

# Introduction

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After World War II, U.S. identity faced severe dilemmas. Its constructed image—the power, the arsenal for democracy, representing liberty, self-determination, and economic liberalism—found itself closely allied with and cooperating with a range of European colonial empires reluctant to cede power in Asia and Africa. Moreover, Washington was quick to cultivate a dualistic image of the world, positing two ways of life that represented a defining choice in world history.

That construction was advanced in the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and elided the ties with European colonialism as it focused on the new other, the Soviet Union. The Cold War constructions pervaded U.S. foreign policy until the early 1990s, with significant disruption in the early 1970s during the era of *détente* and multipolarity brought on by the recovery of Europe and Japan and the consolidation of Chinese power. The polycentric world was constantly challenged by peripheral powers, nationalist movements, and revolutionaries that did not always move in tune with a superpower, but in pursuit of their own local and indigenous agendas.<sup>1</sup> Even as superpower tensions rose again in the late 1970s and then when Reagan entered the White House, the multipolar world remained, but Reagan's discourse and foreign policy agendas worked to ignore the changed context.<sup>2</sup>

This discourse and Manichaean outlook recurred frequently in the history of U.S. foreign policy. Eisenhower's National Security Council considered the dilemma on the eve of Africa's decolonization in 1957. The resulting policy document (NSC 5719) illustrated the conundrum:

Premature independence would be as harmful to our interests in Africa as would be a continuation of nineteenth century colonialism, and we must tailor our policies to the capabilities and needs of each particular area as well as to our over-all relations with the metropolitan power concerned. It should be noted that all the metropolitan powers are associated with us in the NATO alliance or in military base agreements.<sup>3</sup>

The document's policy guidance section suggested that Washington support the principle of self-determination; however, it stressed that such a reality incurred associated responsibilities. It noted care should be taken to "avoid U.S. identification with those policies of the metropolitan powers, which are stagnant or repressive, and, to the extent practicable, seek effective means of influencing the metropolitan powers to abandon or modify such policies." And, for good measure, "emphasize through all appropriate media the colonial policies of the Soviet Union and particularly the fact that the Soviet colonial empire has continued to expand throughout the period when Western colonialism has been contracting."<sup>4</sup>

Such *alterity* has frequently played a defining role in the manufacturing of U.S. foreign policy. As a term, originated in the early 1970s, alterity refers to the construction of an "other" in juxtaposition to the "self." It is vitally important to reiterate that the "other" that is described, defined, and articulated by the various policy makers rests on a discourse that is constructed largely within U.S. culture and its ideological sphere of influence. Those depictions do not actually describe the detailed, multilayered, textured features of the cultures under consideration, cultures that are situated in both time and space and made up of a multiplicity of different influences, stories, myths, flavors, images, and so forth. The importance of the discourse of alterity is its ability to simplify and to remove the culture of its complexity, its position in historical time, place, and geographical location. So in our cases the constructions of alterity largely emanating in U.S. political and cultural discourse do not seek, as perhaps an anthropologist might, the detail and insight into other cultures, but create a simplified depiction of the Indian, the European, the Nazi, and the Communist, and of Islam. They are discourses that resonate in U.S. culture because they not only attempt to depict the other, from afar and above, but also to sharpen U.S. identity through its difference and its long-held notions of exceptionalism. It works most effectively in stark depictions of a "threat" that can solidify the meaning of U.S. identity, juxtaposing the "self" against an enemy "other." For instance, the United States identified itself in contrast to the Communist threat. The poignancy of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s rhetoric on freedom during the Vietnam War and within the context of the U.S. Civil Rights movement undermined the Cold War constructions of U.S. identity; yet without any trace of irony or historical context President Reagan deployed the language of freedom in opposition to the evil Soviet empire. There is thus a "social space" of who is included and excluded in such identity politics and a notion of superiority and inferiority running through such discourse.<sup>5</sup>

