Part I

Villains? The Judicial Truth
Introduction to Part I

Stragismo, as discussed in Chapter 1, refers to a bombing campaign which started in the late 1960s and lasted for several years, causing a high toll in terms of the number of people killed and wounded. Initially, investigations targeted extreme-left, especially anarchist, groups (the so-called ‘red trail’), since the available evidence appeared to point in their direction. Later investigations started to probe an alternative path, the so-called ‘black trail’, which pointed the finger at extreme-right groups as the culprits for the massacres, albeit acting in ways that would pin the blame upon the extreme left. In connection to this discovery, investigating magistrates also brought to light the existence of a strategy, which became widely known as the Strategy of Tension, whose aim was to create an atmosphere of subversion and fear in the country so as to promote a turn to an authoritarian type of government. Since the strategy was mainly directed at containing communism in Italy (especially in the light of the formation of centre-left governments from 1963, and increasing unrest on the part of students and workers in 1968 and 1969), it was an essential part of this strategy that the threat of political subversion should be seen as coming from the left, not from the right. This explained to many why much of the early evidence had appeared to point in the direction of anarchist groups. Indeed, when investigations started to target the extreme right, various state forces mobilised in order to obstruct their progress and to prevent information from reaching the magistrates, thus severely hampering the judicial process.

The chapters that make up Part I examine stragismo and the Strategy of Tension in the light of judicial findings and trial material, especially in connection with the latest trials, concerning the December 1969 massacre at Piazza Fontana, Milan, and the 1973 attack against the police headquarters, again in Milan. The chapters are organised ‘from the bottom up’: that is to say, the analysis starts with an in-depth examination of the role of Italian neofascist groups, and other organisations acting ‘on the ground’ (Chapter 2). It then proceeds to assess the role of various national and foreign bodies, including the intelligence services, the armed forces, the Carabinieri, and the police (Chapter 3). Finally, Chapter 4 discusses the interpretations of both stragismo and the Strategy of Tension as put forward by well-informed individuals who have incorporated the findings of the recent trials in their reconstructions of events. Before we analyse the judicial material, it is important to provide a brief account of the judicial process itself, and the reasons why it has proved so convoluted, with the latest trial on Piazza Fontana concluding as recently as 2005, and the one on the Brescia massacre still pending.
The long and tortuous search for the culprits

The longest and most convoluted of all judicial investigations and trials concerning bombing attacks and other acts of stragismo – which collectively are seen as constituting the so-called Strategy of Tensión – was the one concerning the bombing attacks of 12 December 1969, when various explosive devices went off in Milan and Rome. One of these, planted at the Banca Nazionale dell’Agricoltura, in Piazza Fontana, Milan, resulted in seventeen people dead and eighty-four wounded. Police investigations at first identified the culprits as Giuseppe Pinelli and Pietro Valpreda, two anarchists who belonged to the Milanese group 22 marzo (‘22 March’). While being interrogated at Milan police headquarters, Pinelli died, officially committing suicide by jumping out of one of the windows. This event was to inspire Dario Fo to write his famous play *Morte accidentale di un anarchico* (‘Accidental Death of an Anarchist’), first performed in December 1970. It also marked the beginning of a campaign of hatred directed against the officer considered responsible for Pinelli’s death, Commissar Luigi Calabresi, himself assassinated three years later.

In 1972, after new investigations on the part of Treviso magistrate Giancarlo Stiz, neofascists Franco Freda, Giovanni Ventura and Pino Rauti were arrested. The latter was at the time a national leader of the MSI, having been founder, in 1956, of the extreme-right group Centro Studi Ordine Nuovo. The first two were leaders of the Padua-based cell of Ordine Nuovo. Initially charged with being the organisers of bombing attacks at Milan’s Fiera Campionaria and Central Station on 25 April 1969, as well as various attacks on trains on 8 and 9 August 1969, the Padua group was later also charged by Judge Stiz with the massacre of 12 December 1969. On 21 March 1972, as required by law, the investigation was transferred to Milanese magistrates, headed by Judge Gerardo D’Ambrosio, who on 24 April discharged Pino Rauti and on 28 August charged Freda and Ventura with the Piazza Fontana massacre.

