In September 2020, at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, Japanese prime minister Yoshihide Suga told the United Nations General Assembly that the impending 2021 Olympics in Tokyo, postponed by a year, were now to represent a symbolic victory: “In the summer of next year,” Suga stated in a prerecorded message, “Japan is determined to host the Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games as proof that humanity has defeated the pandemic.” From that point on, social media and news headlines the world over hailed the Games as “a hope towards humanity,” “a triumph of humanity,” an event permeated by the “spirit of humanity,” and putting “humanity in centre frame.” Comments typically focused on the empathy shown among competing athletes or feelings of togetherness evoked during moments of grandeur such as the Games’ opening and closing ceremonies. “Humanity,” it seemed, is something to love, inherently good and worthy to strive for, even when competing to excel in physical fitness, ping-pong, or pole jumping.

And not only then. Beyond sports, the term “humanity” has likewise been cited in cultural debates and forums dedicated to international display, intellectual exchange, cultural competition, and cooperation. “Allowing borders to determine your thinking is incompatible with the modern era,” says Ai Weiwei. “Art is . . . about our beliefs in humanity.” From UNESCO galas to biological labs, from museum halls to church domes, from intergovernmental cultural cooperation to educational design, “humanity” as a term and a refer-
ence point looms large in the vocabulary of cultural representation, invoking forgiveness among rivals, friendship between citizens of countries otherwise not on speaking terms, or the moral responsibility for help in the service of refugees and victims of natural disasters. Notably, the future and the lingo of critical expectations (“shoulding”) figure prominently in the discourse of “humanity,” typically as vistas of improvement: humanity finds itself at a critical juncture, so the story goes, and its future is dependent on the ability to cooperate—to harness culture, science, and technology in the service of a better world.6

Contemporary critics, too, have voiced their concerns, and it is not hard to see why. From recent troubles to coordinate a global vaccination campaign against COVID-19 to the closing of national borders vis-à-vis streams of transnational refugees, critics do not have to look far to discard the very viability of the idea and ideal of a common “humanity.” Two decades into the twenty-first century, we have seen an abundance of military conflicts and interventions launched (and gone out of hand) in the name of “humanity.” Critics thus point to the shallow promises of humanity that underwrote and legitimized two centuries of European imperialism, racism, and colonial violence.7

How can we account for the persistence of that idea and ideal in twenty-first-century cultural thought and representation? To what extent was it ever viable? How have cultural actors ranging from scientists to artists historically appealed to humanity, and in what historical settings? What have cultural norms of humanity promised and to whom? Who has profited from these norms and whom have they suppressed? What follows from our historical analysis if we accept the finding that humanity is normative and constructed within a web of historical cultural meanings and experiences, but not an objective category for historical analysis or political action?

This book offers a critical reflection of the historical genesis, transformation, and problématique of “humanity” in the transatlantic world with a particular eye on cultural representation. We aim to show that the notion of “humanity” is not and never was a fixed core value of modern societies, but a culturally normative and often empty signifier. Its uses have been consistently embedded in networks of actors and cultural practices, and its meanings have evolved in step with historical processes such as globalization, colonial expansion, the transnationalization of activism, and the spread of racism and nationalism. What “humanity” meant and means, we argue, was and
continues to be contingent upon the ability to define it and then circulate that definition.\textsuperscript{8} That ability, in turn, was and is conditioned by those in a position to do so—the “visionaries of humanity”—who by virtue of their leverage have determined whom to include and whom to exclude. As a result and in accordance with individual and group interests, understandings of humanity have changed remarkably over time, depending on political conflict, socioeconomic settings, emotional affinities, as well as shifting fields of sociocultural inclusion and exclusion.\textsuperscript{9}

Exploring those changing visions of humanity through a historical and cultural lens, this book suggests that the idea of humanity has a more troubled legacy than we commonly think: in fields such as humanitarian aid or cultural diplomacy, it could open new spaces for participation and inclusion. In contrast, in the context of anthropological study, the very same appeal to a common humanity could work as a force of marginalization and exclusion. Pointing to such ambivalences, the chapters assembled here make a strong argument for a critical historical inquiry that foregrounds the tensions, changing meanings, and historical contexts of humanity as a historical cultural practice rather than an abstract concept or idea.

Trajectories of Humanity

Notions of a “common humanity,” as historian Siep Stuurman has shown, go back all the way to the first millennium and were first formulated in Greek literature and philosophy as well as in the Hebrew Bible. Over the centuries, Christian and Muslim scriptures, Greek, Roman, and Chinese philosophy, as well as the writings of Muslim theorist Ibn Khaldun advanced alternative groundings for the idea of “humanity.” For all their diversity, intellectuals struggled to reconcile the inclusionary universalism of their thinking with practices of exclusion that shaped the politics of their times. Early modern thinkers, like the French essayist Michel de Montaigne, likewise struggled to understand such disturbing reverberations of the dichotomy between inclusion and exclusion. Much of the premodern intellectual thought on humanity, that is, did not entail a continuing process along clear lines but, rather, a history of thinking against the grain.

