

## MAKING THE BORDER



When Polish Upper Silesia and the regions of Eupen, Sankt Vith and Malmedy joined, respectively, the Polish state and the Belgian Kingdom, the solely German-speaking school systems from before were abolished, and two sorts of schools were set up in order to separate children according to their supposed vernacular. Linguistic differences were separated, spatialised and controlled in schools. Language learning in primary schools played a pivotal role in transforming these pieces of land from spots on a map of Europe spread out on a table in Versailles into lived social spaces.<sup>1</sup> After the state border lines of the interwar European continent had been drawn, establishing and implementing rules on the teaching and use of languages in borderland primary schools became crucial techniques for making the border. This chapter will demonstrate how in both Polish Upper Silesia and the regions of Eupen, Sankt Vith and Malmedy, language learning became the border.

Different aims lay at the basis of language learning rules in both case study borderlands. The ultimate aim for many Polish nationalists was to realise normative isomorphism: the equation of one nation with one language and one religion.<sup>2</sup> In a country where a third of the population did not have Polish as their mother tongue, they wanted to raise as many monolingual Polish-speaking future citizens as possible.<sup>3</sup> However, as will be elaborated in this chapter, in Polish Upper Silesia, they were bound by bilateral and supranational agreements stipulating separate schools for pupils not having Polish as their mother tongue. Meanwhile, in Belgium, where teaching in the vernacular (whether that be French, Dutch or German) enjoyed a wide political consensus, the ultimate dream of most political representatives was not that all primary school pupils throughout the country be taught in the same language. Instead, contention arose over foreign language training. Policies and practices in this area laid bare the fact that French continued to be the dominant language in Belgian politics and high culture.<sup>4</sup>

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Notes for this chapter begin on page 111.

The first years after the switch in state sovereignty are analysed by means of concepts discussed within the framework of comparison in the second chapter of this book. From the first axis of comparison, borders and human territoriality, this chapter borrows the processual understanding of borders (the bordering), a relational approach towards the human-made creation and functioning of borders, and the notion that former state borders can continue to influence everyday life long after they have ceased to exist (the phantom border). The second axis of comparison, power and multiple loyalties, enables us to make clear how multiple loyalties were expressed within newly developed, recovered or reassembled power structures and power strategies. It will show how power at the time was understood in what have later analytically been referred to as the one-dimensional and two-dimensional views of power. The influence of the third axis of comparison, microhistory within a multilayered context, can be found in the attention paid to local developments, such as the implementation of language learning rules within single borderland primary schools, as well as the focus on the practices of individual borderland teachers. The significance of these local practices for the interwar European political set-up can be illustrated through a wider historical contextualisation. The analysis demonstrates that, although the making of the border through language learning in Polish Upper Silesia and the regions of Eupen, Sankt Vith and Malmedy brought about two different systems of power, it nevertheless instilled common characteristics in borderland schooling.

## Drawing the State Border Line

The existence of Polish Upper Silesia and the regions of Eupen, Sankt Vith and Malmedy came about (either being initiated or at least discussed, negotiated and confirmed) as a result of the remapping of the European continent during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Both case study borderlands joined their new states when state border lines were redrawn as administrative entities set apart from the mainland, to which a set of special legal rules applied. Although Polish Upper Silesia and the regions of Eupen, Sankt Vith and Malmedy constituted special singular entities within unitary states, their nature could hardly have differed more. Many partners were involved in the creation of Polish Upper Silesia as an autonomous entity differing from the rest of Poland. The shape of the unique legal status of the regions of Eupen, Sankt Vith and Malmedy, on the other hand, was decided upon by one person. In both cases, special administrative entities were set up in order to defuse the powder keg. Policymakers

indicated potential conflicts of interests and developed power strategies to prevent people from making decisions to the detriment of a so-constructed 'other'.<sup>5</sup>

### *Polish Upper Silesia and the State Border Line*

The way in which peacemakers in Paris in 1919 made decisions over the lands where they noticed potential conflicts of interests differed with regards to Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe.<sup>6</sup> Poland was the first in a list of Central and Eastern European states for which the acceptance of a minority treaty was made a condition for its international recognition as a nation-state.<sup>7</sup> The work of the committee drawing the borders of the newly independent Polish state led to an international policy on the protection of what came to be called national minorities.<sup>8</sup> The Minority Treaty, concluded on 28 June 1919, called on the Polish state to guarantee the protection of life, liberty and religious freedom for all inhabitants.<sup>9</sup> More specifically, Polish citizens belonging to national minorities were entitled to use their language and to finance their own churches and schools. Their rights were copied into the Polish Constitution of 1921 and repeated in the Constitution of 1935. Article 9 of the Minority Treaty stated that where a considerable proportion of guardians of children in a municipality expressed the wish to have their children taught in their mother tongue, the state was required to provide such education.<sup>10</sup> This right was restricted, however, to the German-speaking minority in Poland created as a result of the border changes brought about by the Versailles Treaty.<sup>11</sup>

Because the concept of minority was interpreted differently by the authorities in Poland and Germany, the representatives of these minorities themselves, and the League of Nations, intense debates about who was entitled to national minority rights flared up immediately after the Minority Treaty came into effect. Polish authorities defined a minority based on what they called objective criteria, such as language, religion or culture, but differed in their opinion on the place of minorities within the new Polish state. The right-wing National Democrats, under the leadership of Roman Dmowski, nourished the idea of a linguistically unified and Roman Catholic nation put forward by Polish nationalists in the nineteenth century.<sup>12</sup> The ideal was to create an ethnolinguistically homogeneous nation-state, in which inhabitants spoke a standardised national language and had no command of other languages or dialects.<sup>13</sup> Dmowski, in addition, considered Catholicism 'not an appendix to Polishness, a kind of specific colour, but something grounded in its soul, constituting this soul to a great extent'.<sup>14</sup> A more inclusive stance towards

inhabitants speaking other tongues, nonetheless characterised by an imperialist belief in the attractive potential of Polish culture, on the other hand, informed the federal agenda of Józef Piłsudski, one of the founders of the Polish independent state, and his left-wing followers for most of the interwar period.<sup>15</sup> German authorities, meanwhile, held their own subjective interpretation of minorities. In the contested Polish peripheral territories, some of the self-defined German-speaking minority inhabitants put themselves forward as spokespersons for what they presented as a homogeneous ethnic community, a *Volksgruppe*.<sup>16</sup> The League of Nations, lastly, envisioned itself as a protector of minority rights, but it lacked an effective decision-making process, as well as any powers of legal enforcement.<sup>17</sup>

Back in Versailles, decision-makers had not reached a conclusion as to whether Upper Silesia should remain German or become Polish. Eventually, they pinned their hopes on a plebiscite giving local inhabitants the possibility to determine to which state they wanted to belong.<sup>18</sup> Between the signing of the Treaty in June 1919 and the plebiscite in March 1921, Polish activists organised two uprisings against German rule which were quenched with the support of Entente militaries. In order to mobilise local inhabitants to vote in their favour, Germany elevated the plebiscite territory to the position of a separate province. As a response, the Polish side issued a constitutional act (the Organic Statute of the Silesian Voivodeship) granting the region an autonomous status if it were to join the Polish state. It also signed the new Constitution and the Treaty of Riga in the week preceding the plebiscite in order to give the impression of a well-organised state.<sup>19</sup> The Treaty of Riga provided people living in Poland and belonging to what was defined as the Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Lithuanian minorities, as well as people of Polish descent on the other side of the border, with the right to nurture their native tongue, culture and schools.

The Silesian plebiscite was the biggest experiment in self-determination in modern European history, but instead of offering a clear outcome, the behaviour of voters left many things unclear.<sup>20</sup> In the Lublinitz/Lubliniec district, for example, while 53.1 per cent of the 29,195 voters expressed the desire to remain part of Germany, including the local inhabitants from the biggest cities Lublinitz/Lubliniec and Guttentag/Dobrodzień, the city dwellers of Woischnik/Woźniki, located farther east, voted to become part of Poland.<sup>21</sup>

In a time when the use of language was put forward as the primary indicator of national belonging, the outcome of the plebiscite was at the very least confusing. The last census conducted in the German Empire before the First World War, for example, when asking about inhabitants' mother tongue, had indicated that 57 per cent of the Upper Silesian population spoke Polish (with bilingual speakers being classified as German

speakers).<sup>22</sup> Despite the dissatisfaction of many local inhabitants with the outcome, the League of Nations nevertheless accepted the outcome of the plebiscite.<sup>23</sup> In the meantime, concerns about the rumoured location of the future state border line between Germany and Poland fuelled a third uprising in May 1921. The battle reached a level of violence and atrocity unseen in any of the other territories negotiated in Paris in 1919, and unseen by local inhabitants during the First World War. The region was plunged into a civil war driven by paramilitary forces fighting for the German or Polish sides more out of a hunger for land and industry than out of nationalist incentives.<sup>24</sup> The violence that killed a thousand men, women and children served to establish a border: to install a line of division where it had previously been absent.<sup>25</sup>

Splitting Upper Silesia according to the plebiscite outcome was impossible. In the Lublinitz/Lubliniec district, for example, the voting outcome in villages did not adhere to the West-East divide so easily recognisable in the cities of the district. In Schemrowitz/Szemrowice, for example, a village to the west of Guttentag/Dobrodzień, the majority voted in favour of Polish state sovereignty, whereas in the village of Lissau/Lisów, located farther east, only a minority did so.<sup>26</sup> Wojciech Korfanty, a politician with a history in German parliaments, who was one of the Polish leaders of the Third Silesian Uprising, and who would later serve as the Deputy Prime Minister of Poland in the autumn of 1923, proposed a division line running through Upper Silesia according to which the whole Lublinitz/Lubliniec district would become Polish. His plan was acceptable to French political representatives, who favoured the idea of a great Poland, but not the Italians or the British, who were concerned about Germany's economic viability.<sup>27</sup> Finally, the League of Nations agreed that Germany would receive 71 per cent of the Upper Silesian territory and 54 per cent of its people, but Poland would receive the most heavily industrialised part. The Lublinitz/Lubliniec district was cut into two. Lublinitz/Lubliniec, Woischnik/Woźniki, and the lands around them, including the villages of Lissau/Lisów and Koschentin/Koszęcin, in total 700 km<sup>2</sup>, were transferred to Poland. The city of Guttentag/Dobrodzień and its surroundings, including the village of Schemrowitz/Szemrowice, covering over 314 km<sup>2</sup>, remained in Germany.<sup>28</sup>

Upon the division, local inhabitants could choose their citizenship and move to the other part of Upper Silesia, as a result of which Polish Upper Silesia lost approximately 175,000 local inhabitants. Their number was, however, compensated for by immigrants from other places in Poland.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, a new treaty, the Polish-German Treaty on Upper Silesia, most commonly referred to as the Geneva Convention, was signed. Aiming to resolve the ambiguous interpretations the Minority Treaty had seeded, it

conclusively put forward the subjective definition of a minority.<sup>30</sup> It listed the rights to which minorities inhabiting the former Prussian parts of Silesia (and hence not the southern part, which had belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire) were entitled for fifteen years.

With regards to primary school education, the Geneva Convention repeated the rules laid down in the Minority Treaty, giving guardians the right to freely declare the mother tongue of their children (Article 131), requiring the Polish state to finance minority schools provided they had at least forty pupils and a German-speaking teaching branch in a Polish school where a minimum of eighteen pupils volunteered (Articles 96 and 106), and allowing the existence of private minority schools.<sup>31</sup> In return, Article 133 stated that 'in lessons given at school, the national and intellectual qualities [should not be] improperly depreciated in the eyes of the pupils'.<sup>32</sup> Where it differed from the Minority Treaty, however, was in the establishment of a Mixed Commission to supervise the implementation of the Geneva Convention. Consisting of German and Polish government representatives, this was headed by Felix Calonder, a Swiss citizen.<sup>33</sup> The autonomous status of Polish Upper Silesia contributed to its special status. Since the Silesian Parliament held independent decision-making power over policies such as education, pupils in Polish Upper Silesia, for example, continued to start school at the age of six, a year earlier than in the rest of Poland.<sup>34</sup>

In the first years of the Polish Republic, policymakers in Warsaw had more than enough on their plate without interfering in Polish Upper Silesia's educational policy. The state border lines of the newly established Polish state gradually took shape between 1918 and 1923 by means of a series of wars and conflicts in the north, east, south and west: the Polish-Lithuanian War (approx. 1919–1920); the Polish-Ukrainian War (1918) and the Polish-Soviet War that reached the city of Warsaw (1919–1921); the Polish-Czechoslovak War (1919) and the Silesian Uprisings; and the Greater Polish Uprising (1918–1919). Within these wars, central national authorities often lost control over the local paramilitary groups to which they had 'outsourced' state power, and which were operating in the borderlands according to their own standards and incentives.<sup>35</sup>

