

# INTRODUCTION



War and peace start in the hearts of individuals.

—Pema Chödrön

“For me, it always began with friendship!”<sup>1</sup> This comment by Stanisław Stomma during an interview about Polish–German relations on a rainy October afternoon in Warsaw in 2004 has stayed with me throughout this project. He was ninety-six when we spoke, and ill; he died a few months later. He had welcomed my request for an interview, however, and he seemed excited about the subject. Stomma was born in 1908 in Szacuny near Kėdainiai in today’s Lithuania. He experienced the German occupation of Eastern Europe during the First World War as a young boy. His mother, a widow in an unstable region, drew on the support and aid of occupying German soldiers.<sup>2</sup> As a consequence, Stomma forged friendships with Germans, acquired fluency in the German language as well as an admiration for German culture. In the postwar era, he rejected mainstream Polish memories, which demonized all Germans as “Hitlerites.”<sup>3</sup> He became an integral conversation partner in the earliest dialogue between Poles and West Germans in the 1950s, only eleven years after the end of the Second World War. Stomma embodied through his personal and public life the winding and complex path of Polish–German relations. As Polish–German relations waxed and waned, his engagement proved that personal backgrounds and individual agency mattered in these public and political developments. It also pointed to the entanglements, on structural and personal levels, that preceded and accompanied the reconciliation process. This book analyzes the role of civil-society groups and media along unconventional channels in Polish–German relations. It interrogates the concept of reconciliation in the Polish–German context as well as comparatively as a concept in international relations, creating an alternative narrative of the long-term challenges and successes in conflict resolution.

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Notes for this chapter begin on page 18.

At its heart, this book traces the efforts of a highly influential network of Polish and West German intelligentsia and media personalities to promote and improve a particular version of religious and cultural Polish–German relations, which they termed reconciliation. They initiated dialogues, traveled and met across borders, networked, and struck up personal friendships. They attempted to begin dialogues in the interest of lasting peace. They acted through audiovisual and traditional media to counter prevalent victim-centered and antagonistic understandings of both nations and of Polish–German relations. In the late 1960s and 1970s, and again in the 1990s, their efforts intensified and drew more attention in connection to the interest surrounding Ostpolitik and the 1990 Two Plus Four Agreement, the official peace treaty after the Second World War.<sup>4</sup>

In the 1990s, the Polish Catholic publishers and West German participants in early relations wrote their own stories about Polish–German relations, particularly their religious and cultural dimensions. Together with politicians and scholars, they established the narrative of Polish–German reconciliation, a particular vision of improvement in postwar relations that came to dominate representations throughout the Cold War. This narrative was superimposed onto deeply entangled Central European populations and territories, and it also interacted with the process that Rogers Brubaker and others called the unmixing of Central European populations.<sup>5</sup> From its earliest days, it contained inherent tensions and contradictions, transnational actors insisting on national realities and civil-society pioneers prioritizing state relations. The reconciliation narrative simplified postwar relations into a two-sided ethnonational dialogue. The impact of this narrative on politics and the societies was significant but problematic. The activists contributed in the short term to change the discourse around Polish–German relations, to establish networks and introduce new media approaches to European peace. However, the long-term cost of their insistence on a linear narrative of steady improvements within a postwar national grid became the exclusion of certain segments of their populations, including the voices and alternative histories of surviving Jewish and other ethnic minorities, the voices of the displaced populations in Central Europe and the East Germans. Finally, one must consider to what extent and in which guises understandings of Polish–German relations reached beyond urban elites with already existing ties abroad.

## **Definitions, Methodology, and Historiography**

In considering the reconciliatory aspects of postwar Polish–German relations, this book deals with three separate definitions of reconciliation: rec-

conciliation as traditionally used in Polish–German relations; reconciliation as a framework for post-conflict engagement in international relations and peace studies, and reconciliation as a religious process. In Polish–German relations, reconciliation denoted a success story introduced for political purposes by media, politicians, religious groups, and scholars from the 1960s to the 1990s.<sup>6</sup> “Polish–German reconciliation” included efforts in West Germany and Poland to create closer relations, overcome tensions in the mutual past, and combat stereotypes and unjustified fears domestically vis-à-vis the other country. The efforts also included travels and meetings to build connections, the publication of a series of religious memoranda and statements, and, finally, efforts by public intellectuals and media to publicize and further those memoranda.<sup>7</sup>

Polish–German reconciliation as a media-driven political narrative in West German and Polish public space was a selective narrative. This analysis makes its exclusions as well as its inclusions visible. East Germans were occasionally invited to participate in the process or in meetings. Equally often, they were excluded. Reasons included their perceived loyalty to the East German communist state, a sense of rivalry between West and East Germans concerning positive relations to Poland, and, last but not least, a fear that by including East Germans the West German participants would inadvertently signal an acceptance of the division of Germany to a domestic and international audience. The East German Protestant initiative Aktion Sühnezeichen, a group that traveled into Poland for volunteer work at concentration camps as atonement for German crimes during the war, was fully accepted by and upheld a conversation and contacts with the same Polish groups as the West Germans. However, sources from this era do not indicate meetings and interactions in which all three groups took part. In addition, reconciliation as a narrative did not find its way into East German public space.

On the other hand, “peace” and “world peace” were important signifiers in communist East Germany. They denoted the resistance against a perceived Western military imperialism, including the nuclear threat, and it described socialism as a key aspect of world peace. While some of these notions were propaganda driven, many people in the communist states genuinely supported peace within this framework, and many active peace groups existed.<sup>8</sup> East German communist media described a successful Polish–German friendship as having begun in 1953 as East Germany recognized the Polish–East German postwar border.<sup>9</sup> As a consequence of such dynamics, East Germany and East Germans played a less active role in these emerging conversations about the past and present in the 1950s and 1960s.<sup>10</sup> The 1950s and 1960s dialogue and the resulting narrative also almost entirely excluded Jewish memories and voices. In Polish war mem-

ories during the Cold War, victimhood was primarily, if not exclusively, of Polish suffering.<sup>11</sup> In addition, as they considered Polish–German relations a question of national security and order, participants did not think inclusion of Jewish voices was necessary since the Jewish minority remaining in Poland was too small to constitute a substantial political force.

Secondly, definitions of reconciliation as used in peace and conflict-resolution studies, namely the healing of international or interethnic relations in the aftermath of conflict, serve here to pose more in-depth and critical questions about Polish–German relations by adding a theoretical comparative framework. These definitions involve models, roads, methods, and paths to reestablish postwar and postgenocidal intra- and international relations.<sup>12</sup> Peace scholars understand reconciliation as efforts on a collective and social level, such as apologies, reparations, justice, and the work of Truth and Reconciliation commissions, intended to heal damaged relationships and restore relations between ethnic groups, societies, or countries.<sup>13</sup> Thirdly, theological understandings of the term matter, particularly as they inspired many participants within these pages to engage with Polish–German relations. Reconciliation in a Christian context involves penitence, atonement, and, according to one participant in the relations, “the preparedness to carry the consequences of guilt and to offer compensation for injustices committed.”<sup>14</sup> In theology, reconciliation is the result of penance and emphasizes inner transformation for the party atoning but also for the recipient of the action, if they are able to move toward forgiveness socially but also in the eyes of God.<sup>15</sup>

For both Polish and German media activists, there was also a sense that the impetus behind reconciliation came from civil society, the communicative space between the individual and the state.<sup>16</sup> Thus, it is also necessary to define civil society and its role in these events. David Ost in *Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics* describes the idea of civil society as having become prominent to Polish opposition in the 1970s. Following earlier writers and philosophers, Ost, by using the term, wishes to highlight the “public role of citizens outside the government.”<sup>17</sup> The groups here were civil-society actors in the sense that much of their activity took place outside of and sometimes in challenge to states and organized politics. However, Poland in the late 1950s to early 1970s, as Ost also points out, had a much more limited civil society than it did in the 1980s. Secondly, several of the Polish Catholic intellectuals traced here were indeed political actors, if marginal ones, in the late 1950s to the late 1960s. They had been allowed as a small group of opposition to join the Polish communist parliament, the Sejm. A few of them considered themselves representatives of the state.

