

MARKET OR PLANNED? THE 1949 BUNDESTAG ELECTION



In the 14 August 1949 *Bundestagwahl* (federal parliamentary elections), the conservative Christian Democratic Party and its sister party in Bavaria, the Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) collected 31 per cent of the vote, the largest percentage of all parties. It was enough to beat narrowly their main rival, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which garnered 29.2 per cent. Together with the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP, 11.9 per cent) and the conservative German Party (DP, 4 per cent), the CDU/CSU was able to form a government in the first Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany. In his *Regierungserklärung* (government statement) on 20 September, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer commented:

The question of planned economy or social market economy played a decisive role in the election. The German people have spoken with a great majority against the planned economy. A [grand] coalition between the parties that oppose the planned economy and those that support the planned economy has been rejected by the will of the majority of the voters.¹

Historians examining the 1949 election campaign have concurred with Adenauer that the issue of economic policy proved decisive in the election. Moreover, during the campaign the social market economy and the CDU/CSU became united in public perception.² But the question remains: In what way did the choice of “Market or Planned” manage to play a crucial role in the federal elections of 1949? How did the CDU/CSU represent and use the social market economy as a political platform? And, perhaps more importantly, how did the 1949 election campaign prepare the way for subsequent use of the social market economy and the emerging concept of the economic miracle as political tools?

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Jürgen Falter, a prominent scholar of German politics, has described the 1949 federal election campaign as not marking the beginning of the Federal Republic party system, especially in terms of the sociological characteristics of the parties. Instead, he argues that the 1949 election was the last of the type of elections in the pattern of the Reichstag elections of the Weimar Republic.³ This assessment is accurate, considering that there were many parties that successfully collected at least 5 percent of the vote in the individual *Länder* (states), the minimum to gain a seat in the Bundestag. This was much like the case of the splintered political system that plagued the Weimar Republic.⁴ All told, eleven different parties moved into the first Bundestag. On the other hand, in the 1949 election the pillars of the Federal Republic party system were already taking shape. The three parties that would form the stable party system through the 1980s, the CDU/CSU, the SPD, and the FDP, had already gathered 72.1 percent of the vote in the 1949 election. These parties embodied the three main strains of German political thought: parties of conservative, socialist, and liberal tendencies.⁵ In addition, the sociological subcultures that characterized Weimar political behavior had begun to disintegrate by the 1949 election. Most significant in regard to voting behavior was the breakdown of religious subcultures. Undoubtedly, the CDU/CSU, as successor to the prewar Catholic Center Party, garnered much of its support from Catholics—about two thirds of its voters. Overall, the CDU/CSU in the Federal Republic as the Center Party in the German Reich attracted a similar proportion of Catholics—about 55 percent. At the same time, the CDU/CSU was able to reach out to Protestant votes that were critical to its electoral success, a pattern that was absent in the Weimar Republic. For example, 1924 Reichstag election results show that nearly 100 percent of the Center Party's votes came from Catholics. In the 1950s the CDU/CSU gained a bit over 35 percent of its vote from Protestants.⁶ Along with its staunch anticommunist stance, the social market economy can be interpreted as a crucial political issue used by the CDU/CSU to break out of the Catholic ghetto to which its Center Party forerunner was consigned. Already by the 1949 election, the CDU/CSU was beginning to direct its propaganda regarding the social market economy toward groups that would make it a broad-based party, although its methods could be best described as unsophisticated.

I would also argue that although the 1949 Bundestag election represented continuities from Weimar, or perhaps the beginning of a transitional period, in regard to the sociological base of the parties, it also was very similar to Weimar elections in terms of the methods utilized in campaigning. The message of the CDU/CSU was transmitted to the public through traditional means: the leaflet, the political poster, and speeches.⁷ For the first Bundestag campaign, the CDU/CSU did not yet have at its disposal the wide battery of parallel propaganda instruments it would possess in the late 1950s, but instead was limited mainly to the propaganda generated by the party itself. There was no real use of either modern advertising techniques or public opinion polls, resources that would be fully utilized in the future Bundestag elections. The propaganda methods promulgated by the CDU/CSU were crude and direct, reminiscent of the techniques utilized during

the Weimar era. Although certain party personalities who advanced the CDU/CSU program rose to the forefront of the campaign, especially Konrad Adenauer and Ludwig Erhard, the campaign was not centered upon the party leaders to the extent of elections to come. In these subsequent campaigns, the CDU/CSU became highly successful at creating campaigns focused on leaders personifying certain images and positions of the party. In 1949, however, CDU/CSU programs or accomplishments took precedence over any one person. Propaganda was still based on a party's ideological position, in this case favoring the social market economy, and was directed primarily toward energizing the party faithful, which was characteristic of Weimar elections. In many respects, the "image" of the CDU/CSU as the party of the economic miracle had not fully emerged as it would in the late 1950s. In particular, the social market economy was defined not as the wellspring but the antithesis of self-indulgent consumerism, unfettered capitalism, and excessive individualism—qualities that the Christian element of the CDU/CSU saw as contributing to the rise of Nazism. The social market economy was portrayed as fundamental to what has been called an antimaterialist position toward the economy, in which the economic system would allow an organic, secure German community to reconstruct itself in contrast to the Nazi past, the social and moral turmoil of the immediate postwar years, and the perceived Marxist threat to the East.⁸ This approach is not surprising since most West Germans in 1949 were pursuing not luxury or consumerist goods, but rather basic necessities such as adequate food, shelter, and clothing. With its approach in the 1949 campaign, the CDU/CSU shaped the public consumption of the social market economy primarily as a position that could be seen by its base supporters as a holdover from some of the party's Catholic Center Party roots in the Weimar Republic. However, Adenauer was clearly interested in also using the program to reach out to new groups of voters.

At its founding in the individual zones of occupation the CDU/CSU had not supported a free market economy. In this respect, the CDU/CSU was similar to almost all of the emerging parties in Germany that sought more collectivist solutions to what seemed like unmasterable economic challenges born of Germany's vast destruction. In fact, Germany had a long tradition of state involvement in the economy, and public opinion in the immediate postwar years seemed to support such an approach. In the years following the war, the CDU was a patchwork of both differing ideologies and local political organizations—many times competing against each other for leadership at the national level. During the summer of 1945 Christian Democratic parties began to emerge across Germany with three main centers: the Rhineland (particularly Cologne), Frankfurt am Main, and Berlin. Overall, an avowed goal of the early CDU, whose actual name emerged from leaders in Berlin, was to create an interconfessional party that combined Catholics and Protestants pursuing Christian policies in the political, economic, and moral reconstruction of Germany.

