— Chapter 1 —

THREE VILLAGES-IN-THE-CITY

While the creation of "common affluence" (*gongtong fuyu*) and the development of a "moderately well-off society" (*xiaokang shehui*) have been the Chinese authorities' primary goals since Deng Xiaoping launched economic reforms in 1979, this ideal was to be achieved by allowing some to "get rich first" (Wong 2006).[1] However, the policy of uneven development can be traced back to Mao Zedong's prioritization from the 1950s to the 1970s of the industrialization of inner provinces over coastal ones (Naughton 1988; Yang 1990) and the redirection of agricultural surplus to the industrial sector in the same period (Knight and Song 1999).

Under Mao, the formation of a centrally planned socialist economy was coupled with policies curbing urbanization, enacted through the residence registration (*hukou*) system instituted in 1958 that recorded each household's place of origin and assigned them rural (peasant, *nongmin*) or urban (non-peasant, *feinong*) status. The near impossibility of converting one's rural *hukou* to urban *hukou* prevented migration to cities in the 1960s and 1970s (Chan and Zhang 1999). Furthermore, the Mao era was characterized by the establishment of a strong duality between urban and rural citizens in terms of their standards of living and the benefits available to them. Urban *hukou* holders, who were referred to as "those who eat state grain" (*chi guoliang*), were entitled to food rations and social services, including state-funded education and healthcare. Rural residents were organized into collectives that were expected to fend for themselves in terms of not only food provisioning but also providing their members with basic healthcare, education, and social services (Chan 2009). In short, there was a stark duality between the urban and rural public goods regimes (Solinger 1999; Smart and Smart 2001; Zhang and Kanbur 2005).

The spatial priority given to China's interior provinces in the collectivist era was reversed in the early 1980s, following the onset of economic reforms.[2] The first special economic zones (SEZ) were created along China's entire coast, starting in the southeast (Cartier 2001; Ong 2004). Since 2000, the bias in national economic development has been further entrenched with the redirection of capital investment from rural to urban areas (Ma and Wu 2005; Hsing 2006, 2008; Lin 2007, 2015; McGee et al. 2007; Huang 2008), especially large cities in coastal provinces. Elsewhere, particularly in the interior of the country, urbanization occurred well after the export-oriented light industry boom that fueled Shenzhen's growth. Today all regions of China, including its former hinterlands, are preoccupied with urban growth, and all its major cities compete for highly skilled migrants.

Rural migrants were allowed to register as temporary urban residents for the first time in 1985. They flocked to China's large cities, driven by a combination of pull factors including opportunities for employment on construction sites and in factories and the urban service sector, and push factors such as the state's disinvestment in rural areas and a more general sociocultural devaluation of rural life (Yan 2003). While their *hukou* status no longer served to prevent rural-to-urban mobility, it denied millions of migrants the welfare benefits and many social services provided in the localities where they lived and worked (Davis 1995; Yu 2002; Pun 2005; Wang 2005; Solinger 2006; McGee et al. 2007; Fan 2008; Chan 2012; Huang 2014).

The 2014–2020 National Urbanization Plan mandated the use of points-based schemes (*jifenzhi*) for the acquisition of local *hukou* in cities with a total population of over five million.[3] These schemes brought into effect the announced abolition of the rural/urban categorization and aimed at reaching the plan's goal of granting residency to a hundred million migrants while also capping the size of the population in larger cities. Points systems grant *hukou* to a predefined annual quota of migrants selected according to criteria that privilege those who are educated and economically successful. The consequences of these reforms include increased social polarization among the migrants who, no longer collectively excluded as rural *hukou* holders, are divided between white-collar migrant workers eligible for local residential status or hoping to achieve it one day (see chapter 5) and migrant workers from poor rural areas who live and work in informal conditions that exclude them from applying for points-based *hukou* and even a residence permit. This polarization is compounded in the larger cities by the continuing increase in the nonlocal *hukou*-holding population in spite of measures aimed at controlling their growth, and because of the selectivity of the points-based schemes.[4]

These recent policy changes aim to reduce the inequalities resulting from the legacy of the rural/urban duality, which is particularly strong in China's urbanized villages as this chapter shows. Other legacies are also at play in the urbanization of rural villages, and these combine with newer elements to produce what Andrew Kipnis calls "recombinant urbanization": the recombination of preexisting elements and external factors into new patterns (2016: 15–16). These combinations vary from one locality to another. This chapter introduces the three urban villages that the team studied in the cities of Shenzhen, Chengdu, and Xi'an and examines how local long- and shorter-term urbanization, *hukou*, and welfare policies interplay with legacies from the collectivist era and the sociospatial organization of former rural villages, resulting in different paths of village urbanization and population composition.

The three urban villages are set in one paradigmatic eastern coastal city, Shenzhen, and two interior cities, Chengdu and Xi'an. The first section locates the villages and contextualizes them within the geographies and histories of the cities of which they have become a part. The second directs attention to the contrast between native villagers' initiatives and top-down policies for the urbanization of their villages and provides an overview of their inhabitants, their residence and occupational patterns, and the proportions of natives to migrants in their populations. Next, I look at the varying degrees to which former villagers have lost their autonomy in the process of urbanization, how village institutions have been converted into urban ones, and which of these distribute welfare benefits, finding the strongest inequalities between natives and migrants where former village collectives are in charge. I conclude by highlighting the main commonalities and differences between the three cases, providing a framework for the next chapters.

A Variety of Chinese Urbanization Trajectories

In all three of the case-study cities, the municipal authorities (i.e., their mayors and party secretaries) have considerable leeway in setting goals and plans for urbanization and economic development, and in matters of *hukou* and welfare policies. Xi'an and Chengdu owe this power to

Map 1.1. People's Republic of China. © Bureau Relief.

their status as provincial capitals, while Shenzhen has the privilege of making its own rules and regulations as a special economic zone. Moreover, what Chan and Buckingham (2008) pointed out before the latest reforms has become even truer: the cumulative effect of the *hukou* reforms is not the abolition of the *hukou* but devolution of the responsibility for urban citizenship admission to local government.

They display differences resulting from their geographical positions and long-term histories, and from industrialization policies (or their absence) under Mao; however, they also tend to converge, due to the recent rebalancing of the reform-era coastal bias toward developing the interior. Shenzhen is a brand-new coastal city that embodies the spirit of China's early market reforms; the growth of its population and GDP has been so astonishing that it has led to the expression "Shenzhen speed" (*Shenzhen sudu*). Xi'an and Chengdu are ancient cities in China's interior provinces whose growth may be less spectacular than Shenzhen's, but whose recent expansion illustrates the policy of mitigating the imbalances resulting from uneven development across regions (Lim 2014a).

In Western Chinese cities such as Xi'an and Chengdu, much of the initial investment that spurred urbanization was prompted by the national Open Up the West campaign (*Xibu Da Kaifa*) initiated in 1999 to address the inequalities between Eastern and Western China through significant investment in infrastructure, education, agricultural modernization, and urbanization (Goodman 2004). Both cities strive for top spots as China's fastest-growing cities. Whereas Chengdu's rapid GDP and population growth and its success in attracting business investment has earned it a ranking as a "nationally central city," Xi'an has struggled to refashion itself and its regional impact as it has attempted to deindustrialize and develop tourism, commerce, and high-tech industry, and has been designated a "regionally central city."[5] The determination of Chengdu and Xi'an's governments to accelerate their urban development is comparable to Shenzhen's mission to maintain the speed of its economic growth by substituting high-tech industries for low-value manufacturing. All three aim to become global high-tech hubs attracting white-collar workers in a national competition that is constantly appraised and commented on in the Chinese media. The three villages-in-the-city reflect these long-term and recent processes.

Pine Mansion: An Industrial Village in Shenzhen

From its origins as a poorer marginal area in the wider Pearl River Delta region, Shenzhen became the fastest-growing area economically after China's reopening. It has a long history of human settlement and has been a strategic military and commercial frontier area throughout China's imperial history. Shenzhen was the name of the administrative seat of Bao'an County, a small town on the shore of the Shamchun (Shenzhen in Cantonese) River, which serves as the natural border between Hong Kong and mainland China. In August 1980, an area of 327.5 square kilometers was carved out of Bao'an County to create the Shenzhen City and special economic zone (SEZ). It was the largest and the most ambitious of the SEZs that opened up in China's southeastern coastal provinces after the start of the economic reforms. These zones were selected to test the decollectivization of agriculture, the granting of privileges to overseas investors and entrepreneurs, and the end of the "iron rice bowl," i.e., of guaranteed lifetime employment, reforms that would later spread to the rest of China (Vogel 1989; Sklair 1991; Ong 2006). The reforms turned the Pearl River Delta into the new "workshop of the world." Having transitioned from low-end, labor-intensive manufacturing to high-tech knowledge-based industries since the mid-2000s, the Shenzhen SEZ accounts for over 10 percent of China's exports and is estimated to produce 90 percent of the world's electronic goods (OECD 2017).

