

## A CONFLICTED AND DIVIDED HABSBURG MEMORY



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In one famous novel of the 1920s, a young Austrian officer returns to Vienna from a Russian prisoner-of-war camp at the end of the war and meets an old work colleague. Their perspectives differ due to their age and experience. For the officer, the four-year struggle is by no means over—he aims to return to Russia to settle old scores—while his civilian colleague is about to retire to the tranquil Austrian province of Vorarlberg. The civilian exclaims however: “Tragic, really tragic. All those youngsters gone, and for what, I ask you?”<sup>1</sup>

The Habsburg monarchy—Austria-Hungary as it was usually known from 1867 to 1918—had been completely destroyed by World War I. Over the previous century it had faced disaster several times. During the French revolutionary wars, Napoleon had forced the empire that stretched across East-Central Europe into a humiliating peace (1809) and carved off sizeable chunks of territory in the north and south. In 1848 the internal threat to the Habsburgs was stronger as the regime struggled and finally managed to suppress revolution and secession. The Great War of 1914–1918 was then the final test of the monarchy’s ability to justify its existence on the European stage, both as a Great Power and as a legitimate empire in the eyes of its eleven main nationality groupings. In July 1914 the Habsburg elite had known the risks they took in pushing for war against Serbia, but felt that by not scotching that “nest of vipers” they would demonstrate irretrievable weakness at home and abroad. It would be, Field Marshal Conrad von Hötzendorf predicted, “a hopeless struggle, but even so we must engage, for such an ancient monarchy and such a glorious army cannot perish ingloriously.”<sup>2</sup>

It proved indeed to be a suicidal decision. Despite some intermittent successes that spurred on its military leadership, Austria-Hungary failed to win a decisive victory on any of its three fronts (Eastern, Balkan, and Italian). The war steadily eroded confidence in the imperial regime and from 1916, with a mounting food crisis and war weariness, a major transfer of allegiance took place to local leaders—often nationalist—who seemed to offer citizens a more secure future. By the end of hostilities, eight million men had been enlisted to fight for the Habsburg empire and about a million of those (13 percent) had died for it, roughly on a par with British deaths, but half the number of Russian casualties. Two million Austro-Hungarian soldiers (25 percent) had been wounded in some way, while over one and a half million (21 percent) had been taken prisoner.<sup>3</sup> In October 1918, as military defeat became a certainty, regional governments in Prague, Zagreb, Cracow, and Budapest moved to seize power on behalf of their various nationalities and the Habsburg monarchy speedily broke apart.<sup>4</sup>

The result, as confirmed in the peace treaties of 1919–20, was that out of Austria-Hungary's ashes arose six "successor states." Two—Austria and Hungary—were now treated as defeated countries, responsible for provoking the war and its traumatic impact; they suffered huge losses of their "national" territory as well as economic reparations and other restrictions to their sovereignty. Four successor states, however, posed as victor states in the New Europe—Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Poland—and secured a privileged place at the Paris peace conference. Ostensibly they had gained their national independence, or at least expanded their national territory, thanks to the monarchy's destruction. The official discourse in these states was likely to be triumphant when interpreting what had been lost and what had been gained from the apocalypse.

This basic division in interwar Europe—an official dialectic between the victors and the vanquished—is the starting point in this volume of essays. But our aim is to problematize that divide when exploring the legacy of the Habsburgs' final war. Despite the mass death and physical destruction that marked 1914–18 across East-Central Europe, there has been surprisingly little research on how World War I was interpreted by contemporaries in the different successor states of Austria-Hungary. In most historiographies, the year 1918 forms a watershed with few attempts to connect the experience of Habsburg wartime sacrifice with the transition, especially the transition undergone by military veterans, to life in the post-Habsburg world. Isolated studies do exist that span the watershed moment: for instance, on the memories of the Habsburg elite;<sup>5</sup> on the fate of Habsburg officers;<sup>6</sup> on constructing a Czechoslovak army out of the Austro-Hungarian forces;<sup>7</sup> on German war memorials in Transylvania and Czechoslovakia;<sup>8</sup> or on the economic dimension to total war and its after effects.<sup>9</sup> Most research has tended to focus on one successor state or one national grouping, as a case study in relative isolation from other experiences in the region. Although understandable in that it mirrors the splintering of "Habsburg historiography"

after 1918, this tends to privilege the postwar geopolitical framework and automatically obscures the similar or comparative legacies that emerged from the old Habsburg unit.

