Introduction

Fascism without Borders
Transnational Connections and Cooperation between Movements and Regimes in Europe, 1918–1945

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Fascist movements and regimes have usually been conceived as and presented themselves as national political forces. In fact, contemporaries as well as scholars have highlighted hyper-nationalism as one of the most important features of fascism which separated fascist movements and regimes from each other. Not accidentally, all attempts to forge a “Fascist International” foundered between the two world wars. Many historians have therefore dismissed or failed to recognize cross-border cooperations between fascists. In fact, the hyper-nationalism of fascist movements and their social Darwinist doctrines, as well as the expansionist and racist policies of the Third Reich and Fascist Italy, have led most experts to argue that fascist internationalism or international fascism was merely a camouflage and a sham.¹ The interpretation that “international fascism is unthinkable, a contradiction in terms” has received broad support from most historians.² As a corollary, fascism has largely been investigated in the framework of national history.³ Beyond volumes that have collected national case studies, few systematic comparative studies have been published.⁴ In particular, cross-border interactions between fascist movements and regimes have largely been dismissed in historical scholarship.⁵

The considerable obstacles and barriers to transnational cooperation between fascists must not be ignored. Yet despite the failure of attempts to establish institutional cooperation, especially through the Comitati d’Azione per l’Universalità di Roma (CAUR) in the mid-1930s, the transnational communications, exchanges, interactions, and transfers between fascists merit serious analysis.⁶ They offer new perspectives on the subject, as this volume demonstrates. Its chapters show that European fascism between 1918 and 1945 was a complex
and heterogeneous phenomenon. Research has largely disregarded studies of various aspects of fascism such as small movements, youth organizations, thinkers, writers, and poets in eastern, southeastern, southern, and northern Europe. These publications have evidenced that fascism was both a national and transnational phenomenon, as it transcended national borders but was rooted in national communities. Although its centers were in Rome and Berlin, fascism in interwar Europe was clearly transnational. Its reduction to Italy and Germany simplifies or even distorts the history of fascism. Taking recent historiographical debates on comparison, transfers, and entanglements in modern history as a starting point, we will therefore trace and explain communications and interactions between European fascists. They occurred at specific points in the trajectory of fascist movements and regime. Studies of transnational perceptions and interactions therefore shed light on the dynamics of fascism that was a contingent and contested phenomenon. Moreover, they highlight selective borrowings, misunderstandings and wishful thinking as crucial dimensions of mutual perceptions, exchange and transfers.

In conceptual terms, at least three dimensions of “transnational fascism” are to be distinguished. First, fascism was a transnational movement. It spread across borders, but specific national manifestations are conspicuous. Second, fascism was perceived as a transnational phenomenon, both by its adherents and its foes. Third, fascism can be analyzed from a transnational perspective. It includes comparative studies as well as investigations of transfers, exchanges, and even entanglements. Leaders as well as minor functionaries and members from different European states or movements met on innumerable occasions and different levels, not only to exchange views on ideological questions and policies, but also to communicate on political styles and representations. Not least, fascists of different nation-states repeatedly agreed on common initiatives. Thus, despite its undisputedly strong and inherent ultranationalism, fascism needs to be understood as a transnational political and social practice, inspired by a set of similar national convictions. Ideas were therefore interlinked with, rather than subordinated to, performative practices.

Clearly, fascists entertained mutual relations and accentuated their bonds. After the “March on Rome” in late October 1922, by which Mussolini came to power, the Italian capital galvanized fascists throughout Europe. “Fascism” became both the name of the Italian Fascists and a political value or ideal to which many other similar movements felt closely related, even if they did not use the word “fascist” in their names (e.g., the German National Socialists, the
Croatian Ustaša, and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists). Italian Fascism seemed to demonstrate that the detested parliamentary rule and social conflict that were held responsible for all the problems in postwar Europe could be overcome. Although its influence declined in the late 1930s, Mussolini’s Fascist regime continued to attract Europeans well into World War II. Even though he shared his generals’ disappointment about the military failures of his Italian alliance partners who had suffered humiliating defeats in Greece and Africa as early as 1940–41, Adolf Hitler cherished Benito Mussolini as an ally and a friend as late as April 1945, when Nazi Germany lay in ruins.9

Transfers between fascists, their movements and regimes cannot be reduced to mere mimesis. Instead of a one-way emulation or opportunistic takeover, fascists selectively appropriated foreign elements, molding them into their particular (national) contexts. Rejecting democracy, liberalism, communism, and socialism as well as the politics of compromise and negotiation, fascist parties and groups undoubtedly shared a common point of departure. Interchange and communication between fascists in Europe not only related to overtly political issues such as propaganda, labor relations, violence, and mutual assistance in war, but also to the seemingly non-political fields of cultural and aesthetic representations. Many fascists were aware of their affinity, as reflected in fascist political staging, especially its symbolism and rituals. For instance, they not only wore uniforms in order to impress and intimidate their opponents in domestic politics but also to demonstrate their claim to represent a transnational movement of warriors united by the hostility to common enemies, including the communists, democrats, conservatives, and liberals. The Soviet Union, in particular, was as strongly repulsed and despised as the Jews. Several fascist movements equated the latter with communists, as the belief in a “Judeo-Bolshevik” conspiracy demonstrates. Moreover, fascists shared a commitment to action (instead of discussion).10

Interwar Europe was home not only to fascist movements and regimes but also to various authoritarian dictatorships. The latter were transnational, too, and they sometimes borrowed from fascism or fascistized themselves when it promised political gains. In the long term, however, dictatorships such as Francisco Franco’s Spain and Antonio de Oliveira Salazar’s Portugal were not fascist, but authoritarian in the first instance. They lacked the idea of a permanent and national revolution, which propelled fascist movements and regimes, and they clung to the past or the present. Horthy’s regime in Hungary, Antanas Smetona’s rule in Lithuania, and Józef Piłsudski’s regime in Poland, were also primarily authoritarian. Some of them even fought fascists in
their states. Unlike fascist movements and regimes, not all authoritarian dictatorships placed racism and ultranationalism center stage in their programs. Piłsudski was even an adherent of socialism. The Communist International (Comintern) labelled him “fascist,” because he betrayed communism in their eyes.11