The export-oriented factories initially set up in Shenzhen attracted migrants from across China. In 1978 the town of Shenzhen had 27,366 inhabitants, and the population of the county surrounding it was 300,000–400,000. By 2020 the new city had a population of 17.63 million, of which 12.49 million (70.84 percent) had resident permits and only 4.14 million (29.15 percent) were urban *hukou* holders (Shenzhen Statistics Bureau 2021). Although the proportion of non-*hukou* holders among residents has declined (it had peaked at 76 percent in the mid-2010s), it remains the highest among Chinese cities. Leslie Sklair (1991) describes Shenzhen's growth as resting on a process of "temporary urbanization" in which most of the population growth was, and remains, the result of the presence of residents with temporary permits who can theoretically be sent home at any time. In 2008, Shenzhen pioneered a new type of permit no longer named "temporary," valid for ten years and for which all those who have worked for more than 30 days, hold property, or run a business in the city can apply.[6] In 2012, Shenzhen introduced a points system (*jifen ruhu*) institutionalizing the conversion process via which a permit holder could acquire a city *hukou*. This highly selective system ensures that an increase in the registered population will not result in greater pressure on the local budget (Zhang 2012). In addition to meeting the basic requirements, applicants must provide proof of consecutive registration of temporary residency and evidence of formal employment. Points are also scored based on age, level of education, the amount of capital invested in business, and whether property has been purchased. Applicants can apply if they match the qualification criteria and are granted a *hukou* transfer based on the available *hukou* quota. Such quotas allow governments in large cities such as Shenzhen to grant urban *hukou* to a small number of selected, high-income, educated migrants (see details in the section "Hopes of Accessing *Hukou*" in chapter 5).

Shenzhen's first districts—the four southern districts of Yantian, Luohu, Futian, and Nanshan (see map 1.2), planned by central ministries, were given extensive stretches of land on which high-rise urban residential neighborhoods and skyscrapers were built. Shenzhen's first mayor, Liang Xiang, requested soldiers of the Infrastructure Engineering Corps to build Shenzhen's first towers in Luohu District. In 2003 Shenzhen's city hall moved to Futian District, which became a business and administrative focal point. Shenzhen's first two metro

Map 1.2. Shenzhen's districts. Dotted lines: new districts created in 2010. © Bureau Relief.

lines opened in the same years. To establish the world-class status that it aspires to, Shenzhen hosted the World University Games in 2011, accelerating the extension and construction of new metro lines to catch up with the city's growth. Line 1 runs east to west for 41.04 kilometers, reflecting Shenzhen's east-west span, and stops at 30 stations.

Although Shenzhen has the reputation of being built from scratch, this is more myth than reality (O'Donnell 2001, 2017; Du 2020). The city has largely grown out of the unplanned industrialization and urbanization of the rural villages scattered across Bao'an County. The migrants who constitute 70 percent of Shenzhen's population have found affordable housing in these villages, the authorities having made no provision for accommodation except for requiring factories to provide dormitories for their workers (Song, Zenou, and Ding 2008; Cheng 2014). Shenzhen's four core districts contained almost a hundred rural villages that were administratively urbanized in the first wave of urbanization. There were many more in the rest of Bao'an County, which remained officially rural until 1993, when it was divided into the new urban districts of Bao'an and Longgang, which officially became part of Shenzhen city (see map 1.2). Although these two districts were separated from the SEZ by a barbed-wire border and checkpoints until 2010, their inclusion within the municipality and the proximity of the SEZ brought many changes to the villages long before they officially joined the zone or were urbanized. Their population growth was such that a year after they joined the SEZ, Bao'an and Longgang Districts were split into several new districts.

With the second wave of administrative urbanization in 2004, Shenzhen became the first "Chinese city without villages"; i.e., its entire *hukou*-holding population was urban. Pine Mansion, in the north of Shenzhen close to the border with Dongguan in former Bao'an District, now the new Longhua District, was urbanized as part of this second wave. It can be reached by the fast ferry from Hong Kong International Airport to Shekou Port and an hour and half on the metro, first from west to east on Line 1 and then northward to Line 4's terminus Qinghu, the administrative center of Longhua District, followed by a twenty-minute taxi ride or, since 2018, thirty minutes on a tram. Line 4 is being extended northward at the time of writing and will include a stop in Pine Mansion. Pine Mansion now has a modern high-tech industrial zone, but even before it was connected via the tram it had many small factories and workshops. The entire area has been heavily industrialized since the early 1990s, with two major plants, Foxconn Technology Group and Dongfeng Motor Company, only a few miles from the former village.

South Gate in Prosperous Chengdu

Chengdu is the capital city of Sichuan Province and boasts a settlement history dating back over twenty-three hundred years. Located in the fertile, well-irrigated Sichuan Basin, Chengdu owes its early prosperity to the agricultural productivity of the Chengdu plain, which is also known as the Land of Abundance. Like Xi'an, Chengdu was associated with economic backwardness during the heady economic reform period beginning in the late 1970s.

The initiation of the national Open Up the West campaign in late 1999 marked the beginning of a more dramatic sociospatial transformation in Chengdu, which offered companies seeking to move westward an abundance of developable land and cheap labor. Sichuan Province has been a key source of the migrant labor fueling the economic boom on China's east coast (Mobrand 2009). Chengdu officials used the new policy to position the city as a key growth pole and financial center in Western China, sparking a new round of extensive urban growth and intensive urban redevelopment (Meng 2001). With labor costs rising on the east coast, many companies turned toward Western China as a new investment frontier (Taylor, Ni, and Liu 2016: 180). Over two hundred Fortune 500 firms relocated their

Chinese headquarters in Chengdu, and by 2010 global analysts were hailing it as one of the world's fastest-growing cities of the future (Kotkin 2010). From 2000 to 2012 the city's GDP grew at an annual rate of over 15 percent.

Along with the nearby city of Chongqing, Chengdu aimed to form a core western urban agglomeration zone to rival the Yangtze River and Pearl River Deltas to the east, creating a new national growth pole and, eventually, a world-class metropolis (Fang and Yu 2016: 207). However the city's global ambitions were toned down with the 2012 arrest of Li Chuncheng, who had served as Chengdu's mayor and then party secretary from 2001 to 2011, on corruption charges. Li was considered responsible for Chengdu's development drive, having overseen a distinctive urban-rural integration policy (see below) and intensive urban development with a policy of renovating the old city that earned him the nickname Li Chaicheng, or "Li who demolishes the city." Under Li, the city experienced an extensive southward push to build high-tech development zones and the intensive redevelopment of older neighborhoods in the city core such as Kuanzhai Xiangzi (the Wide and Narrow Alleys) as commercial tourist attractions.

The city's primary orientation lies along its north-south axis. Its first and busiest metro line, which opened in 2010, runs through the traditional city center down to a string of high-tech parks, shopping malls, conference facilities, and luxury residential complexes in the city's southern development zone, Tianfu New District. The 2011 Master Plan reinforced the southern development drive by extending the growth corridor to over eighty kilometers in length, aiming to transform Chengdu into a "modern, international metropolitan city led by high-end industries, commerce, and logistics" (Miao 2019: 528). Like Xi'an, Chengdu has worked to position itself as an important overland logistics hub for China's Belt and Road Initiative.[7] A new railway cargo line connecting the city overland to Lodz in Poland via the Chengdu-Europe Express Railway was opened in 2013, and a second international airport was completed in 2020.

Like those in Shenzhen and Xi'an, Chengdu's officials are attempting to make the postindustrial transition by competing for white-collar migrant workers, offering preferential *hukou* schemes and policies based on a points system similar to that adopted earlier in Shenzhen. From 2000 to 2012 the city's population increased from 11.11 to 14.18 million (Qin 2015: 22). In 2020 Chengdu had a resident population of 20 million (compared with 16.58 million in 2019), including 16 million living in the central city's fourteen urban districts and cities under Chengdu's jurisdiction and four million living in the four rural counties (see map 1.3).[8] The city's floating population is 8.4 million (42 percent of the resident population), of which almost 7 million are intraprovincial migrants. Compared with the sixth national census in 2010, the floating population increased by 4.28 million, an increase of more than 100 percent.[9]

Although Chengdu has similar selective *hukou* policies when it comes to migrants originating from beyond its jurisdiction, it stands in stark contrast with Shenzhen and Xi'an due to the inclusiveness of its local *hukou* policy. Owing to its nomination in 2007 as a "national urban-rural comprehensive reform pilot area," that is, a leading pilot region for the urban-rural integration policy, Chengdu anticipated the national reform by abolishing the dual urban or rural categorization of *hukou* in April 2011. All residents of Chengdu, whether in the city or the surrounding countryside, possess the same *hukou* status and enjoy equal access to social insurance programs previously only open to urban workers (Shi 2012).

As part of the pilot urban-rural integration policies, the city government in 2007 initiated a formal urban village renovation project to demolish and redevelop the final twelve remaining urban villages within the central city. In 2008 reconstruction after the Wenchuan earthquake also provided the municipal government with an opportunity to urbanize Chengdu's peri-urban regions with an urban-rural integration policy (Abramson and Qi 2011). In 2013 a roadmap and schedule for the coordinated development of Chengdu's urban and rural areas over the next five years were announced, partly as a commitment to equalizing living standards across urban and rural areas by reinvesting the revenue from state-led urbanization in rural communities in the form of public goods and services (Ye and Legates 2013). Chengdu's statistics stand out, in that they keep track of the evolution of the income gap between rural and urban residents with assessments of poverty alleviation, reemployment policies, and the degree of social insurance coverage.[10]

Located on the outskirts of Qingyang District, one of the five original urban districts just beyond Chengdu's third ring road (see map 1.3), South Gate Village is only a fifteen-minute ride from the center on the metro. Although most Chengdu residents still think of it as rural, South Gate is, however, the most urbanized of the three villages, both in terms of its urban outlook and the proportion of its urban-*hukou* holders.

River Hamlet: Small Informal Businesses in Deindustrialized Xi'an

Xi'an is the capital of Shaanxi Province in Northwest China. It served as the capital city for several dynasties from as early as the Western



Map 1.3. Chengdu's districts and counties. © Bureau Relief.