This book, *Sacrifice and Rebirth*, while divided geographically, seeks to offer a comparative dimension to how the Great War was remembered and interpreted across the space formerly united under the Habsburg monarchy. Part I focuses on those states or regions where the Great War was usually discussed using a language of “defeat” and where it was difficult to find any meaning for the mass sacrifice. At a minimum it was felt that the dead should be honored by the living, but various discourses soon suggested that the wartime survivors were continuing to make sacrifices in a communal struggle that was not yet over. In the chaotic first Austrian Republic, as Catherine Edgecombe and Maureen Healy reveal, there were immediately conflicting perspectives on the sacrifice and how best to commemorate it. These divisions were often between Austrian regions or localities, but they were also informed by sharp political and ideological stances in the interwar Republic, where some prioritized sacrifice for an Austrian or a German fatherland, while others viewed the past and the future through a socialist or even Habsburg (“legitimist”) prism. This produced a lack of any inclusive memorialization across Austria, something notable within all the successor states. In turn it suggested a hierarchy of sacrifice. Battle-weary men almost always overshadowed women, while Jews and other “outsiders” were often disparaged in a competition to dictate exclusive interpretations of the Austrian experience and legitimize particular postwar agendas.

While this reaction mirrored the interwar struggle in the Austrian rump state to forge a new national identity, postwar Hungary witnessed a militantly nationalist public discourse precisely because of its new ethnically-demarcated borders. It was easier, after the disastrous Treaty of Trianon assigned 75 percent of territory to neighboring states, to tie Hungarian wartime sacrifice closely to Greater Hungary’s decimation by the victors. The struggle in Hungary for some postwar “regeneration” was enveloped by Magyar nationalists into a crusade to reverse Trianon. Moreover, as Franz Horváth’s chapter shows, in the Hungarian case the postwar Habsburg legacy had unique features since Magyar communities, separated by new state borders, were subordinated in Romania and Czechoslovakia to alternative and dominant narratives of the war (only the division of Tyrolean Germans between Austria and Italy is really comparable: see Laurence Cole’s analysis). Horváth’s case study focuses on the Transylvanian Magyars whose military veterans could now only organize and commemorate in exile—in “Hungary proper.” In Transylvanian Romania meanwhile, any Magyar memorialization was very subdued or silenced by the Romanian authorities. It was a contrast not only to the native Saxon Germans who posed less of a threat to Bucharest,<sup>10</sup> but also to a certain tolerance of special commemorations among the Magyar communities in (Czecho-) Slovakia.

Most German-Austrian and Magyar communities typically adopted annual commemorative rituals to express their grief and their obligation to the dead. Yet a minority of junior veterans reacted proactively to the “culture of defeat” (often challenging the very concept) with militant behavior. Two essays in Part I introduce us to this theme: how the struggle and comradeship of the wartime trenches could be transferred into new idealistic crusades across the successor states. The priority in these was not on words or political engagement but on action. In 1918–19, many soldiers returning home found a chaotic domestic scene at odds with the values they had fought for. How they reacted depended greatly on the stability of the new state frameworks. Although some militant work could start immediately, it often had to be a long-term objective. Robert Gerwarth’s chapter highlights paramilitary violence in the year after the armistice, especially in Hungary where a mixture of aggrieved veterans and young men who had missed out on fighting produced “explosive subcultures of ultra-militant masculinity.” The aim of their protest, apart from the thrill of action, was to reassert order in the nation, combating internal traitors while mindful of a wider European struggle against international threats (Bolshevism and Jewry).<sup>11</sup> It was the unstable phenomenon of Bolshevik Hungary in 1919 that allowed some veterans to remobilize almost immediately behind a new banner; and although their public militancy then subsided, it would resurface in the Fascist Europe of the 1930s to support Hungary’s agenda of reversing Trianon.

