In an April 1958 memorandum, an unknown author outlined the current state of youth criminal policy in the German Democratic Republic. “Unlike in West Germany,” the author wrote, “in the GDR, delinquency is no longer the product of war and fascism as it was in the years after 1945.” Implicitly connected to the evils of capitalism, juvenile delinquency was less of a problem in East Germany due to the social character of the workers-and-farmers state. Contemporary cases of youth endangerment and criminality owed their existence not to the structure of state socialism, the author suggested, but to the unequal application of youth policy and educational methods within its borders. Indeed, socialist education programs were either unknown or “not uniformly applied by those responsible for instituting policy.” As long as this remained the case, the endangerment of GDR children and teens called into question the work of committed caseworkers who employed “socialist education methods to agitate for the betterment of East German youth.”1

During the early days of the Cold War, the situation in Berlin and the surrounding region of Brandenburg posed unique challenges for police, court, and youth welfare workers in dealing with juvenile criminal behavior.2 Even before the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the proliferation of petty criminality

Notes from this chapter begin on page 319.
Repressive Rehabilitation

and crimes of morality following the war’s end, together with the economic pressures brought about by the 1949 division of Germany, forced East Berlin authorities to consider a variety of ways to tackle the mounting problem of juvenile delinquency. In a flurry of legal and welfare reform measures, the East German government clarified the conditions under which young offenders could be placed in protective custody and resurrected the use of workhouses and special remand homes (Jugendwerkhöfe) to deal with the problem of endangered youth and juvenile criminals. Conceived as the final sites of intervention once youth rehabilitation had exhausted all other avenues, these houses, numbering some thirty facilities by the 1950s, were designed not only to correct malevolent behavior but to inculcate the moral qualities of socialist citizenship and personhood through a program of political education and hard work. Caseworkers provided an education and limited instruction in household management, agricultural production, and industrial labor. They also collaborated with police and the youth courts to devise practical solutions to what they saw as the growing passivity of the nation’s youth. Many believed that the best way to guard against a juvenile’s full-blown derailment (Entgleisung) was to promote and foster an “active, positive upbringing with . . . respect for the ten . . . commandments of the new socialist morality,” based on the model advanced by Walter Ulbricht in 1958 and put into practice in the day-to-day operation of the nation’s workhouses and remand homes.

This chapter focuses on the East German state’s treatment of those criminal and endangered youth who were deemed unable to conform to the dictates of the new socialist moral code, a code that found informal expression through the regulatory actions of agencies and reformers well before 1958. Caught in the police dragnet for petty crime, vagrancy, prostitution, homosexuality, and general “hanging about” (herumtreiben), young offenders posed the ultimate challenge to state authorities intent on substantive ideological refashioning. Youth’s involvement in “building” socialism certainly forms a significant part of GDR historiography, one which has received much attention in recent years on both sides of the Atlantic. Indeed, most historians agree that the quest to rehabilitate delinquent youth was anything but apolitical. On the one hand, rehabilitation was a constant reminder of the legacy of the Nazi era. On the other, caseworkers and reformers were forced to reevaluate prewar penal and welfare policy while simultaneously searching for new ways to eradicate the remnants of capitalism during the transition to socialism. And, of course, in the initial years after the war, rehabilitation efforts were deeply concerned with securing social stability by any means available.

Although common assumptions informed social policy in both Germanys after 1949, in resurrecting reformatories for the purposes of behavioral and ideological reorientation East Germany sought to sever its connection to the welfare tradition and heritage it shared with the West. Rehabilitation strategies
established in remand homes and workhouses represented a conscious effort to refashion key social reform measures from the Weimar period to achieve a revolutionary transformation of society, which Konrad Jarausch has claimed resulted in the creation of a welfare dictatorship. Despite a full-frontal attack on the Adenauerstaat among East German criminologists and legal reformers, the GDR’s penal and welfare strategies to combat youth waywardness actually emphasized a vision of delinquency, vice, and moral endangerment that had much more in common with the Christian West than one might imagine. As Günter Grau has argued elsewhere, attempts to promote a radical reorganization of society did not necessarily undercut the valency of bourgeois morality, especially in the area of sexual behavior.

In the GDR, juvenile delinquency and promiscuity, still understood in Lombrosian terms, represented a lapse not just in the social but in the moral development of future citizens, and could only be corrected by state involvement in the familial sphere. In identifying which transgressions merited state intervention, penal and welfare institutions both reflected and refracted gendered notions of delinquency and deviance. Caseworkers designed programs to meet the needs of their charges, deciding how best to integrate them into healthy and productive work and family life. These programs, which stressed household, agricultural, and industrial labor, were pragmatic in providing a trade and livelihood, but nevertheless structured rehabilitation around the promotion of specifically gendered identities. Against the backdrop of the mass exodus of able-bodied citizens to West Germany, a rise in divorces, and continued concerns over the falling birth rate, East German youth policy sought to buttress the faltering family by crafting a particular vision of the roles these young citizens were to fulfill in a budding socialist society. Although youth authorities emphasized civic responsibility, productive labor, and healthy gender roles, the inability to implement policy smoothly into the day-to-day management of juvenile delinquency presented a challenge to the utility of a formal socialist morality. At the same time, it hinted that causes for failure could not be externalized indefinitely.

Criminality and the Moral Endangerment of Youth

Youth criminality and youth endangerment linked three strands of social policy to the emergence of the German welfare state: penal reform, child welfare, and corrective education. From the last third of the nineteenth century onward, reformers, jurists, psychiatrists, and a host of self-proclaimed experts rallied the governments of Imperial Germany to implement provisions guaranteeing the utility and function of public custodianship. While guardianship and welfare initiatives were continually debated in the formulation of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch or BGB), adult correctional facilities, reformatories,
and workhouses were licensed through the Criminal Code, which, as of 1923, included a separate statute for juvenile offenders, the Reich Juvenile Justice Act (Reichsjugendgerichtsgesetz or RJGG). Youth reformatories emerged on the scene at the same time, linking child welfare to penal reform by extending patriarchal authority from the confines of the family to the correctional institution. Reforms to the Imperial Penal Code (Reichsstrafgesetzbuch, or RStGB) allowed German states the option of establishing the criteria for reformatories in the prevention of moral waywardness. The family was no longer out of the reach of the state as a quasi-autonomous domain of unfettered patriarchal authority. In an admixture of custodial and criminal law, the state established Rettungshäuser for both criminal and socially endangered youth and in the process laid claim to public guardianship in a manner that had previously been reserved for the heads of households. In fact, according to a prominent penal reformer of the day, corrective facilities were fully capable of inculcating paternal authority and discipline because wayward children could be instructed in the appropriate teachings of traditional society through a surrogate institutional setting.

Although workhouses and reformatories were the product of conflicting visions of social reform, they embodied both a valorization and fear of the family’s role in socializing the young. Progressive reformers from all sides of the political and confessional spectrum called for standardized methods for treating social dislocation and minimizing the destructive aspects of modernity’s relentless march. Rettungshäuser, workhouses, youth courts, jails, municipal youth bureaus (Jugendämter), and legal statutes for young offenders all represented a collective strategy for socializing errant youth while integrating them into society as contributors to national, political, and economic life. When, in the 1920s, moral failings, unruliness, and impoverishment were transformed into medically conceived causes of endangerment, child welfare reformers gained unparalleled authority in defining the form and function of corrective intervention.

