant from an academic or elite point of view, but that they were rarely genuinely dangerous. Despite claiming to represent ‘silent majorities’, they had never attained more than a fraction of the vote (Canovan 1999: 5). That was 1999. Since then, Le Pen succeeded in forcing a second round in the 2004 French presidential elections and helped to prepare the way for Sarkozy. The Netherlands almost witnessed an election win by Pim Fortuijn in 2002, who was shot before that could materialize (Buruma 2006), and in 2010 a potentially hegemonic bloc of scared homeowners gathering around the VVD neoliberals, and populist xenophobes around Geert Wilders, won the elections. Hungary, after years of massive populist demonstrations before the parliament in Budapest, witnessed a massive gain by the populists of Jobbik in 2010 (see Halmai, this volume), who acquired more than 15 per cent of the vote in the Hungarian elections of 2010 and formed a uniquely strong bloc with the bourgeois nationalist Fidesz party. Switzerland and Austria have had their own tenacious populist movements, claiming more than 20 per cent of the votes regularly, while Italy has seen a sustained massive presence of populist parties such as the Lega Nord (Northern League) and the post-fascists in coalitions with another populist, Berlusconi (see Stacul, Blim, this volume). Meanwhile, Poland was ruled by right-wing populists between 2005 and 2007, while Denmark, Sweden and Norway have also seen strong upsurges and new party formations. More significantly, some places and regions have been close to being all but dominated by nationalist populists – such as Antwerp, Cluj-Napoca (see Petrovici, Faje, this volume), the area around Zurich, the Italian Alps (see Stacul, this volume), Carinthia, Debrecen, Miskolc, Sofia, Rotterdam, and a score of smaller and larger French cities (see, e.g., Gaspard 1995). Degrees of wealth clearly do not matter; nor does the presence or absence of long consolidated democratic traditions. The populist wave is practically universal.

Now, the important issue for anthropologists is that such populisms are not just noisy interruptions of the daily business of post-politics, as often described by political scientists; nor should they as a rule primarily be seen as the advance troops of a new European fascism, as is regularly done by liberal journalists and NGO activists. Rather, and more fundamentally, they are the vehicles by which wider disenfranchised populations are labouring to make sense of their experiences with and discontents about the post-political neoliberal globalized environment. Furthermore, those people who do not speak out loudly for the radical nationalists – of the Right and the Left, though mostly the Right; the distinction is relevant but more difficult than it seems – these days often blame incumbent political classes sotto voce for their ultimate complicity with perceived conspiracies against ‘the people’. Like the public ideologists of the new Right, they articulate their critique from combined bits of direct experience and mass-mediated populist protest frames. Unlocking the dialectics between popular anger and resentment on the one hand, and the
organized radical Right (and Left) in Europe on the other, therefore seems an urgent project that ethnographic methods might well help forward. Towards this end, the chapters in this volume advocate the need to uncover the hidden histories of dispossession, disenfranchisement and subalternity that feed the particular alienation of the resenting classes in their volatile dialectic with global, national and local histories of neoliberal transnationalization.

In the remainder of this introduction, I first discuss recent general work in anthropology and other disciplines related to this argument; then I link it with two crucial theoretical and methodological moves that are summarized by the notions of dispossession and critical junctions, notions crucial for the fine-tuning of a class oriented perspective. Finally, I explore the complexions and complexities of emergent populisms by discussing the chapters of the present volume.

**Anthropologies of Neoliberal Globalization, Fear and Nationalist Populism**

In recent anthropology, Gingrich and Banks (2005) and Appadurai (2006) have highlighted the importance of social insecurity, fear and anger in generating popular receptiveness for populist ideologies of ethnic or religious neo-nationalism. They also invoke the association of such receptiveness with the general conditions generated by neoliberal globalization. Their work resonates with Jonathan Friedman’s general notion of ‘double polarizations’ associated with globalization, polarizations that pair widening social divides with spreading idioms of deep cultural difference in an era in which ruling elites and their allies transform themselves into cosmopolitan classes and forsake the project of the nation as a community of fate (Friedman 2003). In the process, the erstwhile ‘Fordist’ working-classes are unmade, in representation as well as fact, into a new ethnicized ‘folk,’ and the lower tiers are turned, in representation and fact, into racialized classes dangereuses. In response, the former embrace the notions of collective bonds and collective fate, and invoke the right to be respected and dignified as the people from which legitimate authority must spring, while the latter become increasingly constructed as essentially alien to the body of the nation, whether expressed in the language of culture and difference, notions of the lumpen or underclass, or biological race.

These very different works collude then in suggesting that any explanation of the surge of populist neo-nationalism in Europe and beyond must be placed against the combined background of what one should probably call the ‘dual

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5. The Dutch high-brow daily NRC Handelsblad recently carried the headline ‘Sexual Problems Are Partly Culturally Determined’ regarding the lack of sexual health practices among immigrants (12 February 2009). Culture regularly takes on a deep and almost biological force of determination in current discourses, something about which Eric Wolf warned long ago (Wolf 2001: 307–19, 398–412).
crisis’ of popular sovereignty, on the one hand, and of labour on the other; a
dual crisis that certainly characterizes the new millennium. They also suggest,
but do not always follow through on the idea, that spirals of nationalist
paranoia, although structurally derived from this dual crisis, receive their
precise historical dynamics, meanings and symbolism from demonstrable
configurations – confrontations, alliances, and divisions – of class, within
specific (but often ‘hidden’) local histories (see below).

This general thesis seems to have substantial support outside anthropology
proper. Comparativist historical sociologists such as Barrington Moore Jr
(1978), Michael Mann (1999), Ira Katznelson (1998), and Charles Tilly (2004,
2007) have emphasized that the class cleavage under democratic capitalism
must be faced, articulated, negotiated and organized rather than repressed if
liberalism is to keep a hold on the centre of the democratic process. The dual
crisis signals, if anything, that over the last three decades it has become ever
darker for liberals to maintain the balancing act. In Europe they have had
predictably more trouble doing so in the postsocialist East than in the West.
The dependent states of Eastern Europe, with their thoroughly comprador
capitalisms, command at best some 30 per cent of the wealth of Western
Europe (see Drahokoupil 2008). Their political elites enjoyed fewer resources
then their colleagues in the West to shield their electorates from global
neoliberalism or to buy them off, and were more dependent on positive
‘naked’ market outcomes such as economic growth and the perceived trickle
down to wider populations. Indeed East European elites needed the ultimate
legitimating myth of catching up with the West and ‘returning to Europe’.
But Western state elites were deeply affected too, as we have seen.

Nor is the story limited to Europe, even though timing, structure and
substance of the process will be different elsewhere. For the Middle East and
western Asia, Tariq Ali has argued that the repression of the enlightened Left
has ultimately become the harbinger of religious fundamentalism (Ali 2002).
Various studies have made plausible the claim that neoliberal globalization,
by fragmenting labour and exerting downward pressure on social wages, by
reducing popular sovereignty on behalf of the sovereignty of capital, and by
circumscribing what Pierre Bourdieu (2000) has called ‘the left hand of the
state’ (social inclusion) while strengthening ‘the right hand’ (finance, law and
order), might well be generally and systematically associated with a climate
of deep popular uncertainty. This climate reportedly feeds into a politics of
fear that is increasingly exploited by new political brokers on both the Right
and Left, generating defensive illiberal popular responses in areas as diverse
as Central and West Africa, the United States, Western and Eastern Europe,
the Caucasus, and East Asia.6 Only Latin America seems an interesting
exception to what looks quite like quite a general trend. Chantal Mouffe has

6. See, e.g., Friedman (2003), Nonini (2003), Turner (2003), Wieviorka (2003), Frank
overview, see Kalb (2005).
stated, ‘it is the incapacity to articulate proper political alternatives around the confrontation of distinctive socio-economic projects that explains why antagonisms are nowadays articulated in moral terms’ (Mouffe 2005: 59). This is the shift of repertoire that underlies all current nationalist populisms. But one should emphasize that they are not just ‘articulated in terms’. They also get articulated in full-fledged and spiralling moral panics that are not restricted to the chambers of higher politics but regularly spill out into the street.

