On 18 April 1890, Joseph Thomson (1858–1895) set out from England to travel to the Cape. After receiving final instructions from Cecil Rhodes (1853–1902) in person, he sailed on as a British South Africa Company (BSAC) agent to Quelimane on the Mozambique Channel. On 26 June, his party continued by boat inland up the Zambezi River. He passed Blantyre in July and moved up the Shire to Lake Nyasa, reaching the Luangwa Valley at the beginning of September. Initially, he was sent to Lake Bangweulu. However, his caravan, plagued by sickness, stopped short at the southern tip of the Bangweulu wetlands at around latitude 12° south. Travelling on the Luapula River, he reoriented the enterprise to advance on the Kafue valley. The river’s upper course runs through the area that is today known as Zambia’s Copperbelt. Thomson failed to reach the Kafue. On 4 November 1890, his party arrived at Lamba Chief Mshiri’s village, after becoming stranded on the Lunsemfwa River at longitude 29° east. His porters objected to moving further west, and Thomson fell sick. The smallpox, most probably brought in by his party, killed Chief Mshiri’s son. Thomson was forced to abandon his mission and returned to Lake Nyasa only two weeks later (Thomson 1893: 97–113). However, those two weeks were not without consequence for the place that came to be known by the name of Luanshya.

Thomson returned from his expedition with fourteen treaties signed by local chiefs between September and November 1890 (Faber 1971a: 138–39; Krishnamurthy 1969: 590). The treaty concluded with Chief Mshiri complemented the Lochner Concession, signed by King Lewanika of Barotseland (Letcher 1932: 60; Siegel 1989: 2), in establishing the ‘legal’ basis for the BSAC’s colonizing au-
authority over mineral rights in an area that was to become the British protectorate of Northern Rhodesia in 1924 and Zambia in 1964. The concessions granted to mining companies by the BSAC had their roots in the extraction of ‘exclusive private property rights (exclusive, that is, to the colonizers)’ from local authorities (Home 2015: 56). Among the four treaties Thomson signed with Lamba chiefs, it is particularly that concluded with Chief Mshiri that made claims to these ‘exclusive’ rights and unfolded legal potential with regard to Luanshya and the copper ore in its soil (Krishnamurthy 1969: 594). The treaty read:

Treaty between MSHIRI Chief of Southern Iramba [Lamba] occupying the Upper Lusefwa [Lunsemfwa] River basin and Joseph Thomson in his capacity as representative of the British South Africa Company hereinafter called the Company.

On the 6th November 1890 in the presence of the headmen and people of Southern Iramba Mshiri the Chief hereby agrees for himself his heirs and successors and on behalf of his people:

1. To accept the British Flag and to place himself irrevocably under the Protectorate of Great Britain.
2. To grant to the Company the sole right to search, prospect, exploit, dig for and keep all minerals and metals.
3. To grant the sole right to construct, improve, equip, work, manage and control all kinds of public works and conveniences of general and public utility and to give to the Company absolutely and exclusively all commercial privileges of whatsoever kind.
4. Mshiri further concedes to the Company the right to do all such things as are incidental or conducive to the exercise, attainment or protection of all or any of the rights, powers and concessions hereby granted.
5. Mshiri further agrees not to enter into any treaty or alliance with any other person, Company or state or to grant any concession of land without the consent of the Company in writing, it being understood that this covenant shall be considered in the light of a treaty between the said Chief and people and the Government of Her Britannic Majesty Queen Victoria.
6. These grants and concessions are to apply to the whole of Southern Iramba lying in the Upper Basin of the River Lusifwa one of the western tributaries of the Loangwa [Luangwa].

In consideration of these grants and concessions the Company agrees to pay Mshiri on the signing of this treaty goods to the amount of £10 (ten pounds) and the annual sum of £20 (twenty pounds) to commence on practical advantage being taken of the commercial or mining clauses of this treaty.
Many Copperbelt scholars have referred to the ‘dubious’ nature of Thomson’s fourteen treaties. Based on Faber’s (1971a: 131, 134, 140–41) seminal article, I shall highlight four issues concerning this charge of dubiousness in the case of the treaty with Chief Mshiri quoted above.

First, despite carrying a geographical mark, the treaty’s place of signature lay approximately two hundred kilometres east of the area that was to become ‘the Copperbelt’. Second, while Mshiri was a Lamba chief, he had no jurisdiction over the area that would later be separated into claims and handed out as mining concessions. Third, the treaty was concluded only two days after Thomson’s arrival in Chief Mshiri’s village. This fact made ‘the presence of the headmen and people’, as noted in the preamble of the treaty, unlikely in light of contemporary modes of transportation. Finally, according to a relative of Chief Mshiri present during the meeting and quoted by Faber, the contract’s actual implications were not discussed between the parties.

The dubious nature of Thomson’s treaties did not just occur to scholars in retrospect: the BSAC’s own employees testified that ‘there is a lot of humbug about the original agreements’ (Northern Rhodesia 1964: 13), and they questioned the treaties’ legal authority. However, Rhodes and the BSAC succeeded in getting the treaties sanctioned by the British Foreign Office in 1894 (Krishnamurthy 1969: 599) and in converting, as Faber (1971a: 131) noted, ‘these scraps of paper into the basis of a commercial success’.

Concluding treaties like the one above with local authorities, comprising such detailed claims to the land as set out in clause (2), illustrated what Home (2015: 56) called the BSAC’s ‘land grabbing exercise’. This ‘exercise’ was, in fact, a colonial practice, one that fell within ‘a broader set of practices structured in dominance’ that Stoler and McGranahan (2007: 8) saw at the core of what they termed ‘imperial formations’. The concept fused the structural and practical aspects of power, which Victoria (2016: 249) has elaborated on in his distinction between ‘power’, that is, the power relations that capacitate an actor to produce society, and ‘politics’, that is, the actual practice of those relations of power. Stoler and McGranahan (2007: 8) humanize this practice of power by looking at ‘imperial formations’ as ‘polities of dislocation, processes of dispersion, appropriation, and displacement’.

In this chapter, I unpack the ‘imperial formation’ that produced the treaty with Chief Mshiri and that built the foundations for the industrial mining of copper in places like Luanshya. The BSAC provided the basis for mining compa-
nies like Roan Antelope Copper Mines (RACM) to establish a capitalist extractive order. This order was rooted in practices of dislocating the landscape, dispersing autochthonous cosmologies, appropriating its workers’ lives and displacing the Lamba people. As the chapter title suggests, I follow earlier works in their reconstruction of Copperbelt history as an interaction between capital in the form of the mining companies and the government (Butler 2007; Sklar 1975). However, I shall also address Lamba responses to the emerging industrial complex. I move on to investigate the town-planning models that shaped Luanshya’s mine townships such as Mpatamatu. Finally, I draw attention to the corporate provisions of the mine in the form of social welfare buildings and show how they were abandoned after the reprivatization of Zambia’s copper sector in 1997.

Corporate Colonialism

Under the BSAC, corporate colonialism culminated in the company’s monopoly over mineral rights. When Northern Rhodesia became a British protectorate in 1924, the BSAC retained this monopoly, which was reconfirmed in 1950 (Sklar 1975: 11, 35–36). At independence in 1964, the Zambian state acquired the BSAC’s mineral rights and replaced the company as the provider of mining grants and collector of royalties (Roberts 1976: 221–22). However, concessions that had previously been granted to mining companies by the BSAC could not be altered. The overall legal composition of Zambia’s copper sector only changed with the nationalization of the mines in 1969/1970 (Sklar 1975: 29–34; Ushe-wokunze 1974: 79).