Mutual perceptions, relations, and exchange among fascist movements and regimes were unequal. In the 1920s, Mussolini’s regime galvanized Europeans across national and political boundaries. In fact, the Fascist dictatorship continued to attract attention in the early 1930s, as demonstrated by the visits of European fascists who came to Italy in order to see the Exposition of the Fascist Revolution opened, exactly ten years after the “March on Rome”. For instance, twelve young French fascists bicycled from Paris to Rome in order to inspect what was claimed to be the radiating center of European fascism. As Hitler’s National Socialists rose in the early 1930s, Italy’s Fascists were increasingly confronted with a mighty and increasingly superior rival. They responded to the new threat by temporarily vying for French support, not least by highlighting the common heritage of Latin culture (latinité). The Fascist leaders also supported the Austrian sovereignty that was threatened by the German and Austrian National Socialists. Yet Italy’s attack of Abyssinia deprived Mussolini (Il Duce, the leader) of this option to counter Hitler’s growing influence after his seizure of power. In World War II, the Duce had to adjust to an inferior position, although the remaining Italian Fascists emphasized Italy’s leading role as a cultural power. In 1944–45, Mussolini finally became Hitler’s lackey. Smaller fascist movements that never managed to seize power, or at least to exert sizable political influence in their countries, remained subordinate to or even dependent on the two major fascist regimes throughout the years from 1922 to 1945. Not least, even the relationship between minor fascist parties like Jacques Doriot’s Parti populaire français and Léon Degrelle’s Belgian Rexist was frequently asymmetrical.12

Moreover, the trajectories of fascist parties and groups differed according to specific political and cultural contexts, and also due to the nature of transnational influences. Thus, understandings and features of fascism changed in the process of transfers. Ideas, institutions, political styles and policies were continuously de-contextualized and re-contextualized. Fascist movements and regimes represented hybrids of indigenous traditions and external influences, not only in border regions such as Alsace or Ukraine.13 More generally, fascism underwent multiple permutations and cannot be grasped according to a typological taxonomy. Instead of clinging to static concepts like
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“pre-fascism” or “para-fascism,” scholars should investigate processes of “fascistization.” It primarily affected authoritarian elites who were prone to selectively adopt fascist “innovations.” They seemed to comply with their overriding aim to secure stability, the status quo, and their power in interwar Europe. However, the rise of fascism also impressed outright political opponents, who closely studied the “fascist” recipe. All in all, fascism assumed specific meanings to different groups, both fascists and non-fascists. Moreover, views and interpretations of individual fascist movements and regimes changed over time. As fascism was a moving target rather than a static entity, it was adapted or rejected according to a wide scope of reasons and for a large variety of (sometimes even contradictory) purposes. They need to be distinguished as much as “positive” interaction (especially processes of exchange, transfer, appropriation and even learning) and “negative” interaction (rejection and blockage).14

By no means accidentally, the adversaries of fascist movements and regimes emphasized the cross-border interchange between and the universal claims of fascist leaders, members, and supporters in the 1920s and 1930s. As George Orwell stated in 1937: “Fascism is now an international movement, which means not only that the Fascist nations can combine for purposes of loot, but that they are groping, perhaps only half-consciously as yet, towards a world system.”15 In the same year, political scientist and jurist Karl Loewenstein, who had been forced to emigrate from Germany to the United States in 1933, observed the “missionary efforts of the fascist International in carrying political propaganda into other nations.”16

Theoretical and Methodological Paths toward a Transnational History of Fascism

The dominance of the “national paradigm” has been a persistent feature in the writing of history in the modern period. In political history as well as in social historical writing, the nation-state has been routinely employed as the prevalent analytical framework. Yet more recent approaches to comparative history have superseded the national paradigm. Although Belgian historian Henry Pirenne, as well as scholars of the French “Annales” school like Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre, had called for the application of comparative approaches to European history as early as the late 1920s, it was mostly after 1945 that the predominant focus on national history was gradually complemented by regional or continental comparative perspectives. In fascist studies,
connections between Mussolini’s and Hitler’s dictatorships were explored as early as the 1940s, and systematic comparisons of regimes as well as movements started in the 1960s.\(^\text{17}\)

The more recent debate on investigations of cross-border transfers, exchanges, and entanglements has promoted transnational history since the 1990s, not least due to the impact of globalization.\(^\text{18}\) Historians have proposed studies of transfers and entanglements that are explicitly devoted to the interrelations and mutual influences. The concept of “entanglements” highlights “a relational perspective which foregrounds processes of interaction and intermixture in the entangled histories of uneven modernities.”\(^\text{19}\) This research perspective underscores the fact that, since in historical reality most units of historical comparison cannot be neatly separated, the world should be better viewed as a web of interactions, encounters, and exchanges.\(^\text{20}\)

We assert that comparative history and transfer studies are complementary rather than incompatible approaches in fascist studies. On the one hand, far from being obsolete, historical comparisons remain an indispensable method in the historian’s toolkit. Efforts to identify and explain similarities and differences among units of research cannot be fully supplanted by the studies of transfers and entanglements between those units. In general, however, historical comparisons need to be combined with investigations of transfers in order to grasp interrelations among intertwined historical phenomena.\(^\text{21}\)

Yet transnational studies of fascism are a new and unexplored field. Historians have investigated cross-border connections, interactions, and exchange between fascist movements and regimes only in the last few years. Most commonly, scholars are increasingly devoting attention to mutual perceptions and discourses, even in bilateral or multilateral relations between fascist states or between them and other countries.\(^\text{22}\) Some publications have concentrated on specific fascist movements, especially the Italian Fascists and German National Socialists,\(^\text{23}\) or on certain regions.\(^\text{24}\) Fascists promoted or espoused particular concepts of European unification that served to justify their “crusade” against the Soviet Union and bolshevism in the units of the Waffen-SS during World War II. These pan-European concepts were directed against liberal visions of a united Europe as well as against Communist internationalism. Foreign supporters like poet Ezra Pound, British fascist James Strachey Barnes, and Irish writer James Vincent Murphy also endorsed and propagated the cross-border claims of Italian Fascism and German National Socialism.\(^\text{25}\)

