Introduction

International organizations (IOs) are an essential part of world politics. There would have been no global interconnected community without the work of IOs. They set norms and standards, formulate and implement international law, alleviate suffering, assist failing states, contribute to resolving conflicts, and help ensure food security for millions. One could expand this list to double its length and still not cover all the crucial contributions that IOs make. Yet, they have their detractors. Not only is there criticism of the work they do, questions are also asked about the manner in which they conduct their affairs. For a long time, they invited more criticism than real scrutiny. But, fortunately, the management of IOs has attracted increasing attention since the 1990s. The number of studies that shed light on how they function is growing rapidly, so that empirical attention has become more sustained and theory development has gained pace. This volume brings together many disparate strands of criticism regarding IOs, describes the growing roles of IOs in world politics, and presents an empirical and theoretical overview of their management issues. The contributors to this book rethink the practice and theory of IOs.

The book draws attention to the pathologies and potential therapies that are inherent to the concept of IOs. These organizations operate worldwide on almost all issues imaginable, from peacebuilding to setting technical standards, from promoting literacy to public sanitation. While they influence the lives of many people around the world, these organizations face profound management problems. Some shortcomings persist to such an extent that it is possible to speak about pathologies. Examples
include excessive bureaucracy, slow action, humanitarian action that reignites war, failures to protect refugees, disruption of markets and dependency as byproducts of development cooperation and humanitarian action, as well as dissatisfaction or resistance by governments. Somalia, Afghanistan, and Syria have come to symbolize the most horrible failures of IOs in peacekeeping and diplomacy.

Nevertheless, criticism of IOs sometimes lacks a sound basis, such as when it reflects insufficient knowledge of their actual functioning or is based on narrow, sometimes biased political concerns of particular groups. Some countries oppose outside “interference” within their borders and thus criticize IOs. Or they jockey for position to reap the benefits of IOs’ operations. When they lack control over IOs, states will complain about their “ politicization” (Zürn and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2013), or they will simply use them as scapegoats, as the Trump administration did with the World Health Organization (WHO) during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Generally, the national interests of states or their elites, their alliances, and North-South differences, which are nowadays often reformulated as grievances in populist discourses, determine the degree and nature of the criticism.

This introduction discusses what pathologies and therapies mean in the context of IOs and shows how their numbers have risen. By studying the scholarly attention given to these organizations, it also explains the paradox of fierce criticism and limited understanding of their functioning. In particular, this introduction examines why scholars of IOs have long swum against the mainstream of international relations (IR) research and how this has changed since the end of the Cold War. Next, it indicates the main research themes that will enhance our understanding of IOs. It ends with an overview of the contributions by the authors of this book.

Pathologies and Therapies

Pathology is the science of causes and symptoms of diseases. Of course, a medical concept is not directly applicable to forms of social organization, but we use pathology to describe the situation in which the organization’s dysfunctional management (causes of disease) results in negative outcomes (symptoms of disease). In management terms, diseases would include inefficiency, waste of funds, duplication, overstaffing, slow decision-making processes, patronage, and fraud.

The consequences of these diseases range from outright failure to damage to the public image, a decrease in interest from donors and other
stakeholders, lessening legitimacy, unfulfilled mandates, unresolved societal problems, the set-up or involvement of alternative organizations, and declining organizations (that somehow never really die) (Strange 1998). However, if one attempts to identify the causes of diseases, one should be careful not to blame the patient too fast. Yes, the patient plays a critical role, but what about environmental factors? Can the patient autonomously influence these factors? In other words, to what extent are IOs responsible for the outcomes of their activities? Do other actors also bear responsibility? Traditionally, the state is seen as the main actor in international affairs, which raises the question of how states and IOs interact with each other.

A related problem is that some supposed therapies—curative treatments of disease—do not work well. Reforms of IOs have often shown disappointing or counterproductive results. Simultaneously, addressing the societal problems that these organizations have to confront, varying from climate change to war crimes and gender issues, can be obstructed by a lack of international policy consensus, absence of financial resources and technological tools, or an inability to address them comprehensively due to their being too large or too politicized. To what extent can IOs manage deeply politicized issues? Can they combine political and managerial logics?

Given the questions raised above, the contributors to this book have attempted to identify explanations and actions that offer promise for better therapies of organizational ailments and pathologies. Ultimately, identifying and proposing promising therapies should be based on a better understanding of these organizations, their shortcomings and strengths, as well as their differences. This will also help to identify promising external trends and internal actions that can foster a stronger functioning of these organizations.

**IGOs, NGOs, and Other Distinctions**

Knowing that patients differ can assist in providing better therapies. This is important because the types and definitions of IOs vary widely. Sometimes, the term “international organizations” is used to include multinational corporations, bilateral organizations, multilateral organizations, regional bodies, and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Other times, only United Nations (UN) organizations are covered by this term. While recognizing that some authors who talk about IOs actually limit themselves to intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), most also include international NGOs that often interface and interact with UN
organizations. In fact, IGOs of the UN system and INGOs usually address the same societal issues. IGOs are international public organizations with a public purpose. NGOs are private organizations with a public purpose. And as Reinalda (2009: 5) points out, IGOs and NGOs have coevolved over the last two hundred years. They often operate in networks for policymaking, norm setting, advocacy, implementation, and evaluation. Hence, we prefer to study them together. Still, IGOs and NGOs differ in international legal status, types of activities, membership, financing, mandates, and so on. The number and scope of these different IOs have been increasing, especially since World War II.

NGOs possess different international legitimacy than IGOs, as they do not represent states. The growing roles of NGOs in international relations, their independence of spirit, and their occasionally close or competitive relationships with each other, IGOs, and states make them worthy subjects of study.

IOs carry out advocacy tasks and often function as forums for information exchange and debate (Keck and Sikkink 1998). UN organizations are also set up as arenas to negotiate binding or nonbinding international rules and standards (Dijkzeul 1997: 28). Importantly, over time, many IOs have become operational and now assist actors predominantly in Southern countries, but in the case of human rights or environmental protection, they can in principle be active all over the world. They then provide goods or services in addition to their other tasks (Lindenberg and Bryant 2001: 5). The more operational an IO becomes in different countries, the more management challenges it faces. Obviously, IOs then need to establish themselves outside such IO capitals as New York, Brussels, Geneva, or Nairobi. They need to be accredited by host governments, to become more dependent on donor governments or funding by the general public, and to interact with other IGO and NGOs as well as an array of local actors, which can vary from women’s groups to war criminals and from religious or traditional leaders to multinational companies or intelligence agencies. In addition, most IOs diversify over time. For instance, already in its early years, UNICEF expanded from humanitarian relief to development, and MSF has added HIV/AIDS treatment to its emergency response mandate, even going so far as to wield a campaign to make pharmaceuticals affordable.

Through all their activities, international organizations—both NGOs and IGOs—play both a regulative and a constitutive role in international relations as they “define shared international tasks (like ‘development’), create and define new categories of actors (like ‘refugee’), create new interests for actors (like ‘promoting human rights’), and transfer models of political organization around the world (like markets and democracy)”
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(Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 699). In sum, both IGOs and NGOs have a public purpose: they both address—and often help define—cross-border societal problems. Many of these problems are international collective action problems; states and IOs will at best create suboptimal solutions when they go it alone.

Numbers

Just like states, the first IOs originated in Europe: they were intended to address collective action problems that states alone could not address, such as governing the transport and navigation issues of the Rhine (Archer 1983: 12). Since the late nineteenth century, their numbers have swelled. Most IOs have originated in Northern, industrialized countries, but over the last decades countries from the Global South have been catching up.

International NGOs have always been far more numerous than IGOs, and their numbers have with some temporary setbacks continued to increase rapidly. Their current number is estimated at some ten thousand. The number of IGOs peaked in 1985 at 378 and decreased until 2002 to 232. From 2003 to 2009, the number of IGOs varied between 238 and 247. From 2010 on, the number constantly increased from 241 to 289 in 2020, which marks its highest level in 29 years (Union of International Associations 2020). Although the growing number of IOs is only a rough yardstick to assess their roles in society, as it may be a sign of

fragmentation and coincides with the growing number of organizations worldwide, it is by and large an indicator of their growing roles in world politics.

The next section examines the different ways in which IR scholars have theorized and studied IOs. It will indicate their assessment of the ontological status of IOs by asking to what extent these theories see IOs as autonomous actors that possess agency, especially vis-à-vis states.

International Relations

Despite the almost continuous growth in IO numbers, theoretical and empirical attention to IOs has waxed and waned in IR. In the 1920s, “the study of international organizations … stood at the very beginning of the discipline” (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009a: 15). Until World War II, international institution building dominated international relations “to such an extent that international organization was viewed not so much as a subfield but as practically the core of the discipline” (Rochester 1986: 780; Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986), but most studies were of an applied, legal, or historical nature. In addition, much writing on IOs was claimed to be of an idealist bend. Idealism implied that the functioning of IOs constituted an important contribution to world peace. Marxists, however, did not accord an important role to IOs. They were either tools of capitalist exploitation or irrelevant on the road to communist salvation. In the meantime, realists, such as Carr (2001 [1939]), had already begun to argue that IOs were less important, as states dominated the international system. In line with Hobbes, they attributed states’ conflicts, “egoism and power politics primarily to human nature” (Wendt 1992: 395). Ontologically, they argued, IOs were subordinated to states and possessed little agency. Epistemologically, they were simply not seen as independent variables or interesting units of analysis. As a result, the use of power as an explanatory concept helped set IR apart from legal studies.