Zhou (c. 1045–771 BC), but is most widely known as the burial site of China's first emperor, Qin Shi Huang (259–210 BC). As a major hub on the Silk Road heading westward out of China, Xi'an continued to serve as a cultural and commercial center throughout much of China's imperial era. It was designated an industrial city with a focus on textiles and precision instruments when the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949. When the special economic zones were established along China's eastern coast in the 1980s, industry in China's interior, including in Xi'an, suffered a sharp decline, and by the turn of the century most of Xi'an's textile factories, many of which were state-owned enterprises (SOEs), had closed, leaving hundreds of thousands of former state factory employees out of work.

The Open Up the West campaign did not spur the same rapid and dramatic economic growth and urban expansion in Xi'an as was seen in Chengdu. By 2015 the city had relocated all of its industry from the central city to industrial zones on the outskirts beyond the third ring road. Yet several issues still plagued the city, including poor air quality, the shoddy construction of the metro, and several highprofile corruption cases such as the illegal building of over a thousand luxury mansions in the Qinling foothills, a protected mountainous area south of Xi'an. Between 2006 and 2016 Xi'an underperformed in many key areas, including GDP, income growth, and infrastructure investment, leading some to describe this period as Xi'an's "lost decade" in comparison to the city of Chengdu.[11]

The Chang'an (Xi'an's historical name) China-Europe freight train was launched in 2016 as part of the Belt and Road Initiative.[12] Since 2016 Xi'an's policymakers have sought to leverage the city's advantages in science and technology research. Xi'an hosts several top science and technology universities and research facilities, including Xi'an Jiaotong University, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Chang'an University, and Shaanxi Normal University. Specializing in telecommunications and communication chips, the Gaoxin High-Tech Zone has attracted the headquarters of major international and Chinese companies such as Samsung, Intel, Foxconn, and Huawei. During the same period, Xi'an became known as a "famous social media" (*wanghong*) city due to its pioneering presence on new Chinese online video platforms and tourism forums such as Douyin and its partnership with the livestream app TikTok.[13] In 2018, with municipal GDP reaching RMB 800 billion (the highest growth in fourteen years), Xi'an was listed as a national central city.

This strategy of urban development through the upgrading of infrastructure and the economy was coupled with a new policy of awarding *hukou* to college graduates, professionals, and investors. The points system for *hukou* transfer was adopted in 2017. Xi'an thus joined many other cities in the nationwide competition for young, educated, white-collar workers.[14] In 2017 Xi'an ranked third for population inflow after Shenzhen and Guangzhou, and in the two years following, more than 1.15 million people became "new Xi'aners." Xi'an's population growth has been the highest of all Chinese cities between the two national censuses in 2010 and 2020.[15] The registered population has increased from 8.46 million in 2010 to 12.95 million in 2020 (a growth rate of 52.97 percent), and the floating population has more than doubled, from 1.72 to 3.74 million. Although a large number of migrants have not been able to access Xi'an *hukou* and have temporary resident permits instead, Xi'an's hukou is one of the most accessible, and the floating population is the lowest in percentage among the three cases (28.8 percent of the total resident population).[16] The vast majority are migrants from Shaanxi or neighboring provinces, making Xi'an a regional rather than a national labor market. These upgrading policies caused housing prices to skyrocket,



Map 1.4. Xi'an's districts and counties. © Bureau Relief.

doubling in 2016–17 and again in 2017–18, and led to a shortage of schooling and other public goods, putting further pressure on already marginalized social groups, mainly the rural migrants.

As in most Chinese metropolises, Xi'an's jurisdiction includes not only the built-up urban core, which is divided into urban districts, but also large areas of surrounding agricultural land in rural counties and towns (see map 1.4). Thus it is not surprising to note that 38.2 percent of Xi'an's legally registered residents were still classified as rural in 2004. This dropped to 31.5 percent in 2010 and 20.8 percent in 2020, suggesting a process of gradual urbanization within the wider city borders.[17] Xi'an launched a comprehensive urbanization plan in the early 2000s, converting agricultural land to urban uses through demolition and resettlement.

There are a dozen famous villages-in-the-city in the core of Xi'an, all located next to universities. Until the 1990s they belonged to the suburbs, but they became part of the city's core area when its border was extended from the second to the third ring road. River Hamlet was one such large village at the intersection between Gaoxin High-Tech Zone and Yanta District (see map 1.4). It was the largest of the twenty villages under the jurisdiction of a subdistrict of the same name, River Hamlet, in Yanta District, which became urban in 1988. In 2004 it became an "urban reform village" (*cheng gai cun*), i.e., a village scheduled for demolition and reconstruction. In September 2018, River Hamlet was transferred to Gaoxin Subdistrict in the High-Tech Zone, which had been coveting its land for years, and the villagers were evicted to make way for its demolition (see chapter 2). Between 2004 and 2018, with its cheap rents, fast food, and general liveliness, River Hamlet was seen as a paradise for many starting their first job or opening their first small business. Its proximity to the Gaoxin High-Tech Zone and Metro Line 3 opening in 2016 enabled an easy commute from work for employees of internet companies and biopharm research facilities, and for shoppers from all over the city.[18]

Collectivist Legacies, Population, and Housing Patterns in the Three Urbanized Villages

The rural past has left legacies that have "recombined" (Kipnis 2016) with villagers' own initiatives and municipal policies, producing distinct patterns of settlement and housing and populations with varying legal status and socioeconomic characteristics.

The retrenchment of rural villages under Mao went hand in hand with the maintenance of local structures, a state concession to community loyalties and traditional economic solidarities (Siu 1989; Shue 1980, 1984). With full collectivization from 1955, production teams (*shengchandui*) became the owners of collective land (Parish and Whyte 1978: 32), established at the level of small, "natural villages" (*ziran cun*) subordinate to the production brigade (*shengchan dadui*) at the administrative village (*xingzheng cun*) level (see table 1.1).[19] Although, to be built on, agricultural land must first be converted to urban use or expropriated by the state, the collective owners of rural land have relative freedom regarding how they use it. Because rural land in China belongs to collectives, villages close to expanding cities have generally started urbanizing in advance of administrative urbanization. In the reform era the collectives, which morphed into village-level enterprises, have been the main agents of rural industrialization along with government township enterprises (Oi 1989; Chen 1998; Pei 2002).

In all three of the village case studies, urbanization has occurred in such a way that the native villagers' socioterritorial organization

Table 1.1. Village and *shequ* economic and administrative organization, 1950s–today.

	Village (*cun*)/Urban Community (*shequ*)	**Village/Urban Community Subdivisions**
Collective economic organization (1950s–1982)	*Shengchan dadui* Production brigade	*Shengchandui* Production team
Administrative organization (1950s–2004)	*Xingzheng cun* Administrative village *Cunweidahui* (abbrev. *Cunweihui)* Village assembly	*Ziran cun* Natural villages *Cunweihui* Village committees
Administrative organization since legal urbanization in 2004	*Shequ dangqun fuwu zhongxin* Party Service Center for the masses	*Shequ jumin weiyuanhui* (abbrev. *Juweihui)* Residents' committees

of the collectivist era has endured, albeit to different degrees. The importance of shareholding companies and other former village institutions, and the degree to which native villagers in urbanized communities continue to identify with their former village although it no longer officially exists, varies according to the extent, modalities, and timing of the expropriation of village land, both collective agricultural land and individual land (Tang 2015). Apart from collective land, in the early years of postreform urban growth, village households generally retained the use rights to their individual housing and homestead farming plots (*zhaijidi* and *ziliudi*). These plots of land have also undergone varying fates, reflecting the degree of the villagers' control over urbanization.

Pine Mansion in Shenzhen: Rentier Natives, Factory Workers, and Self-Employed Migrants

While Pine Mansion village, whose territory covers 3.2 square kilometers, has physically disappeared, its agricultural fields replaced by factories and residential buildings, there is a striking continuity from the pre-collectivist period to today in its territorial-social structure. Everyone who originates from Pine Mansion strongly identifies with their *cun*, which refers to both the former administrative village of Pine Mansion as a whole and to each of its seven "natural village" subdivisions, which became seven production teams in the 1950s (table 1.1). Native villagers introduce themselves by saying they are from this or that *cun* (natural village) or *wei* (neighborhood, residential clusters of aligned houses), both terms referring to the same units and used interchangeably. Six of these *wei* used to be (and still are, to some extent) inhabited by members of different segments of the dominant Chen lineage, whose members are Hakka speakers.[20] Among the natives there is also a very small minority of Cantonese speakers, most of whom belong to a much smaller lineage, the Huang, whose members live in the seventh *wei*.

Pine Mansion now has seven small shareholding companies at the neighborhood (natural village) level, and one large one at the higher, *shequ* (former administrative village) level. The shareholding companies draw rental income from industrial and commercial real estate on the land to which they have collective use rights. The larger shareholding company has bought sections of collective land from the smaller companies and holds use rights to what has become a medium-sized industrial zone on the former village's outskirts, its headquarters located in one of a pair of eight-story buildings in the heart of the old village, the second of which is occupied by the community center. They embody civil society and administrative power, respectively. While *shequ* employees are directly appointed by the upper municipal level, company leaders are elected by the shareholders. However, their concurrent powers are not of the same scope: the shareholding companies are owned by the native villagers, while the community center is concerned with all of the *shequ*'s residents, natives and non-natives alike (see next section).

This shareholding system was first introduced in Guangdong Province in the early 1990s to securitize collective assets (Po 2008) when income from industrialization started to grow; it spread to other regions in the 2000s (Po 2011; Tang 2015). According to elderly Pine Mansioners, living conditions were extremely harsh in the wake of Deng Xiaoping's reforms. Massive emigration greatly reduced the labor force, hampering teamwork as each team was left with only a few workers, mainly women whose husbands had left for Hong Kong. The families survived thanks to remittances and plots of homestead land (*ziliudi*) allocated to them by the brigade, on which they grew vegetables, sweet potatoes, and sugar cane. Farmland was decollectivized in 1981 with the adoption of the Household Respon-



Map 1.5. Pine Mansion, Shenzhen. © Bureau Relief.

sibility System, which made each household responsible for the cultivation of its own plot of land (*zerentian*).[21] The Mao-era collectives had become empty shells.