Beyond the national historical straightjacket, fascism has primarily been investigated in comparative studies. By contrast, studies of mutual
perceptions, relations, transfers, and entanglements between fascists have received less attention. Few scholars have analyzed contacts and collaboration between European fascists and similar-minded followers and adherents in the non-European world. The cross-border attraction of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, and the relations between the leaders and supporters of the two regimes, are an exception to the rule. Some overviews of the history of fascism have highlighted specific networks, too. Historical studies have also reconstructed the intrusion of fascists into the League of Nations, especially its International Labour Organization, and the International Criminal Police Commission that was founded in 1923. Moreover, the cross-border activities of organizations such as the Deutsche Kongreß-Zentrale (set up in the Third Reich) are notable. Fellow-travelers of German Nazism and Italian Fascism in the Near East and in India have received particular attention. Yet the responses of Arabs and Muslims to Hitler’s and Mussolini’s dictatorships cannot be reduced to collaboration. In fact, most of them rejected both these regimes, and colonial rule by the Western powers. Some Arabs and Muslims even saved Jews from persecution. By contrast, scholarship has neglected the interrelationship between fascism and non-communist antifascism, although contemporaries observed mutual perceptions, partial exchange, and selective transfers between the two camps, notwithstanding their political antagonism. More generally, most publications on fascism still mention transfers and entanglements between the movements and regimes only passingly.

Mutual Perceptions, Exchanges, Transfers, and Adoptions: Transnational Relations between Fascists in Europe

After Mussolini had been sworn in as prime minister of Italy in Rome on 31 October 1922 and successfully set up a full-fledged dictatorship in 1925, the Duce found an increasing number of admirers in European states as different as Britain, France, Germany, Croatia, and Ukraine. Thus, Rotha Lintorn Orman established the British Fascisti in 1923, and Pierre Taittinger set up his Jeunesses Patriotes in France two years later. In the early 1920s, the spiritual leader of Ukrainian ultranationalist youth, Dmytro Dontsov, was both mesmerized and shocked by the intrinsic similarities between the Italian Fascists and the Ukrainian nationalists. Most importantly, Hitler admired Mussolini as a strong leader. By the mid-1920s, the Duce had become “the very model of a modern tyrant.”

These individuals, groups, and their leaders were attracted by Mussolini’s promise to overcome the perennial party strife by strong
leadership, ban class conflicts in favor of cooperation between the employers and workers, and eliminate ceaseless economic competition by protectionist policies. The vision of a “new era” and the ideal of the “new man” seemed to compare favorably to the performance of democratic governments. Appalled by the contradictions and frictions of liberal and capitalist modernity, the fascist leaders strove for a comprehensive renewal, which was to be achieved by instilling heroic vitality, imposing military order, promoting racism, and subordinating individuals to the community and state. Fascists were also impressed by the cult of the Romanità, as Mussolini and his followers celebrated the political and cultural legacy of ancient Rome through exhibitions, urban reconstructions, and excavations in Italy and North Africa. Relating the past to the present and visions of the future, the Duce’s dictatorship seemed to combine “revolution and eternity.” Although these concepts of regeneration and rejuvenation ultimately sought to justify dictatorship, suppression and foreign conquest, even conservative intellectuals and politicians like Winston Churchill and St. Leo Strachey (editor of the Spectator) showed themselves favorably impressed by Mussolini’s apparently strong performance as Italy’s new leader in the mid-1920s. Yet their interest was usually restricted to certain points in the trajectory of Italian Fascism, and they contrasted their indigenous problems with the seemingly irresistible advance of Mussolini’s regime. This admiration and adulation, in turn, nourished the Fascists’ sense of superiority. These synergies between fascists and conservatives need to be investigated.

Although Mussolini and his lieutenants initially emphasized the national character of Italian Fascism, their political ambitions clearly transcended the borders of Italy as early as the 1920s. They busily propagated the model of a new transnational European Fascist civilization purportedly embodied by their dictatorship. The Duce, therefore, encouraged Italian Fascists living in different European states to support the new regime. Thus, organizations like the Fasci Italiani all’Estero, which had been set up by the prominent Fascist Giuseppe Bastianini as early as 1923, not only integrated Italians living in foreign states into Italian Fascism but also represented and spread the regime’s claim of a renewal of civilization. The central office of the ancillary organization in Rome was to promote Fascism in Europe, Asia, and Africa, as well as in North and South America. Although they refrained from direct intervention into the politics of their host countries, the Fasci unequivocally espoused Mussolini’s regime and propagated it as a model.
The ascendency of the National Socialists in Germany revitalized Mussolini’s transnational initiatives. Even before the Duce had openly committed himself to a “political and spiritual renewal of the world” in 1932, Italian Blackshirts were delegated to foreign countries in order to mobilize support for the Fascist regime. In China, 400 out of the 430 Italian residents belonged to the branch of the Fasci Italiani all’Estero in Beijing. In Paris and New York, the activities of this organization were mainly pursued by blue-collar workers in the mid-1920s. Italian Fascists in foreign countries not only worked together to support Mussolini’s dictatorship and thereby closed their ranks against the liberals and democrats, but also attempted to appeal to the indigenous populations. Despite the new competition, Hitler’s seizure of power seemed to evidence the success of Mussolini’s regime and thus strengthened the “magnetic field” of Italian Fascism.

