The German Right in the Weimar Republic was a complex amalgam of political parties, economic-interest organizations, patriotic associations, paramilitary combat leagues, and young conservative salons of one sort or the other. What held these disparate organizations together, however, was not so much an ideology as a profound sense of bitterness over the lost war, a deep and abiding distrust of the democratic theory of government with its emphasis upon the principle of popular sovereignty, and a longing for the hierarchical and authoritarian values of the Second Empire. “To stand on the Right” did not mean membership in any particular political party but rather a disposition that expressed itself in a sense of contempt toward the symbols and institutions of Germany’s new republican order. All of this represented a dramatic contrast from the last years of the Second Empire where many of those who “stood on the Right” staunchly defended the existing political order against those of their colleagues who sought to replace it with some form of national dictatorship capable of containing the forces of social and political change more effectively than the constitutional system devised by the Iron Chancellor Otto von Bismarck at the beginning of the 1870s. Although the schism within the German Right would become even more pronounced with Germany’s defeat in World War I, the establishment of the Weimar Republic, and the imposition of the Versailles Peace Treaty, these differences would be papered over by the fact that virtually all of the factions on the German Right remained unalterably opposed to the changes that had taken place in the fabric of Germany’s national life. It was precisely this “unity of the no,” as Hans-Erdmann von Lindeiner-Wildau formulated it in an essay from 1929, that provided the largest of Germany’s postwar conservative parties, the German National People’s Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei or DNVP), with its integrative potential in the first years of the Weimar Republic.1 But with the economic and political stabilization of
the Weimar Republic in the second half of the 1920s, the “unity of the
no” began to lose much of its integrative appeal, with the result that the
DNVP was no longer capable of mediating the differences that had ex-
isted on the German Right since before the outbreak of World War I and
now began to fragment into its constituent social and economic inter-
ests. And with the onset of the Great Depression at the beginning of the
1930s, a badly fragmented German Right proved incapable of respond-
ing to the rise of National Socialism, a phenomenon that was spawned
in no small measure by the disunity and organizational fragmentation
of the German Right. From this perspective, the disunity of the Right
was every bit as important as a prerequisite for the establishment of the
Third Reich as the schism on the socialist Left or the fragmentation of
the political middle.\(^2\)

This is the new master narrative that currently governs the history
of the German Right in the Weimar Republic. It supplants an older,
more traditional narrative that established a direct line of continuity
from the political configurations of the late Second Empire to the “alli-
ance of elites” that negotiated the terms under which Nazi party leader
Adolf Hitler assumed power in January 1933.\(^3\) It has the advantage of
nuance and differentiation, avoids the teleological determinism of the
older narrative, and affirms the agency of the individual historical actor
in the fateful series of events that culminated in Hitler’s installation as
chancellor.\(^4\) Not only does this narrative underscore the extent to which
the German Right in the Weimar Republic was riddled by all sorts of
internal divisions that severely hampered its political effectiveness, but
it also calls into question the “alliance between an old and a new Right”
that a more recent cohort of historians from the late 1970s and 1980s
has postulated as the ideological and organizational foundation upon
which Hitler’s assumption of power took place.\(^5\) Its obvious appeal as
an organizing motif notwithstanding, the distinction between an “old”
and a “new” Right greatly oversimplifies the divisions that existed on
the German Right in the Weimar Republic and fails to define these two
terms with sufficient precision to make such an argument convinc-
ing. In point of fact, the “old Right”—epitomized by the Pan-German
League (Allddeutscher Verband or ADV) and Alfred Hugenberg, the
DNVP party chairman from 1928 to 1933—had by the end of the Wei-
mar Republic been reduced to such a state of impotence that it could no
longer negotiate with Hitler or anyone else from a position of strength.\(^6\)

All of this underscores the need for a more nuanced and differenti-
ated approach to the study of the German Right in the Weimar Repub-
lic. Here it is important to bear in mind not only that the German Right
was a composite of economic interests that were often working at cross purposes with each other but also that the ideologies of the German Right were a hodgepodge of different theoretical positions ranging from the racist and antisemitic pronouncements of the Pan-Germans to the young conservative longing for the political and spiritual rebirth of the German nation with all kinds of variants and hybrids in between.\(^7\)