Until 1950 there was no real centralized party machine running the CDU, so local organizations directed much of the party's decision making. The Christian

party in Bavaria, the CSU, remained completely separate from the CDU in its organization, although it campaigned with the CDU and sat in a combined *fraktion* (parliamentary faction) in the Bundestag. However, since many of the early CDU organizers were former Center Party and Christian trade union members, the three pillar organizations of the CDU, especially the CDU in the Rhineland that was situated within the British Zone of occupation, supported an economic program that could be best described as “Christian Socialist.” In June 1945 the Rhineland CDU leaders issued the *Kölner Leitsätze* (Cologne Principles), which advocated an egalitarian wage policy and a redistribution of industrial resources. Other regional CDU organizations took similar positions over the course of the summer of 1945. In its founding in June 1945, the Berlin CDU called for the nationalization of raw materials and key industries. Jakob Kaiser, a Nazi opponent and head of the Eastern Zone and the Berlin branch of the CDU stating in December 1945, had a background in Christian trade unions from before the Nazi seizure of power. He championed a form of socialism based upon “Christian responsibility” and proclaimed in 1945 that with the defeat of Nazism, a new socialist era was at hand in postwar Germany and that a capitalist, bourgeois age had come to an end—a sentiment echoed also by Konrad Adenauer in the British Zone.⁹

Christian Socialism entailed the search for a middle way between capitalism and the planned economy of pure Marxism. The large firms, or at least basic industries, large banks, and insurance firms should be passed over to community control. But Christian Socialism opposed simple nationalization. Instead, it envisioned a decentralization of economic power into the hands of employers, unions, consumers, and community interests in an attempt to balance the interests of capital and labor. Not only the class interests of Marxism, but also the hyperindividualism of free-market liberalism was to be forsaken in favor of the creation of a balanced, classless, Christian community that protected individual dignity and freedom from excessive statism. To many of the early CDU leaders, the materialism and secularism of the capitalist economy, combined with the Prussian traditions of statism, were what had caused Germany to fall prey to the Nazis. Christian Socialists believed Germany’s idealized *Gemeinschaft* (community) had been shattered in the nineteenth century by industrial capitalism’s focus on individual material acquisition within a mass, urban society. The Nazis’ hedonistic and pagan promises of a racial paradise on earth had merely exploited these trends already in place. The Communists to the East were the latest manifestation of these dangerous aspects of modern life: materialism, secularism, and state control of the individual. Christian Socialism seemed like a natural political position for the developing CDU in a devastated Germany and found fertile ground in the British Zone of occupation. With the Labour Party in power in Great Britain, the British occupiers announced plans in October 1946 to socialize the industrial heart of Germany, the Ruhr Valley. Christian Socialist and anticapitalist sentiments intensified with the “hunger winter” of 1946/47, during which most Germans’ living conditions dramatically worsened. The ideas of Christian Socialism were clearly expressed by the CDU in the British Zone’s Ahlen Program of February

1947, a program viewed by many historians as a middle station in the progression of the CDU's economic policy from Christian Socialism and the social market economy.¹⁰

The Ahlen Program espoused some of the Christian Socialist ideals, but fell far short in terms of laying out actual policies. It stated that “[t]he capitalist economic system has become unjust for the state and social interests of the German people.” The program went on to proclaim that “the content and goals of the social and economic new order cannot be for capitalist profit and the striving for power, instead it can only be for the welfare of our nation [*Volkes*]. The German people should maintain an economic and social system [*Wirtschafts- und Sozialverfassung*] through common economic organization [*gemeinwirtschaftliche Ordnung*].” Overall, the document was a mix of earlier radical ideas and vague demands.¹¹ It was radical in the sense of wanting to reduce industrial concerns to their smallest profitable size and calling for a form of codetermination (*Mitbestimmung*) for workers in economic and social decision making, but it also constituted a barrier against communal ownership of the means of production.

The Ahlen Program represented a pragmatic tactical move on the part of Adenauer and the CDU's bourgeois-liberal elements. With his elections as chairperson of the CDU of the Rhineland regional organization in January 1946 and the British Zonal organization in March 1946, Konrad Adenauer had emerged as the CDU's leading figure in the West. Ultimately, Adenauer feared that Christian Socialism would limit the CDU's appeal and open the door to a possible coalition with the SPD—something that Adenauer saw as a disastrous development in the process of creating a party system dominated by non-Marxist parties. In order to ensure his position as chairperson of the CDU in the British Zone and to intercept the swing of public sentiment toward Christian Socialism in the vote for the North Rhine–Westphalia Landtag (state legislature) in April 1947, Adenauer pushed for the formation of a new economic program for the CDU in the British Zone.¹² Clearly the program was somewhat of a concession to the CDU's Christian Socialist wing, especially to Jacob Kaiser and the CDU in Berlin, a move that was essential because of the economic and social conditions of the winter of 1946/47. In fact, Adenauer was the driving force behind the Ahlen Program's creation. Its espousal of the “principle of the distribution of power” in the economy did much to undermine the nationalization plans held by Karl Arnold, a Weimarer-era trade unionist and CDU minister president of North Rhine–Westphalia from 1947 to 1957. Adenauer and Arnold had been in conflict over the CDU's direction since late 1945. Through this measure, Adenauer and the liberal wing of the party were able to integrate the CDU's left wing firmly and at the same time head off a further drifting of the party to the left. Adenauer continually used the Ahlen Program and his control of the CDU in the British Zone to thwart Arnold's nationalization efforts in late 1947.¹³ In addition, the Ahlen Program contributed to Adenauer's leadership of the CDU on a national level, at the expense of Kaiser's leadership from Berlin, as it helped open the road to the eventual acceptance of Erhard's social market economy under Adenauer's sponsorship.

