In 1963, Germans on both sides of the East/West divide commemorated the twenty-fifth anniversary of Carl von Ossietzky’s death. Ossietzky was every bit as controversial a figure in postwar Germany as he had been in the Weimar Republic. A famous pacifist and journalist, he had exposed the Republic’s clandestine attempts to remilitarize in 1931, suffered internment at the hands of the Nazis in 1933, and been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1935. Many, particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), considered Ossietzky a still-convicted traitor. Rudolf Augstein, founder and owner of Der Spiegel, in 1958 scathingly declared him a “Thersites . . . an evil and ugly hack . . . who could not bring himself, even in prison, to utter a word of praise for the nation.”¹ He was more widely celebrated in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), but here, too, his memory was not without controversy. Publishers, for example, readily reproduced and annotated his famous articles for the left-leaning Weltbühne, but omitted his sharp criticisms of the Communist Party.² Even though he had leaned toward the political left and courageously defied National Socialism, the authorities would not allow his works to appear in print unfiltered.

Discussions about Ossietzky would remain fraught until at least the 1980s, but starting with the 1963 anniversary, a wider number of politicians and intellectuals chose to single him out for public recognition. Their reasons for doing so varied, but these events were almost universally colored by the Cold War. The GDR Peace Council, for example, created a “Carl von Ossietzky Medal” in January 1963 as a sort of analogue to the Nobel Peace
Prize for left-leaning pacifists. Notable recipients included Bertrand Russell and Wilhelm Elhes. That same month, Max Suhrbief, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party in the GDR, organized a rally for Ossietzky at his graveside in Berlin-Niederschönhausen. He used the opportunity to accuse the “reactionary [West German] state” of persecuting the working class in much the same way as it had Ossietzky. In August, West German students and peace activists erected a monument to Ossietzky and other prisoners at the Esterwegen concentration camp near Oldenburg in the FRG. Local authorities refused to countenance it, however, complaining Ossietzky had been a traitor and that in any event, the vast majority of victims buried there had been common criminals. Numerous revisionist biographies also appeared.

Perhaps the most significant rehabilitations of Ossietzky’s memory, however, were those broadcast directly to German living rooms in the form of television plays, or teleplays. In September 1963, for example, the East German station Deutscher Fernsehfunk (DFF) aired a play entitled *Carl von Ossietzky*. Like other East German television programs of the era, it dramatizes a large swath of the title character’s adult life, depicting his initial doubts about revealing state secrets, his subsequent change of heart and heroic reporting, his cruel imprisonment in 1931, and his eventual conversion to socialism while in the concentration camp system. What differentiates this particular narrative from print biographies and commemorative speeches, however, are the visual and aural cues afforded by the medium itself. In the office of the reactionary judge who rules against the hero, for instance, the camera lingers on a bust of Otto von Bismarck, the architect of German unification and the symbol par excellence of Prussian militarism. The program also features the violent suppression of a combined Social Democratic and Communist demonstration and Ossietzky sarcastically responding to police interrogations with the militaristic “Jawohl!” (Yes, sir!). Finally, the program begins and ends with a scene of Ossietzky’s wife, Maud, standing in front of her husband’s tombstone. In both instances, a narrator proclaims, “Everywhere else in the world, his name is held in honor. But not here.”

On the one hand, these cues help advance the plot by marking certain characters as heroes (Ossietzky), villains (the judge), and victims (Maud). On the other, they serve the political concerns of the present. The association between an immoral judge and Prussian militarism aligns with the East German elites’ claim that conservatism, capitalism, and fascism went hand in hand. The depicted alliance between the Social Democrats and Communists whitewashed the very real hostilities between the two parties during the Weimar period and therefore provided an after-the-fact justification for their forced merger in 1947. Ossietzky’s responses to questioning dramatically underline the show’s broader claim that he was a man of real conviction and...
courage, even under the threat of torture. The image of the grieving wife, draped in black and shedding silent tears for her dead husband, invites the viewer to consider the reasons why the title character died for his convictions. Moreover, the scene also references the present inasmuch as it was filmed at Ossietzky’s actual grave in Berlin-Niederschönhausen (in East Berlin), subtly suggesting to the viewer that Ossietzky’s story still matters in the ongoing struggle between communist and capitalist Germany. Indeed, at least one newspaper critic, Otto Bonhoff at the conservative National-Zeitung in East Berlin, noted, “Carl von Ossietzky might help us to recognize and master the here and today.”

Less than six months after the East German production aired, the West German station Norddeutscher Rundfunk (NDR) broadcast a rival play entitled Der Prozess Carl von Ossietzky (The trial of Carl von Ossietzky). This production, as the title suggests, covers a much shorter time frame, starting with the specific events that triggered Ossietzky’s arrest and trial in 1931 and culminating with his imprisonment. The bulk of the plot revolves around arguments for and against the type of hard-hitting investigative journalism that led to Ossietzky’s trial. The dialogue is cerebral and nuanced; it encourages the viewer to think carefully about the philosophical and moral implications of Ossietzky’s actions and whether, by implication, they could be justified in the present day. Similar to the East German version, it paints the hero as courageous and moral. When given the opportunity to leave the country before his sentencing, for example, Ossietzky elects to stay despite death threats, rocks thrown through his apartment window, and the repeated, impassioned admonitions of his colleagues. Like its counterpart, the NDR play draws a connection between Prussian militarism and National Socialism. The reactionary judge overtly lauds Hitler, and members of the audience at the official court hearing are dressed in SA uniform. It diverges, however, in other details. One otherwise conservative military officer and witness at the court proceedings makes an impassioned plea for democracy and tolerance. He declares, “Democracy isn’t a bad thing . . . people can even win wars with it.” This implies the pre–World War II German military system was not completely rotten; instead, it followed a common West German narrative, that National Socialism nurtured the darker aspects of German military culture. Press reviews embraced this interpretation. Contributors at the Evangelischer Pressedienst (epd), for instance, lauded the play for demonstrating the Nazis’ underhanded tactics to members of the younger generation who did not personally live through the regime. The largely positive response must have gratified—and perhaps surprised—the play’s writers, Maria Matray and Answald Krüger, who understood their depiction of Ossietzky as a controversial political statement, framed within an at times ambivalent, at times hostile attitude toward Weimar-era resistance figures.
The two dramas, so different in ideological origin and political context yet so similar in purpose, throw several important questions into sharp relief. Why had Ossietzky been transformed from traitor to hero in the public discourse? How did the two German states, with such contrasting visions of political and moral righteousness, come to valorize and commemorate the same figure? What did they have to gain from resurrecting a hero who embodied neither West nor East German ideals? And why did these changes occur in 1963/1964 and not earlier? While these questions do not lend themselves to simple answers, they speak to one of the most visible unresolved tensions of the postwar era: what to do with the Nazi past. Faced with such a catastrophe as the failed Third Reich, German intellectuals and writers heavily employed the "sick man" metaphor. They equated the nation with a diseased patient, stricken with fascism and intolerance. Popular representations repeatedly invoked the image of the doctor, come to heal a physically and mentally ill nation. Faced with a figurative convalescence, Germans now debated whether to reach back into the past in an attempt to restore their impressive pre-1933 (or pre-1919) culture or to reinvent their intellectual and moral world from the ground up. Responses to this perceived tension varied widely, both in and between the two states. The contemporary historian Friedrich Meinecke, for one, felt much of what he termed the "German catastrophe" could be treated by rediscovering the land of Goethe and Beethoven. Some West German politicians and social critics came to construct a "modernization under conservative auspices," in which intellectual, technological, and even moral progress was achieved within the context of a society skeptical of democracy itself. Other conservatives, including Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and President Theodor Heuss, embraced the restoration of Western European Christendom (the Abendland). For them, it would be manifest as an interconfessional alliance with bourgeois underpinnings. In a similar vein, many clerics and other pious Germans favored a more overt re-Christianization as the most effective antidote to Nazism. Still others preferred a more grandiose, far-reaching reconstruction of German identity, memory, and morality. For instance, the left-leaning Catholic publisher of the Frankfurter Hefte, Walter Dirks, railed against the "vacuum" he saw in both West Germany and more broadly in Europe. This continent of "deficiency and failure," he argued, did not need nostalgia or restoration; it required a "Third Way" between Washington and Moscow. Indeed, for Dirks and his frequent collaborator, the former concentration camp prisoner Eugen Kogon, nothing less than a complete reinvention of the nation and its values would suffice to purge Germany's guilt.