Enlightenment thinking took these ambivalences further. Some of the finest writings by Enlightenment thinkers charted visions of humanity that emphasized the radical equality of “all human beings
on the sole ground of their humanity.” On the other hand, Enlighten-ment philosophy also introduced new ideas and practices of exclusion and discrimination: scientific racism, new theories about the “natural” inferiority of women, and the notion of cultural and civilizational progress that sorted the world’s populations into a hierarchy of civilized versus backward and “primitive” cultures without a history.11

Enlightenment ideas of “humanity” reverberated across the globe through much of the eighteenth century. Yet we also know today that between about the early nineteenth century and the end of World War II, international understandings of humanity changed and, indeed, expanded dramatically. From an elitist occupation with the Western canon of civilization and religion, much defined by Eurocentric standards of racial hierarchy and gender, “humanity” morphed gradually into a more universal term demanding the inclusion of previously excluded groups, including enslaved people and, later, minorities and women.12 Transatlantic abolitionists campaigned hard between the 1780s and the 1860s to extend new visions of humanity by way of speeches, pamphlets, medals, and pictures.

But cultural debates around humanity also worked the other way. Take the following example: when in August 1835 the postmaster of Clinton, Mississippi, received several copies of an antislavery publication with the name Human Rights, it created an uproar in Mississippi and the neighboring states. Alabamians unsuccessfully tried to take the authors to court for violating state laws, while papers in Mississippi called them “fanatics.” In Hinds County, forty citizens responded with an angry letter to the publication’s editor, R. G. Williams, in which they complained about the publication’s “arrogant” and “impudent dictation,” asking, “Why not send . . . your chief apostles of iniquity, and enlighten and humanize the benighted and inhuman South?”13 Southern citizens would not act in an inhuman fashion, the citizens of Hinds County claimed; Southern culture and ways of life would put them on the side of “humanity.”

Cultural debates around “humanity,” that is, did not evolve seamlessly and without creating blind spots, oppression, or moments of resistance; nineteenth-century versions of humanity were refuted as early as they developed, by thinkers and activists such as Frederick Douglass in the United States, Dadabhai Naoroji in India, and José Rizal in the Philippines, to name just a few. Even thinkers like the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), now flagged by many critics as racist, displayed what Susan Buck-Morss
deems “moments of clarity” when occasionally “the consciousness of individuals surpassed the confines of present constellations of power,” realizing the “glaring discrepancy” between ideas of universal liberty and daily practices of suppression. Still, in the end, physical brutality and more nuanced “bureaucratic” violence on the hands of colonists charged with humanizing colonial subjects provided little more than food for thought and revisionist narratives of need, progress, and necessity. Rarely did it stir consequential action, as Penelope Edmonds and Anna Johnston have shown in a volume of collected essays pertaining to the relationship between humanitarianism and violence in the Anglophone colonies since the late eighteenth century.

By the twentieth century, visions of humanity went hand in hand with a change of geography: nineteenth-century European imperialism had crafted an idea of the human that aligned, exclusively, with the settler-colonial white man. Accordingly, discourses focused on Europeans’ and North Americans’ perceived responsibility to confer civilization on much of the rest of the world, notably Asia and Africa. Humanity, according to John Stuart Mill, was a quality bestowed upon the European rulers. In contrast, postwar visions of humanity—most explicitly formulated in the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights—projected a quality of humanity designed to fit everyone and everywhere. On the other hand, even once signed, the Declaration of Human Rights, powerful as it was as a testimony to humanity’s inclusive postulation, remained, for decades, what it was: a piece of paper, rarely cited and drowned in the reality of culture and geopolitics. Humanity as a reference point found little place in the reality of the Cold War, even if, as Jan Eckel has argued, its attendant value—rights—preceded the 1970s popularization of human rights retracted by Samuel Moyn.

Still, the trajectory gives us pause for reflection. Both civilizational convictions as well as universal claims may project visions of humanity. But both follow different trajectories: nineteenth-century images of civilization traced the human to European origins. To be human meant to be different and to take on the self-appointed mission to humanize others—indeed, to carry humanity to distant lands. In contrast, postwar visions framed humanity as an inseparable part of the body’s DNA, and independent from geography, race, gender, and sociocultural distinction. What the history of humanity shows is that despite its claims of universality, the concept was never simple, unconditional, nor, least of all, uncontroversial.
Historiography

The chapters assembled in this volume connect to a number of current research trends, including works on human rights and humanitarianism, global intellectual history, and postcolonial history. Postcolonial scholars have long questioned the universal applicability of “humanity” as a concept—or have rather encouraged historians to analyze the concept in its ideological and regional moments of production. Dipesh Chakrabarty has argued that much of postcolonial scholarship cites universals common in Enlightenment thinking, among them rights, reason, and the dignity of the individual, while at the same time demanding that such concepts be stripped of their essentialist and only seemingly universal aura.20 “Humanity” and the “human” have been central terms in postcolonial studies, fueled, among others, by Frantz Fanon’s scathing account of the dehumanization entailed in colonial rule.21 Aware of the difficult legacy of the term, postcolonial analyses have nevertheless increasingly cited difference, otherness, and inequality, with a strong focus on the legal, political, and intellectual dimensions of both the terminology and debate. Think, for example, of Bakary Diallo’s autobiographical 1926 novel, Force-Bonté. As Cullen Goldblatt has shown, the story reflects the attempt on the part of an African colonial soldier to come to terms with the contradiction between the egalitarianism of the French Republic and the hierarchical structure of the empire. To what extent, Diallo asks in a metaphorical passage dedicated to the human exploitation of laboring horses, can communication ever triumph over solid domination?22