The Ahlen Program reflected the ongoing development of Adenauer's economic and political thought. Early on in the CDU's formation, but especially as head of the CDU in the British Zone, Konrad Adenauer realized the danger that a policy of Christian Socialism presented in the political arena, especially on the national level. He saw the need for the party to distinguish itself from the Social Democrats and link itself to the center-right of the German political spectrum in order to draw more than just the Catholic vote. He feared that a party based solely upon Catholics, as had been the case for the Center Party during the Weimar Republic, and supporting Christian Socialism as part of its platform would revive divisions among the bourgeoisie that had weakened the Weimar system. Adenauer realized that to be successful, the CDU must be able to branch out and integrate support from Protestants and the conservative bourgeoisie within a nondenominational Christian Party. In a meeting of the British Zone CDU held in late June 1946, Adenauer commented that "[w]ith the word 'socialism' we will win over five people and twenty people will be driven away."¹⁴ As a result much of Adenauer's effort during 1946–1949 was centered upon developing a party program for the CDU that would allow a broad political constellation of constituents once the Federal Republic was formed. Adenauer later commented in his memoirs that a resurgence in German political life required a party that attracted both Catholics and Protestants. He elaborated further: "Only a very great party that included all strata of society could rebuild a prostrate, broken Germany. It must be a party which could appeal to employers and employed, the middle classes, farmers, civil servants, intellectuals, people from the North and the South, those driven from their homes and those who had simply fled." Consequently as leader of the CDU Adenauer worked hard to create bridges with Protestant political leaders in North Rhine–Westphalia and across western portions of Germany. Particularly important was his growing relationship with Robert Pferdemenges, a prominent Protestant banker from Cologne who played a key behind-the-scenes role in hammering out deals with the CDU's left wing and encouraged it to abandon Christian Socialism.¹⁵

The main threat to Germany, from Adenauer's perspective, no longer came from the right, as had been the case during the late Weimar Republic, but rather now from the left and the Social Democrats. If the CDU adopted a form of socialism as part of its program, the state governments would be able to enter into coalitions with the SPD, a development that Adenauer wanted to avoid at all costs. After the April 1947 Landtag elections in North Rhine–Westphalia, Karl Arnold retained a number of SPD members within the administration, most notably Ernst Nölting as economics minister. As minister president, Arnold continued pressing for the nationalization of industry within North Rhine–Westphalia, although his efforts were thwarted by the Americans, who were unwilling to allow such a policy to proceed as long as they were occupiers. The cooperation of the CDU with the SPD in North Rhine–Westphalia was unacceptable to Adenauer. Even worse still would be the creation of a grand coalition of the SPD and CDU at the national level. Support of the neoliberal ideas of the social market economy

held great appeal to Adenauer, since Erhard's free market system would rule out compromise between the CDU and the SPD.¹⁶ To Adenauer, the SPD represented a mortal threat to the reconstruction of a new Germany. As plans were hashed out for the first Bundestag election in early 1949, Adenauer argued that the CDU must be successful, for otherwise the SPD would build a coalition with the Communists in the first government—resulting in the enslavement of the German people by way of a socialist economic policy.¹⁷ He later commented that a socialist Germany would disturb him less with the socialization of heavy industry, than with the fact that the SPD had devolved into an “anti-Christian party” (*christentumsfeindlich Partei*) since 1945.¹⁸

The CDU's inner-party developments played themselves out within the context of an ever evolving national political situation. As previously discussed, the Bizone Economics Administration was fully established by the middle of 1947 with the full integration of the American and British Zones. With a stronger organization, the Bizone created a number of new political structures centered in Frankfurt to oversee the economic reconstruction of the combined British and American Zones more effectively. By this time many in the British Zone CDU, especially the members of the party's *Wirtschaftspolitische Ausschuss* (economics committee), were ready to abandon the Ahlen Program in favor of a more market-oriented economic program. In July 1947, the liberal corporate lawyer Franz Etzel was named chairperson of the economics committee of the CDU in the British Zone. On the national level of the CDU, the influence of Christian Socialists such as Kaiser from Berlin was clearly waning. In October 1948 Adenauer created a supra-zonal economics committee with Etzel as chairperson. The body included CSU representatives and was to work closely with the CDU/CSU representatives on the Economics Council (*Wirtschaftsrat*), a quasi-parliamentary body of the Bizone in Frankfurt, in developing party economic policy. Meanwhile, by late 1946 and early 1947 the Americans had made it clear that they would not tolerate plans for socialization and would veto proposals from any state legislature that went forward with such a policy—thereby contributing to further weakening of the party's left wing. Over the course of 1947, CDU/CSU representatives within the Economics Council began to support the free market more actively and worked with the smaller bourgeois parties to hammer the SPD for espousing a fruitless economic system from a bygone era.¹⁹ By March 1948 Ludwig Erhard had taken up the position of director of the Economics Administration of the Bizone. In June 1948 the currency reform was carried out in the Bizone and a series of market reforms were instituted—creating the new availability of goods for West Germans.

The economic upswing that followed the currency reform signaled unmistakably to Adenauer that the social market economy possessed political currency and presented him with the perfect opportunity to push the CDU toward accepting it as a key part of the party's platform. As part of this effort, Adenauer invited Erhard to address the British Zone's CDU party conference in Recklinghausen at the end of August 1948. In this speech, entitled “*Marktwirtschaft moderner Prägung*” (Market Economy of a Modern Character), Erhard placed the West Ger-

man economy's conversion from the *Zwangswirtschaft* (controlled economy) to a *Marktwirtschaft* (market economy) in a broad context by connecting the economic transformation to fundamental social change that freed the new nation from the legacies of the Nazi and occupation past. He opened the speech with these words:

With the political-economic change to the market economy, we have done more than just initiate narrow economic measures; we have put our socio-economic life upon a new foundation and before a new beginning.²⁰

This change in the economic order meant not the introduction of “plundering” or “irresponsibility,” but rather the “committed sacrifice to the whole. Not the senseless and soulless state of drones [*seelenlose Termitenstaat*] with its depersonalization of humanity [*Menschen*], but instead the organic state, based upon the freedom of the individual, striving together for an elevated whole. That is the intellectual basis upon which we want to build a new economy and a new social order.”²¹ In this way Erhard was placing the social market economy within the context of a fundamental restructuring of society and the preservation of individual freedom—echoing sentiments common among early leaders of the CDU. Undoubtedly, Erhard had to couch his economic plans in a manner that defended personal freedom but at the same time considered the interests of the whole. A full defense of the unfettered free market and egotistic individualism surely would have elicited a strong negative response from some members of Erhard's audience who still held pro-Christian Socialist sentiments.

