A volume exploring points of contact between Germans and Pacific worlds across the span of several centuries owes much to global history’s ascent in the historical profession in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century. As global historians have routinely breached conventional boundaries, they have inspired historians in other fields to also interrogate seemingly self-evident units of historical analysis and to consider connections between parts of the world that had long been treated in isolation within national historiographical traditions or area studies scholarship. Arguably, one of the most generative effects of global history in the profession at large is this greater freedom to reframe what constitutes meaningful frameworks for historical inquiry, so that we can pose previously unasked questions about dynamic interactions that have, over time, been taking place across unusual geographical clusters in distant parts of the world.¹

This volume explores connections between spaces in and around the Pacific and Germans who traveled, explored, and settled in the Pacific, and thus, by implication, also the relationship between Pacific lifeworlds and the German lands from which these migrants journeyed to the Pacific. Looking across the span of the centuries from the early modern period to the eve of World War I, the varied contributions call attention to the long and deep history of German engagement and entanglement in this part of the world. In line with the more recent history on Germany’s role in the world, the volume argues that the German presence in the Pacific was not limited to the relatively brief colonial period, and seeks to open up new perspectives on the German–Pacific dynamic.

If we assume for the moment the vantage point of colonial history, it would appear that Germans came late to a Pacific theater where other European players had been protagonists for centuries, forcing them to carve out a space amidst already

Notes from this chapter begin on page 26.

existing imperial structures. This volume, although it includes some contributions to the literature on German colonialism, on the whole takes a different approach. It highlights that Germans were not so much late to the European Pacific theater, but were already there, yet differently so. In the early modern period, Germans came alongside other Europeans, but they hailed from a decentralized empire and worked as non-imperial actors in the interstices of early modern European colonial powers. Accordingly, they brought with them a different European frame of reference and, in the Pacific, relied upon and developed more informal mechanisms of influence. The distinct nature of their engagement raises the question—albeit one whose answer far exceeds the scope of this or any single collection on the subject—whether the earlier articulations of informal German influence became the basis for later articulations of German colonial governance.

It is no easy task to open up new paths for researching and narrating the German–Pacific dynamic in the longue durée. The German lands and the Pacific Ocean basin are very different geographical spaces, and rather different chronologies have become attached to them in their respective historiographies. These chronologies have developed along two distinct arcs, which we will outline below, eluding attempts to subsume them under some kind of overarching narrative at this stage of research. Yet, as this volume highlights, the very divergences between Pacific histories and German histories, and the tensions inherent in exploring linkages between the two spaces, can render altogether new perspectives on both of them.

To begin with the German side of the story, this tale unfolds against the backdrop of a geographical area that was limited in size but shifted considerably over time, and against the backdrop of a historiography that oriented itself along the political evolution of this area. The German travelers, missionaries, entrepreneurs, and colonizers, whose footsteps and activities we trace here, hailed from a largely landlocked and highly fragmented center of Europe, one of the smallest continents. The German lands constituted a space whose borders did not fall along geographical features like rivers or mountains, but rather cut across distinct topographical zones, from river basins in the south to wooded highlands in the middle section and to the plains in the north ending at the Baltic Sea. Moreover, one cannot locate “Germany” in any meaningful way without reference to the evolution of an overarching governmental structure that posited and solidified this geographical space as a political and cultural unity in the first place. Thus, to define the space of the German lands first of all means to take stock of the religious and political negotiations that forged, and at times fractured, their unity. Differently put, “Germany” as a political entity played out in a relatively small landlocked space and through intense negotiations among multiple institutional actors that led to distinct versions of empire and nation-state.

Not surprisingly then, these negotiations have provided a central plotline for German historiography. Historians have traced the medieval formation of the
polycentric Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation in the force field of emperor, electors, and pope. They have recounted the empire’s fluctuating fortunes during the tumultuous times of the Reformation period and ravages of the Thirty Years War, and the post-1648 shift in political balance as Calvinist Prussia rose to prominence and rivaled the Catholic imperial Austria-based Habsburg, first culturally and politically, and then also on the battlefield. Likewise, historians have analyzed in detail the forces behind the empire’s dissolution, and how in 1871, out of the conglomerate of nineteenth-century German polities, the Prussia-based German Empire emerged. That territorial unit too always constituted more than a German “nation-state.” It became, from the 1880s onward, not only the basis for acquiring an overseas empire in Africa and in the Pacific but also for forming a continental “empire” of sorts, on the basis of the inclusion of non-German ethnic groups – Poles, Danes, and Alsatians – as well as through extending the territorial rule of a Prussian-based nation-state over areas with distinct and persistent regional identities, such as the South German states. But while the boundaries of the “German lands” waxed and waned throughout these centuries, all along their size remained miniscule when paired with the Pacific Ocean world. At the height of the Holy Roman Empire’s territorial extension, the German lands still barely exceeded the size of New Guinea, the largest island in the Pacific. Under Bismarck’s German Empire, the area of Germany had shrunk to about two-thirds of this island alone.

If a landlocked territory of limited size circumscribed German society and culture, and political processes gave meaning to “Germany,” water and vastness define the Pacific, leaving their mark on the cultures and societies emerging from and overlapping within it. Space and culture paired differently in this part of the world. The globe’s largest body of water, the Pacific, fills one-third of the earth’s surface; it is capacious enough to encompass the size of all continents combined. Together with the Asian and American landmasses that border the Pacific’s blue expanse and the innumerable islands scattered across its waters, this ocean constitutes a force field in which societies and cultures evolved across time, their histories intersecting in shifting patterns and at varying points of density in response to both internal dynamics and external incursions. The much-touted Pacific Century of our present time is only the latest phase in an ancient process of dynamic interactions, dialogue, and conflict occurring across and beyond the Pacific Ocean basin.

Any effort to pinpoint the chronological benchmarks of the complex histories unfolding in and around the world’s largest ocean demands first of all that we make an important conceptual distinction between two different definitions of “the Pacific” that have organized knowledge and narratives about the topic. On the one hand, there is the Pacific as a “European invention,” as Oskar Spate put it some ago. The history of this Pacific begins with Magellan’s inaugural act of naming it the “peaceful sea” in 1521, and proceeds in successive waves of
mercantile and colonial intrusions that crested in nineteenth-century imperialism. To narrate this history inevitably implies rehearsing the histories of European empires in this part of the world. On the other hand, there is the Pacific that Matt Matsuda more recently has characterized in juxtaposition with the Pacific in Spate’s sense or the Pacific as “a European project.” Simultaneously drawing on and exploding the Braudellian ocean paradigm, Matsuda defines this Pacific as “multiple seas, cultures, and peoples, and especially the overlapping transits between them.” The histories of this Pacific are made up of the overlapping and intertwining of particular stories of the multiplicity of peoples traversing the big ocean, inhabiting littoral zones, islands, and waters, and being drawn together in shifting patterns through forms of cultural and economic exchange and contest. These histories precede the history of the European Pacific by many centuries and can be traced back to the ancient Polynesian voyagers whose far-flung journeys and settlements cast the first wide net of human communities across the blue expanse of the ocean.

