INTRODUCTION
FROM GENTRIFICATION TO GENTRIFICATIONs

The word ‘gentrification’ has spread beyond the confines of scientific discourse and is now uttered by researchers, politicians, the man on the street and journalists alike. It also comes up in protest discourses and in land-use conflicts across the world.1 To some it may refer to the rebirth of old, unfashionable neighbourhoods and to others it is a new form of sociospatial inequality. Regardless, gentrification is now discussed in the mainstream media. Many articles describe the lifestyles of social groups perceived as new (‘yuppies’, ‘hipsters’, ‘bobos’ in France) who move into working-class neighbourhoods. They investigate the electoral impact of such changes in the population of inner cities and occasionally denounce the resulting forced migration of working-class residents towards peripheral areas. Yet, reading the mainstream media is often insufficient to gain an in-depth understanding of the causes, consequences and stakes of these processes. Indeed, media analyses of the transformations of central neighbourhoods in some metropolises can be largely incomplete, dumbed down and biased – often they reduce gentrification to a simplistic mechanism, reproduced identically from one city to the next. Although they sometimes adopt a critical tone, the media are themselves part of the process: their depictions of the transformed neighbourhoods and of the new residents’ lifestyles might in some instances be mildly sarcastic, but they are as a rule quite flattering and reinforce changes in image for those places.

With this book, we intend to help readers gain an informed, healthy sense of scepticism when it comes to the sometimes grossly oversimplified representations of the transformations of the inner cities so often found in public debate. Our objective is to offer a nuanced, detailed and empirically sound
overview of the processes that fall under the term ‘gentrification’. In the process we are careful to avoid two of the main pitfalls in public discussion of the subject. First, gentrification is very often presented as an implacable phenomenon that follows a linear course from the moment it hits a neighbourhood to the ultimate level of social homogenization. Second, we have observed that the vocabulary of gentrification and a standard interpretive approach are applied to a very wide range of cities, neighbourhoods and phenomena, to the extent that they are used to describe all kinds of upgrades in the characteristics, uses and residents of a space.

Against the extensive and excessive use of the term ‘gentrification’, leading to superficial perceptions of the processes and mechanisms at work, this book strives to document the great variety of the paces, actors and forms of gentrification in different contexts, and to identify as precisely as possible the forms of urban change it covers, by evidencing a number of invariants. In other words, we rely on painstaking analysis of the diversity of the forms, places and actors of gentrification in an attempt to isolate its DNA. We should make it clear from the outset that by using the term DNA we are pointing to the idea of a social relationship to the appropriation of space involving unequally endowed actors and groups. The following pages hence address the place of social groups in the city, their competition over the appropriation of space, the infrastructure unequally offered to them by economic and political actors, and the stakes of everyday social relationships. Emphasis is also placed on the infinitely varied forms taken by these relationships, rooted in different historical, geographic and political contexts, and embodied in buildings, populations, practices, images and aesthetics that are specific to given places and cannot be reduced to a single descriptive scheme.

Our approach here is inextricably theoretical and empirical. The entire book is based on the confrontation of materials carefully elaborated in several urban contexts, following diverse disciplinary approaches and using a variety of methods to grasp the multiple facets of urban change. Geography, sociology and political science, with their references, concepts, research questions and tools, are necessary and complementary to account for the plural dimensions of the actors, rationales and forms of gentrification. Urban change is also studied over the long term, as simply observing changes whenever they become visible in public space is insufficient and all too superficial. Indeed, gentrification emerges progressively at the crossroads of the trajectories of cities, neighbourhoods, policies, business dynamics and residents. These trajectories must be examined in their entirety for a better understanding of their social and spatial effects. Gentrification unfolds over long periods, at varying paces depending on the period and the place; it can also stop, and its dynamic can be reversed. Also, it is not the only process at work in inner cities – it interacts with other dynamics, including pauperiza-
tion. We grant special attention to the diversity of the sources, actors and logics that feed gentrification. This entails not relying on a single explanatory theory: however powerful theories may be, overreliance on them poses the risk of giving a truncated account and makes ingredients of change (or hindrances to change) invisible when they do not fit within the theory. This does not mean we do without the available theories, which offer fruitful insights and avenues of research. Rather, we combine them and use them in complement to each other, as their heuristic value may vary according to the facets of change under study.

We begin by presenting the theories and explanatory models of gentrification that founded one of the most dynamic research fields in international urban studies at the turn of the 1980s. The flip side of their effectiveness is that they tend to convey a unified, smoothed-over image of gentrification processes; hence the approach adopted in this book, which is to look at gentrifications, in the plural.

**PIONEERING STUDIES: GENTRIFICATION IN THE SINGULAR**

It is worth mentioning that the classical theories of gentrification were for the most part elaborated on the basis of studies on British and North American cities, where the situation of central neighbourhoods differs significantly from France. In France, the middle and upper classes have generally resided in the centres of large cities for a long time. By contrast, in the US and Canada, for instance, the 1950s and 1960s witnessed the exile of the mostly white middle classes towards the suburbs, a phenomenon coined ‘white flight’. Mass suburbanization accelerated the decline of central neighbourhoods to the extent that some authors have feared the future ‘death’ of American cities. This made the early forms of gentrification all the more visible. France has never experienced such a large-scale flight from the inner cities, but a number of its pericentral and central neighbourhoods have remained working class (for instance, in industrial and port cities) – they too have been affected by gentrification. Early studies in urban research on gentrification have attempted to describe and explain the process with a theoretical ambition; they outlined two main approaches. The first approach, which may be called ‘socio-cultural’, focuses on the demand for housing and services and explains gentrification by the tastes of a new urban social class eager to live in the inner cities. The second approach is more economic, and explains gentrification by the creation of a new supply of housing – in other words, by the action of profit-oriented economic agents (developers, real-estate agents, etc.). These classical approaches to gentrification have for a long time been pitted against each other, often in very
exaggerated fashion. Yet they share the common feature of conveying a linear, ordered and sequential conception of the process and of placing central emphasis on the underlying market rationales of the real-estate business.

**Gentrification as Emancipation: The Demand Explanation**

The gentrification processes observed in the 1960s and 1970s in the US and Canada displayed significant similarities both in way they unfolded and in the backgrounds of the households concerned. It was thus tempting to develop a model of the phenomenon. The earliest attempts were made in the 1970s, with the emergence of ‘stage models’ aimed at describing a typical sequence of the gentrification process (Lees, Slater and Wyly 2008). In 1977, in an academic work on two neighbourhoods in the Boston metropolitan area, Timothy Pattison evidenced different phases witnessing the arrival of small groups of new homeowners ‘attracted at a given time by a given type of neighbourhood’ (Pattison 1977: 2). Gentrification, he argued, is triggered by ‘pioneers’: young, childless, artists, intellectuals, who purchase and renovate dilapidated homes. Funding these purchases and renovations often comes at a great financial risk for these households. This first phase results in the ‘promotion’ of the neighbourhood, which becomes more visible to new households belonging to the same social and cultural groups as the pioneers. These more numerous new households are attracted by the opportunity to negotiate purchase and rental prices in a somewhat strained housing market. They in turn move into old homes requiring renovation, but may also find it difficult to come up with the budget needed for the renovation work. At this point we observe the first evictions of long-time residents, either unemployed or blue-collar workers, especially following the progressive transformation of houses that are home to several families into individual units and the successive purchases of small adjoining flats to expand family homes. The third and fourth phases stand out not so much through their content as through the intensity of the processes at work and the actors that come into play. The neighbourhood has increasingly gained exposure and now attracts more investors and speculators; meanwhile, the public authorities support changes in the area by offering new community facilities. Little by little, the upwardly mobile middle classes, who are able to afford the rising prices resulting from the actions of developers, move in, more frequently as owners than as tenants. Banks that now recognize the neighbourhood’s potential facilitate the funding of purchases and renovations. The number of evictions decreases, as the collective houses hosting workers’ families have already all been sold. The ‘pioneers’, for their part, see in the rise of housing prices an opportunity to sell their homes.
Building on Timothy Pattison’s research, in 1979 and 1980, two other US students, Philip Clay and Dennis Gale, each proposed a ‘stage model’ based on observations conducted in Boston, Philadelphia, San Francisco and Washington (Clay 1979; Gale 1980). In both models, the gentrification of a neighbourhood is again presented as a linear, progressive and sequential process, with new ‘gentrifiers’ intervening at each stage to move the phenomenon towards a point of stabilization and ‘maturity’. This model displays many similarities with Pattison’s observations, but also a few differences, particularly regarding the intensity and progression of evictions of working-class residents, which here are observed until the very last stage of the model. Inspired by the principle of invasion–succession dear to the Chicago-school sociologists (Rhein 2003),3 these models are built around typical profiles of gentrifiers, characterized in Clay’s work by a degree of aversion to risk (insecurity, decline in value of housing, etc.) and in Gale’s by the combination of type of household, educational level, average income level and type of profession; each profile replaces the previous one.

Numerous criticisms have been voiced against these early ‘stage models’, accused of being too simplistic, particularly when it comes to their theoretical underpinnings, and also too rigid as they are incapable of accounting for local specificities or differences within each of the categories of actors identified. Loretta Lees, Tom Slater and Elvin Wyly also point out that several factors, such as the existence of local speculative housing bubbles or much earlier and continual public interference, can disrupt the ‘smooth progression between each stage’ of the process (Lees, Slater and Wyly 2010: 33–34). Such criticisms have failed to affect the spread of these models, whose popularity precisely derives from their simplicity.

