Overview

The history of human cultures is a history of migrations and movements. The contours of human mobility are remarkably sensitive to a broader historical context, and migrations have to a large extent produced and affected historical realities. Based on the insight that cultures are always shaped by mobility and exchange, scholars have developed a growing interest in understanding the cross-cultural connections and conflicts that emerge in response to migration.

Dealing with the history of immigration into Germany during the last five hundred years, the present volume breaks new ground. For a long time, immigration into Germany was not considered as historically relevant as the emigrations of Germans to the New World, to Russia, and elsewhere. The question of whether Germany was predominantly a land of emigration or one of immigration has become a political issue during the last thirty years, leaving its imprint on historical research. Migration illustrates a particular tension between the realities of human movement in German history and the capacity of the country’s social, cultural, and political institutions to absorb its effects. Indeed, the politics of migration in Germany have helped to produce any number of frank assertions about the desirability—and in fact the very nature of—a heterogeneous Germany. The stakes were perhaps never more clear than in the political statements originating in the 1982 federal coalition agreement between the West German ruling Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP): the “Federal Republic of Germany is not a country of immigration. Therefore all steps acceptable from a humanitarian point of view need to be taken to prevent the influx of foreigners.” In the years that followed, a number of German conservative politicians, including
chancellor Helmut Kohl, repeatedly stressed that Germany’s migratory traditions were outgoing, not incoming, and that Germany was—and presumably always had been—a country of emigration, not immigration.

Yet recently, the contemporary and historic realities of human movement into Germany have been addressed on a larger scale. Likewise, scholars, politicians, and the media have reassessed the political nature of a term like Einwanderungsland (immigration country). Gaining ground recently is the idea that Germany boasts a rich history of hosting different immigrant groups, from the descendants of seventeenth-century French Huguenot refugees to those of nineteenth-century Ruhrpolen (Polish miners of the Ruhr area), from Gastarbeiter (“guest workers” from Southern and Southeast Europe and particularly from Turkey) and Vertragsarbeiter (contract workers migrating from several socialist countries in the German Democratic Republic) to Aussiedler (ethnic German immigrants from Eastern Europe). As a result, the sense that German society is defined by its historical development as an “immigration society” (Einwanderungsgesellschaft) is emerging. In recent years, political experts, influenced by eminent scholars, have explicitly mentioned “both sides of the [German] immigration society.” In this respect, the term “immigration society” increasingly includes migrants and non-migrants alike and suggests that the contemporary German Einwanderungsgesellschaft evolved from the long history of communication and interaction between migrants and (supposedly native) residents. However idealistic such an implicit revival of the older “melting pot” idea might seem nowadays, its adaptation publicly acknowledges the significance of immigration to German politics, economy, society, and culture. This importance is of course not a new discovery for migration historians.

Contrary to the well-known and well-researched history of the German lands as important areas of emigration and the population there as long-time participants in larger migration systems such as the Atlantic and North Sea Systems, Germany now stands at the crossroads of accepting that it has a long history of immigration as well. This realization is apparent in public memorials and anniversary celebrations such as the fiftieth anniversary of the 1961 German-Turkish Anwerbeabkommen (bilateral agreement on labor recruitment) in 2011. Against much historical evidence, Gastarbeiter immigration was hailed in this anniversary celebration as the beginning of Turkish immigration into Germany and also of Turkish integration into German society. German media and public memory also recalled the famous arrival in 1964 of the millionth Gastarbeiter, a Portuguese worker named Armando Rodrigues de Sá who was awarded a bouquet of flowers and a motorbike at the train station in Cologne. In retrospect, the public memory of immigration into Germany is sometimes presented as a story of German hospitality toward foreigners that neglects the precarious status of the millions of Gastarbeiter who not only faced severe difficulties to unite with their families from abroad but who also,
as “guests,” worked for their host society before they had to return home. In 2013, hardly anyone except a few critical scholars commemorated the fortieth anniversary of the West German *Anwerbestopp* of 1973, the recruitment ban on foreign workers in Germany that preceded similar laws in other European countries, and that set the stage for the starkly anti-immigrant declarations that followed.11

Whereas public debates over migration within Germany in the late twentieth century focused on the phenomenon of *Gastarbeiter*, current discussions within German politics and culture increasingly deal with a wide range of migrational and immigational issues such as poverty migration, specialist migration, “brain drain” (as well as “brain gain”), and the hybrid cultural allegiances of second- and third-generation migrants. At the same time, the longer historic dimensions of migration within, into, and around Germany slowly find their place in scholarship as well as in a public awareness of the historical dimensions of a German “immigration society.” Whereas the historiography of certain migrant groups has long existed but mainly lay in the hands of their descendants, as is obvious in the traditional historiography on the French Huguenots, a 2005 double exhibition at the *Deutsches Historisches Museum* in Berlin presented the Huguenots as only one of a wide range of immigrants in the German past, albeit perhaps the most prominent.12 Apart from late twentieth-century immigrations, migrational issues have long struggled (and struggle still) to gain an adequate place in history textbooks and in overall historical research.13

What justifies the present volume is not only its attempt to present state-of-the-art research and to give an overview of this changing situation in the historiography of German migration, but also to provide a diachronic perspective on immigration. The contributions do not claim to present a full range overview of a five-hundred-year-long history of migration into Germany. Taking into account their selective nature (and the obvious thematic gaps necessarily inherent to a collected volume such as the present one), they rather seek to raise the awareness of this important topic among non-German readers and to connect the empiric findings of migration scholars to current discussions in German historiography and culture. Taking into account recent research on the history and culture of migration, this volume provides important insights into the long-neglected history of Germany as a site of immigration as well as into the cultural consequences of this mobility. The essays, written by German and American specialists in the field, examine overarching migrational structures, the development and changes of migrational patterns and regimes from the early modern until the contemporary era, and the individual experiences of migrants over time.14 Since each essay contains a broader introduction into one particular migrational phenomenon before turning to empirical case studies, the volume also serves as an introductory overview on important aspects of a
broad, extremely rich, and sometimes rather messy subject—without attempting to provide a comprehensive, textbook style narrative.

However, a few caveats need to be mentioned that point to the complicated character of the history of migrations more generally. The first is that it often appears difficult to separate between phenomena of immigration as opposed to emigration. Such a seemingly obvious distinction tends to overstate a number of assumptions. One is the notion of clear-cut borders between nation states or territorial entities (including the borders of the European Union or the Mediterranean Sea as a natural frontier between the poorer south and the wealthier north). National and even natural borders are, however, to a great extent, historically constructed and change their meaning and importance over time.\textsuperscript{15} Separating emigration from immigration also implies that human movements might be one-dimensional and unidirectional phenomena with a clear point of departure and an equally clear point of destination. However, recent research has pointed out that human mobility is flexible, that it can proceed step-by-step or even in a circular fashion, and that it relies on a number of variable economic, social, political, religious, and legal parameters.