Despite these gains, however, by 1934 private charities and laypeople lost most of their real and imagined authority, as the Nazi consolidation of power gave rise to initiatives like the National Socialist People’s Welfare (Nationalsozialistische Volkswirtschaft, or NSV) and other new institutions designed to underscore the power of the state in structuring social identity.

After World War II, the professional preoccupation with youth formed part of a calibrated response to Nazi policies. Brought into public view by the misery of occupation and defeat, the soaring level of criminality reflected the war-ravaged conditions into which the younger generation had been born. Weaned on a virulent strain of Nazi population policy that tied the Reich’s reproductive health to the glory of the nation, many youths had come of age early to serve the nation as soldiers or as dutiful wives and mothers. Placing blame for postwar lawlessness squarely on the shoulders of Hitler and the Nazis, local government, church officials, and social reformers debated ways in which to curb juvenile delinquency to
resocialize what they feared was an entire generation of morally decayed youth. Just as before the war, youth issues would reemerge as a contested terrain upon which jurists, child welfare advocates, police, and social workers vied for the authority to help shape social policy in an occupied and divided Germany.

**Juvenile Delinquency in Postwar Berlin**

Overwhelmed by the situation at war’s end, youth advocates in the Soviet Occupation Zone (Sowjetische Besatzungzone or SBZ) likewise linked Nazi population policy to the rise in crime precipitated by the collapse of Hitler’s Germany. Although they officially eschewed any connection to National Socialist policy and directives, in the days and weeks after capitulation, SBZ officials had no choice but to uphold several Nazi laws and ordinances to preserve order: maintaining curfews, restricting youth access to adult-oriented nightclubs, and limiting certain forms of employment.\(^{17}\) To construct a new social order, young men and women had to be educated in the roles they were expected to fulfill upon reaching adulthood.\(^{18}\) Criminality, especially crimes of a sexual nature, could not be tolerated if the GDR was to compete both morally and economically with its neighbors to the West. Securing a foundation for moral rebuilding became the priority of all public officials, and as early as 1947 Paul Markgraf, the Berlin chief of police, proclaimed the readiness of his East Berlin police force to protect the interests of children, youth, and society.\(^{19}\)

Putting youth policy into practice on the streets required the work of many different people, institutions, and ministries. Similarly, remand homes and reformatories were governed by a variety of directives, and overseen by a host of professionals from police to caseworkers, physicians to teachers. As in the case of the Struveshof facility in Ludwigsfelde, these facilities often served many purposes in housing wards of the state, orphans, convicts, and *schwererziehbare*, or difficult youth.\(^{20}\) While the local youth service workers coordinated efforts in Berlin, military government laws gave local authorities license to build and operate similar houses for rehabilitative purposes. Police and health service workers also set up a system of reformatories that targeted not only “asocial persons without permanent living quarters or demonstrable work habits” but also women deemed promiscuous to combat the spread of venereal disease.\(^{21}\) Youth under the age of eighteen charged with a crime or suspected of general asociality or promiscuity or of leading an itinerant lifestyle could also be sent to homes operated under the auspices of the Ministry of Volksbildung (education) which, following Order no. 156 of the Soviet Military Authority, oversaw youth services in East Berlin as of 1947.\(^{22}\) These *Jugendwerkhöfe* were designed for the most difficult cases and included educational programming intended to “make [difficult juveniles] into worthy citizens of the workers’ and farmers’ state.” After serving a sentence in a
youth facility, criminal youth could expect to be sent on to remand homes so that further monitoring of their progress could be guaranteed. Despite the differences on paper, this complicated network of facilities and institutions had one thing in common: above all else, caseworkers and government agreed “the main ingredient for reforming wayward youth . . . was work.”

But before reaching remand homes, youth first encountered reform policy in the streets and homes of their communities. Among the most visible agents of youth reform were special police detachments, consisting largely of women, that oversaw the policing of sexual offenses and crimes involving children. These officers, who on occasion worked in tandem with Allied Military Police in conducting sweeps of local bars, moviehouses, and cafés, were the first to encounter promiscuous and endangered youth. Once a crime was committed and an offender identified, the police documented the occurrence in their precinct’s ledger and, depending upon the nature of the crime, they might also enter the youth’s profile into a general card index like those assembled for other sexual offenses such as prostitution and homosexuality. After the initial round of questions at the station house, police forwarded the teens to a temporary outreach center, the Jugendhilfestelle, in the basement of the Dircksenstrasse police headquarters near Alexanderplatz, where, in consultation with the Central Youth Bureau (Hauptjugendamt), they prepared the youth for a possible hearing in court. The Jugendhilfestelle was in such demand that it had to be renovated in 1948 because ten thousand youths had passed through its doors since the defeat of the Reich in May 1945. The Dircksenstrasse facility, along with its overflow center on Greifswalder Strasse, contained 145 beds for temporary shelter, and according to a 1948 newspaper report in Sozialdemokrat, it hardly kept pace with the influx of detainees.

Gender distinctions impressed themselves from the very moment youth were brought under regulatory control. Unlike male youths, young women and girls rounded up in raids were forcibly sent (zwanggestellt) not to the Jugendhilfestelle, but to venereal disease clinics run by the Berlin Department of Health, where they could expect to be detained overnight before undergoing mandatory pelvic examinations for gonorrhea and syphilis. If they had a sexually transmitted disease, they were committed by law for the duration of their illness while health officials forwarded their particulars to both the Jugendamt and the police, because the willful and wanton spread of disease constituted a misdemeanor according to both occupation health ordinances and the German penal code. Meanwhile, boys and young men who had been picked up were held at the Jugendhilfestelle until police and social workers determined the appropriate course of action. Depending on the nature of the crime committed, a youth might be forwarded to one of the city’s group homes to await a hearing in a juvenile court. In the meantime, the case came under the jurisdiction of the Youth Court Counseling Services (Jugendgerichtshilfe), whose task it was to research the offender’s
background and family history, and, if deemed necessary, create a psychological profile to help identify the cause and extent of moral endangerment. Social workers then submitted these reports to the judge presiding over the youth’s case. A direct carry-over from the Weimar period, the Jugendgerichtshilfe attempted to make the court more sensitive to the plight of wayward youth by drawing attention to milieu and family life as indicators of the need for corrective education instead of outright punishment. With careful intervention instead of incarceration, young charges might learn the error of their ways and embrace reform.

Far from simply indicating a preexisting criminal predisposition, however, these profiles reinforced widely held notions of asociality, tracing origins and causes of the condition to the broken and overburdened family. But in the early postwar era, such indicators as dirty living quarters and a working mother—frequently mentioned in these evaluations—were more often the rule rather than the exception. If an intact family was a measurement of healthful maturation and social development, many Berliners certainly fell short of this mark.

In a 1948 article in one of the Berlin dailies titled “Mom Threw Me Out! An Afternoon at Social Services—Helping Hands, Healing Words,” a reporter documented a day at the municipal department of social services (Sozialamt). The mise-en-scène follows the story of a typical parent during her visit to the offices of the local Sozialamt because of her teenage son’s predicament. Describing him as possessing a “mixture of stupidity and smarts,” the mother outlined that Freddy had already spent time in the Fichtebunker youth detention center for breaking and entering, theft, and shirking work responsibilities. Returning to her home with the journalist, Freddy’s mother added that “he stole anything that wasn’t nailed down to buy cigarettes and chocolate” and even “socialized with known homosexuals.” As a result of his most recent crimes, Freddy was sent to the Jugendhilfestelle on Dirksenstrasse, where he initially seemed to conduct himself well. Eight days before Christmas, however, he ran away, only to be caught once more by police. This time, a juvenile court judge would decide Freddy’s fate after a short psychiatric assessment. Whatever the outcome in court, the reporter suggested that the boy would be best served by a stay in the country, a phrase synonymous with a term in one of the city’s workhouses and remand homes.