Before an industry could develop ‘minerals and metals’ in accordance with clause (2) of the treaty with Chief Mshiri, they needed to be located. Several versions of how the copper deposits in Luanshya were ‘discovered’ exist. Needless to say, the Lamba who lived in the area at the time knew about the ore underground, its artisanal extraction and processing.² In fact, prospectors like William Collier (1870–1943) relied on local knowledge to find bodies of ore. The most dominant narrative of the Roan claim’s ‘discovery’ in what was to become the mine and town of Luanshya was based on an expedition Collier undertook in 1902.³ In 1931, RACM’s US-American financier Alfred Chester Beatty (1875–1968) retold the story at the American Institute of Mining, Metallurgy, and Petroleum Engineers as follows:

Late in 1902, an English prospector named Collier, travelling in the N’Dola district, came upon some natives using a green powder for medicinal purposes. Closer examination of the powder revealed that it was ground-up malachite [a copper carbonate]. . . . Collier endeavoured to persuade the natives to tell him, where they obtained this medicine, but for long time without success, because of the general feeling among the
natives that they did not wish to reveal resources of their lands to the white man. Finally, however, he persuaded one of the elders to at least take him part way toward the place where the malachite was supposed to occur. . . . The next morning Collier proceeded up the Luanshya and was about to make camp late that afternoon when he saw a roan antelope buck standing in the grass a little farther up the river. Collier stalked the buck and knocked him out with his first shot. When he came to the place where the dead buck lay he noticed a small outcrop with malachite stain. (Beatty 1931a: 1; 1931b: 518)

What struck me during fieldwork in Luanshya was the tenaciousness with which this account survived. When I first entered the town, I looked for someone at the Civic Centre, Luanshya’s town hall, who was familiar with the history of the town. I was directed to the District Education Standards Officer of the Ministry of Education. In our first conversation, he reproduced Collier’s story above.4 Later, I found out that this narrative had been cast into copper in the form of the ‘Collier Monument’, a national heritage site in Luanshya (Zambia National Heritage Conservation Commission 1989). Collier’s ‘discovery’, an imperial practice of appropriation, had been materialized and monumentalized in a concrete structure (Milner-Thorton 2012: 18). Its ‘specialized lexicons’ still ‘[clung] to people, places, and things’ (Stoler 2016: 20). The story of a White man ‘discovering’ the ore in an act of adventurism had been challenged and publicly called into question (Mukuwa 1981). However, the ‘epistemological claim’ (Stoler and McGahan 2007: 11) of the colonial enterprise and the mining industry persisted.

The significance of Collier’s expedition does not lie in the fact that he ‘discovered’ copper, but rather that he helped translate the ore’s presence into something meaningful for extractive capitalism: marked claims, geological properties and information on ore concentrations, all of which were essential for industrial mining.5 Apart from measuring the landscape, there was something else that brought about the development of the Copperbelt as an industrial hub: an infrastructure of transportation. In order to get the copper to market, a railway line was necessary. In this sense, ‘infrastructure’ as a ‘technical system’ (Larkin 2008: 5), located below (Latin infra) the industry’s production facilities, was established. Its construction represented a huge challenge.

The landlocked Copperbelt was at least 1,400 kilometres from any coast. The region had to be connected to Cape Town, the transportation hub 3,000 kilometres south of the Copperbelt. By the time Collier made his ‘discovery’ in 1902, the Cape railway had reached Salisbury (now Harare in Zimbabwe). Gradually, it was extended northwards, reaching the Mosi-oa-Tunya and Kalomo in 1904, Broken Hill (now Kabwe) in 1906 and the Congolese border on the Copperbelt in 1909. Eventually, a branch line to Luanshya put the mining town on the network in 1929.6 The Cape railway’s connection to the capitalist and colonial
enterprise revealed this particular infrastructure’s ‘fundamentally relational’ character as it became ‘infrastructure in relation to organized practices’, as well as its ‘embeddedness’, which Star and Ruhleder (1996: 113) identified as one dimension of infrastructure.

Two more challenges arose, apart from connecting the Copperbelt to the global market: finding workable methods to extract low-grade ore below the water table, and decreasing the incidence of tropical diseases. The first challenge was met by Beatty, who had founded the Selection Trust in 1914. He had gained experience in the exploitation of low-grade copper deposits in Utah, United States, and became acquainted with Central Africa during his negotiations with King Leopold II of Belgium on behalf of the Guggenheims. Beatty’s knowledge of how to extract low-grade copper deposits gave him an advantage over his competitors in southern Africa. In 1927 he founded the mining company that was to exploit the deposits ‘discovered’ by Collier in Luanshya:

From 1927 London metal prices took an upward turn giving added cause for confidence in the future of the industry, and in that year Chester Beatty’s Selection Trust launched Roan Antelope Mining Copper Mines (RACM), the second of the major mining companies [next to Anglo American], to develop a deposit located on the Luanshya river. (Perrings 1979: 75)

The shores of the Luanshya River were not uninhabited. Beatty’s economic venture was challenged by the local Lamba people. Moreover, claims to the land by the Lamba were themselves challenged by other local authorities (Schumaker 2008: 829–30). Evidently, the concession that was granted to RACM was not an unpopulated terra nullius, nor did the copper ore have to be ‘discovered’ because of a lucky shot from a European prospector’s rifle. Some Lamba people resisted forced migration through the Watch Tower Movement, a religious movement rooted in the doctrine of Jehovah’s Witnesses, albeit developing independently from them in Central Africa (Cross 1973: 275–79; Siegel 1988: 76–77).

Most prominently, the Lamba put forward their claim to the land by relating the high death toll at the mine caused by malaria in the late 1920s to the presence of a snake spirit in the Luanshya River that needed to be placated. This second challenge was met by Arthur Storke (1894–1949), Beatty’s managing director on the Copperbelt, who sought professional advice in 1929 (Schumaker 2011: 406). However, irrespective of the ensuing anti-malarial campaign carried out by the Ross Institute for Tropical Diseases in London, ‘a dramatic cleansing ceremony’ took place in 1930, reported in RACM’s company magazine Horizon:

At the Roan Antelope mine, considerable difficulty was being experienced in recruiting and keeping workers because of a persistent rumour
of a monstrous snake in the Luanshya River. The place was held accursed by local Africans . . . . [J.E. ‘Chirupula’] Stephenson [(1876–1957), a former BSAC administrator] was able to gather the local ‘priests’ and to supervise a dramatic cleansing ceremony which earned him gratitude of the mining company, plus the offer of a reward, which was declined. (Hobson 1961: 23)

According to the Lamba, the snake spirit was responsible for all the deaths, as it had ‘wriggled through the shafts, spewing water and poisonous gas and causing cave-ins’ (Siegel 2008: 8). As noted earlier, ore had to be mined from below the water table. Water presented a constant threat to mineworkers labouring underground. In comparison with Collier’s ‘discovery’, Schumaker (2008: 829) concluded, ‘prospectors’ hunting stories [were] as supernatural as African stories of snake spirits . . .’. Each narrative had the purpose of substantiating claims to the land backed by a supernatural force.