The social and economic infrastructure of the German Right was complex and varied, with heavy industry and big business, large landed agriculture and the small peasant proprietor, Christian labor and the white-collar unions, and the independent middle class in all of its various iterations struggling for survival in a rapidly contracting economy. To bring all of this under a single umbrella, particularly in light of the fact that not of all of those who comprised these groups identified themselves with a conservative political agenda, was a daunting task fraught with difficulties and frustration at every turn. Traditional German conservatism—and particularly Prusso-German conservatism with its defense of the inherited hierarchies of crown, state, rank, church, and the military—had lost much of its integrative potential by the beginning of the twentieth century and had already been forced on the defensive by an increasingly aggressive radical nationalism with distinctly populist and anti-elitist overtones. None of the ideologies on the German Right in the Weimar era, however, were capable of mediating the increasingly bitter conflict between the different factions on the German Right over how the social and economic burden of Germany’s lost war was to be distributed throughout German society. As a result, neither the DNVP nor any other organization on the German Right succeeded in bridging the social, economic, regional, and confessional divisions that had become so deeply embedded in the fabric of Germany’s national life, at least not until the meteoric rise of National Socialism at the end of the 1920s and early 1930s.\(^8\)

The purpose of this collection is not so much to challenge the new master narrative on the history of the German Right in the Weimar Republic as to underpin it with examples of some of the most recent scholarly work on right-wing politics in the Weimar era. To be sure, this runs into the very teeth of the eclipse that has taken place in the political history of the Weimar Republic over the course of the last two or three decades. Nowhere is this eclipse more apparent than in North America and the United Kingdom, where the number of monographs on different aspects of Weimar’s political history and the number of graduate students working on topics related to that history have declined dramatically after reaching a peak in the period from 1970 to 1990. The
reasons for this are complex and varied. In part it reflects the sea change that has taken place in modern historical writing since the last decades of the previous century and represents a paradigmatic shift in the profession at large from the traditional fields of political, diplomatic, and intellectual history to the more popular sub-genres of social and cultural history. It also reflects a shift in the frontiers of German historical research from the Weimar period to the period after 1945, a shift that received much of its impetus from the sudden availability of sources on the German Democratic Republic after the fall of the Berlin wall and the unification of Germany in 1989–90. By the same token, research on the Third Reich seems to have been galvanized by access to archives in the former Soviet Union that had previously been inaccessible to Western scholars. Another factor contributing to the decline of new historical writing on the history of the Weimar Republic is the feeling that all of the major questions have been answered and that there is little in the way of original research and writing that remains to be done. Certainly the publication of magna opera by such giants in the profession as Hans Mommsen, Gerhard Schulz, and Heinrich August Winkler would only confirm that impression. At the same time, fewer graduate students in modern German history in North America and the United Kingdom are being initiated into the techniques of archival research as opposed to less empirical and more theoretical methodologies appropriated from ancillary disciplines such as literary and film criticism, anthropology, and gender studies. With the decline in the levels of funding for graduate and postgraduate research students and scholars from North America in particular but from the United Kingdom as well are finding it increasingly difficult to spend long periods of time in Germany conducting the empirical research required for projects in Weimar political history. As a result, American scholars have all but abandoned the writing of the political history of the Weimar Republic to their German colleagues.

By no means does the dearth of recent English-language scholarship on the political history of the Weimar Republic mean that the study of Weimar politics—and particularly Weimar party politics—is at a dead end. To the contrary, the study of Weimar party politics remains quite vigorous in Germany, although even here this displays a peculiar configuration in that there has been relatively little recent literature of note on the Social Democrats and liberal parties. Although the two Catholic parties—the German Center Party (Deutsche Zentrumspartei) or the Bavarian People’s Party (Bayerische Volkspartei or BVP)—continue to receive close scholarly attention, it is the German Right that has been
the focal point of the most vigorous scholarly research on the politics of the late Second Empire and Weimar Republic in the last ten to fifteen years. Not only have there been four recent publications of outstanding merit on the DNVP as well as a superbly researched biography of DNVP party leader Otto Schmidt-Hannover, but the agrarian milieu upon which the DNVP depended for a large part of its electoral support has come under particularly close scrutiny in a series of excellent monographs of the National Rural League (Reichs-Landbund or RLB), its regional affiliate in Brandenburg, the Christian-National Peasant and Farmers’ Party (Christlich-Nationale Bauern- und Landvolkpartei), and the conservative parties in Württemberg in the Second Empire and Weimar Republic. By the same token, there has been a spate of important new publications on the role that women played in the politics of the German Right, including a rare English-language contribution by Raffael Scheck on the place of women in the DNVP and the other organizations of the German Right. All of this would suggest that while there has been a relative decline in the volume of literature on the Social Democrats and the liberal parties, interest in the politics of the German Right remains vibrant and productive.