One of the main contributions of these models, regardless, was to shed light on the variety of actors involved in gentrification processes. These approaches began to be considerably enhanced in the late 1970s, particularly following the impulse of innovative work by the Canadian geographer David Ley (1996).4 Ley remarked that under the influence of globalization, the economic structure of Western countries shifted from the production of manufactured goods towards services. This economic change has come with a social change, marked by the decline of blue-collars and the rise of unskilled and low-skilled workers and white-collar workers in the new service economy. The most skilled stratum of white-collar workers gave rise to a new social group that he calls the ‘new middle class’ and that the British called the service class in reference to their employment sector (Bidou-Zachariasen 2000). In France, pioneering scholars of gentrification tended to highlight the role of the welfare state in the development of ‘new middle classes’ or ‘salaried middle strata’, for the majority holding public jobs (in education, culture, social
work, health, etc.) (Bidou et al. 1983; Bidou 1984). Additionally, under the influence of 1960s counterculture, according to David Ley the ‘new middle class’ rejected the traditional lifestyle of the North American middle class, perceiving life in suburban houses to be alienating and massively moving ‘back’ to central areas. This rejection of suburban monotony and subsequent choice of dense spaces deemed to be more conducive to individual self-fulfilment suggest looking at gentrification as a feature of a transition towards the postindustrial city. This might be supported by contributions made in the 1980s, emphasizing the rise of salaried work for women and the decline of the traditional distribution of roles within nuclear families, also facing the competition of other types of family structures. Damaris Rose, for instance, noted the preferences of women, but also and more generally of those she calls ‘nontraditional households: single-parent families, households formed by individuals without any family ties, single women, single men, couples with two incomes, etc.’ – for the central neighbourhoods of Montreal. Rose claims that they enable ‘the diversification of ways to accomplish the tasks related to reproduction; they offer a concentration of services and a “tolerant” atmosphere’ (Rose 1987: 218). It is lastly worth noting that in the US, the UK and France, these early studies did not argue that gentrifiers were moved by pure self-interest; they generally emphasized their supposed progressive values and presented gentrification as an emancipatory process (Caulfield 1989), or at least one that could help break from the ‘rigidities of the Fordist city’ (Bidou-Zachariasen 1995: 149) – without altogether neglecting the question of the conflicts between gentrifiers and longer-established residents (Herzhaft-Marin 1985).

These approaches generally depicted gentrification as a gradual process, during which groups on a journey towards social and political emancipation (women, artists, gay people, students) act as pioneers owing to their greater acceptance of the reputation of some working-class neighbourhoods (insecurity, drugs, disreputable schools, lacking urban facilities such as convenience stores and parks, etc.). They are also better placed to live alongside marginalized social groups owing to their social trajectories and values. However, as they move into these neighbourhoods, they change their image and ‘prepare the ground’ for other social groups that less readily cross social boundaries. The role of artists as ‘the expeditionary force for inner-city gentrifiers’ (Ley 1996: 191) has been subjected to particularly intense scrutiny. In a major work, sociologist Sharon Zukin (1982) examined the conversion of industrial wastelands into lofts by artists looking for large affordable spaces in New York’s SoHo neighbourhood. Largely encouraged by public authorities and celebrated by cultural tastemakers (decorating magazines, etc.), the neighbourhood’s transformation gave rise to the emergence of a bohemian lifestyle called ‘loft living’ that attracted the attention of more
privileged social groups. The interest of real-estate developers in SoHo’s lofts then led to the conversion of offices and workshops into upscale homes and the progressive eviction of the artists. Zukin subtly analyses the underlying mutation of capitalism at work in SoHo’s transformation, whereby the artist is used as a Trojan Horse to make a profit. Due to its insights into capitalism, Sharon Zukin’s work also partakes in the second classic approach of the process, focusing on the gentrification supply.

**Gentrification as the Urbanization of the Class Struggle: The Supply Explanation**

The late 1970s saw the emergence of a debate that has since become famous in urban studies, between proponents of the demand-and-supply explanations of gentrification. The latter emphasized the role of capital in the process. Their leading figure was the Scottish geographer Neil Smith, a former Ph.D. student of radical geographer David Harvey. In a landmark 1979 paper, he opposed the ‘humanist’ theories that dominated at the time and proposed to interpret gentrification as a ‘back-to-the-city movement by capital, not people’ (Smith 1979b). The paper sparked controversy: instead of being presented as a form of emancipation, gentrification was pictured as the translation of the class struggle in urban space. Neil Smith’s main weapon was his ‘rent-gap’ theory. Based on the case of North American cities, he argued that gentrification was explained by long-term changes in the processes of investment and disinvestment in the built environment. In the mid-twentieth century, the suburbanization of industrial activities and of the middle and upper classes caused a decline in land values in the inner cities and a widening gap with the suburbs. The depreciation of inner-city neighbourhoods came with a deterioration of the built environment that follows a cyclical logic. Owner-occupiers of homes in a neighbourhood affected by that process indeed generally tend to sell or rent their home in order to protect their assets under the threat of depreciation. The neighbourhood’s transition to tenancy changes the logic of investments in the maintenance of housing, which is only performed if raised rents make it profitable. However, the price of rents also depends on the environment of the homes concerned. This means that investors tend to leave the neighbourhood to focus on less risky areas. Further pauperization ensues, along with plummeting rent and sale prices. As properties are left vacant, the development of vandalism accelerates the process. In the last step, many properties are abandoned altogether. The depreciation of inner-city neighbourhoods serves as the basis for profitable reinvestment. At a certain stage in the depreciation of the existing homes, *capitalized* ground rent (i.e. the value of the house or land) is significantly lower than *potential* ground rent (its potential value under the land’s best use). The ensu-
ing gap in returns enables the provision of gentrification supply by land and real-estate markets, but it requires heavy public and private investments at the neighbourhood level to launch a rehabilitation process.

At the turn of the 2000s, this theory led to a new stage model that some (Lees, Slater and Wyly 2008: 173) considered more robust or at least better suited to describing and explaining the process such as it was observed in the cities of North America, Western Europe and Australia. Applied to the case of New York, the model singled out three main phases of gentrification, separated by two transitional periods of high recession (Smith 1996: 267; Smith 2002, 2003). The first phase of ‘sporadic gentrification’ began in New York in the 1950s and ended in 1973 with the first oil crisis and the major global recession. Limited to inner-city neighbourhoods such as Greenwich Village and SoHo, it was characterized by the arrival of artist and intellectual ‘pioneers’, often at odds with the mainstream, who spontaneously began to progressively rehabilitate buildings and homes, but also by the role of public authorities who at the time began to fight urban decline by injecting federal and municipal funds into renewal and redevelopment projects. According to Neil Smith, developers and investors became full-fledged actors of gentrification during the first recession period that began in 1973. In a context of global economic crisis and local fiscal crisis leading to a decline in real-estate and land values and in public investments in inner cities, the ‘ground rent gap’ between initial investments and potential capital gains quickly widened, leading several real-estate developers and financial institutions to commit capital to various housing programmes aimed at the middle and upper classes. These investments laid the groundwork for the second phase of the process, the ‘anchoring’ of gentrification, which lasted until the late 1980s. During that period, the process spread beyond the initial neighbourhoods where it had taken place through a ripple effect, affecting for instance Tribeca and the Lower East Side. This spread is, however, not so much the outcome of the settling of a ‘second generation’ of gentrifiers, generally better off than the ‘pioneers’, as of the often joint action of public authorities and private actors around emblematic urban renewal and economic redevelopment projects (Harvey 2014). The third phase, which was still ongoing in the early 2000s, followed a second recession period in the early 1990s. During that recession, capitals were essentially channelled into neighbourhoods where the gentrification process was already well under way, limiting its spatial expansion. While at the time some referred to this as ‘degentrification’ (Lees and Bondi 1995), Neil Smith argued that this second transition led to widespread gentrification, both the accomplishment of a concerted, global urban strategy and the true expression of a ‘classist’ takeover of the inner city and surrounding neighbourhoods. The process no longer solely affected the housing sector. It impacted on employment, commercial activ-
ity, cultural facilities, recreational infrastructure and public spaces. It drew on numerous large-scale urban renewal plans, again jointly funded by public authorities and private interests. Gentrification became a highly integrated conquest of urban space, particularly for developers and private investors, who produced new urban landscapes ‘ready for consumption’.

Building on Sharon Zukin’s work (1982) on the media’s contribution to the imagery of ‘urban pioneers’ on a quest for cosmopolitanism and ‘authenticity’, several sociologists and geographers have also shown the crucial role played by the press and more broadly by ‘key cultural intermediaries’ (McLeod and Ward 2002) – including TV programmes on food and home improvement and various lifestyle magazines – in the success of this consumption model. In her examination of the representations of American cities in three ‘urban lifestyle’ magazines over the period from 1960 to 1990, Miriam Greenberg shows how, beginning in the late 1980s, the concentration of the media in the hands of a few conglomerates and the rise of a prosperous urban middle class have led the press to adopt a new, depoliticized outlook on the city, presenting it under the angle of the new lifestyles of the American middle class and its new neighbourhoods of choice (Greenberg 2000). Gentrification is no longer only perceived as a residential strategy, but also as the ‘figurehead of metropolitan change in the inner cities’ (Smith 2003: 58). Loretta Lees, Tom Slater and Elvin Wyly (2008: 178) have recently proposed to update Smith’s model by including a fourth phase, characterized (especially in North America) by the ever-growing financialization of the residential economy and the multiplication of urban policies that explicitly support gentrification.

Neil Smith’s extremely influential theory in the field of urban studies marked a clear shift in perspective: it looks at gentrification as the result not so much of a demand by social groups with distinctive values, revealing deep-seated sociodemographic changes, but rather as the outcome of the ‘mechanical’ supply offered by actors pursuing a purely economic interest (landowners, developers, real-estate agencies, banks) and/or a political interest (public actors). The competition of social groups in urban space is no longer of an ‘ecological’ nature as in the first-stage models, but instead takes a much more structural turn. The fundamental innovation of such ‘neo-Marxist’ models is to offer a new conception of the spatial diffusion of gentrification. Building on Neil Smith’s approach to gentrification as a ‘new urban frontier’ between ‘areas of disinvestment’ and ‘areas of reinvestment in the urban landscape’, these models now represent a process that spreads in areolar and contiguous fashion owing to the progressive and irremediable movement of one or several ‘gentrification frontier[s]’ (Smith 1996: 186–87). Smith argues that ‘mapping’ these ‘frontier lines’ and their shifts is key not only to representing the progress of gentrification but also to providing
neighbourhood organizations, residents and housing activists with a tool to anticipate the process and find the means to ‘defend themselves’ against it.