The dissemination of Collier’s story represented an imperial practice. It was aimed at establishing what Stoler (2008a: 350) termed ‘colonial (un)truths’, namely that it was an act of nature that revealed the soil’s riches for industrial extraction. Correspondingly, the narrative of the snake spirit operated as ‘a ritual apparatus used by the Lamba “owners of the land” to retain power in the face of colonialism’ (Schumaker 2008: 838). The ‘dramatic cleansing ritual’ had been staged by RACM to appease the Lamba and improve the mine’s reputation because of its need for labour. The ‘priests’ who were to dispel the spirit from the Luanshya River had been paid (Schumaker 2008: 830). In fact, the ritual was a symbolic gesture based on the misconceived belief of C.F. Spearpoint, RACM’s African personnel manager, and Malcolm Watson, the Ross Institute’s malaria expert, that ‘the snake was an African metaphor for malaria’ (Schumaker 2011: 405).

Above all, RACM did not seek ritual but technical solutions to eradicate malaria, and with it, the stories about snake spirits and their underlying claims to the land. Based on her seminal research on the Ross Institute’s anti-malarial programme in Luanshya from 1929 to 1931, Schumaker (2008: 840) identified processes of ‘medicalisation and industrialisation’ in concrete technical practices. Dambos, ‘low, treeless, marshy areas, with shallow pools and light shade provided by reeds and grass’ (Schumaker 2011: 409), were drained. Bodies of standing water were oiled and wetlands filled with tailings (Dalzell 1953b). The landscape was dramatically reassessed through colonial epistemological claims in the interests of capital.

The Copperbelt was defined as an ‘extractive space’ (Frederiksen 2010: 237). Dambos, which for the Lamba had represented gardens for agricultural use, became the ‘key to the control of malaria’ (Schumaker 2008: 832). Schumaker (2008: 834) found that the Ross Institute’s scientists spoke about the landscape as having been ‘cured’. The subsequent drop in the incidence of malaria, from a
peak of ninety-four malaria cases per thousand inhabitants per month during the rainy season of 1929/1930 to fifty during the following rainy season and twenty-seven the rainy season after that (Dalzell 1953a: 52), backed RACM’s corporate health campaign (see also Utzinger et al. 2002). Despite everything, however, stories about a snake in the rivers around Luanshya survived. Both Schumaker’s research participants in the early 2000s and the residents of Mpatamatu I met during fieldwork in 2016 made it clear that a spirit was still present in Luanshya’s rivers.

The Lamba opposed RACM’s operations with a counter-claim to the land and refused to work underground (Siegel 1989: 4). At the same time, they interacted economically with the mining sector by offering native beer, agricultural produce and domestic services to the mine’s African workforce. In Luanshya too, ‘mining activities tend[ed] to integrate surrounding regions into a single economic sphere’ (Godoy 1985: 207). This integration was hierarchical, and the Lamba were relegated to a subaltern position outside the mine townships. The ‘medical vision’ behind the anti-malarial campaign interacted with the ‘paternalistic vision’ of RACM (Schumaker 2011: 420). The habitat of the mosquito was mapped onto the people associated with them. In this logic, these ‘dangerous populations’, for example Lamba traders in agricultural produce, were found in dangerous places, such as dambos, and pursued ‘dangerous activities’, such as brewing beer. These populations, places and activities had to be separated from the controlled environment of the corporate mine townships (Schumaker 2011: 416).

Corporate Towns

In his article on early urban development in Zambia, Gardiner (1970: 10) noted that ‘Luanshya proved to be the prototype for the other “twin” towns established on the Copperbelt . . .’. ‘Twin’ referred to the corporate and government parts of the newly established towns next to the copper mines. However, there is more to the twofold character of these mining towns. A look at Luanshya’s spatial arrangement reveals that the term ‘twin’ refers not only to administration but also to race (see Map 1.1). In retrospect, I consider three sets of practices crucial in the development of Luanshya’s spatial order: town-planning schemes for mining sites from South Africa, the Garden City movement from Great Britain, and social welfare measures in order to be able to compete for mine labour with the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK) across the border in the Belgian Congo (now the province of Haut-Katanga in the Democratic Republic of the Congo).

Luanshya had started as a mine camp in the second half of the 1920s. Early on, both White and Black labour suffered from the poor living conditions in the camp, which had been racially segregated from the beginning. Spearpoint
(1953: 13) remembered how Europeans were accommodated in ‘three-roomed buildings’ and Africans in ‘one-room huts’. The term for such a place, ‘camp’, and its internal division in the form of racial segregation based on the separation of different land uses called ‘zoning’ originated in the context of the South African mining industry.\(^\text{13}\)

Labour accommodation and living conditions on the Copperbelt differed greatly from Windhoek, the Rand and Kimberly, where gold and diamonds were mined. The closed mine compounds that Gordon (1977: 29), Moodie (1994: 79) and Demissie (1998: 453) examined resembled prison camps, encapsulated by the outer walls of their dormitories around an inner courtyard optimizing surveillance to prevent theft (see also Leubuscher 1931: 61–64). In his reflections on ‘camps’, Agamben (1998: 169–70) drew attention to their ‘paradoxical status’ as ‘a space of exception’. As the authors mentioned above have also shown in their work, mine camps were both an exception to the order around them and an integral part of the colonial enterprise. This ambiguity connected the Copperbelt mining towns with the camps in South Africa.

The spatial model of the ‘camp’ for the accommodation of male migrant labour on sites of mineral extraction in South Africa moved northwards and was observed in the ‘total absence of privacy’ within the compounds of Southern Rhodesian mines by van Onselen (1976: 35). Apart from the controls of access to mine townships noted by Parpart (1983: 45), the South African model was not reproduced on the Copperbelt. Thefts of copper involved larger quantities of ore and more elaborate logistics. Contrasting the ‘camp’, women ‘had been induced to come [to the urban areas] by the Union Minière’ (Higginson 1989: 69) in Katanga ‘to improve health and social conditions’ (Buell 1928: 562). Further to the northwest, labour at Companhia de Diamantes de Angola was accommodated not in mine compounds but in villages under the mine’s administration (Cleveland 2015: 153). On a scale from the extremely restrictive and centralized model of the ‘camp’ in South Africa to the decentralized accommodation pursued in Portuguese Angola, mining towns like Luanshya started out as male migrant labour camps and gradually turned into mine townships for a very heterogeneous ‘extractive community’ (Larmer and Laterza 2017: 702). By 1931, Luanshya was recognized as a town (Smith 1985: 1490), and its segregated municipal townships started to develop. Corporate control over the mine townships was legally guaranteed by the 1932 Mine Township Ordinance (Parpart 1983: 39, footnote 48, 181).