It had struck a particularly strong chord among German nationalist conservatives and völkisch groups that hoped to bring about antiparliamentary authoritarian rule in a strong state. Before 1932, most German visitors to Mussolini were conservative and Catholic politicians and journalists who looked for an authoritarian alternative to the despised Weimar Republic. Although he had criticized German expansionism in World War I, the Duce established strong relations to veterans’ organizations like the Stahlhelm, especially through his liaison officer Giuseppe Renzetti. However, the Führer’s movement only aroused considerable attention among leading Italian Fascists after it had won 36.9 percent of the vote in the Reichstag elections of 31 July 1932. Conversely, the Italian Fascists had become heroes for many National Socialists as early as the 1920s. Thus, members of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist German Workers’ Party, NSDAP) who were asked to name great personalities of history in an opinion poll in 1929 placed Mussolini third, behind Bismarck and Hitler. Although the Nazis’ adversaries attempted to stigmatize and discredit the Führer in the last few years of the Weimar Republic, they proved unable to halt Hitler’s political rise.

As he felt challenged by the ascending rival movement, the Duce openly committed himself to intensified cross-border propaganda for the Italian model in 1932. To buttress his claim to political leadership in Europe, Mussolini started to subsidize fascists in foreign countries. In 1933–34, for instance, the Italian ambassador, Dino Grandi, passed considerable funds to the British Union of Fascists (BUF). It had been officially founded by former Conservative and Labour politician Sir Oswald Mosley in October 1932, following his encounter with Mussolini in Rome. The Duce also subsidized some other Fascist groups
and parties in Europe like the Austrian Heimwehr and the Belgian Rexists of Léon Degrelle. Moreover, the Croatian Ustasha and the OUN were both trained at the same camps on Sicily in the early 1930s. It was the assassination of the Polish interior minister Bronisław Pieracki in Warsaw on 15 June 1934, as well as the murder of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and the French foreign minister Louis Barthou in Marseilles on 9 October 1934 that drew international attention to Mussolini’s support for these fascist “liberation movements.” The unwelcome attention forced him to proceed more carefully. Nevertheless, the Duce continued to fund fascist groups throughout Europe.\textsuperscript{38}

As these examples show, Italian Fascism was not exclusively perceived as a national movement, but as a transnational pan-European force of renewal that both inspired and supported some other European movements. Yet cooperation between the Fascists and the National Socialists continuously went hand in hand with rivalry and competition as well as mutual reservations and recriminations.\textsuperscript{39} Mussolini’s doubts grew when Nazi Germany increasingly outflanked Fascist Italy from 1933 onwards. Despite their initial reservations about the expansionist program espoused by the National Socialists, many European fascists had enthusiastically applauded Hitler’s seizure of power. The leaders of the fascist movements of France and the Netherlands, in particular, did not hesitate to approach the new rulers of Germany in 1933. Dontsov, the main ideologist of Ukrainian nationalists, perceived Hitler as a model of a fascist leader, and many ordinary members of the OUN, too, admired the German Führer for his inflexible anti-Semitism and anti-Bolshevism.\textsuperscript{40} After they had rapidly established their undisputed dictatorship in 1933–34, the Nazis managed to increase their influence among European fascists. The seemingly unbeatable Third Reich assumed the status of the dominant model, increasingly surpassing Italian Fascism. The Nazis attempted to take advantage of their growing international clout. Directed by Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, the Foreign Organization (Auslandsorganisation, AO) of the NSDAP nourished, and controlled the activities of its branches in many foreign countries.\textsuperscript{41}

The turn of the BUF to the Nazi rulers was particularly conspicuous. The fascist organization was renamed the “British Union of Fascists and National Socialists” in 1936. Mosley’s party had openly adopted anti-Semitism and increasingly abandoned the ideal of the corporate state that the British Fascists had initially espoused. In the summer of 1936, the party was granted a subvention of ten thousand pounds by Hitler, who was also involved in Mosley’s secret marriage to Diana Mosley in Berlin in October 1936. The Belgian Rexists of Leon Dégrelle, who had
initially been supported by Mussolini, received German subventions in the mid-1930s, too.\textsuperscript{42} One of the most important sources of income of the Ukrainian Military Organization and its follow-up, the OUN, was the German Abwehr (military intelligence).\textsuperscript{43}

The adoption of anti-Semitism and racism was largely due to the growing attractiveness of National Socialism to the radical Right throughout Europe. In the Netherlands, for instance, Anton Mussert’s Nationaal Socialistische Beweging (National Socialist Movement, NSB), which had initially been inspired by Italian Fascism, launched a propaganda campaign against the Jews in 1935. Anti-Semitism was particularly promoted among Dutch Fascists by Rost van Tonningen, who was received by Hitler in Berlin in August 1936. In Britain, openly pro-Nazi groups like the “Link” and the “Right Club” attempted to surpass the BUF in their hatred of Jews in the late 1930s. In Eastern Europe, OUN ideologist Volodymer Martynets adjusted the Nuremberg Laws to the Ukrainian context in his brochure “The Jewish Problem in Ukraine,” which was published in 1938 in London. He argued that the Jews who live among Ukrainians are a race that should be completely isolated from the Ukrainian people.\textsuperscript{44}

Altogether, personal contacts, financial subventions, and visits to Germany, as well as cultural events organized by friendship societies like the Anglo-German Fellowship, and bilateral associations like the German–French Society and the German–Dutch Society, tied European fascists ever more firmly to the Third Reich. The increasing rivalry between the Fascist and Nazi regimes by no means excluded pragmatic cooperation. In fact, close interaction between the two nations continued in a number of policy fields. Not coincidentally, the German propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels, complained about the flurry of visits of high-ranking Fascists and National Socialists between Italy and Germany in 1937. Apparently, he felt excluded by the exchange, and reacted with envy and scorn to the increasing number of meetings between high-ranking leaders and members of the state parties that ruled the two countries.\textsuperscript{45} Ukrainians studying in Rome joined the Italian student fascist organization Gruppi universitari fascisti, which assembled young fascists from many other European countries and showed themselves concerned about the future of their continent.\textsuperscript{46}