The reporter’s story draws attention to several features of postwar criminality and rehabilitative care. Freddy’s crimes are quite typical of the period: his initial charges of petty theft and shirking were representative of the kinds of infractions committed by boys and male teens. In addition to this misbehavior, however, he is also described as being sexually permissive, with the added perceived danger of hanging about with friends of dubious sexual orientation. If Germans perceived a threat from youth in a general sense, the specific acts of stealing, shirking, and sexual promiscuity were the three main causes of alarm among youth service workers and police.
Containing Youth Waywardness

Despite the well-meaning intervention of youth service workers, efforts to effect meaningful change in the lives of endangered youth were hampered by material hardship, administrative chaos, and overlapping spheres of influence. Until the currency reform of 1948, economic hardship was a widespread and well-documented factor in monthly statistical reports that charted increasing rates of property crime and malnutrition. Politically, general uncertainty about the Soviet consolidation of power in the Soviet Occupation Zone caused the flight and dislocation of a new wave of political refugees. By the end of 1949 alone, half a million youth aged fourteen to twenty were registered in newly established West Germany, many now living in temporary camps and shelters among other displaced persons who had fled the former eastern German territories in advance of the Russians at war’s end. Since Berlin served as a kind of island in the storm—a Western toehold within the Soviet Occupation Zone—it became home to many transient and disaffected youth, provoking the fears of critics who dreaded the influx of a populace searching for escape, excitement, and leisure among the bright lights of the big city.

To be sure, the decline in living standards, privation, and the breakdown of the family unit caused alarm among police, social service workers, and health authorities in the days and months after the war. The steady stream of transient youths into the city from the surrounding Eastern zone taxed an already overburdened social system. As one health care worker noted in a 1948 health authority report from the West Berlin district of Zehlendorf, delinquent refugees from the Soviet Zone of Occupation (SBZ) were the most difficult to handle since they were “without scruples . . . never ha[d] papers on them, and often use[d] false names.” Still, nothing worried the authorities more than the high rates of venereal disease among adolescents. To protect against the moral endangerment of Berlin youth and to curb the spread of disease, a vast network of public and private, short- and long-term care facilities marshaled their meager resources to intervene directly, seeking to stem the tide of deviant behavior through educational and welfare programs. In all too many cases, however, these facilities contributed to the very problems they were designed to prevent.

As in any institutional setting, difficulties arose in the youth facilities due to overcrowding, inadequate supervision, and a lack of resources. The Jugendhilfestelle on Dircksenstrasse near Alexanderplatz, to which police sent teenaged boys caught hanging around the train station without identification, had a serious problem with kids running away due to the terrible conditions. One of the facility’s coordinators, Frau Hoffmann, described it as a dismal, prison-like structure, with forty-seven beds available for ninety charges. The facility was poorly outfitted and dirty and had no linen outside of what was donated; boys were forced to sleep two to a bed. The situation was so troubling that caseworkers as far away as Struveshof believed it was partially responsible for the rising number
of young male hustlers making their way through the system and ultimately land-
ing in their care.\textsuperscript{34} 

Unable to meet the immediate needs of its wards, the Dircksenstrasse facility instead operated as a kind of clearinghouse where boys would receive short-term evaluations before being forwarded into youth jail or workhouses like Struveshof. Despite the best intentions of youth services and the police, many of these adolescents learned a variety of survival techniques—both good and bad—while in care of the authorities that, in fact, better equipped them for life on the streets. In his 1951 criminology textbook, the criminologist Ernst Seelig argued that shirk-
ers and asocials were forging friendships with other delinquents in group homes, sidestepping all hope for reform.\textsuperscript{35} In one episode at Struveshof, two boys escaped the facility and convinced a john that they were interested in selling their bodies before robbing him of his money and possessions.\textsuperscript{36} In some cases, wards fell into even deeper peril at the hands of staff, including caseworkers, who abused their authority. In one instance, a caseworker was suspected of having sexual relations with two teenage wards while simultaneously romancing a secretary, prompting the facility’s director to alert the police and inform the man’s fiancée.\textsuperscript{37} In an earlier case from 1945, the director of operations in a youth home on Mittelstrasse reportedly raped young female charges procured by the director of the facility herself. In the Tannenhof correctional facility in Lichtenrade, security was so lax that the girls frequently resorted to locking up their personal effects out of fear that the other wards and staff might steal them.\textsuperscript{38}

Despite these setbacks, East German jurists and youth advocates lauded workhouses and remand homes as progressive and humane alternatives to over-
crowded prisons and jails.\textsuperscript{39} Although these facilities had initially been conceived as stopgap measures, by the 1950s they were invested with the authority to help foster a sense of civic responsibility and socialist morality and to promote health-
ful gender roles, especially at such a critical time in the personal and political development of the nation’s youth. However, given the structural inability of East Berlin’s administrative services to implement policy smoothly in the day-to-day management of delinquency, corrective education was not a panacea for rehabil-
itation.\textsuperscript{40} Nevertheless, the remedial programs did at least provide occupational training for the young men and women in custody. In effect, the fledgling East German state was promoting a type of social rehabilitation that was not primarily based on revolutionary theory but on traditional notions of gender and the rudimen-
tary necessities of economic stability.

\textbf{Engendering Reform}

By 1949 in Berlin and Brandenburg, educators working for the Ministry of \textit{Volks-
bildung} together with the Ministry of Justice sought ways to correct behavior
while simultaneously cultivating civic identification through the promotion of work and family values. But this was not the only region employing workhouses and remand homes in this way; in other districts, these facilities were especially important because, as contemporaries put it, many youths “protest[ed] against all community standards as a result of their asocial origins and development.” According to one advocate, this was particularly distressing since these youths were not just rebelling against their parents’ ways, but fostering generational angst and outright hostility toward the new organization of a socialist society.41 As head of the East German Central Justice Administration, Dr. Gentz responded to these fears by underscoring that the purpose of rehabilitative justice was to “awaken social consciousness in the youth to such a degree that they undertake socially-useful employment of their own free will.” Only through “productive work” could a youth’s educational and career path be secured. Of course, these concerns were not simply altruistic but also politically expedient, as Dr. Gentz himself demonstrated when he highlighted the role both the Free German Youth (FDJ) and the Democratic Association of German Women (DFD) would play in these homes.42

Workhouses, in other words, represented an important site of social and penal reform while simultaneously instilling overtly political imperatives. Youth penal policy and welfare reform was part of an overarching strategy of differentiating East German jurisprudence from that of the West that came into sharp focus after 1949. At issue was the role of the courts and welfare services in best serving the needs of the day’s youth. While some bureaucrats were debating the merits of bypassing the courts in favor of forwarding certain offenders directly to the employment office (Arbeitsamt), youth welfare workers continued to operate a network of workhouses and youth facilities that was overburdened by the number of wayward teens in the system.43 Although they were frequently overextended, these facilities nevertheless played a significant role in the state’s strategy to build healthy work and family relationships among a new generation of citizens and workers.44