In addition, Poland's economy was in a deplorable state. In 1920, Polish industrial output amounted to less than half of what had been produced on the same territory when it belonged to the German, Russian or Habsburg Empires before the outbreak of the First World War.<sup>36</sup> Poland and Yugoslavia suffered more war devastation than any other country in Central Europe, and both faced the challenge of integrating the different economic structures they inherited from pre-war political entities.<sup>37</sup> European states mostly needed to take care of themselves; the aid programmes

financed with overseas money did not substantially resolve Europe's problems.<sup>38</sup> As was the case with most other countries, Poland lacked raw materials and food, as well as the money to import them.<sup>39</sup> The state took out loans with the Polish State Loan Bank, but in 1923 inflation accelerated dramatically.<sup>40</sup> Polish Upper Silesia was less affected by these developments because the region enjoyed the highest amount of capital per capita, boasted the best industrial infrastructure and school facilities of the entire country, and benefited from a three-year duty exemption for the goods it exported to Germany.<sup>41</sup>

Besides state border and economic problems, political life was also a source of turmoil. Poland found itself in a deep crisis when the first Polish president, Gabriel Narutowicz, whose supportive stance towards national minorities was opposed by National Democrat politicians, was murdered in December 1922, five days after taking office.<sup>42</sup> When Germany and Russia eased diplomatic relations in 1922, moreover, uncertainty about the stability of the new Polish borders became widespread.<sup>43</sup> Within this political climate, universal suffrage and compulsory education were implemented. A massive task lay ahead. The overall percentage of children not attending primary school amounted to 36.9 per cent in 1922–1923, and while state administration representatives claimed to have reduced this figure to 17.4 per cent in 1925–1926, the real number was most likely higher.<sup>44</sup> Whereas some of the regions in Poland had illiteracy rates that were among the highest in Europe (officials estimated an average illiteracy rate of 50 per cent, 61 per cent in Eastern Poland and 40 per cent in the former Galician part), Upper Silesia had a long tradition of compulsory education and boasted the lowest illiteracy rate in interwar Poland (10 per cent in 1922–1923, and 3.9 per cent in 1925–1926).<sup>45</sup>

### *Eupen-Malmedy and the State Border Line*

Even more than in the case of Polish Upper Silesia, the drawing of Belgium's new eastern state border line was driven by geopolitical decisions. Initially, Belgian representatives travelled to Versailles with the megalomaniacal ideas of a range of Belgian intellectuals in their heads, most prominently Pierre Nothomb. When they found themselves in exile in France during the First World War, they formulated expansionist claims towards the Duchy of Luxembourg and wished to negotiate free access to the Scheldt River with the Netherlands as compensation for Belgians' heroic war efforts.<sup>46</sup> In Versailles, however, Belgium's image rapidly changed from a brave innocent ally to a greedy opportunist. The initial surge of empathy for small nations, along with the willingness to satisfy their aspirations, soon began to run out.<sup>47</sup> Belgium's meagre successes during the

peace negotiations have also been explained by the lack of diplomatic expertise among politicians who had been working for a neutral country.<sup>48</sup>

During the Paris Peace Conference, the decision was made to create a double military buffer zone against German expansionism. The regions of Eupen, Sankt Vith and Malmedy, a roughly 1,000-square-kilometre piece of land of no significant economic importance, as well as Neutral Moresnet, the Belgian-Prussian condominium that arose under the Treaty of Vienna in 1816 and which had been annexed by Germany during the First World War, were given to the Belgian Kingdom.<sup>49</sup> On the other side of the new Belgian-German frontier, Belgian troops continued to occupy a part of the Rhineland.<sup>50</sup> Although Belgian politicians agreed upon a buffer as a geopolitical strategy, and the enlargement of the Belgian Kingdom to the east was considered a deserved reward for the country's efforts during the First World War, support for the annexation within Belgian political circles was not unambiguous.<sup>51</sup>

While most politicians were concerned the annexation would complicate political and juridical practices within the Belgian Kingdom, depending on their perspective, this concern resulted in either the endorsement of or opposition to the proposed annexation. The Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the liberal politician Paul Hymans, for example, worried that the newly acquired regions of Eupen, Sankt Vith and Malmedy were mainly inhabited by Catholics. With universal suffrage being introduced in Belgium in 1918, the men joining the kingdom were expected to express loyalty to the Catholic Church when voting, thus increasing support for the Belgian Catholic Party.<sup>52</sup> The francophone leader of the Belgian delegation, François Ganshof, on the other hand, argued for the importance of limiting the number of German speakers joining the kingdom, as they might increase language tensions between French and Dutch speakers.<sup>53</sup>

Following the Versailles Treaty, in January 1920 Neutral Moresnet was incorporated into Belgium and the regions of Eupen, Sankt Vith and Malmedy were pulled out of the administrative unit of Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen).<sup>54</sup> Instead of a plebiscite, the architects of Europe's interwar set-up in Versailles had agreed on an unusual procedure: a consultation (*consultation populaire*).<sup>55</sup> In the first months of 1920, Belgian authorities opened a register in which local inhabitants of these three regions could write their names if they wanted their territory to stay in Germany.<sup>56</sup> At the end of the consultation, in July 1923, only 271 out of the 33,726 inhabitants entitled to vote had signed, as a result of which the region remained Belgian.<sup>57</sup> The procedure led to locals disputing the democratic character of the annexation throughout the entire interwar period. When in 1925 they received the right to vote in national elections, this dispute carried over into the political arena.<sup>58</sup>



There are probably no better indications that the national minority rights designed at French negotiation tables were not universal. In Central and Eastern Europe, national minorities were to be given the right to vote, but in Western Europe, there were, legally speaking, no national minorities to begin with. Expansions by Allied powers were considered a deserved and eternal compensation for their war efforts, and were not to be disturbed by the dissenting voices of local inhabitants. National minorities in Western Europe were not named. They had no body to appeal to. It was as if they did not exist.

Meanwhile, the regions of Eupen, Sankt Vith and Malmedy also entered Belgium under an autonomous regime, but the meaning of autonomy could hardly have been more different. Belgian authorities installed a transitional regime in the separate legal entity called Eupen-Malmedy using a well-practiced method. Within days of the signing of the Treaty of Versailles on 28 June 1919, the regions of Eupen, Sankt Vith and Malmedy were put under the supervision of Baron Henri Delvaux de Fenffe (1863–1947), governor of the province of Liège at the time, although this supervision would only come into effect after the treaty had been ratified by the Belgian government and signed by German authorities.<sup>59</sup> In the autumn of 1919, de Fenffe was replaced by Herman Baltia, the son of a Luxembourg father and a German mother, a Belgian lieutenant-general with experience in colonial service in Congo and a career in the Belgian army in the First World War.<sup>60</sup> Under his rule, Eupen-Malmedy became the only institutionalised colonial polity on the European continent. In January 1920, upon being given legislative and executive control over a region to which the Belgian Constitution was not applicable, he was told by Belgium's First Minister Léon Delacroix, 'You will be like a governor of a colony, but a colony with direct contact with the metropolis.'<sup>61</sup>

Delacroix was happy enough to hand over the responsibility for Eupen-Malmedy. With no agreements being made in Versailles on the amount of reparation debts Germany owed to Belgium, Belgian policymakers needed to get to work on the reconstruction of their ravaged country themselves.<sup>62</sup> Although the war damage was significant, especially at the former front line in the province of Western Flanders, when put in perspective, the task lying ahead was less difficult than in the newly founded Polish state. With the exception of the Belgian-German border, all of Belgium's state borders were unchallenged by its neighbours. In addition, the guns had fallen silent.

Eupen-Malmedy was initially much better off than most places elsewhere in Belgium. The borderlands had come out of the war undamaged, exported 90 per cent of locally produced goods to Germany, and were exempted from export duties for five years.<sup>63</sup> Although severely affected by

the war, Belgian production reached its pre-war level by as early as 1924, because strategic sectors such as the coal mines and the port of Antwerp had survived the war largely undamaged and the population agreed to higher taxation. But the Belgian currency remained unstable.<sup>64</sup>

Besides the economy, politics was the second major concern within the Belgian Kingdom. The war had mobilised the masses for political issues, and universal male suffrage was introduced in 1918.<sup>65</sup> After the Catholic Party had monopolised rule for thirty years, the political landscape became characterised by rapidly changing coalitions of the Liberal, Socialist and Catholic parties; twenty-five governments ruled Belgium between 1918 and 1940.<sup>66</sup>

Since Belgian politicians were mainly occupied with internal affairs, Herman Baltia had a free hand in Eupen-Malmedy. He was controlled by neither a supranational nor a national body of sovereignty (although his budget needed to be approved by the Belgian Parliament). He granted the local population Belgian citizenship and had their German citizenship revoked (although some opted to retain their German citizenship).<sup>67</sup> Baltia's policy led to the outmigration of almost 5,000 borderland inhabitants within the first years, with former state officials and professional tradesmen in particular leaving for Germany.<sup>68</sup> Once the state border line was drawn and people had moved in or out, decisions about the languages offered in borderland primary schools became a prominent way of making the border. Given the existence of compulsory education in Prussia and, later, the German Empire, Baltia's major concern did not need to be the fight against illiteracy, as it was in many other places in Belgium.<sup>69</sup> Whereas illiteracy in the Belgian Kingdom had amounted to 17 per cent before the establishment of compulsory education, a major political effort during the 1920s resulted in a significant reduction in that figure.<sup>70</sup>

From early on, Baltia engaged himself in the task of organising education, as he was convinced it could win over the minds of local children and ensure their support for the Belgian regime.<sup>71</sup> A report had already been written in July 1919 at the behest of his predecessor de Fenffe emphasising the need to take control over borderland schools as an essential first step for the transitional government.<sup>72</sup>

The crucial question Herman Baltia faced was how tolerant to be in offering primary education in German, at a time when the status of Dutch in Belgian education was being debated. At the end of 1918, Flemish activists had published a list of language demands in what they called their minimum political programme, which included the possibility of teaching Dutch in all branches and grades of education.<sup>73</sup> Apart from a language law in 1921 allowing Dutch and German to be used as an administrative language at a local level, however, it would take until the end of the 1920s

before Flemish activists experienced an electoral breakthrough and could push for a realisation of their minimum programme.<sup>74</sup>

In the first years after the war, a broader support for the proliferation of Dutch in education was lacking because it reminded people of the clumsy *Flamenpolitik* of the occupier.<sup>75</sup> Belgian nationalism, on the other hand, had been galvanised by the experience of the First World War, when citizens had taken up arms for the first time since the country's independence.<sup>76</sup> Baltia made plain his views on the importance of education and language in January 1920, expressing a desire to organise 'a kind of education . . . that makes the French language and Belgium loved and appreciated'.<sup>77</sup>

In sum, after the drawing of state border lines, rules and practices in both borderlands served to demarcate the meaning and influence of the state border line in space.<sup>78</sup> From a place where all pupils were taught in German, the two case study borderlands evolved into places where schools, or at least branches, offering teaching in two different languages were established. Language differences were anticipated and spatialised in the public sphere. Before describing the process of making borders through language learning in the early 1920s, I shall discuss here decisions concerning language regulations for primary school education upon the installation of compulsory education in Poland and Belgium.

## **Compulsory Education and Language Politics in Poland and Belgium**

In both the new Polish state and the Belgian Kingdom, compulsory education was introduced together with universal suffrage shortly after the First World War.<sup>79</sup> In both countries, primary education was to be offered in the mother tongue of the child, and the guardians of children were responsible for indicating what that mother tongue was.<sup>80</sup> This mechanism, however, created tensions whenever the mother tongue of the child was not considered the language(s) of the nation.<sup>81</sup> Regulating access to teaching in German and the conditions of (foreign) language training turned out to be crucial in the attempts to resolve the issue, whereas questions concerning how pupils were to be taught or learn their languages were considered less essential.