The impact of the “successful” fascist movements on the smaller groups in Europe was ambiguous. On the one hand, both Italy’s Fascist regime and the Nazi dictatorship had clearly demonstrated that fascists were able to seize power. They thereby encouraged smaller parties such as Norway’s Nasjonal Samling and the British Union of Fascists, which even received funds from the German Nazis and the Italian Fascists,
if only temporarily. Not least, the second-wave fascists of the 1930s could borrow ideas and institutions that had been successful in Italy and Germany. On the other hand, this selective appropriation of proven and settled “models” robbed the minor fascist parties of the flexibility, adaptability, and fluidity that had been crucial to the success of Fascism and Nazism. The fascist parties that were founded in the 1930s did not manage to gain an independent status. On the contrary, many of them were riven by conflicts between national conservatives and radicals, as well as between the supporters of Italian Fascism and German National Socialism. Together, the two regimes and the successful fascist movements played a constitutive role in the formation and development of the minor groups, which were transnationally oriented from their very foundation onward.47

As World War II approached, fascist calls for European “unity” and “peace” (according to the terms of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy) became more numerous and urgent. Yet the cracks in the “Axis” alliance that had been established between Italy and Germany in October 1936 in the wake of Mussolini’s diplomatic isolation after the attack on Abyssinia one year before became apparent in 1938 when Italy had to abandon its protection of Austria’s independence to Nazi Germany’s demand for forced accession (Anschluss). Moreover, Mussolini and his foreign secretary, Count Galeazzo Ciano, refused to enter the war that Germany initiated by attacking Poland on 1 September 1939.48

Following the German occupation of Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France, and Italy’s entry into the war, high-level exchange between Fascists was gradually reduced to military cooperation and open support for the collaboration. Exchange between the indigenous fascists and the German or Italian occupiers increasingly bordered on national treason, because the National Socialists preferred to cooperate with stable authoritarian regimes than ideologically akin fanatics. Nevertheless, in March 1939 the Hlinka Party proclaimed a Slovak fascist state, and in April 1941 the Ustasha founded a Croatian one. Both were established because Nazi Germany needed the support of those fascist movements. After the German attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, however, Hitler did not approve of states proclaimed by radical right-wing or fascist movements in the territories released from the Soviet occupation. After the proclamation of the Ukrainian state on 30 June 1941 in Lviv, the leaders of the OUN were detained. The same had happened a week earlier to the elite of the Lithuanian Activist Front (Lietuvos aktyvistų frontas, LAF) when they proclaimed a Ukrainian state in Kaunas. The OUN leaders remained detained in German concentration camps as special political prisoners (Ehrenhäftlinge or
Sonderhäftlinge) until fall 1944, together with the Romanian fascists of the “Iron Guard.”

Under the strong impact of the occupation of Norway and France in spring 1940, scares of subversion led to the internment of fascists in states like Britain. Whereas fears of high-ranking “traitors” were mostly unfounded, volunteers were recruited to the German Army and to the armed SS in various European states, and many Fascists consented to defend the European “fortress” against “Bolshevism.” As early as 1941–42, forty-three thousand foreign volunteers joined German military forces in their fight against the Soviet Union. Even from non-belligerent, and then neutral, Spain, a “Blue Division” of volunteers flocked to the German army in order to support its soldiers in their military crusade against the Soviet troops. By late 1944, 763,000 soldiers had been recruited in the territories annexed by Germany alone. Policemen in numerous East European countries outnumbered their German superiors and were deeply involved in the annihilation of the Jews in their respective countries. Clearly, pan-Europeanism was not only espoused by liberals and democrats but also exploited by the Fascists and National Socialists. They proved capable of mobilizing hundreds of thousands of men and women in order to kill millions of civilians.

Yet the vision of a fascist Europe proved to be a chimera. Fascists clearly espoused different versions of European unity. Thus, the Nazis aimed at German hegemony. Moreover, fissures between the Third Reich and Fascist Italy grew in the early 1940s. Due to his country’s weakness as an industrial nation, Mussolini had to succumb to Nazi Germany’s claims of superiority. As the Italian war efforts virtually collapsed in 1942–43, the Duce increasingly rejected the racist ideology and annihilation policies of the Nazis. He attempted to regain status by claiming that Italian civilization would ultimately prevail over brute German power. Many foreign volunteers in the armed SS, too, were not prepared to abandon their demands for independence. Nevertheless, the vision of a fascist Europe was still influential at the end of the war, primarily due to the menace of bolshevism.

Dimensions of Transnational Fascism

New research on fascist movements and regimes has uncovered and highlighted multiple connections between leaders and followers, both in party organizations and regimes. It has demonstrated that fascism was both a national and transnational phenomenon. In contrast to our knowledge about some, although not all, national cases, the transnational
dimensions of European fascism are still under-researched. One important reason for this state of affairs is that studies of fascism require the knowledge of several languages and national histories; another has been the lack of an appropriate methodology with which to compare particular national cases and show how transnationalism shaped the numerous national forms of fascism. Thus, a comprehensive “history of fascist entanglement” has been proposed in order to assess the relative importance and significance of exchanges.\(^{53}\)

A promising approach to the transnational nature of fascism is the investigation of cross-border networks and interactions between specific actors in fields such as propaganda, party organization, and public representation. As recent research on the history of fascism has demonstrated, a “productive transnational method begins with the socially and culturally constructed realities of protagonists, with purposive action that takes place through the use of solidarities of various scales from personal networks and local solidarities through the national to the transnational.”\(^{54}\) Beyond leaders and activists, fascist actors included students, politicians, poets, artists, emigrants, and youths. Ordinary members as well as luminaries of small organizations, huge movements, and regimes interacted on various levels.\(^{55}\) Despite their strong nationalist convictions, fascists felt related to each other and performed transnational exchange on a regular basis, regarding it as a part of their everyday life. The multifarious interactions resulted from diverse motivations such as common beliefs and interests, the hostility to communism, liberalism, and democracy, as well as the perceived need to discuss and agree on the future shape of their countries or of their continent. Mutual perceptions frequently led to exchange and even learning. Yet they also highlighted differences, reinforced tensions, and exacerbated national antagonisms. As the chapters of this book demonstrate, studies of transnational fascism have to take the full scale of these interrelations into account.