Much of the recent literature on the history of the German Right is part of a more general inquiry into Germany’s conservative-nationalist milieu. As problematic as the idea of a “conservative-nationalist milieu” might be, it has nevertheless served as an attractive strategy for bringing the plethora of political parties, economic interest groups, patriotic associations, and paramilitary organizations that constituted the German Right under a single umbrella. One must bear in mind, however, that the integrity of this milieu was under continuous assault throughout the Weimar Republic and that, as Wolfram Pyta has shown in his detailed study of the Nazi breakthrough into the Protestant sector of Germany’s rural population, it began to show signs of serious erosion with the radicalization of its primary constituencies as a result of the general course of German economic development in the 1920s and early 1930s. The increasing radicalization of Germany’s conservative-nationalist milieu could also be seen in the heightened activity of the Pan-German League before its steady eclipse in the second half of the 1920s and in the rise of a paramilitary Right that sought to counter the social and economic cleavages that had become so deeply embedded in the fabric of Germany’s national life with an aggressive and militantly anti-republican nationalism. Historians have also begun to devote increasing attention to the specific features of Germany’s Catholic-conservative milieu as something that was distinctive from its Protestant...
counterpart but with which it nevertheless shared much in common. The radicalization of Germany’s Catholic aristocracy in the last years of the Weimar Republic played an important role in the collapse of the Weimar Republic and in Franz von Papen produced the one person who arguably bears more responsibility than anyone else for Hitler’s installation as chancellor.17

A particular focal point of recent research on the history of the German Right has been the role of Germany’s conservative elites and their efforts to salvage whatever they could of their status and influence in the face of the revolutionary turmoil that transformed German political life at the end of World War I. In this respect, it is important to draw attention to the fact that the German Right after 1918 was not the same as the German Right before World War I. Not only had the party political organization of the German Right undergone a profound transformation as a result of the war and revolution,18 but the extra-parliamentary Right—the conglomerate of organizations that Geoff Eley discusses in his book Reshaping the German Right19—was no longer the same as it had been before the war. Of the various organizations that made up the extra-parliamentary Right before World War I, only the Pan-German League survived into the postwar period to play a significant role in Weimar political culture. What emerged in their stead were veterans’ organizations, the so-called political combat leagues like the Civil Defense Leagues or Einwohnerwehren of the early Weimar Republic, the Young German Order (Jungdeutscher Orden), and the Stahlhelm.20 But even here there had been a significant change in the leadership of the patriotic Right. Before the war the leadership of organizations like the Pan-German League, the German Naval League (Deutscher Flottenverein), and the League for the Eastern Marches (Deutscher Ostmarkenverein) had been recruited almost exclusively from disaffected elements of Germany’s National Liberal constituency. But if one looks at the social pedigree of those who moved into leadership positions in organizations like the Pan-German League, the Stahlhelm, and the United Patriotic Associations of Germany (Vereinigte Vaterländische Verbände Deutschlands)—and this is particularly true of their leadership at the state and regional level—the titled nobility is much more prominently involved in the leadership and activities of the patriotic Right than it had been before the war. At the heart of this is a phenomenon that has not been fully accounted for in the political histories of the Weimar Republic, a phenomenon that, for the lack of anything better, might be called a “displaced elite.” What this term suggests is that many of those from aristocratic backgrounds who had contemplated
a career in the military or civil service only to find those career paths blocked by the events of 1918–19 now began to gravitate to leadership roles in those organizations that were most resolutely opposed to Germany’s new republican system and the odium of defeat with which it was so intimately identified.

Much of the credit for pioneering the study of elites, or Elitenforschung, as a new subfield of historical research—and that of the aristocracy in particular—goes to Heinz Reif. In 2000–2001 Reif, himself the author of a authoritative study on the schism in Germany’s titled aristocracy in the middle of the nineteenth century, edited two volumes of conference papers on the nobility and bourgeoisie in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany that brought the study of elites back to the forefront of historical research. By far the most important work to emerge from Reif’s stable of young historians is Stefan Malinowski’s path-breaking study of the German nobility that appeared in 2003 under the title Vom König zum Führer. Based upon extensive primary research in sources that are not easily accessible and that in some cases had been closed for purposes of scholarly research, Malinowski’s detailed and richly nuanced study of the German nobility from the last years of the Second Empire to the establishment of the Third Reich underscores the extent to which the combination of political displacement, economic decline, and social marginalization rendered the German aristocracy increasingly susceptible to National Socialism as a panacea for all the ills to which it found itself subjected. Malinowski’s work, in turn, has spawned a series of more specialized studies on the German aristocracy by Eckhart Conze, Bernd Kasten, and Rainer Pomp to take their place alongside an earlier study on Pomerania by the American scholar Shelley Baranowski. By no means, however, has the study of elites been confined to the aristocracy. The political behavior of Germany’s industrial and financial elites had long been the subject of scholarly attention, although the approach here has tended to be more biographical than institutional. Even then, none of the recent studies by Reinhard Neebe, Hans-Otto Eglau, Richard Overy, Boris Gehlen, and Werner Abelshauser have succeeded in displacing Henry Turner’s Big Business and the Rise of Hitler as the preeminent monograph on the politics of Germany’s industrial elite in the last years of the Weimar Republic. And the general thrust of this research has been to emphasize, as it did in the case of the titled nobility, the fragmentation of Germany’s industrial leadership in the last years of the Weimar Republic and its inability to manipulate the course of political events as effectively as the initial forays into this field of research had assumed.
political ineptitude of Germany’s industrial elite in the face of National Socialism more convincingly exposed than in Peter Langer’s exhaustive biography of arguably the most politically astute of the Ruhr industrial barons, the Gutehoffnungshütte’s Paul Reusch.25  