On the West German side, while print media journalists were more clearly part of civil society, one must ask whether the radio and television

employees were civil-society groups as civil servants, salaried by political entities. They did have considerable independence vis-à-vis organized politics, however, and considered it their role and duty to challenge and question state policy and leaderships. Both the Polish and German side pursued agendas that frequently fell outside of or contradicted state policy. One might argue that they took part in a civil-society dialogue. Religious and church actors fall more easily into the category of civil-society actors. While my intention here is to redirect the focus onto civil-society initiatives as mediated through the public sphere, it is difficult in reality to separate these groups and layers from one another.

The other organizing principle for the 1960s conversations is the notion of a public sphere, in Ost's words a space in which "something approaching public opinion can be formed."<sup>18</sup> The public sphere plays a role as the stage on which Polish–German reconciliation was presented, performed, debated, told, and retold as a positive postwar story. The public sphere was much more limited in Polish society than in the West German one, and this draws attention to the asymmetry of Polish–German relations as well as to the larger numbers of Polish citizens who were neither aware of nor engaged in this particular movement toward improved postwar relations. When we discuss concepts such as a media freedom, public space, and civil society, the differences between communist Poland and the Federal Republic are considerable. These sources nonetheless show surprising parallels between the two societies in that, on the one hand, a limited public sphere existed in Poland in the late 1950s to 1960s and, on the other, the West German state leadership made considerable, and not always constitutional, efforts to control its media and public space. In addition, debates in one state's media was picked up and carried on by other state's media in entangled developments throughout this time period. Ultimately, this argument and approach draws attention to the permeability of the Iron Curtain. It questions an east–west, starkly polarized, and symmetric approach to Polish–German relations.

## Polish–German Relations as a Field of Research

Does the study of reconciliation have a place in scholarship today? Polish–German relations trended as a topic in the 1990s when the recently signed Treaty of Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation between non-communist Poland and united Germany seemed to indicate political success in the efforts to overcome the two countries' troubled past. The drive toward European integration and eastward expansion became a motivating factor in bringing attention and funding to the study of friendlier his-

torical links and connections between the Polish and German peoples and societies. This body of research celebrated Polish–German reconciliation as more or less completed.<sup>19</sup> Finally, scholars of Catholicism in Poland and Europe have inserted the events surrounding Polish–German relations in the 1960s into analyses of the church’s importance to postwar politics and of its liberal and illiberal strands of thought.<sup>20</sup> In most of these studies, Polish–German relations, although fraught and plagued by the past, were steadily improving in a linear fashion in the postwar era thanks to efforts of both Poles and Germans to find common ground for dialogue and cooperation. Since then, the optimism of those early postcommunist years has faded. Polish–German relations have faced new challenges, including cooperation within the European Union and other recent political developments, which preoccupy scholars.<sup>21</sup> The narrative of steady progress should be considered within four political objectives: the West German efforts to gain support among West German voters for Ostpolitik in the 1960s, the further efforts to ratify Ostpolitik in West Germany between 1970 and 1972, the elation surrounding the final peace and friendship treaties in 1990 and 1991, and, finally, Polish efforts to join the European Union in the 1990s and 2000s, and the German support for that bid.<sup>22</sup> Nonetheless, while not the fairytale ending many dreamed of in 1989 and 1990, comparative reconciliation studies still indicate the relative success of postwar efforts to improve relations and offset antagonism between Poland and West Germany. The stability and peace accomplished in the wake of the Second World War was a remarkable achievement, and today the task remains to make sure that countries in the region maintain working relations and do not revert back to open or armed hostilities.

### **Connection to Memory, Nationalism, and Transnationalism Studies**

The complex, multinational, and transnational realities of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Central Europe provide another conceptual framework for this book. Significantly, Polish–German relations as a narrative recognized neither existing borderlands identities nor fluid or loosened national identities. It also downplayed ethnic diversity and complexities, such as Jewish, Ukrainian, German, Russian, or Belarussian existence in Polish lands or the roles these minorities played in twentieth-century historical developments. Thus, one must also understand the project of Polish–German reconciliation within the context of its omissions and silences.

The peace process in Europe was very closely linked to continuing efforts of nation-building and the restoration of control and authority

to the states. In *Seeking Peace in the Wake of War*, the editors point out in their introduction that postwar European nation-states were “inventing or re-inventing themselves, or indeed being re-invented under pressure from others.”<sup>23</sup> The individuals who promoted and worked for improved Polish–German relations continued their efforts to find formulas, acceptable for both sides, for postwar borders and belonging of Polish and German populations. In this sense, the peace process and multilayered dialogues contributed to construct homogeneous nation-states and national identities or, alternatively, to reconstruct the “mental maps” of audiences in the postwar era.<sup>24</sup> International relations scholars Siri Gloppen, Erin Skaar, and Astri Suhrke referenced Benedict Anderson’s notion of “imagined communities” in the reconciliatory establishment of a “common narrative of the past and shared vision of the future” between formerly antagonistic groups.<sup>25</sup> In other words, in the discursive construction of peaceful relations, politicians and other participants strove also to reimagine and to reinforce the stable national communities created in 1945 and to downplay competing memories that undermined postwar stability.

Similarly, William J. Long and Peter Brecke established as a goal for one of their models of reconciliation “transcending certain beliefs about oneself and the other, that opens the possibility of new, beneficial relations.”<sup>26</sup> In Polish–German relations those beliefs included entangled notions of what it meant to be of Polish or German nationality as defined and contrasted against the other nationality or against injustices suffered historically in the hands of the other nation.<sup>27</sup> Many of the participants themselves in Polish–German dialogue in the 1950s and 1970s had multicultural, multilingual, and, before the war, loosened or alternative national identities.<sup>28</sup> They felt it necessary as participants in the postwar peace process to conform on an individual as well as a national level to more rigid postwar national models. Historian Philip Nord writes that “a number of post-war states made the promotion of a unified, national consciousness a matter of policy-making priority.”<sup>29</sup> In promoting European peace and stability, they also strove to suppress, marginalize, neutralize, or silence divisive or ill-fitting minority memories.