On 23 February 1972 the first trial began, initially with the anarchists as defendants. Later, both Valpreda and Pinelli on the one hand, and Freda and Ventura on the other, stood as defendants, despite the obvious mutual incompatibility between the ‘red’ and the ‘black’ trails. On 13 October 1972, for ‘reasons of law and order’, the trial was transferred from Milan to Catanzaro, in the deep south, in a move which was interpreted in many quarters as an attempt to stifle any further investigations into the ‘black trail’, and especially into the suspected links between the neofascists, intelligence and military structures, and politicians. These suspicions were compounded by the fleeing abroad of Marco Pozzan, a friend of Franco Freda, on 15 January 1973, and of Guido Giannettini, an informer of the Italian secret services (then named SID – Servizio Informazioni Difesa), on 9 April 1973. Both were potentially crucial witnesses, and both were helped to flee Italy by the SID itself, as will be discussed in Chapter 3. Ten years after the crime, the trial concluded in February 1979 with a life sentence for both Freda and Ventura, as well as Giannettini, while Valpreda was found not guilty on
the grounds of ‘insufficient evidence’. On 20 March 1981, the Court of Appeal ruled that Freda and Ventura were also not guilty for lack of evidence. On 11 June 1982, the Supreme Court, the Court of Cassation, declared void the sentence of the Court of Appeal and ruled in favour of a new trial, which was to take place in Bari. The new trial involved only Freda and Ventura, since the Court also established that Giannettini should no longer be prosecuted. On 1 August 1985, the new Court confirmed that Freda and Ventura were not guilty on the grounds of ‘insufficient evidence’, a verdict which was later confirmed by the Court of Cassation on 27 January 1987. The two neofascists, however, were condemned to sixteen years in prison for the attacks at Milan’s Fiera Campionaria and Central Station of 25 April 1969, and on various trains, on 8-9 August 1969.

In 1987, the same year as the Court of Cassation ruled that neither the anarchists nor the neofascists were guilty of the Piazza Fontana massacre, albeit with recourse to a ‘not proven’ verdict, Milanese magistrate Guido Salvini reopened investigations, on the basis of fresh findings. The new investigation, which became publicly known only in 1991, resulted, first in 1995 and later in 1998, in a series of charges against the Venice-based cell of Ordine Nuovo, led by Delfo Zorzi and Carlo Maria Maggi and the Milan-based extreme-right group La Fenice, led by Giancarlo Rognoni (as well as the Padua-based cell of Ordine Nuovo, even though neither Freda nor Ventura could be put on trial for a second time). One of the main witnesses in the new trial, Carlo Digilio, was also a self-confessed culprit, in his capacity as both expert on weapons and explosives and adviser on such matters to Ordine Nuovo in the Veneto region. In June 2001 the Court found the defendants guilty of coorganising the massacre and sentenced them to life imprisonment. On 12 March 2004, the Milan Court of Appeal reversed the first sentence and found the defendants not guilty, although it acquitted both Maggi and Zorzi only with reference to Article 530, comma 2, of the Italian penal code, that is, on grounds of insufficient evidence. This sentence was later confirmed by the Court of Cassation. However, the Court also ruled that there was sufficiently strong evidence to establish that Freda and Ventura were indeed guilty of the Piazza Fontana massacre, as found in 1979, even though they were no longer judicially liable. In addition, both the Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation confirmed the initial guilty verdict for Carlo Digilio, and concluded that the massacre was to be attributed without doubt to the extreme-right group Ordine Nuovo, thereby clearing the anarchists Pinelli and Valpreda of any involvement in this crime.

Another important investigation and trial concerned the bombing attack at Bologna central station of 2 August 1980, which resulted in eighty-five people dead and more than 200 wounded. The trial started on 19 January 1987 and ended with a first verdict on 11 July 1988. The Court sentenced to life imprisonment Valerio Fioravanti, Francesca Mambro, Massimiliano Fachini and Sergio Picciafuoco. Fachini was a member of the MSI and Ordine Nuovo, Picciafuoco was a common criminal who was considered close to extreme-right activists, and Valerio Fioravanti and Francesca Mambro were leaders and founders of the NAR
In addition, the Court condemned for obstruction of justice Licio Gelli (Head of the Masonic Lodge P2), Francesco Pazienza, General Pietro Musumeci and Colonel Giuseppe Belmonte. All were sentenced to ten years in custody. The Court also sentenced Valerio Fioravanti to sixteen years' imprisonment, Francesca Mambro and Massimiliano Fachini to fifteen years each, Gilberto Cavallini to thirteen, Roberto Rinani to twelve years, all for membership of an armed group. This verdict was reversed by a Court of Appeal two years later. In 1992, the Supreme Court upheld the guilty sentences for Mambro, Fioravanti and Picciafuoco, while Fachini was found not guilty. Three years later, on 23 November 1995, the Court of Cassation confirmed a sentence of life imprisonment for Valerio Fioravanti and Francesca Mambro, cleared Massimiliano Fachini and condemned Licio Gelli, Francesco Pazienza, Pietro Musumeci and Giuseppe Belmonte for obstruction of justice. Picciafuoco was also cleared definitively in 1997.