While we are mindful of the broader matrix of Pacific seas and societies and the newer literatures that have explored it, the focus of our volume rests elsewhere. It concerns itself primarily with revisiting the first approach, the history of the Pacific as a European imperial project, though the contributions also seek to engage, whenever possible, the second version and analyze the interaction of Pacific Islanders with the European presence. The respective areas of specialization and linguistic skills of our contributors pointed to this emphasis on the Pacific as a “European project” as the most sensible and credible choice for our undertaking. Yet we hope that the volume also opens up a dialogue with scholarship about the Pacific that is more fully grounded, including linguistically, in the lifeworlds of Pacific societies and cultures past and present. In this spirit, we invited Matt Matsuda to contribute an epilogue—for which we are immensely grateful—in which he offers an evocative reading of the volume’s essays that gestures towards these possible connections.

While the volume thus places the emphasis on the Pacific as a European project, it does so from a distinct vantage point that has been underdeveloped in the existing literature and that we believe aligns, from within European history, in fruitful ways with the focus within Pacific Studies on questions of contingency in colonial and imperial exchanges. Our volume focuses on the “German element” in the long history of European–Pacific encounters and entanglements, and it looks at Germans in the Pacific through the prism of transnational or global rather than imperial history. This focus on the Pacific as a European project from the perspective of Germans has its own intellectual rationale, which grows out of global history rather than imperial history. As global history encompasses the study of multiple forms of connections between different parts of the globe; it asks us to step outside the colonial and imperial frameworks that have organized knowledge about so many parts of the world, including but of course not limited
to the Pacific Ocean basin. Global history furthermore has asserted the relevance of all parts of the world, and this assertion at once disavows Europe’s singularity and demands its reinvigorated study from new vantage points. Global history, to be sure, has primarily concerned itself with decentering Europe and pushing back against Eurocentric biases in the record by expanding historical inquiry and its linguistic and professional bases into neglected areas of research. Yet, on the flipside, rewriting and refurbishing histories of Europe has also become crucial in seeking to tell the story of the globe anew and in a more balanced way.

This book offers a fresh look at the story of the “European Pacific” by turning the spotlight on a group of Europeans that did not formally join the imperial project until the late nineteenth century, when the German Empire acquired its first formal colonies. Nonetheless, since the early modern period, Germans operated in and around the Great Ocean within the interstices of other empires and the indigenous cultures of the Pacific. What role did Germans play in exploiting and exploring the Pacific? When and where did they bolster or mimic, when and where undercut or thwart the efforts of other Europeans? Is there such a thing as colonialism without colonies? How did Germans contribute to generating knowledge about the Pacific that blended local and European traditions and fed them into transnational networks of knowledge and power, including those in the German-speaking territories of Europe? And what do these activities in the Pacific tell us in turn about the global dimensions of German history? These are the types of questions this volume pursues to further qualify the “European” in understanding the Pacific as a “European project,” as well as in “European Colonialism” and “European Imperialism.”

The Pacific as a “European Project”: Imperial Histories

To further elaborate our approach, we first need to turn to the existing historical literature on the Pacific as a European project. Generally speaking, since chronologies of empires have shaped this historiography, Europeans associated with those empires have received disproportionate attention. The German presence in the literature is confined to the late nineteenth century or the period of colonialism. A vibrant scholarship does of course exist on German colonialism, some of which we discuss below. For the earlier centuries, however, the storyline of the European Pacific has centered on the colonial and imperial undertakings of Europeans other than Germans. Although a full rehearsal of this story about the European expansion into the Pacific and integration of various subzones by far exceeds the scope of this introduction, it is possible to name the protagonists and sketch out at least five distinct stages of the plot. We will not attempt to insert Germans in these larger plotlines at this point or intimate how they might fit. Such a simple add-on would do little to shift the larger optics, as is the
long-term goal, from a default focus on national narratives of European imperial expansion in the Pacific to more complex global and transnational narratives that trace how both imperial and non-imperial European actors became entangled in the complex histories unfolding in Pacific worlds.

The first act of the Pacific as a “European project” unfolded in the sixteenth century, as both Portugal and Spain, via different routes, pressed into the Pacific basin in search of spices, metals, and other riches. Their voyages took place at the very moment when indigenous transoceanic voyages had ebbed and the basin’s inhabitants had turned their attention to local consolidations of power. The Europeans came into a complex universe of already established trade networks and systems of political influence and tribute, one seafaring people among many. They were the most recent and hence least experienced arrivals, but they harbored grand ambitions. Nonetheless, it would take until the 1900s for Europeans to integrate and dominate more than limited subzones of the Pacific basin.

Portugal’s approach came via the Indian Ocean on the heels of Vasco de Gama’s eastward voyages, illustrating the early interconnectedness of the worlds of the Indian and Pacific oceans. At the approximate boundary between these worlds sat the city of Malacca, in present-day Malaysia, which the Portuguese conquered in 1511 and used as a springboard into the Pacific. By 1521, they had gained a foothold in the Moluccas, the much-coveted Spice Islands, and from 1535 to 1575, when they were ousted from their base there, the Portuguese were effectively the hegemonic power in the spice trade, suppressing the authority of competing sultans and creating tighter links between Southeast Asian, Chinese, and western Pacific markets.

Portugal’s other main artery of influence ran through Macao, from where Portuguese traders were allowed to operate by Ming officials, who in turn could satisfy Chinese desires for spices and sandalwood while making a profit from the sale of silk and porcelain to the Europeans. Because China had also cut off direct trade with Japan, the Portuguese further became key intermediaries between the two countries. They delivered silver and copper from Japan to China, and they supplied Japan with Chinese porcelain, cloth, and iron, along with Europeans weapons and Jesuit missionaries, and Christianity soon took hold in Japan.

In response to Portugal’s successful forays, Spain dispatched Ferdinand Magellan on a quest for a westerly route to the riches of the East. Following the passage of the treacherous South American straits that now bear his name, Magellan’s fleet progressed in the waters of a new ocean whose seemingly placid surface led the navigator to give it the often misleadingly tranquil name of “the Pacific.” Magellan reached what is now Guam in 1521, before moving on to what became the Philippines, where he was killed in an armed conflict with locals.

Spain’s expansion into the Pacific made little progress thereafter until 1565, when Miguel Lopez de Legazpi began building alliances with local forces and
recruiting indigenous soldiers, eventually conquering Luzon and founding Manila. Meanwhile, his pilot Andres de Urdanata fortuitously discovered a return route to the Americas, inaugurating the galleon ship trade that fused the eastern and western hemispheres into a global economic circuit linking the economies of Asia, the Americas, and Europe, and turning a subzone of the Pacific into “The Spanish Lake.”

Silk, porcelain, ivory, spices, migrant laborers, and slaves traveled via Manila to Acapulco. Silver and people from the Americas flowed in the other direction, and a mere thirty years after the first galleon completed its journey across the Pacific, more silver left Acapulco than was traded across the entire Atlantic. In the wake of the many galleons plying the Pacific, cultures and societies in and around the Pacific basin underwent profound change. The Ladrones, at first a mere stopover on the route, were occupied by Spanish forces in 1668 and renamed the Marianas by Jesuit missionaries. After a series of brutal military conflicts, the island population was “reduced” on Guam, leading to the near-extinction of the indigenous Chamorros, the first Pacific Island population to fall victim to European colonization. The Manila galleons ran for two and a half centuries until 1815, and Spain held on to Manila and the Marianas until 1898.