Through this case study of reconciliation efforts in Central European borderlands, I am contributing to understandings of conflict resolution from a historical perspective, illustrating how a peace process might work longitudinally and in areas with fluid national categories and tenuous state control. The approach of focusing on civil-society participation and developments in Polish–German relations brings attention to the interplay between current state structures, historic memories, and broader societal groups. In peace studies, Polish–German reconciliation has frequently been cited as a model for conflict resolution.<sup>30</sup> Such analysis must be mind-

ful of the illusion of stable nation-states superimposed onto the shifting demography, geography, and ever-present violence of postwar Europe. International relations scholars must consider the wide and varied groups and stories that had to be excluded to make the optimistic narrative of progress and peace possible.<sup>31</sup>

This study has particularly drawn on models and understandings of reconciliation developed by international relations scholars William J. Long and Peter Brecke, and on Yinan He's understanding of "deep intra-state reconciliation."<sup>32</sup> Drawing on theories of evolutionary psychology, Long and Brecke described a "signaling model" of reconciliation in which a leading representative for one side performs a "costly signal that the other side is likely to interpret as a genuine offer to improve relations."<sup>33</sup> Meanwhile, their forgiveness model indicates "a process of forgiveness, transformation of certain emotions and transcending certain beliefs about oneself and the other, that opens the possibility of new beneficial relations."<sup>34</sup> While both of these models are helpful in understanding Polish–German relations, they are primarily applicable to communities whose ethnic or national belongings are clear and unquestioned. He posited that deep reconciliation, beyond addressing normalization and shared security or economic needs, must also be founded in a shared understanding between participating societies that "war is unthinkable and [that they] must hold generally amicable feelings toward one another."<sup>35</sup> She emphasized national mythmaking by elites as playing a central role in creating deep reconciliation.<sup>36</sup> Her model addressed the role and efforts by media and civil-society actors in preceding, complementing, and reinforcing peace efforts by states but once more paid scant attention to fluid national belongings or multiethnic historical memories.

Polish–German relations show the importance of considering initiatives toward and effects of peace processes beyond existing state frameworks. They also caution about the risks of focusing on short-term political success, stability, and especially marketing relations as successful for political purposes. Short-term gains might hamper long-term and genuine open-ended dialogue or alienate nonstate participants, in this case the growing Polish opposition, who later move into leading political roles.

## **Background: The Imperial and Interwar Era**

The demography and borders as well as political systems in Poland and Germany shifted multiple times during the first half of the twentieth century. The oldest participants in the postwar dialogue, like Stomma, were born in the Russian and German empires. During the First World War,



parts of Poland were occupied by Germany under the leadership of German military Ober-Ost. The Soviet Union followed Russia and the Weimar Republic followed the German Empire in 1917 and 1918. The third empire that had controlled Polish territory, Austria-Hungary, became multiple new states.<sup>37</sup> The 1919 Versailles Treaty ceded western Prussia and Silesia from Germany to Poland, and the interwar period saw territorial disputes in the east between Poland and the Soviet Union. The Polish-Soviet War, 1919–20, ended in the Treaty of Riga and a border agreement that left neither side completely satisfied. Poland gained control over parts of Ukraine, Lithuania, and Belarus, but the border treaty also meant that a large number of Poles became minorities in the Soviet territories.

Poland became an authoritarian state in 1926 when Józef Piłsudski led the military coup that installed *Sanacja*. Hitler assumed the role of chancellor of Germany in 1933, the end of the Weimar Republic. By 1939, Poland had lost its independence during the joint German-Soviet invasion and become occupied territory once more. In the ensuing six years, German occupying forces displaced 1.65 million Polish citizens and sent two million to Germany into forced labor. Five to six million Poles perished at the hands of German invading forces.<sup>38</sup> Fifty percent of those killed, that is to say ninety percent of Poland's Jewish population, perished in the Holocaust, in concentration camps, labor camps, ghettos, or during transportation to the camps. In the aftermath of the Second World War, Poland's western border was moved to the rivers Oder and Neisse, while its eastern border was redrawn to the Curzon Line.<sup>39</sup> The ten to thirteen million ethnic Germans who lived east of the Oder-Neisse Line became part of the diminished German lands and later of the four occupation zones that emerged as the two Cold War German states.<sup>40</sup> The Soviet Union also displaced 1.5 million ethnic Poles from the lands east of the Curzon Line westward. The cities of Lviv/Lwów, Vilnius/Wilno, and Hrodna/Grodno, which had been centers of Polish cultural life, now belonged to the Soviet republics of Ukraine, Lithuania, and Belarus. In 1946, after Nazi Germany's defeat, the communist Polish People's Republic followed.

## The Participants—An Overview and Background

The lay Catholic Poles who worked toward reconciliation were born in the 1910s and 1920s. During the 1950s and 1960s, when most media was state controlled, they wrote for the semi-independent Catholic journals *Znak*, *Więź*, and *Tygodnik Powszechny*. Several of them were also members of a small Catholic group, the Znak Circle, who held seats in communist leader Władysław Gomułka's reconstituted parliament (the Sejm) after

1956. Leading figures included Stanisław Stomma; Jerzy Turowicz, the editor of *Tygodnik Powszechny*; Stefan Kisielewski, composer and writer for *Tygodnik Powszechny* and for the Parisian exile-journal *Kultura*; historian and Auschwitz survivor Władysław Bartoszewski; *Tygodnik Powszechny* writer Mieczysław Pszon; *Więź* editor Tadeusz Mazowiecki; and Znak Circle member Jerzy Zawieyski, a poet and an old friend of Polish party leader Władysław Gomułka.<sup>41</sup> Between the 1950s and the 1970s, these members of the Catholic intelligentsia and writers for the Catholic journals engaged with West German media personalities and travelers. Members of church hierarchy who supported the lay groups and, to an extent, the West German dialogue included Cardinal Karol Wojtyła of Cracow (later Pope John Paul II) as well as Bolesław Kominek, the archbishop of Wrocław.

In the Federal Republic, the participants belonged to several groups. One group consisted of religious activists. They included the Bensberger Circle in the late 1960s, an interest group of a hundred-some left-wing Catholics who wished to improve Polish–German relations and oppose West German nuclear rearmament.<sup>42</sup> In the Protestant Church, Polish–German activism emerged in the early 1960s among groups of lay Protestants. Over the next few years, groups within the Protestant Church leadership called for a new Eastern Policy and acceptance of the territorial losses in the east.<sup>43</sup> Their activity culminated in 1965 in a famous statement, the Protestant Expellee Memorandum. Under the aegis of the group Aktion Sühnezeichen, a group of East German Protestants also made efforts toward reconciliation through traveling to Poland, visiting concentration camps, and performing service there—demonstrations of penance on behalf of the German nation.

Another group consisted of media personalities, reporters, and journalists working for elite journals and newspapers, such as *Die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Die Zeit*, *Der Spiegel*, and *Stern*, and for the audiovisual media, in particular the Cologne-based Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR) and Hamburg-based Norddeutscher Rundfunk (NDR). The editor of *Die Zeit*, the Countess Marion Dönhoff, the editor of *Stern*, Henri Nannen, and the director general of WDR, Klaus von Bismarck, great nephew of Germany's "Iron Chancellor" Otto von Bismarck and former Wehrmacht officer and Prussian landowner, provided some of the structural frameworks for writing and broadcasting on Polish–German relations. This group, beyond merely reporting on developments, made concerted efforts to establish connections in Poland with communists and noncommunists, and to reform the image of Poland in West German public space.<sup>44</sup>

Many of those involved in Polish–German relations came from an international, borderlands, or bilingual background. They had received their education in multiple countries, and their upbringing in multicultural re-

gions and contexts influenced them through coexisting and competing regional, national, and supranational loyalties. Several of the contributors to *Tygodnik Powszechny* originally came from the Polish-Lithuanian borderlands and had attended gymnasium and university in Wilno, as the city of Vilnius was named in Polish at the time. The Lithuanian Poles' national identities and historical experiences, particularly during the First and Second World Wars, differed from other Poles.<sup>45</sup> Vilnius/Wilno was particularly diverse before the Second World War, consisting of equal numbers of Poles and Jews, as well as Russians, Belarussians, Lithuanians, Germans, and others.<sup>46</sup>