Topping this off is a series of new biographical studies on various individuals connected with the German Right, the most impressive of which is Wolfram Pyta’s magisterial biography of World War I hero and Reich president Paul von Hindenburg. Based upon extensive research that includes access to materials in the possession of the Hindenburg family that had not previously been made available for purposes of scholarly research, Pyta argues that Hindenburg assiduously sought to base his claim to political leadership upon a charismatic appeal that overrode the partisan political divisions of Weimar political life only to make him in the last years of his presidency increasingly susceptible to the appeal of National Socialism.26 Particularly noteworthy as comple- ments to Pyta’s biography of Hindenburg are two exemplary studies of Heinrich Brüning by William Patch and Herbert Hömig—the latter a two-volume biography that also covers his activities during World War II and the postwar period—as well as the more thematic monograph by Peer Oliver Volkmann that clearly places the principal executor of Hindenburg’s experiment in presidential government on the moderate or governmental Right.27 Germany’s military leadership has also come in for its share of attention with new biographies of Wilhelm Groener, Werner von Blomberg, and the retired yet politically active World War I Field Marshal August von Mackensen,28 while Kurt Schleicher, the most enigmatic of Germany’s military leader and the last chancellor of the Weimar Republic, continues to fascinate a new cohort of historians with his behind-the-scenes struggle to decouple the exercise of executive au-thority from the vicissitudes of Weimar democracy. Recent research has focused on Schleicher’s plans for a reform of the Weimar constitution and the question of whether or not he could have prevented Hitler’s appointment as chancellor by having Hindenburg declare a state of national emergency.29 On Schleicher, however, nothing has surpassed Thilo Vogelsang’s Reichswehr, Staat und NSDAP since it was published in 1962,30 while F. L. Carsten’s The Reichswehr and Politics from 1966 still remains the best general overview of the military’s political activities during the Weimar Republic.31  

The last caveat notwithstanding, recent historical scholarship on the German Right in the Weimar Republic has demonstrated enormous vi-tality. The fact remains, however, that there is still important work that needs to be done, and the collection of essays assembled here indicates
the different directions this might take. A thread that ties together all but one of the essays in this collection is the theme of antisemitism. There can be little doubt that antisemitism permeated the social, cultural, and political fabric of the German Right from the middle of the 1870s right through the end of the Weimar Republic. But antisemitism and the so-called Jewish question meant different things to different groups, and there was no unanimity on just how the different factions on the German Right should address this problem. For some it was the bread and butter of their politics; for others it was simply a matter of striking the right tone in their efforts to mobilize the masses; and for others it was an unwelcome distraction from the hard and often demoralizing challenges they faced in rescuing Germany from total collapse. Moreover, the intensity of antisemitic feeling and the rationale behind it differed not only from group to group but also from time to time depending upon the precise set of circumstances that were in play at any particular point in time. In other words, antisemitism had a temporal as well as a social variant that makes it all the more difficult to assess the precise role that antisemitism played in Weimar political culture and in the politics of the German Right. This endeavor is not well served by those who, in the footsteps of George L. Mosse’s classic Crisis of the German Ideology, posit a direct line of continuity from the antisemitism of the late Second Empire to the establishment of the Third Reich without appreciating all the intervening variables that lent German antisemitism—and particularly the antisemitism of the German Right—its peculiar contours and efficacy. Antisemitism and racism may very well have been constants that in one way or another permeated virtually every aspect of Germany’s right-wing political culture. But the specific forms in which they manifested themselves, their efficacy as instruments of mass mobilization, and the hostility they engendered among specific sectors of the German population were not. Not only was there no consensus as to precisely what constituted the “Jewish problem,” but there was no agreement as to how that problem was to be solved.