In the early 1990s collectives resurfaced with the creation of economic development companies (*jingji fazhan gongsi*) in which the villagers held shares, and they also gained the right to undertake nonagricultural activities. Part of the former collective agricultural land was then redistributed among the villagers by drawing lots. By 1994 most villagers had built four- or five-story houses on these plots and moved from the old compounds to these new modern buildings, often occupying one floor and renting the others to migrant workers. The new residential areas around the core of the old village are named after each of the seven original *wei* or natural villages, preceded by *xin* (new); e.g., "xin Xiangxi," and so on. In short, there has been centrifugal expansion: the *wei* have expanded beyond their original limits onto the land that their inhabitants used to cultivate.

The shareholding companies started building factories and dormitories on their collectively held agricultural land. The village shareholders called for investment and financial support from kin in Hong Kong and overseas, and pooled their money to build the factories, which they rented to Hong Kong and Taiwanese corporations. This process continued even after the village's urbanization in 2004, when the development companies were renamed cooperative shareholding companies (*gufen hezuo gongsi*). In the 1990s, the large village cooperative was forced to sell a significant portion of its land in the northeast of the village to a state-owned company, which two years later sold part of it on to a private foreign company for development into what has become one of the world's largest golf courses and a shopping mall (see map 1.5), and the rest to a state-owned agro-industrial company, both at a much higher price. In 2004, as with most villages urbanized in the second wave, the Shenzhen government did not expropriate individual residential and farming plots. It took over only part of the former collective land, and this was mainly unused forest and hilly land for which the shareholding companies received forty-six RMB per m^2 in compensation. The villages' companies, and those in the Pearl River Delta region more generally, retained collective use rights (*jiti tudi sheyong quan*) on the remaining land (Yan, Wei, and Zhou 2004; Tan 2005; Tian 2008; Po 2008; Chung 2013).

Only the natives were entitled to a share in the reformed shareholding companies. The condition for becoming a shareholder was local peasant residential status before urbanization in 2004. In Pine Mansion, those eligible included the Chens and the Huangs, along with their wives who originate from other nearby villages.[22] Thus, in Shenzhen, administrative urbanization in 2004 gave rise to a new category of people called "native villagers" (*yuancunmin*), whose local *hukou* was changed from peasant to urban and who received shares in the reformed shareholding companies. According to Shenzhen regulations, all those with *hukou* registered elsewhere are to be excluded from this official category, but in Pine Mansion, some downtown Shenzheners who left the village and changed their *hukou* before 2004 (i.e., those with commercial or urban administrative careers) were entitled to buy a share. They paid a much higher price than the 1,000 RMB paid by those who had cultivated the land for their entire lives.[23] The concern about equality is all the more understandable as companies distribute not only annual dividends that can amount to several thousand RMB a year from the richest companies but also social benefits (*fuli*).

According to the last detailed official census in 2010, the population of 59,980 residents of Pine Mansion included 1,441 or 2.4 percent local *hukou* holders or "native villagers." Many Pine Mansioners do not have to work for a living and display the idleness that had become a sign of status by the early 2000s in other formerly rural villages in the area (Chan, Yao, and Zhao 2009: 293); Siu calls their native inhabitants "Maoist landlords" (2007: 334; see also Liu 2009). They collect rent on their apartments, leaving them plenty of time to sit outdoors, chatting with fellow native villagers and playing mahjong. Those who live in the village appreciate their quiet and comfortable community, where everybody knows everybody else. Wang Cuichun, a former peasant whose husband lives in Hong Kong, declared, with her friends nodding in agreement: "Here we have freedom: we're used to rural village life (*nongcun*), there's more space. In the city, in Shenzhen and Hong Kong, the houses are very small." The native villagers persist in speaking of Pine Mansion as "their village" (*women cun*), both to distinguish it from the city of Shenzhen, even though they are formally Shenzheners, and to refer to their close-knit, face-to-face community within the wider urban community (*shequ*) with all its new inhabitants.

The non-native and non-*hukou*-holding population is younger and far less homogenous than the native population. The 2010 census registered 11,881 factory workers, mostly in their twenties and living in factory dormitories and old houses. The redevelopment of the village has visibly reduced their number, although some factories remain.[24] Pine Mansion's temporary resident population is increasingly composed of white-collar employees and small-business entrepreneurs; they run grocery and vegetable stores, canteens and restaurants, garages, and factories producing goods for larger subcontracting factories. About a third originate from other localities in Guangdong Province or nearby Guangxi Province; the rest have migrated from China's inner provinces, mainly Sichuan, Jiangxi, Anhui, Henan, Hunan, and Hebei.

South Gate in Chengdu: Resettled and Commercial Residential Communities

South Gate community was established in June 2004 and covered an area of 1.6 square kilometers prior to its division into two communities. The village's original territory was probably larger, but with urbanization the state immediately expropriated all village land. When Jessica Wilczak started her fieldwork in Chengdu, where she had already carried out her doctoral research (in a different site), South Gate community had just been divided by carving out 0.75 square kilometers in March 2017 to form North Gate community (see map 1.6).

In 2018 the North Gate community website listed a population of 19,645 people, of which 10,415 were permanent residents and 9,230 floating population. The South Gate community website numbered its own population at 19,945, with no breakdown into registered and floating populations.[25] South Gate community consists of two resettlement estates for former farmers (*anzhi xiaoqu*) and seven commercial estates (*shangye loupan*); North Gate community comprises two resettlement estates for former farmers and six commercial estates: while this reflects the rapid expansion of commercial housing in Chengdu (Yang et al. 2017: 84), clearly the division was done in such a way as to keep a balance between native and non-native villagers as part of Chengdu's effort toward urban-rural integration.

For the sake of simplicity, unless differentiated, the former village of South Gate and resulting urban communities of South Gate community and North Gate community are referred to collectively in this book as South Gate. South Gate's communities are primarily residential: other than small shops, restaurants, and medical clinics there are no big employers or factories in the area. Before urbanization in 2004, most of South Gate's residents lived in *linpan*, a settlement pattern unique to the Chengdu Basin consisting of clusters of three to ten courtyard-style houses (*yuanzi*) hedged by tall groves of bamboo and surrounded by small plots of agricultural land. For the most part they grew staples such as rice, wheat, and rapeseed for oil. Vegetables were largely grown for home consumption. Some families also kept cows and sold the milk to a privately run commercial dairy in the village. The land use was mostly residential or agricultural, interspersed with a few small enterprises such as commercial garages. In other words, South Gate was visually quite rural before its formal urbanization in 2004. It was not entirely an agrarian economy, however: by the 2000s most of its young people were working or studying in the city, and some households rented space to migrants from other areas.[26]

South Gate Village is part of a zone referred to as a mixed urban-rural border area, in which resettlement housing represents two-thirds of residential land use for resettlement in Chengdu city (Yang et al. 2017: 85). Unlike Pine Mansion and River Hamlet, South Gate's legal urbanization involved its immediate physical transformation. Similar to the process Zhang, Wu and Zhong (2018) describe in Ji-



Map 1.6. South Gate, Chengdu. © Bureau Relief.

angsu, another region known for its proactive urban-rural integration policies, it was urbanized in a sweeping, top-down fashion under a policy of "large-scale demolition and construction" (*dachai dajian*). Village land was requisitioned by the municipal government and auctioned off to developers. In contrast to Pine Mansion and River Hamlet, the South Gate villagers lost their use rights on all of their collective agricultural and individual residential and homestead land. However, in return they received apartments in new resettlement estates built on plots of land belonging to the five former production teams (*shengchandui*), meaning that members of former teams were often resettled in the same buildings. Therefore, much as in Pine Mansion and River Hamlet, connections among people of the same production team remained strong even after urbanization, and former villagers continued to refer to different locations in the community by team numbers; for example, "on Number 3 team's land."

The construction of the resettlement estates took several years, during which the villagers had to arrange their own accommodation, often renting space in nearby as-yet-undemolished houses. Once the resettlement estates were complete, they organized the decoration of their new apartments, which in China are generally sold without fixtures such as appliances, flooring, and lighting. Only native villagers received a subsidy of a few tens of thousands of RMB for this; women who had married into the village, for example, were not eligible for this subsidy. By 2008 most of the villagers had moved into their new apartments, which were allocated based on the number of household members at a rate of 35 m^2 per person. This meant that most families received more than one apartment, and many ended up renting the extra space to migrants from other areas.

Although both types of estate are conflated under the term *xiaoqu*, or residential area, native villagers are distinguished from nonvillagers largely by their place of residence and ownership status. Resettled villagers do not receive deeds of ownership, and this is a widespread problem in China (Ong 2014). Although they are allowed to rent it out, native villagers on resettlement estates do not own their property. The absence of deeds implies that they are prevented from selling the apartment units on the open market, although they are often traded on the black market at a reduced price.[27]

The resettlement housing estates on which the former villagers live are also visually distinct from commercially sold housing. Those in the North and South Gate communities are complexes of a dozen or so low-rise five- or six-story walk-up buildings. Visually, they resemble the work-unit (*danwei*) housing built in the heyday of state socialism. The commercial estates, by contrast, are collections of four- to twelve-story high-rise apartment buildings with elevators. Their occupants are a mix of Chengdu urbanites and white-collar migrant workers. Although some low-income rural migrants rent apartments or rooms in the resettlement estates from former villagers, the distinction between the low-rise resettlement estates for former villagers and the high-rise commercial estates for white-collar workers is clear-cut. However, there is one hybrid exception: Benevolence Garden is a large, recently completed resettlement complex for villagers from other demolished villages in Chengdu. Some of its apartments are for sale on the open market, with the price per square meter about half that of nearby fully commercial estates due to unclear ownership rights.