It is essential to remember that Edward Said's *Orientalism*, and later his *Culture and Imperialism*, did not try to depict the other; instead they

set about deconstructing the Western discourse on the Orient or more correctly the West's construction of the Orient. It is, according to Arshin Adib-Moghaddam's reading of Said, "the product of ideological fiction with no real linkage to the cultures and peoples it claims to explain." Or as Said emphasized, over and over again in response to criticism, the "line separating Occident from Orient ... is less a fact of nature than it is a fact of human production" that lies in what he calls "imaginative geography." This imaginative geography is removed and distinct from the actual culture set in time and place, whether the Middle East, the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguans, the Soviets of the 1940s, or the Nazis of the 1930s, and extends back to the discourse on the "savage" within and outside colonial, antebellum, and Gilded Age America. The discourse relates to the epistemology and construction of knowledge that is closely related to the powers of production both cultural and material, rather than the ontology of the culture, people, or "threat" under consideration.<sup>6</sup>

In part, these discourses have informed the implementation of foreign policies. The importance of discourse rests in the symbolic patterns "that reflect and form societal ideals and views of the international environment."<sup>7</sup> Certainly the attitudes of key protagonists and authors of strategy papers have succumbed to what Edward Said popularized as orientalism. For instance, the Monroe Doctrine and its influence on subsequent U.S. foreign policy are characterized by elements of orientalism. It set up tendencies of thought, a familiar mind-set, intellectual paths along which subsequent politicians and generations would feel comfortable as they confronted a bewildering and incoherent world. This dualistic tendency exists at the conceptual level. Two abstract spheres of influence, entities and identities that are not necessarily the repository of the characteristics ascribed to them, have been created in speech and subsequent discourse. The notions of "new" and "old" worlds are concepts deployed for political purposes rather than effective descriptions of the Americas and Europe. Too much empirical detail and historical specificity belie such conceptual identities. Said's initial objection was that, as a system of thought, orientalism approached a diverse and heterogeneous world, fixed it in time, and ascribed to political entities enduring essences that cannot be substantiated in history. Furthermore, Said suggests the tendency to regard the other from afar and from above is evident in the doctrine and the discourse. Foreign policy scholar Michael Hunt has demonstrated in *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* that the projection of U.S. identity and the paternalism of its foreign policies extended throughout its history.<sup>8</sup> Despite the deconstruction of orientalism and its application to U.S. foreign policy, one also frequently sees it at work, advanced by various presidents and political commentators to elicit a certain cultural effect.<sup>9</sup> President Monroe

drew a mental geography of two worlds divided in space by the Atlantic Ocean and concurrently on the differences between republicanism and various forms of authoritarianism or monarchy. Such an approach resonated through the future to the present.

Let's start in the near present. Soon after 9/11 the Bush administration engaged in a series of speeches that conflated various "others" into a singular "other." Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and soon after, Saddam Hussein, were joined together in the terrifying and comforting phrase advanced at West Point in June 2002: "the terrorists and the tyrants."<sup>10</sup> The first conflation provided comfort and definition that paved the way to Afghanistan; the second represented what John Dower has called "strategic imbecility."<sup>11</sup> President Bush was predisposed to view the challenges the United States faced before 9/11 in such dualistic terms.<sup>12</sup>

One hundred eighty years before the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and President Bush's response—in 1821—John Quincy Adams warned Americans not to search abroad for monsters to destroy, yet such figures have frequently inhabited the discourses of U.S. foreign policy.<sup>13</sup> The existence of an alter ego or other has been vital to U.S. social cohesion and domestic mobilization despite publics that are sometimes reluctant to engage in the world. It is not peculiar to the United States. Edward Said writes, "throughout the exchange between Europeans and their 'others' that began systematically half a millennium ago, the one idea that has scarcely varied is that there is an 'us' and a 'them,' each quite settled, clear, unassailably self-evident."<sup>14</sup> Such dichotomies run through U.S. diplomacy from the Monroe Doctrine, creating conceptual dualities in the old and the new world, in the Truman Doctrine, positing the existence of two ways of life, which was often welcomed because it made U.S. culture more cohesive.

The Cold War sustained that conceptual divide and enhanced that world view, even though actualities were always far more complex, but such complications and contingency do not have the same appeal. The boldness of an overarching depiction or thesis that can explain the broad geopolitical situation, marrying as it does an intellectual concept with a spatial image, is enticing. After the Cold War, the two articles that invoked the most comment on foreign policy were Francis Fukuyama's "End of History" thesis and Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations." Fukuyama's thesis lacked discussion of the other, which had been transcended with the end of the Cold War.<sup>15</sup> Though widely criticized, Huntington provided a reference point for many Americans as they searched for the overarching meaning of 9/11. The formula was echoed in President Bush's rhetoric when he explained, "either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists."<sup>16</sup> The admonition obscured the arguments on war in Afghanistan but also found multiple echoes throughout U.S. culture.