Act two of the early modern European commercial exploitation and colonization in the Pacific saw the rise of a different European protagonist. In the seventeenth century, Portugal and Spain found themselves surpassed by a rapidly expanding Dutch mercantile empire, led by the Dutch East India Company or VOC, an economic and military power unto itself. Like the Spanish in Manila, the Dutch encouraged the immigration of Chinese merchants and middlemen to their port city of Batavia (present-day Jakarta). Also like the Spanish, they took harsh action against islanders, decimating the population of the Banda island group in the heart of the Moluccas. Not all such deaths were by these direct actions; many indigenous people died of starvation when the Dutch replaced staple food sources with lucrative, highly controlled spice plantations, and restricted the production of certain spices to particular islands. The Dutch also pushed out the English when they took over the British station on Ran Island. They were able to dislodge their competitors by way of a consequential, long-distance land swap, trading Ran for Manhattan Island in the Atlantic. The Dutch monopoly on the Pacific spice trade would last until the nineteenth century.

The second major venue of Dutch influence in and around the Pacific was Japan. Here, the Protestant, commercially focused Dutch took advantage of anti-Catholic sentiment and increased government centralization to help the Shogun remove Portuguese-sponsored missionaries and their converts. Between 1633 and 1639, Japan issued a series of edicts that amounted to a form of self-enclosure: no native-born Japanese were allowed to leave Japan, nor any foreigners to enter. Nagasaki, formerly a Jesuit stronghold, was the one port that remained accessible to both the Chinese and the Dutch. Being the only Europeans with

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permission to reside on nearby Deshima Island, the Dutch were able to access Japanese goods and culture and circulate them globally. They enjoyed this role as Japan’s gateway to the larger world until the mid-nineteenth century.\(^{18}\)

Exploratory voyages to farther regions of the Pacific Ocean form an important subplot of this larger story of Iberian and Dutch dominance. What drove these explorations was the quest for the rumored Great Southern Continent, where a plenitude of material riches and pagan souls allegedly awaited intrepid travelers. In the second half of the sixteenth century, Spanish navigators set out from the Americas and chanced upon—to use the European nomenclature—the Solomon Islands, the Marquesas, and islands belonging to the New Hebrides (now Vanuatu), making contact with peoples of Polynesia and Melanesia. In the early seventeenth century, Dutch rivals of the VOC braved the waters around South America to carve out a path to the riches of the Indies that lay beyond the VOC’s monopoly. They sailed into the waters of the Tongan maritime empire, interacting with various island peoples along the way, eventually passing the northern coast of New Guinea. Some decades later, the Dutch explorer Abel Janszoon Tasman reached the island today known as Tasmania, off Australia’s southern coast, and had an encounter with the Maori peoples of New Zealand. These journeys amounted to extraordinary feats of long-distance voyaging. Yet none of them resulted in commercial links or settlements, nor did they lead to sustained exploratory travel. The complex island worlds of Oceania remained beyond European reach, at least for the time being.\(^{19}\)

Sustained exploration of the unknown came in the eighteenth century, and marks act three of the Pacific as a European project. The age of the Enlightenment brought large-scale, government-sponsored expeditions to the Pacific, blending newer scientific interests with the more long-standing commercial motivations that had first driven Europeans into Pacific waters. Europe saw the rise of scientific academies and the attendant proliferation of journals that delivered scientific information and travel reports to a growing number of readers. As print literature became a consumer product across Europe, it fueled the demand for novel discoveries, and turned the Pacific, the least explored region from a European point of view, into the “eighteenth century’s ‘New World.’”\(^{20}\) An increasingly systematic colonial science emerged, harnessing scientific inquiry to imperial projects, and pulling the Pacific and its peoples into its expanding circuit of knowledge production and imperial ambitions.\(^{21}\)

Spain was an active participant, sponsoring large-scale scientific expeditions of naturalists and artists that resulted in, among other things, an enormous visual archive of the flora of the Philippines.\(^{22}\) However, France and its English rivals clearly dominated this phase of state-sponsored Pacific exploration, embodied by such figures as Louis Antoine de Bougainville and James Cook; the latter was killed in Tahiti after exploratory journeys to map, among other things, the east coast of Australia and Hawaii. Russia was the third driving force behind
the large-scale expeditions of the eighteenth century, with explorers like Vitus Bering expanding European knowledge of the Pacific exponentially, and reaching entirely new regions of what is today the US Pacific Northwest. On the heels of these eighteenth-century expeditions, Europeans established an extensive zone of exchange among Asian, Oceanic, and American societies and their own back home. This would position them well for the nineteenth-century phase of Pacific–European relations, when the balance of power shifted in favor of the Europeans and propelled them into an even firmer position of hegemony.

In act four of the creation of the Pacific as a European project, the widely circulating reports of European voyages brought increasing global attention to the Pacific as a potential site of commercial expansion and geopolitical advantage. In the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars (1799–1815), Pacific exploration and commercial activity increased as European powers searched for economic and strategic gains over their rivals. New actors also appeared on the scene, with North American merchants particularly active. American ships represented almost half of all merchant ships entering Californian waters during the first half of the nineteenth century, followed by British, Spanish, Mexican, and Russian vessels. Altogether, ships from more than twenty polities appeared off the California coast in the decades before the Gold Rush, reflecting broad international awareness of the Pacific’s commercial opportunities. Meanwhile, expanding trade connected the coastal regions of California and South America with Hawaii, which became increasingly important as a commercial traffic hub.

Sea otter fur and whale oil were among the commodities most desired by European and American consumers, leading to the near extinction of the Pacific sea otter population. Whaling along the Eastern Pacific coast, likewise, saw its heyday between the 1830s and 1850s and coincided with increased demand for whale oil due to the industrializing United States and Great Britain. Here too, American commercial interests abounded and accounted for seven hundred ships or three-fourths of the global whaling fleet. The hunt for these natural resources, however, was not a purely Western enterprise but centrally depended on the skills of indigenous people, such as Aleut hunters in the sea otter trade and indigenous harpooners in whaling, as immortalized in the figure of Queequeg in Melville’s *Moby Dick*.

Chinese trade with the West remained highly supervised until the forceful “opening” of China for Western trade during the Opium Wars (1839–42, 1856–60), in which the British made use of their superior gunboats to overcome Qing prohibitions on the sale of opium. In the 1842 Treaty of Nanking, China was forced to cede Hong Kong to Britain, which also gained “most favored nation” trading status. Soon after, the United States and France followed this imperialist model and secured concessions on similar terms elsewhere in China. The “treaty port” became a widespread model that allowed foreigners to operate solely under the jurisdiction of their own consuls, living in separate, Europeanized sections.
of the port town that minimized encounters with indigenous people. As treaty ports proliferated, they came to represent a new form of European power and dominance that remade the Pacific as a European project.

The California Gold Rush in 1848 and the rapid incorporation of California into the United States in 1850 further accelerated the region’s commercial integration. People from across the Pacific were able to arrive on the scene earlier than Americans from the East Coast, a situation that only changed with the completion of the transcontinental railway in 1869. Improved communications and logistics, especially the spread of the steamship and railways and the widespread adoption of the telegraph, shrank time and distance in an unprecedented way and were key factors in the expansion of trade along the Pacific Rim and across the ocean. “By 1850,” writes David Igler, “the ocean’s people, markets, and natural resources were thoroughly intertwined with the surrounding world.”