Some workhouses were located in close proximity to the burgeoning number of nationalized factories (Volkseigene Betriebe, or VEB), making it easier for teenaged boys to participate in industrial production.45 Indeed, most of the homes for boys involved a program of industrial labor, with the exception of one facility specifically designed to promote agriculture.46 In learning a trade, these youths were given the skills needed to serve as providers and producers once they left the workhouse. Girls in protective custody for promiscuity and prostitution at the Heidekrug institution in Brandenburg/Havel, on the other hand, busied themselves with domestic chores including cooking, washing, mending, and cleaning. In Werftpfuhl, “healthy behavior and lifestyle” were imparted to female charges through a program based on gardening, sewing, and nursing.47 Of course, these skills were designed to facilitate the girls’ behavioral reform so that they, too,
could leave the facility with marketable skills and take their proper social place as
morally upstanding wives and mothers.48

But reforming behavior required resources that these workhouses and refor-
matories simply did not have. As with the material hardships faced by the Jugend-
hilfestelle in Berlin, these facilities frequently encountered problems. Although
they were designed to reform aberrant behavior and promote socialism, they
suffered from core organizational problems that undermined the state's efforts
at rehabilitation. In a real sense, these institutions contained the seeds of their
own destruction because the desired outcome—moral reform—was inhibited by
the very structure and operation of the social program itself. If domesticity and
maternal instincts were the markers of young women's successful rehabilitation,
then the success of these facilities remained a source of frustration for wards and
officials alike.

In Heidekrug, which housed up to three hundred women, most of the guards
and workers were members of the communist party, the SED. Although they had
the authority of political affiliation, they worked without a proper uniform that
would have demarcated the staff from the inmates. Although chores included
washing and cleaning, the charges went frequently without soap. Upon visit-
ing Heidekrug, Käthe Kern of the Demokratischer Frauenbund Deutschlands
(DFD) concurred with previous reports that the institution was in disrepair, lack-
ing in soap, coal, and basic amenities. The situation was even worse at a refor-
matory for endangered girls in Thuringia, where guards reportedly begged for
food from the inmates because they received better food rations than the staff.49
Although material hardship threatened to end reform before it began, it was not
the only issue hampering these facilities. One report observed that while the
young women in Heidekrug spent their afternoons working in the fields, guards
took the opportunity to take naps while on duty.50

Although these workhouses and reformatories served as the primary tool for
building healthy behavior by teaching youth the merits of productive labor,
reformers worried that it was impossible to gauge how deeply or genuinely the
young men and women in custody internalized this message. This bitter truth
was not only debated among professionals and laypeople, but also shaped pub-
lic perceptions about the success of socialist reeducation. In a newspaper report
for Neue Zeit published under the sensationalized title “Education with Pop-
ular Music: A Visit to a Reformatory for Endangered Girls,” Dr. Fuchs-Kamp
of the Institute for Psychiatry in Berlin visited a Brandenburg facility to eval-
uate firsthand the problem of institutionally rehabilitating so-called fallen girls
and women. Although all the girls were eighteen and younger, they had already
come into contact with the VD hospital, where they had presumably undergone
quarantine after contracting gonorrhea or syphilis. Those sent to the Cottbus
facility were most likely repeat offenders or suspected of underage prostitution
and therefore placed in custody for a year to ensure that they were “placed on
the right path through hard work.” Given the depths to which these girls had apparently sunk, rehabilitating them was “no easy task.” On one night table, the doctor observed, stood a number of pictures of beautiful men. One desk held three framed photos, all of them of different men, and the same was in evidence on another bedside table. As if to underscore the nature of the girls’ depravity, Fuchs-Kamp asked one charge how she came to be institutionalized in the workhouse. She responded that, like so many others of her generation, she just “wanted to have some fun.” After all, she asked the doctor, was she expected “to die as an old maid?” Seeking out another example to demonstrate the difficulties educators faced in reforming such girls, the doctor turned to another young girl, who sat crossed legged during the interview and appeared very “ladylike,” with painted-on eyebrows, nail polish, and lipstick. When asked what motivated her to put such effort into her appearance while in custody, she answered, with a coquettish glance to the side, that “first of all, sometimes we get the odd visitor here,” and secondly, she hardly wanted “to become a wallflower.”

The newspaper article’s descriptions are significant because they provide insight into the professional and popular visions of sexual delinquency. The girls were portrayed as being “on the make” despite their detention in an institution and therefore apparently beyond the reach of reform efforts. As members of the next generation, these young women served as the canvas upon which Germans, lay or professional, could express their own insecurities about the future and the consequences of their recent past. Although concern with girls’ reproductive future contrasted with the concern for boys’ productivity, both represented a conjoined problem for citizens and officials. Whether mingling with friends at the Bahnhof or staying out late at the cinema, the actions of youth assumed a threatening countenance that consumed considerable resources and defied both scientific management and moral rhetoric.

**Socialist Morals and the Family**

Despite these difficulties in applying policy uniformly, the rise in youth criminality in postwar Germany forced professionals to engage the question of the origins of juvenile crime anew. Baffled by the rise in crime, caseworkers and policymakers asked: Were certain youths predisposed to criminal behavior because of a Fehlentwicklung, that is, a psychological development that went wrong? What role did the environment play in shaping delinquency? Was asocial behavior a result of postwar hardship or, as the director of the Hephata-Treyse institution claimed in 1957 regarding the 80 percent of youth in his facility, due to a variety of neurological afflictions? These contrasting claims continued to animate discussion in the years after the war and, with few changes, remained in circulation at least until the 1960s.
If there was one issue that most youth advocates could agree upon, despite the emerging ideological divide, it was that defeat in war had brought dramatic challenges to reforming wayward youth. “As a result of Hitler’s war,” stated a 1947 police memorandum on the fight against youth crime, “Germany emerged not simply as a rubble heap in a material sense” but it experienced “an unimaginable lowering of its moral and ethical worth.”

Capitulation gave rise to “confused families and weakened family ties,” and these damaged domestic relationships now “played themselves out at an alarming rate on the situation of the youth.” The numerous cases of juvenile delinquency stemmed in large part from the rise of broken homes and so-called half families that confirmed for many Berliners that the world had been turned upside down after defeat. By the time Hanns Eyferth wrote in 1950 that this generation of delinquents “might not be healed of their particular wounds,” many people had begun to fear that the youth teetered dangerously on the brink of outright asociality.

If the initial fears concerning youth delinquency transcended the boundaries that separated the emerging socialist state from its capitalist neighbor, these common priorities were increasingly divided by the language and imperatives of reform as the 1950s unfolded. Social policy on crime and juvenile delinquency suddenly became part of the Cold War battle, in which the attitudes and behavior of the younger generation emerged as fundamental in securing economic and political legitimacy. Despite considerable fanfare, the founding of the East German “Workers’ and Farmers’ State” in October 1949 did not result in social and industrial stabilization, and the number of unregistered youth continued to alarm authorities because they frequently fell into criminal activity and prostitution.

To combat the mounting threat of social and sexual dislocation, the Jugendamt, the Department of Health, and the Ministry of Volksbildung combined their efforts to reform the way workhouses, reformatories, youth homes, and counseling services functioned with the goal of fundamentally realigning priorities. Although never intended for this purpose, workhouses and reeducation facilities were sometimes used for the detention of hardened criminals or political prisoners. More generally, there was a concerted effort to impart political education via carefully schooled educators. As a volume on GDR legal history from the 1970s put it, workhouses were successful when they operated with the principles of “work and self-discipline [as] the main forms of corrective education” but also paid attention to the “political work of each and every youth and their educators.” As was the case in some of the privately run confessional group homes in and around Berlin, a best-case scenario envisioned reformed youth who had been educated by example, and might even return to the institution to hold marriage ceremonies or christenings to share their joy with the caseworkers who helped turn their lives around.