From 1945 to 1960, studies of the budding UN system dominated (Rochester 1986: 782–97). However, the empirically penetrating studies of IOs in this period lacked “a theoretical hook on which to hang [their] observations, and without a professionalized critical mass of scholars to develop these insights, many important findings were only rediscovered and advanced more than two decades later” (Martin and Simmons 1998: 732). At this stage, lack of theoretical development constrained the understanding of IOs.

Especially in the 1950s and 1960s, much writing on IOs was of a functionalist nature (Mitrany 1948). This functionalist school argued that the
expanding functional tasks of IOs would over time foster worldwide, peaceful integration: peace by pieces, as it was called. Interestingly, both functionalists and realists perceived organizations as pliable instruments in the hands of their masters, which was organizationally naïve (Brechin 1997: 7, 31). Organization scholars, however, have long noticed that survival and management interests often supplant the intended goals of their founders. The common judgment in IR that IOs—in particular, those of the UN system—lack autonomy conflicts with this observation (see Haas 1990: 29).

Subsequently, regional integration studies from a neofunctionalist perspective, centering mainly on the European Economic Community, began to play a role in the study of IOs in the 1960s. However, as European integration slowed in the 1970s, neofunctionalism lost its shine, especially in the esteem of liberal scholars, who noticed that institutions facilitated cooperation, even in the international system. These scholars shifted attention for the first time to transnational politics and interdependence (Nye and Keohane 1971; Keohane and Nye 1989).

Yet, this first transnational wave turned out to be short lived. First, security studies, often from a realist state-based perspective, played a dominant role in IR during the Cold War. In particular, Waltz argued that anarchy at the international level—defined as the absence of any legitimate authority in the international system (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998: 658)—characterized relationships among states, in particular in the bipolar international system of the Cold War. States had to help themselves in this system to protect their sovereignty and interests, and in many ways the most powerful states called the shots. Hence, IOs were not a solution to anarchy among states and remained “secondary to great power politics” (Oestreich 2011: 163). They simply lacked autonomy. As long as the assumption of anarchy determined international affairs, IOs remained uninteresting units of analysis.

Second, both realism and liberalism became dominated by political economy approaches, and they incorporated rational/public choice and game theory (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998: 646–47). In the process, they were rechristened as neorealism and neoliberalism. Although the rationalist assumptions behind both neothories facilitated parsimonious explanations of international relations, they failed to do sufficient justice to IOs’ rich social and cultural context. Their methodological individualism was hard to generalize to the interplay of different actors from various cultures with different power bases that permeate the actual functioning of IGOs and NGOs. Economic theories frequently explained the origins of IOs better than their actual preferences and behavior (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 699). In response, Ruggie (1998: 855–56) sighed that both schools had simply become neoutilitarian.
Third, scholars from both schools moved toward the study of international regimes in the 1970s and 1980s. These regimes were defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”—a broad type of institution (Krasner 1983: 2).\(^8\) Regime theory drew attention to the conditions under which states would cooperate, for example, to create IOs (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986: 753–55; Krasner 1983). Yet, as regime theory rose in prominence, research on particular IOs declined further, in part because, “treated as parts of international regimes, international organizations were only arenas through which others, mostly states, acted” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: viii). Moreover, regime theory centered on specific issue areas, such as health, whaling (Iliff 2008), or human rights. The interactions among issue areas and the role of IOs in such interactions received less attention. Skewed theory drew attention further away from real IOs.

All in all, IOs were barely seen as actors in their own right. As a result, their internal (dys)functioning, implementation problems, and deviations from their mandate did not receive much attention. Instead, organizations became “black boxes, whose internal workings [were] controlled by traditional bureaucratic mechanisms” without being questioned (de Senarclens 1993: 453). As a consequence, the actual outcomes of IOs’ work could easily be criticized but were hard to explain. In sum, the state-based focus and rationalist approach of both the neorealist and neoliberal schools explained the paradox of a lack of scholarly attention to IOs, despite their growing numbers and scope of activities.

By the same token, there was little or no interaction between IR and management and organization theory. The 1970s saw only a few powerful exceptions. Allison’s (1971) work on decision-making during the Cuban missile crisis showed the explanatory power of an organizational process perspective for international decision-making, but was not focused on IOs. Jervis (1976) used organizational learning in his book on perception and misperception in international politics. Cox and Jacobson (1973, 1977) specifically wrote on decision-making within IOs. Their opening up of the “black boxes” of IOs, however, was overshadowed by the rise of regime theory in IR. A few years later, Jacobson (1979) focused on network theory and interdependence to study the functioning of IOs in networks.

Decision-making in general received considerable attention in other social sciences, in particular in management and organization theory (Simon 1976). Business and public administration theory moved on from decision-making to the study of implementation and later evaluation (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984; Dijkzeul 1997: 57–58). Although many IOs hoisted up evaluation departments, this move to implementation and
evaluation did not make a lasting impact on IR theory. If it had, the agency of IOs would have gained more attention. At the same time, attention to international policy and decision-making bodies in IR continued, so that at least some attention to decision-making theory in IOs was sustained (Reinalda and Verbeek 2004; Fomerand 2017: 9–13).

In the 1980s, several IR scholars noted the lack of attention to both IOs and management theory. Jönsson (1986: 39) wrote, “The relation between organization theory and the study of international organization … has largely been one of mutual neglect.” Two years later, Ness and Brechin (1988: 246) reached a similar conclusion: “The gap between the study of international organizations and the sociology of organizations is deep and persistent.” In retrospect, the 1980s constituted the low point in IR attention to IOs and management and organization theory.

After the Cold War: The 1990s

During the 1990s, this pattern of neglect initially seemed to endure (Smouts 1993: 443; Brechin 1997; Klingebiel 1999). De Senarclens (1993: 453) contended that “the study of IOs has made scarcely any progress over the past few decades.” Haas (1990), with his book on learning and adaptation of IOs, seemed to be the exception that proved the rule.9 Jönsson (1993) also noted the neglect of organization theory and IOs and criticized the actual study of them. First, he noticed a disproportionate attention to UN organizations. Second, he stated that many studies were monographs that treat “international organizations as self-contained units.” In particular, their modus operandi in a heterogeneous and fluid organizational environment received too little attention. Third, he argued that “research on international organizations has by and large been idiographic rather than nomothetic. The weak or altogether lacking theoretical underpinning has ushered in eclecticism and inadequate cumulation of knowledge” (Jönsson 1993: 464).

In 1991, Gallarotti highlighted four destabilizing consequences of managing international problems through IOs. First, when existing issue knowledge and policy tools are inadequate for the complexity of a tightly coupled system, such as G7 management of floating currency exchange rates in the 1980s, simplistic multilateral responses may exacerbate problems and increase instability. Second, by adverse substitution; IOs’ management may alleviate problems in the short run, helping nations avoid costly solutions. However, “doing so can be counterproductive in that it discourages nations from seeking more substantive and longer-term resolutions to their problems,” as happens in some cases of
UN peacekeeping, economic development, and food aid (Gallarotti 1991: 199–204). Third, by dispute intensification; conducting international disputes on the theatrical stages of UN organizations may heighten conflict by encouraging escalating rhetoric, linking irrelevant issues to the conflict, and mobilizing confrontational alliances. Finally, by moral hazard; when IOs insure against risk, it can encourage nations to take foolish and counterproductive risks, as in financing trade deficits (Gallarotti 1991: 199–204; Dijkzeul and DeMars 2011: 209–13).

The implications of Gallarotti’s critique have not yet been fully absorbed by research on IOs. His systematic approach abstracted from the actual functioning of particular IOs, intensifying that blind spot in IR and IO scholarship. When he published his study on the limitations of IOs, the World Bank (1989) had already published its study on development in Africa, mentioning good governance. In essence, this was a normative concept to move IOs away from structural adjustment and push governments to improve the quality of their rule. This concept caught on, and the limitations Gallarotti described were recast as limitations of global governance (e.g., Woods 1999; World Bank 1992).

Whereas most authors mentioned above were bothered by the general lack of attention to IOs as organizations, Ruggie (1993: 6) held a different point of view: “Multilateral formal organizations ... entail no analytical mystery. ... These organizations constitute only a small part of a broader universe of international institutional forms.” And Mearsheimer (1994) warned against the “false promise of international institutions” from a neorealist perspective. He did not discern an independent effect of IOs on state behavior. They had an epiphenomenal ontological status and possessed no autonomy or agency. Moreover, Keohane still asked why some international institutions by which he meant both “the rules that govern elements of world politics and the organizations that help implement rules” succeed and others fail (1998: 82–96). Yet, neither Ruggie and Mearsheimer nor Keohane were studying actual IOs in detail.10

Nevertheless, after the Cold War, neorealists and neoliberal schools began losing support. Many IR scholars felt embarrassed that they had seen neither the fall of the Berlin Wall nor the dissolution of the Soviet empire coming. Their rationalist theories had not equipped them to understand the demise of the communist bloc. They responded with more sociological attention to nonstate actors and IOs and hoped to do more justice to their rich social and cultural context (Finnemore 1993). Drawing a page from the idealist notebook, constructivists particularly studied changing social norms and ideas to explain how governments and other actors construct or change their identities and interests. “Constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international life” (Ruggie
1998: 856). It became the third main IR school, next to neorealism and neoliberalism. It addressed such issues as actor socialization, complex learning, and cognitive framing (Trondal 2013: 164). In this vein, Wendt (1992) argued that “anarchy is what states make of it.” Other constructivists would add that this also held true for nonstate actors. Although the state-based perspective lingered on, constructivists began to look inside organizations to explain their functioning, implementation, and impact.11

Simultaneously, the end of the Cold War and faster globalization—growing transboundary movements leading to greater economic, social, political, and cultural independence among states and their citizens—fostered four related trends in IR’s empirical focus that moved beyond state-centered anarchy.