Another equally problematic assumption is the idea that immigrants can always, and more or less intentionally, decide upon their national, ethnic, and emotional allegiances. This is represented in the recent discussions of German politics and media on the \textit{Doppelpass}, the law that native Germans of migrant descent must decide at a certain age which citizenship they accept.\textsuperscript{16} Transnational family ties, money transfers, the return of \textit{Gastarbeiter} to their former homelands upon retirement, and the multiple identities of later-generation migrants caught between (at least) two, often conflicting, cultural frameworks shed light upon the problems connected to these shared allegiances between home and host countries.\textsuperscript{17} In German popular culture, this comes to the surface not only in discussions about a possible radicalization of third-generation migrants, or about Muslim women in public service wearing headscarves (the \textit{Kopftuchstreit}, or headscarf debate),\textsuperscript{18} but also in the evolution of particular immigrant languages (\textit{Kanaksprak}) and literatures that do not seem to fit into binary oppositions between home and host societies.\textsuperscript{19} Accepting the evolution of particular migrational “thirdspaces” avoids simple dichotomies and opens up the view on creative practices and the evolution of new, transcultural norms.\textsuperscript{20}

In addition, an issue of major importance is the general problem of defining migration. Often migration is considered a change of residence involving the crossing of a (political) border and lasting for a certain period of time.\textsuperscript{21} Such a definition is obviously problematic, simply by considering the many different political frontiers that could, as was the case in early modern and modern Germany alike, divide a given city or village. Likewise, forms of regular movement for certain months over many years—as can be found among early modern Austrian or Swiss pastoralists in the upper Rhine era, eighteenth-century trad-
ers from Northern Italy, and even twenty-first century harvest hands from Eastern Europe—do not seem to be covered by such a strict definition while they are still seen as temporary work migrations. Similar problems arise when one tries to distinguish forced from voluntary migrations. Is migration to avoid starvation, we could ask, on the forced or on the voluntary side? Is the preemptory decision to emigrate in order to avoid future persecution or even deportation voluntary or forced? What were the opportunities and scope of action of an Ottoman-Turkish prisoner of war in early modern Germany who could otherwise very easily be considered a forced migrant? Is not everyone in some respect a voluntary migrant as long as he or she is able to arrange and pay for a journey to a seemingly better and safer place (depending on age, gender, class, money, knowledge, and other factors)? And what is the amount of migrant agency even within coerced migrations? Only in rare cases during the last five centuries can migrational phenomena into Germany be definitively called forced migration. In the twentieth century, perhaps the most obvious example is the employment of forced laborers under the Nazi regime; in earlier times one might think of prisoners-of-war who sometimes lived under slave-like conditions.

Another distinction occurs between the blurry concepts of immigration/emigration and exile. In early modern Germany, the term emigration had a juridical and/or a political meaning (“immigration” is hardly found at all; “migration” seems to occur for the first time in the early eighteenth century), while exile (exilium, a concept originally derived from Roman Law) since the sixteenth century increasingly denoted religiously motivated self-perceptions of someone being temporarily removed from his or her homeland. While in the early modern era the concept of exile is usually a religious one, it gave way to more political connotations only in the later eighteenth century, especially from the French Revolution onward. Nineteenth- and twentieth-century sources often use the term exile as a politically motivated change of place (such as to escape persecution by Nazi Germany) from which a number of intellectuals and other emigrants decided to remigrate back to Germany when persecution and war were over. What both concepts have in common is that being removed from one’s place of origin is often considered a temporary, not a permanent, condition.

The blurred concepts as well as the fates of individual migrants (against the backdrop of class, gender, ethnic background, politics, economic situation, travel infrastructures, social ties) might thus justify turning from a structural perspective to the analysis of the lives of individuals. This implies stressing the knowledge, options, and opportunities of migrants rather than applying clear-cut macro-definitions from a bird’s eye view of socio-historical scholarship.

Finally, and contrary to what social and economic historians as well as scholars of historical demography have long assumed, migration is not just
an issue of exact and quantifiable figures, but sometimes rather one of non-quantifiable perceptions, feelings, and identities. While passenger lists, parish books, police records, and other seemingly exact data might suggest that it would be easy to simply count the number of immigrants and hold them against a presumably exact number of non-immigrant “natives” in order to distill the scope of migration, for most centuries before at least 1850 (and even nowadays with the hardly controllable influx of refugees and “illegal” immigrants), statistical baselines often pretend exactness more than they depict historical realities.

Therefore, and with all these caveats in mind, most essays of the present volume as well as this introduction argue not strictly upon serialized data and sharp definitions but rather try to integrate the contemporary circumstances of human movement while keeping in mind the flaws of the sources. The emphasis on immigration in the present volume is therefore not a strict but a rather heuristic choice, aimed at a better understanding of the other side of German migrations, i.e., the world in Germany as opposed to Germans in the world. It addresses an English-speaking audience highly aware of their own migrational backgrounds and traditions, which may indeed even connect them to Germany.

Immigration in Germany, 1500–2000

The focus on “Germany,” as well as on a period ranging from 1500 to 2000, needs clarification. Both of these limitations are somewhat arbitrary and must be understood loosely. As far as the geographic and political outlook of the book is concerned, there was no “Germany” before 1815 or even before 1871, and there were a number of “Germanies” after that date. Before 1806, the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation consisted of hundreds of smaller territorial entities, which were largely, but never exclusively, connected to a rather diverse German language and culture. As will be illustrated shortly, there is much evidence that the specific political and confessional heterogeneity of pre-modern Germany had considerable effects on the patterns of migration.

At the same time, one of the eminent characteristics of migration and human movement is that these phenomena transcend and even disrupt seemingly clear-cut boundaries. Still, a certain receptiveness to German languages and cultures was prevalent and necessary for people moving within or into the Empire, at least when migrants got in touch with territorial powers, cultural institutions, churches, or simply with new neighbors. Although French, Czech, and other seemingly “ethnic” immigrant communities existed in eighteenth-century Germany as well as, for instance, Turkish neighborhoods from the
later twentieth century onward, their inhabitants were (and are) never fully homogeneous nor completely cut off from their German surroundings.