A longer-term struggle took place among those nationalist veterans who found themselves among the German minority of Czechoslovakia. Their Sudeten German crusade too would reach fruition in the 1930s but, as Chapter 3 reveals, its origins owed as much to the prewar Czech-German nationalist clash in Bohemia as to the militancy injected by the wartime trenches. Above all, Sudeten nationalist veterans after 1918 tended to make sense of their sacrifice by transforming what had previously been a Habsburg/German-Austrian fight into a specifically anti-Czech mission to break out of their new state “straitjacket.” Rather than showing much nostalgia for the Habsburgs, they now aspired to their own Sudeten national rebirth on a par with what their Czech antagonist had achieved in 1918. However, because postwar Czechoslovakia lacked Hungary’s instability (notwithstanding the relative chaos in Slovakia in 1919), Sudeten German militancy had to be carefully and privately channeled. It became a long-term vision, with some veterans seeking to perpetuate the virtues of trench comradeship through a *Männerbund*, a new national regime based on chivalric male bonding. This mission also relied on recruiting the postwar male generation. Just as youth was vital for national regeneration after the wartime catastrophe, young males who had missed the war were attracted to an energetic, idealistic adventure. Thus as in Hungary, some Sudeten German veterans and young men continued the wartime sacrifice in a refocused form. If Magyar militancy fed

off the Trianon calamity, the Sudeten mission consistently drew its purpose and inspiration from the overwhelming (Czech) narrative of the Czechoslovak state.

In Part II we turn from defeated communities to “victor states” that in the interwar period asserted a hegemonic national narrative of the Great War. Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were the key manufactured states to emerge from the Habsburg ruins. There began what Rogers Brubaker has termed “nationalizing nationalism,” the new state authorities seeking to consolidate victory by forging together one nation out of a multi-national conglomerate.<sup>12</sup> The war was officially interpreted as the final rebirth or liberation after centuries of oppression, the culmination of a long struggle for national unification. This meant imposing upon the population an exclusive narrative of heroic and worthwhile sacrifice. Key events were selected for the nation to remember (the 1915 Serbian anabasis across Albania, the 1917 Czech victory at Zborov), and usually it was the myth of foreign resistance alongside the victorious western Allies that was prioritized. Less attention was paid to voices from the home front where—whether in wartime Bohemia, Polish Galicia, or occupied Serbia—a messier picture existed of opportunism and simple accommodation in the face of Austro-Hungarian rule. For Czechs and Serbs certainly, the recent battles could be portrayed as deliverance from an oppressive Habsburg yoke. But usually this was magnified into a more dramatic crusade, constructed first in a European-wide framework with the small nation playing a disproportionate role, and second within a grand, national narrative that stretched back into medieval times.

Melissa Bokovoy’s chapter analyzes the Serbian hegemonic discourse within the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Yugoslavia). While other historians have recently shown how this blended into a Yugoslav memorial culture,<sup>13</sup> Bokovoy explains how the Serbian authorities subtly massaged the photographic narrative in order to foreground Serbian heroic exploits and military masculinity. They emphasized Serbia’s overwhelming contribution to the creation of Yugoslavia, setting out as in the other successor states a hierarchy of sacrifice. They also framed the struggle as one of linear, primordial progression: reaching back to Serbia’s martyrdom at the hands of the Turk in the fourteenth century and reaching forward to help new generations learn their duty to perpetuate the Serbian national mission. In this way, as in the defeated states, the struggle was not over but was being refocused.

Nancy Wingfield explains the similar dominant (Czech) narrative within interwar Czechoslovakia. The legendary 1917 battle of Zborov on the Eastern Front was commandeered as supposedly representative of the Czech military experience, reverentially commemorated, and immortalized in Czech literary, theater, and memorial culture (including the Czechoslovak “Unknown Soldier” in Prague). By encouraging this, the Czech authorities deliberately privileged the heroic exploits of the Czechoslovak Legion, those ex-Habsburg soldiers who had deserted or been taken prisoner mainly on the Eastern Front, and had then

fought on the Allied side as a resistance force. In contrast, the Zborov myth marginalized those thousands of Czech soldiers who had continued to fight, loyally or obediently, in the Austro-Hungarian ranks. The Czechoslovak hegemonic war discourse was exclusive in other ways too. While it often chafed against Slovak aspirations within the new state framework, the exclusive mythology had little room for Sudeten German or Magyar interpretations of the recent sacrifice either. These groups were rarely incorporated into the Czechoslovak commemorative culture, in war memorials for instance.<sup>14</sup> Instead, they had to seek meaning for the mass carnage in a parallel war discourse that could challenge the very legitimacy of the new state.