> The frontier is most evident where there are no enclosed contours (that is, no peaks or sinkholes). Peaks, with later years at the centre of enclosed contours, represent areas of greatest resistance to reinvestment while sinkholes, with earlier years at the centre, represent areas opened up to reinvestment in advance of surrounding areas. The major pattern that emerged is a reasonably well-defined west-to-east frontier line with the earliest encroachment in the north-west and south-west sections of the Lower East Side.

These ‘peaks’, which serve as ‘nodes of resistance’ to the advancing gentrification frontier, are areas characterized by noise, congestion and pollution issues, numerous social housing buildings or a high concentration of poor, essentially Latino, populations. This ‘economic’ gentrification frontier mirrors what Smith calls the ‘revanchist city’, in reference to the revanchist reactionary campaign led by the bourgeois elites against the working class following the Commune of Paris in 1871, which has often been used to describe the ‘political’ and ‘cultural’ facet of the reconquest of working-class inner-city neighbourhoods and their surrounding areas by the market.

Many geographers have drawn inspiration from this conception of the spatial diffusion of gentrification in their own work. On the strength of its analytical, metaphorical and arguably political effectiveness, the concept of the ‘gentrification frontier’ appears to have prevailed not only in the scientific field, but also in the media. In her book entitled *Paris sans le peuple. La gentrification de la capitale*, the geographer Anne Clerval elaborates on the concept (Clerval 2013: 256). She explains that, in Paris, this frontier shifts in quite a regular fashion from one area to the next (unlike the coalescent nodes observed in New York). She maps out the progress of the gentrification frontier since the 1960s based on fieldwork and statistical analysis of the detailed socio-occupational categories of households, the features of housing and the nationalities of the total population. The map, which generated a certain amount of media coverage, shows the frontier’s progress from the centre – formed by a bourgeois core of affluent neighbourhoods, described as an ‘out-migration area, even though the residents of these neighbourhoods in particular are not the ones who settle elsewhere’ – to the northeastern fringes of the city. The language of the frontier is expanded even further,
acquiring a military dimension: ‘while spatial diffusion represents the main mode of advancement of the gentrification frontier, it also has its outposts’ (like Montmartre or around the Parc des Buttes Chaumont), and ‘sometimes bypasses certain areas, in particular around spaces characterized by a high concentration of foreign populations, like an army avoiding a pocket of resistance to sweep in from the rear’ (Goutte d’Or, Belleville, Faubourg Saint-Denis) (Clerval 2010).

In these ‘new models’, emphasis on the underlying macroeconomic mechanisms of gentrification and their key role in linking the phases of the processes has given way to lively debates. Indeed, one of the main criticisms lodged against this concerns the fact that these models inspired by the ‘ground-rent gap’ theory neglect the great variety and diversity of individuals involved in the gentrification process. The attention to that variety and diversity was precisely the strong point of the early stage models in the eyes of some (Lees, Slater and Wyly 2008: 173). The new models can also be faulted for their sometimes unequivocal treatment of the rationality and internationality attributed to the actors of gentrification – developers, public actors and residents alike. While they have the advantage of emphasizing actors (thereby asserting the idea that gentrification is not a ‘natural’ process), they sometimes minimize the plurality of the logics and issues that inform the choices and practices of these actors. At odds with this monocausal approach to the process, authors like the Canadian geographer Damaris Rose (1984, 1996) actually wrote about the ‘diversification’ of gentrification – an aspect that will be elaborated upon in later pages – precisely because it involves multiple processes and actors with varied rationalities and intentions.

The opposition between these two approaches (sociocultural/economic; demand/supply) is of course based on metatheories, different worldviews, making it caricatural and deeply counterproductive for the purposes of understanding the process. Most authors now concur in acknowledging their complementarity (Lees 1994; Bidou-Zachariasen 2003). In a landmark paper – one of the first articles on gentrification to be translated in France – the British researcher Chris Hamnett (1997) showed that the two conditions were in fact necessary for gentrification to occur. According to him, first, there needs to be a supply of gentrifiable buildings in the inner cities: the existence of a ‘ground-rent gap’ is crucial, but it does not necessarily lead to gentrification. Second, there also needs to be an effective demand for inner-city properties on the part of potential gentrifiers. This may result from the financial inability to buy a house in the most affluent neighbourhoods or – a reason more often put forward – from a preference towards life in the inner cities, close to places of employment and cultural and social facilities. This preference in turn depends on the growth of service-sector employment in the inner cities, demographic changes and lifestyles. For the
middle and upper classes, living within the city offers easy access to jobs, restaurants, cultural activities and other infrastructure. Without this effective demand, related to the attractiveness of life in inner cities, gentrification is unlikely to occur even in the presence of a wide ground-rent gap. Lastly, in some neighbourhoods, despite their central location and supply of affordable housing, gentrification can be delayed or nonexistent. This is the case for neighbourhoods that have been strongly affected by pauperization and decay (generally the outcome of massive deindustrialization, as in the emblematic case of Detroit), by a depreciated architecture, like the high-rise apartment blocks built in the 1960s and 1970s in France, or by the sizeable and visible presence of migrant populations associated with negative representations that discourage potential candidates from moving in (Marin 1998: 101–13; Bacqué and Fijalkow 2006).

While weaving these two main theories together is indeed necessary, it should not be overlooked that they shed light on very different drivers of gentrification dynamics and forms of gentrification. As scholars have repeatedly pointed out, the Western European and North American cities that have served as bases for these theories and explanatory models vary widely from one another, and the concrete processes of urban change that have inspired them are quite heterogeneous: changing residential choices of the young middle classes and rehabilitation of old homes in London (Hamnett 1973; Hamnett and Williams 1980); construction by local authorities and powerful economic actors of luxury high-rises in Philadelphia’s old Society Hill neighbourhood (Smith 1979a); transformation of industrial warehouses into artists’ workshops in New York’s SoHo, followed by the transformation of these lofts into commercial products (Zukin 1982); mobilization of residents opposing rehabilitation and interference in local politics in Vancouver (Ley 1981), etc. Once imported to France, the term was used chiefly to describe the consequences of housing rehabilitation policies in old neighbourhoods, as in Vieux-Lyon (Lyons’ old town) (Authier 1993), as well as in neighbourhoods where rehabilitation was combined with operations involving the demolition/reconstruction of residential buildings, as in Belleville in Paris (Simon 1994). Rather than seeking to integrate contradictory theories at all costs, should we not acknowledge the great variety of causes, actors and effects of the phenomena described by the term ‘gentrification’?

GENTRIFICATION IN THE PLURAL

In this book we intend to tackle this question of the diversity of gentrification head on. The collective analysis of a huge wealth of material on cities with very different backgrounds in France and other European countries has
led us to question the pertinence of the analyses of gentrification that present it as a gradual, ineluctable process involving groups of residents and actors identified as a function of their role in the process. Our research yields a rather clear conclusion: the analytical schemes in terms of successive waves of settling of various upper- and middle-class groups are rarely observed as such in the field – this also applies to the idea of the inexorable and total eviction from the inner-city neighbourhoods of the older working-class residents. Indeed, despite the spectacular character of gentrification, the centres and immediate surroundings of large cities remain marked by the cohabitation of great wealth and abject poverty. Likewise, in the cases we have studied, it is quite difficult to make a clear distinction between the professional producers of gentrification on the one hand and the private individual consumers of gentrified spaces on the other. Sometimes private individuals or entrepreneurs from outside the field of housing ‘manufacture’ gentrified space – through their material work or symbolic productions – and businesses or developers ‘consume’ these places and images to maximize the value of their supply. The role of public authorities cannot be reduced to a systematic alliance with the representatives of capital. Last but not least, gentrification is never the only process at work in a neighbourhood: it can also operate hand in hand with other trends – including dynamics of stabilization or social pauperization that may also have an impact on business activity and the development of tourism – so that the renewal of the population is sometimes relative in social and spatial terms (Authier 2003). This echoes conclusions already formulated in France in the early 2000s by the sociologist Jean-Yves Authier and the geographer Jean-Pierre Lévy, who argued that ‘gentrification presents itself more as a coexistence of different populations and mobilities, as the social outcome of a complex game in which sedentary and mobile residents rub shoulders, the combination of population movements, urban planning decisions, actors’ strategies and the distinctive ways of living and cohabitating of the different social groups’ (Lévy 2002: 200).

The Importance of Contextual Variations

One of our main goals in this book is therefore to build on the legacy of the classical theories of gentrification and move beyond them to expand our understanding of the process by unveiling its multiform character. We shed light on the complexity and diversity of gentrification processes, drawing on concrete examples.

The main deviation observed from theories and explanatory models concerns the timing of urban change. Gentrification can hardly be reduced to a linear, sequential and progressive temporality: depending on the case, it fol-
lows distinctive paces, with more or less long periods of acceleration, slow-down and stagnation, and in some cases of deadlock and even regression (in times of economic crisis, for instance). It can occur extremely quickly and sometimes much more slowly, owing to the multiplicity of drivers and brakes involved, as well as to its intertwining with sometimes contradictory trends.

The ‘diversity’ of gentrification is also reflected in the social dynamics that it launches and produces. Again, the process can hardly be reduced to an ineluctable mechanism of invasion/succession, where (pre)defined social groups perceived to have uniform social backgrounds and lifestyles come in succession – with the wealthier chasing the poorer away. There is of course a competition for space, with a struggle for domination between social groups, creating inequalities. But the resources used in these struggles are quite varied, especially considering that economic and social structures in the West have become a great deal more complex since the pioneering studies on gentrification. It is precisely in the overlaps, mixes, coexistences and changes in social position that these different resources come to light and that social positions and groups are redefined. Gentrifiers and the gentrified are not always found where one might expect them; the most involved actors are not only capitalists moved by the sole objective of making the most of their economic investments.

Lastly, the ‘diversity’ of the process is also spatial – both in the way it spreads and in the form that it produces. The areolar vision proposed in Neil Smith’s model and largely adopted by others, in which gentrification progresses continually across space with a ‘frontier’ preceded by ‘outposts’, does not always account for the way in which space can in some urban contexts alternatively act as an ingredient and as an obstacle to gentrification. Likewise, the urban products of gentrification – the form and aesthetic of buildings, homes, businesses – vary widely depending on the history of the place under study (Launay and Nez 2014).