Implicitly, Erhard was setting up an “either/or” choice for West Germany in terms of what the economic system meant for the individual. With the planned economy, the individual is forced “under the whip of a soulless bureaucracy.” Throughout his speech Erhard repeatedly referred to the “soulless collectivism” or “soulless colony of drones” as a central aspect of the planned economy. In addition, Erhard stressed that the planned economy was a middle station that inevitably led to a controlled economy (*Zwangswirtschaft*), an economic system whose characteristics West Germans could easily understand by thinking back to the Nazi years and the early occupation period or even by looking eastward to the Stalinist Soviet Union. The controlled economy of the postwar years had created “societal chaos,” while the new currency had allowed the average German to consume more in the four weeks since its introduction than during the three years since the end of the war.²²

As an alternative to this system that inevitably led to tyranny, Erhard offered the social market economy. Germany, he argued, must establish an economic system “which through voluntary organization [*Einordnung*], through a conscious responsibility, struggles for the whole in a sensible, organic way.”²³ By expressing this concern for the whole of society Erhard highlighted the social element of the free market—echoing the neoliberal economist Wilhelm Röpke's belief that the economy should be somewhat regulated to benefit all in society, over purely egotistic laissez-faire capitalism. But also central to Erhard's view was that the notion of economic freedom was essential for the creation of a free society. In this way

Erhard defined the fundamentals of a free society, where “in my eyes the most important of all democratic freedoms is the free selection of goods, along with the free selection of professions.”²⁴ Building on some of the ideas of Röpke, Eucken, and other neoliberals, Erhard elucidated a view that would be repeated in political propaganda throughout the 1950s: political freedom and freedom to consume were inextricably intertwined; one could not be established without the other.

By October 1948, Adenauer was pushing for the creation of an economic program for the CDU of all three Western occupation zones.²⁵ On 25 February 1949 Erhard traveled to Königswinter to address the CDU’s zonal committee in the British Zone. Erhard argued to the group that the upcoming federal elections hinged upon economic policy and the social conditions of the German people. He implored the CDU politicians to accept the social market economy as the party’s electoral platform. As in earlier speeches to the CDU, he was sure to stress the social aspects of the free market, in order not to alienate the CDU politicians holding onto Christian Socialism.²⁶ Erhard’s speech supposedly resonated a great deal among those present.²⁷ This response reaffirmed Adenauer’s belief that the CDU should build its economic policies upon Erhard’s principles. After his presentation, Adenauer thanked Erhard for advancing these “fundamental truths” that developments since the currency reform had proven to be “really good principles.” The key task was to articulate these principles in “simple and clear terms” in the upcoming election campaign.²⁸

Others at the Königswinter meeting, including a trade unionist from Cologne, Johannes Albers, agreed that the upcoming election campaign would rest upon the success of the Frankfurt economic policy, so called because the Bizone’s Economics Council and Economics Administration were headquartered in Frankfurt. But he also maintained that social policy would play a crucial role in the election. From Albers’s perspective, Erhard was too much of a free market liberal. The trade unionist was leery of the acceptance of Erhard’s policy, suspecting this would mean the abandonment of the Ahlen Program. As a pragmatic politician, Adenauer affirmed that the party could not get caught up in rigid party program. “I have just said,” he retorted to Albers, “that all of these programs and program statements have no eternal value, but are concerned with matters that are vital now.” Adenauer then introduced what would be the central question of the upcoming election: “I would suggest, first of all, that this theme is summed up a bit in the question: planned economy or market economy [shout from Albers: “social!”] or do we say: bureaucratic planned economy or social market economy [laughter]. . . Along with that, we have the Ahlen Program and the social program.”²⁹ Again, an Adenauer-led CDU was attempting to reconcile the free market with some of the “social” roots of the Weimar Catholic Center Party. Prompted by the success of Erhard’s speech and the timid response from the left wing of the party, the CDU in the British Zone—and with that the whole CDU/CSU in the Western Zones—adopted the social market economy as a central part of its platform for the upcoming election and Adenauer permanently reined in the CDU’s Christian Socialist element. Clearly, Adenauer understood the importance of the social market econ-

omy not only as a club to wield against the Social Democrats in the Bundestag election, but also as a means to reel in the left wing of the CDU and prevent it from alienating more centrist voters.

The CDU's immediate task was to transform the ideas of the social market economy into an effective political campaign. One clear obstacle to this task was that in 1949 CDU had no overarching structure. Within the British Zone the party was organized at the zonal level, while in the American and French zones it was organized at the regional level (*Landesverbände*). In some parts of West Germany, the regional organizations' territory did not correspond to the administrative areas of the Federal States (*Länder*). For example, North Rhine–Westphalia had two regional organizations of the Rhineland and Westphalia-Lippe. In Lower Saxony there were three, with Hanover, Brunswick, and Oldenburg, and in Baden Württemberg four, in North Baden, South Baden, North Württemberg, and Württemberg-Hohenzollern.³⁰ At the beginning of 1947 the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft der CDU/CSU* (Working Group of the CDU/CSU) was formed in Frankfurt under the directorship of Bruno Dörpinghaus, a founder of the CDU in Hesse. This body acted as a “steering committee” but in fact possessed no formal power to determine policy for the party's regional branches. The *Arbeitsgemeinschaft der CDU/CSU* and its subordinate committees provided the *Landesverbände* (regional organizations) and *Kreisverbände* (district organizations) of the party with the main campaign themes and propaganda material for the election campaign.

In early January 1949 Dörpinghaus began constructing a central election committee under the working group charged with the responsibility of coordinating campaign propaganda throughout West Germany. This election campaign committee consisted of representatives from the various regional organizations, the British *Zonenverband* (zonal organization) of the CDU/CSU, the Frankfurt Economics Council, and the Parliamentary Council, which was drawing up the new West German constitution. The election committee's main task was to “initiate the required measures which prove necessary in light of the election for the coordination of the party interests, including the inter-connected organization, propaganda, and press duties.”³¹ A number of other subcommittees were subsequently created for the campaign, such as the electoral law committee (*Wahlrechtsausschuß*) and the so-called Arithmetic Committee (*Arithmetiker-Ausschuß*), entrusted with providing demographic statistics on the Federal Republic and compiling data on previous state and local elections.³²

Despite the decentralized nature of the CDU/CSU, the party's image during the campaign was molded at the national level, and in particular by Adenauer's influence. The election committee planned the schedule of the nationwide speakers and the party's overall campaign strategy for the election campaign. In addition, on 5 March 1949, a press and propaganda committee was created to develop propaganda for the campaign. The committee supplied posters, leaflets, election brochures, and other campaign necessities to regional and district party organizations, including the CDU's sister organization in Bavaria, the CSU, for which

it replaced “CDU” with “CSU” on the materials.³³ On 19 March the press and propaganda committee convened its first meeting, with Dörpinghaus proposing a working staff be formed to take care of the technical planning and proofing of the campaign propaganda. Perhaps the most important information provided by the central party leadership was the *Union im Wahlkampf*, which detailed election information and speaker notes for the party organizers at the regional and district level. Between 20,000 and 25,000 of these election newspapers were distributed by the central committee.³⁴ In addition, the regional and district level organizations supplied propaganda material for local use.³⁵ Generally, the locally supplied propaganda concentrated upon introducing the local candidates through pamphlets or leaflets. Meanwhile, propaganda for more nationally oriented issues flowed out of the CDU/CSU’s central working group and its various subcommittees.