As Said suggested, “the basic paradigm of West versus the rest (the cold war opposition reformulated) remained untouched, and this is what has persisted, often insidiously and implicitly, in discussion since the terrible events of 9/11.”<sup>17</sup>

More examples from other periods are not hard to find. The Inquiry documents produced at the closing of World War I as the Wilson administration considered its position in the world are similarly revealing. One document, number 137, written by Leon Dominian on the “Mohammedan World,” is illustrative of the kinds of depictions studied more systematically by Douglas Little, Melani McAlister, Edward Said, Michael Hunt, James William Park, Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, and in the literature on race and U.S. foreign policy.<sup>18</sup> Dominian represented the Mohammedan world as geographically arching from the northwest of Africa to “China and the Dutch East Indies ... A chafing of the Mohammedan spirit,” he reported, was “observable everywhere.” They resented the foreign powers and their ways were incompatible “with the spirit of modern progress.” In sum, “[h]e is generally bigoted and inclined to be violent in word and deed against non-Mohammedans.”<sup>19</sup> This tone prevails through the seventy-two-page report.

The language of racial hierarchies, civilization, and barbarism were no longer culturally acceptable in public discourse later in the twentieth century; instead, the discourse on development, modernity, and tradition replaced the old forms of depiction, though the hierarchy was frequently the same.<sup>20</sup> One could skip several decades and still detect the sentiment in such strategic papers as NSC 5801, “Long Range U.S. Policy toward the Near East.” This top secret document opined that the “area’s indigenous institutions and religions lack vigor (partly as a result of the impact of nearly 200 years of Western culture), and native resistance to Communism *per se* has, therefore, been disappointing. Furthermore, Communist police-state methods seem no worse than similar methods employed by Near East regimes, including some of those supported by the United States.” Despite conclusions similar to those in the Inquiry document that the United States enjoyed some respect in the region generated through its presence in educational institutions, its “philanthropic ... efforts,” the respect for its military power, “our own revolutionary tradition and our identification with the principle of self-determination,” U.S. wealth, and the country’s science and technology, NSC 5801 concludes that “there are no basic impediments of personality, background or culture to the establishment and maintenance of close personal friendships between the peoples of the Near East and Americans.” Yet it did identify certain political problems; the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as the “continuing and necessary association of the United States in the Western European Alli-

ance makes it impossible for us to avoid some identification with the powers which formerly had, and still have, 'colonial' interests in the areas."<sup>21</sup>

McAlister argues for scholars to move beyond orientalism. The primary problem is that orientalism "fundamentally depends on the presumption that the 'us' of the West is, or is perceived to be, a homogenous entity." Yet the diversity within the nation and the narratives of nationalism have always been more diverse than Said acknowledges.<sup>22</sup> Certainly, McAlister's work centered on the politics of cultural production captures some of the ambivalence of the fear, loathing, attraction, and desire that is going on in U.S. depictions of the Arab world but also in various Arab views of the United States. In that sense it feeds into the not-so-recent turn in American Studies.<sup>23</sup> Said believed that his work merely represented the essences that existed in cultures in time and space.<sup>24</sup> The difference relates to the degree of fluidity and identity within the cultures. It is important to emphasize here that such claims are dealing with dominating discourses that shape and influence structures of thought or "truth regimes," but that they frequently have a very loose relationship with the subjects with which they deal. In that regard, while the internal analysis of the Monroe, Truman, Reagan, or Bush presidencies was no doubt far more informed on particulars and actualities, the overarching discourse that they employed created truth regimes that affected the public discourse and understanding, which in turn affected domestic debate and expectations and informed the questions of credibility surrounding their administrations.