Obviously, merely describing the multiform character of this process, which leads to discussing gentrification in the plural, is not enough. We must understand where this ‘diversity’ comes from, where lags, gaps, deadlocks and obstacles come from (Ley and Dobson 2008; Walks and August 2008). We must also present the manifold elements – forces, dynamics, dimensions, actors – that influence and sometimes contribute to disrupting the linearity of the process. We have quickly noted that the combination or mix of these elements varied according to the local contexts. This means that local urban contexts unarguably impact the paces, forms and actors of the process. We readily acknowledge that this attention to contextual variations in the understanding and very definition of the process is not a new idea. It was in particular the subject of heated debates in the 1990s, revolv-
ing around the terminology to be used to name the process. However, the approach that consists in concretely demonstrating the existence of this contextual dimension of gentrification by cross-examining and comparing cases is a more innovative one. Even an ambitious book like 2015’s evocatively titled *Global Gentrifications: Uneven Development and Displacement* (Lees, Shin and López-Morales 2015) is ultimately not entirely satisfying in that respect. To be able to defend the ‘global’ character of gentrification, the authors adopted a ‘cosmopolitan perspective’ on the process by relying on some twenty case studies in highly varied locations including Karachi, Athens, Damascus, Cairo, Taipei, Istanbul, Seoul, Jerusalem, Lagos, Lisbon and Mexico. In addition to the global character of the process, the diversity of the forms it takes in various cities across the world is striking, leading Eric Clark to claim in the afterword: ‘The rich empirical analyses presented here reflect how gentrification is characterized by particular social, economic, cultural, political and legal contexts’ (Clark 2015: 453). The editors infer from this that there are ‘multiple gentrifications in a pluralistic sense rather than “Gentrification” with a capital G’ (Lees, Shin and López-Morales 2015: 442). This argument obviously directly echoes the position and message we wish to convey in this book. Yet *Global Gentrifications* differs from our work in that it proposes an overarching view of case studies conducted in parallel rather than a genuine comparison and cross-examination; it considers the variations and effects of local contexts on the forms of the process not so much as objects but as results of the analysis.

In that perspective, we concur with Greek geographer Thomas Maloutas’s call to better take into account the contextual diversity of gentrification. In a paper entitled ‘Contextual Diversity in Gentrification Research’, he argued that gentrification is ‘context-dependent’ in the sense that its ‘patterns and impact are determined by the combined effect of mechanisms and institutions involving the market, the state, civil society and the specific and durable shape of local sociospatial realities, i.e. built environments, social relations inscribed in property patterns, urban histories and ideologies’ (Maloutas 2012: 34). He explains that it is precisely because gentrification is highly dependent on contextual causality that it must be seen only as a ‘mid-range’ theory, that is, one that allows for a degree of generalization without proposing an all-encompassing interpretation of society. In that sense Maloutas openly opposes the tendency of many English-language authors to use the concept of ‘gentrification’ in a very extensive and simplified manner: ‘the way gentrification is evolving as a concept that embraces almost any form of urban regeneration is detrimental to analysis, especially when applied to contexts different from those it was coined in/for’ (Maloutas 2012: 44) (meaning British and North American metropolises). As we will later explain, we partly agree with this criticism; however, we are more wary
of Maloutas’s scepticism regarding the interest of studying gentrification through multiple case studies. Should we then concur with Damaris Rose, Thomas Maloutas or Alain Bourdin (2008) in distrusting this ‘chaotic concept’ that appears to cover a great diversity of tangled processes? According to Maloutas, ‘looking for gentrification in increasingly varied contexts displaces emphasis from causal mechanisms to similarities in outcomes across contexts, and leads to a loss of analytical rigour’ (Maloutas 2012: 34).

Juxtaposing case studies can indeed be somewhat sterile if the sole point is to spot similarities and differences. However, comparison can allow us to go much further if these similarities and differences are taken not as an end point, but as a starting point – an observation that needs careful explaining. Why can gentrification be so fast, or so slow and sometimes even unfinished? Why does it take the form of luxury housing in some places and of spontaneous microinterventions on the environment in others? Why does it spread to vast areas in some cities while remaining limited to a few neighbourhoods in others? Why does it sometimes induce a very brutal elevation of the backgrounds and income levels of residents when other cases witness long cohabitations between different fractions of the middle classes? It is by seeking to understand these contextual variations in the actors, forms and paces of gentrification that we have more chance of discovering its drivers and brakes, the economic, social and political factors that underlie and explain it – this is the approach we pursue in this book.

Three Main Structuring Dynamics

Remaining attentive to the contextual variations of gentrification does not mean considering that they are local versions of a phenomenon that exists somewhere in pure form and has its own logic that varied local conditions would merely alter. On the contrary, it means considering that gentrification emerges from the temporally and spatially situated encounter, between a number of urban, economic, social and political dynamics – some national if not international, others temporary and local. Based on the many empirical and theoretical studies published over the past forty years, three main and largely intertwined dynamics can be identified at the national and international levels.

The Large-Scale Economic Transformations of Western Societies

The first dynamic results from the ‘great transition’ of Western economies, from industry-based economies to service-based economies. Beyond this well-documented process, capitalism has experienced other transformations over the past four decades. Mass Fordist production gave way to a
quest for faster adaptation to customer demands, enabling access to niche markets, relying on the intensive use of technological innovation. The hierarchy of post-Fordist firms operating within the ‘knowledge-based economy’ is generally more flexible; they require a greater degree of adaptability and creativity from their workforce. Geographically speaking, they tend to be organized in districts, that is, networks of innovative and interdependent networks, thus reinforcing their position in the international competition, as in the paradigmatic example of the Silicon Valley in the US (Castells 1998). Territories are no longer considered as passive supports for growth; they are in and of themselves factors of growth and competitiveness. This change is far from insignificant – in particular, it explains the international success of urban development strategies based on attracting the ‘creative class’ (Florida 2002), whose mere presence is expected to create new ad hoc activities.

From the perspective of the labour market, where this shift has been most striking, the ‘Fordist compromise’ of indexing wage growth to productivity growth has resulted in a trend towards the bipolarization of the workforce. On the one hand, we have an elite of ‘integrated’, skilled and mobile employees, who secure significant pay-related and/or financial benefits (shares, stock options, etc.). On the other, we have a precariat that expands under the effect of the increasing numbers of low-skilled, interchangeable, badly paid, massively weakened jobs (unwanted part-time work, fragmented working hours, fixed-term contracts, etc.) (Castel 1995). Between these two poles, intermediary jobs remain numerous and differ in multiple ways (according to sector of activity, status, working conditions, required qualifications, etc.), leading some authors to use the image of an archipelago (Chenu 1990). This (still ongoing) rearrangement of the labour market, which produces new, more complex and unstable social structures (Savage et al. 2013), feeds fragmentation processes in the post-Fordist city. The categories that move up towards the higher levels of the middle class provide the demand for differentiated goods (including private homes located in areas well served by public transport and endowed with reputed educational institutions). Conversely, the most precarious categories are as a whole forced to fall back on the less attractive supply (large social housing high-rises, standardized periurban lots) or to move out of the metropolises and their job opportunities altogether, ending up at the boundary of the rural world (Rougé 2005). Additionally, these mechanisms relating to the emergence of the post-Fordist economy are reinforced by the growing importance of transmission by inheritance, recently highlighted in the work of Thomas Piketty (2014), which partly explains the considerable increase in real-estate prices observed during the last two decades in the inner cities of large metropolises. This economic transformation also strongly affects post-Fordist urban policies, which according to many studies have contributed to the rise of inequalities.
(Desage, Morel Journel and Sala Pala 2014). Indeed, sociologically, the perception of the groups considered as the pillars of urban prosperity (through their productive activity as well as their consumption) has shifted from the working class to the upper class. As a result, urban policy strategies are increasingly geared towards attracting these groups defined more or less scientifically as the ‘new middle classes’, the ‘service class’, the ‘creative class’ or, in France, the ‘bobos’.

These great transitions also induced a change in the scale and in the nature of economic regulation: on the one hand, owing to the weakening of the national level under the effect of globalization, cities now appear as new key levels of accumulation (Sassen 1991); on the other, the deregulation of capitalism after the crisis of Fordism has led to the implementation of local policies that proactively seek to attract capital. The post-Fordist city strives for sustained growth in a context of heightened interurban competition for attracting investments that have become more volatile owing to the devaluation of the fixed capitals of Fordism (such as factories). This explains the widespread rise of policies designed for that purpose since the 1980s (with fiscal advantages for the most competitive firms, an attractive environment offered to executives and the new middle classes, etc.). David Harvey argues that the competition between the newly entrepreneurial cities now plays out at four levels (Harvey 2014). First, niches are created within the new spatial division of labour, thanks to the creation of an urban environment that encourages the production of newly valued goods and services. Second, niches called ‘monopoly rents’ are created within the spatial division of consumption – reflecting the current French debate on the supposed benefits of the ‘residential economy’ (i.e. the search for local specialization in tourism, leisure, housing for pensioners, etc.). Third, functions of political, technological and/or financial leadership are pursued. Fourth, European and national public funds are sought after.

Lastly, some researchers have shed light on the way in which these transformations are reinforced by the neoliberal turn of the urban planning policies of central states. In an important book, Neil Brenner shows how Western states have progressively given up the objective of fighting local inequalities in development to focus on bolstering the advantages of the better-off territories: the large metropolises with global connections, competing for executives, capitals and the headquarters of firms working in the knowledge-based economy (Brenner 2004).

Unsurprisingly, urban researchers have been increasingly interested in the fragmentation of urban societies in the wake of the crisis of Fordism. They argue that the new organization of the city based on reinforced segregation is the spatial translation of the social polarization processes that have resulted from the emergence of the post-Fordist labour market.
Gentrification has changed accordingly. Its most spectacular form is called ‘super-gentrification’ by some authors. It affects some particularly connected neighbourhoods of global cities such as Brooklyn Heights in New York or Barnsbury in London (Lees 2003; Butler and Lees 2006), in which the post-Fordist elite, which possesses all the forms of capital (economic, inherited, social, educational and cultural) seizes control of already gentrified neighbourhoods and causes real-estate prices to soar to unprecedented heights. This heightened urban polarization results from changes in the local economy under the effect of globalization, but also from the rising interest of global firms in real-estate investments – an interest that has been reinforced by the post-Fordist transition, and often stoked if not triggered by urban policies. The impact of finance on the spatial organization of cities was first shown in the case of ‘global cities’ (Sassen 1991), and subsequently in recently ‘re-created’ cities such as Dubai (Davis 2007). However, recently, many studies have built on Neil Smith’s work in an effort to show that it is also at play in increasingly less prestigious cities across the world. The French real-estate market, for instance (offices and homes), is also affected by the strategies of financial firms.