Attention to detail may be the foremost skill historians bring to the table in the study and reflection on humanity. In a conversation reprinted in Past and Present, Sasson accentuates how historians have been “latecomers” to the story of the history of the human, thanks to the opening of archives but also, more importantly, to the increasing pressure to prove worth, efficiency, and relevance to university deans and trustees throughout the Western world. Sasson argues that this literature, emerging around 2010, may have reflected not simply a search for the origins of human rights and humanitarianism but, more so, a profound debate, or indeed conflict, over the meaning and nature of humanity, notably the question “whether or not we ought to preserve or challenge it.”23

Since then, global historians and philosophers have produced pioneering works retracing the trajectory of both the term and practice over time. One group of scholars has dwelled on the term’s impli-
cation in the writings and legacy of specific philosophers, typically European, white, and male: Cicero, Kant, Hume, Nietzsche, Ellul, and so on. Earlier still, since the 1990s, another group of scholars has shown how European novels, missionary texts, exploration reports, and travelogues reflected their knowledge of colonized people since at least the sixteenth century. Much of this research focuses on European white male actors—intellectuals, theologians, and philosophers—though temporally the literature ranges far, spanning the centuries from antiquity to the twentieth century. Most prominently among these stands Siep Stuurman’s *The Invention of Humanity* (2017), a powerful exploration of the genesis of the concept of humanity since antiquity. Stuurman focuses on two terms—equality and commonality—to show that the impetus to come together and realize shared values and beliefs has been part of humans’ DNA from the beginning of long-distance travel. Key to an understanding of the concept of humanity, he concludes, is the realization that to be human has never been defined by mere unity; it has always entailed division as well. It is that tension that has marred discourses of human rights, humanitarianism, and humanity worldwide to this day, and informed a wealth of literature: for example, in a gesture to Stuurman, Bruce Buchan and Linda Andersson Burnett have examined how “savagery” (as opposed to “humanity”) was invented as a field of colonial knowledge. The authors show how the colonization of territories entailed a colonization of knowledge based on previous European theological, legal, and political traditions of thought.

A good part of the present literature on “humanity” has focused on six different areas, among those (1) knowledge transmission, (2) military conflict, (3) the language of progress, (4) European socio-political practices, (5) biology and nature, as well as (6) the trope of women and children. To begin, the relationship between teachers and students often forms the core of inquiry, with an eye on how the pursuit and digestion of knowledge have served to connect and develop humanity—and, at the same time, how knowledge transmission is often tied to moral issues affecting humanity at large.

Second, regarding military conflict, subjects span from the outbreak and prevention of war, as well as the prosecution of those responsible for it, to the legality of war and the quest for outlawing military conflict altogether. James Crossland, for example, has looked at the generation of humanitarians between the Crimean War and World War I who created international norms relating to the care of soldiers as humans, the limitation of weapons, and the rules of war. In this context, authors have focused on what war does—
physically, legally, and culturally—to soldiers and civilians, as well as the horrid consequences of war in terms of deprivation, suppression, and massive waves of refugees. Responsibility looms large in these debates: Tom Dannenbaum, for one, has pondered the ironic identity of modern soldiers, whose duty it is, on the national level, to follow orders, while their humanity requires them to disobey orders that are illegal.29

In addition, recent studies of humanitarianism and human rights often emphasize the progress tale of an expanding, inclusive “humanity.”30 For example, in From Empire to Humanity (2016), Amanda B. Moniz accentuates a common belief in Enlightenment visions of progress, self-help, and improvement in the late eighteenth century, as well as the benevolence that motivated that generation to develop an international community of humanitarian workers and thinkers that was eventually marred and fragmented by the violence of revolutions and the emergence of nineteenth-century imperialism. Moniz’s cast of actors—primarily Anglophone and primarily rich and well-educated—united around universal visions of philanthropy that reflected less a belief system than a network fueled by a common milieu and upbringing.31

Pertaining to the fourth point, European sociopolitical practices, Fabian Klose and Mirjam Thulin have examined the emergence of humanity as a practice in Europe since the sixteenth century. Specifically, they ask to what extent humanity served as a norm and social compass for human relationships, most importantly as a link between care and commonality but also as a trigger of both integration and hierarchy.32 As Johannes Paulmann concludes in the same volume, “humanity” as a concept in practice can be analyzed as a term operating in tension with its antonyms. At the same time, one may also distill the manifold functions of humanity in the context of temporality and as a concept that in and of itself allows for different levels of hierarchy.33 Your humanity, that is, may not be my humanity.

Regarding the focus on humanity in the context of biology and nature, Ilana Feldman and Miriam Ticktin choose an integrative approach to politics, biology, and the environment in their book In the Name of Humanity (2016). The editors assemble contributions that reflect on the concept of humanity in three different contexts: humanitarianism and human rights, biological technologies, and humans and nature. They argue that configurations of humanity emerged at and from the overlap of these three fields, fueled by a broad array of governing practices. Examining actors ranging from mortality, to
biology, to childhood, they show that at the heart of these intersections is an array of universalist practices and statements relating to rights, well-being, and nature that served to make humanity tangible for purposes of rule, governance, law, and order. Some scholars have already integrated COVID-19 into their research, identifying the virus as a historically unique challenge to all of humanity, in ways very different from the divisive mechanisms of conflict and war.