First, IR scholars began working with broader conceptions of security, such as human security (UNDP 1994). When the “high” politics of bipolar military security dominated the political and research agendas during the Cold War, IR topics such as deterrence, regional integration, and regimes had simply explained a larger part of international life than IOs did. In particular, the UN had often been paralyzed between the superpowers. This also meant that units of analysis other than IOs were more relevant, which in turn influenced research questions and outcomes. However, the end of the Cold War opened up new opportunities for “low” politics in economic and social areas (Weiss and Gordenker 1996: 24). With the deadlock between the superpowers broken, many hoped, even assumed, that a more effective UN would be feasible (Roberts and Kingsbury 1993: 11).12 The problems with peacekeeping in particular, for example in Somalia and Rwanda, soon dashed these hopes. Still, in “low” politics, more was possible than before. Even the United States’ unilateral actions after 9/11 did not paralyze the UN to the extent that the Cold War had. In fact, in this more favorable post–Cold War context, continued pathologies or “broken” promises of IOs should have received even more attention as they pointed to deeper political and organizational problems.

Relatedly, the second trend was that the international system now allowed nonstate actors more leeway. Advances in information technology and transport reinforced this trend. IR scholars examined a whole array of transnational nonstate actors, such as multinational companies, NGOs, advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998), epistemic communities (Haas 1992),13 and social movements, so that a second wave in transnational studies took off. This wave was more sustained than the first one and also had ripple effects in other social sciences. Migration scholars noticed the dynamic and multidirectional nature of current migration and acknowledged the continued homeland ties of migrants and the existence of transnational migrant communities. For example,
nowadays many migrants regularly move between their country of origin and the country of immigration. In response, Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2003) criticized “methodological nationalism” that considers migration as a primarily national challenge and takes for granted “the nation state as container of social life, the sole regulator of mobility and the predominant unit of analysis” (Fauser 2020: 278). In business administration, the transnational company and its management became an important part of the research agenda (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989; Pries 2008). In political science, attention to both domestic and transnational civil society increased. Several different, but comparable, strands of political activity have required acceptance of the concept of civil society in the study of global politics. … Women’s groups increased the density of their transnational connections and the effectiveness of their lobbying in UN policymaking. Human rights groups raised issues that were by definition primarily concerned not with relations between governments but with the claims made by individuals and social groups to their rights to act independently and challenge oppressive behavior by governments. Environmental groups increasingly gave priority to global questions and saw their social movement as linking the local to the global, against governments which gave insufficient attention to either level. Then, the anti-globalization movement arose and promoted an ideology of the common struggle of all humanity for global equity. (Willett 2011: 28)

The NGOs belonging to these movements make up a central part of transnational civil society. At first they received more political than scholarly attention. For those on the right, NGOs were an alternative for bloated governments and bureaucratic IGOs. For those on the left, they were considered closer to the grassroots and could give voice to the poor and oppressed. Yet, neither side was originally able to empirically validate these claims (Dijkzeul 2006).

The third trend was that the number of humanitarian crises rose rapidly after the end of the Cold War due to civil wars and disintegrating or failing states. Several peacekeeping operations were not able to stop the bloodshed. In some cases, they actually contributed to an increase in the level of violence. The same happened with humanitarian action. These security issues mainly wreaked havoc within states and differed considerably from the conflicts among states studied in state-centric and (bipolar) military security studies. The humanitarian and peacekeeping problems were so horrible and glaring that many (case) studies were written about the role of IOs in these situations (e.g., Weiss and Pasic 1997; Whitman 1999). Often, more general literature on crises also highlighted the fail-
ings and counterproductive nature of IOs (de Waal 1997; Maren 1997; Suhrke and Juma 2002; Rieff 2002). In this vein, others began to detail their operational impact (Anderson 1999; Morales-Nieto 1996; Uvin 1998), while a few authors explicitly applied management theory to IOs in conflict situations (Handler Chayes, Chayes, and Raach 1997; Walkup 1997).

The last trend was that governance became a growth market in IR and public and business administration (Finkelstein 1995; Knight 1995; Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Rosenau 1995; Weiss 2013; Young 1994). Arguably, this “represents the culmination of the work on regimes, coupled with work on transnational advocacy networks, epistemic communities, and other transnational actors. [It] has led [to] the emergence of the phenomenon known as ‘global governance.’ In particular, this approach not only adopted a vision of the world as a network of formal and informal international agreements, rules, and institutions, but also includes networks of vertical, horizontal, and diagonal arrangements linking citizens to IOs, provincial governments to foreign states, local NGOs to epistemic communities, multinational corporations and consumer advocates, and so forth” (Stiles and Labonte 2010: 11). Governance theory has the advantage that it relaxes state-centric or government-centered assumptions. It does not see the state as a unitary actor but instead asks how government institutions, private enterprise, and actors from civil society interact. It thus facilitates the observation of multiactor, interactive processes and networks across the different levels of society. However, it does not necessarily generate more attention to the internal functioning of IOs. A greater focus on organizations can help to explain purposive action (and change) better than most regime and global governance theory do (see Robles 1995: 114). In this vein, Reinalda and Verbeek (1998) began to study the degree of autonomy of IOs. They spoke of autonomy “if international policy cannot be explained simply as a compromise between its most important member states” (Reinalda and Verbeek 1998: 3; Egger 2016: 73). Although this definition was still rather state-centric, it allowed for purposive IO action and raised interest to what is happening in IOs.

Together these four trends show that states play important roles, but they are not the central, monolithic actors with given interests of neorealism. In this respect, the elephant in the state-based IR living room is that many weak states do not function as self-interested unitary actors, if they function at all; anarchy within these states is worse than anarchy among states. Neither donor governments nor IGOs and NGOs know how to rebuild failed or weak states. At best, through their protection, humanitarian, development, and peacekeeping work, they provide
an incomplete therapy. Similarly, environmental problems, “protecting the global commons,” cannot be solved at the level of single states. International responses to these problems have varied considerably, but they all show the great diversity within the networks of national government agencies, IGOs, INGOs, and local actors that was insufficiently noticed before.

In the course of the 1990s, however, NGOs became criticized more strongly. They were not the hoped-for magic bullet (Edwards and Hulme 1996). Biekart (1999: 76) writes, “By the late 1990s, [NGOs] were under fire from various sides: from official donors (demanding measurable results and efficiency), from Southern partner organizations (demanding less paternalism and more ’direct funding’ from official donors), from (some) Northern private donors (demanding transparency), and from their own staff which was squeezed between the demands of institutional growth and efficiency (more turnover with less costs at shorter terms) and developmental impact (which had proven to be expensive and rather slow).” Biekart’s description was quite similar to the criticism leveled at UN organizations. The promise that NGOs would do better than UN and other governmental organizations insufficiently materialized. Just like UN organizations, NGOs came under simultaneous attacks by left-wing activists for sustaining or even facilitating inequality and economic exploitation and right-wing pundits for being too progressive or internationalist.

In sum, from the 1960s to the late 1990s, the debate on IOs has been characterized by a continuous lament that more and better study is required. Similarly, organizational and management theories were not used frequently, with the exception of decision-making theory in the 1970s and organizational institutionalism in the 1990s. Nevertheless, attention to IOs in political circles was greater than in IR as a field of research. Ministries have always worked closely with specific UN agencies active in their functional area, such as the Ministry of Labor with ILO and the Ministry of Agriculture with FAO. Diplomats were trained to work with UN organizations and NGOs. Frequently, NGO representatives participated in their national delegation to IGOs and played a role in developing national and international policies. IGOs implemented development and humanitarian projects with the help of NGOs. IGOs and NGOs also took part in international debates, advocacy, and conducted research. And NGOs received more funding from governments and the general public. Simultaneously, the fact that states—or better governments—rarely act as unitary actors and how they differ—from superpower to failed state—was noticed more acutely than before.

The rise in attention to humanitarian crises, civil society, governance, and broader conceptions of security implied that the growing exchange
between actors at the domestic and international levels came into clearer focus. Theoretically, structural explanations that only played at the international level, such as the concept of anarchy, did not suffice anymore to explain world politics, which dovetailed with constructivist criticism that neoliberalism and especially neorealism had failed to foresee the demise of the communist bloc.