A question closely related to the place of racism and antisemitism in the morphology of the German Right is the relationship of the non-Nazi Right to National Socialism. The dramatic rise of National Socialism in the last years of the Weimar Republic stemmed in no small measure from the way in which it was able to occupy the spaces inhabited by more traditional forms of political sociability, in part by replicating and appropriating the rituals and forms of bourgeois associational life that in almost every case dated back to the prewar era. What this produced was a Nazi-conservative symbiosis that was, as a number of recent...
regional studies have demonstrated, particularly potent at the local or grassroots levels of German political life and that often belied the fragmentation of bourgeois and particularly right-wing politics at the national level. None of this has been adequately addressed in either the standard histories of the NSDAP or by the spate of recent biographical literature on the leaders of the Nazi movement, including Ian Kershaw’s magisterial biography of Adolf Hitler and Ludolf Herbst’s no less fascinating study of the origins of Hitler’s charisma in the earliest days of the Weimar Republic. All of this leaves a great deal to be done in the history of the NSDAP before 1933. Among other things, there is no systematic investigation of the NSDAP’s relations with non-Nazi Right in the critical period from the 1929 crusade against the Young Plan to Franz von Papen’s unfortunate appointment as chancellor in the early summer of 1932. By the same token, there is no study of the way in which the increasingly potent Nazi-bourgeois symbiosis at the local or grassroots levels of German political life influenced or constrained the negotiating tactics of the leader of the DNVP, Stahlhelm, or other right-wing organizations in the last years of the Weimar Republic. The platitudes about the fusion of an old and a new German Right simply do not suffice. This is also one of the deficits in the existing body of historical literature on the German Right in the Weimar Republic that this collection of essays seeks to address.

In his essay on “Hindenburg and the German Right” Wolfram Pyta examines one of the great icons of the German Right, retired Field Marshall and Reich President Paul von Hindenburg. The only politician of his day who commanded the respect and admiration once accorded to Otto von Bismarck, Hindenburg towered over the rest of his contemporaries both literally and figuratively. But Hindenburg’s relationship to the German Right was never as harmonious as either he or the leaders of the German Right had hoped. By the end of the 1930s Hindenburg was vilified by the leaders of the radical Right for his failure to fulfill the hopes they had attached to his election to the Reich presidency in 1925. But, as Pyta maintains, the reasons for Hindenburg’s estrangement from the German Right go much deeper than disagreements over strategy and tactics. At the heart of this estrangement lay the fact that Hindenburg, unlike his contemporaries on the German Right, based his claim to authority upon a myth that he and his associates had assiduously cultivated since the first months of World War I and that he now deployed to full effect in the political struggles of the late 1920s and early 1930s. Drawing upon Max Weber’s typology of political legitimation, Pyta demonstrates how Hindenburg both before and after
his election as Reich president invested his claim to primacy over the German Right—and indeed over the German nation as a whole—with the force of a charismatic vision that not only sought to override the social and political cleavages that had become so deeply embedded in the fabric of Germany’s national life but also enabled Hindenburg to present himself as the embodiment of the German nation itself in all its manifest diversity. It was precisely Hindenburg’s mythic stature and his self-conscious deployment of charisma as a way of legitimating his claim to political primacy that set him apart from his more traditional rivals on the German Right. But it was also Hindenburg’s sense of himself as the personification of the German nation that, according to Pyta, left him vulnerable to the seductive appeal of Hitler’s own charisma, so vulnerable, in fact, that he eventually overcame his deep-seated antipathy toward the Nazi party leader to appoint the man whom he had disparaged as “that Bohemian corporal” as chancellor in the last days of January 1933.