In 1986, another member of the NAR, Luigi Ciavardini, a minor at the time of the massacre, was also accused of being one of the perpetrators. In January 2000, the Juvenile Court of Bologna cleared him of charges. Subsequently, on 9 March 2002, he was found guilty by a court of appeal and sentenced to thirty years in jail, but in 2003 the Court of Cassation annulled this verdict. In 2004 a different Appeals Court confirmed he was guilty of involvement in the massacre. The final decision by the Court of Cassation, on 11 April 2007, upheld the guilty sentence.

More recently, in 2005, the Bologna case was reopened by a magistrate, Paolo Giovagnoli, on the basis of new evidence which seemed to incriminate Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, better known as Carlos, an international professional terrorist closely linked to extreme Middle Eastern (mainly Palestinian) political groups. The reopening of the investigations followed a concerted campaign, organised mainly by politicians and intellectuals of the right, but supported also by representatives of all political tendencies, directed at proclaiming the innocence of the three neofascists charged with the massacre. For their part, Fioravanti, Mambro and Ciavardini have always maintained that they had nothing to do with this act of stragismo. Thus far, however, the new investigations have not led to a retrial.

Other important judicial investigations and trials on acts of violence and stragi considered to be closely connected to the Strategy of Tension concerned the attack on the Milan police headquarters of 17 May 1973, which killed four people and wounded another forty-five, and the bomb attack which took place at Piazza della Loggia, in Brescia, on 28 May 1974, resulting in eight people dead and 102 wounded. The trial for the first crime concluded initially (on 11 March 2000) with a sentence of life imprisonment for Gianfranco Bertoli as the perpetrator of the attack, and Carlo Maria Maggi, Giorgio Boffelli and Francesco Neami (of Ordine Nuovo) as well as Colonel Amos Spiazzi (of the Nuclei for the Defence of the State) as coorganisers. Gianfranco Bertoli was a self-declared anarchist who later was found to have been in close contact with extreme-right members of Ordine Nuovo in Venice and Mestre, Maggi and Boffelli were respectively leader and member of the Venice-based cell of Ordine Nuovo, and Neami belonged to the
Trieste-based cell of the same organisation. Amos Spiazzi was the leader of the Verona branch (‘Legion’) of a national organisation known as Nuclei for the Defence of the State, which depended on the army and recruited civilians and ex-military personnel for anti-communist purposes (see Chapter 2). The Court of Appeal subsequently ruled that Maggi, Boffelli, Neami and Spiazzi were not guilty of the crime, and that Bertoli had organised and executed the attack entirely of his own accord. On 11 July 2003, the Court of Cassation dismissed the latter sentence in highly critical terms and declared it void, thereby asking for new investigations and a new trial with reference to the three suspected organisers of the attack, who belonged to Ordine Nuovo. At the same time, however, the Court ruled that key witness Carlo Digilio was not to be considered credible and that his testimony should not be taken into account. The new Court of Appeal ruled on 1 December 2004 that the defendants were not guilty, albeit on grounds of ‘insufficient evidence’ (Article 530, comma 2 of the Italian penal code). Nevertheless, similarly to the verdict for the Piazza Fontana bombing, the Court also ruled that the attack was without doubt to be attributed to the extreme-right organisation Ordine Nuovo, and most probably to its Venice-based cell, whose leader was Carlo Maria Maggi.

In relation to the Brescia bombing, two investigations took place. One of these led to the charging of a small group of Brescia-based extreme-right elements, among whom was Ermanno Buzzi. The trial started in 1974, led to a first sentence which found the defendants guilty, a second sentence by the Court of Appeal in 1982 which reversed this judgment, and finally a ruling on 25 September 1987 by the Court of Cassation in favour of the defendants. In between the first two sentences Ermanno Buzzi was strangled, in jail, by two extreme-right terrorists, Pierluigi Concutelli and Mario Tuti. The second investigation ended with the charging of a number of Milan-based extreme-right activists, among whom was Giancarlo Rognoni, leader of the group La Fenice. The trial ended with a verdict by the Court of Cassation, on 13 November 1989, which ruled the defendants not guilty, albeit – once again – on the grounds of insufficient evidence.

