

Introduction

THE SEPARATION OF AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY AFTER WORLD WAR I

A Borderland Perspective



Hannes Grandits

In the late autumn of 1918, the Austro-Hungarian Empire lost the war. With it, the territorial order that had existed until then also collapsed. General uncertainty overshadowed a new beginning. A highly controversial remeasurement of new state borders came to the agenda. The dissolving Habsburg monarchy existed for so many centuries as an imperial state structure, and historically came into being as a collection of kingdoms, duchies, counties, and other polities ruled by the House of Habsburg. After the lost war, new borders were to be drawn and new—now national—states were in the process of getting established. This was an ambiguous undertaking from the very beginning. Ambiguity prevailed in particular also in the implementation of the new border between the two main losers within the Habsburg monarchy, namely Austria and Hungary.

The process of defining a new state border between Austria and Hungary dragged on for years. Of course, governmental politics in Vienna and Budapest played a key role throughout this process. There was fear that this issue could, if not solved in a consensual way, develop into a veritable conflict, even war. Otto Bauer, Social Democratic foreign minister in Austria from November 1918 to spring 1919, and also afterwards when concerned with this issue in Austria's Foreign Affairs Committee, even warned of an "Alsace-Lorraine" scenario. Just

as Franco-German relations had been strained for decades over the issue of the Franco-German border demarcation since the 1870s, and this issue had been anything but an unimportant factor in the Great War, as World War I was still called at that time, the same could happen in future Austro-Hungarian relations:

If we do not come to an arrangement with Hungary, we will be at war with Hungary within ten years. Today's committee meeting will ultimately decide on war and peace, on whether Burgenland should become a new Alsace-Lorraine or not!¹

Political and Economic Polarizations during Times of Geopolitical Realignment

The border-drawing process was, however, far from being just a bilateral affair between the Austrian and Hungarian governments. At the Paris Peace Conference (1919–20), the leaders of the five Allied powers—France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States—claimed all the rights on making the decisions regarding the ways the new political and territorial order would be established in the dissolving Habsburg Empire. Deeply affected by the traumas of the recently ended war, the Allied powers were striving for a new postwar peace order for Europe (and the world).² The peace was to be designed in such a way that a catastrophic war such as had just been experienced would not be repeated in the future. This goal also included new visions of a “community of nations,” which was also symbolized by the founding of the League of Nations in January 1920, the first global intergovernmental organization dedicated in particular to maintaining world peace.³ The Austro-Hungarian border demarcation process, together with other border demarcations in post-Habsburg Central and South-eastern Europe (i.e., the creation of a postimperial order on the once Habsburg territory) can certainly be seen as a kind of “ground zero” of such a new international order.⁴

Many political historiographies about the making of a postimperial order in these areas—which, as already mentioned, aimed above all to create new nation-states—tend to underestimate sometimes the extent to which many of these international border demarcation projects were in fact, first and foremost, also very pragmatic reactions to what was happening on the ground.⁵ With regard to the regional context relevant to this book, this was definitely the case. The immediate postwar dynamics in the West Hungarian region itself (most probably this was true also for various other regions that were planned as new border regions) played an essential role—even if sometimes only indirectly or via detours. To illustrate this in its complexity and contradictoriness is one of the main concerns of this book. The very fact that (the western parts of) “Western Hungary” would become a new Austrian province of “Burgenland” was not a given for quite a considerable time, and most of our book focuses exactly on all the transformations


of this borderland before the “new order” stabilized it as part of the Republic of Austria (for a very brief chronology of this transformational period, see the accompanying text to Map 0.1.).

It was precisely the demarcation of borders per se, the idea of clearly delimitable “national communities,” as they were now to be organized in place of the Habsburg Empire, that were in reality, and in an absolute majority of situations, an illusion.⁶ Western Hungary, the region that later created Burgenland, is an excellent example to show this. It was, as were so many of those areas where border demarcation projects were to be carried out, a multilingual settlement area.⁷ Within the Austro-Hungarian Empire it had belonged to the Hungarian side, and thus the Hungarian language was particularly relevant/dominant in public life. However, most of the villages were German-speaking or mixed-language in everyday life, and the economic interweaving with neighboring and mainly German-speaking Styria, Lower Austria, and the nearby Austro-Hungarian imperial capital Vienna was immensely strong. In addition to the many German-speaking and some Hungarian-speaking villages, there were also a quite considerable number of Croatian villages. “Gypsy” settlements were also numerous. In addition, there were a couple of small towns and villages with a significant Jewish population.

During the collapse of the imperial order, as the contributions to this volume show in various facets, the striving of a vast majority of local inhabitants—regardless of their linguistic backgrounds—was in these times above all focused on their economic survival. Furthermore, thousands of mobilized soldiers from the villages and towns of this West Hungarian region had perished in the war, or returned home physically or mentally damaged. War returnees came back to their villages and towns to find not only a critical food supply crisis, but also a precarious security situation.⁸

This difficult economic and security situation in the immediate post–World War I period was exacerbated by an escalating revolutionary political atmosphere.⁹ In the spring of 1919, the widespread revolutionary mood culminated in the formation of a Soviet-style communist regime in Hungary—and thus also in the west Hungarian regional context discussed here. This short-lived Bolshevik regime, which officially bore the name Socialist Federative Soviet Republic of Hungary (*Magyarországi Szocialista Szövetséges Tanácsköztársaság*), often just called Republic of Councils, was established in March 1919. It fed into a massive polarization of the existing class antagonisms, as did the ensuing counterrevolution when the “Whites” regained power from the “Reds” in autumn 1919.¹⁰

During the Soviet dictatorship, the so-called “Red Terror” was directed against the aristocratic landowners, who owned at least a third of the total agricultural and forestry land here in the western Hungarian region, against real and alleged war profiteers, or against exponents of the “old order” in general. In the subsequent “White Terror,” exercised mainly by right-wing activists and paramilitaries



recruited from among the demobilized (Austro-)Hungarian armies, the situation turned around. Now a hunt began for all those who actually or supposedly represented or supported the Soviet dictatorship, the “communists” as well as known leftists or social democrats. Other particular targets of violence were members of the Jewish population, who were accused of having been somehow a driving force

Map 0.1. Western Hungary/Burgenland in the early 1920s. Map according to author's design, cartography © Zsolt Bottlik.