Today South Gate looks like a fairly middle-class residential community. There are no traces of the rural village apart from some murals depicting former village life in the community center and a few unoccupied fields that have yet to be developed and are being used as informal community gardens.

River Hamlet (Xi'an): Rentier Natives, Migrants, and Retired Factory Workers

In 2018, when Wang Bo started his field research in his natal city Xi'an, the native villager population of River Hamlet was around 5,000 and that of migrants was about 70,000. River Hamlet's earliest inhabitants migrated from river villages in Jiangsu to Shaanxi province during the Ming Dynasty in the fourteenth century. In recent decades River Hamlet, which covers an area of 2.474 square kilometers, has seen an influx of both rural laborers and new white-collar urbanites into the commercial residential estates springing up next to the village on sold-off land. The number of 70,000 temporary residents is an underestimate, because many rural migrants do not hold permits and stay only for short periods, frequently changing their accommodation. The popular saying is that River Hamlet has around 300,000 people. A community center officer explained that "only the long-term residents in River Hamlet are counted, for social welfare distribution purposes."[28] In addition, the sheer number of daily visitors to River Hamlet can reach the tens of thousands as both white-collar workers and rural migrants come from the surrounding area to buy food and other goods, to network, or simply to get a haircut.

The native or original villagers are spread across five natural villages (*ziran cun*) corresponding to the five production teams *(shengchan dui)* of the collectivist era, grouped at the administrative village level as a production brigade (*shengchan dadui*) (table 1.1). River Hamlet is not unified around a majority lineage, like Pine Mansion: the native villagers have a wide diversity of surnames. The scope of social interaction and reciprocity ties through gift-giving in life-cycle rituals was, and still is, largely restricted to the natural village—i.e., team—level. Prior to the village's demolition in spring 2018, wedding and funeral ceremonies were held in public spaces, often in makeshift tents in narrow alleys away from the main street (see map 1.7).



Map 1.7. River Hamlet, Xi'an. © Bureau Relief.

After it became an "urban reform village" (*cheng gai cun*) in 2004, River Hamlet's village committee gradually sold much of its collective land to developers for factories, colleges, a wastewater treatment plant, and metro and road construction. By 2017, some of the old village houses built on such formerly agricultural land had already been demolished. Although deprived of their collective assets, the villagers accumulated wealth individually from rent for well over a decade. Like the situation in a Beijing urban village described by Zhan (2018: 1537), "as the ordinary local peasants [had] little access to benefits from their collective land, they [devoted] all their money and energy to the informal rental business on their own housing plots." Ignoring state planning regulations, they rebuilt their own houses with six, eight, or even ten floors and let them to rural migrants; from former farmers they became the propertied rentier class.

While many of the elderly remained in the rebuilt village homes collecting rent on apartments, shops, and vending places in public spaces, most of the younger villagers purchased apartments in the commercial gated communities nearby. Not only younger native villagers but also many well-to-do migrants live in the gated communities on commercial estates, most of which are outside River Hamlet, because the apartments are of a higher standard and living in a gated community is a sign of status. Poor migrants rent apartments on the main street and in back alleys, where many run shops, restaurants, and hotels, which are often unlicensed.

Until it was fully demolished, River Hamlet was a paradise for many rural migrants who opened their first small businesses there, and for students and young graduates in their first job, attracted by the cheap rent and food, good transport connectivity, and general liveliness of the area. Students and young graduates living in precarious conditions have become popularly known as "ant tribes" (*yi zu*) after Beijing professor Lian Si (2009) coined this term to describe the ways in which these hardworking yet underpaid young people congregate in urban villages. Some urban villages in Shenzhen and Chengdu are likewise populated by large sections of young people, but this is not the case of South Gate and Pine Mansion, which are not close to universities and/or high-tech zones, and rather accommodate families with young children. The Hong Kong–based Phoenix Television station produced a 2011 documentary series on the young residents of Xi'an's urban villages.[29] One of these was a college student who tutored computer graphics students part-time to help with his daily expenses and his own tuition. He lived in a six-story self-constructed building with a view of a new high-rise building under construction. He had come from a very poor village, and his dream was to finally leave rural life behind and start a family in the city with his girlfriend.

Mrs. Cheng, the owner of a handmade jewelry business, had arrived in Xi'an in 2001 at the age of just nineteen from the neighboring Shanxi Province. For several years she had rented, from the small village committee, sidewalk space on which she set up a tiny makeshift table to show her elegantly crafted handmade bracelets, necklaces, and earrings. When Wang Bo met her, she was renting a shop on the main street, still from the small village committee. She rejoiced: "You never have to worry about a lack of customers, they come to you in their hundreds every day."[30] She noted that if she had not been willing to pay the rent for the sidewalk, another vendor would have been quick to take her spot. With business that good, living in precarious conditions and paying the native villagers for the use of a piece of public space was tolerable.

Besides the native villagers and rural migrants, River Hamlet's population included a few dozen long-term urban *hukou* holders. They had been workers in the formerly state-owned military garment factory (see map 1.7) before migrating to Xi'an in the 1940s and 1950s, and were among the minority who had transferred their rural *hukou* to urban *hukou* under Mao. Now retired, and some of them very old, they still lived in several factory dormitories that had been left standing, although the factories are no longer in use. The dormitories they used to live in are still unofficially considered to belong to them, both in their own eyes and in those of the government. They were quite isolated and did not socialize with the elderly native villagers.[31]

Of the three cases, River Hamlet conforms best to the negative image of the *chengzhongcun*, villages-in-the-city, as chaotic, unruly, crime-ridden areas. Its thriving informal economy was connected to the existence of gangs involved in sex trafficking and other illegal activities. Indeed, local scholars have commented on the vibrant "gray economy" in these locations, "gray" signifying tax evasion and illegal activities such as gangs and prostitution (He et al. 2012). Police cars patrolled River Hamlet after dark, and gamblers hid their money away before the police arrived. At night the back alleys were lit by the red lights of brothels, from which prostitutes beckoned to potential clients. Despite its rougher side, River Hamlet was popular among many newcomers, who affectionately called it Little Hong Kong, referring to the vibrant yet violent city depicted in the movies they had grown up watching. River Hamlet's violent and insecure atmosphere increased when the municipal authorities announced its full-scale demolition and replacement with plazas and high-rises (see chapter 2). The state-run media justified the demolition by depicting the urbanized village as overrun with vicious criminals and riddled with security concerns.

Administrative Arrangements and Welfare Provision

Administrative urbanization entails a loss of power for village inhabitants. The village committees (*cunweihui*), autonomous mass organizations via which villagers manage their own affairs and meet their own needs, are not part of the state apparatus.[32] Once a village becomes an urban jurisdiction, its committees are replaced by residents' committees (*juweihui*), which, however, have much less say in their community's affairs as community management falls to the new *shequ* office. Communities (*shequ*) are the lowest level of governance in urban China, with a hybrid position at the intersection of administrative power and civil society organizations (Derleth and Koldyk 2004; Ngeow 2011; Heberer and Göbel 2013; Audin 2017). They are governed by the higher-level subdistrict ("street") office (*jiedao banshichu*), which is under the jurisdiction of the district (*qu*), itself directly answering to the city administration (*shi*).

In the collectivist era, the production brigade provided the disabled and the elderly, especially those lacking familial support, with material assistance known as the "five guarantees" (*wubao*), which consisted of food, clothing, medical care, housing, and funeral services. The collectives also funded a cooperative medical scheme (CMS) for agricultural workers. Both systems fell apart following decollectivization (Duckett 2011; Qian and Blomqvist 2014). Although health and social insurance have been extended since 2003 with the goal of universal coverage, this was based on a strategy of "stratified expansion" (Huang 2020: 42). The CMS was replaced by the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (NRCMS) in 2003, and new funding mechanisms for the Five Guarantees were established in 2006.[33] From 2009, a New Rural Pension Scheme (NRPS), based on both individual contributions and government subsidies, was gradually extended (Frazier 2010; Zhang, Luo, and Robinson 2019) (apart from a pilot program based on individual contributions that lasted just a few years in the 1990s, there were no retirement pensions in rural areas until 2009). On the whole, rural welfare benefits were and remain generally lower than those paid to urban hukou holders, as many scholars have noted (Chan 1994; Cheng and Selden 1994; Selden and You 1997; Solinger 1999; Smart and Li 2001; Wang 2005; Zhang and Kanbur 2005; Wu 2009a, 2009b; Whyte 2010; Hsing 2012).