Adenauer and the CDU of the British Zone proved to be the crucial forces behind the creation of the CDU/CSU’s campaign. Undoubtedly, the British Zone CDU was the best organized of all of the regional CDU organizations. As head of the CDU of the British Zone, Konrad Adenauer was named head of the election committee and participated actively on the press and propaganda committee. From the onset, Adenauer stressed that the SPD was the main opponent against which all efforts must be focused.³⁶ Adenauer feared that because the communist vote would always be available to the SPD in the Bundestag, the major goal of the campaign would be to prevent a combined majority of the SPD and the KPD (Communist Party of Germany).³⁷ With this in mind, Erhard and the social market economy lent themselves to being used as political weapons against the SPD. Adenauer made it very clear in a meeting of the press and propaganda committee that Erhard and the Frankfurt economic policy were to take center stage and that the campaign revolved around the question of “*Markt oder Plan*” (Market or Planned), contrasting the economic policies of the CDU/CSU and SPD.³⁸ The challenge was to transform the economic policy into effective propaganda.

But in most of the resulting propaganda, the social market economy was not clearly defined in any theoretical or formal sense. Instead, the CDU/CSU’s propaganda on economics centered around two issues. First, the CDU/CSU portrayed its policies—the currency reform for which the party sought credit and the social market economy—as unshackling the West German economy from Allied controls, rationing, industrial dismantling, and SPD economic planning, and thereby making the basic necessities available to a German populace that had suffered severe postwar deprivations. By taking this position, the party affirmed its capacity to run an effective government. Second, the CDU/CSU used the social market economy to represent the establishment of individual freedom within an organic West Germany community, in contrast to the tyranny and alienation associated with the SPD’s planned economy and the economic system of the Third Reich. With this approach the CDU/CSU reconciled the free market ideas of the social market economy with the party’s Christian Socialist roots. The newly available goods and economic expansion for which Erhard and the CDU/CSU claimed credit were not merely to satisfy individual desires or necessities, but to

help bring about the fundamental reconstruction of German social life after the intense upheaval and dislocation of the Third Reich and crisis years—including an idealized vision of family life and gender roles. The CDU/CSU's propaganda silenced any significant confrontation with the recent past and urged West Germans to look forward to a new beginning free of Nazi guilt. By taking this approach, the propaganda positioned West Germans as powerless victims in the immediate postwar period who now regained a sense of agency due to the CDU/CSU's economic policies. Finally, the CDU/CSU's propaganda avoided any technical jargon regarding the intricate details of economic policy. Instead, like any good political advertising, it translated the party's ideas into concrete terms and played upon the voters' prejudices and predispositions.

Particularly important to West Germans at the time was the challenge of economic reconstruction and securing sufficient food, clothing, and housing for survival. American-conducted public opinion surveys in January 1949 indicated that six out of ten Germans valued economic security and the possibility of a good income over free elections, freedom of speech, a free press, and religious freedom. In addition, 31 percent of Germans in the American Zone selected commercial freedom as the most important of all liberties. Religious freedom followed with 22 percent, free elections with 19 percent, and freedom of speech with 14 percent.³⁹ Clearly, larger, more abstract political ideas took a back seat to immediate and pragmatic concerns. The CDU/CSU played up these sentiments with propaganda centered upon improving West German conditions, especially after the currency reform of 1948.

In a 5 March meeting of the election committee, Dörpinghaus suggested that the proposed propaganda committee design brochures “for the man on the street, simple, uncomplicated with a lot of pictures.”⁴⁰ Adenauer underscored this principle in the 19 May 1949 meeting of the CDU's press and propaganda committee. In a discussion of the formulation of propaganda material, Adenauer suggested that, “we take this as a principle of the propaganda: simple, not too much, not too highbrow.” Especially effective would be some form of pictorial representation of the CDU/CSU program. Adenauer and Erich Köhler, the head of the regional organization in Hesse, were particularly convinced of the effectiveness of a primitive form of propaganda. In early 1949 they had seen a touring theater group from Caux near Geneva, which proclaimed a Christian-based ideology. Both were impressed with this group's ability to captivate the West German public. Adenauer commented about this fascination: “That is the best proof that one must speak simply to the public, not too much, few thoughts, large ideas simply represented.”⁴¹ The Frankfurt economic policy proved easy to shape into this simplistic approach. Walter Otto, a member of the CDU in the British Zone, emphasized the effect of graphics and pictures on the public, adding that the party propaganda, and posters in particular, should appeal not to the intellectuals, but rather to the “primitive levels” of society: “It is decisive that the simple man remains in front of these posters.” One of his suggestions, perhaps the crudest and most successful of all of the CDU/CSU's creations, was a poster depicting a Man-

gol face hovering over Europe while a shield bearing the letters “SPD” crumbled before the Asiatic threat.⁴²

The ideas of the social market economy were put together in the *Düsseldorfer Leitsätze* (Düsseldorf Principles). This program statement was to replace the old Ahlen Program and kick off the CDU/CSU’s campaign. The Düsseldorf Principles were formulated mostly by members of the British Zone CDU. Franz Etzel, the chairman of the economics committee of the CDU in the British Zone and chair of a supranational economics committee, initiated the drawing up of the guidelines over the course of late 1948 and early 1949, with frequent consultation with Erhard.⁴³ On 30 March 1949, Etzel presented the rough draft to the British zonal committee. He argued that the social market economy should lay claim to the economic upswing since the currency reform. He went on to stress that although the conventional wisdom was that a weak and undercapitalized economy plagued with shortages must be remedied by a centralized planning, the CDU must make clear that it stood for freeing the energy in the economy through the social market economy. Etzel observed the need to define the concept of “social market economy” because of its multiple meanings. Interestingly, he pointed out that although the new program statement had nothing to do with the Ahlen Program, Adenauer desired that the old program be cited in the new proposal. Throughout the meeting, committee members banted about what the term actually meant. The conversation reflected both the difficulties of tailoring economic concepts to a political campaign and the approach that the Adenauer and CDU would take to campaigning. That is, the social market economy was not to be about pure economic ideas, but a broad social, economic, and political vision that the CDU offered to the electorate.