A related story involved prosecutor Mario Arcai, who in 1974 was investigating the Movimento di Azione Rivoluzionaria (MAR), a subversive group the magistrate suspected of being involved in the 28 May massacre (see Chapter 2). Soon after, when the name of Arcai’s son appeared in a list of neofascists suspected of the bombing, the magistrate was transferred elsewhere for ‘incompatibility’, and his investigation came to an end. A new trial on this massacre is still pending. However, given that the main witnesses are the same people who testified at the recent trials for both the 1969 Piazza Fontana massacre and the 1973 attack at the Milan police headquarters, it is doubtful whether a significantly different verdict will result from this latest judicial process.

Finally, an investigation and trial which revealed crucially important aspects of the Strategy of Tension, specifically in relation to systematic cover-ups on the part of the armed forces and the Carabinieri, concerned the car bombing carried out in Peteano (Gorizia) on 31 May 1972, which killed three Carabinieri and injured
a fourth. Initially, the investigators followed a ‘red trail’, which quickly proved unfounded. Later, a group of common criminals was charged with the crime and put on trial. In 1979 they were all found not guilty. In 1984, neofascist Vincenzo Vinciguerra, already in prison for another politically inspired crime, confessed to having perpetrated the Peteano attack as an act of war against the state. Without turning collaborator, he nevertheless helped investigations, while denouncing the manner in which various state apparatuses had covered up the true culprits (including himself) and tried to blame others instead. This episode is discussed in Chapter 3.

The trial against Vinciguerra, his neofascist friend and partner in crime Carlo Cicuttini (at the time on the run in Spain) and various Carabinieri for obstruction of justice first ended in 1987 with a sentence of life imprisonment for the two neofascists, and between three and ten years’ imprisonment for the Carabinieri. The Court of Appeal established in 1989 that the two neofascists were guilty and the Carabinieri were innocent. In 1990, the Court of Cassation annulled this sentence and requested a new trial, which ended in 1991, confirming the sentence to life imprisonment for Vinciguerra and Cicuttini and sentencing the Carabinieri to three years and ten months, a verdict later reaffirmed by the Court of Cassation in 1992.

Assessing the outcomes of the judicial process

To sum up, after more than thirty-five years since the events of 12 December 1969 and following costly and lengthy judicial investigations and trials, the only tangible results appear to be a handful of confirmed culprits, a few minor prison sentences against officers of the Carabinieri, the armed forces and members of the Masonic Lodge P2 for obstruction of justice, and no clear-cut explanation of the exact nature, aims and organisers of the Strategy of T ension. The sentences appear to have followed a fairly regular pattern, with the lower Courts finding the defendants guilty, the Appeal Courts reversing their verdicts and finally, after several years and various obstructions of justice, not least on the part of those same state bodies which should have supported the work of the magistrates, the Court of Cassation ruling the defendants not guilty, albeit with recourse to a ‘not proven’ verdict. This pattern can be attributed to a combination of factors, the most important being:

• Repeated cover-ups on the part of certain sections of the armed forces, the Carabinieri and the intelligence services. Cover-ups took the form of giving false information, hiding important information, helping crucial witnesses/perpetrators escape abroad, failing to follow up vital leads and/or to take on board unwelcome evidence.
• In the most recent trials, taking place so many years after the events, the difficulty of obtaining fully reliable and detailed information from ageing,
sometimes ill, witnesses, and the death of other potential informers. Carlo Digilio, for instance, one of the two crucial witnesses (as well as a defendant) for the latest trial on the Piazza Fontana massacre, appeared to suffer from memory losses as a result of a stroke he had had in 1995. His confusion over dates and events undermined his testimony and resulted in the Court of Appeal’s decision, later confirmed by the Court of Cassation, that he should not be considered a credible witness. Many other witnesses who could have corroborated the stories told by Digilio and others had already died.

- Again in the most recent trials, the difficulty of retracing places, such as hiding places for weapons and explosives. In the Piazza Fontana trial, Carlo Digilio had described at some length a place where explosives had been kept by the Venice-based group of Ordine Nuovo, but when he was taken to the village where he was confident he could recognise the exact spot, he found it changed ‘beyond recognition’ and failed to identify its location.