With urbanization (in 2004 in the cases considered in this book), the former villagers as new urban residents were to be covered by urban welfare benefits, i.e., the state should start funding retirement pensions and increase social and health insurance provisioning. The urban healthcare system, which was reformed in 1995, is managed by local governments and applies to all urban hiring units, including state-owned and private enterprises, government organs, and social enterprises (Wong, Lo, and Tang 2006). The Basic Health Insurance is composed of personal medical accounts (both the hiring unit and the worker are required to pay premiums) and local government-run socially pooled funds. Urban social insurance (pensions, unemployment subsidies), made mandatory in 1998, is likewise funded by multiple channels, and enterprises of all ownership types must contribute. It was only in 2011 that the inclusion of rural migrant workers in the urban social insurance system was mandated by the social insurance law, which also facilitates social insurance fund transferability between rural and urban jurisdictions (Shi 2012). Recent studies show that informal employment is becoming a more important factor than *hukou* in access to social insurance (Cheng, Nielsen, and Smyth 2014). Indeed, in recent years there has been mounting pressure from the central authorities on municipal governments to increase the number of *hukou* transfers, thereby further increasing the size of the population eligible for the urban public goods regime. Furthermore, the recent reform of resident permits aims at "promoting basic services and facilitating full coverage of the permanent population," including non-hukou holders.[34] However, its consequences in terms of access to urban welfare benefits for temporary residents are so far unclear.[35]

In general, China's municipal governments are inadequately funded to cover the number of public functions they are expected to perform. They resolve this contradiction by setting up elaborate points systems, as discussed in the first section, and by leaving village collectives or private employers in charge, resulting in inequality between the native and migrant populations. Of the three urban villages considered in this book, this is starkest in Shenzhen.

Powerful Shareholding Companies in Pine Mansion, Shenzhen

On April 1, 2004, Pine Mansion's villagers became urban citizens of Shenzhen; their *hukou* was converted from a rural to an urban one (a process called *nong zhuan fei*). Before that date, Pine Mansion had been administratively autonomous, run by the village head and village committee assembly (*cunwei dahui*). A twelve-year transitional phase saw the gradual transfer of power from village institutions, residents' committees (RCs), and the elected village head to municipal administration.

Urbanization has created a duality of power with increasing subordination to the municipal power hierarchy. Initially the locus of the new municipal power within the *shequ* was the workstation (*gongzuozhan*) (Zhang and Yan 2014), which, in the first years after urbanization, was ruled by the former village head, a Chen. When I (Anne-Christine) arrived in Pine Mansion for the first time, in 2011, he held the position of workstation head in tandem with the community's party secretary, a Huang (the main native minority lineage). The two positions were merged in 2012 and a vice-position was added. Huang became workstation head while remaining the *shequ*'s party secretary, and was reappointed to this double position in 2013, with a native Chen in his forties as vice-head and vice-secretary. In 2017 the latter was appointed workstation head and party secretary while Huang was elected as head of the large shareholding company (see below). In short, the main leadership positions of party vice-secretary, community center head and vice-head, and head of the large shareholding company rotate among the same native villagers.

In 2016 the transitional phase came to an end, and the workstation was renamed the Community Party Service Center for the Masses (*shequ dangqun fuwu zhongxin*). The community center employs sixty people in different departments: family planning, urban management (*chengguan*), social affairs; conflict resolution (*weiwen*), labor supervision, petitions, and "information" (propaganda), reflecting the mix of functions allocated to community centers (Xu, Gao, and Yan 2005). Chen Pine Mansioners head several of these departments, including the most strategic, social affairs and urban management, while other less strategic and more subordinate positions such as those of social workers appointed by the district are staffed by natives Shenzheners originating from other urbanized communities. The renaming of the community center signaled the beginning of a policy of charitable service and activities oriented toward the migrant population (see chapter 4).

The native villagers thus hold important positions in the community center. In addition, they govern two types of institution that represent former village power in the urban community: the Chen lineage foundation, discussed in the next chapter, and the shareholding companies and residents' committees. Pine Mansion's seven neighborhoods are covered by three residents' committees (RCs), one consisting of two small shareholding companies, and the other two comprising three. Mr. Chen, the head of a shareholding company and of an RC, explained that RCs have been marginalized (*bianyuan hua*), with "many of their responsibilities" transferred to the community center. In fact, the RCs' functions are nominally the same as those of the community center, but they have little in terms of resources with which to execute them. Until 2016 the RCs received subsidies from the district, including "vitality funds" for organizing activities and money to pay their employees' salaries. Funding now goes only to the community center (see Audin 2017 on a similar process in Beijing).

The RCs' functions have therefore been reduced to only "very small-scale things," as the same RC head explained, such as the delivery of tenancy certificates for native residents. Although the residents' committees have lost power to the municipal administration, their close links with the shareholding companies keep them running. All three RC heads (*zhuren*) are also elected directors (*dong-*

shizhang) of a small shareholding company.[36] Chen made it very clear that the RCs do not receive enough from the government to cover their needs, and therefore the shareholding companies have to make up the losses from their own budgets (Jiang [2005] describes a similar situation elsewhere in Shenzhen). They provide everything from office space to drinking-water fountains, and systematically appoint shareholding company employees to simultaneous company and RC positions.

The native villagers still enjoy considerable autonomy, thanks to the economic power derived from their collective land use rights. In urbanized Shenzhen villages, the former village collectives, which are now shareholding companies, are responsible for paying villagers' pensions and social and health insurance. This is the main change brought by legal urbanization: previously there were virtually no social benefits. Women aged over 50 and men over 60 now receive a pension of about 2,500 RMB per month from the company in which they hold a share. Wang Cuichun, who married in the village in 1972, lives with her grandson in a house in Xiangxi. She holds a company share, and her grandson has inherited one from his grandfather (her father-in-law). She emphasized that her retirement pension is higher than that of her husband in Hong Kong.

Pine Mansion's large shareholding company provides social insurance (*shebao*) and health insurance (*yibao*), buying them in and providing them directly to their shareholders or reimbursing those shareholders—mainly the self-employed—who purchase their own insurance. This phenomenon, which prevails in the Pearl River Delta, has been characterized as the creation of mini welfare states funded by village shareholding companies (Chung and Unger 2013: 35). In 2018, all-inclusive insurance (*zonghe bao*) covering health and social insurance cost the shareholding company about 900 RMB per person per month. The amount increases every year, accompanied by a gradual upgrading of the insurance coverage. None of the ordinary villagers know precisely how it works, and the shareholding companies provide very little information about the system.

Non-natives are excluded from this urban public goods regime run by the former village collectives. Of the seventy-five non-native non-*hukou* holders I surveyed with the help of a student assistant, a high—and probably disproportionate due to the way we targeted respondents in the public square—number (thirty-three) of respondents were over fifty years old; eleven said they were retired, but none received a retirement pension; some worked outside the home, but most (twenty-four) cared for their grandchildren (see chapter 4).[37]

South Gate, Chengdu: Serving the Middle Classes and Integrating Newcomers

Chengdu's approach to urbanization with almost instant large-scale demolition and resettlement meant that institutional transformation in South Gate village was also fairly rapid. Until 2004 the village was run by a villagers' committee with an elected village head and a party secretary, the latter often being the real locus of power. When the village became an urban community in 2004, the villagers' committee became a residents' committee, although the party secretary remained the same. No proper village shareholding company similar to those in Shenzhen was formed. However, after their resettlement, the South Gate villagers continue to receive small dividends of a few hundred RMB per year, much less than in Pine Mansion, from the small amount of real-estate income drawn from former collective land. The residents' committees collect rent from the shops on the ground floors of the relocation estates, where members of each production team are housed together. To this extent the residents' committees act exactly like Pine Mansion's small shareholding corporations, although they do not provide welfare benefits.[38]

In 2008 the relocation estates and some of the commercial estates were finished, and residents began to repopulate the area. A "Community Party Service Center for the Masses" (hereafter, community center) was built in South Gate, prefiguring the type of community center to be set up almost ten years later in Pine Mansion. The community center in South Gate is a composite unit that centralizes functions that in Pine Mansion are dispersed across the community center, the shareholding companies, and the RCs (and also, as discussed in later chapters, the lineage foundation).[39] The center has taken over even more functions from the RCs than that in Pine Mansion: it includes offices for family planning, social affairs, and conflict resolution, also issuing identification and household registration certificates for all inhabitants (a function of the RCs in Pine Mansion) and providing a clinic, a reading room, and meeting rooms and classrooms for various cultural activities and social clubs. However, unlike Pine Mansion, it does not include an urban management (*chengguan*) unit (see chapter 3).

The increasing population of South Gate community led to its division into North Gate and South Gate communities in 2017. Mr. Wang, a native South Gate villager who had worked at the original community center since its creation, was selected as party secretary to the newly created North Gate community. He lives in the South

Gate residential area. Mrs. Gu, a native of the nearby city of Chongqing who had been employed as a community worker in South Gate for two years previously, was appointed party secretary to South Gate community. Although Secretary Gu is not a native villager, she speaks the local dialect and understands village dynamics. Despite her dedication and qualifications, however, she is not well-liked by the former villagers, who compare her unfavorably to the North Gate party secretary.

Both party secretaries have master's degrees in agricultural science from Southwest Agricultural University, and both were fairly young at the time of their appointment, with Wang in his early forties and Gu in her late twenties. They combine an understanding of the communities' rural roots with a recent move to recruit more youthful and professional community workers. The new North Gate community center is located in the part of the resettlement estate allocated to the former Number 5 production team to which Secretary Wang belonged. The new head of the North Gate community residents' committee, Mr. Xu, in his late thirties and a former villager, has a university degree in design and worked in design before taking up his position in the community in 2017. While ensuring a certain amount of continuity in social organization, the new community centers mark the change from rural to urban life. In most villages the village committee headquarters are fairly functional, with meeting rooms, offices, and possibly a small reading room. The new community centers in North and South Gate villages are not only administrative centers but also active social hubs (chapter 5 and the conclusion).