During the interwar era, these groups also spent extended times abroad. Stomma and Kisielewski lived at times in France in the late 1930s.<sup>47</sup> Jerzy Zawieyski lived in France between 1929 and 1933.<sup>48</sup> Jerzy Turowicz studied Maritain's texts, spoke fluent French, and was engaged through the university and through Catholic organizations in international congresses that took him to Vienna as well as Luxembourg.<sup>49</sup> Bishop Kominek studied at German schools in his youth, which enabled him to cultivate German connections then and later.<sup>50</sup> Both Stomma and Bishop Kominek spoke fluent German from childhood, facilitating their participation in Polish-German relations. Similarly, among German participants, Bensberger Circle member Winfried Lipscher spoke fluent Polish. He came from a German-speaking home but went to Polish gymnasium in the early postwar era before leaving for the Federal Republic.<sup>51</sup>

Many Germans involved in Polish-German relations and West German media concerned with Poland came from the eastern borderlands that the Allies transferred to Poland in 1945. They originated from Prussia, Silesia, Pomerania, Masuria, and from some of the cities that formerly had a German population, prominently Breslau/Wrocław. In these borderlands, particularly Silesia, religious or regional affiliations had competed with and sometimes superseded national ones.<sup>52</sup> Those with a borderlands background also included Catholic activists connected to the 1960s group that published the Bensberger Memorandum on Polish-German relations and some of the early correspondents working for West German audiovisual media in Poland.

East Prussian Marion Dönhoff and Pomeranian Klaus von Bismarck were members of the Prussian landed aristocracy. They were brought up into a sense of their own centrality as bureaucrats, responsible citizens, soldiers, and leaders. They lost their estates and positions but retained the understanding of themselves as national leaders by natural right and duty even as the nation had to be reconstituted along new, civilian lines. Their childhoods in Prussia in an area with a mixed ethnic population did not offset or weaken their national loyalties, but it did complicate them.

Their class had been integral to Prussia's state-building project since the eighteenth century, and they transferred their loyalty to the postwar West German state as well. However, they also had roots in a pan-European imperial nobility predating the nation-states in Central Europe.<sup>53</sup>

Germans involved in reconciliation also shared the experience of living extensively abroad. Television reporter and documentary maker Jürgen Neven-du Mont belonged to a prominent family associated with publishing house M. DuMont Schauberg in Cologne and Munich. His father was an artist in Munich. His family had branches in the Netherlands, England, and Italy as well as in Germany. Neven-du Mont was bilingual from his childhood schooling in Italy and felt comfortable in multiple countries. Warsaw correspondent for West German radio Ludwig Zimmerer, who became West German radio's earliest and most famous Warsaw correspondent during the Cold War, was born in 1924 in Augsburg. He finished gymnasium in December 1945, then entered the army but never actually saw battle. After Germany's surrender, he became a prisoner of war in France. With an ear for foreign languages, he quickly acquired a high degree of fluency in French. Eastern Europe expert commentator and journalist Hansjakob Stehle was born in 1927 in Ulm, where he finished primary school and gymnasium, but he was partially educated in Italy, spoke Italian, and later learned passable Polish. Overall, the biographies of these individuals speak to the entanglements of prewar European networks and lives.

After the war, in the absence of official diplomatic relations, these Polish and German Catholic organizations, networks, and media had to rely on preexisting connections to revive contacts across borders. The churches in Poland and Germany in the postwar era frequently reinforced ethnonational states, and nationalizing state missions, yet smaller groups within these institutions played key roles in reconciliation.<sup>54</sup> A majority of the participants in the dialogue were connected to such religious networks, and the Catholic and Protestant Churches played prominent roles in their lives and identities. In Poland, the postwar Catholic media, particularly *Tygodnik Powszechny*, was constituted around liberal Polish networks and intellectual schools of thought from the interwar era, particularly the Catholic interwar youth movement *Odrodzenie* (Rebirth).<sup>55</sup> Jerzy Turowicz and Stanisław Stomma met through *Odrodzenie* during the interwar era and continued their postwar collaboration in publishing *Tygodnik Powszechny*. The Catholic Church had cultural centers and meeting points, prominently Rome, that facilitated meetings and dialogues between Poles and Germans. As we will see, international Catholic media connections and the Second Vatican Council, 1962–65, would play a role in laying the foundation for new dialogue.<sup>56</sup> While functioning as political commentators, Ludwig Zimmerer and Hansjakob Stehle became engaged with

Polish–German questions specifically because of their interest in the Polish Catholic Church’s relationship with the communist state. In West Germany, lay groups within both the Protestant and the Catholic Churches spearheaded powerful initiatives toward dialogue.

## Legacies and Lessons from the Prewar Era

Fluidity, fragmentation, and change characterized Central European states in the first half of the twentieth century. In 1919, Poland had six currencies, three legal codes, and four languages of command in the army.<sup>57</sup> Many of the Polish Catholic intellectuals who became advocates for reconciliation were engaged in the strengthening and preservation of the newly founded Polish Second Republic in the interwar era. They sought to unify and modernize the republic while protecting its position in Europe and defining what it meant to be Polish in a post–Treaty of Versailles world. These conversations went beyond divisions in civic and ethnic nationalisms and were further complicated by ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity as well as the looser connection between the new state and the nation.<sup>58</sup> In terms of national belonging, more open-ended federal state models based on the old *Rzeczpospolita* and associated with the ideas of Marshal Józef Piłsudski competed with rigid ethnoreligious “*Polak-Katolik*” notions.<sup>59</sup> The differences also concerned Polish foreign policy. Roman Dmowski, Piłsudski’s great rival, and leader of the *Endecja*, always considered Germans and Jews the greatest dangers to Polish sovereignty, whereas Piłsudski was more concerned with the Soviet threat. The Poles in Wilno/Vilnius, including Stomma, were generally in favor of the Piłsudskian ideals of Polishness and primarily concerned with the Soviet Union.<sup>60</sup> Jerzy Turowicz, in Cracow, also supported Piłsudski. His wife Anna was a niece of the famous general.<sup>61</sup>

Stefan Kisielewski, on the other hand, opposed Piłsudski and criticized from a left-wing perspective his ideas about a multinational state as well as Piłsudski’s later coup d’état in Poland.<sup>62</sup> The members of *Odrodzenie* also sympathized to some extent with the political left but ultimately distanced themselves from the socialists. Stomma recalled in his memoirs, “The break with the Left was not easy, fundamentally or personally.”<sup>63</sup> He stated that he shared with the left an awareness of social injustice and also felt closer to them in terms of the nationalities question. Stomma’s reference to “personal” difficulty alludes to his resulting conflict with a friend who took a more radical left-wing turn.

Dmowskian ideas played a powerful role in interwar Poland and would carry over to influence postwar politics, including those of the Pol-

ish Catholic intelligentsia. In the prewar era, one of the activists furthest to the right was Mieczysław Pszon, who later wrote for *Tygodnik Powszechny* and became an important contact for East German Aktion Sühnezeichen. Pszon belonged to the far-right (anti-Semitic) spectrum of Polish politics in his youth. He later justified his position, describing himself as a conservative who believed in democracy but who had chosen to support the authoritarian nationalists, the Endecja, over the socialists because he saw them as his best option after democracy failed in Poland.<sup>64</sup> Bolesław Piasecki (1915–79), once the leader of the more extreme, deeply anti-Semitic and proto-fascist interwar movement *Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny-Falanga* (National-Radical Camp, ONR), founded the Catholic PAX movement after reinventing himself as a communist in 1945. Through PAX, he combined prewar right-wing ideals of ethnic nationalism and anti-Semitism with Catholicism and loyalty to the communist state. A number of members of the Catholic intelligentsia, for example *Więź* editor Tadeusz Mazowiecki, initially joined PAX, only to leave it later on to join other groups.<sup>65</sup>

