

INTRODUCTION

"Can we Europeans still entertain? Can we think in the dimensions of a global culture? . . . The first who has a vision of the film of the future, to him belongs BABELSBERG!"¹ With this bold statement in 1992, Volker Schlöndorff, an acclaimed cineaste born in West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany, or FRG; hereafter West Germany or FRG), invited European artists to take over the studios near Berlin. The same studios had housed the now defunct East German state-run film company, Deutsche Film-Aktiengesellschaft (DEFA; 1946–92) and before that, one of the largest motion picture industries on the continent, Universum Film-Aktiengesellschaft (UFA; 1917–45). As Babelsberg's managing director (1992–97), Schlöndorff had avowed earlier in his statement: "To me, the name DEFA has no color or odor. Like the name UFA, it belongs to history and to an era that is not mine. It should continue to live in history as a name."² This text and later interviews stirred a larger debate about the dismantling of DEFA right after the collapse of East Germany (the German Democratic Republic, or GDR; hereafter either East Germany or GDR)—a controversy in which hundreds of filmmakers and crew members were dismissed from their job because they were viewed as obsolete in a newly transformed industry. In what became known as the public battle for Babelsberg, former DEFA employees largely decried Schlöndorff's failure to recognize how much they had in common with their Western counterparts, particularly in regard to their contribution to European cinema.³ This controversy over DEFA's legacy remained unresolved for at least another sixteen years.⁴ It was not that the Babelsberg manager was oblivious to German national cinema's past successes—indeed, he sought to exploit UFA's classics and assets as magnets to draw directors who were eager to conquer European theaters.⁵ He and the French Compagnie Générale des Eaux

(CGE), which acquired the Babelsberg studios in 1992, saw the forces of globalization sweeping through postcommunist Europe and envisioned spearheading the transnationalization of cinema.⁶ Indeed, they aspired to resurrect the material base of UFA while burying DEFA's past. And here lies the contradiction in terms: Revitalizing a studio that was to cater to European audiences and to attract the best talent on the continent was not merely a project for the future, it was also a dream of the past.

DEFA inherited the dream of becoming a European presence from UFA and both actively cooperated with other industries on the continent. Certainly, UFA and DEFA could only approach such a vision from within their own limits as national and state-subsidized companies. The dream of "us" conquering European markets was a dream where national pride intertwined with the ambition for international visibility and acclaim. German filmmakers of the interwar period (November 1918 to September 1939) had shared this dream with other nations in the so-called Film Europe movement, a concerted effort in the 1920s to oppose Hollywood's inroads on the continent. Even Joseph Goebbels's entertainment empire contested U.S. dominance and its attempt to control world markets. In the postwar years, this dream resurfaced in DEFA's effort to gain prestige in the guise of international solidarity and to earn recognition for the young socialist state. The East German film company restored UFA's network and initiated numerous joint projects with French, West German, Czech, Polish, and other filmmakers, hoping to claim agency as one of the largest industries at the heart of Europe. DEFA's leaders, too, opened Babelsberg's doors for European directors and stars of stature and seized every opportunity to circulate their films abroad. Dismissing the legacy of these predecessors turned out to be a mistake: Schlöndorff's business strategies led to disappointment among producers in and outside of Europe who, ironically, found better production structures, services, and prices in other ex-socialist studios.⁷ The persistent vision of Babelsberg as a locus of European cinema nevertheless invites broader questions that shape the current study: How are socialist cinemas of the postwar period positioned vis-à-vis their Western counterparts? What are productive ways to reconcile divergent traditions within the history of European filmmaking? And more specifically, what was DEFA's original contribution to the cinema of Cold War Europe? What can the study of larger processes within European cinemas, such as coproductions, various forms of exchanges, and mechanisms for the international circulation of films and talent reveal about socialist cinemas?

Cinema of Collaboration seeks to shed light on our understanding of socialist film industries' legacies in what today is defined as European cinema. After all, the root of the controversy around Schlöndorff's dismissive stance toward DEFA was his view of East German cinema as not European enough, or not European at all. Yet the idea of a clean break with the past, though not new to the German national context, has fallen short when it comes to European film. The continuity that links the cinemas of the 1920s, the 1930s, and the postwar period; the proliferation of models and agreements for international coproductions since the 1950s; and the rich dialogue between avant-garde movements in East and West from the 1960s onward complicates our often black-and-white understanding of European artistic production in terms of exclusion and belonging. At the same time, political division was a reality that tainted the cultural dialogue between East and West and engendered competing media discourses. As the major producer of feature and documentary films in the GDR, DEFA inevitably paid allegiance to the socialist state. Yet the company continued to pursue international contacts and joint projects in the hope of securing a prestigious position among the film industries of Europe. Cold War divisions, in other words, had engendered an attempt within East German cinema to consciously overcome nationalism via internationalism. This book, therefore, approaches the Cold War division through the lens of film coproductions and exchange, artistic collaboration, and cultural mediation, and thus responds to the need to rethink socialist cinemas within the constantly evolving discursive space of European cinema.

As several scholars have argued, European cinema is a cinema in flux precisely because it feeds on historical continuity. For instance, Thomas Elsaesser has argued that European film is not a catchall category for national cinemas, but a dynamic entity that constantly defines and redefines itself in dialogue with other traditions, notably North American, Latin American, and Asian. At the same time, he identifies an internally created "gap between Central/Eastern Europe and Western Europe as wide as ever" and rightly questions the ability of "our Western perspective" to comprehend or judge the political tensions underlying filmmaking in socialist societies.⁸ The common ground for European cinema vis-à-vis national cinemas, for Elsaesser, is constituted not merely by avant-garde movements, but also by a persistent vacillation between an attraction to and denial of Hollywood and by a self-empowering mode of coproduction. Scholars of postwar European cinema, such as Anne Jäckel and Tim Bergfelder, have further explored the cross-pollination among continental industries.⁹ They foreground

the key role of coproductions not as an alternative to but rather a defining element of national cinemas. Jäckel, in particular, focuses on the continuity between the early desire for consolidation of European industries and the dynamic transnational modes of production defining current European Union filmmaking processes. Taking a different route into this argumentation, Mark Betz demonstrates a “considerable overlap” among the film cultures and industries in Europe during the Cold War, which for him constituted the specific conditions for the emergence of “European art cinema” not within confined studios scattered across the continent, but in the framework of coproduction.¹⁰ Drawing on all above studies, in *The Europeanization of Cinema* Randall Halle extrapolates that “the cinematic apparatus repeatedly and uniquely proves capable of imagining collectivities and of acting as a bridge to bring people together in new ways.”¹¹ His study of the impact of contemporary European actors and production structures on the transnationalization of cinema around the globe urges us to see the legacy of economic and political processes underlying the film industries in a new way. Halle casts into high relief the contours of European film at the intersection of the apparatus (as a sum of production and reception processes) and the interzone (as a space that always existed and enabled contact among communities of people). This trajectory of scholarship yields several insights about the processes that shape past and current European cinemas—insights that will help us see what socialist cinemas shared with their counterparts. First, continuity in the development of European film industries in terms of their cooperation and self-definition vis-à-vis the U.S. motion picture powerhouses is key for rethinking their output beyond the national. Second, the flow of ideas and individuals across geopolitical borders has always defined European filmmaking, even in times of political division. Third, a turn to the mode of production, economic sensibilities, and agency of individuals can help us examine and understand cinema more holistically.

Taking a cue from these insights, the present study identifies three levels on which DEFA enters European cinema. The first level is the company’s inheritance and appropriation of UFA’s legacy in the shape of business and personal alliances. The second level consists of several strategies for cooperation and film exchange that were driven primarily by economic and commercial concerns. And the third level is formed by the specific mode of production within Eastern European cinemas in the postwar period, which, though distinct from the Western apparatus, enabled renegotiation of artistic agency and film circulation within the East. Exploring these three levels allows us to see DEFA as a com-

elling case study of a socialist film industry that participated in both the making and marketing of films on the continent. From a transnational perspective, DEFA offers an example of a locus of the continuous interplay of state and non-state actors and the cross-border current of pictures and people. The study of a state-sponsored cinema uncovers nuances in the dynamics between official interests and forms of control as additional considerations come into play such as the prestige that films earned internationally as well as the revenue that they brought back into the budget. It is well known that avant-garde movements such as the Polish and Czechoslovak New Waves were largely tolerated by their respective states due to their potential to showcase openness, innovation, and competitiveness with the West. In other words, the exploration of state-sponsored art cannot disregard the socioeconomic aspects of film and talent circulation. More importantly, DEFA's steady attempts to reach out to other industries across the political divide, to coproduce with them, and to break into international markets complicate the view of Cold War European cinemas neatly fitting into two monolithic blocs.

Along these lines, Cold War cultures have also been rethought in terms of a symbolic division that was in fact bridged by bilateral agreements for cooperation, artistic negotiations, and mobility across national borders.¹² The production and dissemination of cultural products such as literature, music, art, and film, as well as related intellectual and commercial pursuits, provide indisputable evidence that "the 'dreamworlds' of East and West were never completely divided."¹³ In this vein, Yale Richmond, a U.S. cultural officer assigned to postwar Germany and an insider of Cold War diplomacy in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, challenges the perception of an isolated East as he explains that "exchanges in culture, education, information, science, and technology" form an important and yet largely understudied background to the political conflict of the Cold War.¹⁴ One should note that the exchanges that Richmond refers to often were regulated at the state level and individual participants were typically involved under the oversight by politicians. More than any other artistic form, film mirrored the respective imaginaries of both antagonistic powers: the United States and the Soviet Union. Film festivals, for instance, as Caroline Moine's and Andreas Kötzing's work demonstrates, even though officially sanctioned, emerged in the 1950s as key sites of artistic encounter, as well as of negotiation of official cultural policies.¹⁵ Moine convincingly demonstrates that unpacking the history of such festivals as a "border and contact zone, a place for screenings as well as

exchanges and meetings between guests from all round the globe" re-stages the GDR on the European and international arena.¹⁶ Such studies comment on the symbolic exchange of ideas and films that can induce a transformation in representational practices and showcase DEFA as exemplary for German socialist cinema, on the one hand, and as an actor in the cultural dialogue between East and West, on the other. This twofold agenda links political and cultural history and warrants the need to study culture in its larger manifestations on the national and international levels.

