Of all the “refugees” in this book, Uyghurs in France seem to have it the best. Uyghurs who arrive at the French border are typically granted asylum if a preliminary assessment confirms the legitimacy of the request. Uyghurs can live anywhere in France, work legally, access social benefits and certain welfare programs targeted at refugees, obtain temporary financial assistance, pursue education, and eventually become legal citizens.1 Though they have these freedoms and opportunities in France, Uyghurs in the diaspora continue to face danger and precarity, and, most terrifyingly, so do their families and community members back home.
The Uyghurs, a Turkic ethnic group, have conflicting ideas about how to refer to waten (our home/homeland). Waten for Uyghurs is currently and officially the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous region in northwestern China.2 Many Uyghurs reject the Chinese government’s authority over their homeland and prefer not to use the name imposed by what they consider to be their colonizer. A global movement of Uyghurs whose goal is independence refer to their homeland as East Turkistan.3 Others don’t believe that independence is a realistic goal, and not everyone agrees with the name East Turkistan even if they hope for independence.4 Though it is clunky, I use “Uyghur homeland” to respect the diversity of perspectives of the Uyghur people whose stories I share.
The Uyghur diaspora in France is small. In the early 2000s, a small number of Uyghurs came to study in French universities. Many remained after graduating and settled in Paris or other cities. They worked and established families and long-term homes. French law allows multiple citizenship. Most of these university graduates eventually became French citizens in addition to their Chinese nationality. Until 2017, Uyghurs living in France could travel home regularly, maintaining strong ties with their home communities, and returning to live in the homeland was always a possibility. Their family members living at home could also obtain passports and visas to visit them.
I provide more information about the circumstances that force Uyghurs to be displaced than I do for the others in this book because the information is necessary for understanding the Uyghur diaspora. The long history of repression and discrimination of Uyghurs by the Chinese government has been widely documented. Here, I offer only a brief overview to contextualize the stories that follow.
The Chinese government used the 11 September 2001, attacks on the United States as justification for their increasing suppression of Uyghurs. The government falsely claimed that Uyghur activists were part of a broad network of Muslim terrorists that posed a significant threat to China (Roberts 2018). In the time leading up to and during China’s hosting of the 2008 Olympics, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) implemented increasingly rigorous control and persecution of Uyghurs in the name of national security. Shortly after the Olympics, which transpired smoothly, there were some limited, localized attacks by Uyghurs in response to the government’s suppression.
The PRC government responded with a violent crackdown that persists as of this writing. Through its highly sophisticated surveillance system, the government identifies and punishes anyone suspected of terrorism or those associated (family members, neighbors, friends) with suspected terrorists. A “terrorist” has come to mean anyone who is critical of the government, who advocates for Uyghur rights, who promotes Uyghur culture and identity, or who just happens to be Uyghur.5
Through the surveillance of the popular WeChat communication, social media, and banking platform, the Chinese government monitors Uyghurs’ communications and whereabouts within the country. Within the homeland and in China generally, officials frequently stop Uyghurs and require them to hand over their mobile phones so authorities can view their communications, photographs, contacts, social media posts, and anything else. In some regions, Uyghur cars are equipped with GPS trackers. Surveillance cameras fill the streets, and facial recognition software helps the government determine people’s whereabouts and activities. (Roberts 2018)
The government has also established “convenience policing stations” throughout urban areas in the homeland. Security officials show up at Uyghurs’ homes to ask questions, search, and trick family members into divulging damning information about one another. People living in the diaspora commonly tell stories about talking to their family members back home, only to realize that security officials are in the room listening, but out of sight.6
According to a report by the Human Rights Foundation on 13 April 2023, “an estimated two million Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Turkic-Muslim ethnic groups are arbitrarily detained in China’s mass network of concentration, what they call “reeducation,” camps, where they are arbitrarily subject to pervasive state surveillance, forced interrogations, political indoctrination, torture, and forced labor.”7 Uyghurs sometimes disappear with no information about where they are taken or if they will ever reappear.8
The Chinese government makes it difficult for Uyghurs to leave the country. They systematically confiscate passports from Uyghurs and make it almost impossible to obtain one. Those who manage to leave join existing diaspora communities in Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, the United States, Australia, Canada, or Japan.9 Others join smaller populations, such as the growing community in France. When I was doing the bulk of my research in 2022–24, the population in France was estimated to be around one thousand, mostly living in Paris.
There is no centralized Uyghur community, nor is there a gathering place in Paris. They are spread out across the vast city. As families come, they tend to connect socially with some other Uyghur families, but they don’t necessarily live in the same neighborhoods. There are several Uyghur restaurants that provide a meeting place where Uyghurs can gather for a meal, eat their own food, and feel some semblance of homeness. These restaurants are also popular for Chinese people living in Paris, so they are not for the most part considered by Uyghurs to be safe places where they are free to talk among themselves about Uyghur issues.10
The PRC’s reach extends internationally through its overseas surveillance system and police stations that are part of its efforts to control Uyghurs and other Chinese citizens living in the diaspora.11 As a result, the activities of Uyghurs abroad can endanger their families back home. The PRC tracks people whose images appear in social media posts of demonstrations, who send messages that hint of politics or criticism of China, or who are quoted in the media advocating for Uyghur human rights.
The Chinese government uses what Uyghurs living in the diaspora do or say as evidence to incarcerate or otherwise punish family members back home. This fear tactic has successfully silenced many in the diaspora who avoid being anywhere or saying anything publicly that could put their families at risk. Of those who do speak out, some no longer communicate with their family members and friends still living in the homeland to avoid putting them at risk (Oztig and Karluk 2024; Lemon, Jardine, and Hall 2023).