As the 1950s unfolded, the problem of juvenile delinquency and waywardness became subsumed within social policy on the general protection of youth. Part of a sweeping anti-smut and anti-pornography campaign that targeted the corrupt
West as the origin of all forms of immorality, measures to combat unhealthy sexual development linked citizens’ physical and sexual health to the overall productivity of the nation. Recidivism, sexual promiscuity, itinerant lifestyles, fears of American cultural exports like rock ‘n’ roll and jazz, and the flight of many young East Germans to the West all spurred the government to clamp down once and for all on all things counterproductive to the march of socialism. Clique youth hanging around Berlin’s train stations were especially targeted, since surveys and spot checks confirmed that many of them were uneducated and untrained, representing the loss of an important resource to the East German state. Ideally, every citizen’s productive capacity had to be harnessed in support of population growth and industrial renewal. In practice, East Germany adopted norms that were, at times, hardly distinguishable from “the bourgeois family,” although this was never acknowledged. Like their counterparts in the West, officials targeted sexual comportment as a vital link in the transition from postwar chaos to stability. In the end, however, the slow rebuilding of Berlin had to be waged on three fronts—on the streets, in the courts, and in care—that offered no guarantees that aberrant behavior could be successfully modified to fit the new model of morality. Work, both domestic and industrial, held the promise of rehabilitating wayward youth by channeling their attention into productive pursuits. The language of productivity also informed West Berlin juvenile penal policy on asocials and prostitutes, especially in cases where judges had to decide whether to send a repeat offender to youth jail or prison. Whereas workhouses were a sanction contained in the postwar West German Penal Code, in the East they formed part of a large-scale reorganization of the legal and social service system that sought to implement more humanistic alternatives to imprisonment even as the state deprived local authorities of control over these matters. Only in these long-term institutions, which supplemented parallel measures for hardened criminals, could “routine work patterns and socially useful thinking and behavior” be taught. Just as the family had served as the barometer of successful (or failed) socialization before the Second World War, the ideal of marriage and family continued to set the parameters of the debate for a successful postwar youth policy. In postwar German discourses of renewal and reconstruction, the family emerged as a kind of safe haven in troubled times and the locus of social and political stability. Challenges to the family, such as those that had resulted from National Socialist population policies, engendered the utmost scrutiny and suspicion. As a corrective measure against a totalitarian relapse, the West German constitution enshrined the family as a bulwark against possible future aggression—a liberal democratic private sphere that must be shielded from state intervention. More importantly, the family emerged as the primary site of political power with prescribed roles for husband and wife, forming the basis for what might be viewed as a kind of (re-)productive citizenship.
In the German Democratic Republic, too, the family ideal was strong and similarly situated in party and constitutional discourses of appropriate civic comportment. But the image of the family propagated in the GDR was socialist and self-consciously devoid of the idolatry of the bourgeois *Sittenkodex*. Of course, popular and official discourses could not hide the fact that the family’s bourgeois underpinnings remained alive and well despite claims to the contrary. Throughout the 1950s officials attempted to formulate a proletarian moral code, looking to the Soviet Union for inspiration. The Soviet pedagogue Anton Makarenko’s (1888–1939) account of the place of law and morality in a socialist society provided a canonical analysis of the role class consciousness and scientific humanism could play in forming a new kind of social relationality within an otherwise traditional family structure.66 As late as the Fifth Party Congress (1958) of the reigning Socialist Unity Party (SED), Party Chairman Walter Ulbricht initiated a preemptive strike against what he feared was the continued influence of all things bourgeois in the fledgling socialist state. As part of a ten-point policy for the continued Sovietization of morality, Ulbricht outlined the steps East Germans should take to secure the path toward socialist renewal. Not entirely unlike the ten biblical commandments, these socialist strictures instructed citizens to “live a clean and respectable life and respect the family.”67

Intent on limiting alternative forms of sexual expression, the East and West German states were more similar than distinct in this regard in the 1950s. Despite their opposed ideological orientation, socialist and Christian Democratic visions of the family bore striking resemblance to each other. Nowhere was this more demonstrable than in the concern over the younger generation and its moral upbringing. But each state’s safeguarding measures were not aimed simply at resocializing youth and eradicating criminality. Against the backdrop of increasing Cold War polarization, this generation of young citizens would not simply demonstrate to the world the scope of German democratic renewal. As future contributors to the moral, civic, and political reconstruction of the East German state, the youth of the 1950s was an essential element in the state’s ideological refashioning. Because family rhetoric united the personal and political spheres and also linked generations of Germans together with shared experiences, fears, and expectations, it functioned as an important site of legitimization for Ulbricht’s regime. Because the family represented one of its foundational elements, any threat to its stability had to be addressed by institutionalized disciplinary structures under the careful management of professionals and party officials.

**Conclusion**

Workhouses and reformatories operated as both welfare and legal institutions involving the most difficult cases of asocial behavior, juvenile delinquency, and
promiscuity. Although East German authorities envisioned them as emblematic of education instead of incarceration, the line between welfare and punishment was frequently blurred because workhouses and reformatories often held wards who were just released from jail or seemed likely candidates for future imprisonment. The way in which the state determined who could be sent to workhouses demonstrates the elasticity of the terms *endangerment* and *delinquency* in the postwar years. Although the language of biological determinism had been dropped, the criteria for what constituted deviant behavior necessitating state intervention remained relatively unchanged from those of the Nazi period.\(^6\)

During National Socialism the perils of a biological understanding of deviance had been demonstrated through the forced sterilization of criminals and asocials.\(^6\) Although these policies came to an end with the defeat of the Nazi regime, postwar policy on juvenile delinquency and waywardness was still influenced by medicalized views of deviance. Thus the social policies practiced in curative institutes and workhouses reflected an ongoing preoccupation with identifying and overcoming “unhealthy” sexual practices before they could be transmitted to a new generation. Important distinctions must be drawn, however. In the court counseling service and the juvenile facilities psychiatrists, social workers, and psychologists interviewed family members to ascertain the extent of debasement within a particular family. In other words, the family environment—rather than genetics—was recognized as playing a major role in delinquency. Nevertheless, postwar social workers and medical authorities did not demonstrate a strong resolve to break with eugenics-inspired conceptions of deviance. Beyond that, state policies on sexual deviance highlight the continued insecurity of the East German state in leaving sexual acculturation to the biological family.

East German reformatories and youth services complemented the state’s efforts to secure the active participation of the nation’s youth in building socialism in the GDR. The transfer of these institutions from the aegis of the Ministry of Social Services (*Sozialwesen*) to that of the Ministry of People’s Education (*Volksbildung*) reveals the ideological imperative: remedying deviant behavior was closely bound up with building socialism through (re)productive labor. In this way, reforming wayward youth was also about state-building, since rehabilitative education protected the family while simultaneously harnessing the participation of the youth in strengthening the state in accordance with the 1950 ordinance on the Contribution of Youth to the Building of the GDR.