Finally, women and children have informed a nascent trend in the literature dedicated to agency and humanity. From the vantage point of anthropology, Penelope Edmonds encourages us to pay attention to the interplay of language and affection. Looking at testimonials taken from indigenous women in Australia, Edmonds stresses that there is an innate inequity in white interpreters’ language of humanity as well as in the display of sympathy. That language, she believes, often focuses on the biological body of the suppressed and colonized, including its exposure to violence and pain instead of the inherent right to not suffer pain in the first place. Objects, meanwhile, can and could also morph into subjects of humanity. As Tehila Sasson reflects in her research on children, media campaigns and marketing agencies, in basing their accounts on the personal stories affected by humanitarian disaster, have yielded an idea of humanity on the daily, local, even intimate level (and, one may add, quite remote from the abstract global visions pitched by international leaders at high-end conference sites). In “How Children Invented Humanity,” David Bjorklund adds to this literature from a psychological developmental perspective. Picking up on the tension between civilization and universalism, the author argues that historically, children have not simply “learned” or “received” humanity but, in fact, helped shape it in the first place. Childhood and children, that is, have contributed to the genesis of humans as a particular species. A collection of essays edited by Esther Möller, Johannes Paulmann, and Katharina Stornig seeks to introduce gender as a category of global humanitarianism in the twentieth century. Ranging from missionaries to doctors, children to soldiers, the volume retraces the multilayered meanings of discourse and action in the context of humanitarian intervention and addresses the role of women as observers, activists, and victims, notably in the care of compassion and representation.

In sum, historians have focused much of their attention on actors dedicated to philosophical, intellectual, and ethical consideration, legal interpretation, and political activism. And this makes sense: Leading in these debates have been legal scholars, notably since
World War II, bolstering concepts such as “crimes against humanity” and making them enforceable. Moreover, knowledge transmission, war, refugee crises, and, more recently, global disease feature prominently in the discussion. Historians center their work either on humanitarian thinkers, writers, and discourses (Stuurman, Klose/Thulin) or on the intellectual trajectory of the present (Feldman/Ticktin). Missionary activity, politics, legal concerns, and human activism take center stage in these accounts, and for good reasons. White male actors seem to take a precedent in the literature, as does a Eurocentric focus.

The authors in this volume share a conviction that the idea of humanity, as Klose and Thulin put it, remains “malleable,” including a broad array of connotations and a vibrant historical trajectory. Optimistic values, opaque mental pictures, and subjective imaginations overlap, going hand in hand with clear limitations as well as ambivalent definitions. These varying definitions share a common understanding of humanity as a tool of cause and conviction, one that rallies audiences to an ideological cause beyond their personal environment. In doing so, the term “humanity” also served as a legitimizing force for—typically Western—inhuman colonialism, imperialism, and universalism, along with militarism, violence, and war.40

The tension between representations of seemingly human and inhuman forms of behavior, as we shall see, did not go unnoticed by historical actors, including the very same involved in suppression and exploitation.

The chapters assembled in this volume build on this current historiography, but they also seek to transcend and challenge it on two levels. What all of the contributions in our volume have in common is, first, a focus on individual actors and organizations and, second, a particular interest in individual practices of humanity. Rather than taking a grand-picture approach, we believe that this actor-based approach provides a more differentiated insight into the nuances and ambiguities of humanity, along with the processes of translation as well as modes of transculturation. In tandem, these help us understand the importance and interplay of European and non-European perspectives and voices in the global discourse of humanity.41

Specifically, the authors in this volume seek to amend this burgeoning scholarship by exploring the cultural idea of “humanity” and its role in international relations. They reflect on but also challenge previous analyses of “humanity” as practices and concepts in that they purposely examine the cultural designs of “humanity” as
cultural practice: in politics, at work, and in the arts, notably music. Collectively, they contend that political action was and continues to be affected, often even framed, by cultural interpretation and representation.

Having said that, a note about the geographical focus of this volume is in order. As three historians and editors working at the John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies at Freie Universität Berlin along with a circle of colleagues hailing, for the most part, from around the Atlantic basin, our natural professional focus is the transatlantic world—sometimes within its global entanglements, other times in its Atlantic or even domestic contexts. The thrust of this volume follows this interest. Its chapters mainly address transatlantic actors, ideas, and connections, though occasionally the chapters venture into fields and contexts that lie beyond the transatlantic world. We are aware that this inscribes a Euro-American-centered perspective into the volume, and we wish to be explicit in framing our volume’s accordingly limited contribution to an understanding of humanity as a concept globally. At the same time, we hope that readers may find this centrism reflexive: it is aware of the limitations residing within its specific positionality and seeks to avoid confusing the transatlantic part with the global whole of visions of humanity. These reflections, we hope, may invite a critical conversation with scholars working on other world regions.