Among the German advocates for reconciliation, only a few were old enough to be politically active in the interwar era. Walter Dirks, initiator of the Bensberger Circle, was a well-known Catholic socialist and radio personality already in the 1920s. He came from a working- or lower-middle-class background, completed his Abitur in 1920 and began to study theology at the university. His older brother died in combat in the German reoccupation of the Ruhr in 1923. Anchored in multiple civil-society organizations in Weimar Germany from a young age, he had been part of the youth movement *Wandervogel* (the wandering birds) and a leading member of another youth movement, *Quickborn*. These organizations were characterized by “pathos for truth and striving for authenticity in pulling bourgeois youth out of the bourgeois world,” and such engagement carried over into Dirks’s later societal engagement as well.<sup>66</sup> As he grew older, Dirks became engaged with the peace movement. He was the editor of left-wing Catholic *Rheinmainischen Volkszeitung* from 1924. During the Nazi era, Dirks went into internal emigration.<sup>67</sup>

Klaus von Bismarck and Marion Countess Dönhoff were conservative centrists during the interwar era. Neither supported the National Socialists. In his memoirs *Aufbruch aus Pommern*, published in 1996, von Bismarck described himself as having been politically very naive at that time. He had made typical choices of someone from his background, studying agrarian science to be able to assist his widowed mother in managing the family estate and joining the army in 1934.<sup>68</sup> He described himself as apolitical but bound by a duty to the nation, incidentally a common refrain of other officers taking part in the invasion on the eastern front.<sup>69</sup>

Why would a former landowner and officer from the Junker class become a spokesman for reconciliation with Poland? Von Bismarck attempted in his memoirs to trace in his prewar background the reasons that he later came to deviate politically from his compatriots. In part, he credited his political choices to his father who he recalled as a nonconformist, although his brother Philipp, later a prominent expellee politician, disagreed.<sup>70</sup> Although von Bismarck grew up in largely Polish-speaking Pomerania, he did not know many Poles personally.<sup>71</sup> As we will see later, von Bismarck's true engagement seemed to have grown from his religious beliefs, war experiences and his experiences with displacement and loss following the war.

As for participants in the groups from West German print and audiovisual media, they benefitted from what Helmut Kohl once called "the blessings of a late birth," and most were not directly politically involved with either support or resistance to the National Socialists in interwar Germany or the early days of the Third Reich.<sup>72</sup> They traced their earliest memories to the 1930s and the early Nazi era. They came of age, began school, and became highly indoctrinated into the Third Reich but were too young to vote or become party members and were only drafted in the end stages of the war, if at all. As young *Flakhelfer*, some of them participated in the final defense of Germany and later struggled to survive during the first harsh postwar winters in the German occupation zones.<sup>73</sup> They shared in the deep shock and full disillusionment in the Nazi state. The fall of Nazi Germany created in them a deep distrust of propaganda and ideology. They have been called the "skeptical generation."<sup>74</sup> This younger group would rise quickly into prominent positions in the West German media because an older generation of journalists had been decimated in the war or, in some cases, were professionally compromised by working for the Nazi press. From these positions, they became able to create substantial media platforms for the promotion of Poland, Polish–German relations, and reconciliation. Their skepticism toward traditional forms of patriotism and national pride also later colored Polish–German relations and their expressions in the media during the postwar era.

## Chapter Breakdown

This book is organized into seven chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 show the motivations behind and practical approaches to peace-building outside of official and state efforts in Polish–German relations. They illustrate the significance of networking and travels in establishing cross-border cooperation in a politically unsupportive climate, and in renegotiating personal and public memories of the past within a mutually acceptable framework.

Chapter 1, “Unexpected Meetings and New Beginnings: Inspirations, Transformations, and Opportunities, 1939–58,” describes the war and immediate postwar experiences of participants, outlining how these contributed to their ability and willingness to engage with postwar Polish–German relations and how they shaped participants’ political views in profound ways. Chapter 1 also describes the way in which the 1956 Polish October became a turning point in Polish–West German relations.

Chapter 2, “Victims, Heroes, and Dark Reflections: Polish Travelers, West German Journalists, and the New Relations, 1958–64,” expands on the role of face-to-face interactions between West German journalists and correspondents and Polish Catholic publishers and intelligentsia in establishing relations. Drawing on their Polish contacts, these journalists modified the prevailing West German anticommunist stereotypes of Poland and offset dominant memories of German victimization during the Second World War while striving to reinforce postwar national boundaries. The chapter also shows how understandings of postwar Poland’s need for internal stability and the necessity of reforming communism from the inside informed West German media coverage.

Chapter 3, “Radio Relations: Klaus von Bismarck, Poland, and the Audiovisual Media Institutes,” and chapter 4, “Televising the Territorial Conflict: Documentary Portrayals of the Polish–German Relations,” describe work in audiovisual media to further disseminate and shape new understandings of Polish–German relations. Public controversies about the expellee question, the Oder-Neisse Line, and Polish–German relations as they played out in audiovisual media functioned as catalysts for reformulating German historical self-perceptions. In addition, the format of radio and television contributed to the nationalizing aspects of the reconciliation narrative, often to the exclusion or marginalization of problematic minority perspectives and voices.

Chapter 5, “Of Forgiving and Forgetting: The Religious Memoranda and the Media, 1961–68,” shows the interconnectedness between media and religious reconciliatory statements and memoranda in Polish–German relations. The documents in this dialogue included the Polish bishops’ letter of reconciliation to the German Catholic bishops and the Protestant Expellee Memorandum in 1965.<sup>75</sup> Again, the chapter indicates the trend of retrenching postwar national identities further as reconciliation messages were disseminated through media channels and public controversies to broader layers of the population in both societies.

Chapter 6, “Brandt-ing Reconciliation: Politics, Media and New Relations, 1968–72” shows the effects of political lobbying on reconciliation connected to the West German Ostpolitik’s effect. The chapter also incorporates a larger context of simultaneous Polish–German–Jewish relations



as it related to Polish–German relations, memories of the Second World War, and to participants’ engagement with the anti-Zionist campaign by the Gomułka government in 1968. The chapter shows that the efforts to salvage Ostpolitik despite the 1968 purge and the Prague Spring’s ending in some ways hampered reconciliation.

Finally, chapter 7, “Remembering and Rewriting Reconciliation: The 1990s,” discusses how politicians, civil-society institutions, and the activists themselves remembered, complicated, celebrated, and rewrote the 1960s and 1970s reconciliation project in the early 1990s. The chapter explores the purposes of the reconciliation narrative in the 1990s political landscape, particularly with regards to Poland’s ambition to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union, and the reunited Germany’s ambition to support this project while simultaneously furthering European integration.

Today, Polish–German relations are troubled. The current Polish government is hesitant to support or improve the relationship with Germany and has actively attempted to revive older anti-German sentiments in the population—for example, through the demand for reparations for war damages—for political purposes.<sup>76</sup> It may seem that postwar peace and good relations in Europe were just an illusion or a short-lived experiment. The conversations described here created openings and connections and established common ground for a dialogue, but they also suppressed problematic topics in relations and excluded segments of the German and Polish societies from the conversation, potentially creating divisions and a sense of alienation that could later be used politically to undermine European cooperation and stability.