Fascists lived in different states and stateless communities. They were primarily concerned about their national organizations, but they shared values and points of views with fascists in foreign countries. Even though there was no coherent ideology, and compromises shaped their political agenda and social practice, fascist movements and regimes embraced a similar set of political ideas, and they shared a militaristic style. Not only the Nazis and the Italian Fascists, but also the Iron Guard and the Ustasha, developed new concepts of presenting themselves in public, manipulating public opinion, or eliminating enemies. Preoccupied by their expansionist ideas, fascists were dedicated to the aggrandizement of their own country, and they strove for conquest in order to expand their
particular nation-state. Yet they sought inspiration from like-minded groups across national borders, and they initially regarded Fascist Italy as their model before they turned to the Third Reich.

Transnational discourse between fascists proceeded on various levels. Texts by Hitler, Mussolini, and many other politicians and ideologists were translated into almost all European languages, frequently by their admirers in the particular states. Discourse on anti-Semitism, racism, and eugenics played an especially important role among European fascists. Similarly, fascist aesthetics, including the style of uniforms, symbols on (national) flags, words, and the tunes of marching songs were clearly shaped by influences across national borders, although we should not disregard national specifics such as the role of folkloristic costumes in the movements of East and Southeast European fascists, nor the extensive fascination with racist symbolism in National Socialism and several movements in East-Central Europe.

In order to further knowledge about fascism in Europe between 1918 and 1945, the editors have decided to focus on some of the most important dimensions and levels of transnationalism. The scope of the volume is not restricted to cross-border interactions between representatives of fascist states, which would be more typical of an international than a transnational approach to the subject. Nevertheless, official politics, ideology, and policies are obviously an important dimension of studying fascism from a cross-border perspective. They also serve as a starting point for a more thorough and comprehensive exploration of the nature of fascist transnationalism. Besides highlighting interaction between high-ranking politicians, the volume engages with other actors who were involved in transnational fascist activism, such as intellectuals, scientists, proponents of the concept of a fascist Europe, and youth organizations.

Propaganda and representations are important fields of exploring transnational interactions, too, as some chapters of this volume demonstrate. The cross-border flows of symbols, meanings, and aesthetics, in particular, merit close scholarly attention. Similarly, fundraising, the financial organization of societies, and the vexed issues of nationalism, anti-Semitism, and racism were important issues in the cross-border exchange between fascists throughout Europe. No less important were discourses on mass violence, expansionism, and the role of religion in fascist movements. In addition to these most essential and obvious levels and dimensions of interactions and cooperation, transnationalism also occurred through conflicts among individuals, groups, movements, and regimes. Contrary to transfers, controversies and bloody conflicts related fascists to each other in a negative way.
The transnational nature of fascism was both a source and a subject of discourses on a fascist international in Europe and the very idea of a fascist Europe. Moreover, fascist transnationalism was interrelated to cross-border antifascism, as it triggered multiple reactions and responses by intellectual and political opponents. As early as the 1930s, contemporaries recognized the interrelationship between the transnational cooperation of the fascists on the one hand, and the cross-border collaboration between antifascists on the other. Like the fascists, their opponents perceived fascism as a transnational political alternative to democracy, the important differences between Italian Fascism and German National Socialism, as well as between the minor fascist parties, notwithstanding. For instance, Carlo Rosselli, the leading luminary of the liberal group Giustizia e Libertà, envisaged an “antifascist Europe” as a response to fascist transnationalism.56

Similarly, Karl Loewenstein highlighted the interrelationship between the fascist onslaught and “militant democracy” as early as 1937. In general, the fascist threat activated, mobilized, and radicalized the antifascists, not only in the confines of the various nation-states, but also beyond their borders. As scholars such as Dan Stone have emphasized, however, antifascism cannot be reduced to its communist variant.57 In fact, liberal and conservative intellectuals contributed significantly to defining and implementing resistance against fascism, as Silvia Madotto and Francesco Di Palma demonstrate in this volume. Altogether, antifascist conceptualizations and understandings of fascism enabled its opponents to clarify and expose the fascist threat, and thus helped to defeat it. Conversely, communist antifascist internationalism encouraged fascists to cooperate most strongly. In a similar vein, transnational cooperation between fascists, as well as collaboration between the communists, were interrelated in attempts to forge a “Catholic International,” especially by the Vatican’s “Secretariat on Atheism” in the 1930s. All in all, the boundary between right-wing politics and antifascism was fluid in interwar Europe. In Italy, for instance, some nationalist supporters of an intervention of the country in the early part of World War I (1914–15) strongly opposed Mussolini’s dictatorship in the 1920s and 1930s. Nevertheless, they still shared a commitment to political violence with the Italian Fascists. Similarly, the Vatican asserted a rejection of fascism, or at least independence from it, while its “Secretariat on Atheism” partially endorsed fascist anticommunism. In the late 1930s, it even collaborated with fascists and Nazis in on-the-ground campaigns against communism.58

State authorities, too, identified an interrelationship between fascism and antifascism. In Britain, for instance, the Security Service was
concerned that the British Union of Fascists boosted and radicalized the antifascist movement, especially the efforts of the Communist International. Some intellectuals, such as Orwell, even wondered immediately after the defeat of the Third Reich “how much of the present slide towards Fascist ways of thought is traceable to the ‘anti-Fascism’ of the past ten years and the unscrupulousness it has entailed?” Altogether, some contemporary observers emphasized the interrelationship between transnational fascism and antifascism.

Addressing these issues and analytical dimensions, the authors highlight the role that transnationalism played between European fascist movements and regimes. They also demonstrate how transnational fascism in Europe actually evolved from the early 1920s until the end of World War II. The aim of this approach is to open a broad perspective and to promote a new research vista that recognizes fascism as an ensemble of manifold but closely intertwined movements. This will hopefully pave the way to more comprehensive studies that will help to specify and understand the nature of fascist transnationalism.