The commercial integration of the Pacific both preceded and enabled European powers’ increasing formal imperial domination of the area, which marks the fifth and final act in the creation of the Pacific as a “European project.” Great Britain, France, and, eventually, the United States had now replaced Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands as dominant imperial powers, though the Dutch did expand and solidify their control over the Dutch East Indies—present-day Indonesia—following the bloody and protracted Aceh War (1873–1903). To be sure, there was not one model for imposing Western imperial dominance on Pacific territories, just as Asian responses to Western intrusion varied widely depending on local circumstances. British control over Malay, for example, followed the explorations of adventurer James Brooke, and was only gradually formalized between 1874 and 1885, while in New Zealand, the British exploited local division by signing the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi with indigenous Maori chiefs. The French Empire in the Pacific emerged partly in response to British expansion. French domination over Tahiti was established in the French–Tahitian Wars (1843–46), while the nation’s presence in the Indian Ocean also provided a base for further expansion into the Pacific. French colonial dominance in parts of Southeast Asia derived from a French missionary presence and Napoleon III’s promise to protect the interests of French Catholics; by 1887, the territories that today encompass Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were combined in the “Union of Indochina.” As in other parts of the world, violence remained a persistent and integral feature of the European colonization of the Pacific. The demand of European settlers for land and grazing rights ultimately led to conflicts with local populations, such as the French faced with the Kanaks in the penal colony of New Caledonia.

In the conventional imperial narrative of the Pacific as a European project, it is at this point that Germany and Germans join the action. Compared to other Western powers, German imperialism arrived late on the scene in the Pacific, as it did in Africa. As with other imperial players, German domination followed

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a previously established commercial presence—though compared to cases such as the Dutch, that presence was relatively recent. In Samoa, the foundation of German imperialism was the commercial expansion of the Hamburg trading firm J. C. Goddefroy and Son, which had established itself in 1857 and eventually controlled the Western Pacific copra trade.39 With Bismarck’s turn to colonialism in 1884/85, Germany acquired parts of northern New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago in 1885 as overseas territories. After the defeat of the Spanish in the Spanish–American War of 1898, the Northern Marianas, the Caroline Islands, Palau and the Marshall Islands also became German colonies. That same year, Germany secured a sphere of influence in the Shandong province in China.40

The second half of the nineteenth century also saw the United States solidify its status as an imperial power in the Pacific. With the arrival of Commodore Perry in Edo Bay in 1853, the United States forced Japan to end its 220-year-long seclusion. Initially motivated by the desire to protect shipwrecked soldiers and expand the commercial whaling industry into Japanese waters, the US eventually forced a series of treaties in 1854 and 1858 that granted concessions of extraterritoriality and favorable trading status, similar to those extracted by other Western powers from China. These provisions would eventually be extended to other European powers as well. Further US expansion in the Pacific centered on the Hawaiian Islands, which they eventually annexed in 1898. Hawaii became a US territory in 1900 and a state in 1950, with Pearl Harbor as the central base of the US Navy in the Pacific. The desire to have a permanent military and commercial presence in the Pacific underscored the increased importance of the region for US foreign and trade policy. The Spanish–American War of 1898 also saw the final replacement of Spanish rule by American rule in the region. Afterward, the US established colonial control over the Philippines during an increasingly brutal war in which an estimated two hundred thousand civilians perished, largely due to famine and disease.41

Finally, the creation of the Pacific as a European project also entailed the adoption of European form of control by one Asian power: Japan. In response to the threat posed by Western imperialism, the Meiji restoration in Japan pursued a “rich nation, strong military” approach. The expansion of the military sector as well as strategic investments in infrastructure and education led to state-led economic growth that eventually enabled Japan to become an imperial power itself. By both utilizing and challenging Western models, Japan developed what was in effect an imperialist anti-imperialism. It imposed an unequal treaty on Korea in 1876 and, following military victories in the Sino-Japanese (1894/95) and Russian–Japanese (1905) wars, annexed Korea as a colony in 1910. The Japanese military and government remained divided between rival models of imperial expansion: cooperation with Western powers on one hand, and challenging Western domination of the Pacific on the other.42

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The Pacific as a “European” project did not thus lead to the domination of one single power over this vast space. Instead, multiple empires competed for control over these territories and entered into a series of diverse arrangements with indigenous populations. Local responses to colonial intrusion varied widely, and yielded a wide variety of arrangements located on a spectrum between formal independence with a commercial presence (China, Thailand) and formal colonialism. The intensified colonial and commercial penetration also enhanced the exchange of people and products, ideas and knowledge. A more tightly integrated transoceanic labor market also emerged over the course of the nineteenth century. It built on earlier migratory patterns, yet it entailed more extensive labor migration across and within the Pacific. The establishment of large sugar plantations on Hawaii, and other cash crops such as copra on Samoa, demanded the steady supply of workers for a large labor force. Following the example of slavery in the cotton economy of the US South, various forms of unfree labor—from indentured servitude to blatant kidnapping and enslavement of Pacific Islanders (the infamous “blackbirding”)—became widespread, occasionally with the collaboration of local chiefs. The British “Pacific Islander Protection Act” of 1872 sought to contain these practices, yet it remained weakly enforced. The British imported Indian laborers into Fiji to work on sugar plantations. Chinese and Japanese laborers, together with “blackbirded” Pacific Islanders, excavated guano along the costs of Peru and Chile, and on Hawaiian sugar plantations. Chinese “coolie” workers built many American railways while Japanese laborers worked the fields of California. Labor migration thus constituted an increasingly common theme across the Pacific. “Remembering of laboring in foreign lands,” as Matt Matsuda writes, “haunted almost all Pacific societies in the second half of the nineteenth century.”

World War I marked a caesura in the history of the Pacific as a European project. The global order was soon to be rearranged as the war helped to consolidate and accelerate anticolonial movements that called into question the entire European imperial project. (Germany’s presence as a formal colonial power in the Pacific also ended with its defeat in World War I; this moment accordingly marks a logical endpoint for this volume.) The mobilization of colonial soldiers in separate units such as the “Australian Brigade” and the “Defense of India Force” accelerated popular demands for greater autonomy or even independence. What the British proconsul Sir Harry Johnston stated in a presentation to the African Society in March 1919 applied to the Pacific as well: the war had brought a “revolt against white supremacy.” In part, this revolt resulted from the experience of the war as a truly global event. Thanks to the global networks of information through telegraphs and professional news agencies such as Reuters and the Associated Press, it was possible to follow the war virtually everywhere without much delay. This global network of information was one reason for the heightened expectations that people in India, China, and Korea associated with the war.

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and its outcome. US President Wilson’s slogan of “self-determination” resonated broadly among colonized societies and sparked renewed demands for an end to Western imperialism. The disappointment of these hopes and the Western powers’ reassertion of imperial control in the aftermath of the Paris Peace conference in 1919 profoundly discredited liberal political models. As a result, anti-colonial nationalists, such as the Vietnamese leader Ho-Chi Minh, turned to communism as an alternative.49

**Germans in the Pacific: Earlier Entanglements, Formal Colonialism, and the Longue Durée**

The imperial perspective outlined above has often driven scholarship on the European presence in the Pacific. As we have seen, Germans only tend to appear very late in this storyline, during the fifth stage with the formal acquisition of colonies in the late nineteenth century. This German colonial presence in the Pacific has become the subject of a quite extensive historical literature that has appeared steadily since the 1970s.50 In recent times, Hermann Josef Hiery has synthesized some of this work into a handbook on the “German South Sea.”51 His and other recent scholarship do reflect a remarkable surge of interest in the history of German colonialism, which has begun to correct the hitherto predominant focus on German imperialism in Africa.52

Still, the predominant imperial framework has had unfortunate effects on scholarship on Germans in the Pacific. First, it is most densely concentrated on the period of formal colonialism and not systematically connected to research that has sought to highlight the German element in the European exploration and penetration of Pacific worlds for the precolonial period.53 Moreover, within this dominant imperial framework, the German presence necessarily appears as late, short-lived, and relatively marginal. Measured against the British or French imperial presence, Germany’s inevitably falls short.