What then is left of the reconciliation efforts, and what lessons can we take from the developments in the postwar era? First, models of peace-building need to extend beyond state relations into broader layers of societies and into multiple groups within those societies. In attempting to construct durable peace, activists and politicians must count on the possibility that the state with whom they are engaging may not survive long term. Secondly, today as much as in the early postwar era, we need groups and networks of moderates and patient peace-builders engaged in dialogue on our political scenes, domestically and internationally. In Poland a new generation of politicians has at times accused the groups of moderates who built postwar relations of being German lackeys.<sup>77</sup> National paradigms and the defense of national frameworks continue to exist uneasily with multinational or transnational individuals or trends in European history. Nevertheless, such trends and individuals play central roles in troubled relations by forging connections or finding common ground when states are in transition or official relations are locked. The

main characters of this analysis had weaknesses and blind spots, and they made mistakes. Their tasks were often difficult and tedious and certainly lacked the glamour of the resistance of 1989, or of those national heroes of old. However, they were to an equal extent patriots and protectors of their country's national interests. Within their understanding of what peace and stability meant and required, they worked actively and sometimes at great personal cost to create a durable peace in Europe.

## Notes

1. Stanisław Stomma, interview by author, 7 October 2004.
2. Connections between occupying soldiers and women, often in vulnerable positions, occur frequently during wartime. See several of the essays on gender and occupation in Nancy M. Wingfield and Maria Bucur, eds., *Gender and War in Twentieth Century Eastern Europe* (Bloomington, IN, 2006). See for example Lulu Anne Hansen, "'Youth off the Rails': Teenage Girls and German Soldiers—A Case Study in Denmark 1940–1945," in *Brutality and Desire: War and Sexuality in Europe's 20th Century*, ed. Dagmar Herzog (London, 2009), 135–67.
3. Wolfgang Pailer, *Stanisław Stomma: Nestor der polnisch-deutschen Aussöhnung* (Bonn, 1995), 26. These mainstream Polish memories of the Second World War, cultivated by veteran's organizations, the communist state, and media, are analyzed and outlined in Joanna Wawrzyniak, *Veterans, Victims, and Memory: The Politics of the Second World War in Communist Poland* (Frankfurt/Main, 2015), 25, 95 and throughout the text.
4. See Christoph-Mathias Brandt, *Souveränität für Deutschland: Grundlagen, Entstehungsgeschichte und Bedeutung des Zwei-plus-Vier-Vertrages vom 12. September 1990* (Cologne, 1993).
5. Rogers Brubaker, "Migrations of Ethnic Unmixing in the 'new Europe,'" *International Migration Review* 32, no. 4 (1998): 1047–65.
6. Aspects of Benedict Anderson's famous notion of the imagined nation can be applied in many ways to Polish–German relations, the necessity of reimagining the two nations, the construction of a communicative space, and the close association of nation-building with modernity. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1983).
7. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Mieczysław Tomala, eds., *Bonn-Warschau 1945–1990: Analyse und Dokumentation* (Cologne, 1992); Mieczysław Tomala, *Patrząc na Niemcy: Od wrogości do porozumienia 1945–1991* (Warsaw, 1997); Anna Wolff-Powęska, ed., *Polacy wobec Niemców: Z dziejów kultury politycznej Polski 1945–1989* (Poznań, 1993). For a discussion of political uses of the concept of Polish–German reconciliation, see Klaus Bachmann, "Die Versöhnung muss von Polen ausgehen," in *Erinnerungskultur und Versöhnungskitsch*, ed. Hans Henning Hahn, Heidi Hein-Kirchner, and Anna Kochanowska-Nieborak (Munich, 2008), 17–20.
8. Melissa Feinberg, *Curtain of Lies: The Battle over Truth in Stalinist Eastern Europe* (Oxford, 2017), 45–56.
9. Sheldon B. Anderson, *A Cold War in the Soviet Bloc: Polish–German Relations, 1945–1962* (Boulder, 2001). See also David Tomkins, *Composing the Party Line: Music and Politics in Early Cold War Poland* (West Lafayette, IN, 2013).

10. It should be noted that in the late 1970s and 1980s, the East German dissidents had connections with and sometimes modeled themselves on the Polish opposition. See for example Christhardt Henschel, "Aus der Geschichte lernen? Zweiter Weltkrieg, Widerstand und der Oppositionsbewegungen in der DDR und der Volksrepublik Polen," in *Gegengeschichte: Zweiter Weltkrieg und Holocaust im ostmitteleuropäischen Dissens* (Leipzig, 2015), 57–78.
11. Michael Meng, *Shattered Spaces: Encountering Jewish Ruins in Postwar Poland and Germany* (Cambridge, MA, 2011), 28.
12. For examples of such scholarship, see Bruno Charbonneau and Genevieve Parent, eds., *Peacebuilding, Memory, and Reconciliation: Bridging Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches* (New York, 2012); Siri Gloppen, Elin Skaar, and Astri Suhrke, eds., *Roads to Reconciliation* (Lanham, MD, 2005); Yanan He, *The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II* (Cambridge, 2009); Birgit Schwelling, ed., *Reconciliation, Civil Society, and the Politics of Memory* (Bielefeld, 2012).
13. Mark Gibney et al., eds., *The Age of Apology: Facing Up to the Past* (Philadelphia, 2009); Colleen Murphy, *A Moral Theory of Political Reconciliation* (Cambridge, 2012).
14. Helmut Hild, "Was hat die Denkschrift der EKD bewirkt?" in *Feinde werden Freunde: Von den Schwierigkeiten der deutsch-polnischen Nachbarschaft*, ed. Friedbert Pflüger and Winfried Lipscher (Bonn, 1993), 90–102. Helmut Hild, 1921–99, was the former president of the Protestant Church in Germany at the time that *Feinde werden Freunde* was published. He led a delegation from the EKD to Poland in 1973, received an honorary doctorate at the Christian Theological Academy in Warsaw in 1974, and was active in the contacts between the German Protestant Church and the Polish Ecumenical Council. Also Robert Żurek and Basil Kerski, "Der Briefwechsel zwischen den polnischen und deutschen Bischöfen von 1965: Entstehungsgeschichte, historischer Kontext und unmittelbare Wirkung," in *Wir vergeben und bitten um Vergebung: Der Briefwechsel der polnischen und deutschen Bischöfe von 1965 und seine Wirkung*, ed. Basil Kerski, Thomas Kycia, and Robert Żurek (Osnabrück, 2006), 8.
15. Hans Henning Hahn, Heidi Hein-Kirchner, and Anna Kochanowska-Nieborak, "Einleitung: Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Erinnerungskultur, Versöhnung und Versöhnungskitsch," in Hahn, Hein-Kirchner, and Kochanowska-Nieborak, *Erinnerungskultur und Versöhnungskitsch*, 6; Piotr Kosicki, "Caritas across the Iron Curtain: Polish-German Reconciliation and the Bishops' Letter of 1965," *East European Politics and Society* 23, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 217–18.
16. Richard von Weizsäcker, "Rede beim Staatsbesuch des Präsidenten der Republik Polen am 30.3.1992," in Pflüger and Lipscher, *Feinde werden Freunde*, 289–93.
17. David Ost, *Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics: Opposition and Reform in Poland since 1968* (Philadelphia, 1990), 19–21. For a discussion of the developments of the term in long-term European politics and history, see Jürgen Kocka, "Zivilgesellschaft als historisches Problem und Versprechen," in *Europäische Zivilgesellschaft in Ost und West. Begriff, Geschichte, Chancen*, ed. Manfred Hildermeier, Jürgen Kocka, and Christoph Conrad (New York, 2000), 13–40.
18. Ost, *Solidarity*, 23.
19. For particular examples see Jacobsen and Tomala, eds., *Bonn-Warschau*; Pflüger and Winfried, eds., *Feinde werden Freunde*; Pailer, *Stanisław Stomma*; Tomala, *Patrząc na Niemcy*; Eva Rommerskirchen, ed., *Deutsche und Polen: Annäherungen — Zbliżenia, 1945–1995* (Düsseldorf, 1996); Wojciech Pięciak, ed., *Polacy i Niemcy pół wieku później: Księga pamiątkowa dla Mieczysława Pszona* (Cracow, 1996); Ekkehard Buchhofer and Bronisław Kortuś, eds., *Polska i Niemcy: Geografia sąsiedztwa w nowej Europie* (Cracow, 1995); Wolff-Powęska, ed., *Polacy wobec Niemców*.