Communist elites in the GDR publicly played down such self-criticism and soul-searching, proclaiming the bulk of former fascists now lived in the Nazi state's natural successor, the capitalist FRG. Yet, such declarations did
Introduction

not prevent many East Germans, ranging from high-ranking party members to average citizens, from engaging in a far-reaching discourse about their recent past and how to master it. On the one hand, intellectuals and politicians in the immediate postwar years identified, exaggerated, and celebrated left-leaning anti-Fascists. Over time, authorities began to see some of these individuals and groups as rivals and moved to trim the list of approved heroes. Nevertheless, the trope of communist resistance remained a pillar of the regime’s self-proclaimed legitimacy. On the other hand, the GDR cultivated an official socialist moral vision, as encapsulated in government-approved documents such as “The Ten Commandments of Socialism.” Such manifestos advocated normative adherence to Marxist doctrine, class consciousness, and egalitarian principles. Like elites in the FRG, then, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany—SED) and its allies explored both abstract and concrete ways to diagnose and treat Germany’s condition.

These various discussions were not merely about crafting political speeches, controlling historical narratives, and manipulating commemorations, as important as these steps may have been in terms of dealing with the Nazi legacy. Many perceived the nation’s deficiencies as widespread and very real. Though observers and elites in both East and West disagreed on the treatment, they agreed Germany had suffered through a fundamental, all-encompassing sickness and now needed a physician’s care. This book explores how such concerns played out on a moral level. The nation’s buildings and infrastructure had been severely damaged, its political institutions destroyed, and its leaders humbled. But the inescapable question for all prospective rebuilders was, “How do we prevent this from happening again?” The question of restoring, reasserting, reconstructing, reformulating, and/or reinventing morality in Germany constantly loomed in the background, a common thread between conservative, liberal, socialist, and communist solutions to overcoming the Nazi past. I argue that television emerged as one of the most important mediums for presenting, discussing, and working through the question of remoralizing Germany. Popular television plays, in particular, provided an ideal platform for Germany’s moral reinvention, one that easily transcended state boundaries and gave producers and writers the ability to ease viewers into a consideration of difficult, painful topics via dramatic representations. Executives, producers, and writers repeatedly privileged moral instruction over entertainment in prime-time television fiction. Viewers and critics helped shape the direction and tenor of moral representations in letters to the stations, newspaper reviews, and viewer ratings. In this atmosphere, a multivariate discourse emerged. Television fiction acted as both a pulpit and a sounding board for East and West Germans as they engaged with the Nazi past and reinvented their moral world. And, despite the ideological

gulf between West and East, a significant number of common post-Nazi values emerged: all agreed, for example, a good German should be tolerant, family-centered, democratic, moderate, brave, and thoughtful. The makers of German television, East and West, followed broadly similar paths to moral reinvention and renewal, even as each side’s end goal, respectable liberal democratic nation in the FRG and triumphant Marxist utopia in the GDR, differed significantly.

Television was far from the first institutional response to the perceived moral vacuum left behind by the Nazis, of course; it was the heir to a long-standing, uneven rebuilding process which had many different facets. The first step in Allied denazification—purging the political structure of Nazi officials—began almost immediately after the war ended. It germinated in the offices and boardrooms of Allied commanders, continued with the Nuremberg Trials and each zone of occupation’s denazification policies, and largely concluded in the consolidation of institutional power after 1949 under Konrad Adenauer in the West and Walter Ulbricht in the East, respectively. These initial processes focused mainly on high-ranking leaders, not on the rank and file, who often continued to serve in bureaucratic functions. The process of identifying and removing Nazis lost much of its focus over the next several decades; in both German states, wartime emotions and passions had become irrelevant and dangerous. Memories of violence and German complicity in a program of mass murder were simply not expedient in the Cold War climate. Despite its short duration, denazification has become perhaps the most well-studied and visible symbol of how Germans overcame Nazism. Another strategy for overcoming Nazism was political reeducation for the masses, which occurred frequently on both sides of the German-German divide and has likewise received a great deal of scholarly attention. Most notably, histories written during and after the cultural turn have highlighted the serious—and enduring—contributions made by cultural artifacts such as films, music, and literature on both sides of the border. In the same vein, the role of youth culture in remembering and correcting the past has also come under the historian’s microscope. Some recent works on reconstruction have expanded the scope of analysis to include the reinvention of morality, sexuality, race, and even civilization generally.

Overall, however, cultural historians have tended to treat media representations as singular examples within what they see as a broader discourse of reconstruction. Particularly juicy media products such as the films Töxi (1952) and Die Mörder sind unter uns (Murderers Among Us, 1946), as well as the television play Gottes zweite Garnitur (The Lonely Conqueror, 1967), to name just a few that have received scholarly attention, often appear as fodder for an article or a chapter-length case study but are usually only one component among many in the concomitant monograph. In a similar
Introduction

vein, scholars often use television programming as a quick and easy way to explore how the masses responded to the rapid pace of social and cultural change. There are notable exceptions to this pattern, of course, as some well-known historical monographs employ mediatic sources (usually films) as the centerpiece of a full-length study. But very few scholars—historians or otherwise—have conceptualized television fiction as a tool for reinventing the nation or as a means for grappling with and overcoming the past. In this book, I postulate that television became much more than a mirror; it emerged as a significant agent of change in its own right.

Of course, Anglo-American cultural historians are not the only group to have studied German television through a historical lens. Television history also has a long, rich tradition within the German academy, with studies devoted to television programming from both institutional and political perspectives. Television's prominent place as a heated ideological battleground during the Cold War also (rightly) receives an enormous amount of attention. In this historiographical tradition, television from the 1950s and 1960s has been fruitfully employed in a wide variety of historiographical contexts but only rarely as a lens for examining Germans' attempts to grapple with and overcome their past. There are two possible reasons for this. First, despite the Nazis' famous attempts to popularize the medium in the 1930s, television did not become a truly mass medium in Germany until the late 1950s, at the very earliest. While American and British consumers purchased sets in droves during the late 1940s, test programming in the two German states did not begin until 1952, and regular broadcasts not before 1956 (for the most part because of technical limitations). Chronologically speaking, television does not fit neatly into the intense 1940s debates Germans had about denazification, collective guilt, and reconstruction. It is certainly true that the tenor of these discussions had changed before viewers began snapping up sets by the millions in the early 1960s. Despite the fifteen-year interim, however, the painful German past had not disappeared. For the elites charged with producing television dramas, at least, the moral imperative to heal and rehabilitate the German nation in the wake of such crimes persisted throughout the 1950s and 1960s. From station directors such as Klaus von Bismarck, Hans Bausch, and Heinz Adamack to producers and writers such as Rudi Kurz, Helmut Sakowski, and Rolf Hadrich, television's makers conceived of their task as one of moral renewal. As I demonstrate throughout this volume, television representations from the late 1950s and 1960s reflect this overriding concern.