At the end of the session, Heinrich Lübke, a leader of the CDU in North Rhine–Westphalia and later the federal president between 1959 and 1969, commented: “Instead of saying planned economy, we should say centralized administrative economy or more popularly expressed, simply controlled economy [*Zwangswirtschaft*]. We reject the controlled economy, everyone can understand that. Central administrative economy would be better in my opinion than planned economy.” Later in the meeting, committee members engaged in a heated discussion about what controlled and planned economies actually meant. The conclusion was that the term planned economy could be more easily associated with economic conditions and organization before the currency reform and with the SPD’s platform in particular.⁴⁴ When suggestions were made later in June 1949 at meeting of the British Zone CDU to use the words “controlled economy,” Adenauer reacted strongly against the hairsplitting over the economics behind the terms. His advice was: “Speak simply. The public wants to be spoken to simply, and don’t rack your brains so much on this matter.” Despite some disagreement over campaign terminology, the term “planned economy” was employed over “controlled economy.” The CDU utilized the term “planned economy” because the SPD by this point had rejected the “controlled economy” and it was essential to differentiate between the parties in the campaign.⁴⁵ In particular situations, “con-

trolled economy” was used because of the images that it could evoke, especially the image of the Nazi economy, the immediate postwar years, and the communist system in the East. Clearly the party was not concerned that its economic concepts have theoretical purity, but rather was interested in what would best resonate with the electorate. As Adenauer argued at the zonal committee meeting, “We are writing the principles for the election, not for a scholarly work or textbook.”⁴⁶

The Düsseldorf Principles were released in a press conference on 15 July 1949, which also served as the start of the CDU/CSU election campaign. Adenauer invited the leading representatives of the press for the “announcement of the CDU/CSU’s program on economic, social and agricultural policies, as well as home construction and the Eastern question.”⁴⁷ In his opening remarks at the press conference, Adenauer gave the impression that the Principles were developed and agreed upon by the entire party, although they were almost solely the product of the CDU in the British Zone and the CSU had not, in fact, given its approval of the Principles.⁴⁸ The Düsseldorf Principles made clear that economic change was an integral component of reconstructing the social and moral fabric of the German community after the degradation of the Third Reich and the occupation period. The document opened by describing the low point that Germans had reached in the first half of 1948 when the struggle against hunger led to “ruthless self-interest” and the corruption in society awoke the “basest instincts.” It did not stress the currency reform, which was an American initiative, instead arguing that the CDU/CSU economic policy led to a political-economic turning point when the efficiency of workers at all levels rose and production climbed. It was the rejection of the “ration card economy [*Bezugscheinwirtschaft*] that gave freedom back to the consumer.” After 20 June, “The stores became full, courage, strength, and energy were roused, and the whole nation was ripped out of its state of lethargy.”⁴⁹ But it was not the currency reform alone that had spurred the economic upturn. Instead, the market reforms of the social market economy that accompanied the currency reform drove the Western Zones’ economic resurgence. Through this explanation of the currency reform and the social market economy, the CDU/CSU laid claim to the rising economy and made it a product of German, not American, measures, thereby projecting a sense of German agency. In addition, by identifying 20 June 1948 as a decisive moment in German economic and political life, the document silences any references to the Third Reich and asks West Germans only to look to the future with no meaningful reflection of their responsibility to the recent past.

But the Düsseldorf Principles also took care to devote much attention to social policy and to promise that the CDU/CSU policy would not revert “to a capitalist form and to an old liberalism of an unsocial, monopolistic type.” The Principles proclaimed that “[t]he ‘social market economy’ is the socially committed constitution of commercial industry in which the performance of free and capable men is brought into a system that provides a maximum of economic gain and social justice.” From the perspective of the Düsseldorf Principles, the free market, if its excesses were avoided, safeguarded the freedom of individuals and

provided the most social justice for the citizens of West Germany.⁵⁰ With this concern for social issues, the CDU/CSU's economic program maintained a connection to the heritage of Catholic social policy while adopting a form of the free market. Maria Mitchell has commented that the Düsseldorf Principles and the Ahlen Program preceding it represented the CDU's interconfessional consensus formed by 1949. This consensus bound Catholics and Protestants together by an antimaterialist view of society and an economy that focused on a spiritual reconstruction of Germany against socialism of any form—be it in the guise of the SPD, the Communists to the East, or even Christian Socialism. She has persuasively argued that between 1946 and 1949 Adenauer and the antisocialist elements within the CDU successfully defined antimaterialism as opposed to any form of socialism—including Christian Socialism. This position strengthened the bond between liberal and conservative Protestants to Catholics with roots in the Weimar Center Party, thereby maximizing the potential constituency for the developing CDU.⁵¹

In the Düsseldorf Principles, the CDU/CSU propaganda created a connection between the free market and overall individual freedom. In contrast to the social market economy, “[t]he system of the planned economy robs the productive man of his economic self-determination and freedom.”⁵² Yet, the principles also stressed the fact that the social market economy was not the same thing as the “free economy” of a liberal bent. In many respects, support for a pure free market system would have generated much resentment from potential voters. Instead, the principles suggested that in order to avoid a relapse into the problems of the “free economy,” the independent control of monopoly was necessary to secure “competition.” The program statement, with its use of the term “social market economy,” was able to retain the resonance that both “market” and “social” might have within the electorate.⁵³ At the same time, the SPD, although not directly mentioned, was associated with the planned economy and its system of statism, absence of freedom, and scarcity. Although Maria Mitchell's study of antimaterialism in the CDU is focused on the party's ideological foundations, especially in economic areas, the CDU leadership was by no means concerned with maintaining some sort of ideological purity or consistency. Not just in the 1949 Bundestag election, but also in future elections, the social market economy proved to be a pliable concept that went beyond its original antimaterialist definition.

With the social market economy as the focal point of the campaign, Erhard assumed a central role in the CDU/CSU's efforts, although he was not yet officially affiliated with the party. As the director of the Bizonia's Economics Administration, he was the perfect spokesperson to present the advantages of the social market economy to the West German electorate. By January 1949 Erhard had already affirmed that he would “go into the upcoming political party clashes with particular energy for the CDU.”⁵⁴ Erhard proved to be the speaker most requested by the regional and district party organizations during the campaign and made speeches all over West Germany, from Schleswig-Holstein to Bavaria.⁵⁵ Generally, Erhard's speeches were much better attended than other speakers' rallies. For example, in

the lower Rhine town of Krefeld, Erhard's rally attracted over 3,000 listeners. In comparison, the local party's other speaker of national stature, Anton Storch, who was the CDU/CSU's spokesperson on social issues, attracted only 300.⁵⁶