Even after the formation of Hungary and German-Austria (*Deutschösterreich*) as independent states at the end of 1918, all three western Hungarian counties (Moson, Sopron, Vas) continued to be administered as part of Hungary. This remained the case, even though it was decided at the Paris Peace Conferences for Austria (Saint-Germain-en-Laye, September 1919) and Hungary (Trianon, June 1920) that the (westernmost, or “primarily” German-speaking) parts of these counties should be transferred to the Austrian side. This area turned out to be called Burgenland, but only officially became part of the Republic of Austria (as the state was renamed after the Treaty of St. Germain) at the end of 1921. In autumn 1921, the transfer of Burgenland to Austrian sovereignty failed due to armed resistance from Hungarian paramilitaries. In October 1921, a compromise on the Austro-Hungarian border was negotiated with Italian mediation (Venice Protocol, 13 Oct. 1921). Hungary promised to surrender Burgenland without a fight (13 Nov. – 4 Dec. 2021), and Austria accepted a referendum (14–16 Dec. 1921) in Ödenburg/Sopron and the surrounding area, which resulted in Sopron and the area around it remaining part of Hungary. However, the final determination of the border line still took many months, in some cases even years. This map shows the larger settlements and towns as well as (only) those villages directly addressed in the chapters.

in the “Bolshevik conspiracy.” The Roma population also became frequent victims of violence in these turbulent times. This also applied to many of those who were considered ardent supporters of the transfer of the western Hungarian territories to Austrian rule. As recent research has shown, this phase of the “White Terror,” which started in late summer/early autumn 1919, was to last longer than the preceding “Red Terror,” although both were highly violent.¹¹

After the proclamation of Austria and Hungary as independent states, the trade in food and all kinds of other goods from the western Hungarian region to the urban centers on the Austrian side and vice versa became legally restricted, and for a short time were even forbidden. However, as the food supply had already collapsed toward the end of the war and the situation did not improve afterwards, smuggling and illegal trade across the border were practiced on a particularly large scale. For instance in Wiener Neustadt this continued to be so for many years. The authorities did not have much choice if they wanted to guarantee at least a minimum food supply for a suffering population. It is certainly not wrong to speak of the development of a special border economy here in the Austro-Hungarian border areas in which the supply asymmetries between the two sides of the border created incentives for all kinds of cross-border businesses. This, and the partial closure of the border for certain goods, led to a kind of economic grey zone or even to the establishment of a very specific and complex “border order.”¹²

The western Hungarian counties were at the same time also characterized by very intensive emigration to America, which was particularly strong in many of those (western and southern) parts of those counties that were later to form

the Burgenland. Even before the Great War, large numbers of people from exactly those parts of the western Hungarian region had emigrated to America. Remittances “from America” had already played an influential role for the village economies back home. In the dramatic situation after the war, from 1919 into the early 1920s, the region became, once again, one of the European hot spots of migration to America. Thousands left to find work in America, in part already referring to their kinship networks overseas.¹³

Conditions such as those outlined here have shaped everyday life in other regional contexts of the disintegrated Habsburg Empire, if not in the same way then at least in some similar forms. The same applies to the fact that the course of many of the to-be-established post-Habsburg state borders (like those in various other postimperial spaces of Eastern and Southeastern Europe) remained unclear for a long time. Linked to this, the future (or final) state affiliation of the citizens living in these regions remained uncertain, sometimes for years.¹⁴

The regional dynamics connected to the border demarcations during and after the collapse of the imperial order are examined by the editors and authors of this book with special consideration of the disastrous economic situation that overshadowed everyday life after a long and traumatic war. Many of the political and class tensions that were so pervasive in the regional case during the period were closely related to the persistent supply crisis and the dramatic shortage of food and other goods. Such an attempt to reconcile or rethink much more fully the relationship between economic, social, and political history is, in our view, of the utmost importance, as it allows us to complement recent research on post-imperial Eastern and Southeastern European disintegration processes after World War I, which, innovative as it was, was to some extent too focused on paramilitarism and violence as such.¹⁵

The disputed border between Austria and Hungary is a fascinating case that has to some extent been neglected in the existing general research on the post-Habsburg transformations. It is worth examining it. With an approach as outlined here, this book hopes to make an addition to current scholarship on the history of postimperial state making, and in particular on the post-Habsburg history of emerging national borderlands.

A Borderland Perspective on the Enforcing of a Postimperial National Order

At nation-state borders, ideally, one nation’s space ends and that of the “other” begins. It can make a fundamental difference if some of the aspired “own” regions and regional societies are “successfully” included into the national statehood. In cases where they were not, this often became the starting point for the longing for those “unredeemed lands” under perceived “foreign rule.”¹⁶ Therefore, border-

drawing processes are per se crucial for the shape an aspired national statehood is going to take.¹⁷ By looking closely at the factual implementation of new state borders it can be possible to receive a deeper understanding about how the new (presumably national) societies were imagined, argued for, and then legitimated (on the basis, for instance, of history or geography).

With regard to the regional context studied here in Hungary, but also in Austria, the “national question” in the dramatic postwar years following the caesura of 1918 was an overriding pivot of historiographical interest for many decades. The break with the imperial past and the newness of the territorial configuration—in Hungary with regard to the loss of long-standing historical (national) territory of the Kingdom of Hungary, and in Austria especially with regard to the “birth” of the new Austrian federal province of Burgenland—were definitely the focus of research interest for a very long time. In the process, fundamental insights were developed and important historiographical knowledge gained on which the present work also depends.¹⁸

Recent historiography of the postimperial period after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire—but also other postimperial situations, such as the Ottoman ones—had in many respects started to relativize the ways in which the “caesura of 1918” as well as the accompanying “national questions” are traditionally viewed. It is not only the protracted nature of the establishment of the postimperial state orders that is highlighted, but also the fact that the war in many parts of Eastern, East Central, and Southeastern Europe was not really “over” in 1918, but in some cases even dragged on for many years after.¹⁹

Moreover, some historians such as Pieter Judson have convincingly pointed out how strongly the everyday practices of the vanished imperial world into which contemporaries had been born and, until then, had lived their lives, remained relevant for a long time afterwards.²⁰ What had been valid before 1918 did not disappear overnight. For a large proportion of contemporaries, it continued to provide a framework for assessing their immediate future “after 1918.” The volume “Embers of Empire,” edited by Paul Miller and Claire Morelon, for instance, uses various perspectives on different social, political, and cultural spheres to illustrate very clearly how such multilayered imperial continuities also shaped the developments toward the new, now “national states” in the post-Habsburg world for a long time after World War I.²¹ The imperial legacy undoubtedly remained of great importance for everyday life in the 1920s and even beyond.²²

This is also emphasized by Nathalie Clayer with regard to a very different regional context in this period, namely the imperial-national upheaval in post-Ottoman, respectively interwar Albania. However, she has also shown in an exemplary and convincing manner how newly established now “nationally” (i.e., “Albanian”) defined state institutions and procedures step by step forced people to “reframe” their everyday dealings with the (until then “Ottoman”) state—whether they wanted it or not.²³