### *Poland*

Although in the newly established Polish state a third of the population did not have Polish as their mother tongue,<sup>82</sup> within the first years of compulsory primary schooling, most pupils were already receiving their

training in Polish, and not all pupils speaking a language other than Polish were being granted the same chance to be taught in their mother tongue. The first official statistical data gathered by Polish authorities for the 1922–1923 school year showed that 83 per cent of pupils were taught in Polish, and that although Ukrainian speakers were more numerous than German speakers, the number of schools offering teaching in Ukrainian was relatively smaller than the number of schools offering teaching in German. Whereas 83 per cent of the schools in Poland offered teaching in Polish, 11.2 per cent provided teaching in Ukrainian (also called Ruthenian at the time), and 4.1 per cent in German.<sup>83</sup> But among the German-speaking children living in Poland, important differences could be noticed. Those living in Eastern Poland were not seen as requiring different treatment from the more numerous Slavic linguistic minorities they lived among, were not protected by Article 9 of the Minority Treaty, and were considered of marginal economic importance.<sup>84</sup> As a result, only a third of these children received primary school education in their mother tongue. In contrast, in Greater Poland and West Prussia, an estimated 50 per cent of German-speaking children received teaching in German, and in Polish Upper Silesia, almost all German-speaking children could attend schools offering teaching in German.<sup>85</sup>

Polycymakers in Poland increased the percentage of the national budget spent on education from 2 to 10 per cent in 1923 and launched a reform to reduce monolingual teaching in a language other than Polish in schools for children not protected by Article 9 of the Minority Treaty.<sup>86</sup> The reform was initiated by a National Democrat, Stanisław Grabski.<sup>87</sup> Political representatives of the *Endecja* (or National Democrats) were in favour of what they called a national upbringing (*wychowanie narodowe*). This idea had developed among the Polish elite during the nineteenth century and encompassed such virtues as speaking Polish, being Roman Catholic, and patriotism towards the imagined fatherland.<sup>88</sup> Now that a Polish independent state had arisen, they used state institutions in order to turn inhabitants into good Poles. Józef Piłsudski and his followers, meanwhile, centralised education around the concept of state upbringing (*wychowanie państwowe*). According to its political ideology, the state was superior to national groups.<sup>89</sup> Pupils could have other languages or religions as long as these did not interfere with the mission to establish a modern centralised state. As a result of Grabski's reform, from 1924 onwards, a school could operate in a minority language only on the condition that 25 per cent of the local inhabitants spoke that language and could provide evidence that 40 children wanted to attend the school. If, however, the guardians of 20 children in a school district requested teaching in Polish, all of the children in that school were to be taught in two languages.<sup>90</sup> As

a result of Grabski's reform, most of the primary schools offering teaching in Ukrainian changed to bilingual schools offering teaching in Polish and Ukrainian.<sup>91</sup> In Poland's most eastern province (Województwo Tarnopolskie), for example, statistics revealed that, whereas in the 1911–1912 school year, 405 schools had offered teaching in Polish, and 704 in Ukrainian, only a year after the *Lex Grabski* came into effect, the number of Ukrainian schools had already dropped to 254, while 304 bilingual Polish-Ukrainian schools had been established (alongside the increased number of Polish-speaking schools, of which there were now 754). Five years later, the number of Polish-speaking schools had fallen (to 653), as had the number of Ukrainian-speaking schools (to 144), but the number of bilingual schools had increased to 504.<sup>92</sup>

In contrast to Polish Upper Silesia, the rights of children to receive education in Ukrainian could be overruled because they were not safeguarded by supranational law. When in 1925, for example, the guardians of 42 children in the village of Bartatów (Powiat Ogródek Jagielloński, Województwo Lwowskie) opted for primary education in Ukrainian, compared with the parents of 29 children preferring Polish, the district administration decided not to establish a Ukrainian-speaking school to be attended by both sets of children. Instead, they interviewed the first set of parents, who were pressured into saying that it was a bilingual school they sought.<sup>93</sup> Whereas the local struggle against Polonisation could take a similar form to the one in Polish Upper Silesia in the interwar years, there could also be marked differences. The Ukrainian equivalent of the organisation responsible for the education of the German minority in Polish Upper Silesia, the German Upper Silesian National Association of Polish Silesia for Minority Rights Protection (Deutschoberschlesischer Volksbund für Polnisch-Schlesien zur Wahrung der Minderheitsrechte – hereinafter Volksbund), was an organisation called Native School (Ridna Skola), which coordinated a network of 21 privately run Ukrainian-speaking schools in 1925–1926<sup>94</sup> and campaigned for education in Ukrainian. The organisation was less well-funded than the Volksbund, but the tenacity with which it pursued its cause, both in the Polish Parliament and beyond traditional political forums (including terrorist attacks against members of the government), caused Polish state officials to step up the programme of Polonisation through education.<sup>95</sup> The fact that Ukrainian speakers were more engaged than, for example, Belarusian speakers can be explained by the fact that the experiences at the end of and shortly after the First World War had raised national consciousness among Ukrainians, whereas Belarusian speakers lacked the stimulus to question power constellations and advocate their reshaping.<sup>96</sup> In contrast to Polish Upper Silesia, however, local inhabitants often resisted the idea of a school being

established in their villages. As the Polish ethnographer Józef Obrębski noted at the time, schools were mistrusted and perceived as new institutions that would prepare children for a career outside local communities.<sup>97</sup> Entire villages protested against the establishment of their local school, and mayors did not dare to make parents pay the fines issued by Polish school inspectors.<sup>98</sup>

Since they were considered incorporable into the Polish nation-state, speakers of a Slavic language other than Polish, such as Ukrainian (but also Russian, Belarusian and Ruthenian), received less favourable conditions for learning their vernacular, or were even denied the right to learn it. However, while Polish authorities did indeed aim to reduce the number of pupils being taught in a Slavic language other than Polish, they were more permissive towards pupils enrolled in German-speaking or Jewish schools (the latter offering teaching in either Yiddish or Hebrew). In the unstable political and economic conditions at the time, Polish state representatives counted on the economic capital and experience of German speakers and Jews to support the post-war recovery.<sup>99</sup> The country witnessed an overall decrease in the number of German-speaking and Jewish public schools throughout the interwar period, but the representatives of these groups had the financial means to build and maintain private schools.<sup>100</sup> Whereas in 1924, 1,102 public primary schools in Poland had offered education in German, by 1925–1926 this number had already fallen to 699, and by 1937–1938 to 160. Meanwhile, however, 234 private schools flourished.<sup>101</sup> The specificity of Jewish interwar education originated from the fact that Jews were considered a religious, not a national, minority, and were therefore not entitled to receive education in Yiddish or Hebrew in public primary schools. 60 per cent of Jewish children were already attending these public schools in the mid-1920s, and their number increased to 84 per cent within a decade.<sup>102</sup>

In particular, Jewish children who had previously lived under the Russian regime recalled state education as an encounter with modernity enabling them to develop a loyalty with a world beyond that of the *cheder*, the traditional elementary school in which children were taught the basics of Judaism. One youngster, submitting an autobiographical composition for a writing contest organised by the Jewish Scientific Institute in 1939, lyrically described how ‘seeing the purity of the school class, I felt a revulsion towards the dirty, smoky cheder’.<sup>103</sup> A network of approximately 300 privately run primary schools was already flourishing in 1925, and would increase afterwards, although the exact number of schools offering teaching in Yiddish or Hebrew is difficult to determine because they operated under different umbrella organisations, each having their own method of counting.<sup>104</sup> The largest organisation of orthodox Jews, Chorew, espous-

ing a traditional religiously oriented approach to teaching, oversaw the schooling of 60 percent of the Jewish children receiving private education. And yet, despite its growth over the years, Chorew saw some of its schools closed after Polish school inspectors found the quality of education to be unsatisfactory.<sup>105</sup> Non-orthodox Jewish private schools, on the other hand, paved the way for a political radicalisation of young Jews, whether as Zionists within the Hebrew schools coordinated by the Tarbut, or as atheists within the Yiddish schools of the Central Jewish School Organisation (*Di Tsentrale Yidishe Shul-Organizatsye – TSYSHO*), to name only the two largest organisations within the rapidly growing and diversifying school landscape at the time.<sup>106</sup>

Interestingly, policymakers in Poland did not overly concern themselves with how foreign language training was organised. It remained unregulated in Polish-speaking schools until the introduction of the primary school law of 1932, which outlined a curriculum without foreign language training.<sup>107</sup> The Minority Treaty offered the possibility of requiring Polish to be taught as a foreign language in minority schools, but Polish authorities did not make use of it until 1926.<sup>108</sup>

Upon the establishment and implementation of compulsory education, besides the formulation of language learning rules, Polish state representatives were also occupied with finding a balance between the competencies of the state and those of the Catholic Church. A secular public school system was opted for, in which clergymen could teach children religion for two hours a week, and religious schools had to operate privately.<sup>109</sup> The power balance between the state and the church changed when a concordat signed between the Vatican and Poland in 1925 granted the church a role exceeding its constitutional rights, leading to a power struggle between state and church that would not ebb until the end of the interwar period.<sup>110</sup>

The new state's political concern over the question of which language pupils were to learn, and in which schools, outweighed questions of how children were to learn a language.<sup>111</sup> Teachers and school textbook writers could largely improvise teaching content until the implementation of the primary school law in 1932.<sup>112</sup> Meanwhile, a multitude of scientific studies on children and education saw the light. Scientists in Poland shared an interest in educating free citizens willing to take up responsibility for the new state, but their findings often overlapped, contrasted or displayed incongruities.<sup>113</sup> The first current of interest aligned with cultural reform pedagogy and gathered scientists to work out methods for learning Polish based on the psychological development of children.<sup>114</sup> The second current centralised the development of children. Books written by foreign child specialists were translated into Polish, while Polish scientists who

had received their education in Western Europe and moved to Poland upon its independence published overviews of pedagogical scientific findings abroad in Polish.<sup>115</sup>

### *Belgium*

Upon the establishment of compulsory education in their countries, Polish and Belgian authorities pursued different aims. Whereas in Poland, efforts were concentrated on promoting a wider use of Polish as the primary language of instruction at the expense of other, mostly Slavic, languages, in Belgium, the prescribed ideal for elite pupils was to achieve bilingualism, not by means of bilingual teaching throughout the entire primary school curriculum, but through intensive foreign language training starting in the final years of primary school education. According to the Belgian programme of studies of 1897, school authorities could, but were not obliged to, introduce the learning of a second language from the fifth year.<sup>116</sup> This recommendation was implemented differently in the north and south of the country, laying bare the fact that Belgian schools continued to privilege French in foreign language training. Most French-speaking children in Wallonia finished their primary school in French without receiving training in a foreign language, whereas in Flanders, all Dutch-speaking children received education in their mother tongue and were offered French as a foreign language.<sup>117</sup>

In addition, primary schools in Flanders were allowed to operate in French without the requirement to offer lessons in Dutch. These schools were not that numerous, but they nevertheless remained popular given the political and economic opportunities for citizens with a mastery of French.<sup>118</sup> Every guardian living in Flanders could declare his child's mother tongue to be French and put his child in a French-speaking school. The fact that whoever dared to question a guardian's choice was legally obliged to pay a fine demonstrates how deep the wounds of the School Wars – fought verbally between the Liberal and Catholic parties in the late nineteenth century over the primacy of state versus Catholic schools – still were.<sup>119</sup> Although the law was in the first instance meant to guarantee guardians' religious freedom, it also guaranteed their freedom to choose the language of their children's primary school instruction. During the First World War, an alderman from Brussels had been deported for defending the free school choice policy for French speakers in the face of opposition from the German occupiers, who privileged the use of Dutch given its proximity to German. Perhaps the unpleasant memory of this episode played an additional role in the consequent implementation of the law once the war was over, although this was a local phenomenon



probably unknown to many school principals in Flanders during the interwar period.<sup>120</sup>

In a way, one could thus say that French speakers in Flanders enjoyed a similar position to the German and Jewish minorities in Poland. As was also the case in Poland, there were children facing the consequences of this particular order of social segregation. The number of primary schools where Dutch was the language of instruction in Wallonia, for example, could be counted on one hand. In 1929, a Flemish priest indicated that Flemish miners working in Wallonia were not aware they could demand Dutch as the primary language of education for their children.<sup>121</sup> These miners were often illiterate and did not have any political representation. Flemish activists were more occupied with striving to turn Ghent University into the first Dutch-speaking university of the country (which would eventually happen in 1930) than in guaranteeing language rights for miners' children in Wallonia.<sup>122</sup> As was the case with Belarusian speakers in Poland, Dutch speakers in Wallonia had not been made or had not become conscious of their language rights.

However, in contrast to interwar Poland, Belgium had installed a complicated system enabling changes to be made in the language of instruction in primary schools in multilingual areas. The dominant language in primary education was defined for each municipality by means of a language survey (*talentelling*) centrally organised once every ten years. A simple majority was sufficient to ensure that French, Dutch or German would be the leading language of instruction in local primary schools for the next ten years. Once 20 per cent of the local inhabitants had declared a mother tongue other than the dominant one, they were entitled to special facilities. These facilities were initiated in the Brussels agglomeration and municipalities along the language border established by the language survey.<sup>123</sup> If at least twenty children spoke a language different to the one offered in school, for example, a separate class had to be set up within the school. Individual school principals had the authority to make these changes on an ongoing basis, but school inspectors ultimately had the decisive say.<sup>124</sup> Moreover, if a switch of languages in primary schools did not satisfy the local inhabitants, they could apply to the Belgian minister responsible for education in order to be granted the approval to offer a language of instruction that differed from the mother tongue of the children and to start foreign language instruction in the third year of primary school instead of the fifth year.<sup>125</sup>

It has been argued that this system of checks and balances accelerated Frenchification in the Brussels agglomeration, where Dutch-speaking guardians preferred education in French because they believed it would increase their children's professional possibilities.<sup>126</sup> On the other hand,

this regulation also caused German to be re-established as the main language of instruction in municipalities belonging to the historically German-speaking part of Belgium, such as Welkenraedt, Boholz/Bého and Arel/Arlon. However, Belgian authorities did not entirely accept a return to the principle of a free use of languages laid down in the Belgian Constitution. Not only did they fail to train any additional German language teachers, but the non-binding programme of studies issued by the ministry responsible for educational affairs in 1922 referred only to the importance of French and Dutch as the cornerstone of the rational and linguistic development of primary school pupils. The programme did not mention German; it merely stated that ‘a thorough knowledge of French is indispensable for the not too numerous German population living along the borders with Wallonia’.<sup>127</sup> In 1924, an additional non-binding programme of studies was issued for German-speaking schools in Wallonia, prescribing that foreign language learning in French should be started in the first year.<sup>128</sup>

In Belgium, the question of which languages pupils were taught, and when, was also considered more important than how pupils were to learn these languages. While pedagogues from different countries praised the 1922 programme of studies for judiciously adapting its aims to the language learning capacities of the public, now that compulsory education had been introduced, the programme skilfully managed to allow school authorities to adhere to the pedagogical demands of the programme, a mixture of encyclopaedic learning and Herbartianism, without having to support these ambitions.<sup>129</sup> The guidelines were formulated in a deliberately vague way because the Belgian state did not foresee itself playing a large role in primary schooling. Whether or not pedocentrism, which continued to enjoy support in liberal circles, was practiced depended on the initiative of individual schools. As a result, Catholic schools could distance themselves from reform pedagogy altogether and not only endorse but also propagate a dogmatic form of Catholicism, Christocentrism, exalted above and outside of time.<sup>130</sup> Indeed, the long-standing power balance between the Catholic Church and the Belgian state, based on a mutual agreement worked out during the School Wars at the end of the nineteenth century in order to prevent further conflicts over education, remained unchallenged throughout the 1920s.