The 13 July 1949 issue of *Union im Wahlkampf* introduced Erhard to the rank-and-file party organizers. Erhard's profile helped establish the image that Erhard himself would cultivate during the 1950s. It stressed his substantial role in the rebirth of Germany by declaring: "Hardly another name is mentioned over the last few years with so much passion as that of this man. . . . Everyone feels that the rise or fall of the nation depends fatefully to a large extent upon this man."⁵⁷ It went on to define Erhard's personal characteristics in a short profile: "Erhard is a man of action, as our nation needs in these times." It went on to emphasize Erhard's incredible optimism and capacity for work. But it also presented him as "a real person of constant amiability and humor." All the while, Erhard was portrayed as an expert on economics who would help guarantee the continued economic reconstruction of Germany. He was a man of the people, yet one with the knowledge and understanding of economics to push Germany forward.⁵⁸

In his stump speeches, Erhard reiterated many of the ideas that he had expressed in some of his earlier speeches to CDU members. Economic freedom and political freedom were inextricably linked and the social market economy was an essential component in establishing individual agency and political self-determination. At the same time, however, he was sure to hit issues that appeared more likely to resonate with the population as a whole. During his campaign tour over the course of the summer of 1949, he outlined his economic views in an address to an assembly of voters in his home district, Um-Heidenheim. He opened the speech by again drawing the strong dichotomy between the market and planned economies. The central question of the election was whether the German people wanted "to be subordinated under a soulless tyranny of a wanton bureaucracy" or whether "we are allowed to progress along the path marked by the social market economy, which frees our people from the system of goods and human economic controls [*Güter und Menschenbewirtschaftung*], the modern form of state slavery."⁵⁹

But also through this speech Erhard helped create a meaning of economics that associated the CDU/CSU's opponent, the SPD, with images of the Nazi past and the communist regimes to the East. Erhard identified the SPD as the "keeper of the controlled economy [*Zwangswirtschaft*]," something that no election campaign maneuvering could cover up. The socialist planned economy must eventually lead to the controlled economy, Erhard argued. He then blurred the lines between the tenets of the SPD's economic program and those in place in the Soviet Zone of Germany. Erhard insisted that "[t]he socialist economy has never proved a success in practice. It has bestowed to us in the communist form the so-called free people's republics." The SPD, he maintained, sought to drive the people back to a "gloomy mood of despair and a brooding fear of life [*Lebensangst*]." But the German people were not prepared "to become enslaved again by a revived bureaucracy and rule by bigwigs and fatcats [*Bonzokratie*]."⁶⁰ The speech continued to blend the SPD with some of the images of Germany's recent past under the

Nazi economy and the occupation before the currency reform, a rhetorical strategy that also implicitly distanced the CDU/CSU from the Third Reich. Erhard declared, “We want to help finally the German citizen get back civil courage, which was beaten down for fifteen years, which allows the citizen to oppose the wantonness of bureaucracy and the tyranny of the state in confidence of his personality, his worth, and his rights.”⁶¹ Therefore, Germans of all levels, classes, and occupations should unite against this deadly danger presented to their newly-acquired freedom through an oppressive bureaucracy.

Along with Erhard’s speeches, posters were the chosen means to disseminate the ideas of the social market economy. They were perhaps the most powerful form of communication that the party created, and the CDU/CSU placed great emphasis upon their use throughout the campaign. Early in the planning of the campaign, Adenauer underscored the necessity of having a poster on which “not the Economics Council, not the Parliamentary Council, but instead the ideas of the CDU must be featured so that everyone can understand them and commit them to memory.” In any case, they were the most uniform sort of propaganda that the party utilized, with the press and propaganda committee developing the same posters for use across West Germany, thereby creating a unified and coherent party image that transcended local interests.⁶² They would give “the impression of the unity of the party from north to south.”⁶³ The central propaganda committee developed the posters with the participation of the regional organization managers, considering what they envisioned would be most effective within their particular region. The regional organization managers then determined how many posters they needed from the central committee. All told the central committee produced 1.7 million posters for the 1949 campaign.⁶⁴

Although the working group of the CDU/CSU generated most of the posters, the regional and district level party organizations also issued their own. There is no way to know the precise number locally issued, but since these local organizations’ finances were severely limited, it was probably relatively small. For example, the CDU/CSU leadership in Frankfurt distributed a total of about 300,000 posters to the Rhineland CDU. In contrast, the zonal and regional organization distributed only 70,000 posters, not a great number considering that the Rhineland CDU was perhaps the best organized CDU/CSU branch in West Germany. The content of the posters issued by regional and district-level organizations was very different from those distributed by the central CDU/CSU organization. Most local-level organizations developed posters dealing with local issues or portraying the local candidates.⁶⁵ Although there were posters addressing a variety of issues—culture, refugees, home construction—most of the central committee’s posters concentrated on economic issues. In fact, the Rhineland’s regional organization complained that the bulk of the posters issued from Frankfurt did not focus on an important campaign issue in the predominantly Catholic Rhineland: political-cultural themes.⁶⁶ The central leadership, although lacking direct control over the conduct of the election campaign on the local level, could determine the themes and issues that were core to the campaign. Undoubtedly the local party

organizations could push issues that were particularly important to their respective districts, but the CDU/CSU working group shaped the main campaign themes.

Those posters dealing with economics underscored two major themes. The first echoed some of the sentiments in E rhard's speeches that constructed a dichotomy between the planned and market economies. Using this dichotomy, the posters helped spell out some of the political implications of both these economic systems. The other major theme was the economic reconstruction and progress over the course of the few years prior to the election. The improved economic conditions were attributed to the CDU/CSU's policies. Overall, the posters encouraged the creation of very crude and simplistic categories in the minds of voters that clearly differentiated the policies of the CDU/CSU and those of its opponent, the SPD. Implicit was the notion that the CDU/CSU was the more responsible party and thus the one best qualified to govern West Germany and reconstruct a German community free from the taint of the Nazi past. In contrast, the SPD was portrayed as a party incapable of defending the newly founded Federal Republic against the ever present Asiatic, Bolshevik threat and as retaining economic policies associated with Nazism and communism.