DEFA's existence was temporally and symbolically framed by major events in Europe's ideological division. The East German studio was founded on May 17, 1946, less than three months after former British prime minister Winston Churchill delivered his Iron Curtain speech, and it was dissolved in 1992, the year when the Treaty on European Union was signed in Maastricht to announce future European integration and a new era of political, cultural, and economic cooperation.¹⁷ Churchill's seminal address inaugurated the division of the continent into East and West: "From Stettin to the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the Continent," declared Churchill.¹⁸ With this speech, Michael David-Fox observes, Churchill "was enshrining a metaphor that would not only rally his contemporaries but retrospectively structure historians' understanding of communism and the Eastern bloc."¹⁹ Indeed, DEFA's precarious position between its role as an instrument of political indoctrination, on the one hand, and its desire for artistic innovation, on the other, has been discussed at length in most studies of the film company,²⁰ and the dueling binaries of East and West have overshadowed not only politics behind the Iron Curtain, but also DEFA's output.

Such oppositions shaped the perception of GDR cinema throughout the following decades, as cultural policymakers and film critics continued to debate how socialist films differ from their Western counterparts. In the immediate postwar years, the discussion about what East German cinema should represent took as its starting point the rejection of National Socialist (Nazi) film aesthetics, at a moment when DEFA was still producing for the entire German market. Ralf Schenk offers a detailed discussion of the experimental character of DEFA narratives and visual style in the early years, but he also shows that during the Cold War the GDR cinema continued to be viewed as "the other" in the West.²¹ Along the same lines, Daniela Berghahn maintains that UFA and DEFA were compared in the literature for a long time as "two German film companies at the service of two totalitarian regimes," while the

similarities between these two companies had remained unexplored.²² In addition, the majority of DEFA scholarship focused on the East German Communist Party's aspirations for its national film industry rather than on the agency of DEFA artists. Nevertheless, in certain aspects such as institutional structure and commercial considerations DEFA came closer to its Western competitors, which earned the studio a reputation as "Honecker's Hollywood."²³ By the time the studio shut down, it had produced over seven hundred feature films, entered into more than fifty realized coproductions with other European studios, and attempted numerous cinematic and technical forms of cooperation, such as service provision, financial support for joint projects, film license trade, and employment of foreign actors and film professionals.

Some critics argue that after the demise of the GDR, DEFA, like the rest of the culture of the former East, was colonized by a triumphant West.²⁴ As a consequence, East German cinema was primarily discussed throughout the 1990s as a remnant of a bygone era and was perceived as a cultural institution serving a solely ideological mission.²⁵ After the collapse of communism, it seemed appropriate that a studio that had catered to the socialist regime should be liquidated. As the 1992 controversy surrounding Schlöndorff's vision of Babelsberg made clear, DEFA's dissolution appeared a necessary measure for freeing German cinema from the burden of the past. In the process, GDR employees were released from their posts and largely seen as useless for the future of German cinema, and this *tabula rasa* approach also called for the dismissal of DEFA films and their aesthetics. Central to this disparagement of the East was Schlöndorff's failure to recognize East Germans' past "enthusiasm for European feature film," as Bärbel Dalichow put it.²⁶ Indeed, the inability of DEFA's critics to comprehend that the state-run company had set out to achieve a European presence, both in artistic and in commercial terms, has haunted the studio almost since its founding. Furthermore, DEFA continues to be at the center of the post-unification discussion of the value of East German culture *per se*. In this vein, Brigitta Wagner has documented the 2008 debate around Schlöndorff's audacious statement that he liquidated "the DEFA name" because "the DEFA films were terrible."²⁷ In fact, apart from objections by former studio employees and institutions now representing the East German studio's legacy (e.g., the DEFA Foundation and the Progress Film Distributor), the outcry against Schlöndorff's uncompromising rejection was rather minimal both in unified Germany and abroad. The common perception that DEFA as a state-run studio operated within a socialist economy and, at best, produced antifascist films, has fed on the

long-sustained convictions that, first, East German cinema lacked connections to the Western film market and, second, that it unequivocally rejected the Hollywood model of popular cinema and the European auteurist traditions.

In the past two decades, this blunt equation of East German film with the GDR and its reduction to an insular institution have come under scrutiny in several influential edited volumes that seek to illuminate DEFA's participation in a "constant dialogue if not competition, with both the capitalist West and socialist East."²⁸ In different ways, they all respond to the 2002 appeal by Barton Byg, the founder of the DEFA Film Library, to reject equating the East German studio's history with the history of the communist state itself and reducing this cultural institution to a mere propaganda machine.²⁹ Byg has critically assessed the persistent portrayal of DEFA "as a specter of Cold War paranoia or socialist utopia" in a legacy that continues to haunt contemporary visual culture.³⁰ The 2013 essay collection *DEFA International*, edited by Michael Wedel, Byg, and others, was the first to bring into focus DEFA's internationalization and to invite a more holistic approach to East German cinema.³¹ In 2014, Brigitta Wagner's edited volume *DEFA after East Germany* sought to lay bare the studio's heritage in the wake of German reunification and the subsequent opening of archives to scholars. In *Re-Imagining DEFA* (2016), scholars from the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom continued to probe new comparative approaches to East German cinema both as a national and a transnational phenomenon, in order to highlight audience reception, stardom, genre studies, and the marketing of DEFA classics in the twenty-first century.³² Studies such as these have laid important groundwork for the examination of East German cinema in an international context. In doing so, they have begun to map an alternative perspective to the traditional Cold War view of DEFA voiced in Schlöndorff's dismissive assertion. Taking a cultural-historical approach to socialist cinemas, *Cinema of Collaboration* builds on this scholarship's commitment to interdisciplinary dialogue. Yet in order to debunk the persistent myths of DEFA as a self-contained national cinema with little ambition or little opportunity to address audiences abroad, we need to envision the East German studio's creative and commercial pursuits as two sides of the same coin.

Cultural exchange, within the present study, is understood as complementary to political division and ideological prerogatives. DEFA's institutional history illuminates this relation due to the studio's rig-

orous export agenda, its role as initiator of numerous coproductions, and its activities as a distinguished player among the European cinema industries of the Cold War. Rosemary Stott has broached the topic of Western film imports into the GDR, focusing primarily on programming policy, exhibition, and spectatorship, yet DEFA as a locus of an ongoing film exchange from East to West still remains to be explored.³³ A handful of studies have looked at a select number of DEFA classics that were circulated both within the Eastern bloc and in the West.³⁴ Others have focused on East German audiences' reception of DEFA films or emphasized distinct genres, specific national contexts, or particular time periods.³⁵ Yet DEFA participated in a wider exchange of feature films and documentaries as well as in license trading throughout its existence. Moreover, taking advantage of its central location in Babelsberg, DEFA sustained contacts with film production companies, producers, authors, and intellectuals in the West, as well as with previous Central European partners, such as Czechoslovakia and Poland. Such partnerships inspired several creative and structural developments within the socialist film industry, from the renewal of joint projects with big French studios to the reintroduction of artistic production units in Babelsberg to the reimagining of established Western genres.

In order to effectively reposition DEFA within the European cinemas of the Cold War, the key conceptual move, in my view, is to take exchange as a heuristic device rather than a marginal phenomenon. My study scrutinizes existing mechanisms of film conceptualization, production, and negotiation as a whole in order to highlight important individuals and agendas that shaped the processes of coproduction and distribution, while also digging into the studio's correspondence with its many international partners. Collaboration might not be the only lens that can be used to this end, but it has acquired importance as an emerging core concept in the history of the Cold War, as well as in the film histories of European cinema and in Central and Eastern European Studies. Approaching DEFA as a case study for understanding socialist societies and their creative pursuits, and more generally for determining the function of cinema in the second half of the twentieth century, this monograph provides a bridge to related fields via its internationally informed discussion.

Cinema of Collaboration, therefore, situates the East German studio in the context of its multilayered interactions with past and contemporaneous cinematic traditions, institutional alliances, and individual players. It focuses on several questions: What motivated DEFA's participa-

tion in the multiplicity of cultural exchanges? How does the company compare to other cinematic industries in divided Europe with respect to its willingness to pursue joint ventures? What kinds of cooperation existed, and how did they relate to the GDR government's ideological agenda, to commercial concerns, or to various cinematic and artistic traditions? The four chapters in the present study will tackle these questions by analyzing DEFA's engagement in a range of collaborations, such as film exchange in occupied postwar Germany, partnerships with independent producers or large film companies in the West, the promotion of new genres in response to Hollywood cinema, and teamwork between writers and directors on opposite sides of the East-West divide in the 1970s and 1980s. Overall, the book examines and contrasts officially channeled or sanctioned contacts and individual agency in order to offer a comprehensive account of DEFA's evolving strategies to ensure its international standing.