Furthermore, in a broader sense, television executives, producers, and writers frequently employed a terminology of newness and originality in describing the significance of their medium. Consider, for instance, the longtime Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR) producer Gunter Rohrbach’s claim

that television represented a new, more sophisticated epoch in theater history, 
or the enthusiast Kurt Wilhelm’s giddy stipulation that the medium would 
in fact permanently replace radio and film. Günter Kaltofen, an early East 
German writer and enthusiast, expressed similar sentiments in his extended 
essay *Das Bild das deine Sprache spricht*. Adolf Grimme, station director 
at Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk (NWDR), even proclaimed in 1952 that 
television would become a panacea for Germany’s broader ills. The East 
German council over television dramas apparently agreed, stating in 1962, 
“It is in the first place [imperative] that our viewers be made aware, through 
the means of the television play, that the German Democratic Republic is 
the rightful German state . . . [and] that new lifestyles and ways of thinking 
are required.” This amounted to more than a Cold War statement: producers 
aimed to connect the power of dramatization with the remaking of entire 
“lifestyles” and “ways of thinking.”

Television set manufacturers, too, contributed to the discourse of the new 
by pitching TV as a medium of the future. Though difficult to quantify, this 
enthusiasm clearly extended to the viewing public, as conversations about 
television became common in both public discourse (in newspapers, on 
street cars, in doctors’ offices) and in living rooms around the nation. What 
percentage of the public owned a set? Figures for the West German criminal 
thriller *Das Halstuch* (The scarf, 1962) are instructive. WDR estimated 
more than 90 percent of the existing West German television sets tuned into 
the last three episodes of the series. Following a formula developed concur- 
rently in both East and West, one television set accounted for approximately 
three people during the evening hours. There were 8.5 million registered 
television sets in West Germany at the time, which means that if these 
numbers are reasonably accurate, more than twenty-three million West 
Germans had tuned in. This does not account for unregistered sets, East 
German viewers (there were roughly three million registered sets in the GDR 
in 1962), or the strong possibility that more than three viewers were watch- 
ing any given set on this particular evening. However, given a West German 
population of around fifty-seven million, this means more than 40 percent of 
the population tuned in, even though there was only one set for every seven 
people. To give a sense of how quickly television ownership rose during the 
period in question, according to the GDR statistical almanacs, the number of 
authorized sets in the East soared from 70,607 in 1956 to almost 4.5 million 
in 1970 (Appendix 3). Given the medium’s huge popularity with the masses 
and its perceived importance among political, intellectual, and even church 
elites, television occupied an important intersection between institutional 
and cultural rebuilding efforts.

Such rhetoric of course did not mean television was the first dramatic 
medium that attempted to educate or instruct the masses. Friedrich Schiller,
for instance, crafted many of his famous plays as concrete examples of what he saw as a basis for the moral enlargement of the individual.45 The cinema (and theater) of the late imperial period and the Weimar Republic continued this tradition, and German-produced films often differed starkly from their Hollywood counterparts in that they offered deeper moral and aesthetic instruction. In some ways responding to cultural critics such as Franz Pfemfert, who warned of cinema’s potential “soullessness” and lack of imagination but also extolled its potential to educate and enhance, filmmakers in Germany crafted didactic, thought-provoking pieces such as *Tagebuch einer Verlorenen* (*Diary of a Lost Girl*, 1929), *Die Geächteten* (*The Outlaws*, 1919), and *M* (1931).46 Despite some initial resistance, social critics and educators in turn came to expect cinema to refine the nation’s tastes and moral sensibilities. Radio plays had likewise long reflected German media’s implicit mandate to combine dramatic tension, entertainment, and education, from Bertolt Brecht’s *Mann ist Mann* (*Man Equals Man*, 1926) to Wolfgang Borchert’s *Draußen vor der Tür* (*The Man Outside*, 1947).47 Television should thus be understood as the heir to an older, broader tradition of didactic theater unique to Germany, and later extended to cinema and radio. The latter media forms, however, had been tainted by association with National Socialism. Well-known radio play writers such as Günter Eich had tailored their programs to the Nazis’ ideological agenda.48 Conservative voices criticized radio for “intellectual emptiness” and for an undesirable “mechanization of culture.”49 Likewise, many German elites now understood the film industry, which remained a highly successful and profitable institution after the war, as somewhat suspect. Regulators and censors saw “unregulated film as potentially more dangerous than radio or the press to German reconstruction because of its visual immediacy and potent appeal to certain ‘vulnerable’ sectors of the population.”50 National Socialist propagandists had made heavy use of the medium in the 1930s, and, within the discourse of reconstruction and renewal, this rendered it problematic.51

While authorities in the Third Reich had little trouble harnessing radio and cinema in their propaganda efforts, they were unable to tap into television as a foundational mass medium. When commercial electronic television first seemed viable in the 1930s, Joseph Goebbels insisted Germany should take advantage. Hitler lent his support to the project, and by 1935, the Nazis had found the necessary personnel and technical capacity to start test programming.52 Despite their leaders’ grand vision, however, the Nazis found themselves limited by technical constraints. Prohibitive costs and a lack of infrastructure meant the regime could establish only a few dozen television parlors in Berlin. This setting attracted a relatively large number of viewers for the 1936 Olympics, but viewership beyond this event never amounted to much. Moreover, a directive from the Führer himself soon placed the entire
industry under the command of the air force, which wanted to develop the new broadcasting technology for military purposes. Very few individuals purchased sets in the late 1930s, and during the war, television functioned almost exclusively as a way to keep wounded soldiers in Berlin up to speed with events on the front.\textsuperscript{53} Because it never achieved widespread popularity, then, television did not figure among the media requiring reform and restructuring after 1945. This does not mean, however, that its creators and enthusiasts failed to see its potential for renewing and reviving the nation; indeed, its very status as something new and fresh made it an ideal engine for reformulating Germany's moral compass. At the same time, a small set of dissenting voices in the 1960s saw television as a potentially detrimental innovation, with one describing it as a “Trojan horse” containing crass materialism that could be inserted directly into the German living room.\textsuperscript{54} However, such criticism, usually originating in church circles, was relatively rare in West Germany until the 1970s and almost entirely nonexistent (at least in any public forum) in the East. Earlier postwar criticisms about radio’s intellectual deficiencies do not seem to have been made about television when it appeared a decade later. The consensus surrounding television’s potential as a moral medium may not have been absolute, but it was strong.

A second possible reason that historians have not often contextualized television as part of the postwar moral or intellectual rebuilding process is that older grand narratives about the trajectory of collective memory after 1945 emphasized the 1950s and early 1960s as a period of relative cultural silence. This narrative traces its origins to the 1968 student protests and found wide currency among scholars until the late 1990s.\textsuperscript{55} This view is no longer fashionable, however. Cultural anxieties about returning POWs, the resurgence of consumer culture, and, by the early 1960s, the appearance of southern European guest workers (reminiscent of forced labor during the war) manifested themselves in newspaper editorials, election rallies, radio discussion programs, and even some films. Far from a memory wasteland of Heimatfilme and lederhosen, the period between the late 1940s and the early 1960s saw the persistence of postwar dilemmas and uncertainties. Contemporaries viewed television as a new, exciting medium but also as much more than a novel curiosity or as an extension of the rising culture of consumption. They saw television, which never caught on as the public form of consensus-building the Nazis had intended, as an ideal means by which to complete the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction. Television enthusiasts, including members of the station directorates, proclaimed television could simultaneously provide a “window on the world” and a carefully regulated fulcrum for domestic and civic morals.\textsuperscript{56} Accordingly, the two German governments earmarked funds for the medium well ahead of the first broadcasting dates, and producers on
both sides spent considerable time and effort crafting their own programs (rather than merely acquiring licenses for American or Soviet productions). To be sure, television’s pioneers in Germany recognized entertainment and relaxation would play a prominent role as well. Right as television began to emerge as a truly mass medium in 1960, for example, 33 percent of West German programming hours consisted of entertainment (Unterhaltung) and sports. Television dramas, documentaries, and films, which could be both entertaining and instructive, made up 31 percent, various types of news broadcasts 14 percent, children’s and women’s programs 15 percent, and religious programs 1 percent. An overview of programming for the same year in the GDR yields similar numbers: entertainment and sports accounted for 31 percent of the total; dramas, documentaries, and films 36 percent; children’s programs 11 percent; and news programs 16 percent. Such statistics demonstrate television existed to serve a broad range of interests and tastes. Two types of programs, however, dominated both the station budget and viewership shares: variety shows (a staple of early television across the globe) and television plays.