## **Making the Border**

After state border lines were drawn, power structures and power strategies in Polish Upper Silesia and in Eupen-Malmedy were reconsidered and re-

arranged, all in an attempt to bestow the new spatial division with meaning.<sup>131</sup> The making of the border through legislation in the two case study borderlands served to confirm and maintain the demarcation carved out by the border line.<sup>132</sup> The solutions introduced to appease the tensions of multilingualism in Polish Upper Silesia and Eupen-Malmedy were strikingly similar. Two sorts of primary schools were set up in order to divide what previously had been a single space and separate children according to their supposed vernacular. Within that process, four elements were of crucial importance: the access to teaching in German, the conditions of (foreign) language training, the situation of teachers, and the role of religion. However, whereas the Silesian Parliament decided to ignore the language learning rules prescribed by the Polish state, instead adopting and adapting the educational laws from Prussian times until 1932, Baltia's plan for language learning in Eupen-Malmedy was from the very start deeply rooted in existing Belgian language regulations for primary education.

### *Polish Upper Silesia*

As has been demonstrated, of all the minorities living in the Second Polish Republic, the German minority in Polish Upper Silesia was granted the most favourable conditions for organising primary school education in German. The Geneva Convention of 1922 stipulated, for example, that guardians in Polish Upper Silesia could choose to send their children to primary schools across the state border line in German Upper Silesia. It also guaranteed guardians in Polish Upper Silesia the freedom to enrol their children in a local German-speaking or Polish-speaking school.<sup>133</sup> Nevertheless, the Silesian Parliament, which held decision-making authority over language learning measures (and chose not to consider Polish legislation a source of inspiration) aimed to reduce the number of German-speaking schools.<sup>134</sup> The dispute settlement framework set up by the League of Nations entitled anyone who felt their rights to have been violated – whether they be borderland inhabitants, Polish statesmen, German representatives or international bodies – to have their case heard. In this way, discussions concerning access to primary education became an important means to make the border. A closer look at the local level illustrates how negotiations and decisions over language learning generated the border in social space.

Schools in Upper Silesia remained under German jurisdiction until the end of the 1921–1922 school year.<sup>135</sup> A rare insight into how pupils experienced their education between 1918 and 1922 is offered by the autobiographical compositions submitted for a writing contest organised by the Polish Sociological Institute (Instytut Socjologiczny) in 1934, in which

youngsters aged between seventeen and twenty-one reflected upon their early days in school. A majority of the thirty-two writers did not like having to attend school, mostly because the classes had as many as sixty pupils, or because learning how to read and write in German was difficult for them. One author, for example, revealed: 'Learning was very hard for me because I did not know any letters in German, because everything my father had taught me was in Polish.'<sup>136</sup> Another wrote: 'I started school in 1920/21. I only know that I went to a German school all year. I learned poorly how to learn, and especially read. When it came time for us to read, I hid behind my friends' backs just to avoid my turn, which I often managed to do.'<sup>137</sup> The Silesian Uprisings are presented in these autobiographical compositions as an almost visible rupture in the lives of the children. In the words of one author, who had been a seven-year-old boy at the time: 'And so I went for three months to the German school. Later, the Silesian Uprising broke out.'<sup>138</sup> What followed was vividly remembered by a young writer of about the same age:

But then came the upheaval and all the German teachers had to scarp. There was no school for almost a year, and when it started again, I was enrolled straight into the second grade. Here I quickly began to understand Polish orthography and learned to read in the blink of an eye. I was admired by the teachers. The word 'freedom' was understood differently back then, especially by schoolchildren. We thought that 'freedom' meant we could do anything we liked. So, we went to school when we wanted to, and we also left when we wanted to.<sup>139</sup>

Jan Szczepański, the sociologist who interpreted these compositions in the mid-1930s, concluded that the tumult of these years had deeply undermined the authority of teachers in Upper Silesia, and that children had developed a system of shared values among themselves that was foreign to the institution of the school.<sup>140</sup>

In the first half of 1922, about 30 per cent of the parents in the Lubliniec district signed their children up for education in German.<sup>141</sup> Among them was the father of Paweł and Małgorzata Helisch, who wanted his children to attend the public German-speaking primary school in the village of Koszęcin. Several reasons may have supported his decision. German had been the standard language in primary education for decades and knowing the language could help his children's career prospects. At the time, it was also unknown whether, and for how long, the new independent Polish state would last. When the German-speaking school in Koszęcin opened in June 1924, welcoming twenty-nine pupils from the village, Paweł and Małgorzata were not among them. An official from the Silesian authorities had convinced their father to give up on the idea.<sup>142</sup> The fa-

ther now claimed that, as a Polish citizen, he wanted his children to learn both Polish and German. The official had explained to him that a foreign language would be taught in the village's newly created Polish-speaking school but not in the German-speaking school located one street farther away.<sup>143</sup> Even though this was not true, as will be explained later in this chapter, the official had secured the children for the Polish-speaking school. After the official had written his name as Jan Helisch in the resignation list (containing the names of parents who wished to withdraw their application to the German-speaking school), the father chose to sign his name underneath as Johann Helisch. Was it a sudden appreciation of the benefits of bilingualism that caused the father to change his mind? Respect for the advice of an educated man? Or a feeling of intimidation in the presence of such an ardent Polish nationalist? Did he sign with his German name by force of habit or could we perhaps read it as a subversive political practice? We will never know. We do know, however, that, irrespective of the linguistic plans nationalists had in mind, Johann Helisch had his own motives for sending his children to a primary school in a specific language. Although about 30 per cent of the parents in the Lubliniec district, just like Helisch, applied to have their children attend a German-speaking school in 1922, Silesian authorities declared two-thirds of these applications invalid.<sup>144</sup>

A group of borderland parents whose children had been denied access sent a complaint to the Mixed Commission in Katowice supervising the implementation of the Geneva Convention. The Mixed Commission rapped the Silesian authorities over the knuckles for contravening the will of guardians who wished to identify their children as members of the German minority, and for completing school applications themselves in the absence of such guardians.<sup>145</sup> The Mixed Commission's intervention postponed the closure of most of the German-speaking primary schools in the Lubliniec district, but could not prevent it.<sup>146</sup> In one of the most prominent cases, the public German-speaking primary school in the city of Lubliniec was closed in 1922 and replaced by a Polish-German bilingual school. Despite being obliged to do so, Silesian authorities did not hurry to provide teaching in German.<sup>147</sup> They were awaiting decisions on the international scene which they believed could bring about changes to the supranational set-up they felt constrained them. Germany faced an economic depression and experienced three internal coups in the autumn of 1923. In particular, the installation of a Rhenish Republic by a separatist government enjoying the support of France sparked the hope that separatists in the German part of Upper Silesia would follow suit, thus calling the Geneva Convention into question.<sup>148</sup> When that prospect vanished in 1924, public German minority schools were opened. Their number gradually decreased in the

years to follow. In the Lubliniec district, only the German primary school in Koszęcin remained open until the outbreak of the Second World War.

Along with access to education in German, language regulation was used as a strategy to make the border. Looking at the regulation for Polish Upper Silesia, it is hard to believe that a battle over the language of education escalated here in the second half of the 1920s. In contrast to Poland, where foreign language learning was unregulated at the time, the Silesian Parliament used its decision-making power over language learning measures in order to copy the former Prussian school law that offered both mother tongue and foreign language training, and to prescribe the same amount of mother tongue and foreign language training in the Polish-speaking and German-speaking teaching branches. Children in Polish Upper Silesia received more hours of both mother tongue instruction and foreign language training than children in the rest of Poland did. In both branches, mother tongue training amounted to ten hours a week, and foreign language training to three hours a week from the fourth year onwards.<sup>149</sup> Over the years, the amount of Polish in both curricula decreased in order to provide more room for other subjects, such as history, but the hours of language training remained higher than elsewhere in Poland and constituted a clear marker of the region's distinct past and current status.<sup>150</sup>

However, the battle over primary education did not centre around the question of how many hours should be spent teaching in the mother tongue and how many on foreign language training. Instead, the conflict was the result of the determination of Polish and German nationalists to offer a monolingual primary school pathway, and the fact that this goal went against the wishes of many local inhabitants. For instance, the school principal of the public primary school in Lubliniec, which offered Polish- and German-speaking branches, D. Zych, started his school chronicle as follows: 'After centuries of servitude in Silesian schools, the mother tongue of the Silesian people can now be heard: the Polish language, which no Teutonic Order was able to tear out.'<sup>151</sup> In one sentence, the author nationalised the tongue of the local population and made it the victor over the Teutonic Order, a *pars pro toto* for German expansionism. His words illustrate how Polish nationalists intertwined language with nationalism and history in their discourses.<sup>152</sup> Paul Poralla, the spokesperson of the institution coordinating German minority schooling in Polish Upper Silesia (*Deutscher Schulverein*), on the other hand, spoke of 'skilful manoeuvring' in meeting the language demands for Polish so as not to 'damage the special mission to educate German people'.<sup>153</sup> But Zych and Poralla often worked with parents who, just like Johann Helisch in Koszęcin, were weighing up multiple loyalties when choosing a school for their children.

In the same resignation list Helisch signed in the early 1920s, we find husbands and wives who disagreed about which primary school to send their children (even accusing the other of having applied while drunk), parents who wanted to offer their children a bilingual education, parents who declared that they had made up their minds, and a guardian with Polish citizenship who considered education in German inadequate for an orphan with German citizenship.<sup>154</sup>

A third way of spatialising power was to steer who was to teach borderland children their language and how. The Minority Treaty enabled teachers holding German certificates to remain employed in Poland. Whereas teachers in Greater Poland and Western Prussia were required to pass a Polish language exam, the Geneva Convention of 1922 allowed teachers in Polish Upper Silesia to continue in their profession without having their competencies checked.<sup>155</sup> And yet, the measure did not prevent many teachers from moving to Germany. In 1922, the school year in the formerly German part of Polish Upper Silesia began with 1,200 teachers, compared to 3,500 the year before.<sup>156</sup> Among them were Konrad Świerczek and Franz Chmiel. Both had taught German when their home grounds lay in the German Empire. Konrad Świerczek was involved in the plebiscite supporting the Polish cause, and after the switch to Polish state sovereignty oversaw the teaching of the Polish language as the first school inspector of the Lubliniec district. As he did not know Polish sufficiently, he took a state exam in Polish language and history in 1925.<sup>157</sup> Franz Chmiel, on the other hand, found work within the German-speaking teaching branch. He became a clerk responsible for school issues in the Volksbund, the organisation representing the German minority, and in 1923 advanced to the position of school principal of the German-speaking school in Koszęcin.<sup>158</sup> The decisions these teachers made were not primarily based on their language competencies. They needed to adhere to the demands laid down in the Geneva Convention and operate within school branches offering education in different languages. German and Polish nationalists provided them with additional incentives to pursue their respective causes.

Within the Weimar Republic, there was wide support for the belief that Germans living abroad needed to be empowered in order to be immune to Polish assimilation pressures. Revising the Treaty of Versailles remained a constant aim in German foreign policy, shared by all political parties and most societal groups.<sup>159</sup> Until that aim could be realised, the German minority was to stay in place and to preserve and protect German culture through speaking, teaching and learning German.<sup>160</sup> German authorities therefore secretly sponsored teachers such as Franz Chmiel so that they could earn even more than teachers working in Germany. In favouring Polish Upper Silesia over Greater Poland and Pomerania in the distribu-

tion of teaching bonuses, political representatives of the Weimar Republic indicated the importance they attached to Upper Silesia.<sup>161</sup> When Polish authorities discovered this secret sponsoring in 1928, forty-two teachers from Polish Upper Silesia were dismissed.<sup>162</sup> And yet, Polish authorities also gave a bonus to teachers in Polish Upper Silesia.