More broadly, by focusing on DEFA as an example, this study re-examines the staging of postwar Central and Eastern European cinemas in the shadow of the Iron Curtain and probes the act of ideological division as an impediment but not a barrier to transnational cinematic exchange. Like other cinemas in the former socialist bloc, DEFA has been discussed in terms of once productive but currently reductive opposites such as commissioned versus auteurist filmmaking, propaganda versus modernist aesthetics, and state-controlled versus free-market cinemas. *Cinema of Collaboration* introduces more variables into these analyses, such as the agency of *Künstlerische Arbeitsgruppen* (artistic production units; hereafter KAGs), foreign producers' business arrangements, studio management interventions, and script co-authorship across borders, to complicate our understanding of filmmaking processes in Cold War Europe. The book does not discount the fact that the continent's geopolitical division played a vital part in the self-definition of DEFA as a "Hollywood behind the wall," to borrow Daniela Berghahn's term.³⁶ However, this split also engendered East German filmmakers' intense engagement with working models and genres that originated elsewhere in the East or the West. Whether we see the response by state-run studios in this "other Europe"—as Dina Jordanova has called the former socialist bloc—to Hollywood and Western European productions as imitation or opposition, disagreement or competition, borrowing or subversion, the rich dialogue with neighbors (as opposed to enemies) shows that European cinema, in fact, was equally shaped by commercial, artistic, and ideological agendas.³⁷

Rethinking DEFA History

As described earlier, *Cinema of Collaboration* undertakes three interventions. First, it questions the conventional demarcation of East German cinema as an insular industry reduced to its submission to the socialist regime. Instead, multiple lines of continuity between UFA and DEFA invite a new understanding of East German cinema as shaped not only by ideological priorities, but also by an agenda for prestige and market presence. Second, DEFA emerges as an important yet neglected participant in Europe-wide film production and film circulation, as well as in the mediation between motion pictures and political philosophies during the Cold War. To that end, the book highlights one of the least explored aspects of the interaction across the East-West divide, namely socialist cinemas' dependency on hard currency and license sales to foreign film distributors. Third, by foregrounding DEFA's exchange with Eastern European cinematic traditions, *Cinema of Collaboration* rethinks GDR cinema as Eastern European and questions ideological and geopolitical biases that relegate it to a second-tier cinema within Germany and Europe. To offer an alternative, this study looks not only at the coproductions DEFA initiated with its neighbors, but also at the project of fashioning socialist cinema as distinct from its Western counterparts. This endeavor entails the development of counter-genres and a unique model of studio organization, as well as strategies for negotiating political control over film art via coproductions and multinational crews or writer teams. All three interventions build on preliminary findings in existing studies.

Continuities between UFA and DEFA

Since the 2000s, UFA's legacy with regard to DEFA has undergone some reevaluation, as scholars have moved away from interpretations of East German film as an ideological counterpart of Third Reich cinema to an increased attention to its immediate postwar context. Traditionally, the 1946 DEFA founding document was quoted to demonstrate the decisive rupture in political terms that the East German studio sought to make with its predecessor.³⁸ Studies focused predominantly on differences between the studios, highlighting DEFA's antifascist agenda and acknowledging resemblances in both institutions' "service of two totalitarian regimes" and their common purpose as "an instrument of political indoctrination."³⁹ At the same time, DEFA as a newly founded institution largely depended on former UFA personnel and expertise,

simply because there were very few film professionals who had not had a career in Nazi cinema.⁴⁰ Thomas Heimann was among the first scholars to draw attention to the discrepancy between the high percentage of former Third Reich filmmakers at DEFA and the studio's rejection of UFA entertainment models. He quotes a DEFA-conducted survey according to which 62 percent of DEFA directors, 73 percent of cameramen, 60 percent of production managers, and 75 percent of dramaturges (literary advisers, similar to a producer or a scriptwriter) between 1949 and 1952 had previously worked at UFA or the Terra studios.⁴¹ DEFA had in fact offered contracts to renowned Third Reich directors, as long as they had not made outright propaganda films and were willing to begin afresh. The list included Arthur Pohl, Gerhard Lamprecht, Helmut Käutner, Hans Müller, Paul Verhoeven, Hans Deppe, Wolfgang Staudte, Georg Wildhagen, Wolfgang Schleif, and others who had specialized in entertainment films during the 1940s.⁴²

Early debates surrounding the abolishing of UFA, as Stephen Brockmann has shown, did not target filmmakers at all, but rather the apolitical and empty entertainment that Nazi cinema used to dupe the masses.⁴³ Moreover, as evident from Brockmann's research, established UFA directors of the Nazi period, such as Arthur Maria Rabenalt, participated in discussions about DEFA's new aesthetic direction on a par with ardent communists, such as DEFA founder Kurt Maetzig. It comes as no surprise then, as David Bathrick explains, that a clear-cut break with the past was rather unrealistic.⁴⁴ Instead, a yearlong transition was necessary due to filmmakers' schooling in a narrative and visual style that offered diversion and mobilized emotions.⁴⁵ But also postwar German audience tastes were shaped by Weimar and Third Reich cinema aesthetics and entertainment genres. In the absence of films with the right ideological spin, or of critical voices to expose the visual traps of Nazi films, and in order to scrape together funds for the emerging DEFA, the Soviet occupation forces sometimes resorted to screening UFA productions with Nazi film stars, such as Zara Leander and Luis Trenker.⁴⁶ Consequently, the assumption that DEFA made a decisive break with its UFA heritage has yielded to the realization that continuities persisted through the reappropriation of film genres, reemployment of personnel, and recycling of prewar film aesthetics. At the same time, UFA's enduring legacy for the self-definition of DEFA as a player on European markets has received much less attention.

DEFA's relationship to UFA can be reconsidered not only in terms of its inherited location and personnel, but also in terms of its creative agenda. As state-funded institutions, UFA and DEFA shared a strong

national agenda as well as the quest for international prestige. Founded in 1917 with the sponsorship of Deutsche Bank at the order of the Army Supreme Command, UFA embodied the great era of German film. The largest European studio at the time comprised the worlds of Ernst Lubitsch, Fritz Lang, F. W. Murnau, Georg W. Pabst, Max Ophüls, and producer Erich Pommer, to name just a few.⁴⁷ Before 1933, UFA paved the way for French, Czech, Hungarian, Polish, Russian, and other directors and actors to make high-quality pictures in Germany and to work with such renowned filmmakers.⁴⁸ The sizeable film company actively pursued exchanges with European partners and worked toward establishing a lasting presence on the international market. Since UFA filmmakers competed with American-made pictures and production models, they sought alliances and coproduction projects with European partners in order to buttress their national cinema, while profiting from foreign studios' resources and expertise. In the 1940s, under Goebbels's auspices, UFA turned into a propaganda factory that continued to produce film fantasies and used earlier allies to distribute them internationally. Combining spectacle with subservience, UFA's short-lived successor, the state-run conglomerate UFI, continued to dominate occupied Europe not only by means of rigorous export and distribution mechanisms, but also by coproducing films with French and Czech partners. In 1945, at the end of World War II, DEFA inherited these international contacts and a wide-reaching network, as well as the desire for a prestigious position among the film industries in Europe.

Cinema of Collaboration reconsiders how the legacy of international contacts and coproduction agreements as transmitted from UFA to DEFA was linked to each studio's understanding of its role in European filmmaking. This perspective illuminates the intertwinement of DEFA's standing as the national cinema of the GDR with its active pursuit of partnerships with continental film industries. Such intertwinement became visible especially in the late 1950s, when the GDR strove to achieve political sovereignty and DEFA facilitated such aspirations by attracting Western European partners. Both filmmakers and politicians hoped that cultural alliances with the West would enable the German socialist state to remain independent of the FRG. At the same time, as UFA's heir, DEFA continued to pursue coproductions with other studios, even after the GDR's aspirations for political recognition in the West were shattered, to build on a cinematic culture that had competed on the world market and to feed off alliances with major European partners.

Reconstructing the historical context of UFA's and DEFA's partnerships with French companies, this book reveals continuities in their

approach and institutional practices. DEFA filmmakers' idea of cinema as a means of demonstrating both the high quality and the political importance of film art resonated with the agenda of French filmmakers in the 1950s. That agenda can be traced back to the significant cooperation between studios in these countries three decades earlier. Germany and France in the 1920s heralded the idea of a transnational cinema called Film Europe that could jointly resist the influx of Hollywood pictures. The goal was to create a universal European cinema that would transcend geopolitical borders. Coproductions were key to this plan: joint projects involving smaller continental film companies allowed these studios to pool their resources in order to lower production cost, and—in some cases—to benefit from national subsidies and screen quotas. The resurgence of the Film Europe ideal in postwar alliances between two of the largest film companies, DEFA and the French Pathé, evidences the desire for a shared European cinematic culture whose scope and function would extend beyond the need to protect national cinemas. Thus, by broadening the Cold War time frame within which the East German studio is usually situated, *Cinema of Collaboration* challenges the traditional view of a break between the cinematic cultures of pre- and postwar Germany. Moreover, it highlights the importance of both studios and individuals, in addition to political authorities, for our understanding of the DEFA project.