Yet even within the dominant narratives of the “victor states” there was also much vigorous and violent dispute. Specifically, it emerged because the phenomenon of discontented veterans or would-be soldiers was by no means confined to the “defeated nations” of the Habsburg monarchy. Indeed, it was ubiquitous that a minority of returning soldiers wished in peacetime society to assert the military ethos of discipline and order they had experienced at the front. They were joined by a younger male generation who hankered after a war experience, who felt alienated by the fast return to bourgeois politics instead of the chance of continued militant action to “regenerate” the nation. Katya Kocourek’s chapter highlights the ideological split that soon developed among Czechoslovak legionary veterans. The crux lay in how the controversial legionary legacy was to be interpreted in Czechoslovakia. One legionary branch exited from the war with a social agenda close to that of the country’s founding fathers. Another smaller group pursued a “state-forming legionary tradition” nearer to the militant, anti-Bolshevik crusade that had characterized the Legion’s anabasis across Siberia. For veterans like Rudolf Medek, if legionary martyrdom was not to be in vain, their heroic, disciplined, and patriotic spirit had to be inculcated into all Czechoslovak citizens in order to maintain the new state against hostile outsiders. As Kocourek reveals, such a project had some success, not least with publicity in commemorative rituals and writings, through attaching itself to sympathetic elements of the Czechoslovak military establishment.

This militant legionary mentality also had distinct parallels in interwar Romania. Although this successor state, like Poland, was not characterized by a specific “Habsburg” inheritance, its main territorial expansion after the war was at the empire’s expense (Transylvania), and its violent political culture was partly defined by a struggle to defend and nurture Greater Romania in a hostile Europe. The hegemonic, often anti-Magyar, war narrative was clear in Transylvania and in Romanian memorial culture more widely.<sup>15</sup> But as Rebecca Haynes shows, this official interpretation of Romania’s “rebirth” was inadequate for some young Romanians who had missed the war and yearned for a militant mission. Like disgruntled youths or veterans in Hungary or Czechoslovakia, the new Romanian Legion saw its role as one of correctly honoring the veter-

ans' wartime sacrifice with its own sacred and selfless crusade, challenging the corrupt and unrepresentative world of Romanian politics.<sup>16</sup> What marked the Romanian crusade as distinct across the successor states was its young leadership, drawn largely from a postwar generation. It also had a powerful mystical dimension to its rebirth, rooted in homegrown Christian Orthodoxy, which set it apart from the "spiritual nationalism" of Croatian or Sudeten German interwar Fascism. Lastly, it proved to be a particularly disruptive force in Romanian society by the 1930s, a militant cuckoo permitted to survive in the national nest. In other "victor states" in contrast, such militancy within the dominant nation was either safely subsumed into a militarized state culture (*Sanacja* Poland), or it was checked and stayed within respectable bounds until an international crisis hit the state (Czechoslovakia).

The New Europe confirmed in Paris in 1919–20 shattered any coherent Habsburg war memory, and quickly redefined the war experience to appear as one of victors against vanquished. Yet as we have seen, this simple dialectic always belied complex realities even in the victor states, for individuals at the grassroots rarely fitted themselves neatly into the newly constructed patriotic narratives. Part III takes us further into those regions where there could be no clear or hegemonic discourse about the Great War sacrifice. The former Habsburg allegiance could become embarrassing for some national communities (Slovenes, Croats, or Poles) who now found themselves in triumphant Yugoslavia or Poland. This was the culture of "hidden defeat," which also included the Italians of Trentino. Moreover, in the case of Poland, the abrupt unification of three separate wartime histories made it extremely difficult for the Polish state to narrate any coherent story of the Great War. The effect in many communities was a very muted discourse, whether in literature or in commemoration of the dead. At the same time, the ubiquitous phenomenon of the postwar veteran—often distressed or disabled—ensured that the experience of 1914–18 lived on, only gradually displaced by new state concerns or new sacrifices expected from postwar generations.