The parallel development of original, innovative, didactic dramas on both sides of the German-German border went beyond a merely structural resemblance; despite the glaring ideological differences between the two sides, East and West German programs often spoke to the same moral issues and themes. From addressing gender inequality and racism to fretting about materialism and political apathy, these productions often featured a common denominator. One of the chief aims of this book is to relate and explain the striking thematic similarities between the two sets of programs. I argue that German television fiction from this era needs to be understood as part of a common, German-wide discourse. Moreover, this discourse encompassed much more than an antagonistic set of attacks and counterattacks. Many representations advanced moral lessons independent of the Cold War struggle. Such a reevaluation of German television history is the natural result of the broader historiographical trend toward nuanced, relational histories of the early Cold War. Historians no longer assume a binary, antagonistic relationship between the two states. They also recognize that even the most ideologically intransigent members of the two regimes, East and West, did not perceive of the German-German divide as permanent. While the amount of scholarship that examines transborder trends during the Cold War has expanded, few studies to date have attempted to compare East and West German television programs, perhaps because they operated under such divergent systematic constraints. In the GDR, the state assumed full authority for the creation and distribution of television programming, largely operating as a centralized system. Authorities reserved their tightest censorship for news broadcasts and documentaries, but teleplays attracted attention as well. They borrowed
technology and equipment from the Soviet Union, but only occasionally looked to the East for guidance on programming. In the FRG, television followed a heavily decentralized, public service model. Here, writers and producers worked for regional stations (e.g., in Hamburg or Stuttgart), and each station was allowed broadcasting slots on the national channel. In this relatively unique system, producers sometimes looked to other European and even American stations for guidance on technological standards and to help fill some morning and afternoon slots with syndicated content; nonetheless, West German television, as in the East, largely followed its own path and created German-specific content.

Heretofore, most historical analyses of German television have mirrored the reality of the division between East and West. Two of the most expansive projects in German television history—the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation—DFG) Sonderforschungsbereich 240, a 1990s research node that produced monographs and edited volumes on various aspects of West German television history, and the more recent DFG Forschungsgruppe Programmgeschichte des DDR-Fernsehens, which systematically (often statistically) catalogued and interpreted East German television programs and their viewers—demonstrate the separateness of the audiences, ideological assumptions, and archival structures of the two systems. Some scholars have demonstrated the weak points in this narrative, in terms of both cross-border institutional exchange and similarities in viewer tastes.61

These common tastes were not coincidental; many viewers on both sides of the divide could watch the other state’s programs. Of course, this is not to imply every viewer in the two German states could receive all German signals. The almost legendary Tal der Ahnungslosen (“Valley of the Clueless”) in the southern GDR, an area in which television viewers, for technical reasons, could not receive either West German channel, certainly existed. But some have argued the cultural and social effects of this “isolation” have been greatly exaggerated.62 More importantly, there is abundant evidence that East Germans watched West German television, and, in a phenomenon that has not been given enough attention by historians, West Germans could, and frequently did, watch East German shows.63 This ensured a relational development in the rise of moral television, even as the two systems competed for the hearts and minds of the German public. Producers, aware of the concurrent programs, copied examples from the other state. The popular DFF program Gewissen in Aufruhr (Conscience up in arms, 1961, see chap. 1), for example, was a direct reaction to the West German So weit die Füße tragen (As far as your feet can carry you, 1959). Perhaps even more telling, the DFF four-part program Wolf unter Wölfen (Wolf among Wolves, 1964), adapted from a Hans Fallada novel of the same name, achieved viewer and

critical success in both the East, where DFF produced it, and the West, where Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF) broadcast it three years later despite a general boycott against GDR programs. Viewers and critics fawned over the excellent acting and objective depictions in Wolf unter Wölfen, ignoring the fact that it had been produced in an ostensibly tainted Eastern studio. In fact, one critic went so far as to say, “To boycott such artistic films, television plays, or documentaries is—there is no better word—immoral and culture-hating.”

Another example of the way television transcended state boundaries can be seen in the way viewers wrote letters to the other side's stations. One viewer in the GDR who sent his letter to Sender Freies Berlin (SFB) through two other Eastern cities to escape detection by the authorities commented, as any other “Western” viewer might, that while they really liked the film Der Teufel spielt Balalaika (Until Hell Is Frozen, 1961), it would have been better if the Russian dialogue had been translated into German. Other letters to SFB spoke to the political situation more directly but did not necessarily agree with the GDR’s position. One viewer from an unidentified village noted “more than 75 percent of all the villagers here watch Western television,” a statement that clearly demonstrates sympathy for the FRG. But he follows up this observation with a somewhat less political request: “Please change the dance programs to Sunday afternoon. I especially like westerns and criminal thrillers.” Viewers in the East seem to have felt a sense of ownership over Western television despite the political barriers. A similar trans-state dynamic existed among Western viewers who watched East German programs. One viewer wrote to DFF: “Keep it up. That should assure all of you that you are also gladly heard and seen beyond your state’s borders.” This and similar West German letters, occasionally cited in DFF's internal report Der Fernsehzuschauer (The television viewer), sent a clear message to the East German producers: if you make quality programs, we will watch them. Viewers had diverse reasons for writing to the “enemy” state's broadcasters, including political consternation, pleas for a respite from dictatorship, and simple entertainment. But the fact that they wrote at all suggests a television culture that transcended state boundaries. And write they did, in surprisingly large numbers. SFB preserved fifty to one hundred letters from the East per year, receiving many more but not keeping them because of content repetition, while the other West German stations seem to have received (though not necessarily preserved) even more, especially in Cologne and Hamburg. These are not huge numbers, but given the difficulty in getting a letter across the border, especially to such a conspicuous institution as a television station (SFB) whose very existence seemed to depend on the continued desire of the West German government to destabilize the GDR, these sources are highly significant.
More visible instances of trans-state exchange also occurred at the institutional level. With *Irrlicht und Feuer* (Ghost light and fire, 1966), for example, DFF’s decision to use a non-Communist, contemporary West German author’s (Max von der Grün) work as the basis for a prime-time drama seemed a controversial decision. However, *Irrlicht und Feuer* became an instant success with viewers. When officials saw how the program incited nonparty viewers to heap criticism on the West, they quickly moved to appropriate it, including it among the “highlights” of an already highlight-strewn summer. Then, in 1968, Südwestfunk (SWF) bought the rights to broadcast the program in a West German primetime slot. This broadcast, which drew a moderate number of viewers (it was unfavorably paired with a popular ZDF game show, so it had little chance of reaching the 80 percent level commanded by the most popular plays, such as the aforementioned beloved criminal thrillers), drew a +3 qualitative rating, an outstanding number considering the controversial subject matter and Western viewers’ general distaste for overtly modernist, avant-garde pieces. Critics also embraced the program. Even after the SWF event, letters continued to pour in from both East and West asking for a rebroadcast. The popularity of *Irrlicht und Feuer* affords a glimpse into television-viewing habits and tastes, which clearly transcended political barriers and taboos. What constituted a “good” teleplay had more to do with the values and morals that viewers and critics in each state had in common than with those that were different.