Traversing Borders and Film Exchange with the West

Travel and interpersonal exchange were crucial in undermining Cold War animosity, and the fluidity of international contacts challenges the perception of the Iron Curtain as a solid divide. We now understand the Iron Curtain as porous and once rigid divisions along geopolitical borders have been rethought via the increasing focus on individuals, as opposed to governmental agency.⁴⁹ Along these lines, Marsha Siefert has introduced an important term, “people-to-people cultural diplomacy,” that extends beyond the concept of soft power customarily used to designate Western cultural influence.⁵⁰ This other type of diplomacy emerges in various forms of private encounters, as Siefert explains, such as “tourism, personal visits and correspondence, student exchanges, music performances, art exhibitions, author tours,” and other similar phenomena.⁵¹ Prominent foreign visitors and foreign influences from the West enhanced the circulation of ideas, practices, and norms in the East and vice versa.⁵² Such intertwinement of interpersonal encounters was made possible only by what Michael David-Fox

has dubbed the “semipermeable membrane,” a porous Iron Curtain that regulated contacts among the blocs and provided selective access for artists and intellectuals.⁵³ While the term “crossing the frontier” in the current discourse of the Cold War habitually refers to movement from East to West, in other words thematizing the West as an object of longing in the East, *Cinema of Collaboration* focuses on a less frequent phenomenon, namely the crossing from West to East.

When we think about border crossing, we typically think about people who legally or illegally traverse frontiers to experience the other side or to mediate between two ideological camps. Such individuals are described differently in scholarship depending on the direction of their movement. In the context of Cold War Europe, Vladislav Zubok has dubbed westward travelers “dissidents” and eastward travelers who came to observe the socialist bloc “pilgrims from outside.”⁵⁴ A third term, David-Fox’s “cultural mediators,” refers to insiders within an Eastern European culture who presented socialist ideology to those unfamiliar with socialism.⁵⁵ Mediators, in this sense, were figures who came into close, sustained contact with prominent travelers or observers from the West, thus shaping their perception of the East as well as of cross-border contact in general. I appropriate this term in the context of divided Germany to describe those who worked in cultural production (in the film or literary business) and crossed borders to partner with DEFA in order to sell and popularize its products abroad. Thus, in the second and fourth chapters of this book, the term “cultural mediators” predominantly refers to Westerners. David-Fox’s term is especially useful here because, in a sense, the individuals featured in my discussion came from within German culture: they spoke the same language as their Eastern counterparts, some still had relatives in the East and visited them despite the division, and many had participated in the same cultural and intellectual life before World War II.

The discussion of cultural mediators who traversed borders to trade or partner with DEFA and to showcase its product in the West is central to the second intervention that this book undertakes. Countering the belief that Eastern European cinemas remained regional in their character, *Cinema of Collaboration* brings out of the shadows producers and film financiers who sought to do business with the socialist studio. Such figures have remained on the margins of European film history, which conventionally privileges either the director, as the mastermind behind a cinematic production, or film stars as central to the marketability and the reception of films. Yet financier Erich Mehl, producers Artur Brauner, Walter Koppel, and Manfred Durniok, and media en-

trepreneur Leo Kirch, among others, exported GDR feature and documentary films to theaters and television broadcasters in the West and profited from this niche marketing. They succeeded in overcoming the rigid divide because they were able to operate simultaneously in two worlds: the Western cultural sphere and markets and East German official policies and ideology. Such intermediaries traded film licenses, introduced seemingly apolitical genres, such as fairy-tale adaptations or science fiction, to Western media markets, and, in the 1980s, were able to broker the import of Hollywood and Western movies into the East. Their agendas and their rapport with DEFA's foreign trade department, DEFA-Außenhandel, have remained unexamined to date, but Cold War film markets were more deeply interlaced than existing scholarship has suggested. Above all, the mediators' commercial engagement with East Germans undermines the popular conviction that socialist films were rarely exported due to their ideological character. In fact, with the growing popularity of television, GDR features often were screened in the West—with their East German labels removed—from the 1960s onward.

Exiled intellectuals represent another type of cultural mediator and they were highly regarded among the socialist party and GDR artists. A prominent example is Thomas Mann who in the 1950s insisted that his 1901 novel, *Buddenbrooks*, be adapted as an East/West German film coproduction. The negotiations continued over several years and drew a number of East and West German literary and cinematic figures, including DEFA manager Albert Wilkening and West German distributor Ilse Kubaschewski. Hans Abich, a West German producer who had participated in license trade across the occupation zones with DEFA, was also involved in the project.⁵⁶ However, unable to consolidate political with aesthetic concerns, DEFA withdrew from the coproduction and *Buddenbrooks* was realized in the West in 1959. In the early 1960s, DEFA dramaturge Walter Janka, a former editor of Mann and other writers who had escaped the Third Reich, used his contacts to the German-Jewish exile community in South and North America to bring business to DEFA and to acquire rights to literary works. Marta Feuchtwanger, Lion Feuchtwanger's widow and a committed German intellectual based in California, participated in the scriptwriting process and the distribution of DEFA films in the United States during the 1970s. Such interactions between individuals and the studio were less profit-oriented and more driven by friendship or personal agendas. In fact, the cultural mediators' actions were quite often constrained by cultural bureaucrats' demands. Marta Feuchtwanger, for instance, saw

an opportunity to bring East German film closer to U.S. exile and academic communities, yet she also had to correspond with GDR high-echelon cultural attachés and diplomats in order to acquire film prints or to bring a DEFA filmmaker to California. Intellectual mediators like Marta Feuchtwanger and Thomas Mann represent a form of transnational cooperation that sustained DEFA's persistent efforts to reach out to audiences behind the Iron Curtain. We need to consider the impact of such mediators as equally important to that of the earlier category of so-called business mediators. Ultimately, both types of mediators were professionals or cultural figures engaged in the same pursuit of art creation and dissemination as their DEFA colleagues, united by a common cause.

By approaching both types of mediators as players in their own right, and by tackling their role in brokering the reception of DEFA in West Germany, Western Europe, and the United States, *Cinema of Collaboration* responds to several needs identified in German film studies. On the one hand, broadening the definition of the term "border crossing" to include West-East movement can impart new meanings to the divided identities within Europe and how they complemented each other. After 1961, when travel beyond the Berlin Wall was prohibited, working with Western cultural mediators also offered opportunities for East German and Eastern European filmmakers to reach out to foreign markets, and thus to establish international validation for their own art. At the same time, several of the cultural mediators working with DEFA opened a door to Eastern European markets and studios. These figures thus shed light on the interplay between officially endorsed encounters and private contacts. By foregrounding this interplay and cooperation, this study embraces a more inclusive approach that extends beyond the directors themselves to scriptwriters, producers, actors, and set designers. Such an approach allows also for insight into broader processes of cooperation among Eastern European artists.

DEFA and the Question of Eastern European Cinemas

As in other socialist states, filmmaking in the GDR was a synthesis of efforts by successive cohorts of creative agents who did not work in isolation, but learned from each other and benefited from the open space of the socialist bloc and state-encouraged forms of exchange. Moreover, with the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, such cooperation became a necessity. What ensued was a decisive turn to the East. GDR directors traveled for several reasons: to study or specialize in Moscow,

Prague, and Łódź; to view their Eastern neighbors' films at festivals in Karlovy Vary, Leipzig, or the Soviet capital; and to negotiate numerous coproductions. The directors who entered such a lively cooperation belonged mostly to a younger DEFA cohort, a generation born after World War II. Some East German contacts, therefore, derived from previous UFA networks, but new alliances were forged as dictated by the needs of a shared market, common audience tastes, and similar demands by socialist governments. To cater to such diverse interests, DEFA filmmakers embarked on numerous joint projects, but a large part of this effort was the creation of socialist genres. Many DEFA classics analyzed repeatedly in scholarship for their artistic and entertainment cachet, such as science fiction features, the so-called *Indianerfilme* (films about Native Americans), fairy-tale adaptations, and artist or scientist biopics, could be brought to the screen only as coproductions with mainly Eastern European partners. This fact seems to get lost in the conventional DEFA story shaped by border closures and geopolitical vicissitudes.

Cinema of Collaboration argues for a holistic view of Eastern European industries of the Cold War and thus examines DEFA's ties to its neighbors within the socialist bloc. Katie Trumpener was one of the first to raise the question about DEFA's "interrelationship with the other cinemas of Eastern Europe" and to point to the regional interconnectedness that played a central role for the film business.⁵⁷ On the one hand, DEFA has always been "part of a film distribution and reception circuit which spanned eastern Europe," but on the other, as Trumpener maintains, the East German studio never took a "dominant position" among socialist film industries.⁵⁸ The reason for this, Larson Powell suggests, lies in the fact that DEFA failed to develop "the kind of auteurist modernism by which postwar cinema is commonly evaluated."⁵⁹ Though Powell emphasizes the influence of Soviet and Polish cinema on 1970s DEFA directors, he agrees with Trumpener that avant-garde traditions, such as the Czechoslovak New Wave and the Polish School, were lacking in the DEFA project. In Trumpener's words, DEFA has remained "for the most part politically and aesthetically orthodox."⁶⁰ However, Oksana Bulgakowa, who also discusses commonalities and differences among DEFA and the Eastern European New Waves between 1956 and 1966, warns not to throw the baby out with the bathwater.⁶¹ Her study demonstrates that affinities in terms of aesthetics and style, as well as narrative themes such as personal freedom, reevaluation of the shared experience of World War II, and visually foregrounded subjectivity, need to be approached with an understanding of the specificity of each national identity and historical past. In other words, the daring

experiments found in Italian Neorealism or the Polish, Hungarian, and Czech cinemas of the time should not become a cookie cutter applied to DEFA. Indeed, scholarship traditionally views avant-garde qualities as a prerequisite for determining which European films are valuable, yet it is necessary to ask whether innovation can be detected elsewhere, meaning not only on the visual or narrative levels. I propose that an inquiry into industrial aspects, distribution patterns, and cooperation strategies can take us further.