**Dilemmas of Anthropological Method in the Global Era: Critical Junctions**

Anthropology has sat somewhat uneasily with recent globalization, despite its early declared interest (see e.g., Hannerz 1991, 1996; Friedman 1994, 2003; Appadurai 1996, 2001; Comaroff and Comaroff 2001; Eriksen 2003; Friedman and Friedman 2008). This is understandable because its twentieth-century history was one of intense indulgence with local cultural particularity, a fieldwork-based focus on singular cases, and approaches that often froze time and blended out space. Recent globalization has resulted in minimally three different forms of response within anthropology. We can characterize them under the shorthand of ‘global implosion’, ‘local coherence’, and ‘global assemblage’. These approaches will not be discussed at length here. My goal is merely to make space for a different, fourth approach, that should be associated with Eric Wolf’s work, arguably the major anthropologist of capitalist globalization (see Wolf 1982, 2001; see also Schneider and Rapp 1996). What follows will be unforgivably schematic but it will help me to explicate a precise methodological response to the globalization of the subject matter of anthropology that suits our purpose here.

‘Classical’ anthropological explanations of ‘otherness’ used to be based in the supposed re-enactment of local cultural traits that differed from customs elsewhere: the proverbial global cultural mosaic of the anthropologist anchored in a patchwork of discrete traditions. The fact of continuity by re-enactment was explained through holism, either of the idealist or structural-functionalist varieties. Modes of explanation were ‘local for local’. Now, ‘global implosion’ approaches started to exchange this model some two decades ago for new sorts of explanations based on the contradictions or unevenness of cultural

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7. Three other responses should be mentioned. The first is Chris Hann’s embrace of a historical anthropology focused on the jumbo notion/area of Eurasia. For him, Eurasia stands for a long historical experience of dealing with markets and states that disallows a full disembedding of markets in the Polanyian sense. ‘Eurasia’ thus becomes an anthropological response to the ideological claims of neoliberalism (see Hann 2006). Ferguson also endorses a macro regionalism, though less anchored in a very long time frame, for exploring the real world dimensions of neoliberalism in Africa (Ferguson 2006). Another response is the turn toward elite studies (e.g, Wedel 2009). These approaches merit a full discussion but lack of space does not permit this here.
globalization, read as uneven diffusion. Local situations were now seen as reflecting the uneven and sometimes contradictory cultural aspects of globalization. Appadurai’s (1996) well known vision of ‘global scapes’ (ethnoscapes, financescapes, technoscapes, and so on), for example, argues that such ‘scapes’ unfold variously and unevenly on, and within, different territories and basically take such places into a maelstrom of identifications and events that derive their properties more from the particular mix of elements from the global scapes that work on a territory or population than from the innate local cultural characteristics of that territory. Another example of such an approach is Geschiere’s (1999) analysis of witchcraft in Africa which he sees as a thoroughly modern phenomenon produced by the cultural contradictions and anxieties of globalization among local African people.

Such diffusionist approaches, thus, tend to subordinate local cultural time to global cultural time, while treating global time as contradictory in itself. Against them, some anthropologists have re-emphasized the continued coherence of local tradition and culture. Interestingly Jonathan Friedman’s ‘anthropology of global systems’ has been very explicit in arguing precisely this (Friedman 2003, 2008a+b). Against Geschiere, he claims that African political relationships and customs have a coherence of their own that does not give way in the face of changing modern global environments and should never be reduced to that. This claim is the more interesting because Friedman is the last anthropologist who can be accused of excessive localism in his work and he has been more consistently aware than any current anthropologist of dramatic shifts in global systems over the longue durée. Culture, for him, seems nevertheless surprisingly firmly anchored in the order of local histories.

The third stream, global assemblage, can be seen as somewhat of a methodological midway point between these positions. Like the cultural sociologist Roland Robertson, it sees local cultural practices as hybrid amalgamations of global and local elements. Robertson called this process ‘glocalization’ (Robertson 1992). Within anthropology, Ulf Hannerz has similarly talked about creolization, hybridization and global ecumenes (Hannerz 1991, 1996). Ong and Collier, in their recent work on modern experts in various global and national settings, have called such mixing outcomes ‘global assemblages’. They are interested in the ‘minor histories that address themselves to the big questions of globalizations’ (Ong and Collier 2004: 15). Thus, they tend to concede a large degree of cultural convergence and homogenization of expert arenas as a consequence of globalization, though putting a typically anthropological emphasis on the ‘not quite’, ‘not yet’ and ‘not fully’. Like Hannerz before them, they concentrate on national and local arenas that allow, generate and sustain cultural resistances.

What unites these three approaches in the anthropology of globalization is an overriding focus on cultural codes and symbols, albeit more ambiguously so in the case of Friedman. The global-assemblages approach deals rather exclusively with the cultural codes deployed by the national representatives of global professions, an ‘elite’ oriented undertaking, as Collier and Ong acknowledge.
Geschiere and Appadurai deal less with elite orientations, but do privilege cultural symbols and cultural practices. Friedman in my eyes fails to bring his dynamic global systems approach into full conversation with his discussions of ‘the simplicity of everyday life’ (see Friedman and Friedman 2008: 139–74).

For our ‘object’, emergent working-class nationalist populism, it makes little sense to work with elite or culture-focused approaches, certainly when they have little to say on class, social reproduction and wider political economies. An emphasis on the coherence of local cultural practices over time would be extremely mistaken because it would assume that populist nationalism is a deeply rooted and more or less constant historical force among particular populations, independent of experiences and processes of class. Of course, in one sense it is such a deep historical force as it derives its symbolism from historical narratives of nationhood and belonging, as Anthony Smith would propose (Smith 1995). Hobsbawm (Hobsbawm 1992; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992) and Gellner (1993) have rightly pointed out that such narratives are often invented and reinvented and are not constant over time, nor stable in their content. Moreover, the populist character of these movements already signals by itself frictions and stresses in political, social and cultural systems rather than simple continuities (Geertz 1972). Populist nationalism comes in ebbs and flows, and is synchronized with political cycles and events. Such cycles and events, importantly, while often playing within and around the field of the nation, are embedded in world politics and the world system, including recent globalization. More precisely, as our thesis goes, such ebbs and flows express the remaking of class and its political alliances within world systemic processes, about which more in a moment. We need an anthropology that serves as a tool to help clarify the relevant multi-level mechanisms. For this reason we need an approach to globalization that focuses on social relations first and only secondly on cultural symbols. We also need one that does not oppose the local and the global but views them systematically in their dynamically nested qualities. Moreover, we cannot refrain from studying the phenomenon much more consistently in its unfolding through time than cultural globalists such as Appadurai and Geschiere do. And while following Friedman on the aspect of global systems, and the decentralization of capital and reconfigurations of class alliances, our approach seeks to clarify, more

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8. This lack of conversation between the global analysis of transformations and the emphasis on local coherence and continuities may spring from Friedman’s reliance on Sahlins and Lévi-Strauss for the part on the local, and expresses itself in what is to my mind a not fully relational conception of local life-worlds. Significantly, local life remains largely accounted for in terms of ‘a culture’. I have similar problems with his vision of capital in global systems, which remains surprisingly Weberian, referring to ‘abstract wealth’ rather than unfolding and contradictory class relations. Consequently, the local and the global never become fully interlinked, hierarchically nested sets of dynamic social relationships. Thanks to Gavin Smith and to an exciting session on Friedman’s work with Jonathan Friedman, Steve Reyna and Don Nonini and myself at the CASCA meetings in Vancouver, 2009.
explicitly than his anthropology of global systems does, the mechanisms that link global processes to local territorial and politico-cultural outcomes, and vice versa. In short, if we need another label, we study ‘critical junctions’ (see Kalb 2005) between local and global processes and we derive inspiration from the ‘global anthropology’ of Eric Wolf rather than from the later cultural globalists of the ‘global implosion’ and ‘global assemblage’ schools.