Despite initial efforts to blame the war and later the West for the ideological waywardness of the younger generation, child welfare workers, police, and members of the East German government quickly recognized the need to look for solutions internally. Petty criminality, delinquency, prostitution, and clique building plagued the divided city of Berlin and therefore attracted the attention of GDR policy makers who feared that asocial young adults were especially susceptible to the influence of American-style cultural capitalism.\(^7\) The persistence of youth
criminality in the East underscored the state’s inability to meet the challenges of social and economic revitalization. The danger posed by the morally derailed (entgleist) younger generation was indeed great, for without rehabilitation it was unclear who would shoulder the burdens of increased industrial productivity to help rebuild the war-torn GDR. As the situation worsened in the 1950s, the state employed a variety of methods to promote preferred socialization. Organized sport and leisure, Free German Youth retreats, and Young Pioneer parades were supplemented by another form of intervention that borrowed from prewar advances in treating juvenile delinquents. Targeting certain young offenders for rehabilitation in workhouses, remand homes, and reformatories, the East German state equated antisocial behavior with antisocialist behavior and sought to impose retributive justice through hard work and austere living conditions. From here, it was but a small step to the inhuman institutionalization of delinquents in the notoriously brutal Torgau facility.

By the 1950s, concerns regarding Nazi-era policies fell by the wayside as the consolidation of East Germany took place in the shadow of American-backed consumer capitalism in the Federal Republic. No longer preoccupied with the fascist past, and having met the challenge of postwar reconstruction at least in theory, GDR social policy found a new foil in Adenauer’s Christian Democracy. These stages in the development of East German social policy—engaging the specter of National Socialism, forging a platform for rebuilding, and legitimizing the current regime—were reflected in the treatment of young offenders in the courts, in custody, and in care.

Youth facilities formed an essential part of East German attempts to define and delimit an appropriate civic identity based on proper familial roles, productive labor, and moral reform. As a result, hundreds of East German youths were funneled through institutions designed to leave a distinct impression of what contributions to society were required of them. Just as GDR health policy linked population policy to the self-legitimation of communist East Germany, social policy on the problem of youth criminality reflected similar preoccupations. Bringing wayward teens to an awareness of socialist mores meant imbuing them with the knowledge of, and respect for, Ulbricht’s family-based industrial political economy. To educate young offenders about their contribution to the health and prosperity of the nation, the Ministry of Volksbildung employed a variety of methods in the management of postwar delinquency. In workhouses and remand homes delinquent youth received careful instruction on how to fulfill their social obligations to state and society. Cloaking social policy in the language of morality and borrowing managerial strategies of containment and prevention from the prewar era, the GDR sought the support of average citizens who were equally invested in eradicating moral dissipation and confusion.

By 1955, the problem of youth waywardness was anything but solved. In fact, a special commission was needed to redirect attention to the issue of youth crime
in the city of Berlin. The Committee for the Eradication of Youth Crime, again under the supervision of the Ministry of *Volksbildung*, consisted of members of the East German criminal police, the prosecutor’s office, the Ministry of Work and Apprenticeship, the Free German Youth, the Association of German Democratic Women, and the Free German Trade Union. An especially perplexing problem was *Republikflucht*, or defection, since an alarming number of teens found their way to the West. Whereas in the early postwar period juvenile crime and waywardness were attributed to the privations brought about by defeat, by the 1950s these phenomena were regarded as emblematic of a different sort of oppositionality. The fear was that these youth were not simply asocial, or even antisocial, but that they were in fact anti-state. Supposedly influenced by the “smut and dirt” of American cultural imperialism, turning their backs on family and factory, and lured to a life in the West by agents of the *Adenauerstaat*, GDR youth were perceived as a potentially serious impediment to the consolidation of state power and control over the private sphere. In the eyes of the East German officials, the extent of youth endangerment could be measured in the “difficulty in reforming waywardness, in the rise in crime, and also in the number of traitorous acts” committed against the state.74 Socialist morality was not taking hold, and despite the most coercive attempts to reform aberrant behavior and revise gender roles in support of the industrial economy, this goal remained elusive.

What was the government protecting in sending its youth to workhouses and group homes? In promoting a healthy work ethic, the family, and traditional gender roles, youth policy in the GDR continued to gender delinquency, seeking to harness the supposedly natural capacities of young men and women under the guise of rehabilitation. Far from being a natural result of German socialism, the ideal family required the intrusion of the state to shape behavior and tailor morality to meet the imperatives of socialist comportment and the “public good.” Although attempts to impose state control over aberrant behavior resulted in incarceration for many, promiscuity and petty criminality did not disappear, as many East German youths continued to live lives outside of the strictures of appropriate identification.

**Notes**

This chapter, written especially for this volume, draws on material from the author’s *Life among the Ruins: Cityscape and Sexuality in Cold War Berlin* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

* “When we educate a citizen, we also educate [the citizen’s] sexual feeling.”

1. Bundesarchiv Berlin (hereafter, BArch Berlin), DC 4 Amt für Jugendfragen, Nr. 1401 Bekämpfung der Jugendkriminalität, Konzeption für die Abteilung, Leiter Beratung am 22.4.1958 zur Vorbereitung einer zentralen Konferenz über Jugendschutzarbeit.
2. BArch Berlin, DC 4 Amt für Jugendfragen, Nr. 1401 Bekämpfung der Jugendkriminalität, Thesen für die Bezirksbeauftragten zur Zentralen Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Jugendschutz zur Vorbereitung und Durchführung der Konferenzen über die Fragen des Jugendschutzes in den Bezirken, circa 1958.

3. Gerhard Jörns argues there were thirty-six actual Jugendwerkhöfe in the GDR by 1956. For more information see his Der Jugendwerkhof im Jugendhilfesystem der DDR (Göttingen, 1995), 66. Aside from these workhouses, between 1945 and 1951 there also existed a variety of remand homes and reformatories in and around Berlin. According to one study conducted by the Innere Mission, public, private, and church-based organizations in Berlin oversaw as many as thirty-six youth facilities in all four occupation sectors with 690 spots allocated to boys, and 1,425 to girls under the age of eighteen. These facilities ranged from protective custody facilities where young offenders waited trial, to foster homes and specialty housing for those who traveled to Berlin to complete apprenticeship training. Fifteen institutions were operated by the city government directly, whereas the Innere Mission ran eleven and the catholic welfare organization Caritas administered nine. Some of these facilities, like Struveshof, would be renamed Jugendwerkhöfe in the early 1950s. Archiv Diakonisches Werk, Gesamtverband der Berliner Inneren Mission (GVB), Nr. 14 Verschiedenes 1945–1951, “Jugendliche in Gefahr, Jugendliche Verbrechen in Berlin.”


5. Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen, Der V. Parteitag der SED (10.—16.7. 1958): Eine Analyse (Berlin, 1958); also printed in Neues Deutschland, 18.7.1958.


7. Of course, social policy was never truly devoid of politics. A Tagesspiegel article from 25.9.46 documents a strategy adopted in the French zone. The article states that youth under eighteen are not housed in prison, but sent to custodial homes where they receive instruction from experienced anti-fascists under the direction of former French officers who served in the “Maquis,” or French Resistance. “These youth,” the article makes plain, “demonstrate a fine sense of justice.”