There is still the importance of the rhetorical depiction and the return to the simpler view of the other as somewhat homogenous. Fabian Hilfrich's reading of the American visions of the Asian periphery is instructive on this. He compares the visions of Vietnam in the mid 1960s with the U.S. acquisition of the Philippines in 1898 to conclude that the Cold War, though important, did not solely determine American views. The rhetorical construct that became the domino theory was important because it was built on a geographical premise coupled with a psychological injunction that moved from the local to the regional and on to the universal. So, the movement in thought is one that passed through concentric circles, none of which related to the importance of the country in question, but rather related more to the U.S. vision of itself. That is, the fear of losing Vietnam (through the narratives of geography, credibility, commitment, and U.S. leadership) pass through the concentric circles to the regional concerns with Southeast Asia and the Pacific, through the logic of the domino theory; "in the outer circle, the psychological domino theory extended the significance of a defeat in South Vietnam to the world, for it spelled the loss of confidence in the United States and, by encouraging the enemies of the United States, the onset of a wider war."<sup>25</sup> Thus ultimately, the con-

struction suggested that their worldview “remained anchored in the monumental conflict between barbarism and civilization, much as the domino theory relied on the binary opposition of democracy and communism.”<sup>26</sup>

While Said’s approach to orientalism has been criticized for its exclusion of the voices of the other, in his attempt to demonstrate and deconstruct the series of western homogenizing constructions, Heller contends that Said also essentializes the West. It is not only essentialized but simultaneously is presented as having the power and the ability to define the other. Similarly, Christopher Browning and Marko Lehti contend, “whilst the West is constructed as an unproblematic unified acting subject, the outside (the Orient) is presented as largely passive and reactive, as unable to (in turn) act back and assert constitutive power of its own.”<sup>27</sup> Andrew Rotter argues that this is quite problematic for diplomatic historians: “Said most emphatically subverts what historians try to do by confounding the idea of the subject. In *Orientalism*, the ‘Orient’ exists only as a useful creation of the West, a projection of Western desire and fear, a subject without its own identity. There is no who there.”<sup>28</sup>

Indeed, Said insists on the relationship between ideas and power. The Orient was orientalized precisely because it could be, especially in the nineteenth century, “through varying degrees of complex hegemony”; it “submitted to being—made Oriental.” Said is quick to argue that there is very little consent to be found in Flaubert’s encounter with the Egyptian courtesan who “never spoke of herself; she never represented her emotions, presence, or history. He spoke for and represented her.” Said wanted to argue that Flaubert’s relationship was not an isolated case; “[i]t fairly stands for the pattern of relative strength between East and West, and the discourse about the Orient that it enabled.”<sup>29</sup> Said, however, was insistent that his essences were just that: essences. He argued that “men make their own history” and that what they produce are just that: constructions. The constructions exist in time and space, even though those depicted in the constructions are represented as existing in a timeless zone; viewed from above and afar they are considered unchanging. Said’s argument is very different from the constructions and depictions that he studies. He concludes that it is precisely the “sense of fixed identities battling across a permanent divide that my book quite specifically abjures, but which it paradoxically presupposes and depends on.”<sup>30</sup> When *Orientalism* is considered within the range of Said’s work, the functions of “talking back” and the deconstructions of moments in the West are recurrent.<sup>31</sup> The parameters of time and space are important. What must be separated in further research, in this regard, are the concepts of audience and the politics of cultural production.<sup>32</sup> What audiences are at the receiving end of the so-called process of talking back? What cultural resonance do their voices achieve, in what

spaces, and at what times? One could even think about voices of dissent within a particular space in the West and question the access to media and its sphere of influence.

It is not only this ability to talk back to the West, but also to contribute to the construction of the West that Browning and Lehti advance as one of the contributions that they make to our understanding of the West. Working through the writings of David Campbell and Lene Hansen that recognized that the construction of identity was drawn from a dialogue, and that the strength of those differences relied on the interlocution, they claim that the other is given agency, not only in terms of self-representation but in this case in their contributions to the construction of the West.<sup>33</sup>