By adopting a global perspective, this volume seeks to move away from the normative power of the imperial framework. Rather than focusing on German colonialism as late and short-lived, it seeks to bring into view the German presence in the Pacific as early and long—as different, as opposed to deficient. Our contributors connect this longer and distinct history to broader trends in global and transnational history as well as in German history to push toward a more nuanced assessment of Pacific–European encounters. To that end, the chapters assembled here move away from a purely state- or empire-centered approach to an actor-centered approach that brings into relief the variegated forms of German engagement with Pacific worlds since the sixteenth century. These engagements were not always precisely driven by a singular imperial interest, but more often unfolded in the interstices of empires in the plural or, in the case of German
missionaries, paid heed to the dictates of another empire altogether: the empire of God.\textsuperscript{54}

Adding previously neglected German actors and voices to the mix, our volume highlights that notions of a nationally cohesive Pacific such as “The Spanish Lake” prove to be fictions of a later age, both because they deny historical agency to myriads of indigenous actors and also because they gloss over the multiplicity of European actors involved in reshaping Pacific societies and cultures. A rather sizable contingent of Germans served under the Dutch VOC in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{55} Raquel Reyes’s contribution to this volume sheds light on the far-ranging networks of some of these men and their central role in forging connections between the Pacific and Europe. As part of the multinational Society of Jesus, many Germans served in Portuguese Asia and the Spanish Empire in the Pacific. Ulrike Strasser’s chapter uses an exemplary case to highlight the intersecting migratory and information networks, imperial as well as religious, in which these Germans participated, crisscrossing seascapes and continents, and not confined to latter-day national boundaries.

What set Germans in the Pacific apart from other Europeans had a lot to do with the complex history of their homeland. These Pacific travelers not only shared a language, but a familiarity with specific institutional frameworks, cultural points of reference, and historical memories that distinguished them from other European actors. One need not resort to an essentialized, reified understanding of what it meant to be German, from the post-Westphalian early modern era to the high imperial period of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to find meaningful threads of connection between the actors discussed and the specific historical situation of the German lands.

Let us name a few of the threads spun by our contributors. A recurring theme is the way in which Germans’ more distant relationship to other imperial projects and Germany’s status as a “latecomer” to nationhood and colonialism served as an advantage. It created the possibility for Germans to align themselves with whatever enterprises in the Pacific were best suited to help them achieve their own aims, whether that be saving souls, making scientific discoveries, building wealth, or fostering cultural ties. The contributions by Andreas Daum and Kristina Küntzel-Witt, for example, call attention to the notable degree of independence in thought and action that characterized German naturalists working in the Pacific in the employ of other empires.

This relative distance to European imperial projects also led at times to a critical attitude toward the more violent aspects of European intrusion as well as close relationship with the indigenous. Perhaps the best-known example is the German writer Adalbert Chamisso, who, on his voyages to the Pacific between 1815 and 1818, developed a “sense of alarm and compassion for all native communities around the Pacific,” which was also illustrated in his famous friendship with the Hawaiian native Kadu.\textsuperscript{56} In this volume, Anne Mariss sheds light on
the importance of Polynesian informants to Johann Reinhold Foster’s scientific exploits. Although Germans were also willing participants in the “othering” and exploitation of Pacific Islanders, their position in the Pacific differed in important and tangible ways from that of other Europeans who were tied earlier and more firmly to specific imperial projects.

Another thread of connection between German experiences back home and German experiences in the Pacific appears in the need to navigate decentralized and overlapping fields of political authority. Germans came from a tradition of comparatively more heterogeneous and decentralized polities with a tradition of religious (Christian) pluralism: the Holy Roman Empire before 1806, and the loose confederation of German states thereafter, arguably prepared Germans well for moving skillfully in a region of the world that also lacked a unifying central authority, had competing cultural and political constituencies, and traditions of negotiating difference among them. Germans were used to and skilled in communicating and interacting with a variety of authorities and to moving in different regional and national cultures, and were therefore better equipped to pursue their interest in the Pacific than other Europeans from more centralized overseas empires.

Related to this point, several chapters, such as the ones by Daum, Küntzel-Witt, and Mariss, show that Germans possessed qualities that made them desirable partners and collaborators for other Europeans. They were often graduates of an academic system that had, by the nineteenth century, become widely recognized as the most distinguished in the world. They possessed linguistic, communicative, and especially academic abilities that proved important soft skills for wielding power, and were indispensable for other European nations that otherwise had the longer experience in the hard business of colonialism and empire. In other words, German engagement with the European Pacific project was not so much deficient, with more successful imperial powers setting the implicit norm for success, but it was a different type of engagement. It was forged in a less monolithic polity, yet unified by structures of communication and education, asking us to nuance our view of the “European” presence in the Pacific by considering the complexities of imperial as well as non-imperial interactions between Europeans and Pacific societies and cultures.

This distinction between non-imperial and imperial forms of influence, although we have introduced it here to highlight the long yet distinct presence of German actors in the Pacific, also dovetails with the more recent literature on German colonialism. This recent scholarship has deliberately uncoupled the notion of colonialism from formal colonial power holding, and stressed the significance of more informal mechanisms of influence and control. Once we expand the history of colonialism beyond territorial control and incorporate various means of wielding informal influence, both the early modern origins of German colonialism and its afterlife begin to look different. It allows for a greater
sensitivity for a wide variety of connections and exchanges between Germans and the Pacific world, and between Germans and other imperial powers.

It further throws into relief forms of European influence in Pacific worlds that preceded German colonialism and, importantly, also extended beyond its formal end in 1918. As such, the deterritorialized German presence in the Pacific might actually have represented a more modern and innovative form of informal imperialism. The role of Germans in the Pacific can thus serve as a model and a historical precursor for very modern, and often very unequal, forms of transnational relations between the West and the global South that endure to this day.

By placing “Germans” and “Germany” into one analytical framework with the “Pacific” we hope to open up new lines of inquiry on both spaces. Beyond the distinct chronologies that have become attached to the histories of Germany and the Pacific, it is also possible to locate parallels and interconnections between these two vastly different spaces. During the early modern period, Jesuit missionaries, for example, conceived of saving souls in the Pacific as part of a broader evangelization effort that was essentially global in nature. From the order’s point of view, the Holy Roman Empire, with its Protestant apostates and superstitious rural populations, was merely “another India.” The Peace of Westphalia freed up growing numbers of German Jesuits to travel “the Indies” proper, including Pacific regions, and they began shaping the views of Germans back home about faraway places through letters and print media. Over time Protestant missionaries, too, followed suit. The year 1648 therefore emerges as an important milestone not only of domestic reordering, but also of German engagement with the world beyond Europe. Newer scholarship on the internal history of the Holy Roman Empire, which has pushed against the tenacious notion of the empire as an unwieldy, inefficient, and failing political system that delayed Germany’s entrance into modern nationhood, has offered a positive re-evaluation of 1648. Long portrayed as the death knell for the vitality of the Reformation period, and the moment when the Holy Roman Empire fell into moribund stagnation, the Peace of Westphalia in this perspective appears as a take-off for effective institutional rebuilding and much-needed reform, which laid the foundation for further political evolution and renewed sociocultural dynamism. These internal innovations, on the one hand, and the intensified engagement with the non-European world, one the other, would appear to be two sides of the same coin of post-1648 renewal and dynamism.