The populist politics of fear is not produced by a global implosion of a culturalist kind, even though culture panics and culture wars about the coherence, substance and integrity of local culture are part of it, and imagined enemies and excessive narcissism belong obviously to it too. Nationalist populism and other politico-cultural responses to neoliberal globalization should not be seen as being immediately oriented on, or caused directly by, global actors or accelerating flows of people, trade and information as such. As Sid Tarrow (2005) and others (e.g., Musante 2005) have shown, counter-globalist sentiments often tend to get filtered by, organized within, and addressed to nation-state-based arenas. I treat the global as the always slightly opaque level of aggregation and abstraction defined by what Eric Wolf (1990) has called ‘structural power’, the power to organize transnational fields of unequal and uneven social relationships, give them direction and meaning, and organize the units, territorial and otherwise, that are allowed to implement and enact them. Structural power does not determine outcomes in any particular sphere, level or territory in any straightforward way, and it is not always directly accessible for purposes of empirical research. Nor is it exempt from internal contradictions and unevenness; on the contrary, it is defined by such contradictions and unevenness. Global structural power is a field of forces that shapes the content and form of relationships within lower level fields of what Wolf called ‘tactical power’ (Wolf 1990). It puts pressure and sets limits on the possible relationships and dynamics within such tactical fields. And it is within such tactical fields, which are often nation-states or clusters of states such as the EU, that the space for manoeuvre of identifiable local and more thickly situated actors, individual as well as collective, gets constituted.

Actual local outcomes, then, are mediated by various ‘critical junctions’ that link global processes via particular national arenas and local histories, often hidden, to emergent and situated events and narratives, and back again (Kalb 1997, 2002, 2005; Kalb et al. 2000; Kalb and Tak 2005).9 Critical junctions are multi-level relational mechanisms that link the global levels of structural power with the respective institutional fields of ‘tactical power’ on the scale of

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9. Critical junctions in the Wolfian sense are not to be confused with what political scientists have called ‘critical junctures’ (Collier and Collier 2002). Critical junctures are purely historical moments, not spatial ones connecting local and global process. They are moments of critical opening in the formation of political systems that subsequently develop a path dependency of their own (see Collier and Collier 2002: 27–40). They are also more about political institutions or institutionalized power blocs than about social relationships and social power in a broad anthropological sense. Thanks to Sid Tarrow for referring me to this work.
the nation-state and with the spaces of agential power of ‘common people’ in situated everyday circumstances (Wolf 1990). Such critical junctions, moreover, have a path dependency, a historical weight and a direction of their own that cannot so easily be turned around. They keep pushing in a particular direction, remain captured by particular fields of power and signification, until some major things happen, often both locally, globally and on intermediate levels at the same time, through which the path dependencies become ‘punctuated’. Both in their continuities and discontinuities, critical junctions are overdetermined by systemic relationships of inequality, power and dependence.

Now, the claim is that it is precisely in these dynamic interlinkages that the politics of fear and anger incubates. The politics of fear is therefore not the unmediated consequence of cultural implosions and global cultural cascades, such as in Appadurai’s account of ethnic riots in India (Appadurai 1996). Rather, while turbulence does happen, fear is generally nurtured, step by step and over time, within the unfolding and grinding mechanisms that link livelihoods and neighbourhoods with mass-mediated, national-level political articulations and mobilizations, as they are constrained, pressurized and energized by globally constituted relationships of exploitation and dependency. Most of these critical junctions can be precisely identified and analysed through time and throughout space, though not always necessarily by the classical methods of ethnography. Examining how the politics of fear is incubated and nurtured within them is ultimately an agenda that requires an obsession with local historical discovery and a critical reading of large-scale global and national processes from the vantage point of the particular and situated livelihoods of subaltern classes. Ethnography is essential but must be extended by methods that capture the flow of time and connections in space, by techniques and sources that are not essentially different from our own classical extended case methods, even though Wolf’s ‘macroscopic history’ deserves some re-emphasis (Burawoy et al. 2000; Handelman 2005; Kalb and Tak 2005; Narotzky and Smith 2006; Burawoy 2009).

Class, Clues and Dispossession

Specifically, we would like to suggest, it is the contradictions and disjunctures between everyday agential power fields, tactical state-based political environments – including political and media opportunity structures (see Tarrow 2005) – and global structural power relationships – including the significations that are generated within and between these disjointed, albeit nested, frames – that move popular anxiety and paranoia. Such anxieties, in their turn, energize the nationalist populisms that are taking the place of the earlier liberal modernisms that have gone awry. In a more narrowly political sense, populism, in the current conjuncture, is then the rejection

10. For an excellent recent study, see Narotzky and Smith (2006).
of liberal elites that fail to use the resources of the democratic nation-state to harness global processes to local needs and desires, that celebrate an elite cosmopolitanism, or that use state power and cosmopolitan ideologies in Friedman’s sense for outright local dispossession (about which more in a moment). The narrowly political outcome of this is the generation of telegenetic and charismatic ideologues that create havoc among established political classes and institutions, as political scientists have noted all along. But more broadly conceived, populism refers to the moods and sensibilities of the disenfranchised as they face the disjunctures between everyday lives that seem to become increasingly chaotic and uncontrollable and the wider public power projects that are out of their reach and suspected of serving their ongoing disenfranchisement. In Charles Tilly’s definition of democracy, this is explicitly seen as ‘de-democratization’ (Tilly 2004, 2007). De-democratization in his deeply sociological vision goes together with an imposed reliance on particularized trust networks crucial for working-class social reproduction. It is the enforced particularization of trust and the narrowing of the public sphere that lights the fire of working-class populism.

This is the point where populism, dispossession and hidden histories meet. Let me explain. The recent conjunction of political theory and psychoanalysis in the work of authors such as Benjamin Arditti (2005), Yannis Stavrakakis (2007) and Slavoj Žižek (2008) has powerfully suggested that working-class populism on a deeper level must be seen as a symptom that expresses the ‘return of the repressed’. It is a symptom that both hints at a traumatic experience and a symbol that expresses that experience in distorted ways. Direct access to the traumatic events remains denied but is not quite forgotten. The symptom allows the return of the repressed ‘through more or less tortuous ways’ (Arditti 2005: 88). But what then is the repressed? The clue that I am hinting at, of course, following Žižek and Mouffe, is class in a very broad sense of the term.11 The workings, effects, exploitations and humiliations of class are the repressed and denied but never-forgotten trauma that expresses itself in neo-nationalist populism, as the wider public culture of neoliberal growth, gentrification and cosmopolitan class formation denies its denizens the availability of the language of class. Žižek therefore calls right-wing populism, ‘a displaced version of working-class politics’, and adds sardonically that ‘rightist racist populism is today the best argument that the “class struggle”, far from being obsolete, goes on’ (Žižek 2008: 267). I share his conclusion that ‘fundamentalist populism is filling in the void of the absence of a leftist dream’ (Žižek 2008: 275). The symptom brings class back in the form of aching Unbehagen and moral panic.

Michael Perelman (2000), David Harvey (2003) and others have lately called renewed attention to Marx’s work on ‘primitive accumulation’, which argued that capitalism had come into being through assets that were accumulated in

11. For extensive interdisciplinary discussions of class from an anthropological viewpoint, see Kalb (1997) and Narotzky and Smith (2006).
Introduction

non-market-based ways, by outright seizure and the use of power, violence and law. The British enclosures of the early modern period are the classic example. Harvey and others now criticize Marx for assuming that this was only relevant for the ‘prehistory’ of capital. Capitalism, as Rosa Luxemburg and later Hannah Arendt famously argued, would always be dependent, also in its contemporary workings, on pushing people, goods and other assets into the circuits of capital by non-market, political and violent ways, thus giving systemic subsidies to capital accumulation. To erase the teleology, Harvey aptly reframed the notion as ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey 2003). While ‘accumulation by expanded reproduction’, in his terms, implies a broadly shared growth of the social product through increases in productivity and social wages, accumulation by dispossession describes a situation where the growth of profits and capital goes together with a destruction of assets, or closure of access to assets, essential for the social reproduction of ‘ordinary people’ and a politically organized downward pressure on the social wage. Harvey cites privatization, massive devaluation and a reduction of social rights and ‘the commons’ as the classical ways by which this happens.