The research for the present volume has been inspired by these historiographical tendencies as outlined above. Closely related to these is another one, which was also immensely relevant to the West Hungarian/Burgenland context studied here—and probably to many other postimperial Habsburg regions (and beyond). This was the fact that national activists (be they Hungarian or German-Austrian as in our case) struggled—beyond probably some towns and certain intellectual and political circles—against widespread national ambivalence or sometimes even indifference from large parts of the region's populations, which here were strongly rural and village-based.²⁴ The situation was quite different in terms of denominational affiliation, which was predominantly Catholic, but also Protestant in certain places—Reformed (Calvinist) in various villages (including Oberwart) and Lutheran in Sopron and the surrounding area. Some places were also partially Jewish. In the everyday understanding of belonging, religious adherence was of great importance, as was local (village) community and, last but not least, class affiliation.²⁵

The authors of the chapters in this book agreed that it is worth avoiding an overly reductionist focus on the national/nationalist aspects of the political conflicts in this disputed border region during the period of upheaval under study. A variety of different identifications within regional society could become sources of both opposition and cooperation. Economic, security, and class-related issues often took center stage and played a far more important role than national, cultural ones. Local, regional, and economic dynamics that emerged in this highly contested border region during a complex transition must therefore be taken seriously. It was very often these in particular that determined how loyalties and disloyalties to the existing and new authorities and institutions would develop.

In addition, it was precisely during the period analyzed in this book that a drastic dynamic set in regarding the until then so deeply established social relations. The “aristocratic”/corporate dominance of social life, which had previously been exercised by aristocratic and other large landownership, was massively shaken by the war, and then even more profoundly during and after the Soviet dictatorship. The starting transition to mass democracy brought various new “bourgeois” exponents into important leadership positions and challenged established political hierarchies—also by referring to national commitment. All of these politically turbulent reorientations took place at a time of radical change, when life was still shaped by the “old order,” but all signs pointed to a new political beginning. The imminent demarcation of a new state border right through the middle of the region was an eminently important part of this new beginning.

The nine chapters of this book deal exactly with the ad hoc character as well as the complexity of this territorial reorganization of the border between Austria and Hungary after World War I—with a clear focus on the situation in the emerging new border area itself. They aim to give an impression of what it meant for contemporaries to experience and cope with the construction of a postimperial—

now aspired national—order in this region. We believe we make an original contribution by unpacking the Wilsonian concept of “people’s self-determination” as the Paris Peace Conference placed it at the core of the new international order, and by critically questioning its (often sole) identification with the nationality principle. Accordingly, the book aims to show the tight, concrete interaction between local, regional, national, and international levels in enforcing the post-1918 order, and to give an impression of the social practices and local political agendas that had been associated with that concept in the everyday life of regional populations in a disputed borderland.

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The chapters of this volume set out to analyze from a bottom-up perspective the interplay of local, regional, transnational, and international actors during the postimperial collapse and transition. Ideological conflicts like the one between Bolshevism and anti-Bolshevism (Ibolya Murber), the role of international institutions like the Interallied Commission for the delimitation of borders (Michael Burri), the contribution of experts’ networks like the geographers (Ferenc Jankó), the food supply crisis and the functions of the black market (Sabine Schmitner-Laszakovits), the polarization and reconfiguration of social/class relations as part of the postimperial transition in the region (Hannes Grandits), the role of the local elites in the process of democratization and its open-ended outcomes on the basis of a regional understanding of self-determination (Gábor Egrý; Melinda Harlov-Csörtán) are all topics deeply investigated by the first seven chapters of the volume. In the final two chapters, the backlash of the regime changes vis-à-vis the local minorities like Croatian-speaking people, Jews, and Romani is explored (Katharina Tyran; Ursula K. Mindler-Steiner).

These topics of the chapters—as briefly described above in a nutshell—present some hints as to their major findings, which will now be addressed more fully in the second part of this introduction.

Discussing, Implementing, and Explaining a New Border (Region)

The two first contributions in Part I, by Ibolya Murber and Michael Burri, deal with how a border demarcation solution in the West Hungarian region was negotiated, questioned, redefined, and finally implemented on the ground. This is shown by closely looking into the complex interrelationship between Austrian and Hungarian government strategies on the one hand, and the Allied victors’ search for a decision on a new international peace order on the other.

As the two contributions elaborate, attempts to alleviate the hunger crisis in the imperial capital Vienna in the winter of 1918/19 and the following spring

of 1919 were at the very beginning of this process. To help find a solution, an American-led Allied mission was sent to Vienna as early as December 1918.²⁶ One of its main representatives was the historian and diplomat Archibald C. Coolidge. He was entrusted—and equipped with a growing staff of experts sent to his mission—to work out empirical knowledge on the economic, geographical, and strategic consequences of the potential border demarcations in the Habsburg Empire—which were to be determined in the upcoming Paris peace negotiations.²⁷ The American geographer Major Martin Lawrence was commissioned by Coolidge to deal in particular with the demarcation between Austria and Hungary, and what (economic and geographical) consequences it might have. As Michael Burri vividly shows in his contribution, the explanations and map sketches drawn up by Lawrence on the Austro-Hungarian demarcation problem—summarized in a memorandum—were to become immensely important reference points in the decision-making process of the Allied peace negotiators. A decisive thrust of the Coolidge Commission's reports with regard to the Austro-Hungarian border demarcation was that the catastrophic supply situation in Vienna was strongly attributed to the fact that the former capital of the empire had now been cut off from its traditional supply regions in Western Hungary.²⁸

As Ibolya Murber shows in her contribution, this was also to become a core of Austrian government policy. In this way, it not only vehemently demanded a border revision of the existing border with Hungary in favor of Austria, but the Vienna supply crisis was also presented as one of the most conspicuous proofs of the economic “non-viability” of German-Austria on the drastically reduced post-war territory. The Austrian government's desire for an annexation to the German Reich was to be reaffirmed as well in this way.²⁹ As the Allies did not want to allow an annexation of German-Austria to the German Reich, these arguments certainly carried a lot of weight in the Paris negotiations.

But as Ibolya Murber's contribution discusses as well, another political factor also came in a dramatic way to play a role. It was perhaps even more decisive, in that the Paris peace negotiators decided in June/July 1919 that the old border between Hungary and the Austrian part of the empire—one of the oldest and most stable historical borders in Europe, whose origins date back to the eleventh century and which was still envisaged as such in the first peace draft of 2 June 1919—should be shifted eastwards to Hungary's disadvantage. This happened during the Hungarian Soviet Republic (March–August 1919) and was centrally related to it.