What we want to argue here is that these positions are not mutually exclusive. Drawing on the methodologies advanced by Gerd Baumann and Andre Gingrich—from the *Grammars of Identity/Alterity*—the hierarchical structure of alterity is a useful lens through which to view the U.S. dilemma on colonialism and decolonization and its concurrent attempts to bolster the construction and identity of communities such as the nation and the West. Baumann, an anthropologist, suggests that greater insight is derived from moving away from the binary constructions of identity in favor of “philosophically ‘weak’ interpretations of the concept of identity,” which facilitates the ability to “differentiate between different modalities of selfing/othering.” Baumann starts by rejecting the contention that Said engaged in a binary methodology; rather, he watches it at work among the Westerners he studied. But Bauman also argues that the binary opposition is constantly subject to reversal. It lies in “Said’s recognition that Westerners not only denigrated that which they called ‘oriental,’ but also desired it.” They desired it because in their constructions the Orient, despite its (considered) strangeness and inferiority, was also ascribed with traits that were lost in the West. This grammar of alterity is interwoven with E.E. Evans-Pritchard’s “ordered anarchy,” which advances a hierarchy of othering and identity. In the early Cold War, for instance, the European colonial powers represented something other than what the United States saw itself as (and constructed itself as), yet within the context of the Cold War they pulled together to resist the Soviet threat. The pulling together necessitated the exaggeration of the Soviet threat. The identity of the West worked at one level on the Cold War question and was simultaneously problematic on the question of decolonization. Yet, given the promises of the Atlantic Charter it was presumed that in time, these transatlantic differences on colonialism and self-determination would be removed. Baumann contends:

The intellectual beauty of this segmentary grammar of identity / alterity lies in its contextual awareness. The Other may be my foe in a context placed at a

lower level of segmentation, but may simultaneously be my ally in a context placed at a higher level of segmentation. Identity and alterity are thus a matter of context, and contexts are ranked according to classificatory levels. Fusion and fission, identity and difference are not matters of absolute criteria in this grammar, but functions of recognizing the appropriate segmentary level. In the segmentary grammar, people can thus serve themselves, and can other others according to context, that is, according to the structural level of the conflict or contest, coalition or cooperation that is at stake at any one given moment.<sup>34</sup>

The period of transition, the construction of the new West after WWII, and the coincidence of decolonization threw these identities into juxtaposition and they were indeed considered strategically in a hierarchical form. The U.S. privileging of an integrated Europe and the transatlantic relationship incurred costs to its own reputation and long-term identity, especially among various nationalists throughout the colonial world. Its ambivalence on decolonization ultimately meant that the West was certainly constructed not only through internal transatlantic hagiography but also by external criticism.<sup>35</sup>

It should be no surprise that the advocates for the new West propagated their identity in such seminal documents as the Atlantic Charter, and other wartime iconic documents, like the Truman Doctrine, NSC 68, Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain speech, or even Henry Luce's article on the "American Century." The power to narrate and to propagate abstract ideas cannot be underestimated. Cultural and ideological inclinations among audiences that adhered to these discourses undoubtedly understood the intentions of these messages. The power of the discourse was unassailable. Yet the content of these documents could also be read as signs of weakness, delivered on occasion to patch over internal inconsistencies and divisions. The power to effectively talk-back to the hegemonic propensity of the United States and the colonial and metropolitan centers in Europe only eventuated with the adherence of the postcolonial discourse and the breakdown of the Western-centered narratives, and only gained momentum between the end of the Vietnam War and the 1980s, before becoming more widespread.

The contributing chapters of this book examine the tendency to construct such discourses of selves and others and explain how these are transmitted to U.S. foreign policy since the colonization of North America. The complex evolution of an American identity through alterity is made evident in the first chapter by Walter L. Hixson, who explores the settler-colonialist disposition toward Native American Indians. The viciousness of Indian genocide, Hixson argues, is a product of a stark othering accomplished by conceiving Native Americans in contradictory physiological and civilizational tropes. The Native American as a savage barbarian was

the prevailing view of colonialists, and not just in the seventeenth century, but long into the nineteenth, thus making this discourse of alterity the most enduring in North American history. The Indian wars (1675–1763) though fought intermittently, were not instigated for discontinuous reasons, but always for the control of North America, and while these wars were essentially prompted by European rivalry, they were consistently waged by Anglo-American colonialists determined to eradicate the Native American other. The regularity of war and the resolve to have an all-white-settler frontier, Hixson argues, were characteristics ingrained into the Anglo-American colonial self, and through repetition it was embossed into the minds of later generations of Americans.

The colonialists, however, were also others, as Jack P. Greene explains in chapter 2. He portrays the multilayered conception of otherness in colonial discourse by grappling with American identity from the vantages of Britain and North America. Though many colonialists identified themselves as British—not merely by heritage, but by seeking recognition from the mother country in political and cultural affirmations—their peripheral place geographically and their proximity to universally acknowledged others, namely, Native Americans, resulted in the refusal by the British metropole to recognize its colonialists as entirely British. As this sense of distancing intensified, Greene argues, a new comprehension of the colonial “self” emerged, this one reactionary and resistant to affiliation with the metropole, a differentiation most evident in the discourse of the American Revolution, which gave colonialists an identity no longer dependent on cultural ties to Europe.