To these factors one needs to add that Italian law, like Scottish law, allows three alternative verdicts in a criminal trial, one of which is the verdict of not proven. While being on a par with a verdict of not guilty in terms of its effects, it is often used by judges to indicate that they have reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt. Some of the Courts deliberating on acts of stragismo used the verdict of not proven quite explicitly and deliberately in this sense, especially in view of the fact that they all agreed on the identification of the extremist group which had carried out the crimes. Conversely, there are specific ambiguities surrounding the behaviour of some Courts, as exemplified by the extraordinary verdict of the Court of Appeal in the trial for the 1973 attack at Milan police headquarters, which was declared void by the Court of Cassation, on the grounds that the evidence had been ‘bent’ by the judges in order to demonstrate a preexisting theory. Commenting on this decision, Milanese magistrate Ferdinando Pincioni, responsible for the supplementary trial requested by the Court of Cassation, stated that it constituted a very severe indictment of the professional conduct of the Court of Appeal judges (interview with the author, 20 October 2005). He also raised a question mark over the decision, by the Court of Cassation, to request a new trial while simultaneously preventing the reconvening Court from considering the evidence of key witness Carlo Digilio. In the magistrate’s view, Digilio had proved a credible witness and the new Court would have reached a clear verdict of conviction had his testimony been taken into account.

At a more general level, considerable criticism has been levelled in Italy and abroad at the exceptional system of justice instituted in the late 1970s and early 1980s, especially with Law No. 15 of 6 February 1980, which included Article 270 bis, referring to crimes of association for terrorist ends or with intent to undermine the democratic order, and Article 280, referring to atrocities for terrorist ends or with intent to undermine the democratic order. In addition, Law No. 304 of 1982, later replaced by Law No. 45 of 13 February 2001, established the legal category of ‘collaborators of justice’, the so-called pentiti (‘repentant wit-
nesses’), thus allowing suspects assisting the police and the judiciary and denouncing their former comrades to plea for reduced sentences. This law has often been criticised for resulting in short prison sentences for serious offences and for encouraging the spread of false information by former terrorists, eager to acquire the status, and enjoy the benefits, of ‘collaborators of justice’. While the legislation proved effective in bringing about a reduction in the number of terrorist acts in the country and contributing to the ultimate collapse of this political phenomenon, its morality was put into question.

A number of trials against presumed terrorists, carried out under this emergency legislation, incurred special condemnation and became the target of a vigorous campaign by Italian and European intellectuals, politicians, and part of the media. The trial against Adriano Sofri is a case in point. Sofri was a founder and leader of the extreme-left organisation Lotta Continua (‘The Struggle Continues’), set up in 1969. Together with another leader, Giorgio Pietrostefani, he was arrested and charged in 1988 for instigating the murder of police officer Luigi Calabresi, killed in Milan on 17 May 1972 and considered responsible by the extreme left for ‘suiciding’ Pinelli. A third activist, Ovidio Bompressi, was charged with the actual murder. Their main accuser was Leonardo Marino, himself an ex-member of Lotta Continua, who, troubled by his conscience, confessed to his own involvement in the crime, and also implicated the other three. After a series of trials, and two verdicts annulled, in 1997 the three activists were found guilty and Sofri was sentenced to twenty-two years in prison. In October 2000, the Court of Cassation confirmed this verdict. The case was taken to the European Court of Human Rights, which in 2003 ruled that the application lodged on behalf of Sofri and others was inadmissible. With reference to two judges, Judge Pincioni (the same who ruled in the case against Bertoli) and Judge Della Torre, the Court considered that there was no evidence to cast doubt on the former’s subjective impartiality and that there was nothing in the case file to suggest that Della Torre’s assessment of the facts had been arbitrary (Registry of the European Court of Human Rights, 2003). Despite this judgment, a wide spectrum of opinion remained convinced that Sofri was innocent, questioning the credibility of Marino’s testimony, and campaigned for his early release through a presidential pardon.