As SWF’s apparent autonomy in the purchase of *Irrlicht und Feuer* demonstrates, the notion of two distinct “sides” in Cold War-era German television is fundamentally flawed. Because of fundamental differences in the four postwar occupation zones, the reality of the Cold War, and the persistence of the dream of unification, German television developed in a unique—and highly confusing—manner. In 1945, the four Allied occupiers repurposed the old state-run radio broadcasting facilities as instruments of their own propaganda campaigns. From the start, the organizational structure among the four zones varied wildly. The Soviets created a highly centralized, state-dependent broadcaster. The British and French, after the model of the BBC, likewise established single stations within their respective zones (NWDR and SWF). Unlike the Russians, however, they disassociated their respective broadcasting stations from the state. The Americans, in contrast to the other powers, decided to seed multiple, independent stations: Radio Bremen (RB), Hessischer Rundfunk (HR), Bayerischer Rundfunk (BR), and Süddeutscher Rundfunk (SDR). This aligned with some early advisers’ vision of a decentralized Germany. By 1948, control over these stations had been largely transferred to German authorities, even before the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. After the Berlin Airlift of 1948/1949, it became clear that two distinct states would coexist.
for the foreseeable future. With a united anti-communist front in mind, the Americans had agreed German radio should follow the British model of public service broadcasting, rather than the Americans’ favored commercial system. But the Allies insisted the stations should be kept separate from the state institutions; to ensure this, they made it clear that continued decentralization was a precondition of German ownership over broadcasting facilities. As a result, smaller stations from the American zone, like RB, operated alongside much larger broadcasters, like the enormous NWDR. Over time, two new organizations joined their ranks: Saarländischer Rundfunk (SR), created in 1947 but transferred to the FRG after a 1955 referendum firmly established the Saarland region as part of West Germany, and SFB, established in the divided city of Berlin in 1953. In 1956, NWDR split into two stations: Norddeutscher Rundfunk, seated in Hamburg, and Westdeutscher Rundfunk, centered in Cologne. This network of regional stations, so divergent in origin and size, would eventually assume responsibility for introducing television in the FRG.

While following a mirrored timeline in terms of inception and growth, radio broadcasters were never assigned primary responsibility for creating television in the Soviet zone. The East German government itself, under direction from Moscow, began preparing for television in 1948. They envisioned this new project as an extension of the inter-German struggle for territory and influence. For SED authorities, television was first and foremost a technical challenge. As such, it fell to the postal service to first conceptualize and administer the nascent medium. As Heather Gumbert has argued, this attitude toward television meant writers and producers of fictional programming enjoyed considerable creative autonomy, in sharp contrast to other artists in the GDR. Over the course of the 1960s, and in no small part as a result of ideological heterogeneity in the rapidly expanding genre of television fiction, the SED moved to corral and eventually instrumentalize television. Even with the end of such autonomy, however, DFF continued to produce vibrant and sometimes unorthodox programs throughout the Ulbricht era (which lasted until 1971). For example, various aspects of bourgeois morality—the nuclear family, consumer culture, and frugal living—coexisted with and even complemented Marxist ideology. The protagonist’s extramarital affair in the well-publicized Sommer in Heidkau (Summer in Heidkau, 1964), for instance, sparked a backlash among both viewers and members of the SED’s inner circle. Moreover, the SED appropriated the bourgeois imperative of order and the rule of law by using print media to disseminate the notion that crime rates had decreased under socialism and that this trend would inevitably continue. Multipart epic teleplays such as Gewissen in Aufruhr and Geboren untern schwarzen Himmeln (Born under black skies, 1962) reinforced this objective by visualizing prewar and wartime criminality and then

offering an orderly, sanitized version of the same locations, now accustomed to a positive Marxist influence.82

The West German government did not directly control the broadcasting industry; nonetheless, directors at the largest station, NWDR, in consultation with British occupation authorities, began preparing the way for television in 1948 by creating task forces and purchasing technical equipment. The other radio stations followed suit. In 1950, an FRG-wide work group known as the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Association of Public Broadcasters of the Federal Republic of Germany—ARD) agreed that television should be a national institution, that they should begin with a single channel, and that airtime should be shared by prearrangement among the regional stations (see Appendix 2 for a diagram illustrating the relationship between the various West German stations). Test programming in both East and West began in 1952. By the mid-1950s, West Germany’s economy and infrastructure had largely recovered from the ravages of the war. Konrad Adenauer, the FRG’s chancellor and a hugely popular conservative figure, favored an American (commercial) model for television. When it became clear he could not reverse the radio stations’ decision to pattern their new TV station after the BBC, he attempted to drum up support for a second television station, controlled by the federal government instead of the radio stations and their allies, the state governments. His “Deutschland-Fernsehen,” later incorporated as “Freies Fernsehen GmbH,” found considerable support among German companies but was fiercely opposed by the existing stations and the Social Democrats.83 A famous Constitutional Court decision in 1960 put an end to Adenauer’s vision, declaring that only the existing stations had the authority to create a second channel. In 1963, the state governments and ARD gave life to ZDF, similarly a public service broadcaster but providing a contrast to the first channel.

Together, the German stations produced more than three thousand teleplays between 1956, the start of regular daily programming in both East and West, and 1970, the last year before sharp funding decreases (a result of a recession in the West and changing viewer tastes in both states) affected dramatic programming both in East Germany and at ZDF. This sheer number attests to the popularity of television plays in the 1950s and 1960s. It also makes it difficult for historians to offer a comprehensive survey of the types of themes, tropes, and moral lessons that appeared during this time. Some studies have approached this issue by employing quantitative methods.84

While extremely valuable to future researchers, such explanations tend to group programs and themes according to predetermined, superficial categories. In this model, the researcher typically relies on definitions offered by the writers and producers themselves. This approach foregoes the opportunity

to explore the nuances of each production in greater detail. Quantitative analyses therefore exclude discussions about any given play’s mise-en-scène, its particular use of image and sound, and the actors’ ability to shape and redirect the piece’s underlying meaning by means of inflection and subtle cues. Other studies offer a corrective to this by employing a fine-grained, qualitative approach. Here, the scholar typically offers a close reading of one or two programs, which, in turn, either correspond to or offer a surprising contrast to other productions from the same era. The weakness here is that a qualitative study might not be particularly representative of what viewers are consuming as a whole. Any given program might be an anomaly.

If plotted on the continuum between these two poles (quantitative and qualitative), my approach in this book falls closer to the latter. Nevertheless, inasmuch as this book discusses a wide variety of dramas, it aims to be more comprehensive than a set of case studies. I focus primarily on productions that resonated most deeply with the viewing public. In purchasing a television set and paying a compulsory annual tax, many viewers demonstrated a certain commitment toward or investment in the new medium. Advertising brought little revenue, and, particularly in the early years, families might well have decided not to purchase a set and pay the tax if they did not approve of the programming. But the notion of viewer investment can be seen even more clearly in how they assessed specific programs. In 1962, for example, the WDR production Das Halstuch aired in the West. A six-part mystery series by the British author Francis Durbridge, Das Halstuch captivated a huge percentage of the German population; more than 90 percent of all existing television sets were tuned in to the last three episodes of the series. When the actor Wolfgang Neuss prematurely revealed the identity of the murderer in a newspaper interview, he unleashed a “storm of indignation” in the FRG. Strong negative reactions to particular programs also show the high level of viewer investment, such as the angry West German letters sent to the NDR about the avant-garde drama Schlachtvieh (Lambs to the Slaughter, 1963) and the equally vicious response to the experimental East German opera film Fetzers Flucht (Fetzer’s flight, 1962, see chap. 2).