The Croatian case stands as a good example of local communities finding war memory distinctly problematic. Here, perhaps not surprising in view of Croatia's reputation as "Habsburg loyalist," there were some postwar echoes of Habsburg allegiance of a kind otherwise most noticeable in interwar Austria. And the prevalent reaction in Croatia seems to have been low-key, with a paucity of memorial culture compared to Romanians, Czechs, Germans, or Serbians (who admittedly had many more local sites of bloodshed). However, where the Croatian voice could be heard in all its diversity was through veterans' organizations. As John Paul Newman indicates, Croatian veterans were by no means unusual across the successor states in finding their new state neglectful. Where their treatment stood out was in the state's tendency to actively discriminate against Croat and Slovene soldiers who had fought for Austria-Hungary while giving

economic privileges to the minority who had been recruited as “Yugoslav volunteers” in the Serbian forces. The division was comparable to the privileging of interwar Czech legionaries over “Habsburg Czechs” but was more pronounced in view of Serbian-Croatian tensions within Yugoslavia. There was also room in Croatia, home to many frustrated political aspirations, for militant responses from a mixture of postwar male youth and veterans. Some of these were even more assertive about pursuing an idealistic Yugoslav state mission. Others—like Sudeten veterans in Czechoslovakia—now shifted their former (Austrian) allegiance in a radical direction, focusing on militant Croatian nationalism in order to overturn the new hybrid state. Only in the 1940s, in the Ustasha Fascist state, could a new Croatian narrative of the war be fully reasserted.<sup>17</sup>

Petra Svoljšak’s chapter on the Slovenian “memory hole” usefully complements this Yugoslav picture. She too highlights the absence of any coherent Slovene war narrative, partly in the face of Serbian-Yugoslav hegemony but also thanks to the conflicted loyalties of many Slovenes during and after the war.<sup>18</sup> The result was a muddled semi-official discourse, a tendency to ignore Slovene military performance in the Habsburg ranks, while at the same time lauding the experience of those who had either contributed to the “Yugoslav victory” (the Serbian narrative) or had suffered in Russian captivity. Other voices however could be heard wishing simply to remember the dead. Slovene war veterans, in contrast to their Croatian counterparts, seemed more confident about building war memorials and establishing a commemorative culture that had hints of the Czech legionary phenomenon in Prague. Svoljšak also hints at how the distinctive Slovene language facilitated, through poetry, a special expression of the Slovenian tragedy. Yet the primary focus of Slovenian bloodshed, the Italian Front, still remained largely untouchable. This was not just because of its embarrassing confluence with the Habsburg war, but because it proved impossible to mourn Slovene sacrifice properly in regions annexed after the war by the Italian state. Caught between Italian, Serbian, and Habsburg versions of the war, Slovenian war memory was therefore vague, distorted, or (in Italy) completely obliterated.

Our final case studies reinforce in a graphic way how, with the European map suddenly redrawn, memories of the Habsburg war could be deliberately sidelined even in those regions where the most blood had been spilled on behalf of the monarchy. Austrian Galicia had been one of the major battlegrounds within the empire’s borders and had even witnessed the wartime creation of cemeteries dedicated to Austro-Hungarian heroes. Yet with the end of hostilities, and Galicia’s full annexation by a new Polish state, this memorial space was largely forgotten, the Polish or Ukrainian wartime graves almost as neglected as those of imperial Austrian or Russian soldiers. The reason, as Christoph Mick’s chapter shows, was that Poland—even more so than Yugoslavia—found it impossible to create a clear commemorative discourse out of a war where Poles had fought