The Bolsheviks' seizure of power in Russia and the Red Army's ongoing struggle to preserve and/or extend the new Soviet rule on former Russian imperial territory was already overshadowing large parts of Eastern Europe from late 1917. In spring of 1919, beside the seizure of state rule by a Bolshevik regime in Hungary, a (short-lived) Soviet republic ruled in Bavaria as well. From the point of view of the Allied Paris peace negotiators, a Bolshevik takeover in Austria—a goal that

the Hungarian Bolshevik leadership under Béla Kun was actually really striving for at this time—was not to be allowed under any circumstances. The border revision in favor of Austria must therefore also be understood as a means of warding off threatening Bolshevik attempts to overthrow Austria. Ibolya Murber's contribution shows in various facets how this happened in detail—also in the bilateral dynamics of Austrian and Hungarian policies in 1919 and after.³⁰

Michael Burri's contribution deals with this issue even further by linking it to the broader context of the ideological visions of the Paris peace negotiators. In one regard, the vision of the Allied power was clear. The postimperial order in Central Europe must under no circumstances become a Bolshevik one.³¹ Following their own "Western" model, it was to be liberal-capitalist and democratic. This latter aspect of the "right of national self-determination"—in Wilson's diction understood first of all in "democratic" terms—also strongly referred to a democratic consensus, or at least to an orientation toward the "will of the people."³² Michael Burri's contribution shows that this view would really play an important role in the final demarcation of the border between Austria and Hungary, when it was later implemented by an interallied commission.

In its work on the ground, travelling from village to village in the demarcation area, this interallied commission did indeed pursue the goal of finding solutions that reflected the "will of the people" locally (or at least as the leaders of the commission understood it). However, this commission then had to obtain consensus on each of its proposals from the institutions of the Paris Peace Conference and then from the institutions of the newly founded League of Nations in Geneva—a process that ultimately also revised many of the geographical solutions found on the ground.

Geographical assessments, as this is well known (but as recent research has discussed also in many new ways), played an important role in the rationalities of arguing for, and explaining the drawing of, the new state borders before, during, and after the Paris Peace Conference. Above all, language distributions and supposedly unambiguous—but on closer examination highly controversial and always problematic—"ethnic" maps repeatedly became central points of reference.³³ However, geographical legitimations (and imaginations) were not only linked to aspects of language or "ethnicity." As Ferenc Jankó's contribution shows in his contribution in Chapter 3, various other spatial references, ranging from economic, geological, and hydrological, to historical and "cultural," could also be important elements for the respective geographical expertise—and, depending on the political standpoint, were often discussed in very contradictory ways. Opinions could also change comprehensively.

This is illustrated by Jankó in his analysis of the work of the geographers Robert Sieger and Marian Sidaritsch. Both worked and taught at the University of Graz, and became of great importance for the geographical "discovery" and then scientific legitimization of the newly created Burgenland in the first half of the

1920s. Before and during the Great War, Sieger had been committed to the idea of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy as a geographical “ideal,” which he understood as the result of historical processes that had produced a coherent state territory over centuries. When during the Paris Peace Conference, as a geographer in the Austrian delegation, Robert Sieger received for comment the demarcation draft for the Austro-Hungarian border of 2 June 1919, which still provided for the “historical border” between Austria and Hungary, he criticized it sharply. The planned course of the new border would run, according to Sieger, counter to the laws of geography. The draft of 2 June 1919 did not remain intact due to a bundle of interacting factors, as described above, and it was decided that the border should be drawn further to the east.

For the Graz geographers Sieger and his former student and later fellow Marian Sidaritsch dealing with the famous “Carte Rouge” of the Hungarian prime minister and geographer Count Pál Teleki, stood at the beginning of their scientific engagement with the Austrian–Hungarian border geography. Teleki’s map, which was also presented at the Paris Peace Conference, reflected his view of the “ethnic distribution” of the Hungarian kingdom, including the West Hungarian border region.³⁴ With a focus on the West Hungarian territories that were awarded to Austria in Paris in July 1919, the two Graz geographers worked intensively to draw up an extensive counterstatement to Teleki’s map. This became the starting point of their intensive engagement with the new Austrian territory of Burgenland.³⁵

As Jankó reconstructs in detail, with their scientific undertakings, among others a series of field expeditions to Burgenland in 1922 and 1923, the two geographers contributed significantly to the development of a “scientific profile” for the new now Austrian province of Burgenland. Despite their early deaths in 1926, their arguments remained important reference points in the political efforts to imagine Burgenland as having its own “regional identity.” Although “Germanness” was also a component of Sieger’s and Sidaritsch’s geographical explanations, it was still only one of several other elements that, according to the two Graz geographers, would in combination characterize Burgenland’s geography—including, above all, the shared centuries-long “historical experiences” of the multi-lingual population of the new Austrian province (it was only in the course of the 1930s that a new generation of geographers began to propagate a far more radical “*völkisch*” German view of Burgenland).³⁶

Economic Disintegration and the Polarization of Class

Although, the new state border was in principle decided upon in the peace treaties of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (September 1919) and Trianon (June 1920), it still remained in limbo for years after.³⁷ As it had been before, the West Hun-

garian territory continued to remain under Hungarian administration during this time. Even after the Austrian administration came to be established in the autumn and winter of 1921/22, the process of determining the exact borders continued, as mentioned earlier with regard to the Interallied Boundary Commission. The border population had to cope with all these ambiguities. These uncertainties also contributed greatly to a long-lasting weakness of the existing (old as well as new) border regime.

Sabine Schmitner-Laszakovits's contribution, which opens Part II, shows very clearly how necessary it is, if one wants to understand the everyday rationalities of the people in the region in dealing with the postimperial border question, not to limit oneself to bilateral government disputes, allied decision-making, or academic justifications on the border question alone. All of this was not generally of primary importance to most people on the ground in the challenges of coping with everyday life in times of economic upheaval overshadowed by a war (still ongoing or just ended). The ambiguities in the functioning of the border regime between the Austrian and Hungarian parts of the monarchy had already begun during the war, and continued dynamically in the following years—without the year 1918 actually representing such a drastic caesura.³⁸ This becomes very clear in the example of the black-market economy in the border area of Wiener Neustadt, which is the subject of Schmitner-Laszakovits's contribution. The black market here (as in various other places along the border) had already gained such great influence in the last years of the war that it was in fact regarded as the “real” market.

The industrial city of Wiener Neustadt, which was only a few kilometers on the Austrian side of the border, and is the focus of Sabine Schmitner-Laszakovits's contribution, had become an important location for the armaments industry during the war. A state-controlled provisioning system had already been established early in the war but had only ever functioned very poorly.³⁹ However, as the provisioning system on the Hungarian side of the Monarchy was less strictly organized, it was easier than in Austria to supply the black market. For example, the harvest was not confiscated as state property, but remained the property of the farmers, who had to adhere to the sales rules. This was also the background for the fact that in Wiener Neustadt during the war the orientation toward food supply from “across” the administrative border (i.e., from to Hungary) became even stronger than was already the case before the war.