As a result, sustained study of IOs reemerged in the 1990s, reflecting that the number and activities of IOs had been growing almost continuously for a long time. This was also manifested in new, regularly updated textbooks and readers on IOs. In the 1970s and 1980s they had been few and far between, mainly Bennett (1977) and Archer (1983), but Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate (1994) and Mingst and Karns (1995) published new textbooks on the UN, and Kratochwil and Mansfield (1994) published their reader on international organization.19

From 2000 On: A Rapid Growth in Attention to IOs

In the first decade of the 2000s, this change in attention to states, IGOs, and NGOs, as well as their interrelations with other actors, was first and foremost reflected in the growing number of publications on different types of IOs. In 2005, Weiss and Wilkinson founded the Global Institutions series, which by now has published more than 150 volumes, many on IOs.20 The international zoo was filled with a much greater fauna, varying from diaspora organizations (Dijkzeul and Fauser 2020a) to rebel groups (O’Neill 2017), and from private and military security companies (Joachim and Schneiker 2017; Abrahamsen and Williams 2011) to faith-based organizations (Sezgin 2017; Barnett and Stein 2012).

In 2004, Karns and Mingst (2004) published the first edition of their textbook on global governance. Readers with an overview of central articles on global governance also began appearing, such as Weiss and Wilkinson (2014). In addition, publishers increasingly issued their own handbooks and research companions, such as the *Oxford Handbook on the United Nations* (Weiss and Daws 2007; 2018), the *Routledge Handbook on International Organizations* (Reinalda 2013b), the *Routledge Handbook of NGOs and International Relations* (Davies 2019), the *Ashgate Research Companion to Non-state Actors* (Reinalda 2011), and the *Palgrave Handbook of Inter-organizational Relations* (Biermann and Koops 2017). Finally, topical journals, such as the *Review of International Organizations* and the *Journal of International Organizations Studies*, were established in 2006 and 2010 respectively. Collectively, growing empirical attention and attempts to summarize the outcomes of the study of IOs drove theory formulation.
Two realist scholars noted the importance of IOs. While studying regulation of the global economy, Drezner (2007) argued that the three most powerful actors are the United States (a state), the European Union (not a state), and what he calls “global civil society” (not a state), which gains its influence by lobbying the United States and European Union to regulate their large markets to match global civil society principles. He notes that the United States and the European Union often seek to instrumentalize or selectively empower both IGOs and NGOs. They “can be used as agents to accomplish their explicit organizational goals; or to create ‘sham standards’ that foster the illusion of effective action; or for some extraneous purpose apart from either success or failure in their explicit goals” (Demars and Dijkzeul 2015: 15). Drezner concentrated on global civil society in a rather undifferentiated manner. In line with neorealists, who perceive states as monolithic actors with given interests, he saw the United States, the European Union, and global civil society as unitary actors with given preferences that are exogenous to their interaction with other actors. In contrast, Bob (2005) opened civil society up in his book *The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, the Media and International Activism*. He saw it as a politicized arena filled with contention and asymmetric power relations. For him, NGOs and other actors in the international arena compete with each other. Still, he did not look into individual NGOs. In different ways, both Drezner and Bob emphasize the power differences among actors and how they determine the outcomes of international policies and activism. In this sense, realism still provides a baseline for further study of IOs; another approach is useful only if it better explains the issue of power than older (neo)realist approaches.

IR scholars continued to use public and rational choice theory to study IOs and their role in international affairs. In the 2000s, they increasingly borrowed principal-agent theory from economics, as it allowed some agency to IOs (Reinalda 2009: 8–9; Hawkins et al. 2006). The premise of this theory is “that an actor (the principal) delegates some authority to a body (the agent) without renouncing this authority. The purpose of the relationship is that the actor will perform certain tasks for the principal” (Reinalda 2009: 8). Independent action by an agent is called agency slack. It can take place as shirking (when an agent minimizes the effort it exerts for the principal) or as slippage (when the agent shifts policy away from its principal’s preferred outcome and toward its own preferences) (Reinalda 2013a: 17). Principal-agent theory showed again how close neorealist and neoliberal scholars still were. Neorealists appreciated that the states were the principals, while neoliberals focused more on the role of IOs in international cooperation. Just as in regime theory, states were usually seen as the dominant actors for promoting international trade,
electoral democracy, and intergovernmental treaties and organizations. “The statist premise—that states are causes, while international institutions are consequences” (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015: 10)—explains why, despite its incorporation of various types of actors, liberal scholars remained state centered until the early 2000s. Still, empirical attention to nonstate actors in such areas as human rights, humanitarian crises, and the environment continued to grow (Oestreich 2011).

Especially constructivist theory fostered attention to IOs. Probably no other book has done more to refocus attention on IOs than Barnett and Finnemore’s *Rules for the World* (2004). The authors distinguished four forms of international organization authority (rational-legal, delegated, moral, and expertise) that influence IO policymaking and applied them to three cases: IMF, UNHCR, and UN peacekeeping during the Rwandan genocide. They smartly operationalized the theme of pathology of IOs. They showed how IMF staff’s “expert authority prompted shifts in its mission in ways that have greatly expanded its ability to regulate domestic economic life and to constitute those very systems that need regulation,” but this expansion resulted not from organizational success but from “persistent failure to stabilize the economies of member states” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 45); how UNHCR’s organizational culture led to the involuntary return of Rohingya refugees to Burma; and how the UN Secretariat’s ideology of impartiality led to the decision not to intervene in the opening weeks of the Rwandan genocide. In sum, the authors argued that IOs can play autonomous roles in world politics, but at the (potential) price of their organizational pathologies.

Yet, one unresolved tension in the study of IOs kept coming back. Principal-agent theory understands the conditions for organizational effectiveness under the premise that effectiveness results from subjecting the organization to strict accountability under its donors (Hawkins et al. 2006). However, organizational sociology takes precisely the opposite tack, proposing that effectiveness is rooted in organizational autonomy from other interests, including from its donors (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). The main underlying question that both groups of authors consciously or inadvertently confronted was the ontological status of IOs: to what extent were they autonomous actors?

As a result of the growing research into IOs, the debate on their ontological status reached a temporary conclusion: IO autonomy is real, but it is a matter of degree and differs over time (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009b: 319). For example, Reinalda analyzed how the ILO evolved from a semiautonomous body (1919–44), through survival (1944–50) to increased autonomy (1950s), continued autonomy (1960s), and then from weakened autonomy (1970s) to finally threatened autonomy (1980s and
1990s). He describes how strong executive leadership and different sub-units with experts, as well as monitoring of labor issues, helped the ILO gain autonomy in the 1950s and 1960s (Reinalda 1998: 48–60). IOs are not just epiphenomena of great power politics or state influence. In this respect, IR theory does not lag any longer behind IO and state practice the way it used to in the second half of the twentieth century. The subsequent question became, what do the IOs do with their differing degrees of autonomy? Or put differently, what is their degree of agency and independence vis-à-vis states and other actors? In principle, it is possible that IOs have autonomy but lack influence (Ege, Bauer, and Wagner 2019: 7). In this respect, questions about their impact, effectiveness, accountability (Hirschmann 2018, 2020), and legitimacy (Tallberg and Zürn 2019) arose.

Moreover, the debate on the actual roles of states in international politics—strong and weak, large and small—intensified. States or anarchy among them are not any longer the ontological starting point to analyze world politics (Koch and Stetter 2013: 5). As a result, the relations between states, IGOs, and NGOs have come up in five different ways, in which IR scholars borrowed once again from other disciplines—organizational sociology for management theory on organizations and their networks, history, and anthropology—in the hope to find better explanations of IO behavior and impact.

The first group of scholars built further on organizational sociology, but they went thematically far beyond decision-making theory and sociological institutionalism and focused on policymaking (Reinalda and Verbeek 1998), implementation (Joachim, Reinalda, and Verbeek 2007), and evaluation (Dijkzeul and Beigbeder 2003). Traditionally, in the UN system the international civil service (see Salomons’s chapter in this volume; Ege and Bauer 2013), secretariats (Trondal 2013), reform (Weiss 2016), and state voting behavior (Voeten 2011) also received considerable attention. Many case studies of individual organizations or their policy areas ensued. Scholars also examined specific actors and their roles within these organizations, such as the UN secretary-generals (Gordenker 2010; Kille 2013) and their special representatives (Fröhlich 2013).

Some of these scholars concentrated more firmly on the inside of IOs. They argued self-consciously that “bureaucracy, not anarchy, is likely to be the defining feature of the international system in the twenty-first century” (Ege and Bauer 2013: 136). In a seminal comparative study, Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009a) and others examined nine permanent secretariats of environmental IOs as organizations, or as they called it with a nod to Max Weber, their “bureaucracies.”21 They found that these secretariats particularly influenced the knowledge and belief systems of
different actors when both the salience of the environmental issue for national decision-makers and the costs for public action and regulation are low. In addition, formal characteristics of the organizations, such as an organization’s mandate and financial and material resources, are less influential than expertise in environmental issues in combination with organizational neutrality, a flexible hierarchy, and strong leadership. Too strong a focus on secretariats, however, can give the impression that secretariats and member states in their governing bodies—both recipient and donor governments—function relatively separated from each other, whereas in daily practice they deeply influence each other. It also can lead to a neglect of the work of field offices.