The Transformations of Employment and Active Populations

The second large-scale dynamic informing the emergence of gentrification phenomena very largely results from the aforementioned economic transformations. It consists in transformations in the social structure and lifestyles of these social groups in Western countries. In particular, the steady growth in numbers of the middle and upper classes, owing to the growing tertiary sector and rising educational attainment levels, has transformed the social division of space. The period from 1945 to 1975 witnessed the very rapid growth of a large group of skilled professionals with higher-education degrees who formed an ‘intellectual elite of technicians’ (Dagnaud 1981) at the global level. In France, executives and holders of intermediate occupations saw their numbers nearly double over twenty years (from 1962 to 1982), with a boom in teaching research, health and social work, and engineering. These engineers, social workers, teachers, magistrates, doctors, architects, urbanists, journalists, arts managers and consultants sold their expertise, recommendations or know-how in the implementation of public policies or services, or converted their cultural capital by introducing occupations tailor-made for them in communications, advertising, polling or private consulting.

These ‘white-collars’ working in administrations, public facilities or business services brought about gentrification owing to the new – or renewed – demand for housing in the inner cities, close to their workplaces and the places where they go out. The family models of these populations formed
in the 1960s have changed: longer education, including for women, spread of double-income households, lower marriage rates and delayed motherhood have contributed to disaffection towards the suburban US model or the emerging periurban areas in France, as middle- and upper-class women are no longer limited to the domestic sphere. Deserted by the bourgeoisie or populated by aging working-class residents, the inner cities are also more conducive to the development of nontraditional familial and sexual standards – homosexual relationships, single-parent families or simply families opened up to sociabilities based on friendship or activism. For young graduates, they also offer nonstandardized places and homes that meet a new aspiration – namely to move away from the models for success that prevailed in their parents’ generation, be they blue-collar workers who accessed the modern convenience of low-rent housing, small-business owners who became richer, dignitaries or members of the technician elite in power.

It was also with that generation born in the immediate postwar period that youth fully became a social age in its own right, owing to the (relative) democratization of higher education and the extension of studies, but also to the emergence of a highly politicized student movement that got involved in public debate nationally as well as internationally – see, for instance, the Students for a Democratic Society in the US or the student protests of 1967 in Germany and 1968 in France. The political models defended by the politicized youth of that generation were diverse, but several advocated the reappropriation of power by lay citizens and the politicization of everyday life. Their demands informed a distinctive relationship to local spaces, which served as the basis for forms of DIY or collective organization (alternative economy, work or consumption co-ops, associative restaurants, cultural venues, associations). This explains the interest in cheap available inner-city space that had lost value in the 1970s and 1980s and growing periurban villages (Bidou 1984). In both types of space, the involvement of these groups in local social life led to access to local power during the ‘pink [socialist] wave’ of the 1977 French municipal elections, with a major impact in terms of cultural and urban policies and economic development.

The neoliberal turn of the 1980s impacted the labour market with a sharp slowdown in the growth of public employment and, in large administrations and corporations, a trend towards the outsourcing of jobs, especially for unskilled positions, but also for some skilled jobs. The holders of expertise or know-how in communications were, for instance, encouraged to freelance and deal with the contingencies of fluctuations in activity themselves. Occupations in the fields of culture, media, engineering and management, however, kept registering rising numbers of jobs: the past thirty years in France have witnessed ‘the increasing prevalence and exposure ... of salaried or independent professions revolving around expertise and specialized knowledge’
These professionals strive to convert their competencies into social status and economic gratifications (Savage et al. 1992). Yet these three elements are increasingly disconnected owing to the outsourcing and deterioration of their jobs. Spatial proximity can then serve as a resource, as it transpires in French studies on the residential choices of information, arts and performing-arts professionals: their particularly strong spatial aggregation clearly relates to the importance of maintaining a social network to find work in those fields (Préteceille 2010; Collet 2015). Reflecting the aforementioned complexification of the post-Fordist social structure, studies on the social division of space have shown a rather sharp polarization of the residential space between ‘private-sector people’ (corporate executives) and ‘public-sector people’, although they might not necessarily have a public-sector job any more: teachers, researchers, arts managers, healthcare professionals and public policy professionals (de Singly and Thélot 1989; Oberti and Préteceille 2003).

For the young professionals entering the labour market since the 2000s, short-term employment or freelancing is now the norm. The generations born in the late 1960s and onwards, facing the crisis of the salaried Fordist employment that had served their parents well, experienced both the devaluation of their degrees and increased risks of downward social mobility (Peugny 2007). With varying degrees of violence depending on the period of birth, they suffered a generational decline in comparison to the generation born in the immediate postwar period (Chauvel 1998). This resulted in the lengthening of ‘youth’, an age of life that is no longer associated with political mobilizations and upward social mobility through education, but is instead perceived as a time of strenuous, never-quite-certain crossing of the thresholds of independence – having a job, gaining financial self-sufficiency and a home of one’s own, becoming a parent.

In light of this employment volatility and of the very steep increase in real-estate prices in metropolises and in particular in the ‘global cities’, opting for a home in a neighbourhood on the path to rehabilitation is a means to make one’s trajectory safer by ensuring a roof over one’s head, and a safe, profitable investment (Tassé, Amossé and Grégoire 2013). Increasingly often, real estate even offers an alternative to the labour market for accumulating capital. This strategy may also allow those who pursue it to put their cultural and symbolic capital to work by investing in the aesthetic dimension of their homes. However, entering the real-estate market requires family support, heightening the importance of inequalities in inheritance – gaps that are further widened by the rise of property values in large metropolises since the early 2000s. Also, as knowledge on the mechanisms of gentrification has spread, opportunity hunters are increasingly numerous, and push the least endowed out of the residential market in the inner cities.
The third set of national and international trends contributing to the emergence of gentrification phenomena obviously pertains to urban policies. As we have briefly noted, a number of urban policy trends in the late 1960s and onwards were instrumental in encouraging various forms of gentrification, directly or indirectly. These were first trends in the history of ideas in architecture and urbanism, which resonated in the priorities of urban policies. The principle of functionalist and rational architecture and urbanism, consisting in creating new towns and in the demolition and reconstruction of the existing urban fabric, started being discredited in the late 1960s, owing to the many issues raised by their implementation (poor-quality housing deteriorating quickly, sparseness or absence of facilities, dislocation of social relations, authoritarian forms of intervention, etc.) and to the resulting ‘urban struggles’ (Fourcaut and Dufaux 2004). The large suburban high-rise social housing estates that were emblems of this modern movement began to be rejected and stigmatized during the 1970s by architects, planners, politicians, intellectuals and residents alike (Roncayolo 1985; Murie and Willmott 1988). The 1980s were marked by a sharp rise in social inequalities and the emergence of a ‘new poverty’ (Paugam 1991) concentrated out of sight in these estates, which buried all the hopes of social and political emancipation of the working classes sparked by the modern movement. Worse yet, it was from the outset almost exclusively addressed by politicians, journalists and urban experts with a spatial approach to social relationships, to the detriment of a genuine consideration of the post-Fordist transformations of modes of production and the consequences of these modes of production on the living conditions of the working classes. As we will later demonstrate, this new take on society, which sociologists and political scientists have discussed in terms of reducing the social question to the ‘new urban question’ (Tissot and Poupeau 2005), contributes to the redefinition of central and local social policies in a variety of Western countries.

In the old centres, the rejection of modern, authoritarian urbanism came with a new outlook that symbolically upgraded neighbourhoods that were until then generally considered slums. This revaluation of old neighbourhoods – also named the ‘return to the centre’ – operated through the rediscovery and legal protection of their architectural and urban value (the old street layouts, reducing the place of cars to the benefit of foot traffic), their historical and patrimonial value (by highlighting their manufacturing/industrial past), as well as their social value (dense sociabilities, associated with those of villages, and contrasted with the anonymity of large suburban estates). This rehabilitation was initially launched by local populations with varying backgrounds, from activists of the ‘urban struggles’ to simple resi-
dents and business owners, some of whom were directly threatened by the expropriations and evictions carried out within the framework of ‘bulldozer-style urban renewal’ operations (Fijalkow and Préteceille 2006). It was done in the name of the supposedly ‘authentic’ nature of the physical space and residents of these neighbourhoods. Still, it contributed to the symbolic and territorial reappropriation of these neighbourhoods by members of the ‘new middle classes’ (Veschambre 2008), ultimately heralding a ‘bourgeois re-capture’ of the inner cities, in the words of Alain Bourdin (1984). These new middle-class residents were more attracted by life in the inner cities – as opposed to suburban residential lots and periurban areas, even as those were becoming particularly popular in the 1970s.

Urban planners, architects and political actors in turn adopted this new outlook on the city. Faced with urban social movements on the one hand and with the issues raised by the massive low-cost construction of large housing estates on the other, they made a complete U-turn that would deeply impact national and local orientations and decisions in the field of urban planning in the following decades. Old towns, with their streets lined with shops, their aligned facades, their low-rise buildings and their functional and social diversity, became the benchmarks for rethinking modes of public and private urban intervention (Colomb 2006; Charmes 2006). Emphasis was now placed on producing a ‘city with a human face’, better suited to the emergence of ‘communities’ with a strong sense of belonging and intense forms of solidarity. This return to the golden age of the old town, which intensified in the following decades as the dual process of revaluation of old central areas and rejection of the high-rise estate model continued to apply, carries with it a number of notions (mixing, heritage, participation, attractiveness) that have become new reference points of local public policy. Depending on the political levels – central or local – but also on the types of neighbourhoods and cities in which these public policies are implemented, the reference points are not always the same or are not always translated similarly. In any case, the success of these concepts points to a larger transformation of the objectives of social policies within the framework of welfare-state reforms. The French sociologists Patrick Simon and Sylvie Tissot have demonstrated this in their respective works on the increasingly frequent invocation of social mixing (Simon 1995; Tissot 2007). The local social policies – which fall under the term politiques de la ville in France – that have been implemented since the 1980s and 1990s focus more on the spatial embedding of poverty and social precarization, which is now considered a problem in itself, than on their real causes, that is, the social inequalities produced by the transformation of modes of production towards a tertiarized and financialized capitalism.