Daniela Gasteiger’s essay on Count Kuno von Westarp, arguably the most important conservative politician of the Weimar era, focuses on a politician who, like Hindenburg, identified himself with the best of the Prussian tradition but whose ties to that tradition became increasingly strained as he struggled to adapt himself and the force of German conservatism to the hard realities of Weimar political life. Gasteiger points out through a careful analysis of Westarp’s relationship to two of the most important lynchpins to his prewar political life—the outspoken racist politician Albrecht von Graefe and the bastion of Prussian conservatism, the Central Association of German Conservatives (Hauptverein der Deutschkonservativen)—that whatever hopes he may have had of keeping them within the orbit of the DNVP were doomed to failure. At the heart of this endeavor lay two issues, the so-called Jewish question and the DNVP’s decision first in 1925 and then again in 1927 to enter the national government as part of an experiment in stabilization from the Right. In the first case, what separated Graefe and Westarp was not so much any disagreement over the threat the Jews allegedly posed to the health of the German nation as a difference of priorities. For Westarp regarded the Jewish question as only one of a host of different issues the DNVP had to address in the postwar period and refused to accord it the primacy that Graefe and his colleagues in the party’s racist faction demanded as a condition of their willingness to stay in the party, with the result that in the final showdown between the racists and the party leadership Westarp sided with the latter. Similarly, Westarp’s decision to support the DNVP’s two experiments in government participation
seemed an act of betrayal to the leaders of the Central Association of German Conservatives and produced a break in 1927–28 that was every bit as painful as that with Graefe and the racists. While Gasteiger’s essay highlights the extent to which Westarp had moved away from the hard-line conservative politics of the late Wilhelmine and early Weimar eras, it also reveals just how hard it was to bring all the various factions of the German Right under a single umbrella.

The third chapter by Larry Eugene Jones offers an even more detailed examination of the DNVP’s antisemitism. Here Jones argues that the DNVP’s position on the Jewish question was “neither constant nor consistent” and that its “embrace of antisemitism” rose and ebbed with “the vicissitudes of the German economy and the stability of the Weimar Republic.” Moreover, the expulsion of the racists around Graefe, Wilhelm Henning, and Reinhold Wulle at the DNVP’s Görlitz party congress in October 1922 did not mean a complete rupture with the party’s antisemitic elements. For, as the establishment of the DNVP’s Racist National Committee (Völkischer Reichsausschuß der Deutschen nationalen Volkspartei) in 1923–24 clearly indicated, the DNVP party leadership bent over backward to keep its racist wing within the party fold and to prevent its defection to the newly founded German-Racist Freedom Party (Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei or DVFP) in the prelude to the May 1924 Reichstag elections. The campaign for the May 1924 elections represented the high-water point in the DNVP’s use of antisemitism as an instrument of mass mobilization, and party leaders were indeed satisfied with the elections results and the establishment of the DNVP as the second largest party in the Reichstag. But as party leaders began to explore how it might be possible to leverage the DNVP’s strength at the polls into a role in the national government, the party’s antisemitism receded more and more into the background to the point where it played virtually no role whatsoever in the DNVP’s campaign for the December 1924 Reichstag elections. During the so-called Westarp era from 1924 to 1928 the leaders of the DNVP’s Racist National Committee festered as a result of their exclusion from the party’s inner circles and formed the core of the anti-Westarp coalition that succeeded in dethroning Westarp as party chairman and in electing press and film magnate Alfred Hugenberg to the DNVP party chairmanship in October 1928. But although Hugenberg had been a founding member of the militantly antisemitic Pan-German League in the 1890s and enjoyed close ties with Pan-German chairman Heinrich Claß, the new DNVP party chairman refused to emulate the antisemitism of the rival NSDAP and eschewed antisemitism for anti-Marxism in his efforts to
unite the German Right into a solid phalanx committed to the destruction of Germany’s parliamentary institutions and the establishment of a more authoritarian system of government.

The next three essays all deal with the history of the Pan-German League, the most influential of Germany’s prewar nationalist associations and the only to survive into the Weimar Republic. Rainer Hering’s essay examines the appeal that Pan-Germanism exercised on Germany’s academic elites and the role that they played in the dissemination of the Pan-German worldview. Hering argues that academics played a critical role in the “construction” of a Pan-German nation that rested upon the exclusion of women, Jews, and minorities from any sort of meaningful role in the life of the German Volk. What drove this project, Hering insists, was a fear of the modern age and the categorical rejection of democracy, socialism, and workers’ and women’s rights—in short, the emancipatory impulses that were in the process of transforming the larger world around them. It was precisely this fear that accounted for the disproportionately high percentage of academics in both the leadership and membership of the Pan-German League. Hering’s argument connects quite well to Björn Hofmeister’s exploration of the reasons responsible for the ADV’s sudden rise and then its equally sudden eclipse as a viable force in Weimar politics. Following the defeat and revolution of 1918 the Pan-German League quickly positioned itself as the most uncompromising and resolute opponent of the changes that had just taken place in the structure of German political life and saw its membership swell to a peak of 38,000 in 1922 before falling to between 13,000 and 15,000 by the end of the decade. According to Hofmeister, the ADV’s decline stemmed from a variety of factors, not the least of which that it never quite succeeded in adapting itself as an association of Honoratioren in the prewar period to the changes that took place in the structure of German political life after 1918. In particular, the Pan-Germans found themselves eclipsed by more militant and populist forms of political activism such as the civil defense leagues, or Einwohnerwehren, of the immediate postwar period, the Stahlhelm and other paramilitary combat leagues, and lastly by Hitler and the NSDAP. It is to this last relationship that Barry Jackisch turns in his essay on the question of continuity and change on the German Right in the Weimar Republic. Jackisch’s essay focuses in particular on the relationship between the Pan-German League and the NSDAP from the time of ADV chairman Heinrich Claß’s first contacts with Hitler in early 1920 to Hitler’s installation as chancellor thirteen years later. Here Jackisch stresses that despite far-reaching ideological affinities between
the ADV and NSDAP—a point that Hofmeister has also made in his contribution to this volume—the Pan-Germans had become increasingly estranged from the Nazi movement in the last years of the Weimar Republic and regarded Hitler’s rise to prominence with a mixture of begrudging respect, bewilderment, and apprehension.