Considering the common historical periodization of eras such as “early modern” or “modern,” it needs to be kept in mind that the history of mobility and migrations does not always fit into larger historical classifications because human movement is often connected to ideas and social practices of *a longue durée* (such as economy and trade, craftsmanship, kinship structures, scholarly exchange, religious ideas) that transgress the boundaries of historical epochs. Yet the legal, political and religious framework of historic Germany and Central Europe, which evolved around 1500, has left its mark on migrations and movements, although perhaps more for sedentary people and the authorities dealing with immigrants than for the migrants themselves. To a certain degree, people on the move had to adapt to the religious, cultural, and political norms of their new host countries when they negotiated with the authorities in order to settle and start making a new living. In this respect, migrants and human movements were affected by processes of state building as manifested in the creation of migrational regimes and citizenship laws, as well as by supranational processes such as an increasing globalization of economies, politics, and communication. This specific framework illustrates why migrations in the early modern and modern eras differ from earlier periods and deserve a closer analysis over a period of the last five hundred years.

Official data issued by the Federal Bureau of Statistics (*Statistisches Bundesamt*) for the year 2013 indicates that about 20 percent of the 80 million inhabitants of Germany had foreign origins. Contrary to such seemingly exact figures, population numbers and immigration rates of earlier times can often be no more than rough guesses: researchers assume that approximately nine million people lived in the Holy Roman Empire around the year 1500, 17 million in 1618, before the Thirty Years War reduced the population to 10 million (1650) after which a general growth set in (22 million in 1800), leading to the population increase of the industrial age (24.8 million in 1815; 40.8 million in 1870; 64.6 million in 1910; 69.8 million in 1940).

Apart from the German emigrations, which amount to approximately 5 million in the nineteenth century, demographers usually consider immigration rates before the twentieth century as rather insignificant in regard to the enormous overall population increase. It has also long been assumed that early modern Germany between 1500 and 1800 in particular consisted of a rather static society characterized by local as well as social stability and dominated by a hierarchic system of estates (*Ständeordnung*) and strong personal and economic ties that bound the population to their overlords and to the land they inhabited. More recent research, however, has shown that early modern societies were highly mobile and that at least one-third of all early modern Germans changed their place of living once in their lives. On an individual
level, there were many different reasons why people went on the move, ranging from the pursuit of trade, the wandering of craftsmen, the search for a marriage partner, and the peregrinations of students and scholars, to migrations caused by epidemics, wars, natural disasters, poverty or the wish for economic betterment. In retrospect, individual options often mixed with structural phenomena, making migration history the terrain upon which micro- and macrohistorical forces intersect. While in some cases migrations were part of a life cycle, corresponded with the seasons of the year, or belonged to certain professions, in others they were rather exceptional processes, as in cases of war and confessional persecution.

Considering early modern societies as based on personal presence and interaction (Anwesenheitsgesellschaft), immigrations and settlement processes are fascinating frameworks that help analyze the features of communication, connection, and personal interaction in daily life, especially against the backdrop of the administrative, confessional, and cultural plurality within the Holy Roman Empire. Therefore, in a certain sense, the early modern Reich consisted not only of an abundance of semi-independent territories, but also of numerous, albeit different, “immigration societies” (Einwanderungs- gesellschaften).

Apart from climatic changes and natural disasters, which caused settlement changes in many parts of Europe, the Reformation and its aftermath left perhaps the strongest imprint on central European migration patterns of the early modern era. Confessional strife between Lutherans and Catholics resulted in or contributed to religious conflicts that forced thousands of people to move. In this respect, the Thirty Years War was the most significant, albeit not the only, war in Central Europe that instigated temporary or permanent resettlement. The confessional divisions of Germany also influenced the treatment of vagrant people by sedentary societies because the ideas of the Reformation contributed to a stronger appreciation of local stability and regular work as norms that went along with a growing marginalization of foreign beggars and itinerant groups. This was especially the case in early modern cities, which had always been attractive to people seeking better lives.

Confessional migration is considered one rather distinct type of central European migration between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries. Thousands of adherents of the new faith had to change their residence due to religious homogenizations and persecutions, or legitimated their wish to move with their faith. The term Reformation of the Refugees has been coined predominantly with respect to Calvinist migrations to underline the creative power of mobility for the transmission of Reformation ideas. This included English and Scottish Presbyterians who fled the anti-Protestant persecutions in England under Mary Tudor and settled for some time in merchant metropolises such as Frankfurt am Main. Dutch Calvinists were an even larger group who left the Netherlands during the Dutch Revolt in the second
half of the century. Many of them settled in northwestern Germany and, as Jesse Spohnholz has recently illustrated, managed their daily living among other faiths with a good deal of pragmatic tolerance. A result of the French Wars of Religion of roughly the same period was the first exodus of French Reformed Huguenots, who entered the Rhenish palatinate and its surroundings, founding the first so-called Cities of Exiles (Exulantenstädte). In many cases, the evidence shows that immigrant communities were rather fluid and open to others, consisting of ethnically heterogeneous migrant families of different origin, although joint emigrations of families and relatives were also seen. In some cases, these migrant communities seemed to have played an important role as cultural transmitters between home and host societies.

While confessional migrations within the Empire surrounding the important Religious Peace of Augsburg (1555) have not yet been researched comprehensively, other larger emigrations of later decades are well known. These migrations point to the fact that confessional migration was far from a Calvinist phenomenon but rather affected Lutherans and other adherents of the Reformation as well. During the re-catholicization process of the Habsburg lands, thousands of mostly Lutheran Protestants decided to move to the southern and southeastern parts of the Holy Roman Empire where, for instance, Nuremberg became an important cultural center of Austrian Lutheran exiles (Exulanten). From the first years of the Thirty Years War, Electoral Saxony had to accommodate large numbers of Protestant exiles from the Habsburg-ruled Bohemian lands who settled at strategic spots close to the border or along the river Elbe and later even founded some Czech church communities where they preserved and sometimes created a common Bohemian heritage. While older research preferred to give exact figures of Austrian or Bohemian migrants based on somewhat mythological statements of contemporaries (for instance, 36,000 Bohemian families), more recent historians try to contextualize these migrations against the backdrop of day-to-day mobility. Still, an influx of probably many more than 100,000 people from the Habsburg lands into southern and central Germany over the seventeenth century seems a reasonable guess.