against each other. Since the fight for Polish rebirth outlasted the Great War by two years, it was possible as in Hungary to transpose the focus of national sacrifice onto the postwar struggle and tie it to the new regime's legitimacy. Most official commemorative rituals in interwar Poland, including veneration of an Unknown Soldier (always a litmus test of the main discourse), could then concentrate on a clear Polish message and simply ignore the Habsburg war. This facilitated a hegemonic narrative as in the other "victor states," one into which Jewish memories had to be subsumed, yet one which chafed badly against the sacrifice of Ukrainian soldiers from eastern Galicia. In Poland the fate of many veterans mirrored their shabby treatment in the other successor states but, in the hierarchy that developed, it was Poles who had fought too soon (during 1914–18) who were usually at the bottom of the ladder. Most maligned were Ukrainian veterans of all persuasions who had no Polish credentials or had actively contested Polish "rebirth." They might share a vision, akin to some Magyar, German-Austrian, or Sudeten veterans, of an eventual rebirth of their own that would topple the "artificial" postwar order.

Where Poland's unity served to entangle war memories in one new state, the peacetime division of Austrian Tyrol between Italy and Austria created a splintered memory culture that mirrored in a fascinating microcosm most of the characteristics from across the other ex-Habsburg territories. Like Galicia, the former war theater of Tyrol was now a region where it was problematic to assert publicly the local sacrifice and suffering of 1914–18, since most Austrian commemoration was obscured under Italian hegemony. As Laurence Cole reveals, although local conciliatory voices surfaced to challenge the official militant narratives, it was the latter that tended to prevail on both sides of the new Austro-Italian frontier. With its territorial amputation, the defeated Austrian Tyrol resembled irredentist Hungary in fixing 1920 as a new date to commemorate sacrifice and injustice. But the official regional discourse also parroted the kind of primordial myths buried deep in Czech or Serbian society, namely that this was just one phase in a cycle of Tyrolean martyrdom where any disunity would soon be reversed. In contrast in "victorious" Italy, especially after the 1922 Fascist takeover, German-Italian Tyrolean commemoration was muted. German South Tyrol resembled Ukrainian Galicia (or even Magyar Transylvania) in that a community's memorial culture was overwritten. Italy's heroic wartime narrative dominated here visually, as ossuaries were constructed to mark out the landscape and former Habsburg subjects were even reburied as "Italians." For ex-Habsburg Italians of the Trentino, the nationalization of memory was even more complex. Set against the "hidden defeat" experienced by many Italian families, it was the Italian legionary or irredentist struggle that was privileged as a vital element of the "national rebirth." Thus Trentino too had parallels with Transylvania, where the sacrifice of (ex-Habsburg) Romanians seems to have been commemorated modestly in the face of a triumphant discourse of liberation.

Across all the interwar successor states, whether victors or vanquished, there reverberated official slogans of “sacrifice” and “regeneration.” The latter implied an ongoing national mission that was being asserted or upheld in order to justify the former. Yet when the war of 1914–18 was publicly interpreted in this way, many voices remained silent or were obscured by hegemonic narratives. Most notable perhaps—a real elephant in the room—was the way that sacrifice on behalf of the Habsburg monarchy or its emperor-king was obliquely obscured; here a comparison with Soviet Russia’s supposed amnesia over the Great War of the Romanov empire is a valid one.<sup>19</sup> Fighting the last Habsburg war was certainly recalled and explained in interwar memoirs of the Habsburg military and political elite, or in the official Austro-Hungarian military history emanating after 1930 from the Vienna war archives. But with the death of the last emperor (1922), the eclipse of old Habsburg officials, and little evidence that the monarchy could be restored in the New Europe, it was contemporary national discourses and works that overwrote the Habsburg narrative while often fencing combatively against it. This was facilitated by the fact that across the former Austro-Hungarian empire there had always been a balance between Habsburg and national/regional loyalties, and the former were now simply declared moribund.

Perhaps too easily, the historian may follow those voices from the successor states that shouted loudest. Many quiescent and often non-national viewpoints—for example, those of Croat peasant soldiers, of old Habsburg officials, of women who recalled sacrifice on the home front—need to be resurrected, even if their footprints in the sources are faint and obscured by bolder tracks. The essays in this volume also suggest further rich opportunities for transnational comparison. Thus we will reassert in the historiography a “Habsburg mental space” that many contemporaries retained even when their old territorial empire had disappeared from the European map.