Temporary complete closure of the border with Hungary, which was a first consequence immediately after the end of the war, led to a dramatic shortage of food in the Wiener Neustadt region. For example, in March 1919, women and their children gathered in front of Wiener Neustadt's town hall, demanding bread and threatening violence in the face of an empty market. Nevertheless, trade never dried up, and under the circumstances of official border closures, unofficial black-market activities even increased. Also, after 1918–19, people relied

on cross-border smuggling networks, as Sabine Schmitner-Laszakovits's chapter illustrates in many facets. But it also shows that even as hostility dominated public discourse and the relationship between Austria and Hungary was repeatedly marred by deep disagreement during the border dispute, personal networks proved to be reliable. The economic and social interests of ordinary people then outweighed—*nolens volens*—the ideological barriers. The ties between Wiener Neustadt and the neighboring western Hungarian countryside were, she concludes, strong even in times of crisis, as they were simply too essential for survival in the local (cross-border) economy.⁴⁰

While black-market activities across the (still permeable) border remained intense in these times of crisis, the precarious supply and security situation exacerbated internal social polarization. As the contribution in Part II by Hannes Grandits shows, these polarizations intensified immensely, and above all along class lines.⁴¹ This was because in the western Hungarian region (similar to many other Hungarian regions) a large part of the rural population was composed of small holders or the “rural proletariat,” who usually had only minimal (or no) land ownership.

It got furthered by the Bolshevik takeover. Everywhere in the local communities—such as in the region's villages and small towns—local soviets took over the administrative power in spring 1919. This often led to quite drastic and sometimes violent local conditions. Grandits's contribution illustrates this, for instance, with reference to the writings of the aristocrat Helene Erdödy about that time, when her castle and estate were taken over by the “red Lenin boys.”⁴² The violence increased again when, after the fall of the Soviet regime in autumn 1919, a Hungarian volunteer army (mostly made up of demobilized officers and soldiers) and then also reactionary paramilitaries aimed to restore the “old conditions” and hunted down the “red” revolutionaries and their real or supposed supporters; and there was more violence when these militias then tried to prevent the handover of the West Hungarian territories that had been granted to Austria in the peace treaties of St. Germain and Trianon.⁴³

With a special focus on the precarious circumstances of this period in particular and also on exemplary village contexts, the chapter shows how difficult it became for many people to make a living. For many families, life was still overshadowed by the great losses of the war, in which almost everywhere up to half or even more of individual age cohorts of recruited young men had been killed or severely disabled. Participation in the black market was therefore one strategy to make a living; another was emigration to America, which was to take on mass proportions shortly after the war.

Against this background, it is not surprising, as the contribution shows with particular attention to the campaign for the first democratic elections after the takeover of Burgenland by Austria in the spring of 1922, how strongly a language of “class struggle” dominated this election, and this was reflected in the results.

The party that received the most votes was the Social Democrats, who strongly advocated a class struggle stance, whereas the other major camp, the Christian Socialists, strongly advocated the devotion and faithfulness to religious and traditional values, and they became the second strongest party. Together with the two small parties of the “right”—the Peasants’ Alliance, which strongly represented the interests of the middle and richer peasants, and the Greater German Party, which was somewhat stronger in some of the towns (but overall came, for its leaders, in a disappointing fourth place)—the “conservative” side achieved a narrow overall majority. Still, this election result for the Social Democrats was surprising because the majority of Burgenland had a religious agrarian population with no significant urban working class. Despite the dramatic experiences from the time of the Republic of Councils a significant part of the population therefore voted left, mainly for the Social Democrats.

Evolution of a New Elite Power Balance

As repeatedly pointed out, the rapidly deteriorating economic conditions became the main driving force for the political mobilization of the population, be it in the form of demonstrations, strikes, or even violence. This was accompanied at the same time by a sudden and often fundamental questioning of established social hierarchies. Gábor Egry’s contribution, which opens Part III, shows that a feeling of social decline was widespread, especially among white-collar workers and civil servants. Anger at supposed war profiteers and (in view of the food crisis) rising resentment against peasants among the urban population were also evident. This complex discontent formed the background for a willingness to participate in mass mobilizations for revolutionary goals.

According to Egry, the Bolshevik revolution of 1919 should be seen as only one manifestation in the search for such a new, more equal and more just political, social, and economic system that was meant to replace the pre-1914 system.⁴⁴ In the eyes of a majority of the contemporaries, this new social system was supposed to bring more “self-determination” (rhetorically national, but the concept could also be understood democratically, regionally, or even locally), as well as—first and foremost—“fairer” economic relations.

Especially in this immediate postwar period, “revolutionary” or “social-democratic” positions had tremendous potency, and this phase also resulted in something like a “social democratization” of the bourgeoisie, as Egry describes it. This was a very conscious attempt to copy institutions of social democracy for the benefit of the middle classes, especially for public employees.

With the experience of the failed Soviet Bolshevik dictatorship, the situation began to turn. Again, a new political climate emerged.⁴⁵ Now it became advisable or more advantageous for local political elites to seek depoliticization, local com-

promise, or local coalition building. And the more informal such arrangements became, the more local political decision-makers tended to rely on “experts,” mostly from the bourgeoisie, who knew well the administrative practices of before 1914–18, and presented themselves as guarantors of their renewed functioning.

Ensuring the functioning of local provision proved to be decisive for the success (or non-success) that such local policy-makers had. This is illustrated in the chapter with reference to several biographical case stories of successful “petit bourgeois” politicians. They are representative—and this is a main argument of Egry’s contribution—of the fact that the demise of the Habsburg monarchy, at least if one considers the postimperial political elite formation, ultimately benefited the middle and petite bourgeoisie the most. In the overwhelming majority of cases, it was the representatives of these strata who, comparatively, were most likely to benefit politically from the new democratic decision-making rationalities in the new postimperial order.

Melinda Harlov-Csörtán’s reflections on the fate of the Esterházy estates and Prince Pál Esterházy in the upheavals following World War I, the second contribution in Part III, complement Gábor Egry’s observations in important ways. As a result of the collapse of the monarchy, the extensive estates of this leading high aristocratic family were now located in three states: Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary. Those in Czechoslovakia were quickly nationalized, while the Princely House continued to try to preserve their claims and rights of disposal over those in Austria and Hungary. As the chapter shows, the prospects for this were still very unclear immediately after the end of the war. At the time of the Soviet Revolution, due to temporary confiscations or gradual expropriations, the immensely rich Esterházy family also lost a number of properties—as did various other aristocratic families who had been so dominant in the West Hungarian region until then.⁴⁶ Their social status also changed profoundly in these first years after the end of the war, although the return of the conservative forces to political power in Hungary also brought with it renewed influence for the aristocracy there. In Austria, the abolition of the nobility was a strong symbolic measure of a surely much more resolute break with the political realities of the imperial past, although here too most aristocratic families retained all or most of their wealth and property.