Despite the lack of scholarly consensus on stylistic innovation, DEFA deserves a central place in Eastern European cinema history by virtue of its handling of the material side of filmmaking. *Cinema of Collaboration* foregrounds this idea and responds to the need for a comparative approach to Eastern European film industries, as identified by Dina Iordanova, Marsha Siefert, and Pavel Skopal. These film historians have recognized film cooperation, trade, and exhibition within the former socialist bloc as underexplored areas.⁶² Their methods of inquiry into this field, moreover, offer a complementary view on the current debate over aesthetics by reframing DEFA as an equal partner in Eastern bloc interactions. For instance, Iordanova and Siefert have shown that there was an elaborate system of cinematic barter between Eastern bloc countries and film festivals where exponent pictures were screened and discussed.⁶³ In addition, socialist nations participated in state-governed circulation of cultural products within the bloc. As Siefert explains, this exchange was regulated by bilateral treaties of “friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance” arranged to govern cooperation in science, education, tourism, and film.⁶⁴ Second, domestic cultural institutions were created to represent “those involved in the production, dissemination, interpretation, and consumption of domestic culture in the individual Eastern European nations.”⁶⁵ Such institutions comprised, for instance, creative unions among writers, musicians, artists, and filmmakers. While resembling professional or labor unions, these communities not only enabled official control over their members, but also served as a pluralistic forum to shape creative impetus. At the same time, as Siefert and Skopal show, allegedly similar institutional structures and practices, such as administrative hierarchies, state oversight, and cultural policymakers, differed from each other depending on national context and historical experience.⁶⁶ This diversity of control mechanisms allowed for exceptions in the practice of censorship, and thus DEFA filmmakers saw coproductions with multiple socialist partners as a means to circumvent political restrictions. While comparing the cinematic industries in the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, Skopal

draws attention to DEFA's role as principal initiator of coproductions and the preferred employer of Eastern European actors and filmmakers.⁶⁷ In particular, he scrutinizes cultural transfer between these three countries, strategies for joint projects, and cultural policy regulating distribution and exhibition practices, as well as patterns of reception. Skopal concludes that "the history of Czech, Polish and East German cinema culture is not exclusively, nor even primarily, a history of ideologically loaded spectacles, ambitious art projects marred by 'them' or a few true 'gems' saved from the past and re-interpreted; it is also a part of many other histories—of institutions, diplomacy, state economics, education, marketing practices, and consumption."⁶⁸

Building on Jordanova's, Siefert's, and Skopal's insights, the present study recontextualizes DEFA's relationship to other socialist cinemas within the specific sensibilities and models of filmmaking informed by the Cold War. DEFA deliberately recycled elements from the state-run film companies in the East. The first such element was the structural organization of the film studio into artistic or dramaturgical units, an idea that emerged in the Czech, Polish, and Hungarian national studios. Such units comprised relatively independent collectives of film professionals gravitating around one or two leading directors and a dramaturge. This model offered internal support, mediation between the unit's members and state officials, and better chances for negotiation of projects. Second, as discussed above, even though DEFA films were not as original as movies made within the Czechoslovak or Polish New Waves, they often adopted imagery and aesthetic sensibilities from socialist partners. Such borrowings attest to the ongoing dialogue within the socialist camp and the possibilities of pushing back at political limitations from within. Third, the socialist studios participated in economic exchanges of technical services, expertise, and talent, or provided landscapes and props for each other's productions. Many DEFA genre films, for instance, were shot in the Yugoslav, Bulgarian, or Mongolian mountains, and other projects required the technical expertise of Soviet or Czech animation experts. In addition, DEFA filmmakers or dramaturges preferred working with multinational film crews or hiring Eastern European stars in coproductions.

To a large extent, DEFA's turn to the East was motivated by a shared sense of otherness vis-à-vis the West or of technological and material limitations. This urge to overcome a peripheral position forged a lasting collaboration among the cinemas of Eastern Europe. Like the above-mentioned continental filmmakers of the interwar period who borrowed from, revamped, or even aesthetically rebelled against Hollywood genres,

Eastern European studios developed strategies to emulate Western successes and to distinguish themselves from them both aesthetically and structurally. The differentiation in aesthetic terms meant the subversion of existing genres, such as the Western or science fiction. By empowering the disempowered, such as Native Americans or African people, in such genres, as well as by searching for innovative animation and special effects, DEFA and its Eastern European partners sought to fashion a “socialist” entertainment cinema. The above-described KAGs or writing teams formed with director, author, and—in some instances—the dramaturge or external consultants offer examples of new structural models that arose in response to Western cinemas. To focus on teamwork means to broaden the discussion of films to include an examination of how relations within the socialist bloc, institutional conditions, and domestic practices were impacted directly and indirectly by Cold War considerations.

Exploring the Archives

Recovering DEFA’s agenda to cooperate with Eastern and Western partners would not be possible without access to archives whose contents have not yet been mined for information on the studio. *Cinema of Collaboration’s* exploration of archives was motivated, in particular, by the book’s ambition to emphasize the role of individuals who worked with and within DEFA. Inquiry into the motivation of West Germans doing business with the East German studio or its export department opens a new and intriguing dimension of national film history. Juxtaposing cross-border travel and trade with interactions that shaped the lived experience of historical actors allows for a fine-grained exploration of what outside observers valued about DEFA or projected onto the company. I delved into private archives of West German filmmakers or exiled intellectuals who dealt with DEFA: film financier Erich Mehl’s private archive in Lugano, Switzerland; the Artur Brauner collection at the Fassbinder Center in Frankfurt, Germany; and Marta Feuchtwanger’s archive at the Feuchtwanger Memorial Library at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles.

Documents in Erich Mehl’s private archive enhance our understanding of the extent to which DEFA was involved in various types of partnerships with Western partners and underscore the studio’s dependency on Western currency. Mehl entered into contractual relations with the studio as a coproducer, traded film licenses, exported GDR films to

West German broadcasters, received distribution rights for DEFA films in the West and copyrights for posters and other visual material, came into contact with promising Eastern European filmmakers such as Roman Polanski, and enjoyed traveling privileges behind the Curtain. In addition, Mehl's correspondence with other producers points to a wide-reaching network of DEFA partners in the West, such as Artur Brauner, Walter Koppel, and Manfred Durniok. The existence of this network was confirmed by findings in the Brauner and in the Durniok archives. The Brauner archive supplies evidence of DEFA's direct involvement in the early postwar film exchange in the late 1940s as well as of the complex process of casting Western actors in East German films or coproductions. Producers like Brauner and film financiers like Mehl operated multiple companies in West Germany or other Western European countries in order to be able to barter film subsidies in cash for services or to coproduce with DEFA. Similarly, the Durniok archive, housed at the Deutsche Kinemathek in Berlin, offers information about intermediaries who brokered deals between Western broadcasters and DEFA-Außenhandel, and thus debunks the myth that East German films were largely unknown or unpopular in the FRG. This archive also documents Durniok's travel, his network-building strategies, and his lively cultural exchange with other socialist countries as well, such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and even China.⁶⁹

Marta Feuchtwanger's correspondence with Soviet and GDR high-echelon party leaders and DEFA filmmakers yields insights into another distinctive area that has not been fully researched yet: the concerted attempt within the Eastern bloc to attract foreign intellectuals as supporters of the socialist project.⁷⁰ The story of Feuchtwanger's cooperation with one of DEFA's best-known directors Konrad Wolf and the prolific dramaturge Walter Janka reveals a double agenda behind such recruiting. On the one hand, foreign visitors not only validated the ideological and social order behind the Iron Curtain, but also served as intermediaries who disseminated socialist artifacts and values in the West. The role of mediators between East and West Germany has so far been explored only in conjunction with attempts to internationally validate the GDR as a legitimate state.⁷¹ Feuchtwanger's relationship with East German and Soviet officials, many of whom were wartime émigrés returning to their home country to build an antifascist society, suggests the longevity and legacy of the networks that existed among the German exiles in South and North America. The correspondence documenting this relationship is split between Konrad Wolf's archive (located at the Berlin Academy of Arts) and other GDR officials' ar-

chives in the Federal Archive in Berlin and Feuchtwanger's collection in Los Angeles.

Another corpus of materials used in this book—including both published and hitherto unreleased sources—consists of interviews with filmmakers or authors employed permanently or temporarily at DEFA. Angel Wagenstein, a Bulgarian-Jewish writer who worked on four coproduction projects and a television feature film with East German filmmakers, offers a unique perspective both as an outsider to DEFA and as a fellow filmmaker from the socialist bloc. The East German studio, as Skopal has also shown, often hired Eastern European actors and film professionals.⁷² This practice was motivated not only by the studio's agenda to hire experts at lower cost, but also by the officially endorsed need to cooperate with brother states. Wagenstein's involvement in DEFA as a writer reflects both mandates: first, he worked on a temporary contract and thus was not paid a salary like most other GDR-based authors; and second, as a member of the Bulgarian Communist Party, he supposedly shared the ideals and values of internationalism promoted within the bloc. On a more pragmatic level, DEFA's motives for cooperation were often purely material. For example, the studio needed locations that could not be found in the GDR; it required technical expertise or sought actors with distinct physiognomies or accents; and sometimes sheer economy forced the studio to trade services instead of paying in hard currency. DEFA strategies such as employing outsiders like Wagenstein, working with Western partners like Mehl and Brauner, or coercing Western intellectuals into popularizing socialist culture abroad all share some overlapping agendas: DEFA's desire to achieve an international presence, to cut costs by cooperating with others, and, ultimately, to straddle the Iron Curtain divide.