20. Brian Porter-Szücs, *Faith and Fatherland: Catholicism, Modernity and Poland* (Oxford, 2011); Kosicki, "Caritas across the Iron Curtain"; and also Karina Paulina Marczuk, "The Origins of the Polish–German Reconciliation, 1965–1966," *Arhivele Totalitarismului* 1–2 (2017): 171–80.
21. Klaus Bachmann, "Die Versöhnung muss von Polen ausgehen," *Taz*, 5 August 1994.
22. For discussion of the political dimensions of Germany developing a policy of reconciliation, see Lily Gardner Feldman, *Germany's Foreign Policy of Reconciliation: From Enmity to Amity* (Lanham, MD, 2012).
23. Stefan Ludwig Hoffmann, Sandrine Kott, Peter Romijn, and Oliver Wieworka, "Introduction," in *Seeking Peace in the Wake of War: Europe 1942–1947*, ed. Stefan Ludwig Hoffmann, Sandrine Kott, Peter Romijn, and Oliver Wieworka (Amsterdam, 2015), 17.
24. Robert Traba makes the point that it is difficult to define a firm identity of an individual. I agree, particularly given the constant shifts and fluctuations in one's self-perception with regards to region and nations. Robert Traba, "'Region,' 'Regionalismus,' 'Identität,' 'Identifikation': Bemerkungen zur Begrifflichkeit und ihrer wissenschaftlichen Rezeption nach 1989," in *Region, Staat, Europa: Regionale Identitäten von Diktatur und Demokratie in Mittel- und Osteuropa*, ed. Burkhard Olschowsky et al. (Munich, 2014), 36.
25. Siri Gloppen, Elin Skaar, and Astri Suhrke, "Introduction," *Roads to Reconciliation*, 4; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.
26. William J. Long and Peter Brecke, *War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution* (Boston, 2005), 23.
27. The notion of *histoire croisée*, a reaction to comparative history, which was still trapped in the paradigm of the nation, was developed by Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmerman. See for example Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmerman, "Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity," *History and Theory* 45, no. 1 (February 2006): 30–50. For the Polish–German case, see for example Philipp Ther, "Comparisons, Cultural Transfers and the Study of Networks: Towards a Transnational History of Europe," in *Comparative and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and New Perspectives*, ed. Heinz-Gerhardt Haupt and Jürgen Kocka (New York, 2009).
28. For discussions of such alternative identities in prewar Central European borderlands, see James Bjork, *Neither German nor Pole: Catholicism and National Indifference in a Central European Borderland* (Ann Arbor, 2008); Mark Tilse, *Transnationalism in the Prussian East: From National Conflict to Synthesis, 1871–1914* (New York, 2011); Pieter Judson, *Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria* (Cambridge, MA, 2007).
29. Philip Nord, "Conclusion," in Hoffman et al., *Seeking Peace*, 322.
30. Yanan He uses the case study in this fashion. He, *Search for Reconciliation*. See also older texts, such as Gregory Baum and Harold Wells, eds., *Reconciliation of Peoples: Challenge to the Churches* (New York, 1997) or Long and Brecke, *War and Reconciliation*, 96–100.
31. Among the groups neglected by the narrative of reconciliation were the German expellees from Eastern Europe, the Jewish emigrants and survivors, and other minorities that left or were forced to leave postwar East European nations. A lot of high quality scholarship now exists on these groups; to mention a few works, Andrew Demshuk, *The Lost German East: Forced Migration and the Politics of Memory, 1945–1970* (Cambridge, 2012); Christian Lotz, *Die Deutung des Verlustes: Erinnerungspolitische Kontroversen im geteilten Deutschland um Flucht, Vertreibung und die Ostgebiete, 1945–1970* (Cologne, 2007); or, Monika Adamczyk-Garbowska and Feliks Tych, eds., *Jewish Presence in Absence: The Aftermath of the Holocaust in Poland, 1944–2010* (Jerusalem, 2014).
32. He, *Search for Reconciliation*, 2.
33. Long and Brecke, *War and Reconciliation*, 18.

34. *Ibid.*, 22.
35. He, *Search for Reconciliation*, 2.
36. *Ibid.*, 4.
37. Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999* (New Haven, CT, 2003); Tomasz Kamusella, *Silesia and Central European Nationalisms: The Emergence of Ethnic Groups in Prussian Silesia and Austrian Silesia 1848–1918* (Purdue, 2006).
38. See Philipp Ther, “A Century of Forced Migration: The Origins and Consequences of ‘Ethnic Cleansing,’” in *Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East Central Europe 1944–1948*, ed. Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak (New York, 2001), 50; Marcin Zaremba, “The ‘War Syndrome’: World War II and Polish Society” in Hoffman et al., *Seeking Peace*, 30.
39. The Curzon Line took its name from a British official from the First World War era, George Curzon. It was an envisioned borderline between Poland and the Soviet Union that became a reality after 1945.
40. A growing literature explores the Polonization of Poland in the 1940s and 1950s: Gregor Thum’s *Die fremde Stadt – Breslau 1945* (Munich, 2003); David Curp’s *A Clean Sweep? The Politics of Ethnic Cleansing in Western Poland, 1945–1960* (Rochester, NY, 2006). A recent article situating the responsibility for the ethnic cleansing and Polonization of the borderlands with the communist rulers is Hugo Service, “Reinterpreting the Expulsion of Germans from Poland, 1945–9,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 27, no. 3 (July 2012): 528–50.
41. Hansjakob Stehle, “Vorwort,” in Stefan Kisielewski, *An dieser Stelle Europas* (Munich, 1964), 12. For descriptions of the Znak Circle, see, among others, Andrzej Friszke, *Opozycja polityczna w Polska 1945–1980* (Warsaw, 1994), and Christina Manetti, “Sign of the Times: The Znak Circle and Catholic Intellectual Engagement in Communist Poland, 1945–1976” (PhD diss., University of Washington, 1998).
42. See for example Friedhelm Boll, “Der Bensberger Kreis und sein Polenmemorandum (1968): Vom Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzil zur Unterstützung sozial-liberaler Entspannungspolitik,” in *Versöhnung und Politik: Polnisch-deutsche Versöhnungsinitiativen der 1960er Jahren und die Entspannungspolitik*, ed. Friedhelm Boll et al. (Bonn, 2009), 77–117.
43. For cultural changes in the Protestant Church, see Benjamin Pearson, “Faith and Democracy: Political Transformations at the German Protestant Kirchentag, 1945–1969” (Diss., University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill, 2007). See also Klaus Fitschen et al., eds., *Die Politisierung des Protestantismus: Entwicklungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland während der 1960er und 70er Jahre* (Göttingen, 2011), and Nicolai Hannig, *Die Religion der Öffentlichkeit: Medien, Religion und Kirche in der Bundesrepublik 1945–1980* (Göttingen, 2010), and for changes in the Protestant Church directly related to its East European relationships, see Martin Greschat, “Vom Tübingen Memorandum (1961) zur Ratifizierung der Ostverträge (1972): Protestantische Beiträge zur Aussöhnung mit Polen,” in Boll et al., *Versöhnung und Politik*, 29–51.
44. Christina von Hodenberg, *Konsens und Krise: Eine Geschichte der westdeutschen Medienöffentlichkeit, 1945–1973* (Göttingen, 2003), 304.
45. Snyder, *Reconstruction of Nations*, 54; Robert Jarocki, *Czterdzieści pięć lat w opozycji (O ludziach, Tygodnika Powszechnego)* (Cracow, 1990), 28, 30.
46. Snyder, *Reconstruction of Nations*, 54.
47. Stomma, *Pościg za nadzieją*, 76, 83.
48. Andrzej Friszke, “Jerzy Zawieyski, szkic portretu,” in Jerzy Zawieyski, *Dzienniki: Tom 1, Wybór z lat 1955–1959* (Warsaw, 2011), 10.
49. Jarocki, *Czterdzieści pięć lat w opozycji*, 19–20.