Only recently, the Roman Catholic dimension of confessional migration is beginning to attract the attention of researchers. However, it seems that due to the number of migrants and accompanying propaganda on the Protestant side, confessionally motivated migrations of Catholics seem to have been rather marginal in Central Europe—apart from military migrations in the Habsburg army or the movements of Dutch and English Catholics to the Southern Netherlands. Sephardic Jews, who settled in Antwerp and elsewhere after their expulsion from the Iberian Peninsula and later came to imperial cities such as Hamburg, have not usually been considered part of the phenomenon of confessional migration.
Emigrations in the name of religion and accompanied by their respective propagandas continued into the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as the famous case of the second Refuge of roughly 150,000 to 200,000 Huguenots in the 1680s demonstrates. A number of German rulers competed over attracting Huguenot settlers, although most of the Réfugiés decided to move to Brandenburg-Prussia, where they settled just as the many Dutch, Swiss, Czech, and other immigrants had done before. Huguenots were particularly successful in creating not only economic and social links to France and the diasporic Huguenot communities in Europe, but also certain myths of migration and religious exile.51 The famous Salzburg emigrants, who were likewise “invited” by the Prussian King Frederick William I in 1731 to repopulate northeastern Prussia, progressed through the empire in spectacular processions of about 16,000 people altogether. They served as a means for enormous political and religious propaganda.52 Still the Huguenots and the Salzburgers in Prussia point not only to the longevity of religious exile and confessional migration, but also to the increasing importance of immigration and attracting foreign settlers to support the economies of particular host countries. Together with a refinement of population theory and demographic scholarship among Cameralist politicians,53 the idea of Peuplierung (population increase) was paramount among numerous territories of the Empire, from Brandenburg-Prussia and other territorial states to smaller units such as in the Wetterau where even decidedly heterodox immigrants were allowed to settle in places like Neuwied.54

Whereas the larger territories in the eighteenth century actively tried to attract foreigners (such as Brandenburg-Prussia, the Habsburg Empire, where immigrants were meant to populate remote places such as Transylvania, or Russia, which was almost as popular for German emigrants as the Americas), other German states, especially in the southwest of the Empire, tried to prevent the emigration of their population by imposing harsh and threatening fines on potential runaways. All this points to the fact that migrational regimes of German states in the Enlightenment era were changing—not toward more tolerance of refugees, but toward acknowledging their economic potential. Scattered evidence from the perspective of the immigrants, however, indicates that contrary to the official policies, many of the new settlements in Prussia or elsewhere turned out to be unattractive to settlers who either fled from their new homes or never even showed up due to the lack of resources, individual safety, or economic opportunities.

Apart from these larger immigrations, early modern Germany hosted individual expert migrants who would hardly appear in a conventional history of German immigration. Scholars ranged from Reformation theologians of Scottish, Polish, Croatian, or Italian origin (such as John Knox, Matthias Flacius Illyricus, Pier Paolo Vergerio, John a Lasco) to eminent intellectuals such as
Justus Lipsius and Tycho Brahe, from court artisans to alchemists, musicians, theater groups, and soldiers. German armies in the seventeenth century consisted of large networks of British, Irish, and Scottish soldiers, among whom Walter Leslie figures prominently as the assassin of mercenary leader Albrecht von Wallenstein and the founder of a dynasty of soldiers on the continent.\textsuperscript{55}

At the same time, the Humanist and Baroque courts of Germany (especially the Imperial Court of Vienna, but also Bavaria, Hesse, and Electoral Saxony) evolved as international centers of scholarship and migrant cultures. Considering the fact that the Holy Roman Empire only indirectly participated in overseas expansion and trade, it is quite remarkable that its numerous courts hosted a wide mix of races and cultures, from former Turkish prisoners captured in the wars against the Ottoman Empire, to Africans, and sometimes even Native Americans. They all had, of course involuntarily, made it to Germany where they were often turned into exotic status symbols of a ruler and his nobility.\textsuperscript{56} In the mid-eighteenth century, the Scottish Jacobite immigrant George Keith lived in Potsdam just across from Sanssouci palace as one of the long-time friends of Frederick the Great of Prussia; his private entourage consisted of Kalmyk, Tartar, and African servants, and, as an adopted child, a Turkish Janissary’s daughter who ended up marrying a French Huguenot in Berlin.\textsuperscript{57}

Court cities such as Vienna and Dresden, with their demand for foreign consumer goods (food and spices, clothing, jewelry), as well as trading centers like Leipzig, Hamburg, and Frankfurt am Main offered opportunities for the development of international merchant infrastructures that often stemmed from a single prominent family. Merchants from certain alpine valleys of northern Italy, especially around Lago di Como, proved influential in building up persisting structures of trade that lasted over many generations and well into the modern era. A striking (but not isolated) example is the Brentano family who started a wine and spice trading business in seventeenth-century Frankfurt and whose later generations ended up as scholars and politicians.\textsuperscript{58} A number of well-known German chain stores, some still in business today, have their origins in similar seasonal migrant trade structures of northwest Germany that date back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{59}

What can be summed up as an early modern means of “brain gain” through migration into Germany relied upon the highly decentralized structures of the Holy Roman Empire. While its numerous territories provided shelter and refuge for suppressed individuals and groups who were expected to enhance the economy, scholarship, and culture of the host countries, the legal structure of the Empire could be detrimental for higher-ranking refugees with particular political goals. Thus, political migrants such as the Bohemian insurgents of 1618 mostly tried not to settle in the Empire but to escape from it for fear of extradition and condemnation, and royal European migrants such as Chris-
tina of Sweden, her successor Charles XII, or the Hungarian Prince Ferenc Rákóczi II eventually headed for Rome and the Ottoman Empire, respectively, where they felt far safer than in the heart of Europe. In the course of the French Revolution of 1789, however, temporary immigrant settlements of French political refugees evolved in a number of cities along the Rhine, among which the Koblenz community was perhaps the most remarkable, not only because of its size but also because of its imitation of French habits abroad.60

These immigrations surrounding the French Revolution hint at the important transition into the nineteenth century that, from a migration historian’s point of view appears to be a mixture of continuity and change. While political and economic factors came to dominate the patterns of migration in what Eric Hobsbawm has coined the “Dual”, i.e., political-cum-industrial, Revolution, issues of class and gender began to emerge as important factors shaping immigration (especially with regard to migrants from rural peripheries to urban centers). Whereas in the early modern era, dealing with immigration had often been an issue of municipal governments and local administrations including church communities, from the nineteenth century the evolving modern state and its institutions developed migratory regimes based upon central authorities and upon increasingly refined methods of administering the population. Undoubtedly, the centralized bureaucracies of the new migratory regimes perfected their systems of registration, governance, and control as far as the population, and particularly immigrants, were concerned. At the same time, a number of rather pre-modern features seem to have remained fairly constant (such as the meaning of family ties, the structure of communication, the migration cycles of journeymen, traders, and specialists). Furthermore, it needs to be taken into account that often even the most sophisticated ways of governing immigrants at least partly failed in practice, leading to the fuzziness of migration, which seems one important characteristic of this phenomenon to this day.