Harvey’s suggestions are helpful for making crucial distinctions for analysing the large-scale mechanisms of uneven social change under neoliberal globalization. However, Harvey makes the fundamental Leftist error of assuming that accumulation by dispossession is intimately associated with the growth of anti-globalist left-wing protest against corporate appropriation (see also Kalb 2009b). While that may happen – important examples from the global South: for instance, Via Campesina in Brazil and left-wing organizing in Soweto and West Bengal12 – it makes sense to point to a recurrent affinity of accumulation by dispossession and working-class neo-nationalist populism of the Right in the European context, in spite of the occasional largely liberal or left-leaning populism – such as the Scottish example discussed by Gilfillan (this volume). Post-politics and the marginalization of left-wing alternatives, including the utter discrediting of socialism and Marxism in postsocialist Eastern Europe, are the obvious reason. The deeper cause, however, is the aligning of upper-middle-class interests with the liberal cosmopolitanism of transnational elites and their globalization project, now deflecting their earlier interest in class language, social rights and welfare-state formation onto the abstract humanism of human rights in neoliberalized incarnation. New class formations, in other words, are the explanation.

This makes the analysis of particular paths and experiences of accumulation by dispossession both important and hazardous. Important, because they promise to deliver insights into the crucial mechanisms and intimate histories of dispossession that lay locked and distorted within populist public discourse; hazardous because the symptomatic character of the latter misrecognizes the actual properties of the former. In a very literal sense we are therefore confronted with ‘hidden histories’.

12. See, e.g., the fascinating section by Luisa Steur et al. (2009) on accumulation by dispossession in Asia.
In the particular case of postsocialist Eastern Europe, the repression is even more intractable. For one, class language after socialism has been even more explicitly delegitimized than in the West, with a broad popular rejection of Soviet imposed ideology and a broad appeal of notions of democracy and reform (see, e.g., Ost 2005; Kalb 2009a, 2009b). Indeed, ‘joining the West’, ‘democracy’ and ‘reform’ have been such powerful public symbols of redemption in Eastern Europe that analysing the systemic contradictions of world capitalist processes and postsocialist social change has until recently been all but tabooed among Central and East European (CEE) intellectuals (but see Szalai 2008, and below). Such narratives have simply not been available. What is available is a growing rightist undercurrent, sometimes becoming mainstream, which senses the injustices against the people and seeks to unmask the enemy within and without that can be made responsible.

The Uses of Ethnic Othering

Although headlines in the Western press tend to paint an orientalizing picture of postsocialist Eastern Europe as a cauldron of majority-ethnic nationalisms, there has, in fact, been very little anthropological work on the dynamics of neo-nationalisms in the region. This stands in contrast to work by political scientists and political sociologists, who have consistently discussed East European nationalisms, often in alarmist mode, since the early 1990s (e.g., Tismaneanu 1998). The newest wave of such work is less alarmist and much more analytical and has started to experiment with, and advocate, ethnographic methods (Derluguian 2005; Ost 2005).

Western media, of course, tend to treat majority nationalisms in the West differently. They see the recent conflicts within which nationalisms in the West are expressed as conflicts about immigration, spurred on by local far-right movements and sharpened by ‘the war on terror’, ‘Islamic networks’ and headscarves at school. Social research has not been much different and has approached majority nationalism primarily under the sign of ethnicity and immigration, for which there is now many times more research funding available than for ethnographic class-oriented research. After so many declarations of its demise, the white working-class, apparently, must have now become a middle class, and is not supposed to have any further justification for existing in its ‘class form’. It may reappear in the form of teenage single mothers, hooligans, school drop-outs, fascists, youth gangs, disposable workers and their need for constant re-education, and single poor old people in less agreeable neighbourhoods. But by offering them up in slices small enough for expert treatments and rejecting ‘classness’ altogether, and by buying into culture-talk, ethnicity crazes and migration panics, both social

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13. For a similar critique, see also Berezin (2009). Klandermans and Mayer (2006) are a case in point.
research and public journalism mystify the sources of populist nationalism in the West by shifting them onto actors deemed ultimately external to the core of the West itself; that is, migrants and the fringe of the extreme Right. By referring to the ethnic other as their ultimate causation, right-wing (or left-wing) xenophobic events and movements are figured as aberrations from a supposedly well-established norm of liberalism in the supposedly middle-class societies of the West, which appear in sharp and flattering contrast to the East, which is nationalist and working-class.

Against such self-gratifying occidentalist imagery, it is our contention that Western and Eastern European nationalist populisms have broadly similar social roots and not incomparable constituencies. They are occasioned by processes of neoliberal globalization and class restructuring on global, regional, national and local levels. Their actual event-based dynamics, of course, derive from differentially ordered and sequentialized political fields, and they get their symbolism from profoundly different national imaginations, histories, memories and amnesias. That is, their surface is indeed different. But their synchronization after 1989 is no coincidence and their formal causation in the current world historical context is a general one. Teasing out the universal from the particular must be part of the anthropological remit.

Recent anthropological work on neo-nationalism in Western Europe (Gingrich and Banks 2005) has somewhat echoed the media’s emphasis on migrants and far Right movements. While this work has given us a much more socially embedded understanding of the far Right in various nations than hitherto achieved – for example, emphasizing the link with threatened working-class masculinity – it has done little to expel the orientalizing and occidentalizing mystifications discussed above. Alternatively, it has focused (Holmes 2000) on conservative West European elites and their revived Catholic organicist ideologies. This does help to re-establish cultural essentialism in its rightful place within the right flank of Western European and continental state making projects but cannot explain its populist dynamics and contents outside elite circles.

The combined focus of the present volume on Eastern and Western Europe helps to facilitate a shift of perspective towards class and to point out the self-serving distortions generated by the ethnic and immigrant focus in the West. Eastern European right-wing populisms have grown lately, particularly in Poland (see Kalb 2009a, 2009b) and in Hungary (see Halmai, Bartha, this volume). But they cannot so easily be explained away by referring to the ‘ethnic other’ as some nationalisms in Western Europe can. On an emic level, participants in these East European movements are frantically searching for precisely such an ethnic opponent, which is sometimes available to them in the figure of the Gypsy – though hardly in Poland. While Roma do indeed figure heavily in Czech, Slovak, Bulgarian and Hungarian rightist populist imaginaries, they are of course not immigrants, and few of them are concentrated in the great cities of the east, such as Budapest or Cracow, as is the case with Moroccans in Rotterdam, Brussels and Paris, Pakistanis in London and Manchester, Turks in Berlin and Essen, and Romanians in
Rome and Zaragoza. Indeed, East European Roma tend to live either in the stagnating countryside or in and around provincial industrial cities, such as Miskolc or Kosice, that have been hit exceptionally hard by processes of working-class dispossession. Moreover, they have lived in those surroundings for a long time. And while 90 per cent of them had formal employment under socialism, they did not pose as an object of open hatred then as they do now. Indeed, they are a newly re-ethnicized, unemployed and re-casualized former working-class which has, in Tilly’s words, precisely become a public moral concern only since the public sector and publicly regulated employment has collapsed, forcing them back into their own particularized networks for social reproduction. In other words, Roma are the quintessential classe dangereuse in Friedman’s sense (see also Chevalier 1981). Once belonging to the lower reaches of the socialist working-class, they are now thoroughly dispossessed and have been left to their own depleted informal and sometimes criminal shadow economies. They were then turned into an imagined object of fear for struggling citizens in massively declining provincial cities, desperately clinging to the old standards of respectability. Ironically, therefore, the postsocialist East allows us to tell the West about class again.

Current neo-nationalist populisms, then, represent a systemic, structural, locally contingent and socially meaningful phenomenon, and scholars should therefore try to grasp them in these interlocking dimensions. Peter Worsley wrote long ago that populism is ‘the eternal attempt of people to claim politics as something of theirs’, as they grope for ‘substantive justice’ and appeal ‘to the involvement of people in the running of their own societies’ (Worsley 1969: 248, 244, 245). This is an anthropological agenda par excellence. Would Worsley have been surprised that post-1989 populisms have partially moved from the global South to the global North, from the periphery to the centre, and from the Left to the Right?