By way of a theoretical kick-off, the volume’s introductory section continues with a conceptual chapter by Suzy Killmister that invites us to rethink the notion of the “human” as a socially constructed category. Philosophers have long made their case for human rights by pointing to some inherent “natural” features and qualities of humans, Killmister argues. Yet accepting those carries the danger of promoting “boundary policing” and excluding specific groups and individuals “from the category of the human.” Thinking of the human as a socially constructed category, in contrast, recasts the problem of exclusion and repositions the importance and powers of social practices in shaping notions of the human. It also draws attention to the important role of human rights as one of the social mechanisms that establishes the ways, meanings, and entitlements of being human by way of human rights norms and practice. There is nothing “natural,” ahistorical, or acultural about human rights, Killmister concludes, forcing us, as historians, to attend “to the genealogy of the institutions and narratives involved in the construction of the human, with particular attention again to the question of whose visions of humanity have been centered, and whose have been silenced.”
The following three parts have been subdivided into three themes emerging from the research undertaken for this book: objects, work, and sounds. All three reflect actors and actions of humanity, but in very different modes and avenues. While “Objects” examines engagements with humanity by way of material examination, “Work” looks at mechanisms of quotidian practice to think and act out humanity. “Sounds,” in turn, investigates fora and individuals dedicated to non-verbal intonation and representation. All three sections seek to highlight the diverse and often highly individual profiles and fora where cultural practices took and continue to take place.

The authors in the section on “objects,” specifically, look at the fascination with material objects and materials in relation to the supposed origins of humanity as well as to claims of stewardship and legitimate custodianship for human heritage. These articles show how human remains as well as archaeological findings served as seemingly objective evidence for narratives that created a chronology of humanity along scientific, yet hierarchical, categories of human development. Based upon these narratives, Western actors—such as scientists and archaeologists—put themselves in charge of collecting, labeling, and preserving objects of human history in museums and universities but also in religious communities. At the same time, these seemingly objective classifications undercut the story of humanity as a universal community, as Western authors imagined the status of Western culture as being superior to other parts of the world such as Latin America or the Middle East. With their focus on objects (and on objectivity), the chapters show us how the science of humanity became an instrument of creating hierarchies that was complicit with the Western project of colonizing the world. They encourage us to historicize “objectivity” as a Western gaze and perspective that became a technique of exercising power.

In his contribution to this volume, Michael L. Krenn focuses on Dr. Samuel George Morton, who is regarded as the “father” of the American School of Ethnology that developed in the mid-1800s. Morton and his associates—both in the United States and throughout Europe—applied “scientific” methods to the study of humankind and developed a new “vision of humanity” that argued that the differences marking the individual races had existed since creation and were immutable. For Morton, the physical differences he noted among the nearly one thousand human skulls in his collection were also reflections of the differences in character and intelligence. He was thus able to provide essential intellectual support for westward expansion and the annihilation of Native Americans, the continued
existence of American slavery, and the rationale for keeping the races from mixing. Morton’s writings were celebrated at home and abroad, and they continue to resonate today through his massive collection of human skulls and ongoing arguments about the meaning of his work.

Using the example of explorers excavating ancient Nippur (located about a hundred twenty miles southeast of Baghdad), Sarah Epping shows how US citizens involved in Ottoman Iraq at the end of the nineteenth century constructed and propagated an exclusionary vision of humanity. As Epping argues, their actions have had severe consequences for US-Iraqi relations ever since. In order to promote and finance their archaeological expeditions, explorers instigated a contradictory, Western-centric discourse that denied contemporary Iraqis any connection to the people who had lived in Iraq in the earliest times. At the same time, they closely connected (ancient) Iraq to the modern-day United States by drawing on long-fostered narratives that framed the region’s earliest inhabitants as the progenitor of US culture. Furthermore, they considered Americans as completely different from and superior to the people living there at present. This notion and the ensuing actions initiated the long-term development of US imperialistic interests in Iraq. Epping’s chapter resonates with current debates about global memory culture, museums, and claims of restitution made by countries throughout the world. As colonial explorers, scientists and academics took cultural artifacts and objects—often under the auspices of preserving them for all of “humanity”—while rendering people throughout Africa, Asia, and the Americas as “people without history,” to borrow a phrase from anthropologist Eric Wolf to describe this asymmetry of voices.44

Section two shifts the focus from “objects” to the category of “work” as a way to think of historical visions of humanity. The chapters assembled in this section address three key themes: humanitarian assistance, women’s rights, and Catholic visions of social justice. They do so by drawing attention to the actual working contexts and the lived experiences of those who acted in the name of “humanity.” Focusing on the Alliance Israélite Universelle and the web of organizations created by Maurice de Hirsch between the 1880s and the 1910s, Barbara Lambauer takes us into the practical work of humanitarian giving and allows us to follow the network’s work on behalf of Eastern European Jewish refugees and transatlantic migrants up to World War I. Jewish aid organizations invoked a language of “humanity” in their work, Lambauer shows, but they struggled over what
a commitment to the cause of humanity should mean in practical terms: Would emigration assistance offer the way out for Jewish refugees or would it be better to promote Jewish education and emancipation in the Eastern European home countries of those refugees? Who was to receive emigration assistance? And who would take up the refugees? Lambauer’s chapter casts a light on the practical tensions and dilemmas that opened up for humanitarian workers once they sought to implement their visions of humanity on the ground. It also shows us how new movements and networks of Jewish refugees framed a new setting for humanitarian work in the late nineteenth century.

Andrew M. Johnston’s chapter, on the other hand, foregrounds “work” as an intellectual practice by exploring the conceptual “boundary work” that underpinned much of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom’s (WILPF) campaign for women’s rights as universal rights. Feminist peace activists, he shows, worked out a new rationale for women’s rights by the end of World War I: within this rationale, masculine precepts and politics had plunged the world into war and violence and, in the words of Emily Greene Balch, had narrowed “men’s sympathies” and loyalties to the conflicting logics of the masculine nation-state. Practical experiences with settlement work within the immigrant city, on the other hand, had demonstrated the possibility of building a cosmopolitan community that transcended those logics. Women active in WILPF, Johnston shows, not only placed much hope on replicating this model on a global scale. They also worked out a new vision of humanity that put the needs of a “suffering humanity” front and center and touted the “universal expansion” of rights and social work as the only feasible way toward building a lasting peace—a call to action that widely resonated among women’s rights activists throughout the rest of the century.