Germany was relatively late in becoming a place of asylum for genuine political refugees. However, in the age of a growing nationalism in the nineteenth century, political migrants could, under certain conditions, still rely on help and solidarity. When in the 1830s many Germans financially supported the refugees of the Grand Emigration from Poland (Wielka Emigracja) following the Polish November Uprising against Russia (1830–31), they probably did so not only because of a particular antagonism with Russia or because the refugees had fought for civil liberties, but also because it was obvious that most of these emigrants would not stay under the authoritative regimes of the German Confederation (Deutscher Bund), but rather would pass through Germany on their way towards Western Europe.61

However, against the backdrop of the large-scale German emigration to North America, Australia, and other places in the nineteenth century, it could easily be forgotten that Germany was more than just an emigration
society and that immigration and movements within the country featured prominently. The period of industrialization and abolition of feudal bonds greatly enhanced mobility, even if it did not instigate population movements from rural into metropolitan areas. Movements of journeymen, for instance, continued from early modern times well into the nineteenth century, attracting 140,000 Gesellen yearly to a city like Vienna with an overall population of 350,000.62 Apart from these rather traditional movements, industrialization resulted in a growing need for industrial labor and the immense growth of German cities, which had long been targets of immigration. This increase in migration from the rural peripheries to the centers is particularly obvious in the conglomerate of the Prussian provinces that stretched from the Rhine in the West to Silesia and to partitioned Poland in the east. The movement of Silesians to the capital of Berlin was an impressive phenomenon of the nineteenth century.63 The migration of Ruhrpolen to Prussia’s western provinces from the 1870s was even larger and perhaps the biggest population movement in nineteenth-century Germany. It provided a fundamental basis for industrialization (mining, steel mills) in the Ruhr area and affected Prussia, Germany, eastern Europe, and in particular the partitioned Polish nation whose western sections were included in Prussia once after 1792–93 and again after 1848. Technically the migrations of hundreds of thousands of Poles further west (the Polish community comprised approximately 400,000 in 1914) were by and large an internal Prussian migration because many ethnic Poles moved from Prussia’s provinces of Posen and Silesia, causing another migration wave of Poles from Russian Poland to fill in the population gaps.64 As immigrants, Ruhrpolen long favored indigenous marriages and crafted a largely closed society. One of the results of this ethnic Polish migration was that, after 1900, the German Empire evolved as the second-biggest importer of workers behind only the United States.65

In the Polish-Prussian province of Posen as well as in the Ruhr area and in other parts of Prussia, these migrational dynamics contradicted the Germanization policy of the Prussian state and, at the same time, created strong anti-Polish and anti-Slavic sentiments that lasted well into the twentieth century. In 1885, Germanization policies led to the temporary expulsion of 40,000 non-naturalized Poles and Polish Jews from Prussia. Due to the growing need for laborers, however, a seasonal employment system was introduced in Prussia only a few years later, with three-year contracts for workers from abroad who had to leave the country during the winter months.66 Such a temporary job rotation preceded similar regulations in the Federal Republic of Germany of the 1950s where Gastarbeiter were initially hired only for a fixed number of years.

Up until the early twentieth century, immigration into Germany as well as movements within Germany were legally not a national issue, because they
were addressed by the respective territorial authorities. By the nineteenth century, however, debates about immigration and citizenship were closely linked to the evolution of the German nation state and the question of what it means to be German. The Prussian treatment of foreigners after the establishment of the German Empire of 1871 indicates that it was a long way from instituting a concerted German immigration policy that was able to deal with the realities of Central European mobility. Prussian citizenship legislation was based on descent from German parents, and, after the failed revolution of 1848–49, became increasingly influential as an example to other German states. The first overarching, centralized German citizenship law (Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz) from 1913, was again based on German descent. Only upon individual application after a presence of ten years in Germany could immigrants receive naturalization; in case of a long and unauthorized absence abroad, Germans (namely deserters from military service), in turn, could lose their citizenship. What hints at the high priority of German militarization and the responsibility of each male for military service, has at the same time been interpreted as a growing racialization of foreign immigration by German society. Primary victims of this attitude in the German Reich were Russian Poles and East European Jews who rarely achieved naturalization. Legal or economic reasoning served to cover up attitudes of cultural and racial superiority. Not only Jewish newcomers from the east but also assimilated Jews in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were increasingly attributed with a particularly “Asiatic” foreignness, attitudes that helped shape the anti-Semitism of Nazi Germany.

Many features of nineteenth-century immigration, migratory regimes, and attitudes toward foreigners point toward the century to come. The migration regime of the Weimar Republic, as well as the mentality of many Germans toward foreigners from Eastern Europe, retained close continuities with the Kaiserreich. In addition, the occupation of the Rhineland by French troops following the treaty of Versailles and largely consisting of soldiers from African colonies triggered off a new anti-colonialist, racist, and sexualized discourse against a Schwarze Schmach (black humiliation). Hundreds of children from mixed relationships between French Africans and Germans ended up being sterilized under the Nazis in the 1930s.

Massive changes in immigration policies, albeit not in the overall attitudes vis-à-vis foreigners, occurred only after 1933. In a seeming contradiction to the National Socialist ideology of race, Germanness, and Volkstum, the Third Reich period ironically witnessed perhaps the greatest number of foreigners living in Germany. An estimated 13 million forced laborers (Fremdarbeiter) from occupied territories all over Europe contributed to the upkeep of the German economy before and during World War II. They often served under slave-like conditions and, in case they survived the breakdown of the Nazi
regime in 1945 on German territory, ended up as displaced persons, most of whom, together with Holocaust survivors, went elsewhere as soon as they could.\textsuperscript{72} Nazi resettlement policies of the so-called Volksdeutsche led to the migrations of millions of allegedly ethnic Germans in Eastern and East Central Europe, who, from 1944 onward, moved farther west.\textsuperscript{73}

The reason why Germany’s population—numbering almost 70 million in 1940—remained approximately 68 million in 1950 despite the millions lost during the Second World War illustrates that immigration had filled the demographic gaps.\textsuperscript{74} Thus, the years around 1945 in Germany and central Europe show probably the greatest extent of mobility ever witnessed in this region. After the end of the Nazi regime, approximately 25 million migrants from abroad (10–12 million displaced persons and around 14 million German refugees from the east), in addition to returned exiles and about 10 million people who had evacuated and thus survived the destruction of German cities, had lost their homes, and were looking for new settlements in a Germany divided into Soviet, American, French, and British sectors.\textsuperscript{75} At the same time, up to 700,000 foreign soldiers, stationed in both parts of Germany for the next forty years, were housed in barracks largely separated from the German population, but over time this would not prevent contact and, for instance, mixed relationships and marriages between Allied soldiers and German women.\textsuperscript{76} Migration between the sectors of occupied Germany was particularly a phenomenon of East-West movements, with approximately 2.7 million people leaving the newly founded GDR (1949) for the Federal Republic before the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961.\textsuperscript{77} In short, Germany in the postwar years consisted of an impressive number of uprooted people, often traumatized by individual experiences of escape and loss in the aftermath of the racist and expansionist actions of Nazi Germany across Europe.