Former villagers occupy a number of positions in the community center, and although the center is open to all, attendance is dominated by the native villagers, who generally express satisfaction with their urbanized living standards. As in Xi'an, their urban status allows them to sign up for a basic urban pension and medical and social insurance schemes, managed at the level of the subdistrict rather than by the shareholding companies as in Pine Mansion. It proved difficult to obtain precise data on social insurance during surveys of native villagers in all three cases, as many did not know how much they were paying or for which type of insurance. This was true not only of former farmers but also of older people who had previously worked in an urban *danwei* (a state factory or administrative work unit), who just said that the *danwei* took care of it.[40]

Most of South Gate's immigrants are middle-class white-collar workers and have earned or are in the process of earning local *hukou*; they sign up to private insurance schemes, or their employer pays for them. Some have come from other cities where they have access to pensions and insurance, while others are from the countryside, mainly in Sichuan Province. Many immigrants have brought their parents to the city with them to care for their children, and these often betray the rural roots that their children have escaped. Most of these elderly temporary residents with rural backgrounds have no pension.

River Hamlet, Xi'an: Dispersed Natives and Excluded Migrants

As in Pine Mansion, in River Hamlet the district government did not take over the village's land upon urbanization in 2004. Unlike in Pine Mansion, however, due to River Hamlet's transitional status as an "urban reform" village, most villagers retained their original rural *hukou*, and the village committee (*cunweihui*) remained in place.[41] This arrangement was an early indication that the district government was willing to impose change only gradually on River Hamlet. In the year it became an "urban reform village," the River Hamlet Village Shareholding Company was established, staffed with elected members of the village committee. Although it was modeled on Shenzhen's shareholding companies, its main purpose is to facilitate land transfers between the village and the district government and to distribute compensation.

The purpose of the River Hamlet shareholding company is not to finance welfare provision under an urban public goods regime, as in Shenzhen. The original villagers retained their non-urban *hukou* and were given shares in the shareholding company, which provides minimal social benefits. Rural status is desirable because of the associated use rights to collective land: those who change to an urban *hukou* lose these rights, and thus their shares in the company. Sometimes even when a household has bought urban property elsewhere, they have registered it in the name of just one of their adult children, so that the rest of the family can continue to enjoy their rural *hukou* and thus claim company dividends of around 2,000 RMB per year, as well as income from renting out their own real estate built on collective land. For elderly people, the informally employed, the unemployed, and children, who cannot obtain urban *hukou* via formal employment, their rural *hukou* is a source of income (on other similar cases of resistance to becoming urban, see Smart and Li 2012).

The River Hamlet inhabitants' welfare benefits such as free medical care differ widely.[42] Native villagers have two options: to register as urban residents without formal employment and receive the minimum medical insurance from the municipal government—not an attractive option, as it means renouncing their share in the shareholding company—or to register as urban residents and see the responsibility for such benefits transferred to the employer, an option that is attractive only for stable employees. *Hukou* holders receive full medical insurance benefits through their employers, as required by urban labor laws. The community center processes the benefit transfers from the government to employers. As of 2018–19, the monthly per capita municipal government's contribution to the city's minimum medical care plan (*chengzhen jumin dibao*) was less than two hundred RMB, reflecting the minimal care it provided, whereas the average amount paid by employers for "five insurances and one pension," *wuxian yijin,* the same as all-inclusive insurance, *zonghe bao*) was at least four hundred RMB.

Integration into the urban government scheme is the new policy, although its actual implementation is slow, as it requires putting demographic data into the system, which was still ongoing at the community center in 2019. This slowness is a source of concern for rural migrants who hold temporary permits, because they are not entitled to medical care for urban residents as long as their medical insurance cards are registered in rural areas of Shaanxi or neighboring provinces, leaving them the option of either attending the rare clinics and pharmacies that accept province-wide insurance cards or not being reimbursed for their medical expenses.

Elderly people who had lived in factory dormitories before River Hamlet's urbanization (see previous section) received benefits from the private contractor to whom the state's pension scheme had been sold when the factories were shut down. The contractor had to commit to pay workers an amount calculated based on the number of years they had worked before retiring. These state-guaranteed pensions were barely enough to live on, even in the inexpensive urban village, and feeling abandoned, retired workers vented their resentment of the guarantee system that had been such a source of pride and security for those retiring in the socialist era. Workers who had not reached retirement age when they were laid off had no option but to find employment with a pension and healthcare insurance.

From 2004 onward, the River Hamlet shareholding company, unlike those of Pine Mansion, gradually sold off the village's agricultural land to real-estate developers via of the district government. The transactions were rapidly completed to facilitate several major projects, including a university campus, a wastewater treatment plant, a riverbed extension project, and a residential development.

In contrast to Pine Mansion, there was a lack of accountability from elected leaders and a lack of solidarity among River Hamlet's villagers, who were strongly divided across and within the five natural villages. As Lily Tsai (2007) has demonstrated, there is a strong correlation between the presence of solidary groups, leaders' accountability, and the level of public goods provision (see also Song 2014; Zhu and Cai 2016). River Hamlet villagers elected ten representatives, two from each natural village, to sit in the village assembly. The competition for seats was fierce, because whoever was elected would have a role in shaping how compensation would be paid to individual native villagers and in negotiating with developers and the district government on the terms of their relocation.

Villagers complained that the transaction processes were opaque. Wang Bo found only one detailed account of how the revenue from a land sale had been divided among the villagers: in 2012 a large piece of land (540 mu) was sold to the district for 335,000 RMB per mu for the construction of a college campus. Each household received 300,000 RMB. Families with only one child or with two daughters received extra money to reward their obedience to the one-child policy, and the remainder was distributed among the senior villagers, comprising men over sixty and women over fifty. The land was sold to the college campus at a suspiciously cheap price, suggesting that part of the money was pocketed. A rumor circulated that the village leaders had exchanged land for promotion to government positions or other under-the-table favors. The rumor became a scandal in 2016 when a real-estate developer was exposed as the niece of a high official who had benefited from the sale of land. Worse still, not only did the below-market price resulted in the River Hamlet shareholding company making less money than it could have, but the A4 sheet that was posted in front of its headquarters, listing the financial records of the shareholding company, revealed that the company's finances were in deficit because it had invested poorly, including in illicit mountain villas that were demolished in 2017.

The tension between the villagers and the administration was high, exacerbated by increasing administrative intervention from above as a result of the village's urban reform status. The village committee kept regular staff in charge of party outreach and women's affairs—that is, party member recruitment and occasional checks on birth control. In 2013 illicit parking became a severe problem as migrants and customers parked their scooters in the village's narrow alleys, blocking the passage of former native villagers' cars when they visited their parents and friends in the village. The village committee decided to establish an office for the imposition of fines, thereby challenging the authority of the subdistrict and the police station, which was only fifty meters from the village office. The office was soon closed down.

Commonalities and Differences between the Three Urban Villages

The distinctive features of the three villages-in-the-city largely reflect the urbanization trajectories of the cities of which they have become part. This is particularly clear in the case of Shenzhen, a city whose growth owes much to the industrialization and urbanization of its constituting blocks, formerly rural villages. Although the core of Shenzhen has been partly state-planned and state-built, state investment, especially in the northern part of the city, which joined the special economic zone late in the process, has been almost nil until very recently. The urbanization of Xi'an and Chengdu has been planned and state-led far more than that of Shenzhen. Chengdu's proactive urban-rural integration policy and the voluntarist policy of the local state (the municipality), which saw rapid top-down urbanization with almost simultaneous rebuilding and the top-down resettlement of rural villagers, is quite distinct. While Chengdu's and Xi'an's authorities have made increased efforts to catch up with the pace of China's urbanization, Xi'an's River Hamlet has more in common with Shenzhen's Pine Mansion regarding the leeway left for former rural villagers to shape their urban village spaces.

Xi'an and Chengdu are more welcoming of migrants than Shenzhen, which has the highest proportion of migrants of the three cities, as reflected in the differences between the three cases summarized in table 1.2, below. Pine Mansion has the highest proportion of temporary residents. In all three cases, native villagers constitute a very small minority; the difference, however, is that in Chengdu's South Gate a large part of the incoming population is made up of white-collar workers who have been granted urban *hukou*, whereas in Shenzhen's Pine Mansion most temporary residents have their *hukou* elsewhere, although the proportion of *hukou*-holding white-collar workers is increasing. Xi'an's River Hamlet is in an intermediate position with an incoming population partly of new white-collar urbanites granted local *hukou* and living in the new gated communities and partly of blue-collar workers, small entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, and owners of small restaurants, most of whom are rural migrants, who were expelled in the winter of 2018–19 in a sudden crackdown on the urban village's informal economy (see chapter 2).

The three cases have all retained some form of collective social organization inherited from the Maoist rural past, i.e., the production groups and brigades, which continue to frame native villagers' sociability. This accounts for their enduring identification with "the village," in the sociological sense of a social collective that has its reference point in a given territory (Feuchtwang 1998: 48) and must be understood in the context of the villages having physically morphed into urban neighborhoods. In Shenzhen and Chengdu this sociological and territorial continuity is very strong, with native villagers coexisting on plots of land that they previously cultivated collectively, while in Xi'an they live scattered across the former village and on nearby new commercial estates.

There is an even greater contrast between the roles of the former villages' institutions. In Pine Mansion, the powerful village shareholding companies have retained collective use rights to former agricultural land, which they have converted to urban use. The creation of the shareholding companies with the village's urbanization has emphasized territorial bonds and given importance to the new social category of "native villager," which defines one who is entitled to a share of the shareholding companies and the welfare benefits that they distribute. These collectives coordinate their own projects and continue to subsidize residents' committees, although the latter's responsibilities have been partly transferred to the community center. In South Gate, all of whose land was expropriated early on by the state, the collectives did not become formal shareholding companies, and while the villagers had little say in the top-down urban redevelopment of their village, they did benefit from relatively good compensation and continue to receive dividends, the only remaining collective source of income being rent from shop spaces on the resettlement estates. Social welfare is distributed by the local state.