Taking us into the 1960s, Betsy Konefal homes in on the connections between practical religious work and new religious discourses of “humanity” during the Cold War. Her chapter examines social justice activism by Catholics in Guatemala in the 1960s as a means to explore competing visions of rights and revolution. It was a time when progressive Catholics worldwide focused on problems of exclusion and oppression, responding to Church calls for “Christian revolution”; by the end of the decade, this thinking and praxis would coalesce into liberation theology. But this case illustrates the complexity and diversity of liberationist ideas, with divergent positions developing about how to realize the transformations that many
Catholics sought. Ideas about change—intensely debated among Church nuns and priests, students, peasants, and even armed revolutionaries—would be powerfully influenced by experiences on the ground: it was through challenges in implementing new visions of rights and justice in settings such as Guatemala, a site of extreme and racialized inequities and violence, that some of their most radical iterations took shape.

Nicholas J. Cull’s chapter, in turn, considers the role of cultural outreach based on an articulation of shared humanity in the global campaign to end the apartheid system in South Africa, along with the apartheid state’s counter-campaign appealing to some of the same ideas. He argues that preexisting cultural connections between South Africa and the world gave prominence to the cause and that the use of a shared transnational vocabulary of humanity derived from the UN, the church, Marxist doctrine, and the Commonwealth succeeded in reaching audiences. The indigenous African idea of humanity, *Ubuntu*—at first seemingly marginal in the struggle—became central to the postapartheid discourse. As Cull writes, “the political salience of South Africa in global conscience owed much to pre-existing cultural connections and a vocabulary of humanity. . . . It was only toward the end that an actual local ideology of humanity indigenous to Africa moved to the fore rather than simply an African experience expressed in global terms.” The humanization of oppressed people in South Africa thus had the unintended consequence of dehumanizing the oppressor in ways that complicated the process of negotiation and conflict resolution.

Taken together, the three chapters in this section suggest that visions of humanity cannot be separated from the lived working experiences of those who shaped them—nor should they. The quotidian challenges and quarrels, the tensions and limits, the hopes and frustrations all formed the web of experience that underpinned historical visions of “humanity.” Acting in the name of “humanity,” the section shows, not only took intellectual, reflective work; transnational activism also represented its own way of work, with its own routines and its own forms of gratification.

Section three turns from thought and the material to “sounds” and artistic visions of humanity, notably ballet, music, film, and literature. Stéphanie Gonçalves introduces us to Maurice Béjart’s visions of humanity. A leading international choreographer in the 1950s and 1960s, Béjart’s ballet interpretation of Ludwig van Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony was at once sensitive, vital, spiritual, and religious—a vision of sound, song, dance, and love that reflected the urgency of
social questions in the 1960s. To Béjart, the world was a stage and the stage a sacred space to sing, play, dance, and celebrate humanity in a pluralist and inclusive, universalist and pacifist fashion. Based on a close reading of the actual performance, Gonçalves analyzes reviews of a performance that consciously took the risk of being seen as “popular culture” and, on that account, was severely criticized by leading US American critics. To the gatekeepers of US high culture, Béjart’s “banal” appeal to humanity equaled a descent into popular culture and, to this effect, a betrayal of the exclusive function of the international ballet scene. It is here where we see, perhaps more obviously than anywhere else in the volume, how art—music and dance in particular—could function as a tool of inclusion and simultaneously a tool of exclusion, both in the name of “humanity.”

Following up on Gonçalves’s contention, Anaïs Fléchet explores Jewish American violinist Yehudi Menuhin’s reflections on music and diplomacy and retraces his action at the head of UNESCO’s International Music Council (IMC) between 1969 and 1975. Drawing on archival materials from the UNESCO Archives, the US National Archives, and the Foyle Menuhin Archive at the Royal Academy of Music, she shows how Menuhin used his international prestige to intervene in a number of diplomatic matters, including the Rostropovich case (1971–1974) and the UNESCO/Israel controversy (1974–1975). In particular, the chapter examines Menuhin’s vision of music as a common good for humanity and a peacebuilding tool in regard to three specific avenues: first, UNESCO’s strategic objectives and achievements in the field of music; second, Menuhin’s moves between the musical stage and the international stage; and third, the rise of a new “musical humanism” during the 1970s. As Fléchet writes, Menuhin’s tenure at the IMC highlights the convergence of two universals at a specific moment in the early 1970s: on the one hand, “humanity” and human rights (which then became established as a collective action program), and, on the other hand, classical music, a “vector of emotion and an aesthetic and moral education initiative.” In the face of daunting global challenges, Menuhin sought to craft a new musical diplomacy that, as he hoped, would turn “art into hope for humanity.”

Tobias Hof zooms in further on sound with a selection of charity songs that were produced in response to the 1980s African famines. By looking at their production, lyrics, and videos, the chapter analyzes these different visions of humanity, their effects on fundraising campaigns, and whether the songs appealed to a global audience.
Hof argues that they offer insight into the political and sociocultural self-image of a society and allow us to grasp the cultural representation of various visions of humanity. As Hof writes, we should understand “humanity” not as an objective but as a normative category, which despite its various forms encouraged and impelled musicians to participate in the fundraising efforts and people to donate at a time of crisis.