Sites of Class and the Nation: Decentring Western Europe from the East

In a collection on neo-nationalism within and beyond Europe, Gingrich and Banks have recently written that, ‘From the outset, Western Europe … represented a central regional focus of this debate, thereby acknowledging that an assessment of nationalism under the post-socialist conditions prevailing elsewhere in Europe would require a debate of its own’ (Gingrich and Banks 2005: 1). They go on to say they seek to balance an emphasis on agency with a grasp of historical and structural causes. As has become clear, we agree only

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14. The realization that liberal human-rights discourses, including cultural rights, in a context of massive dispossession and disenfranchisement of the Roma populations in CEE after 1989 are deeply insufficient to turn their degradation around permeates recent publications: see, e.g., Trehan and Sigona (2010).
partly with the methodological reasoning behind the first statement. Yes, the tactical arenas are differently composed by different historical forces, ideologies and sequences among all European nations and broadly between West and East (and North and South, and so on). But the structural and macro-historical forces playing out in the world system as a whole, and impinging differently but radically on all European locations alike, are not that dissimilar. There are different locations in a common process rather than different processes in a common location (‘Europe’). What we have called critical junctions must be identified correctly and should be made explicit.

Consequently, we believe that Gingrich and Banks’s hold on structural and historical causes is not entirely satisfying, in particular the connection between the two. We argue that similar structural forces all over Europe produce comparable though differently situated, proportioned, articulated and publicly signified outcomes. We also argue that outcomes in Eastern Europe are more likely than those in Western Europe to teach us that processes of class are the core systemic driver and facilitator of these local–global processes, outcomes in the West being so hegemonized under the sign of the politics of immigration and the repertoire of cultural difference. This is not meant to deny that immigration and ‘integration’ generates real and serious issues for societies in the West, or to deny that ‘culture’ could somehow play a role in that. But the staggering prevalence of immigration issues and clashes of culture over processes of class in the academic agenda surely reflects the hegemony of rightist discourse in Western Europe. Approaching Western outcomes from the Eastern side alerts us to the possibility that other driving forces, more straightforwardly associated with the making, unmaking, and restructuring of class, may be the more fundamental ground from which xenophobia as a politically driven process gets its support base in the West, not merely from the everyday friction of ‘cultures’.

Of course, ultimately, on a higher level of abstraction and causation, class restructuring and polarization, social insecurity and (im)migration are all simultaneously encapsulated in the notion of neoliberal globalization. They are sides of the same coin. But this helps little in establishing relative causal priorities in explaining populist nationalist outcomes in Europe. In this collection we look at such outcomes with a strong emphasis on class (as relationally defined). First, we build our arguments on Eastern as well as Western evidence and move as it were from East to West rather than the other way around, which is unusual given global hierarchies that construct Eastern Europe as diverging from Western norms. In fact, we do an exercise in decentring the West from the East. Secondly, we focus on non-metropolitan

15. See Gaspard (1995) for an early study demonstrating precisely that.

16. See Chakrabarty (2000). However, against Chakrabarty, we do this with Marx rather than Heidegger, which is what he, strangely, thinks is impossible because Marx would be the penultimate embodiment of Western teleologies. I am afraid Heidegger is as well. And both can be read profitably without teleology if we read them relationally and historically.
Western populist cases, in northern Italian Alpine communities (Jaro Stacul) and a Scottish post-mining district (Paul Gilfillan), where immigration plays no overt role in generating nationalist populism, though it does so in our third Western case, in a central Italian shoemaking district (Michael Blim). Thus we evade the methodological problem of the ‘contamination’ of class and immigration factors. The cost of that strategy is that we leave Western European metropolitan processes out and cannot directly interrogate the most complex and entangled cases in the West, though we would maintain that we will be better positioned to do so at a later date.

Following the good academic rule that one should attack the strongest bastions of the intellectual enemy first, our collection starts with Dora Vetta’s analysis of nationalist populism in Kikinda, Serbia. In the common-sense post-1989 Western perspective, Serbia functioned as the penultimate example of an essentialized populist nationalism (see, e.g., Kaplan 1994). However, Vetta studies a place that was not just far from the war, located in the northern Vojvodina, but also one that openly rejected Milosevic’s warmongering from 1996 onwards, and helped to generate the broad electoral rebuttal of Milosevic in 2000. Kikinda is a multi-ethnic, multilingual and multi-religious industrial city which because of its anti-war politics and its multicultural composition and practice was awarded the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) prize for the ‘most tolerant city’ in Serbia in 2003. Kikinda, indeed, was one of the proud sites of Yugoslav urban industrial modernity, featuring some of the best and well-known industries of the federal republic. The ‘tolerance’ praised by the OSCE was in fact part of the Yugoslav socialist success story, as Vetta shows. After 2000, however, the broadly pro-European coalitions that laboured to bring Serbia closer to the EU, the democratic principles of the OSCE, and to transnational capital, allowed the destruction of the Kikinda employment base and the collapse of the urban social services financed by local industry. European capital, to the extent that it came, did not always come to revitalize local plants. Often it came to close them down with an eye on limiting competition in Europe, a not uncommon experience in Central and Eastern Europe (see also Halmai, Bartha, this volume). Hence the irony: Just a year after receiving the OSCE prize and being showcased as the example of European liberal cultural modernity in Serbia, the Kikinda electorate gave majority support to Seselj’s Radical Party, which had always been even more uncompromisingly nationalist than Milosevic’s socialists. Kikinda residents now explicitly compared their conditions with those of Africa, Vetta reports. Indeed, their stories closely resemble Ferguson’s interviewees in the Zambian copperbelt who bitterly complained that the promise of development and modernity never really materialized (Ferguson 1999). The difference is that Kikinda’s citizens had in fact enjoyed such urban industrial modernity for a whole generation. It was now radically being broken up right before their very eyes and they were supposed to consent on behalf of ‘European modernity’. Unsurprisingly, they did not entirely approve. ‘Theft’ they called it bluntly, and they asked for a politics of protection.
Without any credible leftist political discourse available, they voted for the one party that had never given its support to the ongoing ‘theft’ and had indeed consistently criticized it. Vetta concludes that material processes of dispossession and sheer rational self-interest explain why engineers, foremen and workers alike endorsed the Serbian populism of Seselj, whose articulate analysis of current global political economy and its consequences for Serbia, quoted by Vetta, reads uncomfortably as if the author has followed seminars by David Harvey, Immanuel Wallerstein and Samir Amin.

We meet again ‘the obsessive theme of the stolen country and the stolen factories’, as Petrovici calls it, in two case studies of Cluj-Napoca, Romania. Obsession is, of course, a recognized feature of the trauma we discussed earlier. Both Petrovici and Faje show once more that the experience of ‘theft’ and the threatening collapse of modern urban livelihoods among the Romanian industrial working-class explains much of the public support for the virulently nationalist mayor Funar over a twelve-year period that only ended in 2004 with accession to the EU and exceptionally large-scale inflows of transnational capital seeking local skilled labour supplies connected to this. In the early 1990s, when Yugoslavia began to fall apart, Czechoslovakia was breaking up, the Baltic states were seceding from the Soviet Union with violence only precariously subdued, and ‘subproletariats’ (Derlugouian 2005) sustained their fighting in the Caucasus, many observers held their breath for Transylvania and its capital city, Cluj-Napoca. The formerly Hungarian territories of Romania hosted mixed populations with a substantial Hungarian speaking section, a population moreover that felt itself still deeply victimized by the Trianon Treaty of 1923 (the Eastern counterpart of the Treaty of Versailles) and the Romanian state, and which had never fully agreed to the imposed borders. Nor did the Hungarian state after 1989 seem satisfied with the settlement. Fortunately, apart from a big brawl in 1991 in Târgu-Mureș, very little collective violence happened.