Xi'an is once again an intermediate case: the local state distributes basic welfare benefits because there is a lack of collective revenue, but villagers are strongly encouraged to take up formal employment in the commercial sector and move over to employer-funded pensions and insurance. Whereas, as in Shenzhen, individual villagers have until recently been left relatively free to run their own local informal rental economy, adding extra stories to their existing homes or building taller buildings in order to rent housing to rural migrants, there has been little collective organization at the scale of the former administrative village, with much of the former collective agricultural

Table 1.2. Summary of the main characteristics of the three case-study villages-in-the-city.

	Timing and Governance of Urbanization	**Proportion of Temporary Residents**	**Power of Village Collective Economy and Persistence Village Institutions**
Pine Mansion, Shenzhen	Gradual, bottom-up	High	Strong shareholding companies, weakened village institutions persist
South Gate, Chengdu	Strong, top-down	Low	Weak shareholding companies, village institutions dissolved
River Hamlet, Xi'an	Gradual, top-down	High	Weak shareholding company, weakened village institutions persist

land gradually sold off to developers, leaving villagers and migrants vulnerable to the sudden, brutal eviction that took place in 2018.

The next chapter discusses the recent redevelopment projects via which Xi'an's River Hamlet and Shenzhen's Pine Mansion are intended to catch up with model urban villages such as Chengdu's South Gate, and takes a closer look at the new urban public goods and what remains of the collective past.

Notes

1. Deng's frequently quoted slogan in the 1980s was, "Let a portion of the people get rich first" (*Rang yibufen ren xian fuqilai*).
2. The Four Modernizations (of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology) were announced on 12–18 December 1978, at the third plenum of the eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
3. New-Type Urbanization Plan 2014–2020, article 7, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2014-03/16/content_2640075.htm. China, 2014; China State Council, "Advice on

Further Hukou System Innovation" issued 24 July 2014, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-07/30/content_8944.htm.

4. The gap, mentioned in the introduction, between the urban population share and the share of the population holding *hukou* in a city has increased in ten years, between the two national censuses. In 2010 the difference was of 17.19 percentage points between the two, and in 2020 the difference had widened to 18.48 percentage points. In other words, the population of city dwellers holding *hukou* in the city where they live has grown more slowly than the population of city dwellers without *hukou* (Cheng and Duan 2021: 288). Moreover, although the plan's goal of granting *hukou* to an additional 100 million people has succeeded, another aim—namely, to bring down the percentage of the migrant population without access to urban social benefits from 17.3 percent in 2012 to 15 percent in 2020—has failed. This book explores some of the reasons for this failure, although more research will be needed.
5. In 2010 the Ministry of Urban-Rural Development published a "Development Guide for Urban and Rural Planning" outlining how provincial cities could strengthen their competitiveness by considering social, economic, and ecological development. http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2010-06/30/content_1641639.htm.
6. Note that a precondition is to have official registration, i.e., *hukou* and a birth certificate conforming to family planning policy. This excludes a significant number of the Chinese population who do not have official registration.
7. President Xi initially introduced the Belt and Road concept in 2013, expanding on the idea of the ancient Silk Road's trade route to strengthen the region's infrastructure and economy and connect China to Asia, Europe, and Africa. See Summers (2016) on the importance given to major urban nodes in this spatial configuration.
8. Chengdu bureau of statistics, http://www.cdstats.chengdu.gov.cn/htm/detail_180293.html. The resident population reached 20 million in 2021.
9. Chengdu Bureau of Statistics, 27 May 2021, http://www.cdstats.chengdu.gov.cn/htm/detail_385112.html.
10. Chengdu had already implemented a lowest-living-standards guarantee system for its urban inhabitants in 1997, which was extended to its rural areas in 1998. https://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu-projects/Global_Report/pdfs/Chengdu.pdf.
11. "A Tale of Two Cities: Xi'an vs. Chengdu: Who Is the First City in the West?" *Research on City Industry Dynamics Blog*, 18 July 2019, https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/74196256.
12. See this chapter, note 7. "The China-Europe Railway Line Chang'an Provides Substantive Freight Services," Xinhuanet.com, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2020-07/22/c_1126269690.htm.
13. Anonymous, "Douyin zhi cheng – Xi'an" [Tiktok city Xi'an], 10 June 2018, https://k.sina.cn/article_1887344341_707e96d502000aq87.html?from=news&subch=onews
14. "Xi'an: Nearly 3 Years after the Implementation of the New Household Registration Policy, the Average Age of the Registered Population Dropped by One Year," *The Paper*, 28 June 2019, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_3789900.
15. Chen Jie, Li Zehui, Du Bohan, "Ten-Year Population Changes in "Double Ten Thousand" Cities," 20 November 2021, http://m.caijing.com.cn/api/show?contentid=4821585.
16. "The Main Data of the Seventh National Census in Xi'an Announced That the Permanent Population Increased by 52.97 Percent," 30 May 2021, http://sx.sina.com.cn/news/b/2021-05-31/detail-ikmxzfmm5628577.shtml.
17. Ibid.
18. Wang Bo, *Final Report on Fieldwork* (hereafter *Final Report*), 31 October 2019.
19. In 1958 the Great Leap forward introduced self-sufficiency and collectivization on a larger scale: that of the commune (*gongshe*). Each commune included an average of ten to twenty production brigades and one hundred production teams, involv-

ing about fifteen thousand people (Oi 1989: 5). Following the major economic and demographic disaster this caused, the communes were reorganized into small cultivation teams (*xiaozu*) that became the basic units of collective ownership and management while remaining under the supervision of the production teams and brigade. However, it was only in 1983 that government administration was separated from economic management (O'Brien 1994: 37; see also Shue 1984: 259). Administrative villages (*xingzhengcun*) then returned to the forefront.

20. The Hakkas constitute an ethnolinguistic group, but they are Han and do not figure among the official ethnic minorities ("nationalities") recognized by the Chinese state. Chengdu and Xi'an are located in provinces that have significant ethnic minority (not Han Chinese) populations, but these were absent in both South Gate and River Hamlet.
21. Eight *fen* (0.8 *mu*: 1 *mu* = 0.0667 hectare) of land were allocated per person. *Tian* land (as in *zerentian*) was for rice, and *di* (as in *ziliudi*) for vegetables, sweet potatoes, and sugar cane.
22. Although there is continuity between the lineage structure (its genealogical and territorial subdivisions) and the shareholding companies, lineages have not remained unchanged in the process of morphing into collectives under Mao and into shareholding companies today (see Zhao 2014; Zou 2014; Trémon 2022).
23. For more details and analysis of shares and the moral economy underlying their distribution, see Trémon 2015 and 2022.
24. Updated data were not yet available at the time of my last stay in 2018.
25. North and South Gate community websites, date, and link not disclosed for anonymization.
26. Jessica Wilczak, *Chengdu: Initial Assessment Report*, 8 April 2018, and *Final Research Report* (hereafter *Final Report*), 30 July 2019. The remainder of this section is based on this latter report.
27. See blog post by Fang Tianxia on *Baike Baidu*, 12 May 2019, "What's the Difference between Shequ Housing and Commercial Housing? Regrets after Buying a Resettlement House," http://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1652047187009326504.
28. Interview by Wang Bo, 26 September 2018.
29. *Chengzhongcun Li de Qinchun* [Youthful years in the urban village] (2011).
30. Interview by Wang Bo, 5 May 2019.
31. Wang Bo, *Final Report*, 31 October 2019.
32. Article 2 of the Organic Law of Villagers' Committees (1987, revised 1998). Their full name is *cunmin weiyuanhui*. They have broad powers and limited but real autonomy from the rural township governments that sit above them (O'Brien 2001: 416). Elections were introduced to clarify the authority of village leaders (O'Brien 1994). See this chapter, note 20.
33. State Council, Regulations on the Work of Providing Five Guarantees, 2006, http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=11892.
34. Article 1 of the Interim Regulations on Residence Permits, which came into force in January 2016, see this chapter, note 6. It extends the type of permit introduced in Shenzhen as early as 2008 to all Chinese cities.
35. The research project looked only at pensions and insurance schemes and did not include *dibao* (minimal living guarantee). For recent research on *dibao*, see Gustafsson and Deng (2011), Solinger and Hu (2012).
36. In recent years, the party-strengthening campaign has led to stronger control over who can be elected. All elected leaders must now be members of the CCP, and party branches must be established in each shareholding company. This caused the 2018 elections to be delayed because of the lack of party members in Pine Mansion.

37. I conducted the survey in March and April 2018 in Pine Mansion with the help of two students originating from Shenzhen. We conducted 126 surveys in total with 60 men and 66 women. Among the 51 natives surveyed, 9 did not hold local *hukou*; they had lost it after moving to Hong Kong and did not get it back when they returned after living there for several years.
38. Unless otherwise stated, this section is based on Jessica Wilczak, *Final Report*, 30 July 2019.
39. The actual term is Community Party Committee, Commission for Discipline Inspection, Residents' Committee and Community Party Members Service Centre (*shequ dangwei, jiwei, juweihui, he shequ dangqun fuwu zhongxin*). As this is rather cumbersome and does not reflect the wide range of services these centers provide, I simply call them community centers.
40. Jessica Wilczak, *Survey Report,* 19 January 2019, and *Final Report*, 30 July 2019.
41. Unless otherwise stated, this section is based on Wang Bo, *Final Report*, 31 October 2019.
42. Survey conducted between December 2018 and January 2019 by Wang Bo and two students; 163 responses were collected among 69 local urban-*hukou* holders and 94 nonlocals. Wang Bo, *Mid-term Report on Fieldwork*, 29 March 2019.