As local teachers made up only a third of the teaching personnel, teachers from elsewhere in Poland willing to move to Polish Upper Silesia were in great demand and could count on a financial incentive to relocate.<sup>163</sup> Even during the nineteenth century, Polish nationalists had considered terrains beyond the western borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, such as Silesia, as Polish.<sup>164</sup> One such Polish nationalist was the school principal of the Lubliniec primary school, D. Zych, who had taught Polish in pre-war Galicia and had moved to Polish Upper Silesia with the aim of Polonising local inhabitants. He systematically encouraged children to leave the German-speaking branch and switch to the Polish-speaking one in his school. The teachers within his school, however, did not necessarily endorse the principal's nationalist cause. The school chronicle reveals that all teachers, whether local or immigrated, whether active in the Polish-speaking branch or the German-speaking one, undertook joint initiatives to support a cause they considered more important: to ease the lives of poor pupils.<sup>165</sup> Raising money for shoes and providing food bridged the various backgrounds and national motivations of the teaching personnel.<sup>166</sup>

At the same time, local talent was to be trained. In Polish Upper Silesia, special teaching seminaries were set up for those wanting to teach in Polish-speaking branches because local inhabitants were considered insufficiently prepared to start teaching in Polish.<sup>167</sup> Locals wanting to teach in a German-speaking branch, however, needed to attend one of the Polish state teaching seminaries outside Polish Upper Silesia. These seminaries lacked access to the latest pedagogical developments because Polish prospective teachers were being prepared to teach in German and replace these minority teachers.<sup>168</sup> By the end of the interwar period, not a single institution of higher learning in Poland was still offering training for German-speaking teachers.<sup>169</sup>

Having enough teachers to provide language instruction was a constant preoccupation within Polish Upper Silesia. Polish and German policymakers concentrated on peopling the borderlands with teachers loyal to their new regimes, whose teaching would guarantee the upbringing of loyal future citizens.<sup>170</sup> With the hindsight of time, it can be said that Polish authorities achieved their goal. In the 1940s, teachers were among the most loyal Polish citizens in Polish Upper Silesia. A Polish questionnaire composed shortly after the Second World War revealed that 152 of the 225



interwar teachers of the Lubliniec district wanted to be employed again in local schools.<sup>171</sup>

The fourth and final element playing a role in the making of the border through language learning was religion. The predominantly Catholic inhabitants of Polish Upper Silesia appreciated the greater religious freedom pupils enjoyed in school after the lands had switched state sovereignty. Because the Silesian Parliament did not demand a clear separation of church and state in education, as was the case elsewhere in Poland, Catholic schools were able to dominate the Polish Upper Silesian interwar school landscape.<sup>172</sup> Pupils in Polish Upper Silesia saw their religious courses supervised by the newly founded Katowice diocese, instead of by the Polish state, and received twice as many religious classes as pupils elsewhere in Poland (four hours).<sup>173</sup>

Clergymen did not shy away from asking for more. In the summer of 1924, for example, clergymen argued to Silesian authorities that an increase in religious teaching from four to five hours a week would help children to learn Polish: 'the lack of language skills among Upper Silesian children makes the study's instruction significantly difficult for the teacher and forces him to proceed more slowly, and this is especially true, the more difficult the topic is'.<sup>174</sup> They used the same argument as their fore-runners. In 1890, the Roman Catholic Bishop Kopp in Upper Silesia had asked the Prussian Minister of Education to introduce an additional hour of religious instruction, claiming that there was an insufficient knowledge of the German language among local children, while at the same time pursuing his own agenda of increasing the amount of religious teaching.<sup>175</sup> Since the *Kulturkampf*, people in Upper Silesia had bridged the language divides that German and Polish nationalists wanted to install by means of practices such as bilingual masses, thereby establishing a distinct social space that remained visible in practices long after the border lines were redrawn.<sup>176</sup>

According to the Polish Constitution and the Geneva Convention, it was not only Roman Catholics but the members of every confessional minority who possessed the right to practise their religion in their mother tongue. If at least twelve pupils of a certain denomination also belonged to a linguistic national minority, a school had to organise minority religious courses.<sup>177</sup> With only 0.9 per cent of its inhabitants Protestant, the Lubliniec district was the least multiconfessional of all Polish Upper Silesia's districts, where on average 6 per cent were Protestant.<sup>178</sup> Nevertheless, it is somewhat surprising to find in the school chronicle of the bilingual school in Lubliniec that eleven children attending the school in 1923–1924 were Protestant, seven of them following the Polish-speaking curriculum, four the German-speaking one.<sup>179</sup> Was this number pure coincidence or the re-

sult of skilful manipulation? These children received their religious education together and were taught by one teacher.<sup>180</sup> Meanwhile, the Roman Catholic children received their religious teaching separately, either in the Polish-speaking branch or the German-speaking one. Apart from Protestant children, no traces of pupils holding other beliefs were found in the archival documents of the public primary school in Lubliniec.

Despite the Geneva Convention being equally applicable to German Upper Silesia, education in Polish existed merely as a formality on the other side of the state border line. Georges Kaeckenbeeck, President of the Arbitral Tribunal of Upper Silesia in the interwar years, cited the composition of the Convention as the main reason for this discrepancy. Fearing that borderland parents would suffer reprisals from German authorities, the Polish delegation negotiating the Convention's conditions had proposed that census data on children's mother tongues be used as the basis for a policy on minority schools. They correctly foresaw that most of the educated inhabitants who felt an affinity with Polishness, since they had been active on the Polish side in the Uprisings, would soon resettle to Polish Upper Silesia, while inhabitants who felt an affinity with Germanness (*Deutschtum*) in Polish Upper Silesia, whose ranks included great landowners, would prefer to keep their lands.<sup>181</sup> The Geneva Convention nevertheless eventually required guardians to apply for minority education, which turned out to be more favourable for the German party. There was indeed an abundance of local inhabitants willing to play a leading role in the Volksbund, which determinedly strove for the continuation of education in German in Polish Upper Silesia. By contrast, a similarly zealous movement capable of building a Polish school system from scratch in German Upper Silesia was lacking.<sup>182</sup> 'It was therefore', according to Kaeckenbeeck, 'the inequality wrought by the different working of the principles of the convention under different conditions which was at the root of the whole difficulty . . . the German authorities had little else to do than let the principles of the convention work in their favour.'<sup>183</sup>

The prestige of German culture, and the prospect it held of a more prosperous professional career, was something Polish culture could not compete with, either in German or Polish Upper Silesia.<sup>184</sup> According to Marek Korowicz, a Polish nationalist and state official in Polish Upper Silesia, there were 83,000 Polish-speaking children in German Upper Silesia in 1925, of whom only 1,288 attended a Polish minority school; by the mid-1930s, their number had decreased to 961. Whereas in Polish Upper Silesia, German minority schools attracted twice as many pupils as would have been expected from the census data gathered in 1925, in German Upper Silesia, only one out of seventy Polish-speaking borderland pupils received their education in Polish. By the 1930s, the number of border-

land pupils attending German-speaking schools in Polish Upper Silesia had come to correspond to census data, whereas the discrepancy had accelerated to one out of four hundred on the other side of the border.<sup>185</sup> And yet Georges Kaeckenbeeck concluded that in the ardent struggle over minority schools in the second half of the 1920s and the early 1930s, ‘the greatest change’ was endured by the German minority in Polish Upper Silesia. That struggle, he argued, ‘was one between cultures – and ultimately between states – but the victims were all men, women and children, who forfeited a quiet and normal life by becoming the instruments of contending forces’.<sup>186</sup>

### *Eupen-Malmedy*

As was the case in Polish Upper Silesia, the school environment of pupils in the regions of Eupen, Sankt Vith and Malmedy had already changed before these borderlands switched sovereignty, with the authority of teachers being deeply affected in the process. In the autumn of 1919, new teachers recruited in Wallonia and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg started work in the primary schools of Eupen, Sankt Vith and Malmedy, where they initially taught alongside German teachers. Hermann Heutz, recalling his time as a schoolboy in the village of Hauset, wrote:

Downstairs in the senior class, the Headmaster K. opened the door and windows and sang with his schoolboys ‘The Watch on the Rhine’ with all his might.<sup>187</sup> The junior teacher Th. called on the ‘little ones’, the group to which I belonged, to open our reading books so as to reveal the image of the German imperial couple. He then asked us to scratch out the eyes of the deposed couple with the nibs of our pens. We children took to this task with enthusiasm, in ignorance of the situation and filled with the joy of destruction.<sup>188</sup>

Moreover, when his new Belgian teacher gave him an exercise book with a lion eating an eagle on its cover, Hermann’s father tore the cover off, upon which his teacher refused to further correct the boy’s homework in that book.<sup>189</sup>

Once Herman Baltia had assumed power over the newly created entity Eupen-Malmedy, he used language learning in primary schools as a crucial means of making the border. This process was characterised by the same four elements as in the case of Polish Upper Silesia: the access to teaching in German, the conditions of (foreign) language training, the situation of teachers and the role of religion. First, he copied Belgium’s primary school law (issued in 1914 and implemented in 1918) almost in its entirety into local legislation, enshrining in law the principle that borderland pupils were to be taught in their mother tongue.<sup>190</sup> In order to

determine the mother tongue of borderland inhabitants, he issued a language survey, which revealed that there were 45,000 German speakers, 4,000 French speakers and 8,500 bilinguals.<sup>191</sup>

As a consequence, he divided Eupen-Malmedy into two language zones in accordance with the results of the survey, creating a smaller French-speaking zone centred around the city of Malmedy and a larger German-speaking zone centred around the cities of Eupen and Sankt Vith. The inhabitants who had declared themselves bilingual were included in the French-speaking region.<sup>192</sup> The fact that Baltia established schools according to the results of the survey clearly shows that it was not his initial intention to reduce the number of German-speaking schools. In fact, he also pumped money into the renovation of classrooms abandoned during the latter days of the First World War.<sup>193</sup> Joining the Belgian Kingdom under these conditions made even the former colonel's opponents appreciate his language policy. The exception was the Royal Flemish Academy, who argued that the vernacular spoken in Eupen was not German, but Dutch, and that primary education should therefore be offered in Dutch instead of in German – an argument Baltia rejected.<sup>194</sup>

Baltia was more cautious in offering local inhabitants other freedoms: 'Across all classes, from patricians to workers, these people learn a great deal of discipline from the army or the school. They misuse freedom if it is offered to them too quickly', Baltia reported to the Belgian prime minister.<sup>195</sup> He introduced a latent form of censorship, which caused the press to cease criticising both the borderlands' switch to Belgian sovereignty and his policies.<sup>196</sup> In addition, upon discovering with horror that a considerable number of children were crossing the border to receive their education in Germany, he introduced special measures for Eupen-Malmedy: he declared German primary school certificates invalid, threatened to sanction parents unable to justify their children's school absences, and forbade the use of books from Germany within Eupen-Malmedy.<sup>197</sup>

Establishing Eupen-Malmedy as a colonial entity in order to prepare the formerly German lands for full integration within a country boasting one of the most liberal constitutions in the world, the Baltia regime made overt the marriage of liberal and colonial ways of thinking that prevailed within the Belgian Kingdom. While being forbidden to cross the state border for their education, borderland pupils were nevertheless guaranteed primary education in either German or French. Furthermore, in contrast to borderland pupils in Polish Upper Silesia, they had no cause to fear that education in German would disappear any time soon.

At first glance, language learning in Eupen-Malmedy bore a number of similarities to language learning elsewhere in Belgium. First, as was the case for Dutch-speaking children in Flanders, pupils in the German

language zone enjoyed education in their mother tongue and received foreign language training in French. Second, as was the case for Dutch-speaking children in Wallonia, German-speaking and bilingual children in the French language zone were to attend school in French. Third, as was the case for French-speaking children in Flanders, a school was set up in Eupen to provide education for the children of Belgian civil servants moving to the region. Nevertheless, although access to language learning in primary schools in Eupen-Malmedy mirrored rules practiced elsewhere in Belgium, they were not entirely the same. Unlike elsewhere in Belgium, borderland pupils in the German-speaking zone were not allowed to enrol in the French-speaking school of Eupen.<sup>198</sup> In fact, Herman Baltia did not give any borderland parents the freedom to choose a primary school in their preferred language. Nor did he provide opportunities for them to air their grievances, in contrast to Polish Upper Silesia, where local inhabitants could contact the Mixed Commission. And yet, Baltia's measures to prevent conflict over primary education by means of the installation of language zones went further than in Polish Upper Silesia because Belgian legislation provided him with a suitable framework to start from.