Indeed, response letters provide a particularly valuable source of information about viewers’ preferences and expectations. As noted earlier, each station received thousands of letters a year. Unfortunately, many of the letters to West German stations were destroyed. Some have been preserved in regional archives and a select few in the Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv (German Broadcasting Archive), an institution that has locations in Babelsberg (for the now defunct DFF) and in Frankfurt (for the ARD). However, stations only started diligently filing and preserving these letters in the 1970s, and there are few extant viewer letters from the 1950s and 1960s. They are referenced in official documents, but such reports rarely reveal much about the letters’
specific content. Moreover, obtaining access to such documents at West German archives is extremely difficult, in part because of the decentralized nature of the ARD, in part because the institutions have chosen to restrict large numbers of documents to internal users only. The situation on the East German side is similarly frustrating, but for different reasons. Michael Meyen, who has studied DFF viewer information extensively, notes, “Opinion research in the GDR was embedded in the ideological monopoly of the SED and was subject to the politics of the day.” Thus, the number of letters preserved by the stations at the time depended more on political expediency than on the resonance the program actually had among viewers. Even setting aside the problem of preservation and station politics, it is unclear to what extent the letters—on either side of the Wall—can be seen as representative of the viewing public. Because they are unsolicited (unlike the responses collected by ratings agencies), they may well reflect a particular agenda or concern. To give one small example of this, the overwhelming majority of letters surviving for Gottes zweite Garnitur are fan letters, requesting contact information for the charismatic lead, Jimmy Powell (an African American actor who had trained in Vienna before taking the ZDF job, his first major role). Moreover, the archives preserve very little in terms of demographic data. Some records reproduce the writers’ names and mailing addresses, but other potentially useful information such as age, political affiliation, and so on is impossible to divine unless the writers mention it themselves.

Nonetheless, viewer letters, as well as opinions collected by television correspondents, provide valuable glimpses into the programs viewers preferred; in some cases, responses even forced the East Germans to collect viewer data after the fact. The DFF multipart series Dr. Schlüter (1965), for instance, became one of the most popular television broadcasts of the decade—and it caught the authorities completely by surprise. Letters that probably would have otherwise been destroyed were preserved and even bound together in a self-congratulatory book circulated among the station executives. Clearly, viewers took their viewing experiences seriously, and those plays that elicited a strong public reaction (positive or negative) are included in this study.

Anecdotal evidence and small sets of viewer letters are not the only ways to gauge viewer participation, however. Though inconsistently gathered and in many ways incomplete, ratings statistics and social scientific surveys about viewing preferences are largely untapped gold mines for television historians. Starting in 1963, for example, the two West German channels (ARD and ZDF) contracted a private company called Infratest GmbH to collect viewer statistics and data. Infratest monitored every program during the evening, using both quantitative (Infratam) and qualitative (Infratest) measuring sticks. The former was merely a percentage of the total number of viewers, taken from a sampling of one thousand installed machines that
reported back to Infratest every five minutes. The latter assigned a rating between −10 (low) and +10 (high) to every program based on six hundred viewers’ responses. In addition, the Infratest portion of the report included a sampling of comments made at the time of the survey, designed to give decision-makers a more nuanced feel for how audiences felt about the show, along with Infratest’s own interpretation of the data. Though this method of collecting data seems inadequate by today’s standards, Infratest continued using this system until 1974, and it evoked little criticism until after 1970.91

In the East, too, authorities collected information about how many people tuned in to each program. This was never as systematic as in the West, and there are significant gaps in the late 1950s and early 1960s. For the purposes of deciding which programs to look at more closely in this volume, however, these gaps and silences are perhaps just as significant as the actual numbers. Authorities assigned special significance to and collected data for certain programs. Advertising for these select productions began weeks, sometimes even months, ahead of the actual broadcast date(s). This in turn doubtless led to heightened viewer anticipation and reactions (exceptions such as Dr. Schlüter notwithstanding).

Television critics, writing chiefly in newspapers, magazines, and other print publications, also invested themselves in dramatic productions. Some critics, especially in the smaller daily newspapers (both West and East) and in the Springer publication Hörzu, aligned themselves with what they felt were the entertainment demands of viewers. One excellent example of this is a Bild-Zeitung critique of the 1970 ZDF criminal thriller 11 Uhr 20 (11:20), in which the comments of a variety of viewers, including even the show’s director, Wolfgang Becker (though these were seemingly taken out of context), offer the same criticism: the show was “boring.”92 Such commentators gave special attention to criminal thrillers, especially those written by the English author Francis Durbridge, and expressed their likes or dislikes according to criteria such as novelty, surprise, and excitement. Larger daily newspapers like the Süddeutsche Zeitung, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and, on the East German side, Neues Deutschland emphasized artistic and aesthetic innovations. These critics thought television stations had a mandate to produce intellectually stimulating material and that viewers had a right to expect educational, thought-provoking dramas.93 Finally, the epd—Kirche und Fernsehen, published by the Protestant Evangelischer Pressedienst, and the Funk-Korrespondenz, a Catholic trade publication, based their assessments on both intellectual and moral criteria. Sometimes the commentaries in the two church-related papers openly decried moral degradation and promoted the positive influence of Christianity, but normally the two church publications carefully embedded moral observations in intellectual or aesthetic critiques.94

As the complex patchwork of newspaper reviewers neatly demonstrates,
television spoke to a broad, heterogeneous set of viewers. Because of this, the societal critiques advanced by the writers and producers of teleplays, responding as they did to the critics' reactions, often exhibited substantial complexity and nuance.95

While multifaceted, the project of moral reinvention through television fiction did follow particular themes. Some of these topics, moreover, transcended the German-German divide. The five chapters in this book correspond with what I see as the most prominent themes that received substantial attention in both the FRG and the GDR. The first chapter focuses on representations of the Nazi era, from Wehrmacht soldiers and collaborators to rescuers and victims during the Holocaust. The purpose and tenor of representations varied, but in general, they served the needs of the present: marginalizing Nazi perpetrators as exceptional, and constructing heroes by displaying the valor and/or courage in resisting the regime and its crimes. A few programs broke this mold by challenging the “resistance” narrative or by complicating viewers’ relationship with the past, but in large measure, fictional dramatic programs that provided instruction on the past did so as a way to justify the present, whether communist or liberal democratic. Chapter 1 explores the rationale behind this decision, as well as the voices of dissent that would eventually find greater expression in the wake of the 1968 student uprisings.

Chapter 2 examines televisual lessons on politics and morality. From the start, German elites on both sides of the border recognized the need for political reorientation and reeducation in the wake of the Nazi dictatorship. As television matured into a mass medium, bringing popular dramatic programming into viewers’ living rooms, concerned producers and decision-makers such as Klaus von Bismarck, Heinz Adameck, and Christian Geißler invested heavily in moral-political programs. East German citizens learned about the evils of the FRG—the pseudo-democratic heir to the Third Reich—and the origins of a unified Socialist Party that could represent all workers’ interests. West Germans watched as, for example, East German border guards were forced to shoot their fleeing comrades. In both states, programs promoted abstract ideals such as democracy and civil society, as well as more specific responses to political oppression, such as daring escapes across the border and quixotic struggles against the “other” German regime. These programs indoctrinated viewers on Cold War politics, but they also provided a platform for overcoming Nazi attitudes about the state.