The historical sociologist of nationalism in Europe, Rogers Brubaker, in an extensive historical and ethnographic study of Cluj (Brubaker et al. 2006), has recently explained this unexpectedly benign local outcome via a critique of prevalent notions of ethnicity. Ethnicity, he argued, often seems to evoke a ‘groupism’ that is rarely warranted. He recommends treating ethnicity as a ‘cognitive repertoire’, which should not be reified and equated with the supposed existence of actual cohesive groups competing with other groups. While Brubaker poses in this study as an ethnographer who bases his insights on ‘conversational analysis’, he pays scant respect to work in the anthropology of ethnicity, even though anthropologists had arguably arrived at broadly similar ‘non-groupist’ conceptions long before him (e.g., Barth 1969; Epstein 1978; Eriksen 1993; Rogers and Vertovec 1995; Halpern and Kideckel 1997; Richards 2009). Few of his overall insights will therefore surprise an anthropologist. It seems, however, that his target is the popular and journalistic contemporary ‘groupist’ connotation of ethnicity in the West (and among World Bank researchers and so on), a product of panic rather than academic insight.
But there are also crucial differences with anthropological accounts. Anthropologists tend to approach ethnicity as a symbolic repertoire functioning within the context of ongoing social relations, relations which should be studied ethnographically in their historical and situated unfolding. In other words, they endorse a ‘relationally realist’ approach to ethnicity as one available symbolic repertoire among many. Brubaker, however, makes a double idealist move as compared to this anthropological work. He does this by transforming the prefix ‘symbolic’ – which refers to a public process or event – to a merely ‘cognitive’ act that apparently eventuates in the individual mind; and by subsequently substituting historical ethnography with ‘conversational analysis’ based on interviews and focus groups. Predictably, his book comprises a strictly urban historical section on Cluj – which is excellent in itself but simply functions as a historical backdrop – and a strictly synchronous section on the use of cognitive ethnic categories based exclusively on conversational analysis. This division of the book is no unfortunate coincidence: ‘everyday ethnicity’, Brubaker maintains, stands opposed to large-scale historical forces and institutional processes, and the latter have little purchase on the former. It is somewhat surprising to see this construct of an everyday life emptied of power, politics and publics thirty years after the blurring of anthropology and history and the proliferation of cultural studies started to offer us less naive tools. But indeed, to say it crudely, this is no anthropology or ethnography. Petrovici also points out that this approach stands in sharp contrast to the relational Brubaker of earlier work (Brubaker and Cooper 2000), and he cunningly employs Bourdieu to show the limitations of Brubaker’s use of Bourdieu.

While Brubaker’s cognitive repertoire may help to describe how ethnicity in Cluj remained a largely private experience, it cannot explain why the loud and boisterous nationalist Funar came on the scene, won three consecutive local elections, and only went in 2004 after twelve long and tumultuous years of rule. Brubaker, confronted with that fact, suggests somewhat helplessly that residents of Cluj found Funar ‘ridiculous’. Perhaps, counters Petrovici, but they did vote for him en masse and not because he was perceived as a collective embarrassment. More precisely, Funar’s votes were concentrated in the large, modern working-class neighbourhoods built as residential adjuncts to socialist industry in the 1970s and early 1980s. Petrovici sets out to show that power struggles over public politics, public symbols and public space are a necessary background for explaining the upsurge of Romanian nationalism in the worker suburbs of Cluj after 1989. He also demonstrates that such public struggles cannot be understood without studying processes of class, and in particular the trajectories and experiences of dispossession experienced by industrial workers.

17. For an explicit recent statement, see Richards (2009).
18. For a taste of the debate on anthropology and history, see Kalb and Tak (2005).

A marvelous recent item from a historian deeply involved in that discussion is Rebel (2010).
The postsocialist case studies in this book underline that one should never ignore the fact that the major gain of socialism for much of Eastern Europe had been the possibility of modern urban life for an erstwhile largely rural and deeply impoverished population. To overstate the case only slightly, prior to 1940 cities in eastern Central Europe and in South-eastern Europe in particular had been home for the Germans, Jews, Hungarians and other dominant classes. Socialism had brought peasants into the city as a modern and literate proletariat. The collapse of socialism after 1989 under neoliberal globalist auspices threatened to reduce this urban working-class to peasants once again. Petrovici studies in detail how the collapse and privatization of factories and the general loss of economic resources hit Romanian workers’ pride. Industrial suburbs that had been added to the older Hungarian city of Kolozsvár (Cluj) between the 1960s and 1980s had once embodied hope, progress and modernity. Now they were being reduced to spaces without hope for an underemployed and casualized sub-working-class that was often being referred to again as peasants in the city. As in Vetta’s Kikinda, just over the border in Serbia, the postsocialist collapse threatened to erase people’s life achievement of actually having become urban and modern. People of Cluj did not compare themselves with Africans, as did people in Kikinda, but they noted with deep dismay that they had tumbled to the lowest rung in Europe. While the inner city of Cluj was still largely associated with the Hungarian middle classes, Romanian workers from the de-classed suburban blocs supported a politician who claimed that the modern urbanity of central Cluj was actually theirs. Petrovici argues, therefore, that the significance of Funar was about articulating the workers’ right to the city after the industrial base of Cluj, on which their presence in the city had depended, had collapsed. Workers had become suspended between a peasant past and an indeterminate postsocialist future without clues about their possible status and prospects. In other words, the actual obsession with urban space and symbols was a useful displacement, created by Funar and other ideologues, from the traumatizing obsession with stolen factories that no one seemed to have the power to bring back.

Florin Faje discusses the same urban arena but from the perspective of competition between two football clubs in Cluj. The more established club, Universitatea, became increasingly appropriated as their symbolic home during the 1990s by young casualized males from the suburban blocs. Turning ever more confrontational and nationalist, they pushed both the Hungarian and Romanian middle-class fans out of the club. These then embraced an older but traditionally less successful club, CFR, which was bought up by a Hungarian entrepreneur in the early 2000s and turned into a capitalist football machine, buying up players from Africa, Latin America and elsewhere, winning the national championship and qualifying for European tournaments. This is Friedman’s divide between cosmopolitan classes and indigenized or dangerous classes neatly embodied in the ritualized rivalry between two local football clubs and their fans. Again, it is class experiences and emergent class divides that drive the process at a popular level.
Faje’s study is a good reminder that the public arena for the populist politics of class and neo-nationalism is indeed the public sphere as a whole, and not just politics narrowly conceived. That public sphere importantly includes the media and all sorts of public perceptions, representations and events. Michal Buchowski has shown how the public spheres of postsocialist countries and the new ‘free’ media in particular became the theatre for fantasizing about the emergence of a middle class, and with it consumption and prosperity, as in the occidentalized imagination of the West. At the same time they coined and spread orientalizing notions of workers and peasants as an internal and eternal ‘East’ that could ultimately endanger the rise of postsocialist middle classes and should hence better be silenced by open humiliation (Buchowski 2006; see also Kalb 2009a, 2009b). The notion of dispossession undoubtedly has a hard materialist core, but it does have a strong cultural dimension as well which is not always sufficiently recognized. Honour, dignity and prestige are scarce public goods that can be allocated to you by political societies, but they can also be taken away from you. If that happens, public politics starts to punish the poor and blame the victims of dispossession for their own plight, as Loic Wacquant in particular has showed (Wacquant 2009). Indeed, one cannot think about ‘hard’ processes of dispossession getting institutionalized over time without sustained public assaults on the credits, honour and dignity of those that are being dispossessed.¹⁹ Postsocialist ‘transition’ was such a double-edged process. The studies of Kikinda and Cluj-Napoca hint at how the collapse of jobs and suburban neighbourhoods was paired to wider forms of public humiliation, in which dominant liberal ‘talking classes’ close to relevant power arenas became perceived as openly contemptuous of ‘the common folk’, their ways of life and the urban infrastructures on which they depended. In return, subalterns suspected them of being keen on moving ordinary people back, minimally in imaginary ways, to where they came from, that is the underdeveloped ‘Eastern’ countryside (or ‘Africa’ or ‘the lowest rung in Europe’). Socialism and nationalism – and democracy before its marriage with neoliberalism – were the symbolic repertoires cum institutional complexes that historically helped to elevate subaltern populations de jure from disenfranchised subjects into citizens and to possess them of the modern jobs, rights and duties that would allow them to socially become so. As argued above, in the absence of socialist alternatives, populist nationalism in the current conjuncture becomes the vehicle by which dispossessed populations fight the symbolic aspects of dispossession in the hope that the material aspects might follow. The Funar interlude in Cluj is a good example. Halmai’s and Bartha’s studies of respectively Budapest and Győr in Hungary bring further insight to such analyses, located as they are on the very border of ‘the West’ and in a country that has recently become the prime example of rising working-class populist nationalism.