With reference to the trials against presumed extreme-right terrorists, similar doubts have been raised, as already mentioned, concerning the validity of the judicial process against, and the guilty status of, Valerio Fioravanti and Francesca Mambro, leaders of the neofascist group NAR, sentenced to life imprisonment for the Bologna station bombing. In 1994, a group of politicians and intellectuals, mainly from the right but including representatives of the left, set up a committee named ‘What if they are innocent?’, and started a campaign to have them cleared of this crime. Unlike the Calabresi murder, for the Bologna station massacre a new investigation is under way, which may eventually lead to the incrimination of different people with radically different political ideologies and roots. It is also the case, as will be seen in greater detail in the following chapters, that the Bologna massacre may constitute an anomalous act of terrorism, in the sense
that it was not part of the Strategy of Tension as this is commonly understood, and may have pursued a different agenda.

As regards the other trials on stragismo, there have been no equivalent claims of judicial partiality or unfair outcome concerning the defendants in Italian public opinion, other than among the right. On the contrary, much public opinion supported the view that these trials had suffered from repeated obstructions of justice on the part of state bodies and intelligence services, which accounted for the missing evidence. Unlike some of the trials whose verdicts are being contested, these trials, especially the most recent ones on the Piazza Fontana bombing and the attack at the Milan police headquarters, relied on a wide range of testimony, including that of independent witnesses alongside ‘repented’ ex-neofascists. In addition, the final verdict of acquittal clearly indicated that the Courts had given full consideration to the available evidence and to the rights of the defendants. It is also interesting to note that most of the neofascist and postfascist right campaigned against the granting of a presidential pardon to Adriano Sofri, defending the legitimacy of his trial. In their view, as will be seen in Part II, the extreme right in Italy was criminalised by the judiciary, while the extreme left was treated much more leniently. For this reason much of the right has resisted the temptation to question the legitimacy of all the trials concerning acts of political violence and terrorism, calling instead for bringing all the extreme-left perpetrators to justice, including those who were granted asylum in France, like Cesare Battisti, found guilty of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment in 1985, or who escaped to other countries, like Achille Lollo, found guilty of a murderous arson attack and sentenced to eighteen years’ imprisonment in 1987.

Finally, from the point of view of discovering the truth and uncovering the perpetrators of the stragi, the assessment of the criminal process is not as bleak as its seemingly meagre results might suggest. Thanks to judicial findings, today it is possible to identify fairly accurately which specific groups were responsible for which stragi and why, even though the trials were unable to identify ‘beyond any reasonable doubt’ the individual culprits other than in a few cases. Yet these cases are in themselves revelatory, since all the known perpetrators belonged to neofascist organisations, among which the most prominent was Ordine Nuovo. Franco Freda, Giovanni Ventura, Carlo Digilio, Vincenzo Vinciguerra and Carlo Cicuttini all belonged to this organisation. Nico Azzi, charged and later sentenced for a (failed) bomb attack on a train, carried out on 7 April 1973, belonged to the Milan-based group La Fenice, which had close contacts with the Veneto cells of Ordine Nuovo. Whether or not the Bologna massacre was perpetrated by international terrorists rather than home-grown ones, the fact remains that all the other stragi, and especially those carried out between 1969 and 1974, have been attributed by the Courts to neofascist groups. In addition, despite the very lenient sentences approved by the Courts against members and officers of the intelligence services, the armed forces, the Carabinieri and the police, it is also true to say that many cases of cover-ups have been identified and disclosed, to the extent that it is now fairly clear which state bodies were involved and which groups they pro-
tected. The trials have even provided some important clues as to the role played by Italian and international political forces in the Strategy of Tension and in stragismo. In short, the judicial trials have produced substantial and illuminating material for establishing the role of neofascism in stragismo and for helping to reconstruct the historical truth concerning the entire Strategy of Tension.

This more positive assessment of the judicial process, however, is no consolation to the relatives of the victims of the massacres, who fought for so many years to achieve justice for the hundreds of people who were killed or badly injured. Furthermore, although the trials have uncovered much of the truth, the whole truth remains unknown, so much so that even the most recent investigations met with reticence on the part of many potential witnesses, and uncovered a persisting climate of intimidation and connivance, as we shall see in the following chapters. Finally, the at best partial success of the judicial process, and the exposure of much wrongdoing on the part of military, intelligence and political actors, have led to continuing mistrust in, and undermined the legitimacy of, state institutions, despite the collapse of the First Republic in the early 1990s and the many hopes entertained at the time for a renewal of the country’s political system. This leaves open the question of whether the criminal process was the most effective, or indeed the only tool for dealing with these politically inspired crimes and whether it should be complemented by different approaches, related to what is known as ‘restorative justice’. These issues are taken into consideration in the Conclusion to Part I.