These reorientations of local social policies are therefore not disconnected from other evolutions that can be observed in the political represen-
tations of society, its problems and what it should be, which also contribute more indirectly to the gentrification of old neighbourhoods. In the wake of the ideas channelled by the 1968 movements and the ensuing birth of the ‘new social movements’, left-wing political parties broadened their palettes to include the claims of the ‘new middle classes’ (ecology, feminism, access to the law for ethnic/racial minorities and homosexuals) while emptying them of their critical content – for instance, by formulating them in cultural terms rather than in terms of economic inequalities resulting from capitalist modes of production (Boltanski and Chiapello 2006). Urban questions were no longer limited to the struggles to improve housing conditions for workers and immigrants, and expanded to include demands on ‘quality of life’ in the city. Only in the early 1980s would a real ideological turn come, with the triumph of neoliberal dogmas. The ideological and social shifts of left-wing parties towards a reformist agenda, the decline of the Communist utopia and its political apparatuses, the access to power of conservative parties, including in the UK and the USA, and the French socialist government’s embrace of austerity in 1983 ultimately led to the abandonment of Keynesian policies to the benefit of policies inspired by neoliberal ideology. More broadly, they brought about the redefinition of these policies’ relations to the working class – towards more strained relations, focused on individuals more than on the mechanisms of domination that keep them in subordinate positions in modes of production and in society at large.

The encounter between these three intertwined overarching dynamics is most visible, as we have noted, in the central neighbourhoods of large Western cities. However, they can result in multiple processes of urban change: large-scale construction of offices, leisure spaces, high-end shops and luxury homes, tourist-oriented facilities, spontaneous or planned revaluation of neighbourhoods for use by the ‘creative class’, ‘super-gentrification’, ‘studentification’ (revaluation almost exclusively for the use of students), arrival of very well-paid residents with little public presence, looking for carefully selected neighbours, etc. The forms of the ‘upgrading’ (Rousseau 2014) of the inner cities are multiple. Some central neighbourhoods can also remain unaffected by these dynamics, continue to be populated primarily by newly arrived immigrants and serve as drivers of integration for wider communities – for instance, by hosting high concentrations of businesses targeted towards these populations. All depends on the local configuration in terms of urban morphology, ownership structure, political commitment and the social groups present. Some material, political and social configurations are conducive to gentrification in the stricter sense, that is, the progressive elevation of the sociological features of residents combined with forms of rehabilitation or transformation of old buildings. But others rather tend to foster massive intervention by public or private actors and lead to demolitions and
reconstructions that more radically transform the urban landscape. Others yet can slow down transformations and support the status quo, or even the development of competing dynamics such as the degradation of old buildings or their exploitation by slum landlords, squatters or small entrepreneurs. In other words, gentrification processes also emerge at the intersection of the aforementioned macrosocial dynamics and of the trajectories of neighbourhoods, buildings, residents and elected officials.

Here we argue that it is in this sense that the concept of gentrification is worth retaining, insofar as its use is limited to well-defined phenomena of urban change, situated at the crossroads of wide-ranging economic, social and political dynamics specific to the post-Fordist period and to distinct trajectories of neighbourhoods, offering the conditions for revaluation without large-scale demolition. We believe that using the term, as some have suggested, as a ‘generic’ (Clark 2015) concept very broadly referring to all phenomena consisting in ‘the production of space for – and consumption by – a more affluent and very different incoming population’ (Slater, Curran and Lees 2004: 1145) empties it of its value and poses the risk of creating confusion and depriving it of its analytical power, as Thomas Maloutas and others have argued. It would, for instance, mean treating the transformations in rural areas or the Haussmannization of nineteenth-century Paris as gentrification. In our view, the concept of gentrification is useful precisely in that it relates to historically and geographically situated processes. Again, this does not mean that the question of competition between social groups for the appropriation of territories is not a major one. But while this class struggle for and in space can be observed in all gentrification processes, it does not in itself define gentrification. The concept is fertile in that it allows us to point to a certain type of competition between certain actors for certain particular space; this is also why it should remain, as Thomas Maloutas suggests, a ‘mid-range’ concept, to be used for bringing together and comparing numerous concrete cases operating under similar logics, but one that only refers to a particular manifestation of this struggle for the appropriation of space.

LOOKING FOR THE DNA OF GENTRIFICATION
An Unequal Social Relation to the Appropriation of Space

We have made clear that the ambition of this book is not to put forward a stabilized definition of gentrification to claim what is and what is not gentrification, to claim that territories are ‘gentrifying’ or not, as if the concept alone could sum up everything that happens there. Rather, our intent is to
use gentrification as an analytical concept instead of a descriptive one, unveiling social, geographic, political and economic mechanisms specific to the postindustrial period, which shed light on the evolution of today’s urbanized societies. It shows, for instance, the extent to which the urban model of the old town has for over thirty years been overwhelmingly prevalent in legitimate representations. It shows the way in which relations of competition, alliance or domination between social groups now unfold largely in and for the city, with the contribution of more or less consciously involved private and public actors. It enables us to see in inhabited space a base material of social distinction, and calls attention to the power of cultural resources, alongside economic ones, in the rise and fall of places and their residents.

The confrontation of materials and cross-analyses featured in the following pages evidence a few basic elements of the DNA of gentrification – allowing us to identify the content of the concept. Gentrification appears as a process of economic and symbolic (re)valuation of a space, partly under the influence of an urban model inspired by old European towns, and through the competition between various actors and social groups unequally endowed to appropriate and transform it. We will now elaborate on each of these elements, beginning with the latter – arguably the most important.

Gentrification refers first and foremost to the transformation of the social makeup of a neighbourhood due to the departure or death of working-class residents, and the arrival of younger households with higher qualifications and social statuses, whose incomes are not necessarily much greater initially but are poised to increase. This replacement of a population by another comes with transformations in the urban fabric (rehabilitation of buildings, increase in real-estate value) and in the business community (with the apparition of a new supply to meet the demand of the new populations). It admittedly reflects the evolution of the relative place of these groups in society as a whole, but at a heightened pace, as the working classes decline more quickly in those neighbourhoods than elsewhere (Clerval and Van Crieckingen 2014). Whether they leave of their own accord or they are chased can be established only by conducting refined, local analyses – as the working class (just like the middle and upper classes) can vary quite widely, including within a single neighbourhood.

The evolution of the social makeup reflects a competition between unequally endowed social groups for the appropriation and conservation of the local space. In practice, retired skilled workers who own their homes and newly arrived young migrants who rent them and work undeclared, part-time jobs do not have the same resources to stay in the neighbourhood where they reside together. These resources are not only economic; they are also legal (having the right to be there), linguistic (to defend their rights) and symbolic (the older residents prevail). Likewise, public-sector managers
with stable and well-paid positions and theatre and visual artists employed discontinuously do not have the same resources to move into a neighbourhood, settle there and appropriate space: they have very unequal abilities to pay rents or repay loans on a regular basis, and are not armed with the same guarantees on the real-estate market. Yet, as we have seen, inheritances can serve to correct these inequalities, as well as nonfinancial resources such as access to information, advice, legal aid, restoration aid, a flexible schedule, and material and aesthetic forms of know-how allowing them to transform and revalue properties with little economic value. Appropriation does not only consist in the purchase or transformation of a property; it also refers to the ability to impact the evolution of a place beyond the property itself – neighbourly relations, school operations, political power struggles, urban projects, etc. The resources to resist or contribute to gentrification are multiple and varied. Their value depends on the neighbourhood’s context and characteristics: type of housing, availability of land, actors in play, state of the local political game, prices, etc. One of the characteristics of gentrification is undoubtedly this variety of resources to be used to appropriate and transform places – in particular the role of cultural and symbolic capitals in convincing elected officials, decorating one’s house or having influence in parent groups.

Gentrification can thus be defined as, among other things, an unequal social relation to the appropriation of space that plays out on several levels: between social groups, between generations, between ethnicized and racialized groups – three types of groups that do not have the same boundaries. These social relations also change with time, as the context and the values of the resources of the different actors change too. Hence, the categories of ‘gentrifier’ and ‘gentrified’ cannot refer to stable social actors or groups: one can be a very long-time resident and actively contribute to gentrification; one can be gentrifier one day and gentrified the next. They should rather be used as a couple, to refer to these unequal social relations that keep taking on new forms and involving new actors.

The actors of gentrification are not only residents: the customers of businesses and business owners, and those who work in or regularly visit the neighbourhood can also take part in it. Most importantly, real-estate professionals (developers, buyers and sellers, real-estate agents), though they may not necessarily reside in the neighbourhood, play an important role and intervene with their own resources in this local game: economic capitals, of course, but also highly variable degrees of knowledge of the local market – a distinction must, for instance, be made between long-established real-estate agents and investors with only superficial knowledge of the neighbourhood but considerable resources. The effects of their participation in gentrification vary.
Lastly, the public authorities definitely play a role in gentrification processes by strongly contributing to defining the rules of the game in a number of areas. They impact the social fabric with housing policies; the economic fabric with (re)development policies favouring some activities to the detriment of others; urban planning with the definition of rules and norms in urbanism as well as concrete interventions in urban space; the housing market, by establishing what is and is not possible when transforming buildings, by playing a part in transactions, and by implementing policies that modify supply; and, finally, schools and associations.

Yet we must also refrain from considering residents, economic actors and political actors as entirely separate categories. Among the first group, some might become buyers/sellers – for one or two transactions or on a more long-term basis – while others might open a business that is adjusted to the tastes of their social group, manage a cultural venue or get elected to municipal office. Likewise, the city can become an economic actor, for instance through a semipublic company. Being a real-estate agent or a business owner does not prevent one from securing an electoral mandate. These individuals accumulate resources by combining roles.