Thus, also Pál Esterházy ultimately retained the majority of his family estates, lands, castles, and business facilities, both in Hungary and in Austria. He also remained—although he kept himself out of the direct political world—a personality who continued to shape social and economic life. Melinda Harlov-Csörtán shows this particularly vividly with the example of Kismarton/Eisenstadt. In 1925, the small town of Eisenstadt (which at this time had barely three thousand inhabitants) was declared the provincial capital of newly founded Burgenland, after Sopron/Ödenburg, which had actually been designated for this purpose, was not annexed to Austria following the referendum of December 1921. The

townscape of Eisenstadt was then (and still is today) very much characterized by the large Esterházy Palace, which remained in use as one of Pál Esterházy's residences up to World War II.⁴⁷

However, the new Burgenland provincial government gradually claimed and took over various buildings, real estate, and land for public administration purposes from the Esterházy estate—for example, the former “Hofgarten,” which was converted into a public park. At the beginning, this was quite a conflictive process, where political sentiment was repeatedly stirred up against Esterházy in particular, and the role of the (former) Hungarian aristocrats in Burgenland's public life in general.⁴⁸ However, after a former accountant of the Esterházy family was elected as the new mayor of Eisenstadt in 1929, a more cooperative relationship developed between the town, the provincial government, and the former prince, from which all sides were trying to benefit.

Another important aspect is addressed in the contribution, which went hand in hand with the increasing use of the Esterházy estate by the new Burgenland. The Esterházy architecture, especially the castle in Eisenstadt, gradually became part of the symbolic representation and a “characteristic” of Burgenland over time, a process that intensified further after World War II. As the “land of castles,” the new Austrian province also “inherited” or gradually appropriated this (actually aristocratic) element of self-representation for itself.

Postimperial Solidification of Ethnic Categories

There is another characteristic of Burgenland that is gradually being recognized today as a value to be appreciated, but that at the time of the border demarcations discussed here was undoubtedly regarded more as a “problem to be solved,” and it is at the center of the considerations in the last two contributions of the volume. This is the fact that the Austro-Hungarian border region, as Katharina Tyran points out in her chapter, was known “to be a complex area in terms of languages, religion, and loyalties.” It is true that in the political controversies between Austria and Hungary in the period under study, mobilizations of the regional population for “Germanness” or “Hungarianness” were undoubtedly at the center (as they usually are also in historiographical observation). As the two contributions in Part IV show—that of Katharina Tyran, who deals with the postimperial “framing” of the Croatian-speaking population of Western Hungary/Burgenland, and that of Ursula Mindler-Steiner on the Romani and Jewish population—the problem must perhaps be considered in a more principled way.

The idea of “self-determination” of the peoples, which was held up as a noble goal in the Paris Peace Treaty negotiations (at least rhetorically), also possessed—as already mentioned above—a strong “democratic” component. Although this component was more relevant than is often assumed, it generally receives less

attention in historiographical analyses. This has already been referred to above. However, the idea of “self-determination” was also understood “nationally”—and this is usually the focus of attention. The multinational Habsburg Empire was to be replaced by a newly created world of states according to principles of “national self-determination.”⁴⁹

As was the case for many other regions of Austria-Hungary, especially those where borders were to be drawn through a region, the enforcement of the principle of a clear “national” classification collided with social realities that had been constituted quite differently up until then. This was particularly true for the Austro-Hungarian border region.⁵⁰ Traditionally, and even up to and beyond the last years of the Great War, a probably overwhelming majority of the West Hungarian inhabitants affirmed their loyalty to historical Hungary, the king (who was also the Austrian emperor) and the crown. This was generally true regardless of which mother tongue was most important as the first language in private or local settings. This applied to the Hungarian-speaking as well as to the German-, Croatian-, and Romani-speaking populations. For the social and political elite, in commercial life or for labor migration, it was anyway indispensable to be able to communicate well in both Hungarian and German.

It was widespread here in the mixed-language West Hungarian region during the Monarchy period—also and especially, for example, among local political leaders—and this is shown in these contributions by Tyran and Mindler-Steiner (but also in pretty much all the other contributions), to use not infrequently different linguistic variants of one’s own first names, depending on the context. Pál was just as much in use as Paul (e.g., in the Esterházy case), just as Ivan could also be called Johann or János (as in the case of the teacher who is the focus of Katharina Tyran’s contribution). Such context-specific practice was not the exception in everyday life, but the rule—right down to small-town and village milieus.

With the pending decision on whether the West Hungarian region should become part of Austria or remain with Hungary, such a flexible stance was no longer compatible with the commitment to “national” self-determination. Now it was no longer a question of “as well as” but of “either or”—also with regard to language. In her contribution, Katharina Tyran shows how such a focus on “monolingualism” as a sign of a new conception of “modernity” was received in those communities where local Croatian dialects were used as the local language, and how the intellectual elite there (priests, teachers) also sought to position themselves. She emphasizes that there was no uniform preference among the Croats in Burgenland for a future affiliation to Austria or Hungary—just as there was no “homogeneous” (e.g., political) “Croatian population.” Parts of the (later) social democratic voting working class, especially those not too far from the industrial centers of Vienna or Wiener Neustadt, were clearly in favor of Austria. Large sections of the clergy, as well as most teachers, were more in favor of continuity in remaining with Hungary. However, what found great resonance beyond

political and class polarization as a means of maintaining “cohesion,” especially at the village level, was the turn to “Croatianness” as a means of self-positioning in times of crisis-ridden transformations.⁵¹

Both the Croatian population, which had been settling in the western Hungarian region since the early sixteenth century, and the Romani as well as the Jewish populations, which have been well documented in sources since the seventeenth century, can be seen, to the best of our knowledge, as “old-established” inhabitants. As Ursula Mindler-Steiner’s contribution shows, with the adoption of “national” categories for the determination of civic citizenship after World War I, the “foreignness” of the “Gypsies” and “Jews” (to some extent also of the “Croats”) became a rhetorical figure that was to have a considerable impact. This was already latently the case for the latter two during the time of the monarchy. Now, however, with the (incipient) assertion of national “uniformity”—first in the western Hungarian and then the Burgenland regions—a new reality of political thought arose in this regard.⁵²

As Mindler-Steiner shows, this had disastrous consequences for the Romani and Jewish populations. Just as little as the Croatian population mentioned above (and just as little as the German or Hungarian), the Romani and Jewish population was “homogeneous.” It was differentiated into various milieus, both regionally and with regard to their social and economic positionings. In the crisis-ridden years after the end of World War I, violence against “Jews” and “Gypsies,” as Mindler-Steiner shows in many facets in her contribution, became a special feature of the “White Terror” mentioned above. Anti-Gypsyism and antisemitism also remained central to the political mobilization that various parties (from the Christian Socialists to the Greater Germans) then also pursued in the Austrian Burgenland context. When the NSDAP began to gain a foothold in Burgenland after the onset of the great economic crisis of 1929, political propaganda began that openly called for a more “radical solution” to the Jewish and Gypsy “question” in the course of the 1930s.