Language learning regulation was the second element in making the border. In contrast to Polish Upper Silesia, in Eupen-Malmedy, a specific focus was put on foreign language training. Herman Baltia went further than the usual introduction of foreign language training in the fifth year (as happened in Flanders and Wallonia), the third year (as happened in the Brussels agglomeration and multilingual municipalities along the language border), or even the first year (in accordance with the 1924 non-binding programme of studies for German-speaking schools in Wallonia). Besides impeding borderland pupils from attending primary schools in Germany and denying guardians the freedom to choose their schools, the third specificity in his educational legislation was his decision to make foreign language learning from the first year of primary schooling mandatory instead of allowing that prescription to remain non-binding.<sup>199</sup> The fourth special measure stipulated that pupils in the German language zone were to be taught mathematics in their seventh (and final) year of primary school in German, but suggested they should repeat the content in French.<sup>200</sup>

These rules enshrined in law Baltia's aim to accelerate the integration of German-speaking pupils within the Belgian state. Although Baltia decried the French policy of generalising the use of French in Alsace-Lorraine immediately after the switch to French state sovereignty, there should be no misunderstanding about the similar future French and Belgian policymakers had in mind for their borderlands.<sup>201</sup> They were to become integral parts of the French and Belgian state inhabited by people who

spoke French fluently. Whereas French authorities adopted a more hard-line approach, Baltia opted for a softer, more gradual integration of the German-speaking zone.<sup>202</sup>

In the French-speaking zone of Eupen-Malmedy, he stepped up the pace of his reforms. Pupils starting school in the French-speaking zone were taught in French immediately and were given didactic materials for free in order to support their learning process.<sup>203</sup> An exultant Baltia crowed: 'We gave out free books of prayers and French songs so as to replace those fat German missals that had flooded the Walloon country!'<sup>204</sup> While Baltia considered the transition to learning in French a relatively straightforward matter, the history of language use in the region was a little more complicated. In the early twentieth century, German authorities had reported that the people who lived and studied in the city of Malmedy saw their Walloon tongue as a means to resist Germanification,<sup>205</sup> while loyalty towards the German Empire among farmers in the villages in the vicinity of Malmedy was reported as being satisfactory.<sup>206</sup> By the time the villages found themselves under Baltia's transition regime, peasant children either spoke German or were bilingual. The situation of borderland pupils in the French-speaking zone bore similarities to that of the children of Flemish miners in Wallonia, who were also taught in French. In contrast to the latter, however, these borderland peasant pupils received an hour of German instruction a week. Baltia also introduced this special measure in the French language zone where, according to his logic, the German language classes could have impeded integration. Thus, despite his authoritarianism, Baltia acted with a consistency that was lacking in Belgian language regulations.

The third element in the making of the border through language learning was steering the selection process that would determine who was to teach borderland pupils their languages. The question of what to do with the existing teaching staff was answered differently in the two case study borderlands. The bilateral Belgian-German Convention of Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen), which was concluded in 1920, foresaw the possibility for teachers in Eupen-Malmedy to become Belgian civil servants. However, upon being required by Belgian authorities to swear an oath of loyalty to the state, almost the entire teaching force left for Germany.<sup>207</sup> As a consequence, the need to attract teachers from elsewhere was higher than in Polish Upper Silesia. Indeed, initially, almost all teachers in Eupen-Malmedy had either migrated to the region or commuted from neighbouring provinces in Wallonia.<sup>208</sup> In order to lure teachers to the borderlands, Baltia adopted the same approach as was used in Polish Upper Silesia, offering bonuses to those willing to relocate. However, the envy this provoked in teachers already employed in Eupen-Malmedy, as well as those working elsewhere

in Belgium, caused him to abolish the measure within months.<sup>209</sup> Because it was so difficult to find German-speaking teachers, Herman Baltia decreed that certificates of higher education acquired in Germany should be automatically recognised, and organised a final exam for local teachers who had started their education under the former regime.<sup>210</sup> Baltia was acting pragmatically here: in suspending the freedom municipalities enjoyed under Belgian law to appoint and dismiss teachers, he retained control over the profile of the teaching staff.<sup>211</sup> It is impossible to know whether the money Germany secretly transferred to Eupen-Malmedy in 1921 in support of cultural activities was used to pay out bonuses to these primary school teachers in order to shore up their loyalty to the fatherland. In any case, Baltia's control measures soon caused this funding to dry up.<sup>212</sup>

In order to train new borderland teachers, Baltia did not open a teacher seminary in the Eupen-Malmedy region but let local inhabitants enrol on a German-language teacher training course at an established Belgian institute of higher learning in Arel/Arlon. He also effectuated the opening of an additional German section in a similar institute in Verviers.<sup>213</sup> German pedagogues criticised the substandard pedagogical level of the training being provided in Belgium and lamented that it would cause the German nation to lose its borderland children: '[the children] become adults, marry and pass on the attitude of the teacher in their professional environment, their family, their children. Yes, those who have the youth have the future! Woe to us when our future is in the hands of these pedagogues!'<sup>214</sup> German pedagogues saw in their science a tool to introduce teaching techniques that could shape and control human behaviour. They expressed their concern about the Belgian institute of higher learning because they believed that the education of a different kind of teacher could have a decisive influence on future power relations. Policymakers in Belgium, however, had a less extensive history with compulsory education and reform pedagogy. How the children in Eupen-Malmedy were to learn their languages was of little concern to them. Above all, policymakers aimed to people the borderlands with teachers loyal to the new regime.<sup>215</sup> As was the case in Polish Upper Silesia, their policy seems to have worked. In 1940, teachers were among the most loyal nationals in Belgium's newest borderlands, with two-thirds of them fleeing from the German invasion to the centre of Belgium.<sup>216</sup>

The final element playing a role in the making of the border through language learning was religion. Following the switch to Belgian state sovereignty, all primary schools in Eupen-Malmedy transformed from secular public schools under state control to state-funded Catholic private schools operated by local municipalities.<sup>217</sup> Municipalities could have opted to run

public secular schools but were unanimous in favouring Catholic schools. Local clergymen praised 'the extensive rights of self-determination' Belgian school legislation offered to the Catholic Church, as well as the pedagogy it espoused.<sup>218</sup> Traditional authority, as pointed out by Max Weber almost a century ago, based its legitimacy on religiousness and people's respect for their ancestors. The new system of power being carved out in the region reduced the rational-legal authority of modernisation, bureaucratisation and legalisation, to the benefit of traditional authority.<sup>219</sup>

Granting the Catholic Church these rights had consequences for the opportunities of borderland inhabitants of other faiths. Eupen-Malmedy was not inhabited by Jews, but there were 282 Protestants living there.<sup>220</sup> The Belgian state subsidised the teaching of Protestant courses if at least fifteen pupils signed up, but the Belgian Federation of Protestant Churches was only entitled to provide that teaching in secular schools.<sup>221</sup> The Protestant school in Eupen was closed in 1922 because of a lack of pupils.<sup>222</sup> When guardians responsible for sixteen pupils applied to the city council to reopen it in 1931, their request was denied because a suitable room could not be found.<sup>223</sup> Because the region only offered Catholic schools, the right of the children to receive Protestant teaching could not be realised. Space had turned into an essential factor in the battle over control.<sup>224</sup> There was no supranational equivalent to the Geneva Convention to rectify this situation. In the 1930s, an appeal was made to donors in Germany for financial support, which would indicate that a private Protestant teaching initiative existed. However, a lack of other sources suggests this initiative was not continued.<sup>225</sup>

## Conclusion

Two new administrative entities came into being after the First World War: Polish Upper Silesia and Eupen-Malmedy. Through a processual understanding of borders, as well as a relational approach towards the human-made creation and functioning of borders, this chapter looked beyond the drawing of the state border line in order to demonstrate how language learning in the borderlands functioned as a crucial means of making the border.

The framework of comparison detailed in chapter two demonstrated how the processual making of the border manifested itself differently in Polish Upper Silesia and in Eupen-Malmedy. With reference to the first axis of comparison, it can be said that phantom borders only played a role in Eupen-Malmedy in the sense that the earlier establishment of compulsory education made the fight against illiteracy easier than in other places



within the Belgian Kingdom. In Polish Upper Silesia, however, their impact was more profound. This is exemplified by the decision of the Silesian Parliament to copy and adapt the old Prussian school curriculum, instead of implementing the Polish school curriculum, and the fact that local clergymen continued their habit (developed during the *Kulturkampf*) of making the monolingual demands of Polish or German nationalists subordinate to religious loyalty.

With regards to the second axis of comparison, it became clear how decisive power structures and strategies were for the constitution and articulation of multiple loyalties. The document father Helisch signed when taking his children out of a German-speaking primary school in Polish Upper Silesia reveals the whole gamut of pragmatic decisions taken by borderland parents after weighing up the potential impact on their lives. If the rights granted these parents by the Geneva Convention were violated, they could voice their complaints within the dispute settlement framework that had been set up under supranational control. Colonel Herman Baltia, by contrast, steered borderland guardians' choice of primary schools instead of giving them the right to a free choice, as was common elsewhere in Belgium. Owing to the installation of latent censorship, and given the absence of a supranational framework of control, this rule was not thematised further. It is all the more surprising, then, that the local solutions Baltia offered to appease the tensions of multilingualism in borderland primary schools, such as establishing a German-speaking language zone and accepting the fact that local children had German as a mother tongue, went further than the ones offered in Polish Upper Silesia. This was because he could borrow extensively from the national legislation of a country that respected the equal use of languages, at least in its constitution.

Through the third axis of comparison, it can be seen how local practices were shaped by the multidimensional spatial and temporal contexts in which they were articulated. Already within the first years of its existence, historical actors in Polish Upper Silesia made great use of the dispute settlement framework that had been set up under supranational control. This was because the respective interests of Polish nationalists, German nationalists and borderland inhabitants were, and would remain, fundamentally different. Eupen-Malmedy, meanwhile, was an administrative entity that, to a certain extent, embodied in microcosm what the Belgian Kingdom stood for. Its inhabitants experienced a combination of dictatorial rule and a limited form of the liberalism practiced elsewhere in the Belgian Kingdom (enjoying the freedom of religion, for instance). In contrast to Polish Upper Silesia, there was no supranational control over the way in which these borderland inhabitants were treated.

Despite the different systems of power in Polish Upper Silesia and in Eupen-Malmedy, a set of six common characteristics of borderland schooling could be distilled from the analysis. First, given that the drawing of the state border line was more a result of geopolitical decisions than an articulation of the wishes of local inhabitants, many borderland pupils had parents who had not chosen to live under a Polish or Belgian regime. Second, since policymakers clearly defined their ideas for the future in the language learning regulations they introduced, these pupils were participants in a political experiment. The solely German-speaking school system from before was replaced by two types of schools that, on the basis of an abundance of newly introduced rules governing language learning, separated borderland pupils according to their mother tongue.

Third, the language learning process in borderland schools was much more regulated than was the case for children growing up elsewhere in Poland and Belgium. The systems of power applicable to Polish Upper Silesia and Eupen-Malmedy had control and preventive measures built in so as to avoid conflicts over language learning. In the case of Polish Upper Silesia, the Geneva Convention, which set in stone the language rights of borderland pupils, as well as the rights of guardians to decide upon the mother tongue of their offspring created a juridical body that allowed borderland inhabitants, Polish statesmen, German representatives and international bodies to air their grievances about this system of power, with such dispute settlements being documented in great detail. However, in the case of Eupen-Malmedy, the school and language a child was to be educated in was not the result of an active choice on the part of a guardian, but depended on the language zone he or she lived in. Furthermore, no framework existed in which disgruntled parties could air and settle their grievances, a lacuna that leaves us today with barely any sources.

Fourth, the additional regulations for borderland schools could not prevent them from experiencing the inconsistencies and contradictions of the system of power surrounding them to a much greater extent than schools elsewhere in Poland and Belgium. Aligning an objectivist understanding of minority belonging with the aim of bringing up exclusively monolingual children, Silesian authorities centralised the matter of access to primary education in German in Polish Upper Silesia and strictly regulated foreign language training. Many local inhabitants, however, were in search of bilingual training for their children. In Eupen-Malmedy, Baltia introduced special measures for borderland pupils in order to speed up the process of their French language learning but did not allow German-speaking guardians to place their children in the newly founded French-speaking school of Eupen.

Fifth, the fact that supranational law protected local teachers in Polish Upper Silesia and not in Eupen-Malmedy did not prevent primary schools in both regions from being understaffed. In both case study borderlands, schools were staffed with immigrated teachers loyal to the new regime as well as by local teachers who were deprived of access to new German pedagogical findings. At the time, the concern that teachers in the border regions lacked the knowledge to guide and shape the behaviour of their pupils was expressed solely by German pedagogues.

Finally, most borderland pupils enjoyed more freedom to practice their religion than before. Returning traditional authority to Catholic clergymen was considered normal in Belgium, as religious rights were codified in the Belgian Constitution, while the relationship between the Catholic Church and the state had stabilised after the School Wars at the end of the nineteenth century. In Polish Upper Silesia, however, nationalists and clergymen continued to question that relationship, while religion, as it had done since the *Kulturkampf*, continued to present itself as an alternative source of loyalty to nationalism.