With that said, modern research has still stressed that the postwar Allied reeducation efforts of the German population focused too sparingly on migration and cultural difference, leaving space for continued xenophobia and anti-Semitism in Germany after 1945.\textsuperscript{78} The Grundgesetz of the Federal Republic explicitly states in Article 116/1 that all “ethnic German” refugees (Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene) in Germany were legal German citizens and thus continued the ethnic concept of Germanness well into the postwar period. The integration of these millions of refugees from areas like the Sudetenland (Bohemia), Silesia, East Prussia, and elsewhere, has long been glorified in public memory as an astonishingly smooth process. Only recently have the accompanying individual setbacks, social and economic hardships, and psychological difficulties facing migrants as well as their host communities received more attention.\textsuperscript{79}

Continuities in legislation as well as in the attitudes of Germans toward foreigners can indeed be found between the nineteenth and the later twentieth centuries. The large-scale immigration of Gastarbeiter during the Wirtschafts-
wunder decade of the 1950s in West Germany not only relied on a rotation system resembling earlier Prussian practices (although now it was not so rigidly enforced), but it was also connected from its beginning with, at best, skeptical, and at worst, xenophobic reactions by considerable parts of the population.80

Gastarbeiter migration combined the employment needs of Germany, the need for economic and demographic relief of the country of origin, the creation of new markets, the interaction of German firms and foreign countries, and increasingly, the transfer of money from Gastarbeiter in Germany to their families in their home countries. The bilateral Anwerbeabkommen with Italy in 1955 opened the way for the large-scale employment of Italians in Germany, and similar contracts followed with Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Portugal (1964), and socialist but “block free” Yugoslavia (1968). Thus, Gastarbeiter policies largely recruited workers from Mediterranean nations experiencing conditions of economic contraction or slow growth (although similar contracts with North African states existed, they did not result in a broader migration).

In a political sense, many of these Anwerbeabkommen had their origins in or were heavily influenced by German obligations in international alliances such as the European Community and NATO.81 A particularly striking example for the effect of global Cold War policies on German immigration is the Anwerbeabkommen between Germany and the Republic of Korea in 1963, which, ten years after the Korean War and the political as well as ideological partition of the Korean peninsula, was strongly supported from the South Korean side and brought into Germany several thousand well-trained immigrants, most of them miners and nurses.82

At the time of the Anwerbestopp in 1973, approximately 3 million foreigners (mostly Turks) lived in West Germany, a country with an overall population of slightly less than 60 million. The joint recruitment ban initiatives of several European countries in the early 1970s used the oil crisis as an excuse to end what was likely to become a permanent mass immigration (although this led to more long-term settlement strategies among the existing immigrant societies, including family reunifications). Trends to collaborate among European countries also illustrate a growing Europeanization of migration patterns and migration regimes from the 1970s.83

It should not be overlooked that some of the migrational schemes and contacts from overseas to Germany in the late twentieth century can be traced to earlier times, sometimes dating back to the early modern era or at least the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries. This is obvious in respect to scholarly and student exchanges, but also to industrial labor, craftsmanship, and trade. Here it is possible to gain insight into the actual possibilities of interaction and exchange between foreigners and Germans, which should not be reduced to
German xenophobia. From the early modern era onward, German universities and educational institutions had attracted foreign students, which continued in the fields of natural sciences and engineering, but also the humanities, well into the twentieth century. For instance, the future national author of Pakistan, Muhammad Iqbal, received his doctorate as a British Indian citizen in Munich in 1907; a Japanese student exchange of the 1920s brought some of the first Koreans to Germany, among them poet Mirok Li. Small Italian communities had existed in Germany since the late seventeenth century (such as the court artisans and musicians in the *Italienisches Dörfchen* of Dresden), and temporary Italian migrants like industrial workers or ice cream vendors arrived north of the Alps around the turn of the twentieth century. They fostered the first, albeit small, infrastructure of Italian restaurants in Germany while Germans became increasingly interested in Italian food from the 1910s onwards. The American colony in Dresden around 1900 is another example for such earlier contacts between migrants and Germans.

In Soviet-occupied East Germany after 1945, which became for forty years the German Democratic Republic, organized immigration followed some of the patterns of the West German *Anwerbeabkommen*, even if it started some years later (1973), on a far smaller scale, and with a decidedly more political impetus. Contract workers (*Vertragsarbeiter*) were hired from socialist brother countries (such as postcolonial African states, Vietnam, and Cuba), in order to prepare their home countries for the development of a socialist society and to stress the particular socialist internationalism of the GDR. Foreign workers were segregated from Germans and often employed to do the hardest and most monotonous industry work that Germans would rather avoid. The number of foreigners in the German Democratic Republic, consisting of contract workers, international students, and temporary political asylants, largely from anti-imperialist resistance organizations such as the FLN (Algeria), PLO (Palestine), SWAPO (Namibia), as well as from the Chilean opposition, was small compared to the 4–5 million *Gastarbeiter* and other non-Germans in the Federal Republic in the 1980s. The largest group of non-Germans in the GDR was of course the members of the Soviet army and its civilian administration, with approximately one million people (mostly male) at any given time. Anti-Russian as well as other xenophobic sentiments were widespread among the population, contrary to the official doctrine of friendship with its socialist brother country.

Sometimes the migrational strategies of the GDR were directly opposed to West European immigration schemes, although with limited success (such as in the case of fostering a Yugoslav and North Korean exchange with the GDR). A similarity between West German *Gastarbeiter* and East German *Vertragsarbeiter* was that both populations kept a strong attachment to their countries of origin, leading to the sending of significant amounts of money
and goods to their families at home. This was as true for Turks in West Germany as it was for Vietnamese in the eastern part, who, in other respects, differed significantly from Vietnamese immigrants in West Germany. Today, the Vietnamese, who originally came to East Germany as contract workers on a rotation system from the 1980s, still form the largest group of non-European immigrants in the eastern part of unified Germany. Their patterns of immigration completely differ from the fate of the so-called Boat People among whom some 30,000 came to the western part of the country from 1979 as political asylants. Due to the Cold War, Vietnamese immigrants in West Germany had no opportunity to go back to Vietnam. Hence they assimilated rather smoothly into German society, as opposed to the Vietnamese in East Germany, who were separated from Germans and often did not learn German because they expected to return collectively after a few years.