Historical and political reeducation were perhaps the most obvious solutions to the moral wasteland left behind by the Nazis, but they were by no means the only fronts. In Chapter 3, I examine anti-materialist efforts in the two German states. In the West, the major churches, Catholic and Protestant, had been enmeshed in broadcasting institutions and politics since the Allies
Introduction

allowed stations to restart radio programming in 1946. The stations allotted significant airtime for church broadcasts, and, even more significantly, clerics and laymen from both confessions sat on station advisory boards, advocating church-approved programs and occasionally censoring material they considered objectionable. The intersection between the churches and public service broadcasting in the FRG constitutes a vast, underexplored site of postwar rebuilding, cultural change, and political contestation. This site was by no means homogeneous, and leaders did not always agree on which themes, tropes, or strategies to pursue. However, one topic runs like a red thread through the church representatives’ plans and, more broadly stated, through FRG broadcasting as a whole: the relentless battle against materialism and worldliness. Decision-making bodies at each of the stations, under the sometimes subtle, sometimes overt influence of church bishops and authorities, conflated general postwar fears about rising materialism with what they saw as the hedonism and moral depravity of the Nazi era. This became even more imperative after the start of the economic miracle (1948–1966). Other strategies for reestablishing the Christian milieu, such as the Ruhr Valley industrialists’ apprenticeship system, had proved ineffective. Television, the emergent mass medium of the mid-twentieth century, became an important arena for corrective West German representations of anti-materialist values such as frugality, restraint, and even religiosity. Ironically, television plays in the FRG sometimes even included the television set itself as part of the problematic culture of materialism. East German producers, ever mindful of DFF’s ability to broadcast in the West (and of their own citizens’ knowledge of West Germany’s superior economy), similarly crafted moral lessons on materialism, often loosely rooted in Marxism but likewise sensitizing viewers to nonmaterialist modes of happiness. Religion played a more minor role here, but, despite vastly disparate ideological foundations and goals, the two sides employed strikingly similar tropes.

Chapter 4 looks at the reformulation and reinvention of gender norms. The Third Reich’s defeat had left German masculine ideals and stereotypes, based heavily on aggression and militarism, in tatters. Moreover, women began to enter the workplace in large numbers, particularly in the East (where the regime, seeking to shore up its legitimacy, forged an uneasy partnership with women). This situation raised the question of women’s equality. Television fiction stepped in to address these perceived issues with new role models and ideal behaviors. Other gendered concerns, such as family relations, raising children, and the proper limitation of (especially female) sexuality also featured heavily. Authorities certainly never reached any kind of consensus on gender politics, a fact reflected by the colorful variety of programs during the 1950s and (especially) the 1960s, which present heterogeneous visions of gender relations.

Finally, in chapter 5, I explore the issue of race and ethnicity in postwar Germany. A central platform of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft (people’s community) had been the exclusion of non-Germans and minority groups such as homosexuals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the “work-shy.” Despite the ambiguous and dubious nature of Nazi racial categories and laws, most Germans adopted some level of prejudice and approved of the separation of Aryans and non-Aryans. These attitudes, as television authorities knew full well, persisted after the war ended. A major task of moral rebuilding, then, particularly in an era of guest workers, political reconciliation, and Europeanization, was overcoming racist attitudes. Television plays sometimes provided viewers with strong non-German protagonists, but more commonly, they presented progressive, anti-racist versions of tolerance and acceptance.

Notes

6. The usual translations for Fernsehspiel, “television play” or “teleplay,” respectively connote a stage play and a screenplay in modern American English usage. But while some of these television programs adapted material from the theater, none were actually performed on stage. More closely akin to films, but not the same as the “made-for-TV-movie” introduced by NBC in 1964, the German Fernsehspiel (some critics and authors preferred the term Fernsehfilm) constitutes a unique genre. Television consciously aimed to promote itself as a separate artistic category from film, and some techniques from the early experimental days remained enconced even as the Fernsehspiel started to technologically resemble cinema. The Fernsehspiel was shorter than a standard film, the actors’ faces occupied a much larger percentage of the screen, and many productions were broken up into multiple episodes.
8. In the 1980s, the East German regime would move to appropriate Bismarck’s legacy as part of the broader German socialist tradition (as well as other figures such as Martin Luther). In the 1960s, however, Bismarck remained something of a villain, in stark contrast to celebrated cultural “heroes” such as Goethe and Schilling. See Alan L. Nothnagle, Building the East German Myth: Historical Mythology and Youth Propaganda...


11. epd—Kirche und Fernsehen 7, 15 February 1964, 11.

12. See the May 1963 letter from the writers to the director in the Staatsarchiv Hamburg, NDR 621-1 144 1060, “Carl von Ossietzky.” Matray and Krüger worried conservative voices would take issue with their decision to valorize such a divisive figure. The question of Ossietzky’s legacy was indeed long contested in the Federal Republic, as evidenced by a 1992 court decision to uphold his conviction. Large has shown that West German rejection of resistance groups and figures was not at all uncommon, especially in the 1950s. See David Clay Large, “A Beacon in the German Darkness: The Anti-Nazi Resistance Legacy in West German Politics,” Journal of Modern History 64, Supplement (1992): 174.

13. Kapczynski has extensively traced the genesis of this trope, in the National Socialists’ obsession with biology and in its development after the war. Intellectuals as diverse as Karl Jaspers, Friedrich Meinecke, Thomas Mann, and Bertolt Brecht gave voice to the metaphor, and it remained popular for decades. The imagery found currency in so many circles because it simultaneously conveyed the notion that something was terribly wrong with the German body and, at the same time, absolved the nation from any real guilt, infected as it was with a foreign disease (National Socialism). See Jennifer M. Kapczynski, The German Patient Crisis and Recovery in Postwar Culture (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 22–23, 27.

14. Most notably in Wolfgang Staudte’s Murderers Among Us (1946), Thomas Mann’s Doctor Faustus (1943), and Peter Lorre’s The Lost One (1951).

15. Or they resisted the polarizing restoration-reinvention discussion by pragmatically harnessing previous cultural patrimonies to a “counter-elitist political vision.” Sean Forner, “Reconsidering the ‘Unpolitical German,’ Democratic Renewal and the Politics of Culture in Occupied Germany,” German History 32, no. 1 (2014): 76–78.


17. Christoph Kleßmann, “Ein stolzes Schiff, und krächzende Möwen: Die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik und ihre Kritiker,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 4 (1985): 480; Axel Schildt, Zwischen Abendland und Amerika Studien zur westdeutschen Ideenlandschaft der 50er Jahre (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1992), 7. It is important to note Schildt embraces such terms because they capture various conservatives’ motivations in the post-war period. My research in television similarly suggests that various competing visions of Germany’s reconstruction had much in common.


21. Historians, too, sometimes employ “vacuum” to describe the process of cultural and moral rebuilding in the postwar period. Werner Faulstich, for example, asserts a “Wertevakuum” arose in the late 1940s and especially in the 1950s, in which mass media emerged as a major engine for social change and diversification. Werner Faulstich, *Die Kultur der 50er Jahre* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2002), 8.


24. It is true that political leaders in postwar Germany, in particular Catholic and Protestant bishops, argued against any massive political and moral reckoning, particularly regarding war crimes trials. Frank Buscher neatly sums up this counterpoint when he asks, rhetorically, “if Germany’s political and moral leadership did not think that the German people were in need of reorientation, why should the average man in the street think otherwise?” Frank Buscher, *The U.S. War Crimes Trial Program in Germany, 1946–1955* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 3. However, while this iteration of the “restoration” position indeed found deep resonance among conservatives, it also belies the fact that those same religious elites repeatedly bemoaned Germany’s deep-rooted materialism and lack of political virtue. For the bishops and their allies, then, the question was not whether National Socialism had sparked a nationwide illness (it had), but what sort of treatment was now needed.


34. Perhaps the most notable attempt to show the importance of television in the context of Germany’s attempts to deal with its past is Christina von Hodenberg, who argues television itself played a pivotal role in the development of a critical public sphere in the FRG. Christina von Hodenberg, “Mass Media and the Generation of Conflict: West Germany’s Long Sixties and the Formation of a Critical Public Sphere,” Contemporary European History 15, no. 3 (2006): 386.