Crucially, these scholars of IO bureaucracy ask, who is the bearer of agency within IOs? (Ege and Bauer 2013: 143). To answer this question they also need to differentiate between subunits of the IOs and take the politics of the (member) states and other actors, including other IGOs or NGOs, into account. After all, agency—and perhaps multiple forms of agency—may simultaneously play a role in different parts of the IOs: not just in the secretariat but also in the governing bodies or field offices. Later, more advanced studies noted that the agency of IOs often depended on understanding the interplay between external conditions and internal challenges that these organizations face. Knill and his colleagues, for example, identified four management styles—servant, advocate, consolidator, and entrepreneur—in IOs that differed depending on this interplay (Knill et al. 2019). These scholars also noted that although the number of studies on IOs had increased, their outcomes were hard to generalize. In response, Ege, Bauer, and Wagner (2019) made the case for more comparative studies in the hope that these would lead to more generalizable insights. Still, in these studies, it is often not clear how to conceptualize the relationship between organizational management and politics.

A second group repeated a move that Jacobson already made in 1979 (Jacobson 1979). After studying IOs as organizations, they shifted their gaze from individual IOs to the interorganizational relationships or networks in which these operate (Biermann 2008; Biermann and Koops 2017). A few authors, such as Jönnson (1986) and McLaren (1990), had continued in this vein, but by the end of the 1990s scientific attention began to grow more rapidly. While Keck and Sikkink (1998) explained the functioning of transnational advocacy networks, Reinicke (1999) examined global public policy networks in which public and private actors, such as government agencies, NGOs, UN organizations, advocacy groups, and firms, work together to address cross-border collective action problems. Similarly, Slaughter (2005) showed how transgovernmental networks ad-
dress crime, terrorism, or trade. The latter authors generally focused on the positive aspects of international cooperation, but other authors noticed more strongly the hidden agendas, competition, and conflicts among the various “partners” in the networks. “Some ‘partners’ may be hidden in some way [e.g., corrupt government officials, local leaders, or intelligence agencies] or may not share all the values and norms by which network members identify each other” (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015: 5).

Other authors attempted to develop a stronger theoretical perspective on NGOs and their networks (Ohanyan 2009, 2012; Biermann and Koops 2017). Some scholars examined the specific roles that IOs play in networks; Abbott et al. (2015), for instance, showed the conditions under which IOs also orchestrate other actors, including governments. Other scholars went beyond specific actors and noted how cultural and national factors influenced the management of NGOs. Stroup (2012) provocatively argues that national factors such as laws, funding agencies, and political opportunity structures shape NGOs more than transnational influences do. Additionally, Stroup and Wong (2017) found out that NGOs are also shaped by an interorganizational hierarchy among NGOs themselves, in which well-known NGOs, such as Amnesty International, Oxfam, Human Rights Watch, and Care, lead the way for other NGOs. This hierarchy is a rather persistent form of power that deeply influences—even constrains—their authority and autonomy. The slogan of all these scholars could be “networks instead of anarchy.”

Third, the study of global governance moved to the center of IR. It eclipsed the subfield of international organization in looking at processes and structures of world order. Although the actual management and internal functioning of IOs generally still plays a restricted role in these studies, they do show their impact. As IOs assist with formulating constitutions, they actually help to create and empower states (Sripati 2012). Through international law IOs help to establish the rules of the game for their interaction (Romano 2011). The IMF and the World Bank have more economic power than many of the states they are working with. More generally, the conditionalities of their aid deeply influence the functioning of states (Stubbs et al. 2020). Humanitarian and development IOs even keep failing states from falling further apart by providing services that governments cannot or do not want to deliver (Aembe and Dijkzeul 2019). In fact, World Vision International has a higher budget than the national budgets of some the countries it serves. In addition, with support from NGOs, UN organizations “are monitoring and sanctioning states themselves, even powerful ones” (Brechin and Ness 2013: 21). In this respect, Zürn noted that “governance without government [is] a form of governing that takes place on the level beyond the nation state. With this
shift from regime analysis to the concepts of governance without government, the assumption of anarchy was transcended” (Zürn 2018: 262). The central challenge for global governance literature is, once again, to look into the black box of IOs’ internal functioning, to explain cooperation, competition, and conflict among governments and IOs, and then explicate their impact.

The fourth group used historical approaches and has also been vibrant and diverse over the last decade. These authors differ considerably in their opinions about IR theory. Several IR scholars noted that they had used economic and sociological institutional theory far more than historical institutional theory. Fioretos (2017) showed how such theory can complement both economic and sociological institutional approaches and deepen our understanding of IOs.

Reinalda (2009) wears IR theory lightly in his magisterial Routledge History of International Organizations and focuses strongly on the historical empirical material. He notes the long intertwined history of IGOs and NGOs since the Congress of Vienna in 1814–15. For example, NGOs helped shape the Concert of Europe, fostered Jewish emancipation, successfully fought slavery, and contributed to international conferences and the creation and functioning of many IGOs.

Mazower criticizes IR theory in his history of global governance (Mazower 2013) and his study of the origins of the League of Nations and the UN system (Mazower 2009). He shows that the preservation of white colonial rule was crucial for the founding fathers of both world bodies. They promoted a system of states rather than international arbitration, and individual human rights rather than collective rights, which strengthened the role of the governing (colonial) elites. However, in the early years of the UN’s existence, their aims were thwarted by the newly decolonized states, in particular by India. Ironically, these newly independent states would subsequently rarely allow “their own” minorities to claim collective rights. And they benefited from the UN system legitimizing and strengthening their state structures.

Davies (2013) provides a history of NGOs that shows how the number and activities of NGOs have grown and declined in macrohistorical waves since the end of the eighteenth century. “Transnational civil society has developed in three ways with peaks reached in the decades preceding the two World Wars, and at the turn of the millennium” (Davies 2013: 6). Provocatively, Davies suggests that transnational civil society fragmented and declined before the two world wars, inadvertently contributed to both wars, and is currently also in decline. His cyclical, almost Nietzschean, approach to history points to the most serious and recurrent pathology of IOs; in contrast to their professed normative goals to address societal
problems, they may at times be self-defeating and contribute to violence, even war. Although other scholars noted similar trends, they doubted whether such a cyclical pattern existed. Whereas the League of Nations also seems to fit this pattern, is it not yet clear whether this holds true for the UN system.

Despite their differences, these historical studies have in common that they do not accept the mainstream narratives of the exclusive roles of states in international affairs. Instead, they come up with broader or alternative narratives that show how, given the roles of nonstate actors, change takes place over longer periods of time and across issue areas. Implicitly, they criticize the narratives that the main three IR schools developed and used to legitimate themselves.

Under the heading of practice research, the fifth group looks in far more detail at what IOs actually do (Adler and Pouliot 2011; Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, and Savigny 2001). For example, Gross Stein (2011) describes how international humanitarian organizations engaged self-critically in a debate about their competencies and standards. Yet, she critically notes that in these debates “claims to moral standing are foregrounded, often masking the difficult and troubling [working] practices that continue to be reproduced and sustain” the humanitarian community (Gross Stein 2011: 105). Sending and Neumann (2011) investigate how World Bank practices, in particular its Country Policy and Institutional Assessment to measure country performance “according to a set of Bank-defined criteria for good policies and institutions” (Sending and Neumann 2011: 232), shape the relationships between the Bank and both its donor governments and client countries.

Practice studies generally focus on thick description and the micro-foundations of IOs’ behavior. Several practice scholars take anthropological methods, in particular field research, to study IOs’ functioning and implementation seriously. As a result, they are able to explain why the impact of their functioning differs from both IR theory and the normative goals of the IOs. Autesserre (2010), for example, shows how IOs and peacekeepers failed in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo because they got the conflict dynamics wrong by focusing too much on conflict minerals and politicians at the national level without understanding land conflicts at the local level. In her next book, an ethnography of peacebuilding, Autesserre (2013) shows how IOs’ standard operating procedures caused failures in peacebuilding because they led to a misunderstanding of local actors and conflict. Micinski (2019) shows how informal, local initiatives to assist refugees on the Aegean Islands were partly coopted and partly crushed by the Greek government. The challenge for practice research will be to link the study of organizational routines and
other daily practices to deeper social structures. Methodologically, they are strong at zooming in on the local and the daily, but they will also have to zoom out to the international and the structural (Scholte 2019).

Finally, Johnson (2014) has studied in Why Governments Are Losing Control over the Proliferating Structures of Global Governance how staff of IGOs advocate the creation of new IGOs, participate in their institutional design process, and “dampen the mechanisms by which states endeavor to control new” IGOs. She calls these new IGOs “organizational progeny” and notices that their international staff members gain specialized knowledge and are “extremely well versed in particular policy issues, relegating many states to the position of dilettante rather than political master.” Although the most powerful states may rival IGOs in this respect, they are a minority of the overall population, and the number of parties who have accrued particular expertise is relatively small. Apart from the technical or scientific knowledge that is needed to define a policy issue, international bureaucrats also have administrative, procedural, diplomatic, and organizational knowledge that is needed to address the issue, but they do not necessarily share this information with states. Due to their number and divisions, states have a hard time jointly controlling IOs, while IO staff can reach out to potential allies among other IGOs and nonstate actors, such as NGOs and other civil society actors. If this loss of state control over IOs contributes to new forms of anarchy, it was clearly not foreseen by traditional IR.