Although the volume is largely restricted to Europe, fascism undoubtedly mobilized support beyond the confines of the continent. In some states, like Japan and Argentina, radical nationalists were inspired by the successful models of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. The military and authoritarian regimes of Tōjō Hideki (1941–44) and Juan Perón (1946–55), respectively, borrowed specific mechanisms of rule (for instance propaganda and techniques of representation), as well as certain policies such as corporate economic organization, from fascism. Yet the settings and contexts differed markedly from those prevalent in Europe after 1918. As Robert Paxton has rightly emphasized, “the similarities seem matters of tools or instruments, borrowed during fascism’s apogee, while the differences concern more basic matters of structure, function, and relation to society.” Moreover, European fascist movements like the Dutch NSB clearly clung to the imperial rule by their respective nation-states as late as World War II. Yet these schemes clashed with Nazi policies, which aimed at a “New Order” in Europe.

Similarly, the book confines itself to the time between 1918 and 1945. The catastrophic failure of Italian Fascism, and particularly German Nazism and its numerous associates, was a significant obstacle for the multiple neo-fascist and neo-Nazi movements after World War II. Even more importantly, the Holocaust and other atrocities committed during the war have profoundly transformed memory cultures of fascism, National Socialism, and of World War II itself, all over the world, at least since the 1970s. They have largely delegitimized any open racist violence, too. After 1945, leaders and members of right-
wing and neo-fascist groups had to relate themselves to Nazism, Hitler, and the Holocaust. Looking backward rather than forward, they largely remained on the political fringe. Altogether, despite the “generic similarities among movements of the modern secular Right, which include both classic fascism and the present radical Right in Western Europe, critical changes in the historical context set these two phenomena apart in essential ways.” For pragmatic reasons, too, a certain geographical limitation can therefore be justified. “If you spread your net too wide the fish may get through, and early attempts to give fascism a global status as an example of ‘developmental dictatorship’ made its contours still more infinite.”

The Chapters of the Volume

Exploring various aspects of transnational fascism, the volume is composed of thirteen chapters. The texts address the major levels of transnational fascism as well as negative reactions to fascism, known as antifascism. The first section is devoted to theories and methodology (Aristotle Kallis and Matteo Pasetti), followed in the second by chapters on propaganda, leisure, and representations (Anna Lena Kocks, Goran Miljan, and Cláudia Ninhos). The third section of the volume deals with actors, conflicts, and religion (Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, Raul Cârstocea, and Marleen Rensen) and the fourth with fascist concepts of Europe (Monica Fioravanzo and Johannes Dafinger). The fifth section investigates the interrelations and transnational exchange between fascists, and cross-border interaction between their opponents (Kasper Braskén, Silvia Madotto, and Francesco Di Palma).

Following this introduction, Aristotle Kallis explains why fascism cannot be understood in national terms. In fact, he identifies its transnationality in its generic and contradictory nature. Fascism manifested itself in a number of similar movements in Europe and beyond. This was neither a coincidence nor a by-product of other political movements or ideologies. Scholars of fascism have tried to approach this problem in divergent theoretical and empirical studies that, however, frequently restricted themselves to governmental internationalism or bi- or tri-national comparisons. As Kallis evidences, however, violence and anti-Semitism are central to transnational fascism. Destruction correlated to visions such as a “new order.” These two dimensions constituted transnational fascism as a highly dynamic phenomenon. Its complexity is demonstrated in the following chapters.
Matteo Pasetti analyzes the dissemination of corporatist ideas in Europe. This shows an important dimension of fascist transnationalism, paying special attention to theoretical concepts of cross-border diffusion and flow of ideas and ideologies. Pasetti explains how an economic system, deeply rooted in Italian culture and policies, found, thanks to Mussolini, adherents in many European fascist and non-fascist states, and was adapted to various economic and political circumstances outside Italy. Corporatism was intended to become a third way, different from socialism and capitalism, and an integral element of an authoritarian state. It was central to the political appeal and inclusiveness of fascism in Italy and beyond.

Anna Lena Kocks compares the organization of leisure in two unequal fascist communities: the Italian Fascists and the British Union of Fascists. She shows the flow of transnational ideas and concepts between them, and points out the leading role of Italy in the discourse on fascist self-representation. Despite different premises, Italian and English fascists used propaganda in similar ways to prepare their members for leisure, and used it as propaganda. However, we find also dissimilarities and political differences, such as the role of women in the concept of leisure in Italy and the BUF.

Goran Miljan analyzes the youth organizations of the Croatian Ustasha and the Slovak Hlinka Party. These two similar and equal organizations, which both understood themselves as “liberation movements,” operated in the interwar period in similar political circumstances, and established collaborationist states under the aegis of Nazi Germany as the Germans began to remodel the map of Europe. The youth organizations of these movements fulfilled similar roles in the Slovak and Croatian societies, and felt spiritually related to each other. During joint summer camps they discussed the roles of their states in the New Europe, and exercised their bodies to the glory of their leaders. The transnational activism was strengthened by the similarity of languages and the idea of belonging to very closely related people, both racially and spiritually.

Cláudia Ninhos explores the German–Portuguese relationship in the context of science, knowledge, and power. She concentrates on the worker and youth organizations, scientists, and diplomats, and investigates the impact of German Kulturpropaganda on Portugal. Ninhos highlights the complexity of the relationships between these two nations, and unveils their channels of fascist transnationalism, as well as the meaning of colonialism and the role of the extermination of the Jews in the German–Portuguese discourse.
Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe opens fascist studies to a new subject of conflicts. Using the example of the relationships between the National Socialists, and the Austrian, Romanian, and Ukrainian fascists, he shows what caused the conflicts between fascists, and why the National Socialists sometimes preferred not to cooperate with ideologically closely related movements. Paying attention to National Socialists’ geopolitical interests, and their wish to secure resources for the war against the Soviet Union and the extermination of European Jews, Rossoliński-Liebe demonstrates how the National Socialists persecuted or detained fascists from Austria, Romania, and Ukraine, and preferred to cooperate with other forces in these countries.