Consequently, what Gardiner regarded as a core characteristic of Luanshya as a prototype and what Home (2013: 6) termed ‘twin townships’ referred to the separate company (mine) and government (municipal) parts of Luanshya and the respective European and African townships within them.\(^\text{14}\) Map 1.1 (RACM 1951) illustrates this double twin composition: the European mine township around the park ‘C’, the ‘R.A.C.M. African Township’, the European government township ‘L’, and the African government township Mikomfwa, which was...
Racial segregation became a cornerstone of the new spatial and social order on the Copperbelt, with ‘[the] segregated city not only [resulting] from but in many cases, [creating] the segregated society’ (King 1980: 212). Looking at Map 1.1 once again, it can be seen that the Europeans lived in the low-density area at the heart of town further away from potential sites of industrial pollution. The Africans lived in a high-density satellite settlement, detached on the other side of the main plant ‘P’ and close to the shafts ‘S’ and ‘T’ along the ore body ‘Q’. The contrast between the European and African living quarters on the Copperbelt was horrific. In a 1960 interview, Kenneth Kaunda, later the first president of independent Zambia, described it with reference to a mining town that could have been Luanshya:

You travel along an avenue shaded by trees; on either side are the beautiful European houses with well-kept gardens where the garden ‘boys’ work. Under your feet is a good tarmac road. Suddenly the tar comes to an end, you are treading on a dusty red road. You have arrived in the African residential area. Now you see row upon row of huts and each is like the one next door. When the sun shines the hut becomes an oven, when the rain falls it becomes a well in the middle of a swamp. When it is cold the hut is like a refrigerator. How can a man and woman bring up their children decently in such surroundings? (Kaunda and Morris 1960: 41–42)

During my fieldwork in Mpatamatu, I revisited Kaunda’s observation. On my way from downtown Luanshya to the township the roads changed from tarmac to mud, the plot sizes decreased, and the houses became smaller. Homes felt like an oven during the dry season. Kaunda’s observation was in stark contrast to how Watson remembered the European part of Luanshya from the days of the anti-malarial campaign. He wrote that RACM had constructed ‘townships laid out like garden cities’ (Watson 1953: 69). His association was certainly not related to Lamba understandings of *dambos* as subsistence gardens noted earlier, but to ‘... contemporary developments in British town-planning practice and garden city design’ (Home 2015: 64). Particularly in the inter-war years, British town planners promoted the ‘garden city’ in the colonies, making colonialism a ‘vehicle’ of urban planning models (Home 2000: 330; King 1980: 206).

One of those town planners was Charles Compton Reade (1880–1933), who arrived in Northern Rhodesia in 1929 to prepare plans for Livingstone and Ndola (Home 1997: 157–63; Tregenza 1988). However, the ideals of the Garden City movement, aimed at combining British working-class neighbourhoods with
the English countryside, could not be applied without conflict to the segregated mining settlements of Northern Rhodesia (Home 1997: 32; 2000: 343). In fact, the implementation of Garden City ideals in the colonial context was ‘in sheer contrast to the original Howardian concept, essentially anti-social’ (Bigon 2013: 482). Reade negotiated unsuccessfully with the mines over general plans and eventually lost his job with the colonial government in 1932.

Home (1997: 32; 2013: 8, endnote 18, 21) suggested that Reade might have become a victim of the ‘major conflict of philosophy’ between the Garden City movement and the principles of segregation that were defended by the mining companies when he was found dead in a hotel room in Johannesburg in 1933. In following Schumaker (2011: 413), I can nevertheless discern the impact of the Garden City movement and its town-planning ideas on the corporate mining townships of companies like RACM. This influence came from the temporality of urban development on the Copperbelt, which started much later than in South Africa.

RACM awarded the planning of Mpatamatu to the South African town-planning consultants Collings and Schaerer. Major J.C. Collings and V.T. Schaerer had both been active in the Research Committee on Minimum Standards of Accommodation of the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), which was concerned with urban African housing. Collings had also been Director of Housing and a member of the National Housing and Planning Commission (South African CSIR 1947a, 1947b, 1948). This South African connection might explain the self-sustaining character of Mpatamatu as based on zoning and racial segregation. Mine township autarky was compatible with the company’s goal of establishing a controlled environment that allowed supervision of the labour force. Elements of the Garden City movement found their way not only into the Copperbelt’s European mine townships, but in one of ‘the few cases’ (Bigon 2013: 479) also into the spatial arrangement of African mine townships like Mpatamatu: tree-lined streets and garden-like playgrounds in section 21 (see Map 1.2; RACM 1957, drawing number NR.RA2), with a park belt separating sections 22 and 23 (see Map 0.1).

The location and time for the construction of Mpatamatu were related to the position of the copper ore underground, movements in the copper price and labour tensions in the 1950s. Luanshya had started as a mine camp on the south-eastern tip of the ore body. Racial segregation and shaft development along the ore body towards the northwest resulted in the first African mine township of Roan being constructed opposite the Storke shaft (‘S’ in Map 1.1). When the mine reached the Irwin and MacLaren shafts further west, opened in 1948 and 1963 respectively (Coleman 1971: 10–11; Cunningham 1981: 165), and more labour needed to be accommodated in close proximity, Mpatamatu was born as RACM’s second African township in 1957. Roan was considered too crowded
Map 1.2. Mpatamatu’s planned section 21, 1957. ZCCM-IH Archives, Ndola.
and distant from the newly developed shafts. A study of the social services in Mpatamatu for RACM management noted:

Mpatamatu African township is to be built because the movement of mining westwards will otherwise cause many employees to live too great a distance from their work; . . . It is also said that transport of Africans by rail to Irwin and MacLaren Shafts will interfere increasingly with the surface ore transport system and with cage schedules. It is therefore intended eventually to house all or nearly all the mining departments’ African labour in Mpatamatu. (RACM 1960b: 2)

The copper price had been steadily increasing since the Second World War (Horizon 1965). The war in Korea drove the price still higher until it reached an all-time peak in 1955/1956 (Horizon 1959a; Roberts 1982: 348, 355–57). The high price of copper caused its replacement by aluminium, bringing the price down at the end of the 1950s. Prices remained relatively stable in the 1960s and early 1970s (Cunningham 1981: 173). This was a rare condition in a market characterized by inelastic supply and demand, both being relatively insensitive to changes in price. Subsequent over- and underproduction usually resulted in price volatility (Stürmer 2009: 19–20). The market situation in the 1950s and 1960s made mine development and the extension of production feasible. As a result, Mpatamatu was built on the congruent growth of copper supply and demand against the backdrop of the Cold War.

However, Mpatamatu was not built as an integrated mine township with extensive corporate welfare provisions just because technicalities necessitated it and the copper price allowed it. After the Copperbelt strikes in 1935 and 1940, the conflict over African unionization increased in the 1950s, culminating in another strike in 1956. The mining companies attempted to counter the politicization of the labour force through paternalistic provisions of social welfare (Parpart 1983: 140–43). As noted earlier, working and living conditions had been crucial in Luanshya’s early days in the competition for skilled and experienced mine labour with UMHK (Higginson 1989: 94; Parpart 1983: 34–35). Collings and Schaerer’s 1957 development plan for Mpatamatu substantiated the corporate characteristics of the new mine township accordingly:

1. The new township, extending westwards from Irwin Shaft and on the southern side of Irwin Shaft and the New [MacLaren] Shaft, is intended to accommodate 3,584 houses for married African employees. The houses are to be single detached units and the prescribed size of a regular plot is 50 feet in frontage and 70 feet deep.
2. The planning must allow division of the residential areas into sections, each section to be in association with its administrative offices, welfare
buildings, etc., and each section to have its own water reticulation and electrical systems. Ten sections of 358 houses each are suggested.

3. Provision must be made for Schools, Welfare Halls [i.e. social clubs], Clinics, Sports Fields, Cinema, Beer Halls, Parks, Churches, Trading Sites, and Market, Administration Offices, First Aid Station and Maintenance Workshops. (RACM 1957: II)

The mining companies owned and controlled everything within the mine townships of the Copperbelt. RACM and all its successors prior to the reprivatization of the sector in 1997 – Roan Selection Trust (RST), Roan Consolidated Mines (RCM) and Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) – were responsible for the construction and maintenance of Mpatamatu’s infrastructures in the form of roads, houses, electricity, water and sewerage. They provided all basic communal services, namely health care, leisure and adult education (primary and secondary education was largely outsourced to the colonial and later national government). The three paragraphs from Collings and Schaerer’s plan quoted above summarize my earlier elaborations on the location and time for the construction of Mpatamatu. The township was to serve the extraction of the ore underground and provide social amenities for its mineworker residents and their dependants. Paragraphs two and three in particular qualify Mpatamatu as what Crawford (1995: 5) termed a “new” company town.