The second main feature of gentrification is that this appropriation of space appears to be informed by a distinctive model of urbanity that can be summed up in four words: centrality, density, diversity and historicity. The dream space of the actors of gentrification is not quiet and peripheral, natural or wild, vast and loose; it is busy, dense, made of small streets, small businesses and small cafés; it can be crossed on foot and brings together a great number of activities and people who meet in public spaces. This dream space is not homogeneous, smooth or harmonized when it comes to the housing stock and the population: it displays a diverse landscape, houses and attracts residents and visitors with varying backgrounds, and combines housing, facilities, workplaces and all kinds of businesses. This diversity is in itself the reflection of a local history that leaves traces in the present. The dream city is not new or modern, it does not deny its past, but displays it as a token of authenticity, unicity and appropriability: a place where everyone can leave their mark.

This model is not socially neutral. It was initially defended by protesting youths in the ‘urban struggle’ of the 1960s and 1970s before triumphing in urban policies, first in the 1970s, as we noted earlier, with the abandonment of urban renewal policies in the old centres and of the construction of high-rise suburban estates, and the adoption of measures to protect and rehabilitate old towns. It prevailed for a second time at the turn of the 1990s with the political formulation of the so-called suburban problem (‘problème des banlieues’) and the main orientations of urban policy, including the adoption of a model based on old neighbourhoods for corrective intervention on large
high-rise housing buildings (Tissot 2007). As Sylvie Tissot has shown, the circulation of the ideas and representations of what a city should be largely relates to the circulation of the people who defend them: many of the urban policymakers of the 1990s were former activists of 1968 protest movements. More broadly, this ‘revenge’ of the old town model can be interpreted as the triumph of upwardly mobile groups under post-Fordism, who have a key impact on urban power: members of the intellectual middle class in the 1970s and 1980s and more recently the transnational elite of the great metropolises, as well as, from a remove (particularly through the writings of individuals such as Richard Florida), the ‘creative class’, marked by varying degrees of precarity in midsized and declining cities.

However, asserting the importance of this urban model does not mean that gentrification can only exist in central, dense, historic, mixed neighbourhoods. It means, rather, that gentrification partly consists in acknowledging or producing this centrality, density, historicity and diversity on the basis of available elements. These can sometimes be tenuous, as in the cases gathered under the label of ‘new-build gentrification’, in which old buildings are completely demolished to be replaced by new ones. Even in such cases, the architecture adopted mimics the dense city, structured by streets and squares lined with shops where pedestrians, cyclists and motorists mix. Also, it connects to local history by highlighting traces of former activity – a tower crane, a factory chimney or salvaged materials. The image of these places that is conceived and channelled by public authorities and developers often explicitly refers to carefully selected specific facets of local history.

These forms of appropriation and transformation of places result in economic and symbolic (re)valuation, which in turn supports and speeds up social and urban change. These spaces may have been built for the bourgeoisie and prized for that reason, and over the decades experienced a social decline as the bourgeoisie left for new spaces and less wealthy residents moved in. This applies, for instance, to the Marais in Paris or Stoke Newington in London. The former was the place of residence of the Ancien Régime nobility, while the latter was home to the intellectual bourgeoisie in the late nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, they welcomed often poor populations of migrants in private mansions and large houses, divided into small flats with minimal comfort. In such cases, the revaluation draws on the old housing stock to emulate the splendour of past constructions and decorations while combining it with contemporary comforts and aesthetics; it also feeds on local history to promote the image of a distinguished, sought-after neighbourhood. But gentrification can also occur in poor areas, built to accommodate working-class activities and populations, as in the Penates de la Croix-Rousse in Lyons, Bas-Montreuil near Paris, Alcântara in Lisbon or El Raval in Barcelona. In such cases, revaluation involves the attribution of a new value to
these spaces and their buildings. It is facilitated by the recognition of an ‘old’ urban fabric – that is, which pre-dates the second half of the twentieth century – but also requires recognizing a specific aesthetic or architectural value in an industrial or working-class area – this is, for instance, what happened with Brooklyn lofts – and sometimes brushing aside the political history of these neighbourhoods and the protests that took place in them. This entails a change in outlook, for instance by adopting a perspective focused on heritage, which is turned definitively to the past and attributes a new cultural value – therein lies the beauty of the redefinition of ‘working-class’ or ‘poor’ neighbourhoods as ‘popular’ neighbourhoods, giving a watered-down, pacified image of the same place. This can be conversely done by pursuing an approach turned towards the present and future, concerned with finding a place’s ‘potentialities’ and using it as raw material for activity that creates spaces, ways of inhabiting a place, discourses and images that are valued in their own right. In all of these processes, the cultural capital possessed in particular by middle- and upper-class holders of artistic and intellectual occupations must once again be stressed. We may go one step further and ask if the strength of this social group might not come from its ability to have the value of its productions recognized outside its own social space.

Such symbolic upgrades come with economic valuation; yet the relation between the two is in no way linear or mechanical, as real-estate prices depend on many other local and especially global factors. Some types of properties can gain particularly large amounts of symbolic value for the aforementioned reasons and have their prices increase more quickly than others; rents may follow with some delay. Prices also quickly increase in cafés, restaurants and shops, which adjust to a new customer base and profit from the new image of their neighbourhood. Again, this is far from a mechanical process, and very different people can still live alongside each other in such neighbourhoods, frequenting dedicated places – for instance, central areas for immigrant populations like Brick Lane in London and Château Rouge in Paris. Also, revaluation for some can mean devaluation for others: a neighbourhood that used to be perceived as shady by some and welcoming by others can become pleasant in the eyes of the former and cold and snobbish to the latter. However, the different place occupied by these populations in the social structure and the existence of a hierarchy of tastes accredited by institutions – beginning with the market – enable us to discuss this change in status as a valuation. This valuation can be observed in the improved social status conferred by the neighbourhood to those who can afford it.

Ultimately, speaking of gentrification is raising the question of the reorganization of social domination in space, the question of the winners and losers of the West’s great economic transition in the last forty years and of the political shifts in orientation that came with it. Observing gentrification
processes means looking at how urban space changes by embracing and reproducing new social hierarchies. These unequal relations in urban space that play out in gentrification must be evidenced, as a number of authors have done before us, without falling into the trap of oversimplification. We should, for instance, be wary of jumping too quickly from identifying inequalities and power struggles to denouncing the same culprits or accomplices everywhere. This would neglect the complexity of local situations and actors’ interests: the benefits of gentrification are not always where one expects them – for instance, long-term residents can take advantage of the revaluation of the housing stock to sell their property and move out – even though some indisputably always end up suffering from it, starting with tenants whose lease has expired. In the following, our first effort will modestly consist in describing and analysing to improve our understanding. Relations of domination endure, change shape and shift their own boundaries. We therefore need to thoroughly examine the forms of appropriation of place they involve; in which public policies they are embodied; where and how they play out again and again.

Three Disciplines, Six Researchers, Nine Fieldworks

This book is the outcome of the comparison and discussion of research produced in six doctoral theses (three in geography, two in sociology and one in political science) on gentrification, conducted over nine European fieldworks. The benefit of this plural approach is that it allows us to evidence similarities, variations and effects of local contexts on the forms assumed by gentrification in the cities under study. Based on empirical material, we are able to show a variety of expressions of the social relations of appropriation of space that characterize gentrification in different urban contexts.

Although the approach we defend here is empirical, our aim is not to provide a thorough review of the current state of gentrifications in Europe; nor do we even strive towards painting a representative picture. Rather, we are concerned with in-depth analysis of what has happened in a few places across the continent. In our view, empirical approaches are crucial to the study of gentrification processes, and taking their temporality into account is also key. Only then can we move beyond partisan discourses, which carry a judgement on gentrifiers, the gentrified and public authorities, sometimes at the price of mythicizing the living conditions and social relationships of the older residents and demonizing the residential strategies of newcomers or the intentions of public authorities. Owing to the lack of fine-grained data on sociospatial transformations and on the practices and discourse of the key actors in projects that contribute to gentrification, it is difficult to establish whether such a process is indeed happening, and if it is explicitly supported
or sought by public authorities. One might argue that this is not an essential concern, and that taking into consideration their direct and indirect impacts on the populations is more important than knowing whether the effects of policies are actually the ones pursued by public and private actors. However, even from that angle, it is not always clear that the influx of middle and upper classes in some neighbourhoods (including with the indirect support of local authorities) systematically leads to the eviction of poorer residents: this question has been the object of intense debate between scholars for a long time.\textsuperscript{15} In some urban contexts, the long-established residents, for instance elderly people or families, are actually eager for middle-class residents to move in to secure more attention from the authorities and ensure that local businesses can stay open (Paquette and Salazar 2005) or have forms of social pacification in the neighbourhood reinforced (Uitermark, Duyvendak and Kleinhans 2007). It is worth underlining that projects aimed at improving quality of life in an urban space (such as the creation of green areas and playing fields, the regulation of traffic and noise, or safety projects) do not only benefit the newer residents; they are also enjoyed and in some cases eagerly awaited by the older residents with less social capital. The remarkable thing, however, is that these improvements are often only obtained on the condition of the arrival of new residents.

Our goal here is thus to find out what is actually going on in these neighbourhoods. Yet, beyond detailed and informed description, we believe that these specific cases will yield more general insights only by conducting in-depth analysis based on precise questions, using the tools of geography, sociology and political science, and by situating the phenomena under study within broader temporal and spatial contexts. Only then will they resonate elsewhere on the continent – and even beyond – and feed further discussion of the causes and consequences, the stakes and actors of gentrifications.