**Multipolar Populism and an Illness: Threatening IOs**

In 2016, with the election in the United States of President Donald Trump and the Brexit referendum in the UK, several trends came together that deeply influence the relationships between the domestic and international levels, and increasingly challenge the post–World War II multilateral order and the functioning of IOs. They show that earlier successes of IOs—in promoting free trade and international communication; diminishing the East-West conflict; putting international problems, such as ozone depletion and climate change, on the agenda; and, more generally, in growing their membership and extending their activities—have caused a backlash (Dembinski and Peters 2020).

Inspired by the Chicago School’s idealization of the market economy and enabled by US president Ronald Reagan and British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, free markets, deregulation, and privatization started to unravel social safety nets in the Global North during the 1980s. Labor unions, especially in sectors hit hard by imports—such as automobiles,
steel, coal mining, textiles, and machine tools—became skeptical of free trade but rarely were able to make a fist. In the Global South, liberalization through the Washington Consensus and WTO contributed to a decline in social services. Simultaneously, information and communication technology led to higher market concentration in the private sector and growing inequality, in particular in regions where traditional industries and jobs were disappearing. In addition, large corporate scandals, such as those around Enron in the United States or Ahold in the Netherlands, as well as the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2001, created a growing sense that the global economic system was rigged against ordinary people. All this diminished the trust in international cooperation as a means toward solving common global challenges.

After the attack on New York’s World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, on 11 September 2001, terrorists were able to strike regularly in both the Global North and South, and international cooperation was seen through a security prism. The UN Security Council was sidelined by the US-led Coalition of the Willing, which got stuck in Iraq and Afghanistan, unable to win militarily, unable also to prevent the rise of the Islamic State and build functioning democratic states. Unsurprisingly, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq also created tensions among NATO allies, while anti-Western sentiments spread in the Global South, particularly in predominantly Islamic countries. Another long-term trend, migration to the Global North, showed an inverted image: antimigrant and anti-Islam sentiments grew, whereas military interventions and development cooperation lost popularity. IOs had to swim against the current.

Crucially, China’s rapid economic rise, a significant part of globalization, spurred economic nationalists to criticize that the “liberal order allowed China to trade unfairly and hollow out” manufacturing in the West (Mastanduno 2020: 533). Especially the 2008 housing bubble and financial crisis called into question the neoliberal economic model,24 shattered the Washington Consensus, and reinforced criticism of international elites. Were the elites and IOs still able to protect, let alone improve, the lives of ordinary citizens?

After the 2008 economic crisis, and with China as the manufacturing hub of the world, the US unipolar moment seemed over. Overall, the Global North has grown much slower than the economic tigers of East Asia and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). The Euro-crisis, the 2015 refugee crisis, and Brexit have further weakened Europe. Strongmen in countries such as Hungary, Turkey, and the Philippines are muzzling civil society and the judiciary. China’s leadership is increasingly preoccupied with security issues and therefore often relies on coercion. It is also building its “own” IOs in which it has strong...
control, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in which Russia also plays an important role.

Under its authoritarian government, Russia is making strenuous efforts to reimpose itself in its near abroad, leading to wars in Georgia (2008) and the Ukraine (2014), and later further afield with its interference in the Syrian conflict (2015). It also controls regional IOs with states mainly from the former Soviet Union. In sum, the world is becoming multipolar, and if history is any guide, transitions between ascending and standing powers are generally tense and unstable (Dembinski and Peters 2020: 142).

This is aggravated by the fact that so-called populists began to dominate national political debates and questioned the legitimacy and effectiveness of internationalist elites and IOs. With their anti-elitism and antipluralism, populists usually distinguish between the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite” (Schneiker 2020: 3). In this way, they do not follow the traditional left-right divide but create a cleavage between open and closed societies. And with their nationalism, they often condemn international affairs as a zero-sum game and root cause of economic problems. In this respect, for many populist politicians, strong leadership means being able to break established international norms or conventions. Consequently, their foreign policies become more confrontational, and they disrupt IOs and policies in areas such as trade, development, human rights, and the environment. Although these established norms and policies were often incomplete, at times contradictory, and almost always hard to implement, they were based on the ideals of international cooperation that intended to prevent the beggar-thy-neighbor policies and fragmentation from before World War II.

In contrast, US president Trump remarked at the seventy-fourth session of the UN General Assembly, “The future does not belong to globalists. The future belongs to patriots” (Trump 2019). His administration, for example, has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement on climate change (June 2016), the UN Human Rights Council (June 2018), the Iran deal (June 2018), as well as UNESCO (October 2017) and the WHO (May 2020), and regularly protests that its allies are not sharing their burden in NATO and are weakening the United States. The COVID-19 pandemic is the first major international crisis since 1945 where the United States has not played a leading role.

For IOs, two contradictory narratives, an open “cosmopolitan” one and a closed “communitarian” one, have emerged (Zürn 2018: 265–66) that are both reinforced by COVID-19. On the one hand, the “global health crisis has further demonstrated the need for multilateralism and exposed the fallacy of go-it-alone nationalism or isolationism” (Malley 2020: 1).
On the other hand, “globalization and open borders create vulnerabilities to viruses and other threats, and the ... struggle for control of supply lines and life-saving equipment requires that each country takes care of its own” (Malley 2020: 1). Moreover, “under conditions of heightened economic insecurity, there will be a strong impulse to scapegoat foreign- ers for the crisis” with calls for protectionism, restricting migration and trade, and less support for IOs (Roubini 2020: 2). If the closed narrative wins out, “Sino-American decoupling in trade, technology, investment, data, and monetary arrangements will intensify” (Roubini 2020: 2), which may lead to a new Cold War, this time between the United States and China with Iran and North Korea joining as spoilers, while Russia alternates between being a superpower and a spoiler.

In all this turmoil, the UN has once again become paralyzed as superpowers clash. NGOs and UN organizations are limited in their remit and will have to work mainly in “friendly” countries. Currently, the UN Security Council is unable to address COVID-19 and its consequences.

For the leadership of IOs it will be decisive to what extent it can proactively deal with politicization and protectionism and, when necessary, make organizational changes or take new initiatives to address pandemics, armed conflicts, forced displacement and the ensuing economic crisis while addressing environmental deterioration. This is a tall order. Can the executive heads and staff of IOs make the case for open and inclusive societies? Or mitigate or transcend the open-closed cleavage? Can they still suggest or lead the way to more sustainable economies? If they do not succeed, new forms of fragmentation, perhaps even anarchy, will come to dominate international affairs. Power among states and IOs will remain a central issue in answering these questions (see Fomerand in chapter 3), but IR scholars will continuously have to go beyond structural explanations at only the international level to explain new configurations of the domestic and the international. At the moment, there are not many studies on how multipolarity and populism are affecting IOs. Nor do we know much on how IOs are addressing multipolarity and populism. Are they strong enough to tackle these challenges, or are they hollowed out by pathologies that cripple their ability to meet their mandates? The authors of this book reflect on these questions.

Analysis: Attention and Criticism Revisited

What have we learned so far about the study of IOs? First, it is impossible to reach a general judgment on IOs and their management. Ideologi- cal distinctions such as left or right or political preferences for open or
closed societies, or judgments based on the theoretical assumptions of specific IR schools or management theory all deeply influence why and how IOs are being assessed. Moreover, IOs also compete with each other, for example, for funding or media attention, so that a gain for one IO may be a loss for another (Cooley and Ron 2002). Finally, a great diversity of IOs is now working on so many different issues across the globe that a general judgment would not do them justice. By the same token, there is no general theory on their management. Nevertheless, it is abundantly clear that they play many, often crucial, roles in world politics, in particular when dealing with global collective action problems.

In response, IR scholars have incorporated and adapted theories from other disciplines, such as law, economics, history, organizational sociology, and anthropology, to understand IOs better. Disciplinary myopia occurs less frequently (compare Dijkzeul and Beigbeder 2003: 16). With the shift from economic theory to more sociological and anthropological approaches, the four main ontological assumptions about IOs have changed:

1. IOs are not epiphenomenal to states but have a degree of autonomy, which may differ over time;
2. States and IOs are not unitary actors with given preferences but can be disaggregated;
3. Anarchy as a structural explanatory concept at the international level does not suffice but can be replaced by attention to the interaction between networked actors at the international and national levels;
4. IOs are generally set up for a functional/issue area, such as health or food, but the most interesting politics take place at the edges of issue areas or among them. Human rights, gender, the environment, development cooperation, and humanitarian action are often studied as separate issue areas, but in practice they cut across various issue areas, functional and conceptual.

These changing assumptions mean that a vertical hierarchical perspective from (donor or receiving) governments to the UN to international NGOs to local NGOs or local administration to people on the ground is being replaced by the study of more diverse networked (also horizontal and diagonal) relationships among them. Similarly, the assumptions of dominant states, unitary actors, a strong focus on the international level, and separate issue areas give the impression that actors and issues are
self-contained, so that the interaction among them—except for the vertical top-down perspective—barely received attention, which led to a curtailed understanding of both the management and politics of IOs. In the next section, we indicate five themes for future IO research that highlight both the management and politics of IOs that help go beyond these issues.