Mine labour accommodation on the Copperbelt was related to models not only from other parts of southern Africa but also North America. Crawford, who explicitly included mining towns in her work on the design of company towns, set out from the premise that they represent a ‘regulatory mechanism’ aimed at controlling the labour force and countering labour unrest. She identified elements of the Garden City movement in the design of the “new” company towns’ in North America: the decentralization of communities, the linking of industrial and agricultural activities, and beautifying urban areas with tree- and grass-lined streets (Crawford 1995: 6–7, 70–75, 151). These characteristics appeared in Mpatamatu’s detached location near a mine shaft, its division into sections, the presence of subsistence gardening alongside industrial labour (Horizon 1968: 32–33; Perrings 1979: 24), and the spatial design proposed by Collings and Schaerer.

The construction of Mpatamatu started with sections 21 and 22 in 1958 (see Map 1.2 and Figure 1.1; Horizon 1965: 24). According to a handwritten note on the draft pages of a 1960 social services study, the first houses were occupied in November 1959 (RACM 1960b: 6). Sections 23 and 24 followed in the first half of the 1960s (see Figure 1.2; Horizon 1968: back cover). These four sections became the new home for mineworkers working at the Irwin (now the 18th) and MacLaren (now the 28th) shafts (RACM 1960b: 3). Section 26 was developed in the first half of the 1970s, sections 25 and 27 eventually in the second half of
the 1970s. These three western sections were occupied by mineworkers of Baluba shaft, opened in 1972 (RCM Luanshya Division 1972).

Mpatamatu was continuously developed over a period of approximately twenty years from the late 1950s to the late 1970s. In total, the township comprised 4,701 residential units and fifty ‘commercial, recreational, other’ buildings according to a municipal valuation roll in preparation for the mine’s reprivatization in 1991 (LMC 1991).

Its construction history was recalled by many of its residents. Most of the information I acquired through interviews corresponded to archival records. Several research participants remembered when the different sections were constructed or whether their family was the first to occupy a mine house. Moreover, they recalled the housing contractors: Amlew, Costain, Delkins, Ford, Morta and Roberts. Roberts from South Africa built houses in sections 22 and 24. Costain, a British construction company, erected the houses in section 23. Morta from Zambia was involved with the construction of section 25, and Amlew, the building and civil engineering division of Anglo American, with section 27 (Charter Consolidated Limited International Appointments Division 1970; RCM Luanshya Division 1974).

A look at Map 0.1 reveals the substantial differences between the older (eastern) and newer (western) sections of Mpatamatu. Sections 21 to 24 were developed under the principles outlined in Collings and Schaerer’s 1957 development
Figure 1.2. Mpatamatu’s section 23, 1964. ZCCM-IH Archives, Ndola.
plan: hierarchized roads, alternating house directions, changing street layouts, playgrounds and social welfare buildings – in short, features that made each section a ‘small socially self-contained residential unit’ (RACM 1957: 6) marked by Garden City movement conceptions. This is despite the fact that, for instance, section 22 underwent additional densification (RST Roan Antelope Division 1962b).

In contrast, sections 25 to 27 showed few of these features. Construction was based instead on the principle that as many mineworker families as possible should be housed. This is mirrored in their housing densities. While sections 21 to 24 have an average of 576 houses, sections 25 to 27 have 798 houses each on average. The rather spartan layout of the more recent sections had its roots in the strained economic situation and budgetary limitations of the 1970s, as summarized by the Roan Mpatamatu Mine Township Management Board (RMMTMB):

Finally, 1973 has been a year of the ups and down for Zambia and therefore Mpatamatu Township being a small part of Zambia is no exception. (RMMTMB 1974b: 5)

Mpatamatu thus became the last extension of Luanshya as a mining town. The township was special because it represented an elaborately and comprehensively planned mine township for the African labour force. Unlike Roan township, Mpatamatu did not grow out of the first living quarters that made up the mine camp in the early days of RACM (RST Roan Antelope Division 1964f). No grass-thatched rondavels were erected for African mineworkers in Mpatamatu (Horizon 1959b: 6). The township was not occasionally supplemented to meet corporate, government or labour requirements. It was developed and erected in accordance with concrete corporate provisions, the social welfare buildings at the core of this book.

Corporate Provisions

At the heart of Mpatamatu and the corporate provisions for its residents rested the social welfare buildings, infrastructure that the former chairman of RST Ronald Prain (1907–1991) summarized as ‘amenities’ that included ‘hospitals, clinics [and] welfare centres’ (Prain 1956: 309). The term ‘welfare’ is ambiguous in this context. In the first place, these buildings were not meant as charitable institutions for the labour force. They were not the materialized Polanyian ‘counter-movement’ initiated by the colonial government in order to ‘check the action of the market relative to labor, land, and money’ (Polanyi 2001: 136, 79).
Rather, these ‘amenities’ were sites of corporate action to control the workforce in the face of a decline in labour turnover and an increase in unionization. As Parpart (1983: 152) noted, ‘[welfare] services aimed to divert miners from more controversial organisations’ (see also Luchembe 1982: 390). Beer halls, clubs and sports facilities kept mineworkers occupied after work. Mine clinics monitored the labour force’s health. Community centres integrated women into the mine’s labour regime and defined their role as housewives responsible for the social reproduction of the labour force. These buildings represented a separate infrastructure that was capable of ‘[bending] human routines and material practices to its will’ (Howe et al. 2016: 551).

Extending from the Foucauldian notion of power translated into built environment in Demissie’s (1998: 454), Home’s (2000: 327) and Njoh’s (2009: 302) abstractions of mineworkers’ housing in southern Africa, I understand Mpata-matu’s social welfare buildings as an example of corporate paternalism and as fundamental aspects of the mine’s disciplinary architecture setting the boundaries for social life. They provided for ‘the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of phenomena of population to economic processes’ (Foucault 1998: 140–41). The social welfare buildings established what Epstein termed the “unitary” structure of the mine:

It is important to bear in mind what I may term the ‘unitary’ structure of the mine. As I have already explained, the mine is a self-contained industrial, residential, and administrative unit. Every employee is housed by the mine, and no African who is a mine employee may live off the mine premises. Moreover, until recently, every African was fed by the Company, and the vast majority of the employees continue to draw weekly rations from the Company’s Feeding Store. A butchery and a number of other stores enable those who wish to supplement their rations to do so without making a trip to town or the Second Class Trading Area. It is the mine which provides the hospital, and employs the doctors and nurses who care for the sick; and it is the mine, again, which provides for the recreational needs of its employees. The African miner writes his letters at the Mine Welfare Centre, he drinks with his friends at the sub-Beer Hall on the mine, he prays in the church of his own denomination on mine property, he sends his children to school on the mine. In the work situation he has an allotted place within the structure of the mine. He has a job within a department, works together with the members of his gang under an African boss boy, who is in turn responsible to a European supervisor, and so on. In short, the mine impinges on his life at every point, a state of affairs which is epitomized in the office of the African Personnel Manager [C.F. Spearpoint at that time], who is ulti-
This “unitary” structure of the mine’ was an example of institutionalized corporate paternalism. The labour force was ‘cared for’ through central provisions by the mining company. This ‘care’ was based on ‘strategies of inclusion and exclusion’ (Schlee 2008: 35–42) within the ‘fatherly’ (Latin *paternus*) relationship of the company, in the form of its management, with its workers and their dependants. This fatherly relationship was epitomized by the infantilizing language of White compound managers like C.F. Spearpoint in Luanshya (Spearpoint 1937). Integration in respect of this relationship was characterized by an ‘interplay of difference and sameness’ (Schlee 2018: 14–15). Corporate paternalism appealed to a shared identity, that is, to being employed by, part of and dependent on the mine. Management and labour force belonged to the same unit and were thus part of the same ‘body’ (Latin *corpus*), in other words, the ‘corporation’ (Schlee 2018: 6). At the same time, this unit was hierarchically structured on the inside, most prominently in the form of the colour bar. This politico-corporate order and its socio-economic consequences based on difference excluded the largest part of the predominantly African workforce from decision making.