The Pan-German League was of all the major forces on the Weimar the most resolute and relentless in its antisemitism and pursuit of the Jewish question. But, as Brian Crimm and Ulrike Ehret illustrate in their respective chapters on the paramilitary Right and the Catholic Right, antisemitism on the non-Nazi Right was by no means confined to the Pan-Germans and their allies in the DNVP. Crimm’s essay focuses on the two of Germany’s most politically active and durable paramilitary organizations, the Stahlhelm and the Young German Order. Though ostensibly nonpolitical, or überparteilich as the Germans liked to put it, the Stahlhelm clearly stood on the Right and harbored a militantly antisemitic wing that gained more and more influence over the organization’s affairs before it finally adopted an “Aryan paragraph” that excluded Jews from membership in March 1924. Artur Mahraun and the leaders of the Young German Order, on the other hand, were much more militantly antisemitic in the early years of the Weimar Republic but moderated their antisemitism in the second half of the 1920s in what was a strategic move to the middle. In both cases Crimm argues that the antisemitism of the paramilitary Right was “situational,” that is to say that a particular organization’s stance on the Jewish question was formed “in response to internal and external experiences” and that this frequently “reflected an organization’s changing priorities resulting from demographics, fluctuating political fortunes, and bitter feuds with rival groups.” As such, Crimm concludes, the “situational antisemitism” practiced by the Stahlhelm and Young German Order revealed “the ephemeral nature” of antisemitism on the German Right and was not as much of a constant as the standard histories of German antisemitism have tended to argue. Ehret’s essay on the antisemitism of the Catholic Right, however, takes a somewhat different point of view. Ehret stresses religious antisemitism as a constant on the Catholic Right, although it was no longer exclusively rooted in religion but had acquired more modern accoutrements such as the concept of race along the way. The concept of the Catholic Right is itself elusive and refers to a relatively small percentage of Germany’s Catholic population that identified itself with the political agenda of the German Right and that in some cases embraced a conspiratorial view of history that saw the Jew and the Free Mason as the archenemies of Germany’s Christian
national culture and the “ideas of 1789” as the corrosive poison that was slowly, but surely, destroying the social and spiritual fabric of the German nation.