The migrational regime of the GDR vis-à-vis the Federal Republic illustrates that in the latter half of the twentieth century, migration politics became increasingly part of international contexts: economic, social, and political (within the EU, NATO, among Socialist countries, or simply in opposition between the two Germanies). However, West Germany still contained and even revived a nationalist attitude, especially in the era of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, when debates increasingly concentrated on the reduction of the number of foreigners and on a possible misuse of political asylum in Germany. As a reaction, center-left parties as well as trade unions, churches and local initiatives since the early 1980s stressed the benefits of a multicultural (colloq: Multikulti) society that, especially in the bigger cities, had started to evolve especially within a socio-economic context (restaurants, ethnic shops, immigrant-German collaboration at work). It was still rarely acknowledged in public that, against the backdrop of frequent polemics toward migrants who seemingly benefitted from an overstretched job market and from the German welfare state, their role as tax payers and increasingly as businesspeople made them perhaps less a burden than a benefit to the West German economy. However, the assaults upon migrants in the eastern and western parts of a reunified Germany in the early 1990s as well as the xenophobic attitude among parts of the population toward foreign immigration made clear not only that immigrants often attracted economic fears but also that German politics still had to cope with the country’s National Socialist past.

This is obvious in the case of the immigration of “ethnic” Germans from the eastern parts of the European continent. The 1980s and especially the 1990s witnessed an influx of ethnic German Aussiedler from east central and eastern Europe and from the states of the former Soviet Union where, due to Stalinist deportation, German communities existed in places as far as Kazakhstan and Siberia where they are nowadays often almost extinct. Such a reverse migration, often based on rather diffuse ideas of German heritage and of ethnic
Introduction

and cultural belonging to a German nation, dates back into the nineteenth century. After the breakdown of Socialism in the early 1990s, the increasing influx of Aussiedler, now called Spätaussiedler, who were granted a German passport upon arrival because of an alleged German descent, was reduced to certain quotas and connected to a basic knowledge of the German language, which was usually scarce among migrants from the former Soviet Union.

As opposed to the Aussiedler, the unclear status of Gastarbeiter and the issue of immigration opportunities for foreign workers and their families had been discussed since the 1960s, giving voice to the first statements that West Germany had to face that it was or had become a country of immigration. Still, not only the conservative but also the social democratic governments of the 1960s and 1970s were reluctant to deal with the substantial change in the legislation of foreign immigration, fearing political repercussions with the countries of origin, in addition to economic and social problems in Germany and an increase of xenophobic reactions.

Whereas from the time of the Anwerbeabkommen until the 2000s, German legislation had not enforced a strict rotation system of temporary foreign labor, it also did not foster structured immigration policies. Rather, Germany enacted a separation of foreigners from Germans. However, an evolving cultural plurality could no longer be denied, resulting, for instance, in immigrant cultures influenced by their German surroundings (mixed marriages, immigrant pop music, immigrant literature) and vice versa. Even one of the most famous Gastarbeiter contributions to German cuisine, the Döner Kebap, made its way allegedly from 1970s Berlin to German immigrants and non-immigrants alike.

In recent years, the legal situation for immigrants in Germany has changed. Amendments of laws in 1999 (Passgesetz) and 2005 (Einwanderungsgesetz), respectively, governed immigration and allowed easier naturalization for migrants and their descendants. Now birth on German soil can serve as the basis for naturalization. As in other countries, such immigration laws nevertheless did not end discussions about the status of immigrants and the ways and means of immigration policies, but it helped to put Germany into an internationally comparable position as an immigrant society with a rich migrational history.

American ketchup, Italian pizza and pasta, Turkish Döner, and many other dishes have found their way into seemingly genuine German food habits. However, migrants in Germany today, as in other immigration societies, still face an over-simplification and reduction of their complex and differing cultural backgrounds to certain symbols such as headscarves or to a seemingly monolithic “Islam.” Whereas ethnic food has been a long-acknowledged immigrant contribution to German cultural diversity, in other fields Germany now needs to become aware of its historic continuities as an immigrant country in order
to understand the contribution of migration for its history and to leave enough space for the growing and vibrant cultural diversity it deserves. In short, even “Germanness” is a far more diverse and complex phenomenon when looked at from a historical perspective than has long been acknowledged.

Outline of This Volume

The case studies presented in this volume explore the long and varied history of migrations in German lands. Although only a small part of the multifaceted story of immigration in Germany can be addressed in more detail, the chapters represent and highlight larger phenomena and structures of migrations in German lands. They cover the large chronological period of the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries from three central thematic angles: religion and exile; flux and the politics of immigration; and cultures of exile and the formation of immigrant identities.

Andrew McKenzie-McHarg, Ulrich Niggemann, and Anna Koch take up questions of how religion and religious identities informed the experience and practice of exile and immigration from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries. McKenzie-McHarg probes the ways a martyr narrative was used to understand early modern exilic experience. Niggemann takes up the question of Huguenot identities and the ways that assimilation and autonomy were framed by religion. Anna Koch’s essay also examines these themes in the context of post-Holocaust “return migration” of Jews to Axis countries by comparing the experiences of returning Italians and Germans. Koch’s essay on twentieth-century issues allows us to better see how the themes animating McKenzie-McHarg’s and Niggemann’s work develop and change across the early modern/modern divide.

The second theme—flux and the politics of immigration—plays out over four essays. Jason Coy and Alexander Schunka provide access to the issues of exile, penal banishment, forced migration, and assimilation in the early modern period. The essays by Roland Gehrke and Jochen Oltmer examine Polish laborers in the Kaiserreich and Weimar Republic, and they provide insight not only into the political stakes involved with immigration between 1871 and the Great Depression, but also into the experience of flux that was occasioned by worker and seasonally periodic migrations.

Finally, the historical processes undergirding the formation of “cultures of exile” and of diasporic identities in German-speaking lands that involve aspects of (self-) perception, are taken up by the essays written by Nadine Zimmerli, Christopher Molnar, Jannis Panagiotidis, and Bettina Severin-Barboutie. Zimmerli examines the formation of an expatriate culture in Dresden that was explicitly cultivated by the city leadership; Molnar and Pan-
agiotidis take up the question of how Yugoslav communities experienced life in West Germany. At times explicitly transnational, at times providing a type of ethnic “anchor” for further immigration, these communities not only resisted assimilation but also performed a kind of crafty jujitsu that maximized their power within the asymmetries of the Cold War. Severin-Barboutie concludes this set of essays—and the volume—by considering the ways that (im)migration has been remembered and represented in Germany since the 1970s.