Outlook

The emergence of a new ideal of “monolingualism,” as just discussed, can also be noted as a very general social characteristic of the period after the establishment of the Austro-Hungarian border. As already mentioned, until the 1920s it was normal for public and economic life to be “multilingual.” In the new national order—whether in Burgenland, which now saw itself as a “German-speaking” province, or in the now “Hungarian-speaking” West Hungarian towns of Sopron/Ödenburg and Köszeg/Güns, which could look back on a long tradition of multilingualism—“monolingualism” was now considered “normal” and the lived multilingualism actually (at least in principle) “abnormal.”⁵³

The consequence of this—and that is why it makes particular sense to take a closer look at “minorities” here—was that increasing sections of the population (especially the younger generations) gradually came to understand monolingualism as the normatively most significant condition of social coexistence—at least in public life. More and more villages (including, for example, in many once multilingual Croatian contexts) became “monolingual” over time, such as “German” in Burgenland. When the National Socialists came to power in 1938, they made real what had been considered mere political rhetoric in the early 1930s, advocating a “radical” solution to the “Gypsy and Jewish question.” Only a few people of this origin survived their systematic persecution and murder by the Nazi regime during World War II.⁵⁴

This turn toward the ideal of national “monolingualism,” which was also established here in Western Hungary/Burgenland with the Paris Peace Treaty and the establishment of a new border, had yet another consequence. Of course, this was not an abrupt development, but must be seen as a longer-term process, spanning generations. But the drawn border between Austria and Hungary, as implemented in the former West Hungarian region in the early 1920s (even more so after 1945, when this border also formed part of the Iron Curtain), increasingly became what it had not been for centuries: a language border.

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Notes

1. *Außenpolitische Dokumente der Republik Österreich 1918–1938 (ADÖ)*, Vol 4., ed. Klaus Koch, Walter Rauscher and Arnold Suppan (Vienna: Verlag der ÖAW, 2015), Dok. 559, 13 August 1921: 64.
2. See, among others, Leonhard, *Der überforderte Frieden*; Conze, *Die große Illusion*; Payk, *Frieden durch Recht?* or Sharp, *The Versailles Settlement*. For global repercussions of the war and peace settlement processes, see Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment* or Gerwarth and Manela, “The Great War as a Global War.”
3. See, for instance, Henig, *The League of Nations* or Clavin, *Securing the World Economy*. On policies of the League of Nations vis-à-vis the post-Habsburg lands, see Becker and Wheatley, *Remaking Central Europe*.
4. Wheatley, “Central Europe as Ground Zero of the New International Order.” See also the discussion on this topic by Michael Burri in Chapter 2.
5. To get an impression of these upheavals in the overall framework of the Habsburg monarchy in the period in question see, for example, the concise chapter on “War and Radical State-Building, 1914–1925” in Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 386–441. This period of dramatic revolutions and counterrevolutions was, of course, by no means limited to Central and Eastern Europe, but could often be found on a global scale. Cf. for example Rinke and Wildt, *Revolutions and Counter-Revolution*.
6. It is also important to consider the findings of various and also newer nationalism theories. For instance, those of Rogers Brubaker, on ethnicity as a “category” in political mobilization or scientific debate, see Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups*, 1–27. See also the conceptional thoughts on “multiculturalism” in the Habsburg Central European context in Feichtinger and Cohen, “Introduction.”
7. For the functioning of multilingualism in daily life in the late Habsburg Empire, see Wolf, *The Many-Languaged Soul*; Gal, “Imperial Linguistics”; Prokopovych, Bethke, and Scheer, *Language Diversity*. On complexities of nationalistic instrumentalization of language in this period, see, for instance, Judson, *Guardians of the Nation* or Puttkamer, “Magyarisierung!”
8. There is a need for further research with a special focus on the security crisis in Western Hungary. Tamás Székely’s ongoing dissertation project on “Dilemmas of Security in Western Hungary (1867–1918)” promises to become an important contribution. See, in particular, with a broader regional focus, Beneš, “The Green Cadres,” and Révész, “Soldiers in the Revolution.”
9. For more detail, see Murber, “The Habsburg Monarchy,” 107–15.
10. On these interdependencies, see Murber, *Grenzziehung*, 39–91. See also Bodó, “Actio und Reactio,” 69–82.
11. Bodó, “The White Terror”; Révész, “The Land of Peace?”; Bodó, *The White Terror*.
12. For further theoretical considerations, see Leutloff-Grandits and Wille, “Dynamics of Dis/Order.”
13. Most relevant are still the works of Walter Dujmovits. See, for instance, Dujmovits, *Die Amerikawanderung*. For a contextualization of the West Hungarian/Burgenland emigration in the late Habsburg framework in, respectively, Central and Southeastern Europe after its demise, see Steidl, *On Many Routes*, and Brunnbauer, *Globalizing Southeastern Europe*.