The last two chapters by Edward Snyder and Joseph Bendersky focus on two individuals who were only peripherally involved in the politics of the German Right but who nevertheless enjoyed close ties to Germany’s conservative establishment: Friedrich von Bodelschwingh and Carl Schmitt. Of the two, Bodelschwingh is by far the lesser known, while Schmitt has emerged as one of the most enigmatic and controversial figures in twentieth-century German history. As one of Germany’s foremost Protestant theologians and director of the Bethel Institutions in Bielefeld, Bodelschwingh was unquestionably one of the most important representatives of social Protestantism in the Weimar Republic. But, as Snyder points out, Bodelschwingh is important not only because of his emphasis on work therapy as a corrective to the psychological and mental illnesses that afflicted the patients at Bethel but also because he and many of his closest associates at Bethel endorsed the practice of eugenics, including measures like sterilization, to “restore a fallen Germany to its place among the Kulturnationen of Europe.” While Bodelschwingh was careful to keep his feelings about Jews to himself, his emphasis on the nation’s racial health as a prerequisite for its recovery from the twin shock of defeat and revolution clearly suggested a bias that was not altogether different from that of main-line conservatives like Westarp or the leaders of the Stahlhelm. Carl Schmitt, on the other hand, is one of the most difficult individuals to classify or categorize. To be sure, Schmitt stood on the Right and, if his private diaries are any indication, shared the animus toward Jews that pervaded the right-wing political. But Schmitt assiduously avoided identification with any of the major organizations on the German Right, preferring for himself the role of the politically unaffiliated intellectual and legal expert. It was only in the last months of the Weimar Republic that Schmitt stepped into the political limelight, first as the head of the government’s legal defense team in the trial over the legality of the deposition of the Prussian cabinet in July 1932 and then as one of a handful of legal specialists that Schleicher tapped for the task of drafting a new constitution for the German Reich. But, as Bendersky argues, Schmitt’s most enduring contribution to Weimar political life was the destabilizing effect that his legal writing, his assaults on liberalism, and his hostility to Marxism had upon the intellectual legitimacy of the Weimar Republic and thus helped fuel the anti-republican discourse of the German Right.
As the essays in this volume clearly indicate, historical scholarship on the German Right in the Weimar Republic remains remarkably vigorous and productive. The essays presented here tend to confirm and perhaps modify in some detail or the other the general narrative that was outlined at the beginning of this essay for the history of the political Right in the Weimar Republic. In the light of recent research on right-wing politics in Weimar Germany it becomes increasingly clear that the German Right was anything but a homogeneous political force, but in reality was so riddled by internal divisions—some that were social, economic, and even ideological in nature, some that had more to do with strategy and tactics than anything else, some that were rooted in personal animosities and distrust—that it was incapable of articulating a coherent response to the paralysis of Germany’s parliamentary institutions in the ever deepening economic crisis at home and abroad. It was precisely the fractious nature of right-wing politics in the last years of the Weimar Republic that left the more traditional elements of the German Right so vulnerable to penetration by the most radical group on the German Right, namely the NSDAP. In the final analysis, the dramatic rise of National Socialism stemmed in no small measure from a deep sense of public frustration with the rivalries among the various factions on the non-Nazi Right. Not only were the Nazis adept at exploiting the divisions between their rivals on the German Right, but Hitler and his party succeeded in articulating a vision of the nation that was so powerful in terms of its emotional appeal that it simply overrode the factionalism that had become so deeply embedded in the fabric of German right-wing politics. At the same time, the disunity of Hitler’s rivals on the German Right meant that he was negotiating from a position of strength and they from a position of weakness in the critical deliberations that preceded the installation of the Hitler cabinet in the last fateful days of January 1933. This also accounted for the ease with which Hitler and his party were able to reverse the terms of the arrangement under which Hitler had assumed power and brush aside the conditions that his coalition partners had implicitly, if not explicitly, attached to his appointment as chancellor.

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Notes


7. Stefan Breuer has been particularly relentless in his dissection of the values and ideas of the German Right. Of his numerous publications, see in particular Anatomie der konservativen Revolution (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1993); Grundpositionen der deutschen Rechten 1871–1945 (Tübingen: Edition Diskord, 1999); Ordnungen der Ungleichheit. Die deutsche Rechte im Widerstreit ihrer Ideen 1871–1945 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2001); and most recently Die radikale Rechte in Deutschland 1871–1945. Eine politische Ideengeschichte (Frankfurt: Reclam, 2010). Of particular value among the more specialized


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16. Although the Stahlhelm and the other organizations of the paramilitary Right have been discussed in the context of the milieu studies by Bosch and Matthiesen (see n.13), nothing has yet surpassed Volker R. Berghahn, Der Stahlhelm—Bund der Frontsoldaten 1918–1935 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1966). Two works of special note are Wieland Vogel, Katholische Kirche und nationale Kampfbünde in der Weimarer Republik (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald, 1989), and Gerd Krüger, “Treu德utsch allewege!” Gruppen, Vereine und Verbände der Rechten in Münster (1887–1929/30) (Münster: Aschendorff,


20. On the militarization of German politics in the immediate postwar period, see above all else the recent contributions that place this phenomenon in a broader comparative perspective by Robert Gerwarth, “The Central European Counter-Revolution: Paramilitary Violence in Germany, Austria and Hungary after the Great War,” Past and Present 200 (2008): 175–209; and


33. For an important corrective to this tendency, see Heinrich August Winkler, “Die deutsche Gesellschaft der Weimarer Republik und der Antisemitismus—Juden als Blitzableiter,” in *Vorurteil und Völkermord.*


41. For an elaboration of this argument, see Wolfram Pyta, “Paul von Hindenburg als charismatischer Führer der deutschen Nation,” in Charismatische Führer der deutschen Nation, ed. Frank Möller (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2004), 109–47.


43. For a sample of the most recent research on Westarp, see Larry Eugene Jones and Wolfram Pyta, eds., “Ich bin der letzte Preuße”: Kuno Graf von Westarp und die deutsche Politik (1900–1945) (Cologne, Weimar, and Vienna: Böhlau, 2006).