11. Peukert, *Grenzen der Sozialdisziplinierung*; there were a variety of ways in which adults could be committed to a workhouse, most notably through § 361,5 or § 42d of the Penal Code in addition to corresponding welfare legislation. For more information, see Wolfgang Ayass, *Das Arbeitshaus Breitenau. Bettler, Landstreicher, Prostituierte, Zuhälter und Fürsorgeempfänger in der Korrektions- und Landarmenanstalt Breitenau (1874–1949)* (Kassel, 1992); Andrea Rudolph, *Die Kooperation von Strafrecht und Sozialhilferecht bei der Disziplinierung von Armen mittels Arbeit: Vom Arbeitshaus bis zur gemeinnützigen Arbeit* (Frankfurt am Main, 1995).

12. See Deputy Wächler’s comments advocating reform in *Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des preussischen Hauses der Abgeordneten* (1878), as cited in Dickinson, 20.

13. These developments resulted from the amendment to the RStGB and gained expression in laws both in Prussia and Baden that allowed for the placement of youth in foster families or reformatories if the child’s behavior indicated suitable cause for concern. Dickinson states that a number of other states passed similar legislation in the 1890s. Dickinson, 21.


17. For an overview of the postwar reorganization of youth criminal policy, see Jörg Wolff, Margreth Egelkamp, Tobias Mulot, and Michael Gassert, *Das Jugendstrafrecht zwischen Nationalsozialismus und Demokratie: Die Rückkehr der Normalität* (Baden Baden, 1997). With the founding of the German Democratic Republic in October 1949, these laws were finally rewritten along with a host of other policy directives aimed at purging the remnants of Nazi social engineering while streamlining youth support for state socialism.


19. Landesarchiv Berlin (LAB), C Rep 303/9 Polizeipräsident in Berlin, 1945–1948, Nr. 11. Präsidialabteilung, Schutz der Jugend memo from Markgraf dated 1.2.47 to all the necessary departments, including the Hauptjugendamt.

20. Despite a well-developed network of short-term counseling and care facilities, by 1950 public and private youth homes housed over two thousand boys and girls, and youth courts forwarded an additional two thousand per month to these longer-term institutions. Due to shortages of space and financial backing, young offenders sometimes shared the same quarters as general wards of the state, compromising in the minds of educators the effectiveness of contemporary


22. The Ministry of Volksbildung oversaw children’s aid and traditional child welfare services (such as adoption and care facilities), while also coordinating penal policy and directives as they affected children and teens. For information on the SMAD Order, see Deutsche Verwaltung für Volksbildung in der SBZ, ed., Jugendämter: Aufbau und Aufgaben (Berlin, 1948), 31.


25. BArch Berlin, DQ 2 Ministerium für Arbeit und Berufsausbildung, Nr. 3772 Zeitungsaußsnitte zur Bekämpfung gefährdete Jugendlicher 1946–1948. The newspaper snippet dated 6.2.48 titled “Jugendhilfestelle wird ausgebaut” found in the files of the Ministry for Employment and Apprenticeship states that over ten thousand young boys and girls employed the services of the Jugendhilfestelle. This number included those youth removed from difficult family situations as well as criminals.

26. For more information on the laws governing disease transmission and suspected prostitution, see Uta Falck, VEB Bordell: Prostitution in der DDR (Berlin, 1998), and Annette Timm, “Guarding the Health of Worker Families in the GDR: Socialist Health Care, Bevölkerungs- politik, and Marriage Counselling, 1945–72,” in Arbeiter in der SBZ-DDR, Peter Hübner and Klaus Tenfelde, eds. (Essen, 1999), 463–495.

27. See Warren Rosenblum’s chapter in this volume.

28. Of primary importance to police and social services was the need to convince Berlin’s youth that their job was to help the youth navigate a path through the judicial and reformatory system. Understandably, many youths remained wary of any help police sought to provide. See BArch Berlin, DO 1 7.0 Deutsche Verwaltung des Innern (DVdI), Nr. 353 Broschüren zur Verordnung zum Schutz der Jugend 1948, Merkblatt zur Bekämpfung der Jugendkriminalität, Zonenkriminalamt Referat K6, Berlin 28.7.47, no author.

29. For examples of the treatment of young offenders, in this case young men charged with male prostitution, see the court case files from the Amtsgericht Tiergarten in 1947, which include examples of information gathered both by the Jugendamt and the Jugendgerichtshilfe before the division of municipal services in 1948. LAB B Rep 051 Amtsgericht Tiergarten.


31. Hermann Glaser, Kleine Kulturgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn, 1991), 72–73.

32. LAB, B Rep 210 Bezirksamts Zehlendorf, Acc. 840, Nr. 91/3 Tätigkeitsberichte des Gesundheitsamts vom 1. Januar bis 31. Dezember 1948. Report for the period of 1 January to 31 March 1948 signed by a caseworker identified only as S.E.
33. Frau Hoffmann describes the Dircksenstrasse facility in the Diakonisches Werk report on youth services. See Archiv Diakonisches Werk, Gesamtverband der Berliner Inneren Mission (GVB), Nr. 14 Verschiedenes 1945–1951, "Jugendliche in Gefahr: Jugendliche Verbrechen in Berlin." See also the article in Sozialdemokrat from 6.2.48 "Jugendhilfsstelle wird ausgebaut" regarding the desperately needed renovations to the facility.


35. Ernst Seelig, Lehrbuch der Kriminologie (Dusseldorf, 1951), 48. Selig suggests that "shirking career criminals take to a life of crime while teens, often remarking later in life that they couldn’t find work as young adults. In reformatories (homes for wayward youth or similar institutions) they aren’t cured, but instead learn from more established career criminals and refine their skills . . . once on the outside they continue to seek out established criminals and form small bands of grifters." Interestingly, Seelig suggests that no form of state intervention will prevent these youths from re-offending. However, he notes that in a few cases marriage brings about resocialization.


37. See the letter from the Director of the Jugendhilfestelle Herr Weimann to the head of the Kriminalpolizei from 28.9.48 in LAB C Rep 303/9 Polizeipräsident in Berlin 1945–1948, Nr. 259 Weibliche Kriminalpolizei 1945–1949.

38. See the weekly reports in LAB C Rep 303/9 Polizeipräsident in Berlin 1945–1948.


40. Despite efforts to promote education instead of incarceration for teenaged youth, in special circumstances charges could be kept in custody beyond their eighteenth birthday if the situation warranted continued supervision. BArch Berlin, DC 4 Amt für Jugendfragen, Nr. 1657 die Arbeit zwischen Jugendklubhäuser und Heimen und soziale Betreuung Jugendlicher 1952–1956, Bericht über die Lage in den Jugendwerkhufen und die Perspektiven im 2. Fünfjahrrplan (undated).


42. BArch Berlin, DP 1 Ministerium der Justiz, Hauptabteilung Strafvollzug II-42 Jugendstrafvollzug 1949–1952. Working plan for the amelioration of youth workhouses as drafted by Dr. Gentz and submitted to the Ministerium der Justiz upon receipt of the 30.09.50 report from Saxony.

43. The problems affecting East Berlin and the emerging GDR were not necessarily specific to the East. Overcrowding of youth facilities, including the mixing of simple offenders and more advanced criminals, raised the ire of many youth advocates in the West as well. See the article “Jugend protestieren” in Juna from 12.09.1950 regarding the deplorable conditions in the Plötzensee youth facility. In an article in Telegraph from 15.06.48 titled “Sommersonntag hinter Gefängnismauern: als Chorsänger im Jugendgefangnis Plötzensee—Gespräche mit Häftlingen—Kriminelle, Gefährdete, Gestrauchelte,” the author reports how the young prisoners eat...
their rations out of empty cans that have been cleaned with sand because there were no available dishes.