As Epstein showed, belonging to the mine worked both through inclusion, for example through infrastructure such as the social welfare buildings, and exclusion, for example the hierarchy structuring the labour regime and the administration of the mine township. Sameness and difference penetrated people’s lives at the mines in what Schlee (2008: 5–11) termed ‘modes of integration’. As I show in the next section on corporate abandonment, the integrative potential of the mining companies decreased after ZCCM’s privatization. This was particularly the case in Mpatamatu, where the mine retreated from its social investment. This abandonment turned integration based on selective corporate sameness into a nostalgic image of a paternalist past with lost opportunity.

Much of Epstein’s observation and analysis can be related to Goffman’s concept of the ‘total institution’. This concept combined the three aspects of life that Goffman (1990: xiii, 5–6) saw in ‘sleep, play and work’ under a single authority. Despite the fact that Goffman’s typology of total institutions included ‘work camps’ and that Davies (1989) refined the concept, the ethnographic context of its development was not productive workers in company towns but the inmates of mental hospitals. Moodie (1994: 88) pointed to this fact, and Goffman (1990: 21) himself drew attention to the incompatibility between total institutions and the ‘work-payment’ environments of social life. In contrast, Hughes (2010: 4) claimed that the ‘company town [was] another excellent example of a total institution’, while Porteous (1972: 63) called the company town ‘a total environment’. Following Moodie in departing from a Goffmanian abstraction of the mining compounds, Sparks (2012: 173) showed how corporate paternalism was
‘co-produced’ at Suid-Afrikaanse Steenkool, Olie en Gaskorporasie or the South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation (SASOL).

In light of these reflections on the explanatory range of Goffman’s ‘total institution’, I return to Epstein’s (1958: 123–24) observations, which stemmed from the same field site as my own ethnographic data. The term ‘unitary’, in my view, also emphasizes the institutional character of the mine in general and the social welfare buildings in particular. It attributes these social provisions to the company while retaining enough conceptual space for the everyday practices of a company town’s residents, who at times challenged the order they lived in. In this sense, I suggest that the concept of the ‘total institution’ obstructs appreciation of residents’ agency. This aspect was important in the context of Luanshya in how township residents and the larger extractive community made and continue to make a living.

Thus, the social welfare buildings shaped township life in Mpatamatu. Table 1.1 at the end of this chapter provides an overview of them. The buildings were nodal points in a network through which power worked and ‘[weaved] itself into . . . everyday practices’ (Luthar and Pušnik 2010: 10), material representations of Foucauldian ‘governmentality’. Collings and Schaerer’s development plan for Mpatamatu made it clear that the mine was engaged in what Devisch (1998: 225) termed ‘social engineering’, that is, the interplay between shaping the material environment and moulding social life under corporate colonialism. The ‘landscape [was] part of the operation of power’ (Cane 2019: 3) and unfolded in what Casid (2011: 98) termed ‘the performative, landscaping . . . the interrelations of humans . . . and what we call the “environment”’.

The unitary structure of the mine in Luanshya remained intact after Zambian independence in 1964 and the nationalization of the copper sector in 1969/1970. This continuity is my reason for employing the term ‘corporate paternalism’ to characterize the mine’s presence and corporate practices in Mpatamatu up until the copper sector’s reprivatization in 1997. At the same time, I refrain from using the term ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR) in the context of post-reprivatization Mpatamatu because ‘old regimes of corporate paternalism [were not] reinvented’ (Rajak 2011: 10; see also Dolan and Rajak 2016: 6) in the township. My research participants repeatedly juxtaposed the corporate absence of CNMC Luanshya Copper Mines (CLM) in Mpatamatu with the continuous provision of opportunities provided by the mine in the township before 1997.

In following Ferguson (2006: 197), I wanted to mark the colonial roots of the mine townships: the provision of worker housing, the maintenance of recreational facilities, the subsidies distributed in kind. I saw the civilizing mission of the colonial era being translated into the corporate care of the mining companies and their modernist ideas on what progress meant for their labour force. In contrast to other structural changes in Zambia’s copper industry, such as the dismantling of the dual wage structure and the replacement of expatriate workers...
in a process of ‘Zambianization’ (Burawoy 1972a; Sklar 1975: 110–11), I argue that the paternalist social project persisted in the mines’ relationship to their labour force until the 1990s. This condition changed selectively with the advent of neoliberal reforms in Zambia propagated by the Bretton Woods institutions. In Luanshya, CSR practices by CLM were mapped onto existing practices of spatial segregation, only affecting the permanent labour force. Consequently, and in contrast to Luanshya city centre, Mpatamatu and its residents were left behind by the successors of corporate paternalism.

Corporate Abandonment

The involvement of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Zambia’s copper sector constituted the background to one of the most fundamental transitions in the lives of most Copperbelt residents. In his article on Zambian reactions to neoliberal reform, Larmer (2005) identified one particular outcome of structural changes within Zambia’s copper sector that I argue were closely related to the post-privatization situation in mine townships like Mpatamatu. Neither the creation of the parastatal ZCCM advised by the World Bank in 1982 nor its dismantling enforced by the very same institution in 1997 had the effect of increasing investments in Zambia’s most important industry. Instead, the foundation of ZCCM resulted in substantial outflows from the sector to the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP), while ZCCM’s privatization resulted in mines like that in Luanshya ‘being asset-stripped’ (Larmer 2005: 34–35). Even worse, the structural readjustments did not shield production from a low copper price or mineworkers from being laid off.

ZCCM’s privatization resulted in a gradual retreat of mining operators from the mine townships, their infrastructures and residents’ lives.23 Mine houses were sold to their tenants, typically in a transaction involving a deduction from the terminal benefits that mineworkers received from ZCCM. The corporate abandonment of the industry’s social investment resembled the change that had been described in the Lusophone context during decolonization as a ‘process of emptying out’ (P. Gupta 2015: 181). Mine employees and township residents lost access to welfare facilities because the buildings were no longer considered part of the mine. The buildings in turn lost the people who regularly visited them because departments responsible for them were dissolved and mineworkers were retrenched.