¹⁹. On credit, see Tilly (2008).
A good 100 kilometres east of Vienna – an exemplar of European urban grandeur, and currently a wealthy and successful regional banking centre that extends its financial networks farther to the east than the Habsburg Empire ever did – lies the Hungarian city of Győr, and around it one of the most successful export-oriented manufacturing zones to have developed in postsocialist Europe. Even more than Cluj after 2000, Győr is one of two or three locations in Central and Eastern Europe that have seen by far the largest transnational flow of industrial investment, starting before 1989. Based around automotive and electronics manufacturing, these investments came not to kill off earlier industries, such as in Kikinda, but to create new green-field plants that generated substantial employment and offered among the best wages in the country to young, educated workers. However, with long tax holidays in a quasi free-trade zone, and dependent on international rather than local suppliers, as well as on inputs from engineers in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands rather than from Hungary, they contribute only a little to the national economy as such.

After twenty years of ‘transition’, Eszter Bartha’s interviewees in Győr’s slowly dying Rába plant are keenly aware that this form of development does not substitute for the roundabout and thick national development that socialism, and the Rába motor vehicle plant that was one of its national symbols, once brought. The number of jobs is insufficient to substitute for the tens of thousands that Rába offered and that are now largely gone; the profits are repatriated to the West; and tax holidays do not help to maintain local urban services. Worse, Rába managers rewarded themselves ever better salaries while limiting the wages for workers and administrators whose jobs were recurrently cut or restructured, and they actively dismantled and sold parts of the factory complex, among others for lucrative real estate deals close to the city centre. The ‘stories of decline’, as Bartha understands the narration of her interviewees, narrate creeping dispossession both in its hard and soft forms and, like elsewhere, speak explicitly of ‘theft’ of what was once conceived and experienced as ‘the people’s property’. Their stories are not just about the factory, they are also about the stagnation of family fortunes as declining real wages, dwindling job opportunities and insufficient state benefits make social reproduction over time ever more precarious. People complain that what they got from socialism – the chance to make and sustain a family, build a career around honest work, and maintain a house of one’s own – can’t so easily be gained today. The stories of decline are also about a keenly felt erosion of solidarity and communal life.

Bartha, a social historian of Eastern Europe, reminds us, importantly, that the communist parties of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were by 1980 well aware of their societies’ relative economic and technological deterioration vis-à-vis the West. But, dependent as they were on the continued silent support of industrial workers, they would not let living standards slip. The new post-1989 elites did not have such hard limitations on their power and allowed 1.5 million jobs to go in Hungary alone and social inequalities
between workers and the new managerial classes to explode. One of Bartha’s articulate interviewees says, insightfully, ‘this working-class [used to be] part of the middle class, but [now] they have lost their cause. And they are alone with their problems because they don’t ask for benefits. And if they are not recorded, who gets interested in their problems?’ Silenced and dispossessed, they endorse a populism that exalts the nation as a repository of virtue that must be protected against a parasitic elite in Budapest and in the new managerial functions that seem bent on selling out to international capitalist predators who, as another interviewee says, ‘take us for nothing’. How else can one explain that circumstances seem so radically different a mere half hour by car to the West?

Bartha employs a comparison with workers in the Zeiss optical factories of Jena in the former GDR to show that while dispossession is far more comprehensive in Győr, it is the former East German workers who have actually endorsed a critique of capitalism as such, while those in Győr cannot speak the more structural language of anti-capitalism anymore. In characteristic populist fashion the latter must therefore detect and denounce the profiteers who deceive the people and prevent them from having the healthy national capitalism that is on display just over the border in Austria. The explanation for the difference between Rába and Zeiss workers, Bartha suggests, lies in the continued and indeed revitalized presence of an articulate anti-capitalism in public and political life in Germany and the disappearance of it in Hungary. It also makes a difference to the popular analysis whether you are ‘taken’ on the basis of good standards by your own national capitalists or ‘taken for nothing’ by those from another nation with your own rulers being complicit in an unequal deal from which the foreigners gain. The symbol of the nation here serves hardly as a displacement of something else called ‘the economy’, but rather reflects crudely the huge global inequalities within which capitalism as well as concrete capitalists and their lieutenants thrive.20

In the context of unlocking the dialectics between popular resentment and the mediated messages of the organized far Right it is not irrelevant that Bartha’s interviews are from 2002. One of her interviewees mentions the nationalism of Istvan Csurka, with whom they partly agree. At that point in time Hungary did not yet have a strong nationalist right-wing movement except for the rather isolated Csurka. It was popular nationalism prior to mobilization and strong media discourses. This suggests that the perceptions of Bartha’s informants at the time may not have then been formed by articulate national level actors and populist mobilization. The Kikinda case, as narrated here by Dora Vetta, shows, too, that voters moved to a long-established nationalist party only in the course of experiencing tangible and

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20. Such huge global inequalities separating nations come dramatically together in the worst-off places close to the German and Austrian borders. The Polish former mining town of Walbrzych, in the Sudeten mountains and less than 100 kilometres from the German border, may be the most dramatic case of deep and durable poverty and abandonment in close proximity to world-class wealth.
systematic dispossession. The Cluj case is more ambivalent in that regard, nationalist sentiments seeming to grow in tandem with the emergence of Funar’s campaign in ways that are hard to disentangle in retrospect. Halmay’s contribution is unique in focusing squarely on the ongoing interplay of campaigns and mobilizations within the formal political field on the one hand and the discursive articulation of popular experience on the other.

Halmay presents an ethnographic study of the emergent Civic Circles movement, called into being by Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian conservative leader, after his election loss of 2002. The Circles, a highly decentralized set of civic initiatives mobilized and certified by Orbán’s party, acquired over a hundred thousand members in a short span of time and developed a clear logic of their own as newly activated people started to push Orbán’s party more to the nationalist Right. Tellingly, this new populist Right rejects the privatization of social services and public utilities, and is against the World Bank-inspired neoliberal policies of the social democrats. In a literal sense, their outlook is more national socialist than conservative Christian-democratic of the West European variety, even though that is what Orbán always had in mind. Halmay shows how the Circles, by taking politics into the streets and neighbourhoods, ultimately helped to prepare the ground for long cycles of nationalist cum far Right demonstrations against the incumbent social democratic postsocialist government in Budapest in late 2006 and after. Halmay participated in events and meetings of the Circles from 2005 to 2009 and shows how populist nationalism could gradually become hegemonic in its mobilization against the former socialists turned neoliberal state managers. His study focuses on the two formerly ‘red districts’ of Csepel and Újpest, the centres of the worker-council movement of 1956. In these worker districts, once firmly controlled by the former socialists after the 1956 uprising, the Circles gradually made deep inroads as deindustrialization, disinvestment, privatization, inequality and ostensible corruption around real estate increasingly discredited the post-1989 order. By 2009, Orbán enjoyed the largest voter support of any party in Europe, while his Right flank was covertly fading into the new explicitly anti-Semitic, anti-Gypsy, national socialism of the new far Right Jobbik party that, allied to the hundreds strong, uniformly armed Magyar Garda, had become the third largest force in the Hungarian political field. The Circles had helped to generate a Gramscian counter-hegemony of an angry populist Right against the transnational class and its comprador representatives on the one hand and the classes dangereuses of Roma communities on the other.