## Notes

1. See SE, III/191, 127 (Enseignement. Situation au 10 janvier 1920). On social space, see Lefebvre, *Production of Space*, 68–69.
2. Kamusella, 'Isomorphism', 57.
3. Borodziej, *Geschichte Polens*, 131.
4. Pabst, 'Eupen-Malmedy', 289ff.
5. Lukes, *Power*, 25.
6. *Ibid.*, 19.
7. Zloch, *Polnischer Nationalismus*, vol. 78, 168; Raitz von Frenzt, *A Lesson Forgotten*, 263–67.
8. Macmillan, *Paris 1919*, 207.
9. Loeber, 'Die Minderheitenschutzverträge', 189.
10. Raitz von Frenzt, *A Lesson Forgotten*, 265.
11. *Ibid.*, 265.
12. Kamusella, *Isomorphism*, 79.
13. *Ibid.*, 57.
14. Roman Dmowski quoted in Borodziej, *Geschichte Polens*, 171.
15. *Ibid.*, 111.
16. Eser, 'Volk, Staat, Gott!', 22; Novikov, *Shades*, 204.
17. Macmillan, *Paris 1919*, 97.
18. Fink, *Defending*, 135–40 and 235.
19. Borodziej, *Geschichte Polens*, 121.
20. Bjork et al., 'Introduction', 1.
21. Wambaugh, *Plebiscites*, vol. 1, 211; Dziewulski, *Wyniki plebiscytu*.

22. Rodriguez, 'Scoundrels', 100.
23. Prażmowska, *Poland*, 93–94.
24. Bjork, *Neither German*, 256; Böhler, *Wojna domowa*, 154–63.
25. Wilson, *Frontiers*, 213; Böhler, *Wojna domowa*, 260.
26. Jerczyński, *Historia*, 352. See also Dziewulski, *Wyniki plebiscytu*.
27. Prażmowska, *Poland*, 93–94.
28. Bieniek, 'Służba zdrowia', 9–10.
29. This figure for the year 1922 was mentioned by Błaszczak-Waławik, 'Miejscę', 13. See also Schattkowsky, 'Minderheitenfrage', 117–47.
30. Fink, *Defending*, 260–64; Raitz von Frentz, *A Lesson Forgotten*, 85.
31. Article 131: 'Was die Sprache eines Kindes oder Schülers ist, bestimmt ausschliesslich die mündlich oder schriftlich abgegebene Erklärung des Erziehungsberechtigten'; Article 106: 'Erziehungsberechtigten von wenigstens vierzig staatsangehörigen Kindern einer sprachlichen Minderheit unterstützt wird'; Article 133: 'beim Unterricht in den Schulen die nationalen und kulturellen Werte des anderen Teiles vor den Schülern nicht in ungebührlicher Weise herabgesetzt werden' (Junckerstorff, *Schulrecht*, 49–112). The Geneva Convention was published in French in Kaeckenbeeck, 'Convention', 568–822.
32. *Ibid.*, 601.
33. de Gruyter, *Amtliche Sammlung*, vol. 1, VIII.
34. Wanatowicz, 'Województwo śląskie', 241.
35. Böhler, *Wojna domowa*, 259–61. Quote in Haslinger et al., 'Frontiers of Violence', 237.
36. Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo, *World Economy*, 56.
37. *Ibid.*, 43.
38. Henig, *Versailles*, 39–40.
39. *Ibid.*, 42.
40. Jezierski and Leszczyńska, 'Okres', 264; Mrzygłód, 'Harsh Reality', 27–46.
41. Wanatowicz, 'Województwo śląskie', 239; Frużyński, 'Industrializacja'.
42. Wandycz, *United States*, 184.
43. Borodziej, *Geschichte Polens*, 129.
44. Górski, 'Organizacja', 183.
45. APK, 1376/1101 (Ministerstwo Spraw Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego do Magistratu miasta Lubliniec, 10 February 1923), 226.
46. Balace, 'Belgien', 73–102.
47. Marks, *Innocent*, 96.
48. *Ibid.*, X.
49. Pabst, 'Eupen-Malmedy', 266. In addition, Belgium received mandates for Rwanda and Burundi. Mandates were trusteeships invented in Paris for those regions the decision-makers did not consider capable of autonomous government. They were controlled by the League of Nations or an Allied power with a colonial tradition. Rwanda and Burundi were considered a just reward for the efforts of the Congolese army under Belgian command in removing German soldiers from East Africa during the First World War; see Macmillan, *Paris 1919*, 106; van Reybrouck, *Congo*, 145ff.
50. Pawley, *Watch on the Rhine*, 5.
51. Doepgen, *Abtretung*, 66.
52. Balace, 'Belgien', 88.
53. *Ibid.*, 94.
54. In the spring of 1920, a special international commission with representatives from France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan travelled to the regions of Eupen and Sankt Vith in order to establish the exact course of the state border line between Germany and Belgium. The local railway road (Vennbahn) came under Belgian jurisdiction, but five little

enclaves on the western side of the railroad remained under German jurisdiction, most of them as a part of the city of Monschau. These German enclaves could be accessed from Germany without border control (Doepgen, *Abtretung*, 204–13).

55. Doepgen, *Abtretung*, 78–80.
56. *Ibid.*, 5.
57. *Ibid.*, 186.
58. Cremer, 'Annexion', 8; Kartheuser, *Les années 30 à Eupen-Malmedy*, 30; Lentz, *Wahlverhalten*, 27.
59. O'Connell, *Annexation*, 66–67.
60. *Ibid.*, 88.
61. Pabst, 'Eupen-Malmedy', 267. Léon Delacroix, as remembered by Baltia, 'Memoiren', 19.
62. Gerard, 'De democratie gedroomd', 945; de Schaepdrijver, *De groote oorlog*, 294.
63. Quadflieg, 'Elitenkontinuität', 118.
64. Gerard, 'De democratie gedroomd', 957. The Belgian and Polish economies are hard to compare. Charles Hilliard Feinstein, Peter Temin and Gianni Toniolo conclude that in 1929 Belgian output was 30 to 40 per cent higher than it had been before the First World War, whereas in Poland in the same year, pre-war levels had not yet been reached (Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo, *World Economy*, 56). Such a comparison does not shed much light on the structural differences between the economies of the two countries. Whereas Belgium was a largely industrialised country, Poland was largely agricultural (with its industry being concentrated in a couple of urban centres, including Polish Upper Silesia). And whereas the new Polish state needed to integrate three very different infrastructural entities, the Belgian economy could continue to operate within the same structure.
65. Gerard, 'De democratie gedroomd', 989.
66. *Ibid.*, 1111–112.
67. Brüll and Kontny, *Eupen-Malmedy im europäischen Vergleich*, 51.
68. In 1922, 873 people migrated out of the region, of whom 820 went to Germany. Meanwhile, 263 people moved into the region, among whom 210 came from Germany (van Banning, *Gebiedsovergang*, 89). The German census of 1925 included 4,890 people who had lived in the regions of Eupen, Sankt Vith and Malmedy in 1914 (Lejeune, Rauw and Josten, 'Die große Suche', 244). The net migration from Germany to the regions of Eupen, Sankt Vith and Malmedy amounted to 2,000 inhabitants within the first five years (Brüll and Kontny, *Eupen-Malmedy im europäischen Vergleich*, 51).
69. SE, 651/55/115, Mallinger, L. (Le Conseiller des Sciences et des Arts), Circulaire aux administrations communales N. 9025, 24 August 1922.
70. These official statistics date from 1910. In 1930, illiteracy was reduced to 8.12 per cent. Within the age cohort of 15- to 20-year-old inhabitants, it amounted to 1.17 per cent (Mallinson, *Power*, 131).
71. SE, III/191, 127 (Enseignement. Situation au 10 janvier 1920).
72. Archives diplomatiques (AD), 10.792/ I, Eupen-Malmedy, Léon Xhaflaire to Henri Delvaux de Fenffe, 16 July 1919 (O'Connell, *Annexation*, 66).
73. Gerard, 'De democratie gedroomd', 911.
74. *Ibid.*, 1022–24.
75. de Schaepdrijver, *De groote oorlog*, 304.
76. Beyen, 'Belgium', 342.
77. SE, III/191, 124 (Enseignement. Situation au 10 janvier 1920).
78. van Houtum, 'Mask of the Border', 50.
79. Trzebiatowski, *Szkolnictwo powszechne*, 10; Gerard, 'De democratie gedroomd', 936.

80. de Vroede, 'Language in Education', 116; Ministerstwo Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego, *Oświata*, 133.
81. Fishman, 'Language', 157.
82. Borodziej, *Geschichte Polens*, 131.
83. *Rocznik Statystyki Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, 1924, 219–21. See also Szablicka-Żak, *Szkolnictwo i oświata*, 141.
84. Eser, 'Volk, Staat, Gott!', 277 and 668.
85. Fałęcki, *Niemieckie szkolnictwo mniejszościowe*, 46.
86. Trzebiatowski, *Szkolnictwo powszechne*, 170–77; Zloch, *Polnischer Nationalismus*, vol. 78, 211 and 243.
87. Tomiak, 'Education', 187 and 193.
88. Jakubowska, *Przeobrażenia*, vol. 6, 44–45.
89. Seweryn, 'Zagadnienia', vol. 7, 9.
90. Sanojca, *Relacje*, vol. 16, 124–25.
91. *Dziennik Ustaw*, 1924, Pozycja 766, 1213. Statistics for 1929–1930 show the effect of the Grabski reform. Whereas 82 per cent of schools in Poland taught in Polish, 10 per cent were bilingual. The largest group of these bilingual schools (8.8 per cent) offered teaching in Polish and Ukrainian.
92. Linkiewicz, *Lokalność*, 160.
93. *Ibid.*, 167.
94. Ridna Skola included 33 Ukrainian-speaking private schools at the end of the 1920s and, after its liquidation in the late 1930s, continued to operate as a network of secretly run, and hence illegal, schools (Tomiak, 'Education', 194; Linkiewicz, *Lokalność*, 302).
95. Tomiak, 'Education', 194.
96. Subtelny, *Ukraine*, 339ff.
97. Obrębski, 'Polesie', 367 and 379.
98. Linkiewicz, *Lokalność*, 140–42.
99. Eser, 'Volk, Staat, Gott!', 129.
100. Mauersberg, *Szkolnictwo powszechne*, 163.
101. *Ibid.*, 128–31.
102. Kijek, *Dzieci modernizmu*, 128.
103. Autobiography 3792 (Em. Tępa), 1939, quoted in Kijek, *Dzieci modernizmu*, 136.
104. For a detailed overview, see Tomiak, 'Education', 196–98.
105. Kijek, *Dzieci modernizmu*, 157; Eisenstein, *Jewish Schools*, 84 and 96.
106. When the new educational reform of Janusz Jędrzejewicz foresaw the possibility of closing those private schools which disseminated radical political views, a number of TSYSHO schools were eventually shut down on the accusation of being bulwarks of communist agitation (Eisenstein, *Jewish Schools*, 48–49; Kijek, *Dzieci modernizmu*, 173–87).
107. Article 389, *Dziennik Ustaw*, 1932, 639–45.
108. Scheuermann, *Minderheitenschutz*, 28.
109. Ministerstwo Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego, *Oświata*, 49.
110. Novikov, *Shades*, 48.
111. Borodziej, *Geschichte Polens*, 126.
112. Zloch, *Polnischer Nationalismus*, vol. 78, 288.
113. Wnęk, *Dziecko w polskiej literaturze naukowej*, 61–62; Sobczak, *Nowe wychowanie*, 47–74.
114. Wnęk, *Dziecko w polskiej literaturze naukowej*, 25 and 107. For an example, see Szober, *Zasady nauczania języka*.
115. Translations such as Dewey, *The School and Society* (in Polish 1924); Parkhurst, *Education on the Dalton Plan* (in Polish 1928, second edition 1933); Piaget, *Le langage et la pensée chez l'enfant* (in Polish 1929); Rousseau, *Emile, ou de l'éducation* (in Polish 1933). See also