In tandem, the chapters in this section show the extent to which cultural actors developed their own set of visions of humanity, one ranging from the display of a utopian community of colors and people dancing on stage to address social inequality (Gonçalves); to the use of humanity as a weapon in a bipolar world (Fléchet); to an appeal for international attention, sanction, and relief for a region in crisis (Hof). Most noteworthy, all three point to a decisively different vocabulary of identity and action. Rather than assigning “humanity” to one or the other side of the struggle, their vision invoked universalism, however vague. As Charles Maier once wrote in a review essay: “The Russians who wept at a [1959 Leonard] Bernstein concert [in Moscow] did so because music provided its continuing Dionysian hope that art might dissolve boundaries, control and contention.” For whatever reasons, music allowed performers, organizers, and audiences alike to sense a vision that went beyond the space race, bipolar confrontation, and ideological competition, allowing a brief glimpse of the world above and beyond politics.47

In the epilogue to this volume, Siep Stuurman widens the lens by situating the historical visions addressed in this volume in the broader history of “languages of common humanity.” Stuurman sees one achievement of the volume in the ways it draws our attention to the centrality of “silent exclusions”: Morton’s “scientific racism,” the unilinear “genealogies of civilization” promoted by American archaeologists around the 1900s, the exclusions inherent in the class- and education-based approach of Jewish philanthropy, as well as the White Atlantic mindset of radical feminists in Stuurman’s reading all stood for visions of a “super-We” that were reductionist and “loudly or silently exclude[d] large swaths of the world’s population.” Stuurman sees as a “watershed in discourses about common humanity” after World War II when the idea of a universal humanity was fixed as a “global normative value,” a theme he perceives resonating through the histories of religious activism, anti-apartheid campaigns, and musical performances addressed in this volume. In the end, Stuur-
man concludes, human rights and visions of humanity have always been ambivalent concepts as “human artifacts,” but there is a certain anthropological robustness about them; we should not give up on them, he claims, in these times of reappearing authoritarianisms.

It is these glimpses beyond law and politics that also inform the larger epistemic value of this volume. While politically, messages invoking humanity remained partisan (against capitalism, against communism, against apartheid, against inequality), culturally the story is more complex on at least five different accounts: first, while intellectuals and political shakers certainly did much to develop and examine concepts of humanity (including their ideological malleability and often disastrous impact as a force of legitimation), the chapters in this volume show that to a large extent the genesis and the meaning of the term was crafted outside of the political spotlight and the ivory tower. Scientists like Samuel George Morton or feminists at the WILPF may have received little attention in the study of humanity. Likewise, transcendent visions of religion and the law, much studied and well known, played a significant in cultural reflections on humanity in altogether unforeseen scenarios. Echoing a growing literature pertaining to this topic, Betsy Konefal picks up on the religious angle in her discussion of Catholicism and humanity in 1960s Guatemala when she examines what came to be known as “‘A New Humanity’ for the Poor.” Suzy Killmister, in turn, demonstrates how legal processes surrounding human rights claims, seemingly researched ad nauseam, morphed into new imaginations about what it means to be human, way beyond the courtroom and political fora. Yet as these stories show, their tales also offer surprising, even disheartening perspectives on a term that constitutes, at the end of the day, one of the most exclusive figures of current political speech.

Second, all of the actors examined appealed to visions of humanity to transcend precisely the sort of conflict they found themselves in: Béjart’s hope for a human community of equals resonated strongly with Menuhin’s vision of a world of music lovers united by sound. The notion of Ubuntu employed in the context of the apartheid discourse had a life and employed a vision of the world far beyond the political conflict, as did the metaphor of Bob Geldof’s children, notwithstanding all the criticism bestowed on Live Aid concerts. In each of these instances, visions of humanity served
as catalysts within a specific political context, but they also preexisted—and that is the key—outside and beyond such a context in the first place and, for many, continued to do so after the fact. Notwithstanding the frustrations and struggles of actors to put visions of humanity into practice—think of the Alliance Israélite Universelle’s troubles in prioritizing its aid—the longevity of their imagination set them apart from political and intellectual proponents of academics at the time.

Third, and related to this, in tune with the understanding of the arts as an affective impetus, actors put emotions at center stage and, more often than not, insisted on the apolitical and timeless nature of their intentions. One might question the validity of these claims, but the fact remains that this is what they deemed important and legitimate to their work. The nexus between emotion, temporality, and humanity endowed their respective visions with a meaning that appeared to transcend space and time to yield a legitimacy and an appeal far beyond the functional understandings of beneficial collectivity. This echoes what the philosopher Kyrill Gosseff has termed “A Transcendental Emotional Reference,” based, among others, on Husserl’s theory of consciousness.48 Sharing, to cite Desmond Tutu, was not a means to do or feel good. It was the only way to come to terms with one’s own limits as a human being. Disregarding humanity, including the humanity of others, meant to unbecome human oneself—a vista so terrifying that it could only be addressed and digested in the cultural realm.