Straddling the Divide

Collaboration between East and West as seen through the prism of DEFA's creative and business strategies serves as the organizing principle for the four chapters in the present study. While the first two chapters focus on earlier models for cooperation with Western partners (joint projects and service exchange between studios as well as film trade with cultural mediators), the last two chapters demonstrate how collaboration between artistic collectives (filmmaking units or director-writer teams) played a central role in fashioning socialist cinema as a counterpart and competitor to Hollywood. The first two chapters thematize

tize primarily commercial pursuits and stage DEFA as a company with a specific economic and export agenda. The last two chapters engage deeper with the theoretical concepts of genre and authorship. Whereas film credits and critics usually give precedence to the institution of the film director, DEFA partnerships within the socialist bloc during the 1970s deconstructed this idea by treating filmmaking as a collective effort within an international (rather than purely national) framework. At the same time, individual chapters offer discussions of numerous genres: literary adaptations (chapter 1), suspense films and costume dramas (chapter 2), science fiction and films about Native Americans (chapter 3), and artist or scientist biopics (chapter 4). The variety of DEFA pictures made as coproductions or in cooperation with European film industries suggests that genre as a supranational category can further serve as a comparative lens. While this idea is not new to DEFA studies, it is new in the context of understanding film collaborations as driven less by political agendas than by popular demand and product marketing strategies.

It is in this spirit that *Cinema of Collaboration* presents DEFA as a participant in an intense intercultural dialogue that so far has been perceived as mere backstage negotiations. The individual chapters in the book locate this dialogue in the East German studio's cooperation with French companies (chapter 1), in the DEFA export department's work with West German cultural mediators (chapter 2), in the adoption of Eastern European production models as an alternative to the Hollywood structure and the utilization of coproduction strategies to compete with mass entertainment (chapter 3), and in DEFA's and Eastern bloc filmmakers' shared desire to reconceptualize their artistic agenda in late socialism (chapter 4). Building on existing research and new archival findings, each chapter consists of close readings of representative film coproductions that are woven into broader cultural-historical accounts of political and institutional developments in Cold War Europe. The discussions in all four chapters include three components: first, an attempt to reconceptualize models for cooperation and agendas that have shaped DEFA history; second, primary research on film culture and politics in the GDR and Eastern Europe; and third, a focus on distinctive actors in the cultural mediation during the Cold War. Although all four chapters can be read as individual case studies, they refer to each other and form a chronological sequence.

Chapter 1 traces the legacy of the 1920s ideal of an all-European cinema—Film Europe—in DEFA's four postwar coproductions with French partners. All four were successful projects and serve here as a point

of departure for illuminating the ubiquitous conflation of artistic with political discourses from the 1920s, through the Third Reich, and into the 1950s. Specifically, chapter 1 delivers a comparative analysis of the continuities in Franco-German relations by demonstrating how three interwoven agendas were redefined in each period to reflect changing political prerogatives: first, a robust anti-American sentiment coupled with a critique of cultural imperialism; second, a national agenda driving international collaborations; and third, the use of joint productions to gain both recognition and a strong market presence abroad. These agendas were translated into institutional strategies for film coproduction that redressed Germany's exclusion from the international community after each of the world wars, while also encouraging unity and solidarity among European filmmakers. Artists also networked on a transnational level by participating in film congresses and festivals, producing films with multinational casts, and sharing technical skills. As this chapter traces the continuity of Franco-German collaboration into the postwar period, it illuminates the ubiquitous conflation of artistic with political discourses and reveals the legacy of Film Europe. The question of commonalities and differences among DEFA, UFA, and UFI becomes crucial for understanding how past legacies may have impacted film production in postwar Eastern Europe.

Chapter 2 highlights a different type of continuity that links the postwar interzonal film exchange between East and West Germany with the trade of film licenses during the Cold War. Financier Erich Mehl, who popularized GDR cinema abroad, fostered this exchange by overcoming the FRG's ban on inter-German coproductions and by utilizing a wide network of professionals in his partnership with DEFA. While Mehl's story forms the core of this chapter, other cultural mediators between East Germany and the West or Asia, such as Artur Brauner and Durniok, are also noted. Although lesser known in scholarship on East German cinema, Mehl was by far the most successful partner DEFA had in the West until East Germany's political recognition in 1972. To illustrate his efficient business model, I open chapter 2 by recounting his significant intervention within West German politics to ensure the release of Wolfgang Staudte's DEFA film *Der Untertan* (*The Kaiser's Lackey*, 1951, GDR) in the West. My discussion here is based on unpublished correspondence and trade documents from Mehl's private archive. Analysis of these sources reveals that Mehl's lasting partnership with DEFA emerged from the interzonal film exchange, defied the governmental ban on inter-German cooperation in the 1950s, and adapted to shifting political tensions between 1961 and 1990. The chapter con-

cludes with an in-depth analysis of the development of Mehl's agenda between his first joint project with the East German studio, *Leuchtfeuer* (*Navigating Light*, 1954, dir. Wolfgang Staudte, GDR/Sweden), and his last one, *Spielbank-Affäre* (*Casino Affair*, 1959, dir. Arthur Pohl, GDR/Sweden). In historiography, there are always continuities as well as ruptures; the question is how to identify and conceive of them and how to balance them. Recognizing continuities in the conduct of business across the European divide of 1945 can heighten our understanding of how collaborations persisted even when the Iron Curtain descended and common forms of trade and travel gradually stalled. Cultural mediators' crossing of borders provides a framework for thinking about East German cinema's trajectory and reception on both sides of the European divide.

However, the activities of individuals attempting to straddle the divide also raise other issues, such as the role of ideology and institutions in the Cold War context and their broader influence on filmmaking. Chapter 3, therefore, explores DEFA's efforts to produce entertainment films together with Eastern European partners in order to compete with the popular genre films of Hollywood and Western European cinemas. In German studies, ideas such as internationalism are sometimes set aside or dismissed as a pure form of ideological indoctrination. Yet we need to examine ideologies not only as shaping both sides of divided Europe, but also for their implications for the respective cultural discourses. Therefore, I highlight the importance of creative KAGs for the emergence of socialist-style entertainment cinema. Historically, these filmmaking collectives offered a new mode of artistic organization that Poland and Czechoslovakia had introduced in the 1950s within the structures of their respective state-run studios. In contrast to the Hollywood studio system of the time, filmmakers in Eastern Europe developed an alternative model: relatively autonomous units consisting of directors, literary advisers (or dramaturges, as they were known in the 1960s), scriptwriters, and production managers, which operated under the auspices of the larger state-run studio. DEFA adopted this model in the late 1950s with the mediation of Kurt Maetzig, who founded the first KAG within DEFA, Roter Kreis (Red Circle). I continue my discussion with a focus on Red Circle's first coproduction, the East German–Polish utopian film *Der schweigende Stern* (*The Silent Star*, 1960, dir. Kurt Maetzig, GDR/Poland), made in the same year as the West German–U.S. coproduction about Wernher von Braun's life, *I Aim for the Stars* (1960, dir. J. Lee Thompson). Tackling the impact of ideological discourse on these productions at the height of the space race,

this chapter sheds light on both the utopian film and the *Indianerfilm*, an Eastern European version of the Western, as ideologically charged genres that transcended national considerations. At the same time, such commercial projects were unthinkable without the exchange of services among Eastern European cinemas. It was not only the trade of expertise or the hiring of actors within the socialist bloc that defined these genres in coproduction, but also their emergence within distinctive artistic collectives: the creative unions. The impact of Eastern European genres, of course, extends beyond the commonly critiqued reenactment of Native American rituals or ferocious debates over scientific achievement during the space race. We need to see these films as occupying a middle ground between Western-style entertainment and the socialist project of educating the audience. Engaging these genres not only uncovers parallels between cinema's agenda in both East and West, but also raises questions about the distinctiveness of GDR and Eastern European film. Its particularity had many dimensions, including its appeal to socialist and nonsocialist audiences, its competitiveness, its fascination with technical innovation, and, finally, the opportunity for a creative encounter among filmmakers within the East.

In its last two decades, DEFA churned out a stream of historical dramas and biopics of artists and scientists that, like the genres discussed in chapter 3, were either coproduced with Eastern European partners or relied on collaboration through the exchange of technical services. Even though these genres had been common in East German cinema after the postwar period, they experienced a revival in the 1970s and 1980s as a kind of European art-house cinema and became central to DEFA's international project. Chapter 4 contextualizes representative coproductions and focuses on the collaboration of directors with a writing team as well as with various cultural mediators. Filmed with a crew from eight different socialist countries, Konrad Wolf's 1971 epic about the Spanish painter Francisco de Goya presents a unique opportunity to examine these developments. *Goya, oder der arge Weg zur Erkenntnis* (*Goya or the Hard Way to Knowledge*, GDR/Soviet Union [USSR]) was directed by Wolf, yet it was cowritten by a team of authors, including DEFA dramaturge Walter Janka, Bulgarian scriptwriter Angel Wagenstein, and expatriate German intellectual Marta Feuchtwanger. This chapter draws attention to the strategy of screenplay coauthoring that became typical in such coproductions and in the case of *Goya* culminated during postproduction in a collective artistic effort to negotiate a film's release despite censorship. I conclude chapter 4 with an in-depth analysis of the last successful coproduction between East and West Germany, *Die*

Besteigung des Chimborazo (*The Ascent of Chimborazo*, dir. Rainer Simon, 1989, GDR/FRG). This retelling of Alexander von Humboldt's life resonates with the aesthetic sensibilities of European-made films about artists and scientists. *Goya* and *Chimborazo* share several similarities worth pursuing here, because they illuminate the trajectory of the biopic as well as the significant effect a team of writers had on this genre. On the narrative level, both films focus on a universal genius portrayed as a person with strengths and weaknesses and on the discrepancies between rigid courtly norms, on the one hand, and artistic freedom of expression or passion for scientific truth on the other. On the production level, the multiplicity of languages spoken in both films (e.g., Spanish, French, and German in *Chimborazo*), as well as the varied shooting locations (*Chimborazo* was shot in East and West Germany, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, France, Colombia, and Spain) served to increase artistic and entertainment values and to appeal to wider international audiences. By tracing evolving coauthorship patterns among filmmakers in the 1970s and the 1980s, my discussion complicates the auteurist image of the DEFA director as a flagship institution in both film production and negotiations. In addition, it sheds light on the crucial involvement of the coauthors, dramaturges, and even consultants who ultimately shaped the aesthetic message of a film.