- Sobczak, *Nowe wychowanie*, 47; Wnęk, *Dziecko w polskiej literaturze naukowej*, 52; Joteyko and Grzegorzewska, *Metody*, vol. 1; Ziemnowicz, *Nauczanie*, vol. 13.
116. Fittbogen, *Schulrecht*, 98.
  117. Schmidt, 'Sprachnationale Konflikte', 408; Mallinson, *Power*, 116–17.
  118. De Vroede cited a ministerial survey conducted in 1906, which found the percentages of these schools in selected cities to be as follows: Kortrijk 11.7 per cent, Ghent 2.2 per cent and Antwerp 0 per cent. The author added that the figures were an underestimation but could nevertheless be considered indicative (de Vroede, 'Language in Education', 117).
  119. Mallinson, *Power*, 114.
  120. Dominguez, 'Comment les imprécisions'.
  121. *De Volksgazet*, 16 October 1929, 1.
  122. Schmidt, 'Sprachnationale Konflikte', 406 and 409.
  123. An official language border was only established in Belgium in 1963. Before, the shape of the language border was determined by the outcome of the language survey organised in 1921, 1931 and 1947.
  124. Bischoff, *Die deutsche Sprache in Belgien*, 59–60; Wenselaers, *De laatste Belgen*, 76.
  125. de Vroede, 'Language in Education', 125.
  126. *Ibid.*, 118.
  127. Bischoff, *Die deutsche Sprache in Belgien*, 18–19; Fittbogen, *Schulrecht*, 88–89.
  128. Pabst, 'Eupen-Malmedy', 303.
  129. Mallinson, *Power*, 127–30.
  130. Depaepe and Simon, 'De Vlaamse jeugd', 311.
  131. van Houtum, 'Mask of the Border', 50.
  132. *Ibid.*, 51.
  133. For the full text of the Geneva Convention in German, see Junckerstorff, *Schulrecht*; in French, see Kaeckenbeeck, 'Convention'.
  134. Junckerstorff, *Schulrecht*, 54–58.
  135. Archiwum Szkoły Podstawowej w Lublińcu (ASPL), School Chronicle, 232–44.
  136. Szczepański, 'Przejście', 297.
  137. *Ibid.*, 300.
  138. *Ibid.*, 296.
  139. *Ibid.*, 301.
  140. *Ibid.*, 302–3.
  141. In the 1934–1935 school year, there were 7,596 primary school children in the Lubliniec district, of whom 1,473, or 19 per cent, attended the primary school in Lubliniec. In 1922, 965 attended the Lubliniec primary school, 595 pupils being instructed in Polish and 270 in German (Bulik and Centerowska, *Szkic monograficzny*, 8). If we assume this constituted 19 per cent of the primary schoolchildren of the district, this would mean that in 1922 5,079 children attended primary schools. The Mixed Commission stated that 1,514 applications had been made to attend German-speaking schools or classes (of which 92 arrived after the deadline). This means applications were made for approximately 30 per cent of the schoolchildren from the district (Gemischte Kommission für Oberschlesien, *Amtliche Sammlung*, vol. 1, 124).
  142. Gemischte Kommission für Oberschlesien, *Amtliche Sammlung*, vol. 1, 144; APK, 27/304, 74 (Wydział Oświecenia Publicznego, Sprawozdanie: Dotyczy Szkoły Mniejszościowej w Koszęcinie, 20 October 1927).
  143. APK, 27/304, 13 (Resignation list composed by Trembaczewski and signed by school principal Jerzy Hejda [undated, between 1922 and 1924]).
  144. Junckerstorff, *Schulrecht*, 53. The Mixed Commission stated that 1,514 applications had been made to attend German-speaking schools or classes (of which 92 arrived after the

- deadline). While the applications of 506 children were approved, those of 633 children were withdrawn, and 427 children were not approved (Gemischte Kommission für Oberschlesien, *Amtliche Sammlung*, vol. 1, 124).
145. *Ibid.*, 124.
  146. Whereas the pupils in Polish classes had made up 70 per cent of the school population in 1922, a decade later, this percentage had grown to 93 per cent (APK 1376/1077, 181 [Liczba dzieci w tut. szkołach, Lubliniec, 30 May 1932]). Initially, seven schools for minority children were set up in the district, but already by 1924 only three remained (ASPL, School Chronicle, 277 [Polonia, *O szkołach mniejszości w Lublinieckim*]); Gemischte Kommission für Oberschlesien, *Amtliche Sammlung*, vol. 1, 230–38.
  147. Novikov, *Shades*, 43.
  148. Kolb, *Weimarerer*, 53; Buřhak, 'Sojusze systemu', 45–47.
  149. Mauersberg, *Szkolnictwo powszechne*, 142; Glimos-Nadgórska, *Polskie szkolnictwo*, 80.
  150. Novikov, *Shades*, 90; Glimos-Nadgórska, *Polskie szkolnictwo*, 77–78 and 83.
  151. ASPL, School Chronicle, 249 (Rok szkolny 1922–23, Wrzesień). See also Korzeniowska, 'Historia', 71.
  152. Kamusella, *Isomorphism*, 57.
  153. Paul Poralla quoted in Eser, 'Volk, Staat, Gott!', 569.
  154. APK, 27/304, 16 and 18 (Resignation list composed by Trembaczewski and signed by school principal Jerzy Hejda, between 1922 and 1924).
  155. Junckerstorff, *Schulrecht*, 14 and 167; Orzechowski, 'Nauczycielstwo', 162.
  156. *Ibid.*, 17. See also Glimos-Nadgórska, *Polskie szkolnictwo*, 150.
  157. Olszówka, 'Szkolnictwo polskie', 15.
  158. Dokumentesammlung des Herder-Instituts Marburg (DSHI), Sammlung Jendrike, 80 (Formular Chmiel, Gleidingen, 12 May 1957).
  159. Kolb, *Weimarerer*, 184.
  160. Eser, 'Volk, Staat, Gott!', 150.
  161. *Ibid.*, 514.
  162. *Ibid.*, 514–17.
  163. The bonus for immigrating teachers disappeared when the Jędrzejewicz reform was introduced to the Silesian Voivodeship in 1932 (Glimos-Nadgórska, *Polskie szkolnictwo*, 177). In 1925, only 35 per cent of the teachers were local inhabitants (Wanatowicz, *Ludność napływowa*, 60–61 and 71–72).
  164. Zieliński, 'Sprawa polskich', 407–23.
  165. ASPL, School Chronicle (Sprawozdanie z czynności Podkomisji Oświatowej I. Rejonu Konferencyjnego w I. półroczu roku szkolnego 1926/27, Lubliniec, 1927).
  166. Olszówka, 'Szkolnictwo polskie', 20.
  167. Cieńciała, 'Nowa organizacja seminariów nauczycielskich', *Miesięcznik Pedagogiczny*, 1922, vol. 31, 2, 44–47. The special seminars ceased to exist in 1936/37 (Kempa, *Kształcenie nauczycieli*, 69ff.).
  168. Suchowiak, *Niemieckie szkolnictwo*, 63ff.
  169. Eser, 'Volk, Staat, Gott!', 538.
  170. Depaepe, *Order in Progress*, 244.
  171. Olszówka, 'Szkolnictwo polskie', 48.
  172. APK, 1376/1086, 70 (Uchwała Rady Miejskiej w Lublińcu z dnia 3 March 1933).
  173. Glimos-Nadgórska, *Polskie szkolnictwo*, 116–17. The Katowice diocese was founded in 1925 (Myszor, *Historia*, 194–95).
  174. The letter is quoted by Novikov, *Shades*, 53–54.
  175. Bjork, *Neither German*, 66–67.
  176. Struve, 'Erfahrung', 140–41.



177. Kaeckenbeeck, 'Convention', 623.
178. Czembor, *Ewangelicki Kościół Unijny*, 44–47.
179. The Protestant parish in Lubliniec was the smallest parish in Polish Upper Silesia. It consisted of 178 parishioners in 1936, which was merely 14 per cent of the number in 1918 (Czembor, *Ewangelicki Kościół Unijny*, 46). In the nineteenth century, there was a Jewish school in Lubliniec for a short period of time, but it was later abolished (Korzeniowska, 'Historia', 64). The school chronicle of the bilingual school in Lubliniec does not mention Jewish pupils.
180. ASPL, School Chronicle, 286.
181. Polak-Springer, *Recovered*, 26; Winkel, *Corpsalbum*, 241.
182. Kaeckenbeeck, *International Experiment*, 341.
183. *Ibid.*, 342. For instance, it would take until 1932 before the first secondary school offering education in Polish opened in German Upper Silesia; until then, up to 100 pupils attended a secondary boarding school on the Polish side of the state border line in Lubliniec (Janik, 'Zespół Szkół', 5; Jaworski et al., *Deutsche und Polen*, doc. 282: Leitendes Grenzkommissariat Oppeln an den Oberpräsidenten ebendort. Polnische Bewegung im Kreis Oppeln, 832–34).
184. Kneip, *Die deutsche Sprache*, 136.
185. Korowicz, *Górnośląska ochrona Mniejszości*, 85.
186. Kaeckenbeeck, *International Experiment*, 342–43.
187. 'Die Wacht am Rhein' was a German patriotic anthem popular during the Franco-Prussian war in the late nineteenth century and during the First World War. The original poem was written by Max Schneckenburger in 1840; the music was composed by Karl Wilhelm four years later.
188. Heutz, 'Jugenderinnerungen', 34.
189. *Ibid.* The coat of arms of Belgium bears a lion, whereas the coat of arms of Germany displays a black eagle.
190. Fittbogen, *Schulrecht*, 28.
191. Wenselaers, *De laatste Belgen*, 52; Ministère de l'Intérieur belge, *Statistique de la Belgique*, 562–65.
192. Fittbogen, *Schulrecht*, 29.
193. *Ibid.*, 28; SE, Gouvernement Eupen-Malmedy, C.3.3.119, 29 (Eupener Zeitung, 13 March 1923); Warny, *Belgiens wiedergefundene Brüder*, 242–43.
194. SE, III/191, 127 (Enseignement. Situation au 10 janvier 1920); Pabst, 'Eupen-Malmedy', 293. The argument that Flanders and Eupen belonged together was repeated in Flemish nationalist circles throughout the 1920s and 1930s (Mouton et al., 'Ein Blick von Aussen', 100–102).
195. Herman Baltia quoted in Wenselaers, *De laatste Belgen*, 58.
196. Christmann, 'Presse', 70ff.
197. Pabst, 'Eupen-Malmedy', 306; SE, Gouvernement Eupen-Malmedy, C.3.3.150, 2 (Gazette de Liège, 263, 22 November 1921); Stadtarchiv Aachen (SA), Nachlass Benker, 23/75-76, unpaged (T. Gierets to Stadtbüroinspektor Benker, Aachen, 3 February 1930); SE, Gouvernement Eupen-Malmedy, I. 3 / 28 (die Ausführung des Gesetzes über Schulzwang [10 April 1944]).
198. Fittbogen, *Schulrecht*, 111; SE, EN 647/55/88 (Letter of Mayor Léon Xhaflaire to Nikolaus Claessen, 26 November 1925).
199. SE, Gouvernement Eupen-Malmedy, C.3.3.151, 13 ('Zur Eupener Volksschule. Einführung des französischen Unterrichts', Eupener Zeitung, 125, 20 August 1921); Melchior, 'Realprogramm', 64.
200. Fittbogen, *Schulrecht*, 146.

201. SE, III/191, 127 (Enseignement. Situation au 10 janvier 1920).
202. Pabst, 'Eupen-Malmedy', 289ff.
203. SE, Gouvernement Eupen-Malmedy, C.3.3.150, unpagéd ('Notre Effort à Malmédý', *L'Express*, November 1920, 1).
204. SE, III/191, 127 (Enseignement. Situation au 10 janvier 1920).
205. Fittbogen, *Schulrecht*, 28.
206. Pabst, 'Eupen-Malmedy', 273.
207. Timmermann speaks of six teachers who remained versus 126 teachers who left for Germany (Timmermann, *Zur nationalen Integration*, 203). See also Pabst, 'Eupen-Malmedy', 300; van Banning, *Gebiedsovergang*, 44; Melchior, 'Realprogramm', 61; Lejeune, 'Abtretung', 60 and 74.
208. Fittbogen, *Schulrecht*, 32; Pabst, 'Eupen-Malmedy', 301.
209. SE, Baltia-Fonds, 193, 'Zweiter Tätigkeitsbericht des Gouvernements der Gebiete Eupen und Malmédý', 10 July 1920 – End of July 1921, 91–92.
210. The measure would remain in place until 1930 (Pabst, 'Eupen-Malmedy', 306). See also Kartheuser, *Les années 30 à Eupen-Malmedy*, 22; SE, Gouvernement Eupen-Malmedy, January 1923 (I,4), Baltia, H., 'Décret instituant un examen spécial pour certains agents de l'enseignement ne possédant pas le diplôme final d'instituteur', 20 December 1923.
211. Pabst, 'Eupen-Malmedy', 306; Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde (BABL), R 57/1051, 3. Léon Mallinger, Baltia's assistant responsible for school affairs, was a 'great friend' of Jules Destrée, the Belgian minister responsible for culture and education at the time (Willems, 'Un grand ami', 69–95; Pabst, 'Eupen-Malmedy', 294).
212. Doepgen, *Abtretung*, 148ff.; Lejeune, *Die Deutsch-Belgischen Kulturbeziehungen*.
213. Melchior, 'Realprogramm', 76; O'Connell, *Annexation*, 186.
214. BABL, 1051, 36, unpagéd (Von den Schulen Eupens, 1927, 3).
215. Depaepé, *Order in Progress*, 244.
216. Hennen and Knauf, *Templerkloster*, 35.
217. Massenaux, 'Blick auf das Schulwesen', 17ff.
218. SE, Gouvernement Eupen-Malmedy, C.3.3.156, 19 (Eupener Nachrichten, 173, 30 July 1924); SE, Gouvernement Eupen-Malmedy, C.3.3.156, 15 (Eupener Zeitung, 22–23 July 1924); *Sankt Vither Volkszeitung*, 2 September 1924, 1.
219. Bendix, *Max Weber*, vol. 2, 382–83; Brüll, 'La référence à l'Alsace-Lorraine'.
220. On Protestants, see SE, EN 717/37, Kirchenrat der evangelischen Gemeinde Eupen, 17 February 1926. On Jews, see Brüll, 'Eupen-Malmedy', 311.
221. van Wageningen and Vandooren, 'Korte Geschiedenis'.
222. SE, 647/55/87 (Protocol of the City Council of Eupen, 23 February 1932).
223. SE, 647/55/87 (Sir Bivart aus Evangelische Kirchengemeinde zu Eupen an Herrn Kreis-schulinspektor Lousberg, 9 October 1931).
224. Elden and Crampton, 'Introduction', 2.
225. Christmann, 'Presse', 457.