Since 2021, France, Canada, the United States, and multiple other countries have declared that the PRC is committing genocide and crimes against humanity against Uyghurs. Many people know that genocide refers to the deliberate killing of people from a particular nation or cultural group with the explicit intent to eliminate the group. Less widely known is that the term also encompasses efforts to wipe out the culture of a group, what some refer to as cultural genocide, though strategic cultural annihilation is often part and parcel of genocide (Harris 2020). A strategy by perpetrators of some genocides, including the PRC, is forcing those who are not killed to stop participating in their culture—speaking their language, practicing their religion, and participating in cultural activities. The goal is for the persecuted population to assimilate into the dominant culture so that they will eventually disappear.
The PRC has criminalized Uyghur cultural practices that are important to everyday people with the justification that such measures are preventing terrorism. This is particularly true for Muslim religious practices, such as saying daily prayers, fasting, growing beards, wearing head coverings (for women), and performing religious ceremonies, including weddings.12 The Chinese government has demolished mosques, cemeteries, and other significant sites throughout the homeland. The PRC strives to eliminate the Uyghur language, foodways, music, and other aspects of culture through persecuting those found participating in them. The government is also strategically “reeducating people,” by schooling Uyghur children within the homeland in institutions where they are taught only Mandarin and Han Chinese history. And many Uyghur children are removed and taught in boarding schools outside the homeland where they are linguistically, religiously, and culturally immersed in the dominant Han Chinese culture.
Uyghurs living in the diaspora far from the heart of their culture fear that they may be the ones ultimately responsible for the future of Uyghur identity. Many Uyghurs abroad continue to speak their language, eat their foods, participate in their ceremonies, and promote their heritage in order to conserve their culture. Some Uyghur parents also want to ensure that their children know their language and culture in case they can ever return to the homeland.
Before starting this project, I knew very little about Uyghurs. During my one trip to China in 2017 as a visiting professor at the Minzu University in Beijing, I heard references to “Muslims” as potential “terrorists.” I also learned that “Muslim restaurants,” as they were described to me, were extremely popular. I thoroughly enjoyed eating the lamb skewers and anise spiced noodles in the restaurants where my colleagues and students took me. I had also heard news about the Chinese government’s repression of Uyghurs. Mostly, however, I was ignorant.
In the fall of 2021, as I was conceptualizing this project, I reached out to friends and colleagues in different parts of the world for suggestions of people who would be appropriate for this project. Andy, an American anthropologist whom I had met in China, offered to introduce me to Eheteli, a young Uyghur poet, who had only recently arrived in Paris (see chapter 30).
After asking Merdan if he would be willing to talk with me, Andy arranged for the three of us to meet virtually. I explained who I was and the goals of the project. Merdan was tentative and asked many clarifying questions, which I understood to be necessary given the global surveillance of Uyghurs and the potential risks of participating in a public-facing project.
After that initial conversation, Merdan and I held a series of virtual interviews where he told me about himself and his poetry. Knowing my interest in arts and culture, he began sending me messages about Uyghur cultural events happening in Paris. Eventually, I decided to go to Paris, where Merdan promised to introduce me to Uyghurs involved in the arts.
On 2 May 2022, I met Merdan for the first time outside a metro near the hotel. He was leaning against a banister wearing a strikingly bright red leather jacket and round metal sunglasses. I recognized him immediately, and we awkwardly greeted each other. Soon, we were on the subway headed to a Uyghur restaurant where we were joined by an activist from Kazakhstan.
After spending the afternoon together, Merdan invited me to join him for dinner to celebrate Eid al-Fitr at the home of Gulbahar Jalilova, one of the few survivors of a Uyghur concentration camp who has made it out of the country. Dilnur Reyhan, a founder of the European Uyghur Institute, was at that dinner, as were a few others. I was exhausted but energized after this amazing first day. Thanks to Merdan, the rest of the week was just as full.
Merdan generously took me to meet many different Uyghurs of different ages who had come to France under a variety of circumstances. During my six-day visit, I enjoyed casual meals and social gatherings with a wide range of people. I also held more structured interviews with those engaged with the arts who were willing to be part of this project. In our informal times together and during the more formal interviews, everyone shared their struggles with the intense isolation of being forcibly removed and separated from their homeland, their sadness at not being able to communicate freely with their families, and their fears for their families and friends back home.
I returned a few months later on 16 July 2022 for a ten-day visit, this time on my way to Malawi. I met with many of the same people catching up on what had happened since my last visit through informal conversations and follow-up interviews. I also interviewed some people whom I had not met or interviewed the previous time. Since then, I have kept in touch with people through WhatsApp, Signal, and Facebook. I also did some follow-up interviews using virtual platforms and shared early drafts of some of the chapters.
On 15 May 2024, I returned to Paris to complete the final research. I met many of the people featured here in person again and did some follow-up interviews. I also met a few new people, which allowed me to add some additional chapters. Most importantly, I shared drafts with almost everyone so that they could offer feedback, make corrections, and approve how I present their identity and life stories. As with the past visits, I socialized, shared meals, and attended artistic and activist events with people who have now become my friends.
Language has been a fun and challenging part of doing this research. Many of the people interviewed in France speak either French or English, both languages that I speak. For those who speak neither, Merdan has been generous about translating. Many gatherings have been multilingual, whether they are social occasions or more formal interviews. During these, multiple languages usually occur simultaneously, with various people talking to one another in different languages and other people translating.