In a neoliberal reorientation, mining companies refocused on the mines as sites of mineral extraction. The presence of the mining industry on Zambia’s Copperbelt went from, in Ferguson’s (2006: 35–36) terms, ‘socially thick’ to ‘socially thin’. Before 1997, mineworkers had been ‘incorporated into a social system’ and, as will also become evident in the following chapters, ‘paternalistic relations of dependence were . . . central to workers’ identities’ (Ferguson 2013: 227, 228). Building on Larmer’s work (2005) and a Rights and Accountability
in Development (RAID 2000) report, Gewald and Soeters came to the following conclusion in their in-depth study of the reprivatization of Luanshya’s mine:

Through the relentless pursuit of profit for investment capital, the liberalization and privatization of the mines has led to the destruction of the social structure of the mines, not only in Luanshya/Baluba but more generally. (Gewald and Soeters 2010: 165)

Luanshya deserved particular attention in this process of ‘the destruction of the social structure of the mines’ for several reasons. First, ZCCM’s Luanshya Division, one of the oldest Copperbelt mines with an extensive welfare infrastructure, was the first asset to be sold to an outside investor in October 1997. Second, the transaction was overshadowed by the fact that ZCCM’s Privatization Negotiation Team (PNT) abruptly reversed its decision to accept the offer of First Quantum Minerals (FQM). Instead, it awarded the contract to Binani Industries, a company that had not conducted any underground studies at the mine, was inexperienced in copper mining, and that specialized in scrap metal. Binani Industries’ profile and the sudden change in awarding the contract aroused widespread suspicion (RAID 2000: 162–65). The head of the PNT Francis Kaunda (not related to Kenneth Kaunda) later tried to diffuse this suspicion by publishing his own account of ZCCM’s privatization (Kaunda 2002: 42–57). Nevertheless, he was sentenced to jail in connection with certain irregularities during the restructuring of Zambia’s copper sector in 2008 (Donge 2009: 79, 88; Lusaka Times 2008). Third, the ‘development agreements’ that legalized the transfer of the parastatal’s divisions from public into private management did not safeguard the sustainability of the social services at each mine.

Civil unrest and strike action spread on the Copperbelt in October and November 1998. Mpatamatu was the scene of these protests, culminating in fights with the local mine police forces (RAID 2000: 154, 184). According to the agreement settling the sale of ZCCM’s Luanshya Division, Binani Industries’ subsidiary Roan Antelope Copper Mines of Zambia (RAMCOZ) assumed control of and responsibility for the social services related to the mine. The respective paragraph reads:

The company has assumed ownership, operational control and responsibility for the social assets connected to the mine. These comprise the medical and educational services (two hospitals, nine clinics, and one trust school), recreational facilities, sports clubs and essential municipal infrastructure, including electricity and water supply and sewerage systems. The company agrees to apply existing eligibility criteria for registering dependants entitled to these services. (RAID 2000: 188, based on Clifford Chance 1997: 17–20)
The RAID (2000: 188–89) report stressed that there were several clauses in the agreement that enabled the mining company to retreat from its social obligations in the mine townships without the government being obliged to step in. RAMCOZ was permitted to contract out the management of social facilities. This process had already started in Mpatamatu in 1985, when ZCCM (1985) leased out the township taverns to private individuals. The abandonment of the mine’s social structure proceeded under RAMCOZ from 1997 to 2000 and the subsequent private and government receivership. Moreover, within three years Binani Industries’ subsidiary had piled up a mountain of debt that the government receivership was still struggling to neutralize at the time of my fieldwork. The value of former social welfare buildings was repeatedly assessed in order to sell them and get them out of the receivership’s portfolio. When the mine was reopened by Luanshya Copper Mines (LCM) in 2003, most of the mine’s social assets remained in receivership with RAMCOZ.

At the time of my fieldwork, two facilities in Mpatamatu, the pay line buildings and the section 23 clinic, were formally run by CLM. The introduction of salary transactions under RAMCOZ had already rendered the pay line buildings useless for CLM’s predecessors. The section 23 clinic was being run as the last remaining mine clinic in Mpatamatu. The separation of ‘core’ mining and ‘non-core’ social assets (RAMCOZ (in receivership) 2001) and the World Bank-financed transition of mine townships into municipal entities (World Bank 2000) resulted in a dramatic redefinition of Mpatamatu: it was no longer a mine township with little involvement by the government, but a municipal township full of abandoned corporate remains with insufficient involvement by the government. By the turn of the millennium, the “unitary” structure of the mine’ (Epstein 1958: 123–24) had ceased to exist:

ZCCM provided almost everything that held society together in the Copperbelt: jobs, hospitals, schools, housing, and a wide range of social services including HIV-AIDS and malaria awareness and prevention programmes. Towards the end of the ZCCM era, much of this effort was collapsing. The new investors have made little effort to pick up these responsibilities. They are clear that their ‘core business’ is mining, and that the provision of social infrastructure goes beyond this remit. According to free-market ideology, and the Development Agreements, these goods and services should now be provided either by the local authorities or by market forces. (Fraser and Lungu 2007: 4)

The retreat of RAMCOZ and its successors, LCM and CLM, from the mine-workers’ living quarters in Mpatamatu took away a variety of opportunities that had been based on the mine’s corporate provisions. Endemic undercapitalization was the main economic condition following the mass retrenchments in the early
2000s, making the takeover of the former social welfare buildings by outside companies or individuals highly likely. The privatization of the buildings that did not remain with the mine was set to follow the same pattern as the privatization of ZCCM: dismantling, sale to outsiders, asset reassessment, depreciation and uncertainty over new investments.

In Mpatamatu, one building, the former section 21 housing office, was sold to a commercial actor from outside. Bayport Financial Services, a Mauritian financial service provider, first rented and later acquired the building where mine-workers and their dependants were previously allocated mine houses. Until the closure of Baluba underground mine in September 2015, the branch office in Mpatamatu was run to offer micro-finance solutions such as loans, deposits and money transfers. It has been placed under maintenance since then.

All the other former social welfare buildings that were abandoned by the mine were taken over by stakeholders previously linked to the township through their residence or workplace. Despite, or rather because of this fact, the process of privatizing the ‘non-core social assets’ meandered through ZCCM lease agreements, rental contracts issued by RAMCOZ, sale advertisements, letters of offer, and partial payments to the receivers. The buildings existed in a state of ‘suspension’ (A. Gupta 2015), a separate temporal state between corporate abandonment and legal privatization. Consequently, the statuses of owner and tenant became blurred over time. Sitting tenants found themselves in a relatively strong position vis-à-vis the receivership and potential investors from outside. They organized themselves in the RAMCOZ Social Assets Sitting Tenants Association, which had repeated successes in making its voice heard at State House in Lusaka (M anchishi 2013; Musonda 2014).

Ruination after Paternalism
Processes of disintegration accompanied me throughout my fieldwork in Mpatamatu. They touched every house in the township and people’s everyday lives. The conditions overwhelmed me from time to time. I passed through kitchens with electric stoves being used as shelves while food was being prepared on imbaula braziers using charcoal outside. I used bathrooms equipped with a ceiling lamp, shower and flush toilet while being instructed to use a torch and water in a bucket procured from a well. I looked up to the street lights that once illuminated the township’s most important arteries while experiencing the complete darkness of night in Mpatamatu.

Residents talked a lot about material deterioration. However, in conversations about the former social welfare buildings, their material conditions were left to one side, and the loss of social opportunity became the focus. Like the buildings, our exchanges cross-cut the material–social divide. Research participants illustrated what the material infrastructures in the township and their deterioration meant for social life in Mpatamatu. I came to understand this change in
residents’ living conditions through Stoler’s concept of ‘ruination’ (Stoler 2008b). I recognized it as a productive conceptual analogue to what I had observed and recorded, and to what I had learned from the public discourse on the corporate paternalism of the past. In a Zambian commentary online on ‘what Zambia has lost’, I read that ‘[it] is an embarrassing fact that any mining town in 1957 or 1977 had better maintained social welfare and youth facilities than in 2017’ (Mulenga 2017). This was exactly the cross-temporal perspective that I encountered when I interviewed residents of Mpatamatu.