50. Tomasz Serwatka, *Kardynał Bolesław Kominek (1903–1974): Duszpasterz i polityk, zarys biograficzny* (Wrocław, 2013).
51. Winfried Lipscher, "Rückkehr in die Heimat?" in Pflüger and Lipscher, *Feinde werden Freunde*, 427–32.
52. Bjork, *Neither German nor Pole*; Philipp Ther, "Beyond the Nation: The Relational Basis of a Comparative History of Germany and Europe," *Central European History* 36, no. 1 (March 2003): 45–73; Snyder, *Reconstruction of Nations*; Tilse, *Transnationalism in the Prussian East*; Peter Polak-Springer, *Recovered Territory: A German-Polish Conflict over Land and Culture 1919–1989* (New York, 2015); Beata Halicka, "The Oder-Neisse Line as a Place of Remembrance for Germans and Poles," *Journal of Contemporary History* 41, no. 1 (January 2014): 75–91; Tomasz Kamusella, "The Changing Lattice of Languages, Borders, and Identities in Silesia," in *The Palgrave Handbook of Slavic Languages, Identities and Borders*, ed. Tomasz Kamusella et al. (Basingstoke, 2016), 185–205.
53. Marion Dönhoff, *Kindheit in Ostpreussen* (Berlin, 1988), 8; Klaus von Bismarck, *Aufbruch aus Pommern* (Munich, 1996).
54. Porter-Szücs, *Faith and Fatherland*, and Robert Żurek, *Zwischen Nationalismus und Versöhnung: Die Kirchen und die deutsch-polnische Beziehungen 1945–1956* (Cologne, 2008). See also Piotr Kosicki, "Five—Vatican II and Poland," in *Vatican II behind the Iron Curtain*, ed. Piotr Kosicki (Washington, DC, 2016), 127–98. All three illustrate the tensions between international and nationalizing forces in the German, Polish, and East European Catholic Churches.
55. For a history of this movement, see Konstanty Turowski, "*Odrodzenie*": *historia Stowarzyszenia Katolickiej Młodzieży Akademickiej* (Warszawa, 1987).
56. Kosicki, "Five—Vatican II and Poland."
57. For a discussion of the notions of the nation in interwar Poland, see Paul Brykczynski, *Primed for Violence: Murder, Antisemitism and Democratic Politics in Interwar Poland* (Madison, 2016), or Porter-Szücs, *Faith and Fatherland*, in particular the chapter "Polak-Katolik," 328–59.
58. Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, 1998).
59. For Polish national models, see Snyder, *Reconstruction of Nations*, 55–60. See also the older essay by Andrzej Walicki, *Trzy patriotyzmy: trzy tradycje polskiego patriotyzmu i ich znaczenie współczesne* (Warsaw, 1991). See also Paul Brykczynski, "Reconsidering 'Piłsudskiite Nationalism,'" *Nationalities Papers* 42, no. 5 (2014): 771–90.
60. Specifically on Polish national thought in Vilnius, see Snyder, *Reconstruction of Nations*, 55–57. See also Zbigniew Kurcz, *Mniejszość polska na Wileńszczyźnie: studium socjologiczne* (Wrocław, 2005).
61. Jarocki, *Czterdzieści pięć lat w opozycji*.
62. *Ibid.*, 66.
63. Stomma, *Pościg za nadzieją*, 26–27.
64. Pszon, "Wspomnienia—1915–1945," in *Pięciak, Polacy i Niemcy*, 479.
65. Mikołaj Stanisław Kunicki, *Between the Brown and the Red: Nationalism, Catholicism, and Communism in Twentieth-Century Poland—The Politics of Bolesław Piasecki* (Athens, OH, 2012), 93.
66. Ulrich Bröckling, *Katholische Intellektuelle in der Weimarer Republik: Zeitkritik und Gesellschaftstheorie bei Walter Dirks, Romano Guardini, Carl Schmitt, Ernst Michael und Heinrich Mertens* (Munich, 1993), 38.
67. Ulrich Bröckling, *Walter Dirks: Bibliographie* (Bonn, 1991), and Bröckling, *Katholische Intellektuelle*.
68. Bismarck, *Aufbruch aus Pommern*, 82.

69. Geoffrey P. Megargee, "A Blind Eye and Dirty Hands: The Wehrmacht's Crimes in the East," in *The Germans and the East*, ed. Charles Ingrao and Franz A. J. Szabo (West Lafayette, IN, 2008), 316.
70. Bismarck, *Aufbruch aus Pommern*, 35. For discussion of Pomerania, see Richard Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles: The Germans in Western Poland, 1918–1939* (Lexington, KY, 1993), but also, for an alternative perspective, essays in *Mazowsze, Pomorze, Prusy, Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza nr 7*, ed. Błażej Śliwinski (Gdańsk, 2000). Also, Karlheinz Koppe considered his political choices as a continuation of his father's independence of mind. Koppe, *Dreimal getauft und Mensch geblieben* (Berlin, 2004), 62–63. For a description on the DNVP, see Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles*, 55.
71. Klaus von Bismarck, "Ein evangelischer Christ erfährt Polen," in *Ungewöhnliche Normalisierung: Beziehungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu Polen*, ed. Werner Plum (Bonn, 1984), 133
72. Wulf Kansteiner, *In Pursuit of German Memory: History, Television, and Politics after Auschwitz* (Athens, OH, 2006), 252.
73. *Ibid.*, 356.
74. The concept of a skeptical generation dates from sociologist Helmut Schelsky in his book *Die skeptische Generation: Eine Soziologie der deutschen Jugend* (Cologne, Düsseldorf, 1957). On the emergence of a new journalistic elite in West Germany, see Simone Christine Ehmig, *Generationswechsel im deutschen Journalismus: Zum Einfluss historischer Ereignisse auf das journalistische Selbstverständnis* (Munich, 2000), 52–53. For critical perspectives and an emphasis on long-term continuities as well as in elite networks, see Hodenberg, *Konsens und Krise*, and Christina von Hodenberg, "Die Journalisten und der Aufbruch zur kritischen Öffentlichkeit," in *Wandlungsprozesse in Westdeutschland*, ed. Ulrich Herbert (Göttingen, 2002), 278–314
75. Żurek, *Zwischen Nationalismus and Versöhnung*, or the collected essays in Boll et al., *Versöhnung und Politik*.
76. "Gutachten sieht Deutschland zu Reparationen verpflichtet," *Zeit Online*, 11 September 2017, 4:39 P.M., <http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2017-09/polen-gutachten-reparationen-deutschland-zweiter-weltkrieg>.
77. Anna Wolff-Powęska, "Zur Aktualität von Dialog und Versöhnung im polnisch-deutschen Verhältnis," in Boll et al., *Versöhnung und Politik*, 396.