One advantage connected to the kaleidoscopic character of this volume is that it offers a multifaceted approach into different historical phenomena, periods, and methodologies all connected with migration in German lands. The patchwork nature of the volume illustrates that migration research is in some fields still very much in flux (especially in contemporary history), that it is perhaps a better-trodden path for the later twentieth century and increasingly for the early modern era, and, all in all, that migration is in itself a rather messy subject, connected to almost any other possible approach in historiography (politics, society, economy, culture, and gender). If the present volume succeeds in raising a general awareness of the topic especially among non-German readers, the editors are hopeful that future research and publications will fill the existing gaps.

There is, however, no doubt that issues of cultural identity, of religious, political, and economic participation, as well as the fulfillment of certain practical, cultural, and spiritual needs still range broadly among today’s migrants, just as among those five hundred years ago. The contributions of this volume document a long process of mutual learning in the daily interactions between migrants and the German host society that was itself formed over centuries on the basis of cultural mobility and demographic change.

Alexander Schunka is Professor of Early Modern History at the Freie Universität Berlin. He received his doctorate in History at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München in 2004 and has since taught early modern history at the universities of Stuttgart and Erfurt. He specializes in the cultural and religious history of early modern Europe with a focus on the history of migrations. His publications include Soziales Wissen und dörfliche Welt (2000), Gäste, die bleiben (2006), some co-edited volumes, and a number of articles. His forthcoming book will be on the relationship between Protestantism and the birth of German Anglophilia in the eighteenth century.
Notes

5. Ibid., 16.
6. This idea featured prominently in the so-called Chicago School and particularly for the American sociologist Robert Ezra Park, who was influenced by Germans Georg Simmel and Ferdinand Toennies, see Robert Ezra Park, “Human Migration and the Marginal Man,” in American Journal of Sociology 33, no. 6 (1928): 881–93.
14. On the notion of migration regimes see Europäische Migrationsregime, ed. Ute Frevert and Jochen Oltmer (Göttingen, 2009: Special Issue of Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 35 [2009]).
15. On the historical uses of the concept of space see, from a German perspective, Susanne Rau, Räume: Konzepte, Wahrnehmungen, Nutzungen (Frankfurt am Main, 2013).

18. See, for instance, Schirin Amir-Moazami, Politisierte Religion: Der Kopftuchstreit in Deutschland und Frankreich (Bielefeld, 2007).


22. Recent migration research has stressed that such a distinction can often be blurred, see Migration, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives, eds. Jan and Leo Lucassen, 3rd, rev. ed. (Bern et al., 2005); Oltmer, Migration, 63.

23. For an early modern example, see Philip Otterness, Becoming German: The 1709 Palatine Migration to New York (Ithaca, NY, 2004).


25. On these problems see David Eltis, ed., Coerced and Free Migration: Global Perspectives (Stanford, CA, 2002).

26. Ulrich Herbert, Fremdarbeiter: Politik und Praxis des ‘Australie-Einsatzes’ in der Kriegswirtschaft des Dritten Reiches (Bonn, 1999); on slavery in a European context from the early modern era onward, see Nicole Priesching, Sklaverei in der Neuzeit (Darmstadt, 2014).

27. See, for instance, Fritz Stern, Five Germanys I have Known (New York, 2006).

28. See, for instance, Fritz Stern, Five Germanys I have Known (New York, 2006).


30. See, for instance, Fritz Stern, Five Germanys I have Known (New York, 2006).


33. See, for instance, Ehmer, Bevölkerungsgeschichte, 9.


38. On the interactions among migrants and between migrants and host societies see, among others, Jesse Spohnholz, *The Tactics of Toleration: A Refugee Community in the Age of Religious Wars* (Newark, NJ, 2011); Schunka, *Gäste, die bleiben; Migration und kirchliche Praxis: Das religiöse Leben frühneuzeitlicher Glaubensflüchtlinge in alltagsgeschichtlicher Perspektive*, ed. Joachim Bahlcke and Rainer Bendel (Cologne et al., 2008).

39. See, among others, the recent microstudy by Holger Berg, *Military Occupation under the Eyes of the Lord: Studies in Erfurt during the Thirty Years War* (Göttingen, 2010).


55. David Worthington, British and Irish Emigrants and Exiles in Europe, 1603–1688 (Leiden, 2010); for the relevant courts see, among others, Robert J.W. Evans, Rudolf II and his World: A Study in Intellectual History, 1576–1612 (Oxford, 1973); Bruce T. Moran, The Alchemical World of the German Court: Occult Philosophy and Chemical Medicine in the Circle of Moritz of Hesse, 1572–1632 (Stuttgart, 1991); Helen Watanabe-O’Kelly, Court Culture in Dresden; From Renaissance to Baroque (Basingstoke et al., 2002).


65. Dirk Hoerder, Geschichte der deutschen Migration vom Mittelalter bis heute (Munich, 2010), 84.


70. Jochen Oltmer, Migration und Politik in der Weimarer Republik (Göttingen, 2005). See his contribution in the present volume.


73. Oltmer, Migration, 44; Hoerder, Geschichte der deutschen Migration, 99–100.


82. See the contributions in the exhibition catalogue Shared. Divided. United, ed. Nils Sanders et al. (Berlin, 2009).


84. On Iqbal, see Annemarie Schimmel, Muhammed Iqbal: Prophetischer Poet und Philosoph (Munich, 1989); on Li see his autobiography, Mirok Li, Vom Yalu bis zur Isar (Sankt Ottilien, 2011). See the contributions in Gerhard Höpp, ed., Fremde Erfahrungen: Asiaten und Afrikaner in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz bis 1945 (Berlin, 1996).


86. See Nadine Zimmerli’s contribution in the present volume.


90. Hillmann, “Riders on the Storm.”


94. Schönwälder, “Migration und Ausländerpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.”

95. Chin, Guest Worker Question; Chin, After the Nazi Racial State: Difference and Democracy in Germany and Europe (Ann Arbor, MI, 2009), 137ff.


Bibliography


Frevert, Ute, and Jochen Oltmer, eds. Special Issue of Geschichte und Gesellschaft 35 (2009).


Gehrke, Roland. "Praktische Solidarität als Ausdruck politischer Gesinnung: Die Aktivität der südwestdeutschen ‘Polenvereine’ von 1831/32." In Migration als...


Li, Mirok. Vom Yalu bis zur Isar. Sankt Ottilien, 2011.