Marleen Rensen presents the French intellectual Robert Brasillach, who turned to fascism while watching a rally in Nuremberg in 1937. Analyzing his worldview and exploring his life, she highlights the role of ultranationalism and fascism in writings of this journalist, and film critic. Rensen demonstrates how Brasillach adapted National Socialist proposals to the French circumstances, became a collaborationist, and developed the concept of a new European order where Franco-German relations would have played a central role.

Another scholar who explains the transnational nature of fascism on the basis of one personality is Raul Cârstocea. Concentrating on the leading member of the Iron Guard, Ion I. Moţa, he demonstrates that the organization wanted to ally with other fascist movements in order to combat their common enemies, especially the communists and the Jews. In 1934, at the meeting of European fascists in Montreaux, Moţa supported the idea of a fascist international, despite the ambivalent attitude of other fascist movements to religion—the most important part of the identity of every Romanian legionary. It was the anti-Semitism and racism that convinced him to be ideologically closely related to other European fascists, even those who did not cherish religion, mysticism, or folklore like the Iron Guard did.

Monica Fioravanzo analyzes the Italian fascist visions of Europe. Unsurprisingly the cultural and political center of Europe in this concept was Rome. Italy was intended to spread fascist culture in the entire continent, which would create a common European fascist identity. Other parts of Europe would subordinate themselves to Italy and consider themselves to be the colonies of the true European fascist center—the truly Italian Rome. At the same time, Mussolini had to react to domestic quests and demands for renewal, especially in the early 1930s. For these reasons Mussolini first created the Fasci Italiani all’Estero, and in 1933 the CAUR. Italian intellectuals, journalists, and politicians who spread these “universalist” ideas across Europe ignited
a vivid debate between representatives of different European fascist movements, and challenged the National Socialist hegemonic plans.

The Nazi concepts of Europe are explained by Johannes Dafinger, who emphasizes the importance of völkisch elements in a fascist Europe dominated by the Germans. Because of their unlimited racism, and the obsession with eugenics and the Slavic and Jewish contamination of the Aryan race, the German fascists defined völkisch as the component that would both purify and join the European races into a continent united by fascism. Given the anti-universalist nature of racism, unifying Europe around völkisch culture was truly challenging; many racist German thinkers began with anti-European ideas but ended as supporters of European models. Like nationalism, racism and völkisch ideology were excluding concepts, but they neatly corresponded to fascism. They were next to nationalism and obsession with violence the most intrinsic and thus transnational element of European fascism. Yet the Nazi “New Order” did not prevent the emergence and dissemination of competing cultural influences.

To what extent and in which sense antifascism became transnational is explained by Kasper Braskén, Silvia Madotto, and Francesco Di Palma. Braskén emphasizes the correlation between transnational fascism and antifascism. Concentrating on communist groups, he demonstrates how transnational antifascism affected the dynamics of fascism, which in turn impacted on antifascism. Indeed, the history of transnational fascism cannot be properly understood without paying attention to the activities of antifascist groups, movements, and parties. This broad perspective embeds the final two chapters. Silvia Madotto’s investigation deals with a particular case—the antifascist resistance at the European universities—and concentrates on the crucial role of the University of Padua and the activities of an influential networker, Silvio Trentin. Besides popularizing fascism and racism, universities were the centers of antifascism activism. However, many students and professors did not understand fascism and antifascism as contradictory, but rather changed and adjusted their behavior according to the political circumstances. All in all, the interrelationship between fascism and antifascism was a constitutive element of their transnationality. Francesco Di Palma, on the other hand, analyzes the antifascist activities of the German Social Democratic Party in exile and the Giustizia e Libertà, an Italian resistance group. Investigating their contacts with other antifascist groups and their reactions to fascism, Di Palma exposes the channels of transnationalism among antifascists in exile.

An afterword by Arnd Bauerkämper concludes this volume. Taking up some crucial findings and insights from the contributions
to this book, he elaborates on perspectives of historical research on transnational fascism.

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Notes

1. Throughout this volume, “Fascism” (capitalized) refers to the Italian variant, whereas “fascism” denotes the generic concept.


5. For exceptions, see notes 22, 23, and 24.

6. The CAUR had been initiated by Fascist functionary Asvero Gravelli, who edited the journal Ottobre. Gravelli spearheaded a group of Fascist leaders who aspired to redefine Italian Fascism as a youthful movement that was to mobilize support throughout Europe. Directed against the new National Socialist regime, the CAUR was to spread Fascist Italy’s claim to represent a universal force of cultural renewal. Yet a conference of fascist leaders (including Vidkun Quisling, Oswald Mosley, General Eion O’Duffy, and Marcel Bucard) in Montreux in December 1934 failed to achieve unity, largely due to different views on the importance of anti-Semitism. Neither did another meeting of fascist leaders in Amsterdam in April 1935 arrive at binding decisions. On the CAUR, see Michael A. Ledeen, Universal Fascism: The Theory and Practice of the Fascist International, 1928–1936 (New York, 1972), esp. 104–32; idem, “Italian Fascism and Youth,” Journal of Contemporary History 4 (1969): 137–54.


10. See, for instance, Oswald Mosley, *Fascism in Britain* (Westminster, 1935), 11: “We have had enough talk; we will act!”


17. Goeschel, “*Italia docet*?” 483, 489. For more details, see Aristotle Kallis’s chapter in this volume.


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34. Roger Griffin, ed., Fascism (New York, 1995), 73.


43. See Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 73–74.


46. Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 76.
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55. See, for example, the contributions to Julie V. Gottlieb and Thomas P. Lineham, eds., *The Culture of Fascism: Visions of the Far Right in Britain* (London, 2004); Fraixe, Poupault, and Piccioni, *Vers une Europe latine*.


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