Fourth, and in direct relation to the preceding observation, the present volume accentuates critical reflections on cultural representations of inhumanity. Inhumanity was and is not just the flipside of humanity, a dark shadow lurking beneath joyous claims of progress and inclusion. Inhumanity is, indeed, part of humanity’s essence, not just in analytical but also in historical terms for many of the very actors examined in this volume. As Sarah Epping, Michael L. Krenn, and Stéphanie Gonçalves report, the delineation of specific characteristics, behavior, and physiognomy did not simply serve as venues to define and exclude the “other.” Rather, in these accounts, humanity emerged as a twisted mix of attributes—both inclusive and exclusive, benevolent and brutal, respectful and racist—which individuals experienced, recognized, and tried to make sense of simultaneously.

On that note, finally, the most prominent figure emerging from the following account is one that accentuates competition and di-
versity rather than unity, universalism, and sharedness. Excavators in Ottoman Iraq entertained different visions of humanity than, say, Church nuns and priests in 1960s Guatemala. James Laidlaw, Barbara Bodenhorn, and Martin Holbraad have recently urged the social sciences to “bring back” the subject in an anthropological fashion. Among the many cultural actors perused in this volume, there were and are always more than one vision of humanity—not simply by way of accident but because, from an anthropological point of view, human individuals find themselves consistently put together in different and diverse historical contexts of change, in which their influence on outcomes cannot be overestimated. What is more, these cultural actors continuously contested and competed with one another, over time and across space.

Future research, one might hope, will explore these five points further, but also move beyond the themes and topics outlined in this and other publications in terms of both geography and temporality. By way of a suggestion, we would like to point out two related subjects that hitherto have remained understudied or unaddressed: climate history and the nonhuman turn. Picking up on Maeckelberghe and Schröder-Bäck’s (and German president Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s) suggestion about a “test for humanity,” historians of culture and international history are well qualified to explore the nexus of inclusion and exclusion in earlier instances of international cooperation in the service of natural disease control. How did humanity feature in historical debates and assessments of climate and climate change? How did historical actors perceive human agency within the same? How did climate serve as a forum to come to terms with humanity?

Moving on to the second subject, for all the interest in animal studies, critical plant studies, and the nonhuman turn, there is hardly any historical research on the interplay of humanity and nonhumanity from an international perspective. Issues of universalism and diversity, as discussed in this volume, certainly figure large in the history of sonic, visual, literary, performative, religious, and scientific imaginaries of the human-nonhuman encounter. Novels and poetry, such as Kazuo Ishiguro’s 2019 Klara and the Sun, increasingly portray the osmosis between humanity and nonhumanity in a not-too-distant future, along with the extension of human values to relations with nonhuman creatures. How have previous protagonists of AI science, machine learning, and protohumanity grappled with issues of humanity in work and self-reflection? How did contemplations of nonhumanity relativize references to an all-encompassing...
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humanity? How does nonhumanity decenter the many histories dedicated to humanity, including this very book?

Barely had the 2021 Olympics in Tokyo concluded when the city opened its doors to part two of the event, the 2021 International Paralympics. “You are the best of humanity,” declared Andrew Parsons, president of the International Paralympics Committee, during the opening ceremony, following an impressive show of light, dance, and fireworks. Twittered notes of praise and inspiration arrived by international sports stars including Bayern Munich star Alphonso Davies and Manchester United striker Marcus Rashford (“real-life superheroes”). Yet for all the joy of competing and performing in Japan, some of the athletes and their fans found little evidence for visions of an inclusive humanity. TV viewers noted that unlike the Olympics, the Paralympics could not be watched 24/7 and were only available on selected, often costly channels.53 Worse, as blind skier John Dickinson-Lilley stated, terms such as “inspiration” and “super-human,” often cited during the games, objectified disabled people for the sole benefit of nondisabled spectators, echoing what Australian comedian Stella Young once called “inspiration porn.”54 Scoffing at such mechanisms of objectivation, Young stated in a 2014 TEDx Talk, a few months prior to her death: “I really want to live in a world where disability is not the exception but the norm.”55

Now, expand “disability” to include any sort of difference, and we might finally begin to come to terms with the conflicted historical and cultural legacy of the trajectory of humanity outlined in this volume. Which is another way of saying that difference, as much as unity, marks any vision of humanity.

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**Notes**

1. “Japan Will Host in 2021.”
19. See Johnston, “Jeanne Halbwachs.”
30. McNeince, “Review Article.”
31. Moniz, *From Empire to Humanity*.
33. Paulmann, “Humanity.”
34. Feldman and Ticktin, *In the Name of Humanity*, 23.
36. Edmonds, “Activism in the Antipodes.”
38. Bjorklund, “Children.”
41. For a further reflection on this approach, see Jobs and Mackenthun, “Introduction.”
42. Laukötter, “The ‘Colonial Object.’”
44. Although Wolf and Eriksen have mainly focused on modes of production and economic inequality, the phrase also proves inspiring in our case. See Wolf and Eriksen, *Europe*.
45. For a perspective that illuminates the focus on work and labor as experienced and shaped by individual actors in their everyday lives, see Lüdtke, “Arbeitsbeginn.” For a transnational perspective, see Jobs and Mailänder, “Arbeit Begrenzen Entgrenzen.”
47. Maier, “Review.”
49. Laidlaw et al., *Recovering the Human Subject*.
51. Note that climate change does not loom large in the current academic literature on “humanity.” We are indebted to Connor Ruby for this point.
55. Young, “Inspiration Porn.”

**Bibliography**