Moving into the ensuing century, the commercial integration of the Pacific that David Igler discusses for the period from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century roughly coincided with the onset of the first phase of industrialization and commercial expansion in the German lands. To put it more provocatively, it might be possible to argue that Germans developed imperial ambitions and activities before or while becoming a nation-state. Uwe Spiekermann’s chapter on the commercial expansion of the German-American
Spreckels family on the American West Coast and in the Pacific exemplifies such activities by non-state actors. Along similar lines, Reinhard Wendt’s contribution shows how Pacific islands became the destination for the migration of ethnic Germans during the same period. The German model of imperial expansion differed from the British and French model in that the “trans” and the “national” appeared simultaneously rather than sequentially. In this sense, it was perhaps more similar to the imperial expansion of, say, the Dutch in the eighteenth century, where the formation of the nation-state occurred simultaneously with imperial expansions.

One of the most innovative aspects of the transnational turn in historiography surely consists in the ways in which familiar narratives and chronologies begin to look different when essentially national (and often teleological) frameworks are dissolved. Thus the contributions in this volume also document how an idea of Germanness takes shape and is enacted in confrontation and cooperation with other European empires in the Pacific as well as with indigenous “others.” Conversely, the considerable participation of Germans in transnational networks shows that competing visions of what it meant to be German were already being discussed in reference to the larger world—and to the Pacific more specifically.

The volume provides further evidence of Sebastian Conrad’s central insight, namely how “globalization” and the formation of the modern nation-state went hand in hand and mutually informed each other. Or, as Geoff Eley put it more recently, “by thinking transnationally in advance of the national state’s creation, we can observe the ‘boundaries of German-ness’ already being fashioned into place.”

This is also a central reason for why this volume crosses the conventional divide between the early modern and the modern periods. The early transnational or global ties and protonationalist conversations that our contributors uncover invite us to rethink the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century as part of a longer and more complex history of German engagement with the extra-European world. They further contribute to a revised understanding of the origins of German colonialism, one that reaches back many centuries before the onset of formal colonialism in the late nineteenth century, and it points forward to non-state-driven forms of imperial presence in the postcolonial period. The volume thus also raises the question of whether the different German involvements in the early modern period helped usher in a different imperial presence in the nineteenth century. One cannot flatten the complexity of the precolonial period into a simplistic teleological prehistory of the colonial period; it followed its own historical logic, and included paths not taken. But it is notable that later German colonists, like the early modern missionaries and naturalists who preceded them, developed a wide variety of relationships that depended as much on local circumstances as on German interests and on relationships with other imperial powers. A long tradition of adjusting to local contexts and engaging
with multiple authorities perhaps engendered a more flexible approach to colonial penetration and rule. Shellen Wu’s contribution, for example, is suggestive in that it demonstrates how German engineers in China deliberately sought to develop more cooperative forms of imperialism in order to distinguish themselves from British and French competitors. Doug McGetchin, in turn, shows how German policy aligned with Indian anticolonialism in an effort to weaken the British Empire during World War I.

This is neither to downplay the well-known coercive dimension of German colonialism in the Pacific (or elsewhere) nor to overlook the active participation of early modern German Jesuit missionaries in the “othering” and oppressing island populations in the Spanish-controlled Pacific. Various contributors to the volume call attention to German colonial violence and dominance. They do so by focusing on mechanisms that simultaneously lay beyond and underpinned political rule and economic exploitation. Thus, the chapters by Katharina Stornig, Livia Maria Rigotti, and Emma Thomas locate struggles over religion, gender, and sexuality at the heart of the German colonial enterprise, while Jürgen Schmidt points to the ideological importance of a German “work ethic” to colonial governance. They also gesture toward what Geoff Eley called the “colonial effect”—that is, the myriad ways in which the colonial experience informed and shaped German society and culture at home. Yet the colonial effect was not just a modern phenomenon, but, as this volume demonstrates, it was operative already in the early modern period, albeit in a more mediated way. German botanists, missionaries, and naturalists may have participated in the colonial adventures of others. Still, their reports from afar also fed into evolving conceptions of colonialism and Germanness back home.

By arranging contributions across the span of centuries of German presence in the Pacific, the volume finally invites reflection on the early modern and colonial roots of modern scientific exploration. German explorers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries at times self-consciously followed the paths of early modern missionaries, yet failed to acknowledge or even outright disavow their religious sources. The emergence of modern science and academic disciplines in Europe owed much to the earlier ethnographic, geographical, and botanical work of missionaries in the Pacific and to the indigenous informants whose local expertise was indispensable for missionaries and naturalists alike, even though neither group gave much credit to these indigenous knowledge brokers. In fact, “German science” about the Pacific, to put it bluntly, owed much to religion and indigenous peoples. These are only some of the connections and themes that can result from a more dynamic understanding of encounters and entanglements between Europeans and Pacific peoples, neither subsumed under the dictates of empire nor defined by clearly delineated geographical or chronological boundaries, but rather emerging and reverberating across multiple cultural domains both in the Pacific itself and back in Europe.
Contributions

Our contributors flesh out these larger themes from a variety of vantage points in richly textured case studies. Raquel Reyes opens the first section with an exploration of the motivations, activities, and networks of German apothecaries and botanists in early modern Indonesia, the Philippines, and Japan. She highlights how already in the early modern period commercially minded and scientifically inclined German naturalists contributed to the production of medical and scientific knowledge that became so important to the botanical prospecting of empires and global trade. Most of her subjects were active under the aegis of the VOC: Andreas Cleyer (1634–98), gentleman-soldier turned director of the Dutch medical shop in Batavia; Georg Everard Rumpf (1627–1702), gentleman-soldier turned naturalist of Ambon and the Spice Islands; and finally, Engelbert Kaempfer (1651–1716), a physician in VOC employed in Japan and Indonesia, and an avid student of medical practices. But there was also Georg Josef Camel, a Jesuit missionary-pharmacist in Manila, who devoted much time to gathering specimens and documenting plant life in the Philippines. What distinguished these Germans, according to Reyes, was the blend of entrepreneurial spirit with scholarly disposition. They maintained close ties to the European scholarly community while, at the same time, forging relationships with and relying on local informants who were knowledgeable in indigenous herbal medicines, such as native healers and Chinese herbalists. Men on the margins of empires, they made central contributions to emerging new European sciences.

The next chapter, by Ulrike Strasser, dovetails with several of the themes introduced by Reyes, such as the importance of learned Germans as knowledge brokers between indigenous life worlds and European empires. Strasser examines the history of the first European map of the Caroline Islands of Oceania, which was printed in multiple European countries and associated with a German Jesuit named Paul Klein (1652–1717). Originally from Bohemia, the highly educated Klein spent most of his life in Manila where he reached high offices and engaged in various intellectual pursuits, including botanical work in tandem with Georg Josef Camel as discussed by Reyes. The intersecting networks of the Spanish colonial empire, the far-flung transnational Society of Jesus, and the European Republic of Letters made it possible for German Jesuits like Klein to travel to the Pacific and for their materials to circulate back to Europe. Yet while the first European map of the Caroline Islands has been attributed to Klein, this version was actually a copy of a copy, with the original sketch provided by a group of Carolinian castaways using pebbles in the sand to communicate with the Europeans. Strasser highlights the cross-cultural exchange at the heart of this mapmaking enterprise, and the indispensable role of indigenous informants in the making of “European” knowledge. Highlighting the many hands involved in

the making of this map and how various contributors were made invisible over time, Strasser points to some of the challenges of isolating a “German” contribution to early modern knowledge production in and about the Pacific, and calls attention to the transformation of knowledge during its journey from the Pacific to Europe.