In the early years of the American republic, such internal and external others persisted to affect U.S. foreign policies. Europe continued to act as an American foil best exemplified by the Monroe Doctrine, Marco Mariano points out. Chapter 3 examines this seminal foreign policy—the doctrine to precede all future doctrines—that pronounced European colonization the ideological other to the growing democracies of the Western hemisphere. Mariano also argues that the Monroe Doctrine conceived an internal other in the Americas south of the U.S. border. The discourse of the doctrine was rooted in developing Latin and South American others in the image of the United States. Beyond space, Mariano explores the temporal reach of the doctrine and its underlying ability to bifurcate in the twentieth century. The Roosevelt corollary, the new world/old world isolationism of the 1920s, the Truman Doctrine, and the Manichaeic nature of the Cold War are styled, Mariano writes, from the Monroe Doctrine.

The geographical discourses of war, the frontier, and the notion of the West are complimented by Kristin Hoganson’s view of the self/other discourse inherent in the cultural geographies of pleasure. Consumerism in

the nineteenth and early twentieth century was obsessed with the foreign. The indulgence in obscure and alien artifacts, while certainly an appreciation of otherness, was no less covetous and capable of making a distinction between self and other. Chapter 4 focuses on the American appetite for collectable otherness as a cultural appreciation of the self. Hogganson argues that the fad for foreign imports, particularly Oriental rugs, overseas couture, exotic foods, and quirky knickknacks brought pleasure to their consumers through a reinforced sense of self-worth. This blurring of self and other in consumer geographies nicely foreshadows the domestic debates about American-ness occurring in the same period examined by Michael Patrick Cullinane in the “great debate” about overseas colonial acquisition. The U.S. foreign policy articulated by self-proclaimed imperialists led to the acquisition and government of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Guam, and Cuba, a program opposed by self-proclaimed anti-imperialists. The dualistic name of these activists only highlights the deeper-seated arguments both groups held regarding American identity. The “great debate” at the turn of the century led Americans to take up the perennial questions, “who is a U.S. citizen,” and “where exactly are the nation’s borders,” raising the potential for these differences among the domestic community to create yet another identity: the un-American American.

Internal debates among Americans in the early twentieth century were subsequently internationalized in the peace following World War I. Wilsonianism—the conception of global harmony by extending democracy, self-determination, and free trade—was a foreign policy seemingly without others. Advocacy for covenants of peace, as President Wilson saw them, was applicable universally. Lloyd Ambrosius, however, illustrates in chapter 6 just how segregationist Wilson’s philosophy was. Wilsonian self-determination constructed a global system of stratification based on race and nineteenth-century preconceptions of civilization. Outwardly, Wilson’s Fourteen Points declared universal liberties for all and equality among nations, but as Ambrosius shows, the mandate system copperfastened a sense of otherness based on common imperial geographies with lasting implications for the American Century.

The bifurcation of the world into us and them after World War I was problematic when it came to waging war again in the 1940s. From the vantage of the twenty-first century it is hard to imagine Hitler and the Nazis as anything but a quintessential other. Fascism by 1945 had come to be seen as the world’s greatest evil, but Nazi Germany was considered in a very different sense during the interwar years. The ubiquitous view of Nazis as evil did not exist before the war, Michaela Hoenicke Moore writes. American policy makers, American soldiers, and even the general

public could see themselves in the Nazis, complicating the war and the rationale for fighting. Hoenicke Moore explains how the Roosevelt administration—to varying degrees of success—transformed the image of Germany from a kindred nation to that of the other in order to effectively execute the war.