**Old Shortcomings and New Research Directions**

Five thematic directions stand out in the study of IOs. As can be expected with organizations that address cross-border problems, including the most difficult international collective action problems, these themes are all linked to how the actors and their power relations evolve—and how this is perceived. Which actors can make their case and overcome international collective action problems—and which ones remain behind? The themes concern (1) the role of the state and its subunits; (2) the degree of autonomy of IOs and their subunits; (3) the interplay between internal processes and the external environment of IOs; (4) the implementation of international norms, policies, and decisions; and (5) the resulting impact. To understand implementation and impact, it is crucial to distinguish between direct IO implementation and indirect implementation. With all five themes, questions come up on how these actors influence one another. How independent or permeable are they?

The first research theme is based on the fact that the state-centric perspective has become less dominant in IR, which can still be taken a step further. As Willetts (2019: xix) has argued, “the concept of state is only appropriate in international law,” where states have legal personality, so that they have the legal standing to enter into treaties, establish contracts, claim rights, and be held accountable. This concept downplays the role of IOs, be they IGOs or NGOs. It is more useful to speak of governments and distinguish types of governments, from superpowers to failed states, and disaggregate them into their institutional subunits to understand in more detail how (parts of) governments, IGOs, and NGOs coevolve and influence each other’s policies, management, and activities (Hirschmann 2018: 38; Stubbs et al. 2020: 31).

The second theme highlights that although IR scholars neglected the autonomy of IOs for a long time, more and more studies have shown that they possess a degree of autonomy that can differ over time. Hence, the degree of autonomy should be an empirical question, not an ontological assumption. Subsequently, the question “What do IOs do and achieve with their autonomy?” came up. Most scholars that study the results of this autonomy concentrate on the policy outcomes of IOs. As a conse-
quence, themes like accountability and legitimacy of IOs and their policies will continue to receive scholarly attention.

Third, the acknowledgment of autonomy also led to more attention to the interplay of internal factors and the external environment, and therewith to the networks of IOs, governments, and other actors. Just as with governments, scholars began to disaggregate IOs to understand the different degrees of agency of their different subunits, such as their secretariats/headquarters, governing bodies, field offices, and expert committees. The interaction of these subunits and more generally the internal functioning of IOs still requires more attention. In this respect, the ongoing interplay between political and managerial aspects should be studied more often—a topic that comes back in several chapters and the conclusions of this volume.

Fourth, implementation and concomitantly the impact of IOs are also crucial research topics where this interplay and the degree of autonomy come to the fore. As implementation usually plays at the domestic level, it has often been neglected by IR scholars, although the organizational sociology/management and network scholars, as well as practice scholars, sometimes address it more regularly. Broadly, one can distinguish between indirect and direct implementation by IOs.

With indirect implementation, other actors, such as national government agencies, a local administration, private enterprises, or domestic NGOs, execute most of the work. With this form of implementation, IOs—and their scholars—tend to restrict themselves to the international level of analysis, especially on facilitating international negotiations and cooperation. The main examples include agenda setting, setting norms and developing policies, codification and development of law by governments, and carrying out and disseminating research to governments and other actors. To a certain extent, IOs can then evaluate and influence implementation at the domestic level by forms of reporting to the international level (either by member states’ self-reporting, by peer reviews, or by naming and shaming [Kahn-Nisser 2019]). To give a practical example, in the environmental area, scholars of IOs have generally concentrated on such policy-outcome indicators as whether parliaments have accepted new laws or ratified international treaties or how ministries have changed their policies or added environmental departments in response to IOs’ advice, research, and lobbying. Others have studied how governmental voting behavior, funding patterns, reporting, or use of new knowledge in policy discourses regarding environmental issues have changed. Nevertheless, even when IOs achieve such policy outcomes, biodiversity may still decrease, and climate change may get worse. In other words, outcome is not impact; at best, it is a proxy. In the case of
climate change—probably the hardest international issue of all—IOs can barely influence factors ranging from peat fires in Siberia or car use in England to deforestation in Brazil and carbon tax in the United States. Similarly, the law on the books on internal displacement may be perfect in some countries, whereas internally displaced persons suffer miserably. The same holds true for humanitarian law; the International Committee of the Red Cross may do terrific work as the guardian of international humanitarian law, but what does it matter when rebels do not take notice and kill, maim, or plunder? IOs thus run the risk that although the operation has been successful, the patient has died; changes in policy outcomes do not necessarily mean sufficient impact. Put differently, IOs can influence outcomes, and in this way contribute to a change in impact, but they certainly cannot control impact. With indirect implementation, the challenge is to link the IOs’ normative and policy work at the international level with the networks of implementing partners, such as government agencies, civil society organizations, other IOs, and private enterprises, at the national level (Dijkzeul and Funke 2017).

As stated earlier, most IOs also take on operational work on the ground. Such direct implementation includes capacity building, executing programs and projects, advocacy, and funding and working with a wide variety of local counterparts. With direct IO implementation, it is necessary to understand how the IOs function as part of networks of actors that are involved or take an interest in implementation. These actors range from warlords to women’s groups, and from presidents to unemployed adolescents or professional aid workers. Often, this interaction is not well studied, but such studies would help explain how the impact comes about. All these actors influence each other’s activities and impacts, but it is often not clear how exactly. Studying the diversity of actors has the added advantage that it will be possible to incorporate local voices and initiatives from the Global South, which have often been absent in scholarship of IOs so far.

In general, knowing impact is crucial if one wants to know to what extent and how IOs influence the societal problem, be it with direct or indirect implementation. Yet, impact is notoriously hard to measure, due to many intervening variables. Policy outcomes are, as stated, easier to identify and assess. Hence, going beyond policy outcomes to evaluating impact and linking this to IO action will be one of the great challenges for the study of IOs. After all, when these organizations are founded to address transborder societal problems, then we need to know how well they influence these problems. So far, only a few studies have assessed the impact of IOs and linked this to either the functioning and interaction of their subunits or the interaction among networks of highly diverse actors during implementation. For example, in Does Peacekeeping Work? Fortna
(2008) combines quantitative data and qualitative fieldwork to study the effectiveness of peacekeeping. Dijkzeul and Lynch (2006) used epidemiological and organization-sociological research methods to examine how three international NGOs and one local NGO supported primary healthcare in the war-torn east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and assessed their impact in terms of increased utilization of health facilities by patients and the degree of cost recovery of health facilities. We need more work like this on the functioning of IOs.

Finally, utilitarian theories perceived states and IOs as hard-shelled unitary actors with given preferences (national security or economic interests). In this sense, they resembled billiard balls that bounced against each other but were not changed by their encounter. However, with the disaggregation of actors, such as government and IO subunits, the need arises to understand both IO and government diversity better, in particular how these actors and their subunits empirically influence, constitute, or permeate each other. To be effective, IOs need to keep many actors in the game. For instance, donor influence may be strong, but IOs also may have to negotiate under the radar with warlords, traditional leaders, religious institutions, media, women’s groups, youth organizations, or corrupt government officials. Many of these actors treat IOs as either a prize to capture or a threat to suppress (DeMars 2005: 43). They will thus attempt to instrumentalize IOs for their own purposes. Depending on the actors involved, this can take many forms, such as cooption, politicization, marketization, or militarization, which strongly influences the actual impact of IOs’ activities on the ground. Put differently, IOs need to be understood in networks of different actors that permeate each other politically and managerially. Some IOs are able to resist this instrumentalization, some do so partially, and others do become instrumentalized; the mechanisms and extent to which this happens require more study (Weiss 2014). Only then will we be able to understand the actual politics and impact of IOs better.

Outline of This Volume

The authors of this volume have attempted to bypass or to surpass the shortcomings in the study of IOs described above. Our aim is to empirically assess and criticize the functioning of these organizations. We show how pathologies come about either within the IOs or in their interaction with the broader environment. We have done this as a group, because addressing these matters requires knowledge of several disciplines. Sound empirical knowledge of IOs cannot be gained within the confines of academia alone. It is essential to engage with IOs both at headquarters and
in the field and learn from the practitioners and local actors and to stay long enough to understand IOs’ interaction: how do they influence, constitute, and permeate each other? Studying these organizations means understanding their organizational processes from the top, starting with multilateral diplomacy and funding, to the bottom, with action in the field. It also requires an understanding of organizational processes and reforms, as well as knowledge of substantive issues in local contexts, be they the application of international gender norms or the conceptualization and implementation of sustainable human development.

Hence, this book follows, to a large extent, the policy and programming process going from decision-making, including resource allocation, to implementation and evaluation. Each chapter identifies some central pathologies and therapies. Cumulatively, the authors show the interrelationship of IGOs and NGOs in addressing international problems, and that there is a whole set of pathologies, and often only imperfect therapies.

The first part examines closely the policymaking and decision-making of IOs, with emphasis on the roles of states. In chapter 1, Jim Muldoon and JoAnn F. Aviel focus on the latest trends in multilateral diplomacy, in particular the move toward more networked approaches, combining state diplomacy with multilateral organizations and NGOs. The second chapter by Sandra Aviles and Romano Lasker examines the financing of UN peacekeeping and “regular” activities in which states traditionally play a central role. They note in particular that the functioning of the UN system is increasingly confined to crisis countries, and they indicate what kind of funding is necessary to make its fieldwork a success. They also note how the United Nations has to cooperate with other actors in networks to address its main operational challenges. In chapter 3, Jacques Fomerand studies the conceptualization of sustainable human development (SHD) and the political struggles surrounding it. He shows how international structural factors hamper the implementation of SHD along predictable North-South lines, but also that incremental improvements have occurred over time.