Now for a brief presentation of the nine fieldworks that serve as raw material for the remainder of this book, taking us to France, Portugal, Spain and Great Britain. Three of them are located in the Paris metropolitan area – as France’s biggest urban area, a prime site for the study of gentrification: La Goutte d’Or, in the eighteenth arrondissement; its central section, Château Rouge, where dynamics of change are different owing in particular to its commercial reach; and the inner suburb of Bas-Montreuil, which borders the twentieth arrondissement. Three other studies have been conducted in other French cities: in Lyons’ Croix-Rousse neighbourhood; in Grenoble’s Berriat–Saint-Bruno district; and in Roubaix’s central areas. The Portuguese case is Lisbon’s Alcântara district, while the Spanish case is Barcelona’s central district of Ciutat Vella. The ninth and last case is the inner city of Sheffield (England).
Long-term analysis allows us to identify different stages in the gentrification process according to the cases under study. In most cases, gentrification began between the mid-1980s and the 1990s and remained somewhat limited until at least the mid-2000s, subsequently accelerating sharply (in Bas-Montreuil or in Roubaix’s inner city with the structuring of a ‘loft’ market). In Lyons’ Croix-Rousse, however, the process began in the late 1960s but still went on unabated in the 2000s. Berriat–Saint-Bruno (Grenoble) stands somewhere in between: it witnessed the beginning of gentrification in the early 1980s and a subsequent intensification of the process, as public policy encouraged rehabilitation and the renewal of the population.

Several of these cases reflect the ‘model of urbanity’ we described earlier. They are located centrally or close to the centre of their city or urban area, without having the same demographic weight – resulting in necessarily variable concerns in terms of public policies, social change and gentrification: from under 3 per cent of Lisbon’s population for Alcântara, up to nearly a quarter of the municipal population for Bas-Montreuil. Most are former industrial and manufacturing suburbs that began witnessing rapid urbanization in the nineteenth century, except the much more heterogeneous Ciutat Vella in Barcelona and the inner city of Sheffield, historically devoted to industry and trade. Most of the cases under study display a heterogeneous urban fabric, composed of buildings from different eras and of varying architectural styles (nineteenth-century workers’ houses and investment properties, more recent collective housing, new constructions combining social and luxury housing in varying proportions), sometimes with specificities owing to the neighbourhood’s urban history: workers’ houses and workshops in rear tenements in Bas-Montreuil, the so-called canut buildings (where textile workers used to live and work) on the slopes of Lyons’ Croix-Rousse or La Ribera’s medieval palaces in Barcelona’s Ciutat Vella. Previously dedicated to industrial activity, the urban fabrics of the inner cities of Roubaix and Sheffield reflect trends in the regeneration of urban wasteland, characterized in Roubaix by a high proportion of social housing. All of these neighbourhoods offer opportunities for rehabilitation or real-estate investment, and therefore for gentrification, which vary widely from one area to the next and even sometimes from one building to the next.

In varying proportions, these places experience comparable social trends that are characteristic of gentrification (decrease in the share of blue-collar workers and employees, increasing presence of managers and holders of intermediate occupations, growing younger population), even if the Goutte d’Or neighbourhood stands out for being the African commercial hub of Paris, if not Europe – which, as we will see, has effects on the diffusion of the gentrification process – and Ciutat Vella is clearly a centre for the immigrant
population. However, the historical, political and economic trajectories in which these processes are embedded differ. Paris, Lyons and Barcelona have experienced political stability, with municipal power in the hands of the left (since 2001 for Paris and Lyons and 1979 for Barcelona) until at least recently (for Barcelona). Roubaix, Grenoble, Sheffield and Lisbon have, on the contrary, seen changes in local political leadership, but those did not necessarily result in significant changes of urban development strategies.

Most of the cities examined here fall within the category of national and international dynamic metropolises (Paris, Barcelona, Lisbon, Lyons, Grenoble), even if their strategic urban policy orientations have varied during the period under study: urban requalification of working-class neighbourhoods and promotion of ‘social mixing’ against a backdrop of continually soaring housing prices in Paris; efforts to attract foreign students and tourism in the inner city and urban renewal in suburban working-class areas in Lyons; internationalization of the economy, touristic development and reduction of the municipal debt in Lisbon; support to high-technology and most recently nanotechnology research and industry in Grenoble; and rehabilitation of urban heritage, touristic development and support to ICT industries in Barcelona.

However, two of our fieldworks are set in shrinking cities – Roubaix and Sheffield – owing to the crisis of the textile (Roubaix) and steel (Sheffield) industries. This makes the implications of economic restructuring and of the reclaiming of urban wasteland in central areas and their surroundings very different from the other places under study. Having both witnessed the implementation of successive economic redevelopment strategies, they now target outside investments to attract students (particularly in Sheffield) and firms operating in cutting-edge technologies and services.

Montreuil falls into both categories, owing to the combination of an acute demographic and economic crisis from the 1970s to the 1990s and the influence of Paris’s economic and real-estate dynamics, which has been felt since the 1980s and even more intensely since the 2000s. In this former part of Paris’s ‘red belt’, a stronghold of municipal communism, urban dynamics have progressively diversified, from policies supporting the maintenance of industrial activities to the promotion of social housing, the rise of the private real-estate market under the influence of soaring prices in Paris, and an opening-up to the tertiary sector.

The research that provides the raw material for this book is the result of long periods of investigation (over several years) and frequent returns to the field, involving a mix of classic information-collection methods (statistical analyses on the evolution of the sociodemographic makeup of the neighbourhoods under study; analysis of archives and urbanism documents) and of more original ones in our domain, such as the monitoring of the social
makeup in Château Rouge buildings over several years, complemented by a questionnaire survey conducted in the street with residents and visitors to shed light on the uses of the neighbourhood, a press review in the case of Bas-Montreuil16 and a discourse analysis17 in Ciutat Vella. All draw on numerous, repeated interviews with residents from highly diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, long-term residents and newcomers, regular visitors to the neighbourhood, public actors (elected officials in municipal and inter-municipal bodies, members of chambers of commerce, school principals, etc.), private actors (shop owners, developers, real-estate agents, etc.) and actors from local community groups.

These fieldworks document different forms of gentrification. As we compare them, we can identify contextual effects, but also overarching structuring lines — components of the ‘DNA’ of gentrification. The following pages evidence three components of gentrification phenomena. The first are economic, urban and social dynamics that have affected European countries as a whole over the past forty years and that have been embodied in cities through changes in former working-class neighbourhoods. The second are urban policies — that is, actors, representations, models and procedures — that in turn encouraged gentrification. The third and final components are social groups and relations whose (im)balances shape the ways in which gentrification processes unfold. The texts presented in each of these sections also strive to show the effects of the encounters between these structural dynamics, these policies and these actors, and territories with their own distinctive features.

Based on the cross-study of these nine fieldworks, the first section of the book examines the combination of structural effects (changes in the job market, real-estate markets, the built environment, etc.) and local contextual effects in spaces experiencing gentrification. It provides concrete illustrations of the differences in the process observed in each case study, and presents gentrification as a point of intersection between global structural dynamics, a neighbourhood’s trajectory, and the individual trajectories of its residents and regular visitors. The second part of the book focuses on the actors of gentrification, with an emphasis on political actors. It shows that gentrification is also informed by transformations in local public policies, shifts in alliances and discourses promoting urban attractiveness or social mixing — these may act successively as drivers and brakes in the process. Lastly, the third part of the book zooms in on the inhabitants of gentrifying neighbourhoods, residents and nonresidents alike, and their cohabitations. It argues that the social relations over the appropriation of space that play out in gentrification should be understood in light of the other dynamics at work (commercial, migratory and socioeconomic dynamics) and with consideration to the diversity of the inhabitants, their residential and social trajectories and their spatial practices.
Notes

1. During the night of 26–27 September 2015, in the East London district of Shoreditch, a demonstration organized by anarchist and anticapitalist groups to denounce the gentrification of poor East London districts attracted 150 to 200 people. In January 2014, similar demonstrations took place in Madrid, Barcelona and Burgos.

2. A prominent example is Jane Jacobs, whose book (1961) and activism have unarguably contributed to the symbolic revaluation of the inner cities. On this period of change in large US urban centres, see also Beauregard (2003).

3. On the ecologist vision of Chicago sociologists, see Rhein (2003).

4. See his reference work (Ley 1996) on the sociocultural approach to gentrification, based on a compilation of his main articles published in the 1980s.

5. This approach arguably peaked with Jon Caulfield’s analysis of Toronto’s gentrification as a cultural and social practice stemming from deliberate resistance against suburban ideals and allowing gentrifiers to ‘individually and collectively … pursue practices eluding the domination of social and cultural structures’ (Caulfield 1989: 624).

6. See the pioneering study by Yvette Herzhaft-Marin (1985).

7. One of the first authors to note the role of gay populations in gentrification was Manuel Castells (1984), who showed how moving into a tolerant space (the Castro district in San Francisco) was vital for this oppressed group, but also how it in turn affected other oppressed groups (Blacks and Latinos), forced to leave the neighbourhood as a result of rising rents.

8. On the promotion of the loft as housing and lifestyle in France, see also Biau (1988).

9. In the sense of the researchers of the Chicago school of sociology in the first half of the twentieth century; according to them, relations between social groups are grounded in ‘competition’ for urban space, similar to the fight for survival in the animal and vegetal realms (hence the analogy with ecology). They argue that this competition explains the processes of ‘invasion’ and ‘succession’ that continually reshape the social divisions of urban space. See Grafmeyer and Joseph (1990).

10. For instance, Atkinson and Bridge (2005: 300).

11. For a recent example, see Lees, Shin and López-Morales (2015).

12. For an insightful analysis of this new social structure in the UK, see Savage et al. (2013).

13. Worth mentioning are, for instance, the work of Jane Jacobs in New York (1961) and Manuel Castells in Paris (1973). They analyse the urban struggles that emerged in the 1960s by connecting efforts to defend the local environment and national efforts to reduce social inequalities. In the 1970s, these urban struggles gradually became more focused on increasingly local issues – see Grégory Busquet (2007).

14. In the cases of the French cities of Angers and Le Mans, Vincent Veschambre (2008) has convincingly shown that the heritage revolution in their old towns owed much to the efforts of local cultural and social elites to reappropriate these spaces.

15. In part for methodological reasons, detailed analysis of eviction processes and, more generally, of the harm caused by gentrification for working-class residents is no easy undertaking. On the case of New York City, see Newman and Wyly (2006).

16. The press review sought to count the occurrences of ‘Montreuil’ and ‘Bas-Montreuil’, and representations corresponding to these place names, from the mid-1990s.

17. This involved the textual analysis of over twenty years’ worth of editorials in *Barcelona. Metròpolis Mediterrània* (1985–2007), a municipal urban-policy journal.

**References**