Hungary, thus, appears to have become the current locus classicus of the Friedman’s politics of double polarization discussed above, with Poland a good second (see Kalb 2009a, 2009b). What can we learn from our three Western cases in the light of these processes in the East? Gilfillan’s mobile and flexible workers of Fife, the former Scottish pit district, and Stacul’s similarly mobile worker-peasants in the northern Italian Alps clearly seem like a happy and quiescent lot compared to the bitterly disappointed east
Central European worker communities explored in this volume. Home ownership, acceptable incomes, even good early retirement schemes make life pretty well bearable and sometimes even surprisingly enjoyable for quite a few people, as Gilfillan in particular shows. But two things stand out. First, both settings have suffered severe population decline as earlier local political economies organized around mining and complex Alpine village economies have collapsed in the wake of the globalization of markets. This gives an indication of how precarious local social reproduction has become and how fragile the self-maintenance of a local community is these days. Secondly, neither setting expects much from central states and metropolitan politics anymore, except for their pensions and health care. At the same time, they seem increasingly dependent on locally attuned welfare arrangements and support from regional political centres. Working-class nationalism in Scotland, with its anti-British orientation, and worker-peasant ‘regionalist nationalisms’ in the Italian Alps, with their affinities with the anti-Rome politics of the Lega Nord and Forza Italia, are the overt expressions of those two basic facts. Politics is exuberantly anti-metropolitan.

There is at least one more important commonality and one significant difference between these two cases. In both settings local political energies seem to spring from a keen appreciation of the physicality of their characteristic forms of labour. This is the force that must be sustained and that keeps what is left of these communities vital, and which is hence keenly celebrated and contrasted with bourgeois life and politics. But this cultural emphasis on physical labour and labourism gets politically signified in entirely contrastive ways. In the former pit village it builds on a left-wing heritage and takes this further into an anti-British left-wing politics of Scottish nationalism, lending boisterous support to the Scottish National Party and the Scottish Parliament’s push for independence. In the Alpine valleys, however, it helps to take local politics after the collapse of the national party system in the early 1990s out of the ‘social’ and workerist strain within Christian democracy and into the slightly xenophobic neoliberalism of Berlusconi and Bossi. Gilfillan describes masterfully how the anti-bourgeois politics of physical labour in Fife leads to a rejection of domination by London, which is denounced as neoliberal and imperial. Stacul shows in detail how ‘being a worker’ leads to an affinity with the ‘worker’ Berlusconi against a left-wing bureaucratic class in Rome that ‘has never worked’. And both populisms in fact claim to be of a different nationality than the one that belongs to the hated centre; they are Padanians and Scots.

Michael Blim’s case, situated in the highly industrialized Marche region in central Italy, shows some different aspects again. Blim’s case is one where xenophobic forces only emerged in the last few years. It is a place where considerable prosperity is still generated through export industries, a wealth that is surprisingly equally distributed, in spite of a gradual decline in workers’ living standards over the last decade. It is a success story of the Italian Left, which ruled the area together with the Christian Democrats
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and their successor parties for some thirty years. Blim explains the recent emergence of a strong protest vote for the Lega Nord as being precisely due to the very success of the Left. This is not a Left that historically faced big concentrated capital but rather a dispersed and highly artisanal and specialized form of capital, and it was therefore never really strong on the shop floor. Rather, it emerged on the basis of electoral gains and subsequent political bargaining. Over the years this led to a strong local and regional corporatism. Ensnared in political alliances with small capital and the Right, the Left had to gradually lose its critical edge. It failed to mobilize against deindustrialization, systematic violations of labour standards in response to competition, and creeping decline. Significantly, it never reached out to the large percentage (almost 20 per cent of the labour force) of immigrant workers that kept local export industries globally competitive. Moving ever more with local workers’ sentiments to a self-protective chauvinism, the Left failed to generate a new electoral base among the large immigrant groups. The Lega Nord polled a surprising 17 per cent in the local elections in 2010, reflecting a decline of the Democratic Party (the new name of the former communists) with similar numbers and expressing the growing anti-immigrant sentiment that Blim had been noting over the years.

There are significant differences between these three Western European locations and the east Central European settings in this book, limiting their comparability for our purposes. They are less urban, much smaller in terms of population size, and less economically and socially differentiated. Where Romanian nationalist workers in Cluj-Napoca demand their right to the city and the workers in Győr and Kikinda would certainly like to claim their right to be Europeans, the populist politics of former Alpine lumberjacks and the worker nationalism of casualized post-mining communities in Scotland is rather about the right not to move to a city and the right to be (with) oneself and not something else. Scale, homogeneity and peripherality clearly matter here. The ethnographies of Stacul and Gilfillan give a graphic sense of that anthropological difference.

But these three Western cases do deliver a relevant comparative insight: worker populisms in the West – nationalist or regionalist, Left or Right – often tend to lack the dimension of a critique of (transnational) capital and its supposed conspiracies. They focus on corrupt national state-classes or on exploitative structures centred in the capital city but have little sense of transnational capitalist predators roaming in their backyards as Eastern European workers sometimes have. There is no comparable sense, nor a discourse of, ‘theft’. This certainly reflects their closer location to the sources and nationality of capital. Transnational capital comes in addition to national capital, or does not come at all, but it clearly does not come to destroy local modernities, as it often seems to do in Eastern European experiences and populist perceptions. Of course, despite neoliberal restructurings and capital flight, experiences in the West are not marked by the deep ruptures that have shaped popular experiences in the East. There is significantly more
continuity in the discontinuity. In Western European populisms it is the domestic governing classes that are suspected of causing or allowing the precariousness of local existence (though the Scottish nationalists in Fife would deny they are in fact domestic, of course). In settings not studied here, such as the Netherlands or France, it could certainly be the transnational governing classes of the European Union that are the subject of populist distrust, that distrust perhaps including suspicions of conspiracy and of the complicity of elected national politicians. But even though Le Pen sometimes argued explicitly about the lack of loyalty of big capital to France (now copied by conservative leaders such as Sarkozy and Merkel), there is no similarity with the experience of those postsocialist industrial workers in places such as Győr and Kikinda. Stories of decline abound in all working-class settings, but postsocialist workers sense their outright dispossession and accuse capital and their own state classes openly for the ‘theft’ of what was once more or less genuinely believed to be ‘people’s property’ (see Kalb 2009a, 2009b). Western European workers, meanwhile, feel less openly burgled but do feel deeply abandoned and left behind. They are left on their own. Some populist nationalisms, such as in Italy and the Netherlands, where working-classes are co-opted by neoliberal nationalist alliances, make a classic Bourdieu-like inversion by turning necessity into virtue and telling their state-classes that they also want to be left on their own, in the expectation that they will thus be enabled to win any global competition as well as revitalize their communities and localities. These are neoliberal chauvinistic nationalisms with xenophobic outer edges. In other cases, such as Germany, France, Austria and Belgium, populist nationalism tends to be less neoliberal and would rather call for renewed social protection for deserving insiders offered by the state against the vagaries of markets, the disloyalty of capital, and impositions by Eurocrats. These are the right- or left-wing nationalisms of social protection.

All these nationalisms focus excessively on supposed intrusion into the national body, but different nationalist undercurrents reflecting different public histories and political alliances help to generate slightly different populisms. All in all, our studies suggest that CEE populisms reflect a deep sense of dispossession at the behest of transnational capital and its comprador local state elites, while Western cases are rather marked by a gradual disenfranchisement in relation to the benefits offered by the state. And both populist settings are permeated by the feeling that elites are not inclined to listen to common problems. Hijacked by populist nationalist entrepreneurs, the public signification of traumatic experiences of disenfranchisement and dispossession is then hegemonized, displaced – and therefore voiced as well as silenced again – under the sign of anti-immigrant and anti-communist discourses respectively, and projected onto supposed intruders into the national space and body politic.

In this volume we are suggesting that the differences between these cases of populist mobilization are generated by different local trajectories and
experiences, which are differently signified within the discourses, alliances and sequences in national political arenas, in particular by the evolving class formations and configurations that drive them. But more importantly we argue that the structural causations behind various emergent working-class populist nationalisms have in fact common roots. These roots lie in the dispossession, disenfranchisement and dislocation associated with the double crisis of labour and popular sovereignty produced by the latest round of capitalist globalization. They reflect the trauma of class in a context that publicly rejects talking about class because the legitimate ‘talking classes’ have now set their cards on liberal cosmopolitanism and the furthering of the globalization project. But in fact they are, to come back to Žižek’s resounding remark, ‘the best argument that the “class struggle”, far from being obsolete, goes on’ (Žižek 2008: 267).

References