In the second part, the internal functioning and decision-making of these organizations is examined. This part focuses on the headquarters level and the central problems, such as organizational reform, policymaking, and internal decision-making. A common theme in these chapters is the hardship in making these organizations function better. In chapter 4, Dirk Salomons studies the pathologies of human resource management in the United Nations, which have their roots in the League of Nations and which continue to obstruct efficient, results-oriented management. In chapter 5, Yves Beigbeder focuses on corruption and culture in the UN system and the managerial difficulties in resolving fraud and corruption.
The third part treats the issue of implementation in detail. In chapter 6, Dennis Dijkzeul looks at a central tool of IOs, the program approach, and assesses one of the main strategies to make this approach work—participation. He also explains why such participation remains limited. In chapter 7, Monika Krause takes a closer look at the counterproductive, if not counterintuitive, aspects of human rights NGOs from a practice approach. She regards human rights NGOs as valuable structures that are also highly insufficient for what they hope to deliver. In this respect, she explains the collective consequences of the choices these organizations make. Anna Ohanyan and Gevorg Ter-Gabralyan, in chapter 8, study the implementation problems of NGO diplomacy from a network perspective. They provide an illustrative case: the problems in transnational peace-building between Turkey and Armenia, two middle-income countries without diplomatic relations, troubled by the genocide more than a century ago. The United Nations barely has a presence in either, and the governments resent UN interference, but local and international NGOs still attempt to take the initiative to foster peace. In chapter 9, Kristie Even-son examines how the funding policies of donor organizations—governments, the European Union, and the UN—actually hamper local NGOs in rebuilding civil society and fostering democracy in Bosnia, which contradicts their professed aims. Similarly, Lucile Martin and Saeed Parto explain in chapter 10 the unsuccessful implementation of gender policies in Afghanistan by IOs, both IGOs and NGOs, despite great investments. They show the disconnect between a top-down normative process (e.g., numerous UN resolutions) and the reality on the ground, where international elites funnel money to national elites, pretending there is a post-conflict society whereas in reality violence is brutal, and pretending to develop intricate programs while access to local communities is virtually impossible. There is no real participatory process with bottom-up needs assessments and no accountability downward—just donor-reporting practices as the canon for fake effectiveness.

In the last part, the conclusions, Dennis Dijkzeul, Yves Beigbeder, and Dirk Salomons assess the contributions of this book in light of the deficiencies in the study of IOs that have been identified in this introduction. Criticizing the concept of self-contained tasks, it develops a basic theoretical model for explaining the behavior of both individual IOs and the networks in which they operate, while emphasizing the remaining dilemmas as well as possible practical therapies.

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**NOTES**

1. Compare, for example, the criticism by Glennon (2003) and the reply by Slaughter, Luck, and Hurd (2003).

2. Archer (1983: 1–3) describes how the term “international” subsumes three more specific concepts, namely, intergovernmental, transnational, and transgovernmental. NGOs, for example, are actually transnational organizations. See also Pries (2008). Multinational organizations are a form of private enterprise that also operate transnationally. The term IO, however, is usually reserved for (not-for-profit) multilateral public organizations, as well as for civil society organizations that carry out activities across borders. In our analysis, we do not include regional (multilateral) organizations, such as the European
Union, ASEAN, and MERCOSUR. It would make the scope of this book too broad. Nor do we describe government- and/or party-controlled NGOs, or GONGOs, which have been created in countries such as Russia and China in an attempt to identify these with genuinely independent NGOs and benefit from their status.

3. IR scholars use the term “institution” broadly. Institutions guide or even prescribe the behavior of international actors. They often distinguish conventions, regimes, and IOs. The first two types of institutions have a rule or norm like nature. However, a norm, principle, rule, or procedure as one possible meaning of the concept “institution” is often used in this way in economics and sociology, but in management and organization theory, “institution” usually means role or organization. The “norm” or “rule” type of institution is generally diffused among a large number of people. The “role or organization” type is inherent to intentionally constructed human groupings. Goldsmith (1992: 582) states, “Slipping from one definition to the other is easy, for roles and organizations usually need rules and conventions to reinforce them, and vice versa. Moreover, both definitions refer to repetition in the way people act. In either case, an institution is understood to entail stability and persistence.” The main distinction between the two types of meaning is that regimes and conventions do not act—people do, in their roles as heads and staff members of their organizations.

4. International organization is the subfield of international relations that studies the structure and processes of (establishing and maintaining) world order. Originally, international organizations were at the center of the discipline, but as we shall see later they were supplanted by international political economy topics.

5. In contrast to international relations, legal studies or international law has largely sustained attention on international organizations (predominantly intergovernmental ones) throughout the post–World War II period and has been especially vibrant in the post–Cold War period (e.g., international human rights and humanitarian law) (see Fomerand 2017; Noortmann 2019; Bogdandy and Venzke 2013; de Waal 2003).

6. Interestingly, Olson and Groom compared forty IR textbooks published between 1916 and 1941 and found no internationalist or idealist dominance in them. In other words, it may be that early realist scholars were better at rhetorically framing IR literature than reading it, but this framing stuck (Olson and Groom 1991: 81; Reinalda 2013a: 2–3).

7. The Keohane and Nye (1974) article on transgovernmental relations should also have received more attention.

8. For a brief overview of the origins, as well as liberal and realist views, of regimes, see Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner (1998).

9. The main shortcomings of Haas’s book were its remnants of state-centered perspective. The learning processes started mainly through international
bargaining and decision-making. The internal functioning and the extent to which these organizations could act or learn autonomously received far less attention.

10. Keohane’s question, “Why do international organizations succeed or fail?” should have been preceded by the question “How do these organizations actually function?” (see Biekart 1999: 14). The second question is a precondition for answering the first one. In other words, measuring effectiveness should be preceded by information on how it is possible to achieve results or failure. Interestingly, Ruggie later worked for Secretary General Kofi Annan as special representative of the UN secretary-general for business and human rights (Carbonnier and Lightfoot 2017: 171, 188). To be fair, Keohane has done research to IOs in the early stages of his career and later coedited a volume on the European Union.

11. Still, this strong focus on norms ran the opposite risk of rational theories. Constructivists “borrow from sociology a methodological collectivism that assumes all the actors share the same norms, rationalist theories, as stated, borrow from economics a methodological individualism that assumes all actors share the same utility-maximizing rationality. Put differently, in both cases, a reductionist argument causes blind spots in the analysis of actors and their politics.” In opposite ways, both schools “make a similar misstep of presuming the homogeneity of actors” (Dijkzeul and Fauser 2020b: 9; Dijkzeul and DeMars 2015: 290).


13. Haas (1992: 3) defines an epistemic community as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.” A transnational advocacy network is a set of “relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and a dense exchange of information and services” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2). Both types of networks focus on collective amelioration.

14. Note that Willetts (2011: 23, 28) places this growth in attention in the 1960s and 1970s. We argue that the number of individual studies, for example after the Helsinki Accords (see the chapter by Krause in this volume) grew, but as shown above the growing attention to NGOs since the late 1980s has constituted a second transnational wave.

15. To a much smaller extent, but in a similar fashion, IOs addressing AIDS also received attention (e.g., Gordenker et al. 1995).

16. In fact, some of the same authors covered UN organizations, NGOs, and countries in crisis extensively. See, for example, Weiss and Gordenker (1996); Weiss (1998).

17. The state-centric approach also explains the popularity of decision-making theory. With this theory, it is easy to remain at the intergovernmental or strategic level, because this is the level where state representatives make
decisions. However, the internal functioning, implementation problems, and deviations from mandate then become secondary concerns. With regime theory, something similar happens. Regime theory helps to explain the behavior of governments and other international actors when there is no central authority, but it does not look inside the IOs. The state-centric approach and regime theory also tend to ignore the influence or leadership of international secretariats and their executive heads, for example, James Grant at UNICEF and Halfdan Mahler at the WHO.

18. For his study, Biekart (1999) prefers the more specific term “private aid agencies” to the more general term “NGOs.”

19. Two new journals, Global Governance (1995) and International Peacekeeping (1994), also played a pivotal role in generating more attention to IOs. Disasters, an older journal, also offers regular articles on international organizations.

20. The UN Intellectual History Project also made clear that UN organizations had a larger impact on world politics than IR traditionally acknowledged.

21. Notice that Barnett and Finnemore use bureaucracy and IO interchangeably—whereas Biermann and Siebenthaler only focus on the secretariats—when they talk about bureaucracy and leave out the governing bodies, in which the member states play a dominant role. While we understand the need to focus research on the internal functioning of these IOs, we do think that the interaction between the political and managerial aspects is crucial for understanding IOs. Hence, we prefer not to leave out the member states. In the conclusion of this volume, we will study the combination of the managerial and political logic.

22. For an alternative view of IOs as membership organizations, see McLaren (2005).

23. This is an interesting reversal of dependency theory.

24. Note that the neoliberal economic model, based on monetarist theory, and the neoliberal IR school, based on public/rational choice theory to explain the institutions of international cooperation, differ in focus and explanation.

25. Would that be another trough in Davies’s macrohistorical waves?

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