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## Notes

1. Leo Perutz, *Little Apple* (London, 1991), 54. First published in 1928 as *Wohin Rollst Du, Äpfelchen*.
2. Gina Gräfen Conrad von Hötzendorf, *Mein Leben mit Conrad von Hötzendorf: Sein geistiges Vermächtnis* (Leipzig, 1935), 114.
3. Edmund Glaise von Horstenau and Rudolf Kissing, eds., *Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg 1914–1918*, 7 vols. (Vienna, 1930–1938), vol. 7, *Das Kriegsjahr 1918* (Vienna, 1938), 831, and Beilage 37, “Die Verluste der kriegführenden Heere im Weltkrieg.” In addition, 478,000 officers and men died as prisoners of war, while another 437,000 were taken prisoner by the Italian army at the end of the war.
4. For the various perspectives as the war ended, see Mark Cornwall, “Austria-Hungary,” in *At the Eleventh Hour: Reflections, Hopes and Anxieties at the Closing of the Great War, 1918*, ed. Hugh Cecil and Peter Liddle (London, 1998), 285–300.
5. Gergely Romsics, *Myth and Remembrance: The Dissolution of the Habsburg Empire in the Memoir Literature of the Austro-Hungarian Political Elite* (New York, 2006).
6. István Deák, *Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps 1848–1918* (Oxford, 1990), 205–12 and Appendix I.
7. Martin Zückert, *Zwischen Nationsidee und staatlicher Realität: Die tschechoslowakische Armee und ihre Nationalitätenpolitik 1918–1938* (Munich, 2006).
8. Bernhard Böttcher, *Gefallen für Volk und Heimat: Kriegerdenkmäler deutscher Minderheiten in Ostmitteleuropa während der Zwischenkriegszeit* (Cologne, Weimar, and Vienna, 2009). See also Martin Zückert, “Getrennte Erinnerung. Gefallendenkmäler und Weltkriegsdeutung in den böhmischen Ländern,” in *Das Gedächtnis der Orte. Sinnstiftung und Erinnerung*, ed. Elisabeth Fendl (Freiburg, 2006), 285–305.
9. Eduard März, *Austrian Banking and Financial Policy: Creditanstalt at a Turning Point 1913–1923* (New York, 1984).
10. See Böttcher, *Gefallen für Volk und Heimat*, 265–391.
11. For further examples, but mostly from outside the “Habsburg arena” in 1918–23, see Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, eds., *War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War* (Oxford, 2012). See also Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, “Vectors of Violence: Paramilitarism in Europe after the Great War, 1917–1923,” *The Journal of Modern History* 83 (2011): 489–512.
12. Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (New York, 1996).
13. See, for example, Aleksandar Ignjatović, “From Constructed Memory to Imagined National Tradition: The Tomb of the Unknown Yugoslav Soldier (1934–38),” *The Slavonic and East European Review* 88/4 (2010): 624–51.
14. An unusually inclusive German-Czech memorial however was that erected in Liberec (Reichenberg) in 1928. The dramatic figure of a traumatized man is the cover picture of this book.
15. See Franz Horváth’s chapter in this volume, and also Maria Bucur, *Heroes and Victims: Remembering War in Twentieth Century Romania* (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 2009).
16. See the classic study by Henry Roberts, *Rumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State* (New Haven, 1951).
17. Comparable, as Franz Horváth shows, to the revitalized Magyar narrative in Transylvania, and also to the suppression of any Czech legionary narrative in the Nazi Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.

18. See Pavlina Bobič, *War and Faith: The Catholic Church in Slovenia 1914–1918* (Leiden, 2012); Mark Cornwall, “The Great War and the Yugoslav Grassroots: Popular Mobilization in the Habsburg Monarchy,” in *New Perspectives on Yugoslavia: Key Issues and Controversies* ed. Dejan Djokić and James Ker-Lindsay (London and New York, 2011), 27–45.
19. See the revisionist work of Karen Petrone, *The Great War in Russian Memory* (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 2011).