Throughout the book I argue against a reductionist outlook on East German cinema, maintaining that processes in each arena explored here—partnership with Western European studios and cultural mediators, film exchange, introduction of filmmaking collectives, the recasting of Hollywood genres, transnational networks, and writing teams—need to be given their own historical weight. In short, an in-depth study of DEFA must be informed by the engagement of the state-run company with past and present traditions. I hope that the reader will find this engagement thought-provoking and worth pursuing.

Notes

Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

1. Volker Schlöndorff wrote these words in an open letter to East German director Günter Reisch: "Die Vision oder wem gehört Babelsberg: DEFA und kein Ende: Offene Antwort Volker Schlöndorffs auf einen Brief Günter Reichs," *Berliner Zeitung*, November 21, 1992. Translated in Randall Halle, *German Film after Germany: Toward a Transnational Aesthetic* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 66.
2. "Selbstverständlich ein Immobiliengeschäft: Ein Gespräch mit den Filmregisseuren Volker Schlöndorff und Peter Fleischmann über den Verkauf der Defa," *Tagesspiegel*, May 9, 1992.

3. For a detailed discussion of the debate, see Bärbel Dalichow, "Das letzte Kapitel: 1989 bis 1993," in Ralf Schenk, ed., *Das zweite Leben der Filmstadt Babelsberg: DEFA Spielfilme, 1946–1992* (Berlin: Henschel, 1994), 329–53.
4. See Brigitta Wagner's discussion of the Schlöndorff's controversy in 2008 and the collection of related articles from the German press she curated in Brigitta B. Wagner, ed., *DEFA after East Germany* (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2014), 1–7, 320–31.
5. Gundolf Freyermuth, *Der Übernehmer: Volker Schlöndorff in Babelsberg* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 1993).
6. For a detailed discussion of the transnational character of European cinema and Babelsberg's central place within Europe as envisioned by Schlöndorff and CGE, see Halle, *German Film After Germany*, 60–88. Halle provides an insightful analysis of Schlöndorff's expertise and his strategies to revamp Babelsberg into a prestigious site for high-quality and high-budget pictures, nevertheless hindered by the director's resentment of Hollywood. Halle also sensibly points out that "Babelsberg was a small object in a giant media conglomerate," *Vivendi*, in which the studios' future was not a top priority and whose downfall ultimately led to the resale of the studios (Halle, *German Film After Germany*, 83).
7. See Angus Finney's argument in *The State of European Cinema: A New Dose of Reality* (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 68–84. Throughout the chapter, but also specifically in two sections entitled "The Barrandov Experience" and "The Babelsberg Disappointment," Finney explains why Schlöndorff's strategies for restructuring the management of the studios and improving marketing operations failed compared to those at the Czech Barrandov studios and others, such as the Koliba Studios in the Slovak Republic and Mafilm in Hungary.
8. Thomas Elsaesser, *European Cinema: Face to Face with Hollywood* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2005), 13, 16.
9. Tim Bergfelder, *International Adventures: German Popular Cinema and European Co-Productions in the 1960s* (New York, Oxford: Berghahn, 2005); Anne Jäckel, *European Film Industries* (London: British Film Institute, 2003).
10. Mark Betz, *Beyond the Subtitle: Remapping European Art Cinema* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 1–43 (29).
11. Randall Halle, *The Europeanization of Cinema: Interzones and Imaginative Communities* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2014), 14.
12. For comparative studies on Cold War cultures, see Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabendam, eds., *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945–1960* (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Uta Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in Divided Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); David Crew, ed., *Consuming Germany in the Cold War: Leisure Consumption and Culture* (Oxford: Berg, 2003); and Mila Ganeva, *Film and Fashion amidst the Ruins of Berlin: From Nazism to the Cold War* (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2018).
13. Giles Scott-Smith and Joes Segal, "Introduction: Divided Dreamworlds? The Cultural Cold War in East and West," in *Divided Dreamworlds? The Cultural Cold War in East and West*, ed. Peter Romijn, Giles Scott-Smith, and Joes Segal (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), 1–9 (1). This essay collection argues that, despite obvious gaps between the political systems and everyday experience, people who lived in the two antagonistic power blocs still shared cultural forms. Another edited volume on this topic, *Cold War Cultures: Perspectives on Eastern and Western European Societies*, ed. Annette Vowinckel, Marcus M. Payk, and Thomas Lindenberger (New York: Berghahn, 2012), argues for extending the scope of Cold War studies beyond the focus on politics, diplomacy, and military action in the 1950s and 1960s. The contri-

- butions to *Cold War Cultures* show how the reduction of the Cold War to a political conflict overlooks multiple artistic and cultural expressions that reveal commonalities and hybridity in the experiences of the period.
14. Yale Richmond, *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), xiv.
 15. Recent scholarship on film festivals suggests the importance of both feature and documentary films and the sites for their display in this regard. See Andreas Kötzing and Caroline Moine, *Cultural Transfer and Political Conflicts: Film Festivals and the Cold War* (Göttingen, Germany: V&R unipress, 2017).
 16. Caroline Moine, *Screened Encounters: The Leipzig Documentary Film Festival, 1955–1990* (New York, Oxford: Berghahn, 2018), 8.
 17. DEFA's liquidation (i.e., the erasure of the company's name from the German Business Register) technically took place in 1994. However, the company had already been sold in 1992 to the French conglomerate CGE, later renamed Vivendi SA. This sale was, effectively, the end of DEFA. See Jens Rübner, *Faszination Kulisse–60 Jahre DEFA* (Leipzig, Germany: Engelsdorfer, 2008). Compare to Seán Allan and Sebastian Heiduschke, "Introduction: Re-imagining East German Cinema," in *Re-Imagining DEFA: East German Cinema in Its National and Transnational Contexts*, ed. Seán Allan and Sebastian Heiduschke (New York: Berghahn, 2016), 1–16. For DEFA's last years and its legacy in the new cinematic landscape of unified Germany, see Wagner, *DEFA after East Germany*.
 18. Winston S. Churchill, "The Sinews of Peace," in *Churchill's "Iron Curtain" Speech Fifty Years Later*, ed. James W. Muller (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1999), 1–14 (8). Churchill's speech on March 5, 1946 was a reaction to Joseph Stalin's election speech delivered on February 9, 1946 where Soviet supremacy was asserted against a capitalist world that allegedly had engendered World War II and would soon collapse into another similar conflict. For details, see Alastair Koch-Williams, "The Soviet Union and the Early Cold War, 1945–53," in *Russia's International Relations in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Alastair Koch-Williams (London: Routledge, 2013), 87–99.
 19. Michael David-Fox, "The Iron Curtain as Semipermeable Membrane: Origins and Demise of the Stalinist Superiority Complex," in *Cold War Crossings: International Travel and Exchange across the Soviet Bloc, 1940–1960*, ed. Patryk Babiracki and Kenyon Zimmer (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2014), 14–39 (15).
 20. Most edited volumes on DEFA rehearse its history and structure, but English-language monographs that offer a comprehensive analysis of the film industry and its intertwinement with the state are Daniela Berghahn's *Hollywood Behind the Wall: the Cinema of East Germany* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2005); and Joshua Feinstein, *The Triumph of the Ordinary: Depictions of Daily Life in the East German Cinema, 1949–1989* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).
 21. Schenk, *Das zweite Leben*, 8–49.
 22. Berghahn, *Hollywood Behind the Wall*, 19–23.
 23. *Ibid.*, 22.
 24. See Leonie Naughton, *That Was the Wild East: Film Culture, Unification and the "New" Germany* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002). See also the interviews with two former DEFA directors, Peter Kahane and Jörg Foth, in Wagner, *DEFA after East Germany*, 51–79.
 25. Studies of DEFA's ideological agenda include, among others, Thomas Heimann, *DEFA, Künstler und SED: Zum Verhältnis von Kulturpolitik und Film in der SBZ/DDR 1945 bis 1958* (Berlin: Vistas, 1993); Dagmar Schittly, *Zwischen Regie und Regime: Die*