Andreas Daum analyzes the German contribution to what he calls a “transnational culture of expertise” among explorers of the Pacific around 1800. Prussia, as the largest German state at that time, was not a maritime power, and German explorers therefore participated in the voyages of other European imperial powers, mainly Britain, France, and Russia. They include Johann Reinhold and Georg Foster, who sailed on James Cook’s second voyage (1772–75) and whose publications inspired the journeys of the most famous of all German explorers, Alexander Humboldt, from 1799 to 1804. Yet Daum also identifies up to thirty less-well-known German naturalists who traveled on these voyages and made important and lasting scientific contributions to the study of the human and natural environment of the Pacific. Their apparent disadvantages of not being directly tied to European projects of imperial explorations eventually turned out to be fortuitous. German naturalists’ academic training provided them with an expertise that was in high demand; their communicative and linguistic skills enabled them to convey their discoveries to a larger educated public. Finally, the Germans’ pragmatic rather than ideological perspective entailed an “intellectual openness” and “relative autonomy” that allowed them to move beyond a merely imperial optic in their encounters with Pacific habitats. This stance the German scientists seem to have shared with German missionaries like Klein.

Following Andreas Daum’s suggestion to “study individually” the “complex ways in which German travelers perceived and analyzed the natural habitats they observed in the Pacific,” Kristina Küntzel-Witt examines closely the lives and contributions of two German explorers, Georg Wilhelm Streller and Carl Heinrich Merck. Like some of the explorers discussed by Daum, Streller and Merck sailed under a foreign flag, this time in the service of Russian explorations of the North Pacific. Having studied medicine and natural science at the University of Heller, Steller eventually moved to St. Petersburg and then participated in Vitus Bering’s second Kamchatka expedition from 1773 to 1783. Based on Strelle’s diary, Küntzel-Witt reconstructs Streller’s explorations of the natural fauna, his discovery of a now extinct sea cow named after him, as well as his encounter with indigenous people. Küntzel-Witt also examines Streller’s conflicts with seamen on the ship who questioned his medical authority. A few years later, the German botanist and physician Carl H. Merck participated in the Billing-Sarychev expedition of the North Pacific from 1785 to 1794. Merck’s collection of plants, herbs, and artifacts was eventually handed over to the Russian Academy of Science, though his diaries were not published and did not become widely known until the twentieth century. Küntzel-Witt’s chapter thus
rescues from near historical oblivion the contributions of two German scientists to the exploration of the North Pacific, while confirming Daum’s thesis that these German explorers defined their “Germanness” mainly with respect to their academic training and superior level of Bildung. Their specific Germanness, to put it in stark terms, lay precisely in identifying themselves in the “universal” terms of scientific training and expertise. These were also precisely the qualifications that made them desirable participants in the imperial voyages of other European powers.

Anne Mariss’s essay also offers a close-up look at German knowledge production by considering the ship as an incubator of knowledge. Like Daum and Küntzel-Witt, Mariss stresses the important role of Germans not just in the reception but also the production of knowledge about Pacific worlds. Like Reyes and Strasser, she emphasizes the role of the indigenous in the development of European epistemic concepts. Taking Johann Reinhold Foster’s participation in the second Cook voyage (1772–75) as an example of a “microhistory of the global,” Mariss examines the “social and material conditions of the processes of knowledge production in voyages of exploration.” While Foster incorporated his discoveries in the field of the then dominant Linnean conceptual framework, the interests of the ship’s commanding officers often limited the available time for the complete collection of specimens. Moreover, Foster’s research was often influenced by, and depended on, the empirical observations of seamen on the ship, who were able to draw on past experiences. Seamen not only coined botanical and zoological terms still in use today but often also competed with naturalists in collecting specimens. Mariss’s chapter thus points at conflicts between naturalists and seamen in the process of knowledge production, which is alluded to in Küntzel-Witt’s chapter as well. Finally, Mariss’s chapter highlights the role of indigenous people as important cultural intermediaries. Polynesians often served as crucial local informants for European naturalists like Foster, but occasionally they consciously withheld information and knowledge against what constituted European “bioprospecting” or “biopiracy” of the natural environment of the Pacific.

Knowledge transfers, which had been a major element in the premodern interaction between Germany and the Pacific worlds, continued well into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, although new actors emerged alongside the missionaries, travelers, explorers, and scientists who made up the earlier European presence in the Pacific. Informal patterns of influence from preimperial days persisted and even expanded in the period of formal empire. Shellen Wu’s chapter shows that engineers became important brokers of cultural and technological transfers and informal agents of empire in the modern period, when German universities not only trained those venturing outward, but hosted foreigners, initiating a two-way traffic between countries. Specifically, Wu examines the role of German engineers in building a formal and informal empire in China from 1880
to 1914. Chinese students attended German technological colleges and universities, while German engineers and scientists took up key positions in China’s nascent industry and technological colleges. Although originally sent on a clandestine mission without Reichstag approval, German engineers crucially contributed to Germany’s imperial presence in China by building infrastructure, mines, and factories. These engineers received an extremely attractive compensation and the full support of the German embassy. Since they made decisions about which machinery the Chinese purchased, these Germans were seen as important promoters of German products and crucial nodes of future business networks. As such, German engineers played an important role in the competition with other nations, notably the British, Belgians, Russians, and Americans, over access to the vast Chinese market.

Already in the early modern period, the economic integration of the Pacific constituted a central element of European expansion into the Pacific. In the modern period, German-American entrepreneurs were directly and significantly involved in this project. In exploring the economic ventures of the Spreckels family, Uwe Spiekermann analyzes a fascinating example of German-American business activity in the Pacific between 1870 and 1920. The Spreckels developed the Hawaiian sugar industry and created several shipping lines connecting, among others, San Francisco and Hawaii, and Australia and Samoa. Their wealth enabled them to play an important role in developing the infrastructure of West Coast cities such as San Francisco and San Diego. The example of the Spreckels reveals the German-American presence in the interstices of the expanding US empire in the Pacific: they were instrumental in advancing US interests in Hawaii, and their ships were deployed in US imperialist ventures in the Pacific. Spiekermann makes clear that their German descent significantly contributed to their business successes: they continued to rely on their contacts in and with Germany by recruiting German-trained engineers and thus made use of their technological expertise. Sometimes they even traveled back to Germany to learn about the latest cultivation methods and about new agricultural machinery. Technology transfer relied on personal networks and travel of individuals. Their belief in white supremacy led them to attempt to recruit—unsuccessfully—German and Scandinavian workers, but they ultimately relied on Chinese labor. In the end, their business success resulted from a genuinely transnational confluence of interconnected factors such as German technology, American capital, and Asian labor. This is a prime example of how private commercial actors of German descent were centrally involved in the gradual expansion of informal US imperialism in the Pacific.