44. In the Treuenbrietzen facility, boys lived in small groups with a single caseworker in what were deliberately designed as family-like environments. See Horning, “Die Arbeit des Jugendwerkhofes Treuenbrietzen an straffällig gewordenen und erziehungsgefährdeten Jugendlichen,” *Neue Justiz* 3 (1949), 38–39.

45. For an example from Saxony, see the article by an Amtsgericht judge in Aue, “Erfahrungen mit dem produktiven Arbeitseinsatz Strafgefangener,” *Neue Justiz* 4 (1950), 57–58.

46. At Struveshof in Ludwigsfelde, boys could learn a variety of trades in the facility’s workshops including roofing, carpentry, and electrical work. Generally, youths did not enjoy agricultural work because the hours were long and the work hard. They were rarely embraced by local farmers, who often saw them as difficult city youths with poor attitudes and a lack of respect. See C Rep 120 Magistrat von Berlin, Abteilung Volksbildung, Nr. 2710 Geschäftstätigkeit des Jugendwerkhofes Struveshof, 1948–1960.


48. The persistence of traditional gender roles despite the language of equality has been emphasized in a variety of studies. For an example, see Ina Merkel, “Leitbilder und Lebensweisen von Frauen in der DDR” in *Sozialgeschichte der DDR*.


53. Merkblatt zur Bekämpfung der Jugendkriminalität, Zoneneralamt Referat K6, Berlin dated 28.5.47, author unknown. BArch Berlin, DO 1 7.0 Deutsche Verwaltung des Innern (Dvdl), Nr. 353 Broschüren Materialien zur Verordnung zum Schutz der Jugend 1948.

54. Merkblatt zur Bekämpfung der Jugendkriminalität, Zonernalamlamt Referat K6, Berlin dated 28.5.47. BArch Berlin, DO 1 7.0 Deutsche Verwaltung des Innern (Dvdl), Nr. 353 Broschüren Materialien zur Verordnung zum Schutz der Jugend 1948.

55. For more information and statistics from the early postwar situation in Berlin see Heide Thurnwald, *Gegenwartsprobleme Berliner Familien: Eine soziologische Untersuchung an 498 Familien* (Berlin, 1948).


57. On cross-fertilization and sharing of resources: Uta Poiger points to the paradoxes provided by postwar Berlin. In the sensational court proceedings against gang member Werner Gladow held in East Berlin in 1950, the prosecution actually called for the expert testimony of a West Berlin psychiatrist. Despite the entrenched battle lines between the two states, this court case demonstrates the continued sharing of resources until the early 1950s. See Poiger’s discussion
of the case in *Jazz, Rock and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley, 1999), 48–51.

58. Even as late as 1955, East Berlin health authorities continued to lament the influx of itinerant youth that lounged about in unsavory circles and frequently fell into prostitution. See LAB C Rep 118 Magistrat des Gesundheits- und Sozialwesens, Nr. 555 Beratung zur Bekämpfung der Prostitution, Dezember 1955. Meeting on 6.12.1955 in the Headquarters of the Committee to Fight the Spread of Venereal Disease. Responses to report by a representative of the district of Mitte on the importance of working together with the police and social services to combat the spread of disease in the East. According to the Director of the East Berlin Department of Health, Dr. Gross, each police precinct recorded between eight hundred and one thousand unregistered and homeless people, many of them youths. See his letter from 2.12.1954 to the representative of the mayor of Berlin, Frau Johanna Kuzia in LAB C Rep 118 Magistrat des Gesundheits- und Sozialwesens, Nr. 668 Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung der Geschlechtskrankheiten besonders bei Jugendlichen 1954–1955.

59. Text by law student Gerda Grube in *Zur Geschichte der Rechtspflege der DDR 1945–1949*, which was purportedly written by a collective of authors under the direction of Hilde Benjamin (Berlin, 1976), 277.

60. See the individual cases listed in Archiv Diakonisches Werk (ADW), Gesamtverband der Berliner Inneren Mission (GVB), Nr. 14, Verschiedenes 1945–1951, “Jugendliche in Gefahr. Jugendliche Verbrechen in Berlin,” a forty-five-page report on youth homes in Berlin-Brandenburg, undated but written around 1950.


63. See the psychological assessment and case file of the underage Erhard S. charged with homosexual prostitution in 1958 in LAB B Rep 069, Jugendstrafanstalt Plötzensee, Acc. 4202, Nr. 1032.

64. See the article “Jugend protestiert” in *Juna* from 12.09.1950.

65. This argument was made in reference to West Germany in Robert Moeller, *Protecting Motherhood: Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar Germany* (Berkeley, 1993).

66. Makarenko was highly regarded among pedagogues and his writings were frequently cited in the documents. He represents the Soviet state’s efforts to deal with the growing problem of homeless children and juvenile crime after 1917. For one of his key contributions to juvenile delinquency, see A. S. Makarenko, *Problems of Soviet School Education* (Moscow, 1965). Makarenko was especially lauded for his work with the *besprizorny* or delinquents of the early post revolutionary era. Wendy Goldman suggests that in Soviet Russia by 1924, the state viewed young criminals as a distinct subculture that was “stubbornly entrenched and inimical to the ideals of the state.” To deal with the problem posed by young offenders, the state sought new ways to channel their energy towards respect for the family and key social institutions. See Wendy Z. Goldman, *Women, the State, and Revolution: Soviet Family Policy and Social Life, 1917–36* (Cambridge, 1993), 89. For additional information on the problem of child welfare and juvenile delinquency in post-1917 Soviet Russia, see Alan M. Ball, *And Now My Soul Is Hardened: Abandoned Children in Soviet Russia, 1918–1930* (Berkeley, 1994); Laurie Bernstein, “Fostering the Next Generation of Socialists: Patronirovanie in the Fledgling Soviet


68. Elizabeth Heineman includes a short description of the use of workhouses for the work-shy, prostitutes, and asocials during the war. See *What Difference Does a Husband Make? Women and Marital Status in Nazi and Postwar Germany* (Berkeley, 1999), 30.


70. The best analysis of the influence of American culture on postwar German youth can be found in Uta G. Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels*.

71. Much work has been done on the Free German Youth movement in English and in Germany. Wilkinson, *Training Socialist Citizen* examines the role of sport in East Germany’s quest to mould and shape healthy and active socialist citizens.

72. The closed workhouse of Torgau was regarded as the most heinous juvenile facility in the GDR. For information on its history see Gerhard Jörns, 149–178, and especially Norbert Haase, Brigitte Oleschinski, eds., *Das Torgau-Tabu: Wehrmachtsstrafsystem, NKWD-Speziallager, DDR-Strafvollzug* (Leipzig, 1993).

73. Annette Timm argues that the ongoing importance of population politics in Berlin health policy suggests that the family occupied a primary role in shaping socialist citizenship. See “Guarding the Health of Worker Families in the GDR: Socialist Health Care, Bevölkerungspolitik, and Marriage Counselling, 1945–72.”

74. BArch Berlin, DC 4 Amt für Jugendfragen, Nr. 1401, Bekämpfung der Jugendkriminalität, Thesen für die Bezirksbeauftragten zur Zentralen Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Jugendschutz zur Vorbereitung und Durchführung der Konferenzen über die Fragen des Jugendschutzes in den Bezirken, circa 1958.