In the aftermath of World War II the United States sought to decolonize European empires based on the doctrine of the Atlantic Charter, a document that promoted ideals remarkably similar to Wilsonianism, but the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine ran contrary to these ideals as it stripped Palestinian Arabs of their right to self-determination. The creation of Israel has been the subject of substantial scholarly writing, much of which takes up the view that Palestinians were conceived of in a way consistent with Said's orientalism. Instead of recounting this well-trodden trope, Geraldine Kidd surveys the manufacturing of such alterity by one individual: Eleanor Roosevelt. Though more traditionally known as an activist for human rights and for the plight of the Third World, Kidd exposes Roosevelt's perception of the Palestinian Arabs as others, incapable of development. This outlook is an account of how a sense of otherness is arrived at via oft-repeated racial stereotypes, personal contact with foreign people, and the inherent imperial spirit of liberal internationalism. Regardless of Roosevelt's empathy with many in the Third World, and the appeals of Palestinian Arabs for her to see their liberation as a cause similar to her crusade for human rights, she remained intractably devoted to the Israeli state.

David Ryan examines the persistent use of othering during the Cold War and after. The attractions of orientalism among U.S. foreign policy makers led to constructed images of American opponents as others and created various essences that had little relation to the more complex and particularistic reality. Ryan explores four such examples ranging from the Truman Doctrine and the construction of the West, to the Reagan doctrine as applied in Nicaragua, through to the post-Cold War thesis on the Clash of Civilizations and the rhetoric employed by George W. Bush after 9/11. U.S. policy makers found that in some instances such depictions facilitated domestic and congressional mobilization, yet these perspectives also vitiated the application of U.S. policy and force. The Cold War as a Manichaean construct of U.S.-styled democracy as the "good" ideology versus Soviet communism as the "evil" ideology played out around the world. In no place was this construct more complicated than in Vietnam, where U.S. intervention was waged—at least outwardly by American politicians—to save millions of Southeast Asians from despotism. Liam Kennedy writes that photography played a significant role in creating and dispelling the imagery of otherness. The representations of the Vietnamese captured by

the lens of Philip Jones Griffiths, a Welsh photojournalist who saw the war as a brutal mixing pot, are dissected for the purpose of understanding the complexities of visual portrayals of identity. Griffiths sympathized with the Vietnamese people and attempted to illustrate them in less abstract and symbolic ways, and more as complex humans. His ultimate purpose, Kennedy argues, is to eliminate the distance between American and Vietnamese, to eliminate the sense of otherness, and move beyond the ideological frame of the war.

The final chapter engages the contemporary discourse on Islamism. Adib-Moghaddam examines the uses of the post-9/11 Islamophobia as a means for promoting the war on terror and explains how such otherness is manifested in a Foucauldian "bio-power." The otherness is best exemplified in the torture techniques used in the Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay prisons. This reminds us of the persistence of the other in U.S. foreign policy, which we need only look to the daily newspapers to find.

## Notes

1. Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
2. Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945-1990* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 302.
3. National Security Council, "U.S. Policy toward Africa South of the Sahara Prior to Calendar Year 1960, NSC 5719, July 31, 1957," Record Group 273, National Archives and Record Administration (hereafter cited as NARA).
4. *Ibid.*
5. David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 85–86; X [George Kennan], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* 25 (July 1947).
6. Edward W. Said, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (London: Penguin, 1995); *idem*, *Culture and Imperialism* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1993); Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, *A Metahistory of the Clash of Civilisations: Us and Them Beyond Orientalism* (London: Hurst, 2011), 13; Edward W. Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered," in his *Reflections on Exile and Other Literary and Cultural Essays* (London: Granta, 2000), 1999.
7. Fabian Hilfrich, "Visions of the Asian Periphery: Vietnam (1964-1968) and the Philippines (1898-1900)," in *America, the Vietnam War, and the World*, ed. Andreas W. Daum, Lloyd C. Gardner, and Wilfried Mausbach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 44. See also Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 1989); David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992); David Ryan, *US Foreign Policy in World History* (London: Routledge, 2000); Frank Ninkovich, "Interests and Discourse in Diplomatic History," *Diplomatic History* 13, no. 2 (2007); Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, *A Metahistory of the Clash of Civilisations*.

8. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin, 1995), 333; Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); David Ryan, *US Foreign Policy in World History* (London: Routledge, 2000), 1–54.
9. Melani McAlister, *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945–2000* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Matthew Frye Jacobson, “Post-Orientalism,” *American Quarterly* 54, no. 2 (June 2002), 307–15; Gyan Prakash, “Orientalism Now,” *History and Theory* 34, no. 3 (October 1995), 199–212; Edmund Burke III, “Orientalism and World History: Representing Middle Eastern Nationalism and Islamism in the Twentieth Century,” *Theory and Society* 27, no. 4 (August 1998), 489–507; Fred Halliday, *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), 199–200; Fred Halliday, *Two Hours that Shook the World: September 11, 2001: Causes and Consequences* (London: Saqi Books, 2002); Kail Ellis, “Review of *American Orientalism* by Douglas Little,” *H-Net Reviews*, H-Levant (March 2004); Andrew J. Rotter, “Saidism without Said: *Orientalism* and U.S. Diplomatic History,” *The American Historical Review* 105, no. 4 (September 2006); Edward Said, “Orientalism Reconsidered,” *Cultural Critique* 1 (Autumn 1985), 89–107.
10. Barack Obama worked hard with his Afghan allies to redraw distinctions between al Qaeda and the Taliban, offering various incentives to the latter to talk with Kabul, after the necessary delineations of war and U.S. military encounters of eight years failed.
11. John W. Dower, *Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor/Hiroshima/9-11/Iraq* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2010), xxiv.
12. David Ryan, *Frustrated Empire: US Foreign Policy, 9/11 to Iraq* (London: Pluto, 2007).
13. *Ibid.*, 24.
14. Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1993), xxviii.
15. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Penguin, 1992); Samuel P. Huntington, “Clash of Civilizations,” *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993); Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
16. President George Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” 20 September 2001 (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>).
17. Edward Said, “The Clash of Ignorance,” in *After 9/11: Solutions for a Saner World*, ed. Don Hazen et al. (San Francisco: AlterNet, 2001), 84.
18. Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002); McAlister, *Epic Encounters*; Said, *Orientalism*; Said, *The World, The Text, and The Critic* (London: Vintage, 1983); Said, *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World* (London: Vintage, 1997); Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*; James William Park, *Latin American Development: A History of Perspectives in the United States 1870–1965* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995); Adib-Moghaddam, *A Metahistory of the Clash of Civilisations*.
19. Leon Dominian, “The Mohammedan World, May 20, 1918,” Inquiry Document 137, M1107, roll 10, NARA.
20. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 161–62.
21. National Security Council, “Long-Range U.S. Policy toward the Near East, NSC 5801, January 10, 1958,” RG 273, NARA.
22. McAlister, *Epic Encounters*, 11.
23. John Carlos Rowe, “Edward Said and American Studies,” *American Quarterly* 56, no. 1 (March 2004), 33–47.
24. It is important to note that while Said identified certain homogenous constructions, he did not believe in them himself. His work on Western and Arab cultures and contexts in time and place was extensive and important because it simultaneously worked against the powerful cultural images or mental maps. Said argues:

My position is that in the case of an essential Islam or Orient, these images are no more than images, and are upheld as such both by the community of the Muslim faithful and (the correspondence is significant) by the community of Orientalists. My objection to what I have called Orientalism is not that it is just the antiquarian study of Oriental languages, societies, and peoples, but that as a system of thought it approaches a heterogeneous, dynamic, and complex human reality from an uncritically essentialist standpoint; this suggests both an enduring Oriental reality and an opposing but no less enduring Western essence, which observes the Orient from afar and so to speak, from above. This false position hides historical change. Even more important ... it hides the interests of the Orientalist.

Said, *Orientalism*, 333–34; Ryan, *US Foreign Policy in World History*, 27.

25. Hilfrich, "Visions of the Asian Periphery," 53–54.
26. *Ibid.*, 57.
27. Christopher S. Browning and Marko Lehti, "The West: Contested, Narrated and Clustered," *The Struggle for the West: A Divided and Contested Legacy*, ed. Christopher S. Browning and Marko Lehti (London: Routledge, 2010), 26.
28. Rotter, "Saidism without Said."
29. Said, *Orientalism*, 5–6.
30. *Ibid.*, 5, 336.
31. Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); Johannes Fabian, *Memory against Culture: Arguments and Reminders* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007).
32. Pierre Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production* (Cambridge: Polity, 1993).
33. Browning and Lehti, *The Struggle for the West*, 26.
34. Gerd Baumann, "Grammars of Identity/Alterity: A Structural Approach," in *Grammars of Identity/Alterity: A Structural Approach*, ed. Gerd Baumann and André Gingrich (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004), 18–23.
35. David Ryan and Victor Pungong, *The United States and Decolonization: Power and Freedom* (London: Macmillan, 2000).