‘Ruination’ allowed me to focus on the ‘corrosive process’ taking place at the former social welfare buildings, locations that had been abandoned by their corporate creators. The concept reached into the past and grasped imperial continuities which persisted up to the time of my fieldwork. It considered the ‘material and social afterlife of structures, sensibilities and things’ (Stoler 2008b: 194), providing a tool with which to trace the material in the social and vice versa from the past to the present. Finally, ‘ruination’ focused ‘not on inert remains but on their vital refiguration’ (Stoler 2008b: 194), speaking to my observation that people in Mpatamatu creatively reappropriated what had been left by the mine.

Stoler (2008b: 194) developed the concept based on the literature on ‘ruins’, Benjamin’s (2002) *Arcades Project* in particular. She refined the concept, originally designed for a material site, to one identifying a socio-material process (see also Mah 2008: 16–17). Simmel (1958: 379–85) had provided the starting point for Gordillo (2014: 9–10), who positioned ‘rubble’ against ‘ruin’ in order to tear down the latter's glamorized ascriptions. He ‘interrogate[d] ruins as objects in which space, history, decay, and memory coalesce’ and that triggered memories and transplanted past living conditions (Gordillo 2014: 2, 256), a capacity I also observed in Mpatamatu. Other scholars had used Benjamin and Simmel’s reflections as a basis for the way they thought about ruins producing politics (Dawdy 2010: 777), dialectical disharmony (Boym 2011) and culture (Göbel 2015: 135–70).

In my view, the literature shared the mapping of material corrosiveness onto the concepts of the ‘ruin’ and ‘ruination’. I acknowledge that the reappropriations I was interested in were intertwined with concrete sites of material decay. Howe et al. (2016: 552) emphasized how ruins, or broken infrastructure, rendered themselves visible by becoming ‘acute’, thus exposing social conditions. For Edensor (2005a: 842), ruins were at ‘an intersection of the visible and invisible’. In this sense, the remains of Mpatamatu’s social welfare buildings made the invisible loss of opportunity visible.

Stoler amalgamated the site and the process, the visible and the invisible, the ruin as a ‘byproduct of capitalism’ (Schwenkel 2013: 257) and a ‘snapshot of time and space within a longer process of ruination’ (Mah 2008: 16). She proposed that ‘we might turn to ruins as epicentres [of creative human action]’ (Stoler 2008b: 198). However, in their reappropriation of the former social wel-
fare buildings, people were *creative*, something I missed in the semantics of the concept of ‘ruination’. Was ‘ruination’ still the determining process of their innovative actions? Mpatamatu took me to the conceptual edges of ‘ruination’ and, ultimately, left me with the question of what came after it.

### Table 1.1. Mpatamatu’s former social welfare buildings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Building</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Main tenant</th>
<th>Main use</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Buseko Recreation Club</td>
<td>RAMCOZ in receivership</td>
<td>Club committee</td>
<td>Bar</td>
<td>87–88, 92, 97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kabulangeti Community Centre</td>
<td>RAMCOZ in receivership</td>
<td>MPACE</td>
<td>College</td>
<td>58, 79–80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kabulangeti Tavern</td>
<td>RAMCOZ in receivership</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Church</td>
<td>101–104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kalulu Recreation Club</td>
<td>RAMCOZ in receivership</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Bar</td>
<td>92–93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Kansengu Community Centre</td>
<td>RAMCOZ in receivership</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td>56, 78–79</td>
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<td>Kansengu Library</td>
<td>ZESCO</td>
<td>ZESCO</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>78</td>
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<td>Kansengu Tavern</td>
<td>RAMCOZ in receivership</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Bar</td>
<td>90–91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Kansumbi Tavern</td>
<td>RAMCOZ in receivership</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Bar</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Mpatamatu Pay Line</td>
<td>CLM</td>
<td>Suzika Private School</td>
<td>School</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Mpatamatu Stadium</td>
<td>RAMCOZ in receivership</td>
<td>Mpatamatu United FC</td>
<td>Stadium</td>
<td>93–98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Mpatamatu Sports Complex</td>
<td>RAMCOZ in receivership</td>
<td>PAOG(Z)</td>
<td>Church</td>
<td>96–98, 104–106</td>
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<td>Muliasi Community Centre</td>
<td>RAMCOZ in receivership</td>
<td>Golden Eagle Private School</td>
<td>School</td>
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<td>Mwaiseni Tavern</td>
<td>RAMCOZ in receivership</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Bar</td>
<td>91–92</td>
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<td>Section 21 clinic</td>
<td>RAMCOZ in receivership</td>
<td>Serve Zambia Foundation</td>
<td>Administration</td>
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<td>Section 21 housing office</td>
<td>Bayport Financial Services</td>
<td>Bayport Financial Services</td>
<td>Service</td>
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<td>RAMCOZ in receivership</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Bar</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Section 25 clinic</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
<td>Ministry of Health Clinic</td>
<td>Clinic</td>
<td>66, 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Section 26 clinic</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
<td>Ministry of Health Clinic</td>
<td>Clinic</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At this point, I would like to conclude by situating Mpatamatu as a scene of ruination and renovation for the subsequent chapters. The township was built as a corporate project in direct relation to the extraction of copper at a mine that owed its existence to corporate colonialism. It was integrated into a segregationist order within the mining town of Luanshya on the Central African Copperbelt. Mpatamatu's corporate infrastructures, particularly its social welfare provisions, established it as a company town. However, the paternalistic order ruling the mine township collapsed after Zambia's copper sector was reprivatized. Abandoned by the mine, corporate remains in the township decayed while at the same time being reappropriated for different motives: from reviving a paternalistic vision and starting a business to providing meeting places for Mpatamatu's population.

Notes

3. For sources on this expedition and a biography of Collier, see Bradley (1952: 64–74).
5. On the role of 'scientific' prospecting techniques in the development of the Copperbelt, see Frederiksen (2013), Luchembe (1982: 196).
8. Rajak (2011: 66) noted that 'foundational myths are important then, not only in the construction of corporate identity, but in naturalising the company's position in the broader historical landscape of industrial capitalism in South Africa'.
10. See Waters (2019) and Chansa (2020) for recent studies of epistemological claims in environmental knowledge put forward by the mining industry.
15. See the 'Locality Plan for Construction Sites' in RST Roan Antelope Division (1964b).
18. RST Roan Antelope Division (1962a, 1964c). Roberts was started by Douglas Roberts (1906–1982) in 1934. The company changed its name to Murray and Roberts in 1974 and was listed as Masimba Group at the time of my research. See Bruce (2012), Masimba Group (2013).
21. See also Sparks (2012: 21, 186) on the case of the South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation (SASOL).

22. On the explanatory power of Foucault’s concept in the context of Copperbelt, see Frederiksen (2014).


26. Richard Kafunda, a former Zambia Consumer Buying Corporation store manager, explained to me how ‘undercapitalization’ was the main economic problem caused by the retrenchments following RAMCOZ’s bankruptcy. The retail sector did not collapse but was downgraded to a level of low-cost products. Richard Kafunda, interview with the author, 12 May 2016, Mpatamatu.

27. Bayport Financial Services Luanshya Office Staff, interview with author, 5 May 2016, Luanshya.