- Filmpolitik der SED im Spiegel der DEFA-Produktionen* (Berlin: Links, 2002); and Wolfgang Gersch, *Szenen eines Landes: Die DDR und ihre Filme* (Berlin: Aufbau, 2006).
26. Dalichow, "Das letzte Kapitel," 351.
 27. See Brigitta Wagner's "Introduction: Making History ReVisible" and "The Schlöndorff Controversy (2008)" in Wagner, *DEFA after East Germany*, 1–7 (1), 320–31 (322).
 28. Marc Silberman and Henning Wrage, eds., *DEFA at the Crossroads of East German and International Film Culture* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2014), 2.
 29. Barton Byg, "Introduction: Reassessing DEFA Today," in Barton Byg and Betheny Moore, eds., *Moving Images of East Germany: Past and Future of DEFA Film* (Washington, DC: AICGS, 2002), 1–23.
 30. Barton Byg, "Spectral Images in the Afterlife of GDR Cinema," in Wagner, *DEFA after East Germany*, 24–47 (25).
 31. Michael Wedel et al., eds., *DEFA International: Grenzüberschreitende Filmbeziehungen vor und nach dem Mauerbau* (Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer, 2013).
 32. Allan and Heiduschke, *Re-Imagining DEFA*.
 33. Rosemary Stott, *Crossing the Wall: The Western Feature Film Import in East Germany* (Oxford: Lang, 2011).
 34. See, e.g., Sebastian Heiduschke, *East German Cinema: DEFA and Film History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Qinna Shen, *The Politics of Magic: DEFA Fairy-Tale Films* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2015); and Wedel et al., *DEFA International*.
 35. See here all the contributions listed under "Transnationale Distribution und Rezeption" in Wedel et al., *DEFA International*, 353–450. See also Lars Karl and Pavel Skopal, eds., *Cinema in the Service of the State: Perspectives on Film Culture in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, 1945–1960* (New York: Berghahn, 2015).
 36. Berghahn, *Hollywood Behind the Wall*.
 37. Dina Iordanova, *Cinema of the Other Europe* (London: Wallflower Press, 2003), 1–3.
 38. See, for instance, Christiane Mückenberger and Günter Jordan, "Sie sehen selbst, Sie hören selbst . . .": Eine Geschichte der DEFA von ihren Anfängen bis 1949 (Marburg: Hitzeroth, 1994), 14, 25. Compare to Alfred Lindemann, "Die Lage des deutschen Films," in *Der deutsche Film: Fragen—Forderungen—Aussichten. Bericht vom Ersten Deutschen Film-Autoren-Kongress. 6–9. Juni 1947 in Berlin* (Berlin: Henschel, 1947), 9–19.
 39. For a discussion of the structural resemblance between DEFA and UFA in terms of their organization and all-encompassing supervision of film projects, see Berghahn, *Hollywood Behind the Wall*, 13–21 (13, 19).
 40. Mariana Ivanova, "Die Prestige-Agenda der DEFA. Koproduktionen mit Erich Mehls Filmfirma Pandora (1953–1957)," in Wedel et al., *DEFA International*, 217–33.
 41. Thomas Heimann, *DEFA, Künstler und SED-Politik*. 57. Quoted also in Bathrick, "From Soviet Zone to Volksdemokratie: The Politics of Film Culture in the GDR, 1945–1960," in Karl and Skopal, eds., *Cinema in the Service of the State*, 15–38 (17).
 42. For some shared themes that such directors addressed when embarking on making films for postwar audiences, see Ganeva, *Film and Fashion*, a comparative study of East and West pictures in the immediate postwar in terms of aesthetic continuity and rupture.
 43. Stephen Brockmann, "The Struggle over Audiences in Postwar East German Film," *Film & History* 45, no. 1 (2015): 5–16.
 44. David Bathrick, "From UFA to DEFA: Past as Present in Early GDR Films," in *Contentious Memories: Looking Back at the GDR*, ed. Jost Hermand and Marz Silberman (New York: Peter Lang, 1998), 169–88. See also Bathrick's expanded version of this essay, "From Soviet Zone to Volksdemokratie."

45. On Nazi cinema's creative strategies and emotional effects, see Eric Rentschler, *The Ministry of Illusion: Nazi Cinema and Its Afterlife* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).
46. Detlef Kannapin, "Was hat Zara Leander mit der DEFA zu tun? Die Nachwirkungen des NS-Films im DEFA-Schaffen—Notwendige Anmerkungen für eine neue Forschungsperspektive," in *Apropos: Film 2005* [= Das Jahrbuch der DEFA-Stiftung, 2005], ed. Schenk, Ralf, Erika Richter, and Claus Löser (Berlin: Bertz + Fischer, 2005), 188–209.
47. For a comprehensive account, see Klaus Kreimeier, *The Ufa Story: A History of Germany's Greatest Film Company, 1918–1945*, trans. Robert and Rita Kimber (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996).
48. See Leni Borger, "Ufas Russen. Die Emigranten von Montreuil bis Babelsberg," in *Das Ufa-Buch: Kunst und Krisen—Stars und Regisseure—Wirtschaft und Politik. Die internationale Geschichte von Deutschlands größtem Film-Konzern*, ed. Hans-Michael Bock and Michael Töteberg (Frankfurt, Germany: Zweitausendeins, 1992), 236–39; Sybille M. Sturm and Arthur Wohlgemuth, eds., *Hallo? Berlin? Ici Paris! Deutsch-Französische Filmbeziehungen, 1918–1939* (Munich, Germany: edition text + kritik, 1996); Jörg Schöning and Johannes Roschlau, eds., *Film im Herzen Europas: Deutsch-tschechische Filmbeziehungen im 20. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: absolute Medien, 2007).
49. See Vladislav Zubok, "Introduction," in Babiracki and Zimmer, *Cold War Crossings*, 1–13; Michael David-Fox, *Crossing Borders: Modernity, Ideology, and Culture in Russia and the Soviet Union* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015); and Patryk Babiracki and Austin Jersild, eds., *Socialist Internationalism in the Cold War: Exploring the Second World* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
50. Marsha Siefert, "Soviet Cinematic Internationalism and Socialist Film Making, 1955–1972," in Babiracki and Jersild, *Socialist Internationalism*, 161–93 (164).
51. *Ibid.*
52. Patryk Babiracki and Austin Jersild, "Editor's Introduction," in Babiracki and Jersild, *Socialist Internationalism*, 1–16 (2). In addition, two other volumes in the series *East Looks West* address the topics of travel and cultural exchange within Europe, before and after the division of the continent, and thus broaden the Cold War perspective on European spaces and cultures: Wendy Bracewell and Alex Drace-Francis, eds., *Under Eastern Eyes: A Comparative Introduction to East European Travel Writing on Europe* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2008); Wendy Bracewell, *Orientalisms: An Anthology of East European Travel Writing, ca. 1550–2000* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2009).
53. David-Fox, "The Iron Curtain as Semipermeable Membrane," 14–39 (14).
54. Zubok, "Introduction," 1–13 (2).
55. David-Fox, *Crossing Borders*, 163–84 (163).
56. Schenk, *Das zweite Leben*, 90; "Buddenbrooks: Bonner Bedenken," *Der Spiegel*, August 5, 1959; Manfred Jelenski, "Nur Bonn verhinderte die Koproduktion *Buddenbrooks*," *Deutsche Filmkunst*, 12, 380–81.
57. Katie Trumpener, "DEFA: Moving Germany into Eastern Europe," in Byg and Moore, *Moving Images of East Germany*, 92.
58. *Ibid.*
59. Larson Powell, "'Wind from the East': DEFA and Eastern European Cinema," in Silberman and Wrage, *DEFA at the Crossroads*, 223–42 (223).
60. Trumpener, "DEFA: Moving Germany into Eastern Europe," 95. On the term "Polish School," see Paul Coates, *The Red and The White: The Cinemas of People's Poland* (London: Wallflower Press, 2005), 17–19.

61. Oksana Bulgakowa, "DEFA-Filme im Kontext der 'neuen Wellen' im osteuropäischen Film," in Wedel et al., *DEFA International*, 73–91.
62. See Dina Iordanova, *The Cinema of the Other Europe: The Industry and Artistry of East Central European Film* (London: Wallflower, 2003); Marsha Siefert, "East European Cold War Cultures: Alterities, Commonalities, and Film Industries," in *Cold War Cultures: Perspectives on Eastern and Western European Societies*, ed. Annette Vowinckel, Marcus M. Payk, and Thomas Lindenberger (New York: Berghahn, 2012), 23–54; and Pavel Skopal, *Filmová kultura severního trojúhelníko: Filmy, kina a dváci Československa, NDR a Polska 1945–1968* (Brno, Czech Republic: HOST, 2014).
63. Iordanova, *The Cinema of the Other Europe*, 49; Siefert, "East European Cold War Cultures," 37.
64. Siefert, "East European Cold War Cultures," 30.
65. *Ibid.*, 32.
66. *Ibid.*, 31. See also Karl and Skopal, *Cinema in Service of the State*; and Balázs Apor, Peter Apor, and E. A. Rees, eds., *The Sovietization of Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on the Postwar Period* (Washington, DC: New Academia, 2008).
67. Skopal, *Filmová kultura severního trojúhelníko*.
68. *Ibid.*, 286.
69. For further information on Durniok's international activities, see the contributions by Angel Wagenstein, GDR documentary filmmaker Gitta Nickel and journalist Peter Schultze in Manfred Durniok, *Manfred Durniok—Films & Friends*, Berlin: Das neue Berlin, 1996, 24–29 and 127–32.
70. Marta Feuchtwanger's role as an intermediary between Soviet and GDR culture and the United States has been previously mentioned only briefly by Manfred Flügge in his biography, *Die vier Leben der Marta Feuchtwanger: Biographie* (Berlin: Aufbau, 2008), 375–82.
71. See, for instance, Marc Silberman's discussion of intermediaries between the French studios and DEFA in "Learning from the Enemy: DEFA-French Coproductions of the 1950s," *Film History* 18, no. 1 (2006): 21–45; and Stefan Soldovieri's discussion of Erich Mehl's role at DEFA in "Socialists in Outer Space: East German Film's Venusian Adventure," *Film History* 10, no. 3 (1998): 382–98.
72. Pavel Skopal, "The Pragmatic Alliance of DEFA and Barrandov: Cultural Transfer, Popular Cinema and Czechoslovak-East German Coproductions, 1957–95," *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 38, no. 1 (2018): 1–14.