By the late nineteenth century, Germans were not only involved in the imperial enterprises of other nations, they also appeared in the Pacific as colonizers in their own right. Focusing on Germans in Samoa, Jürgen Schmidt analyzes conflicting notions of work ethic. He reveals how German self-perceptions and perceptions of the colonized islanders shaped attitudes toward work on Samoa.
As the island was conceived as an abundant paradise of the South Sea, Germans more or less accepted what they perceived to be different attitudes toward work. Samoans refused to conform to European work schedules and were in a strong position to defend their autonomy because Germans—in the absence of soldiers and policemen—needed their voluntary cooperation. As a result, Germans colonizers engaged in the widely used practice of importing contract workers (“coolies”) from China and Melanesia who had to work under harsh conditions and often did not renew their contracts after the initial three-year term. While German settlers often perceived Samoans as lazy, notwithstanding a high level of productivity on the island, they often overlooked similar attitudes among Germans. The climate and the autonomy of the remote colony precluded the retention of German patterns of work among colonial administrators and merchants. In a way, Samoans and Germans moved toward a cultural symbiosis at the expense of Chinese and Melanesian coolies.

Livia Maria Rigotti’s chapter also looks at the interaction of Germans and indigenous people during the colonial period at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. She also calls attention to German women travelers to the Pacific, and together with the two following chapters by Stornig and Thomas opens up the exploration of gender dynamics in the German–Pacific encounter. Rigotti’s chapter highlights the marked differences between African and South Sea colonies. Due to the remoteness of the South Sea and the small numbers of German settlers, racial divisions were not as rigid as in Africa. Indeed, interracial marriages and informal relationships of German men and indigenous women were quite common. These couples and their offspring were by and large socially accepted—or at least tolerated. Relationships of German women and indigenous men, however, remained rare and strictly taboo. The large surplus of men in the German colonial communities made it easier for German women to find a suitable co-ethnic as a partner. Social dividing lines lost much of the rigor they bore in Germany. Thus, marriages across social demarcations were common. The number of German women migrating to the South Sea remained small. Unless they were married to German colonists, most of the German women in the South Sea worked as nurses, but some were nuns, helpers of missions, educators, or cooks. Colonial or women’s associations in Germany and religious missions supported these journeys because they considered the lack of women in the colonies as a major problem. The main rationale for the settling of women in the South Sea was the founding of German families and the prevention of “mixed marriages.” Given the relative numbers of the sexes, this aim failed in many cases, and a culture of relative tolerance and even mutual integration developed—an untypical outcome for German colonies.

Katharina Stornig focuses on German missionary women in the Pacific, whose outlook in some respects resembled that of early modern German Jesuit missionaries. When Catholic nuns from Germany arrived in New Guinea in the late
nineteenth century they needed to cooperate closely with indigenous women, especially in their work as educators and care givers. According to Stornig, their relationship was characterized by mutual assistance and by bitter conflicts. The latter revolved around questions of morality. Nuns perceived New Guinea as a highly sexualized space that posed multiple threats to Christian propriety. The nuns saw themselves as selfless sufferers and courageous evangelizers, often leading ascetic and highly disciplined lives. Their model of femininity collided with indigenous lifestyles. One field in which conflicts came to the boil was the corporal punishment of pupils, which the nuns perceived as “loving care.” The nuns, like the Jesuits before them, also mediated European perceptions of New Guinea as they established a sphere of communication through letters and journal articles, which were printed in the Catholic press in Germany.

Emma Thomas looks at a very different group of women in German New Guinea, further complicating the gendered dynamics at play. Her essay focuses on female Pacific Islanders and other Asians who worked as indentured laborers for the Germans and thus represented one facet of widely practiced unfree labor in the colonies. Indentured labor was a key feature of colonial exploitation. Until 1914, about 85,000 New Guineans had been indentured to work on plantations for the colonial government or the missions. Most of them were men, which put the female laborers into a particularly vulnerable position. Recruitment was often involuntary, and there was a premium paid for single women as the massive surplus of men among the colonists and the indigenous workforce created a huge demand for women, both as domestic laborers and objects of sexual exploitation. Indeed, white colonists, as Thomas shows, believed themselves to have unrestricted access to the labor and the bodies of these women. The women were often the victims of gendered violence, including sexual assault and rape by both German colonists and male New Guinean laborers. When these cases were brought to the attention of the authorities and even became objects of court procedures, the male line of defense was to equate indentured women with prostitutes. Colonial courts sometimes convicted indigenous men but regularly acquitted Germans. White fantasies of the islanders’ sexual permissiveness and promiscuity also added to this discourse, which legitimized gendered and racialized forms of violence.

A very different entanglement of Germans in trans-Pacific networks is the subject of Douglas T. McGetchin’s chapter on the Ghadar movement that agitated on behalf of Indian independence in the United States and across the Pacific rim before and during World War I. McGetchin shows how a broad anti-British impetus led German diplomats as well as private citizens to lend material and logistic support to Indian nationalists in their struggles against British imperialism. Most of these plots eventually failed or needed to operate on increasingly hostile territory after the US entry into World War I in April 1917. Yet these activities nevertheless forged ties between German officials and Indian anti-imperialism that persisted into the post–World War I era when Weimar Berlin
became an important hub for Indian nationalists. McGetchin thus succeeds in revealing a small if important German contribution to Indian nationalism that took shape across Pacific worlds.

A similarly small yet revealing form of the German presence in the Pacific is the subject of Reinhard Wendt’s contribution. He traces the history of a transcultural diaspora of a group of ethnic Germans who migrated from Pyritz, Pomerania to Vava’u, a group of tropical islands in Tonga, in the second half of the nineteenth century, as well as the persistent cultural memory of this migration into the twentieth century. In a chain migration from the German lands, several community members followed a successful pioneer, established thriving businesses, forged economic contacts with surrounding territories, and gradually developed a hybrid Tongan–German identity, largely through intermarriage. As Wendt shows, this was a migration driven not by the push of a desperate situation at home but rather by the pull of a quite realistic appraisal by community members of the prospects for a better life in the South Pacific. It also preceded the formal establishment of Western colonialism in the South Pacific, with Tonga eventually becoming a British colony. World War I ended the “golden age” of a German transcultural diaspora in the South Pacific, but even after Vava’u Germans were dispersed throughout the Pacific, they managed to cultivate and preserve a cultural memory of Germanness throughout the remainder of the twentieth century. They thus provide another fitting example for the longue durée of a German presence in the Pacific worlds between Sydney and San Francisco, Auckland and Anchorage, that this volume as a whole seeks to bring into focus.

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Notes

Many thanks go to Charles Parker, Jeremy Prestholdt, and Heidi Tinsman for their critical reading of an earlier draft and helpful suggestions for improvement. We further thank the two anonymous reviewers for pushing our thinking on some key issues.


15. Thus the title of volume 1 of Oskar Spate’s trilogy, which remains a key point of reference: Spate, The Spanish Lake.
19. Matsuda, Pacific Worlds, 64–73, 83–87. There is of course a literature on each of these encounters, including paradigmatic studies such as: Greg Dening, Islands and Beaches: Discourse on a Silent Land: Marquesas, 1774–1880 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1980); Anne Salmond, Two Worlds: First Meetings between Maori and Europeans, 1642–1772 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991).
27. Ibid., 118.
28. Ibid., 107; Matsuda, Pacific Worlds, 185–86.
32. Ibid., 618.
33. Igler, *Great Ocean*.
37. Ibid., 210–11.
38. Ibid., 214.
45. Ibid., 226.
52. See, for example, recent edited collections that do not include contributions on the Pacific, or treat the subject only very marginally: Volker Langbehn and Mohammad Salama, eds., *German


57. As one paradigmatic example, see Sebastian Conrad, German Colonialism: A Short History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). See also Nina Berman, German Colonialism Revisited.


59. Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire, 588–644.

60. Ibid., 30. Dickinson, “The German Empire: An Empire?”


63. Ibid., 37.

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