38. Quoted in Gerhard Schäffner, “Das Fenster in die Welt: Fernsehen in den fünfziger Jahren,” in Faulstich, Die Kultur der 50er Jahre, 92. Note that there is a certain tension between Grimme’s ambitious concept of a panacea and former BBC head Hugh Carleton Greene’s original vision for NWDR, when it was first created as a radio station in 1945, that “a German station [should] inform and entertain and diffuse democratic values simply by exemplifying them.” David Welch, “Priming the Pump of German Democracy: British ‘Re-education’ Policy in Germany after the Second World War,” in Reconstruction in Postwar Germany: British Occupation Policy and the Western Zones, ed. Ian D. Turner (New York: Berg, 1989), 229.


42. Hickethier and Hoff, Geschichte des deutschen Fernsehens, 158.


26 • A Dramatic Reinvention

51. Of course, the German film industry—in particular, the West German side—had other difficulties. They were essentially unable to export their products in the 1950s, and American productions provided stiff competition, even within the FRG. See Irmela Schneider, Film, Fernsehen & Co: Zur Entwicklung des Spielfilms in Kino und Fernsehen (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1990), 32–33.
52. Hickethier and Hoff, Geschichte des deutschen Fernsehens, 38.
54. Gerhard Hildmann, Fernsehen—ein Trojanisches Pferd? (Stuttgart: Neske, 1963), 5–11. See also Ernst Emrich, Wir Schalten um (Ravensburg: Ravensburger Taschenbücher, 1965); Otto Walter Haseloff, “Über Wirkungen des Fernsehens,” in Wirkungen des Fernsehens, ed. Otto Arzt, Bruno Krammer, and Bernhard von Watzdorf (Mainz: Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen, 1972), 5–25. Even these dissenting voices are tempered and cautious, readily admitting the medium could also be a positive influence.
55. Historians still recognize the late 1960s as a period of major transformation in terms of Holocaust memory. But as Moeller concludes in a 2002 review article, referencing scholars such as Ute Frevert, A. D. Moses, and Detlef Siegfried, the 1968er generation seemed for a time unable to recognize the fact that some Germans did critically confront the past before 1968. Robert G. Moeller, “What Has ‘Coming to Terms with the Past’ Meant in Post–World War II Germany? From History to Memory to the ‘History of Memory,’” Central European History 35, no. 2 (2002): 236.
57. As listed in Hickethier and Hoff, Geschichte des deutschen Fernsehens, 134. The remainder included announcements, pauses, and advertisements.
58. Ibid., 192. What constituted “news” and what “documentary” in the GDR seems to have been unclear.
59. As one example of this, see Steven M. Schroeder, To Forget It All and Begin Anew: Reconciliation in Occupied Germany, 1944–1954 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013).
60. Martin Sabrow, “Der Apfel von Weibelskirchen: Plädoyer für einen entgrenzten Blick auf die deutsche Teilungsgeschichte,” in Mehr als eine Erzählung: Zeitgeschichtliche


This fact was bemoaned, for example, by Emil Dovifat, a journalist and member of the NWDR Verwaltungsrat (governing board), in an internal memorandum prepared for his fellow television executives in Hamburg. Cited in Axel Schildt, “Der Beginn des Fernsehzeitalters: Ein neues Massenmedium setzt sich durch,” in Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre, ed. Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek (Bonn: Verlag J. H. W. Dietz, 1993), 492.

Hans Fallada and Klaus Jörn, Wolf unter Wölfen, dir. Hans-Joachim Kasprzik (DFF, 14, 16, 18, 21 March 1965). Re-broadcast on 6, 8, 10, 11 March 1968 on the ZDF.

Joachim Holm, Die Andere Zeitung, 21 March 1968. Die Andere Zeitung is admittedly a left-leaning publication and may harbor more sympathy for East German programming than other West German news outlets. The “boycott” refers to Ernst Lemmer’s instructions to the West German press not to print DFF’s program schedule or else risk being labeled as purveyors of communist propaganda. See Woo-Seung Lee, Das Fernsehen im geteilten Deutschland (1952–1989): Ideologische Konkurrenz und programmilche Kooperation (Potsdam: Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, 2003), 53–54.


Ibid., 1965 letter, anonymous.

74. **epd—Kirche und Fernsehen** 25, 22 June 1968, 9.
75. DRA-B, Dramatische Kunst—Fernsehspiele II—Programmunterlagen nach Sende-
77. Ibid., 64.
78. Heather Gumbert, *Envisioning Socialism: Television and the Cold War in the German
79. Notable events along this timeline include the negative public response to two 1962
modernist dramatic programs, *Fetzers Flucht* and *Monolog für einen Taxifahrer*, the 1963
Kafka Conference in Prague, the second Bitterfeld Conference in 1964, and the 11th
80. Thomas Grossbolting, *SED-Diktatur und Gesellschaft: Bürgertum, Bürgerlichkeit und
Entbürgerlichung in Magdeburg und Halle* (Halle: Mitteldeutscher Verlag, 2001), 416.
81. Richard Millington, “‘Crime Has No Chance’: The Discourse of Everyday Criminality
61–62.
(DFF, 21, 23, 25, 28, 30 October 1962).
84. Hickethier, *Das Fernsehspiel der Bundesrepublik*; Claudia Dittmar and Susanne Vollberg,
ed., *Zwischen Experiment und Etablierung: Die Programmentwicklung des DDR-
85. Nora Hilgert, *Unterhaltung, aber sicher! Populäre Repräsentation von Recht und Ordnung in den
Fernsehkrimis “Stahlnetz” und Blaulicht,* 1958/59–1968 (Bielefeld: Transcript,
2013).
86. Hickethier and Hoff, *Geschichte des deutschen Fernsehens*, 158.
87. DRA-B, SFB 362/31/11/04/05-06.
88. I explore the challenges of navigating German television archives in Stewart Anderson,
“Modern Viewers, Feudal Television Archives: How to Study German *Fernsehspiele* of
89. Michael Meyen, ed., *Einschalten, Umschalten, Ausschalten? Das Fernsehen im DDR-Alltag*
90. Karin Bacherer, *Geschichte, Organisation und Funktion von Infratest* (Munich: Infratest,
1987), 31. Infratest was founded as a rough analogue to the American company Gallup,
and would come to use many of the same measurement technologies and techniques as the
(also American) Nielsen ratings.
91. Ibid., 182–188.
93. It must be noted that critics writing for most East German newspapers, including the
highly visible, state-run *Neues Deutschland*, were tightly constrained by the SED’s official
Marxist ideology. Nonetheless, they regularly criticized broadcasts, even those that mem-
bers of the Politburo had carefully vetted and instrumentalized.
94. See, e.g., the *epd*’s predictable delight and moralizing of the 1967 WDR program
*Wie verbringe ich meinen Sonntag?* (How do I spend my Sunday?), which discusses the
emptiness of most people’s Sunday activities. *epd—Kirche und Fernsehen* 11, 18 March
1967.

"A DRAMATIC REINVENTION: German Television and Moral Renewal after National Socialism, 1956–1970" by
95. In fact, the plays' thematic and moral complexities distinguish them from many other mediatic representations in postwar Germany. The American occupation authorities, for instance, insisted that theater pieces with a contemporary setting should stick to simple, positive depictions and lessons. See Ralph Willett, *The Americanization of Germany, 1945–1949* (New York: Routledge, 1989), 64. After the heavy-handed policies in the early occupation ended, theater resumed its place as an arbiter of social and cultural issues. Nevertheless, some of the most lauded playwrights, such as Karl Wittlinger and Leopold Ahlsen, switched to television in the late 1950s, both reflecting and precipitating a move toward safer classical theater productions. See Knut Hickethier, “Das Theater der Bundesrepublik,” in Faulstich, *Die Kultur der 50er Jahre*, 47.