14. For exemplary recent studies on postimperial spaces of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, see e.g., Egry, "Navigating the Straits"; Conrad, *Umkämpfte Grenzen*; Stefanov, *Die Erfindung der Grenzen auf dem Balkan*, 244–340; Dotter and Wedrac, *Der hohe Preis des Friedens*; Reill, *The Fiume Crisis*; Suveica, *Post-imperial Encounters*.
15. See, in particular, the highly relevant contributions in Gerwarth and Horne, *War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence*.
16. In this context, it can be very helpful to operate with a more regional approach to political/historiographical observation. For the Hungarian context of the period under study, see for example, Szarka, "Nationale Regionen." For a insightful application of such regional focuses, see Schmitt and Metzeltin, *Südosteuropa der Regionen*.
17. For the "blurriness" that has always been associated with this, see for our regional context and period, e.g., Rásky, "Vom Schärfen der Unschärfe," or Bencsik, "The New Borders." On "temporal" implications, which seem to be closely linked to the drawing of borders, see e.g., Struck, "Grenzziehungen." Social constructions of memory are constitutive in many ways; see e.g., Horvath and Müllner, *Hart an der Grenze*, Deinhofer and Horvat, *Grenzfall Burgenland* or within a wider regional framework Klabjan, *Borderlands of Memory*. On how "forgotten" borders can become topical again as "phantom borders," see Grandits et al., "Phantomgrenzen," 13–56, or Hirschhausen et al., "Phantom Borders," 368–89.
18. The most comprehensive study is still the very valuable Schlag, *Aus Trümmern geboren*. For further insightful political histories, see Hochenbichler, *Republik im Schatten*; Berlin, "The Burgenland Question"; Berczeller and Leser, . . . *mit Österreich verbunden*; Kerekes, *Von St. Germain bis Genf*; Botlik, *Nyugat-Magyarország*, which appeared also in translation as Botlik, *The Fate of Western Hungary*. The most recent study, which goes beyond the mere political dimension in an innovative way, is Ibolya Murber's *Grenzziehung* (as mentioned in Note 10 above).
19. See, for instance, Konrad, "Two Post-war Paths"; Šmidrkal, "What a Republic It Was!" See particularly also Gerwarth, *The Vanquished*, and Pudlocki and Ruszała, *Post-War Continuity*.
20. Judson, "'Where Our Commonality Is Necessary . . .'".
21. Miller and Morelon, *Embers of Empire*.
22. Egry, "The Leftover Empire?"
23. Clay, *Une histoire en travelling de l'Albanie*. On the contradictions and flexibilities in the interplay of imperial and national loyalties in the period before, during and immediately after World War I, see, for example, Veliz, *The Politics of Croatia-Slavonia*; Guidi, *Generations of Empire*; Miladinović, "Heroes, Traitors, and Survivors."
24. Gábor Egry talks even of "national indifference as everyday ethnicity" (by studying, for instance, the Transylvanian region in this period); see Egry, "National Indifference as Everyday Ethnicity." See also the important theoretical reflections on "national indifference" in Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities," as well as Judson and Zahra, "Introduction."
25. Studies that approach this topic with the help of comparative village or local-level investigations have proved to be particularly informative in this regard. See, for example, Baumgartner, "Der nationale Differenzierungsprozeß," or Grandits, "Ländliches und städtisches Familienleben im Wandel," 656–60.
26. See in detail, Adlgasser, "American Individualism Abroad."
27. Insightful here is also the correspondence of A.C. Coolidge published by his brother four years after Coolidge's death. See Coolidge and Lord, *Archibald Cary Coolidge*.
28. Berlin, "Die Rolle"; and, in detail, Berlin, *Akten und Dokumente*.

29. See also Schausberger, “*Österreich und die Friedenskonferenz*.”
30. After the fall of the Republic of Councils, the Hungarian counterrevolutionary government successfully used intensive anti-Bolshevik propaganda and paramilitary activities against Austria to delay the cession of Burgenland. The dichotomy between communism and anticommunism remained relevant throughout the twentieth century—regarding Austro-Hungarian relations in general but also regarding the Austro-Hungarian state border in particular. See Murber, “Die politische Gewalt.” See also Adlgasser, “Roots of Communist Containment.”
31. On this issue see also, for instance, Mayer, *The Politics and Diplomacy*, or Thompson, *Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace*.
32. On the difficulties of this “double transformation” in relation to the simultaneous implementation of democratic and national self-determination, see Hein-Kircher and Kailitz, “Double Transformations.” See also how the so influential American president envisioned this, in Wolff, *Woodrow Wilson*.
33. See, for instance, Crampton, “The Cartographic Calculation of Space” and Svatek, “Ethnic Cartography.” See also Demeter, Bottlik and Csáplár-Degovics, *Maps in the Service of the Nation*; and, in general, Haslinger and Oswalt, “Einleitung: Raumkonzepte.”
34. Pál Teleki, *Magyarország néprajzi térképe a népsűrűség alapján. Az 1910. évi népszámlálás alapján* (Budapest: Magyar Földrajzi Intézet, 1919).
35. Ginsburger, “L’expertise territoriale.”
36. On this, see Jankó and Jobbitt, “Making Burgenland”; and in detail, Jankó, *Burgenland*.
37. For most recent works on the peace treaties for Austria in St. Germain and Hungary in Trianon, see Suppan, *Imperialist Peace Order*; and Ablonczy, *Ismeretlen Trianon*.
38. For the broader context, see Cornwall, “Das Ringen.”
39. On the state-controlled provisioning system, see Scheer, “Die Kriegswirtschaft”; and in detail Scheer, *Die Ringstraßenfront*.
40. For a more general assessment, see Sandgruber, “Die österreichische Ernährungssituation” as well as Schmied-Kowarzik, “Die wirtschaftliche Erschöpfung.”
41. This was a broader phenomenon at the time, and quite in keeping with the “spirit of the times” throughout many parts of Central Europe (and beyond); see Gerwarth, “Fighting the Red Beast.”
42. Erdödy, *Fast hundert Jahre Lebenserinnerungen*, 229.
43. See again the literature mentioned in endnotes 9 and 10. With reference to the years during the Great War, see Székely, “*The Agony*”; and Murber, “Die politische Gewalt.”
44. See the insightful overview in Boyer, “Silent War.” Cf. the conceptual thoughts in Gerwarth, “Age of Revolutions.”
45. For the fundamental turnarounds in the political climate in Hungary during these years of upheaval after WWI, see, for instance, Klimó, *Nation, Konfession, Geschichte*, 185–230.
46. For more detail, see Eddie, *Historisches Verzeichnis*.
47. See Schlag, “Eisenstadts Weg zur Landeshauptstadt,” as well as Krizsanits, *Eisenstadt*.
48. See Böröcz, *Kampf um Boden und Freiheit*.
49. On the conceptual contrasts of “Wilson’s” and “Lenin’s” notions of self-determination and their implications, see Olschowsky, “Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and Woodrow Wilson,” and in detail the classical study Fisch, *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht*. For a broader perspective on the dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy, see Judson, “Wilson versus Lenin.” For the deeper “ethnic” logic of the new “Paris System” see Weitz, “From the Vienna to the Paris System”; and for its “implementation” see Prott, *The Politics of Self-Determination*.

50. See also Egry, “Nationale Selbstbestimmung.”
51. On the longer-term developments in this regard, see also Tyran, *Identitäre Verortungen*, and Tyran, “Zwischen autochthon, Region und Nation.”
52. Mindler, *Grenz-Setzungen*; Mindler, “Die Kriminalisierung und Verfolgung”; Mindler-Steiner, “Gewalterfahrungen.”
53. However, a Hungarian revisionism with regard to the “lost” West Hungarian area was also to become quite politically accentuated in the interwar period; see Haslinger, *Der ungarische Revisionismus*. On the Austrian side, in contrast, there was a strong political propagation of a new Burgenland regional identity; see, for instance, Haslinger, “Building a Regional Identity.” On these interrelated developments, see also Tóth, *Két Anschluss közzét*, as well as Murber, “Der Anschluss.”
54. See, among others, Mayerhofer, *Dorfzeigener*; Hörz, *Jüdische Kultur*; Gerhard Baumgartner et al., *Arisierungen*; Baumgartner and Brettl, “Einfach weg!!”

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