One of the posters most widely distributed by the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der CDU/CSU entitled "At the crossroads of the economy" epitomized this dichotomy (Illustration 2.1). The poster incorporated a large black and white "X" upon a field of blue. The words "reconstruction" and "work" were inscribed upon the white axis of the "X," while "controlled economy" and "bureaucracy" appeared on the black axis, thereby juxtaposing the two choices facing the voters. The poster possessed a certain visual unity, with the large "X" in the poster representing both the act of voting on the ballot and this economic crossroads confronting West Germany. The vital importance of the vote was emphasized by the slogan that tied the poster together: "Our vote leads to work and reconstruction. We are voting CDU." Perhaps an even more popular poster counterposed the conditions from 1946 and 1949 by juxtaposing short phrases from 1946 on a black field opposite a field of white with images of consumer products (Illustration 2.2). The poster evoked memories of critical food shortages, rationing, and the black market following the war through messages such as: "no coal," "ersatz coffee," "50 grams fat for January," and "5 kilograms potatoes." The poster also elicited memories of the despair that was pandemic within Germany with statements such as "Exchange suit for something to eat." and "Inquiries purposeless!" The mood of 1946 was clearly contrasted to the situation of 1949 as represented by the lower part of the poster, which was overflowing with food and consumer products including clothes and shoes, goods that were acutely scarce following the war. The bottom slogan tied these images together with the bold letters "CDU" and "This is what our economic policy provides you." In many respects the poster's layout helped support the message that the period of social and economic emergency had already passed in West Germany, and that the CDU was responsible for this upswing and what could be construed as "normalcy."



Illustration 2.1 At the crossroads of the economy



Illustration 2.2 This is what our economic policy provides you

The posters worked well together by setting up a series of dichotomies that underscored the voters' two alternatives in casting their lot with the CDU/CSU or SPD. They helped heighten the sense that economics was a key partisan wedge, and enabled the CDU/CSU to define itself as the party that having already brought prosperity and reconstruction was responsible for carrying West Germany into the future. The posters never tried to clearly define what the alternatives really entailed. They associated the SPD with the difficulties and the seemingly hopeless situation of the crisis years. They simply sought to elicit sentiments toward economic developments that were not based upon any rational assessment of the CDU/CSU's policies but instead played upon the perceptions and predisposition of the West German populace. The posters indicated the reestablishment of some form of a reconstructed West German community in which work and goods were now available. Even more importantly, they suggested the regaining of agency for individual West Germans. Because of the CDU/CSU's policies, the posters implied, West Germans would no longer need to face bureaucracies and economic conditions that were completely out of their control. They could, therefore, begin to reconstruct their own personal, family, and social lives.

The most effective of all the CDU/CSU posters was the one portraying an Asiatic-looking face hovering over Western Europe, beneath which the slogan read: "The savior: CDU" (Illustration 2.3). It resonated so strongly not only because it was visually striking but also because its meaning could be understood in a number of contexts. Clearly, given the powerful image of the Mongol invader from the thirteenth century and the religious term "savior," the intent was to evoke a sense that a crucial historical moment confronted not just West Germany, but all of Christian Western civilization. Turning back the Eastern threat would shape the future development of the Occident for centuries. Undoubtedly it was intended to exploit German racial prejudices and play off Nazi propaganda depicting the godless, Bolshevik, Asiatic hordes from the East. As Elizabeth Heineken has pointed out, this poster also evoked memories of the rape of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of German women as the Soviet army moved into eastern portions of the Third Reich at the war's conclusion.⁶⁷ One version of the poster depicted a SPD shield splintering in the face of an Asiatic onslaught—an image that dovetailed very well with the CDU/CSU's self-image as the party of responsibility and protection. Not only was the CDU/CSU strong enough to safeguard West Germans from the threats from within—such as economic hardship and the portrayed soulless bureaucracy of the SPD's planned economy—but the party also was a free and open Western Europe's bulwark against the threats from the East. In the context of economics, it highlighted the contrast between the "East," with its controlled economy and the "West," with the social market economy that permitted the reconstruction of personal freedom and a coherent West German community. The poster aimed to disabuse the viewer of any faith that the SPD was up to the historical challenge.




Illustration 2.3 The savior: CDU

The CDU/CSU message was reinforced by another important form of propaganda for the campaign: the *Flugblätter* (political leaflets). These were distributed in copious quantities in the days leading up to the 14 August election by the central, regional, and district party organizations, although those leaflets developed by the regional or district organizations usually dealt with local issues or incor-

porated information about the local candidates themselves. The central press and propaganda committee provided three different leaflets, two dealing specifically with economic issues and the other criticizing the SPD for attacks against Catholic education. Clearly the efforts of the Frankfurt leadership were insufficient, for only about 400,000 of the two economics-oriented leaflets were delivered to the Rhineland CDU, which had about 4.4 million voters in its districts. In addition, the regional party organizations complained that the leaflets arrived too late to be distributed fully and that the quantities were nowhere close to the millions promised by the central committee.⁶⁸ To overcome this shortfall, the regional organizations had to print their own copies of these leaflets.

Nevertheless, the leaflets reflected the way the central election committee was trying to represent the ideas of social market economy and construct its meaning in relation to the CDU/CSU. One of them warned West Germans to be sure to vote in the upcoming election, going on to remind them that only four years earlier all of Germany had lain in ruins. The last two years had seen a dramatic upswing in the economy—which was created by the politicians with experience and responsibility in the Economics Council of the Bizone. It stressed that the CDU/CSU was responsible for this economic upswing with the observation: “Think about it. It has been exclusively politicians of the CDU/CSU, who with so much work to do, have not had the time to put forth propaganda and grand claims.” The leaflet then blended Cold War fears with suggestive conceptions of culture and the economy. “Think about it, that in the countries on the other side of the iron curtain a regime of terror rules, which disregards and ill treats religious belief, places agriculture, small trade, and business under the socialist oppression of unity, and forces deportation of workers into uranium mines.” The implication of this message was that the alternative to the CDU/CSU would not necessarily be able to defend West Germany against this threat, a point made most emphatically through posters. In contrast, the CDU/CSU was the party of strength and achievements. Through its policy of reconstruction it had distanced West Germany from its Nazi and occupation past, while at the same time protected the new state from threats from the East. The last page of the leaflet concluded that one should vote for the “Party of Responsibility—the CDU/CSU.”⁶⁹ In this view, the social market economy and economic reconstruction were not just matters of establishing basic living standards, but rather were basic elements in the survival of the West German state and society.

Another leaflet proclaimed: “You can’t do that! Why won’t the SPD recognize the success of the CDU/CSU’s social market economy?” It went on to accuse the SPD of spreading lies about West Germany’s economic reality in general and the CDU/CSU’s economic policy in particular. In many respects, the leaflet echoed some of the same sentiments as in the one discussed above. The subtext of the leaflet was that the CDU/CSU was the party of responsibility, while in contrast, the SPD could not be trusted to form an effective government. The leaflet purported to expose and counter a series of false assertions made by the SPD with the “truth” of the CDU/CSU’s successes. Its main thrust was to underscore the connection among the CDU/CSU, the social market economy, and the upswing in

the West German economy. It concentrated upon the CDU/CSU's achievements, including the rise in employment over the past year. In contrast to CDU/CSU actions, the text commented, "As for the SPD, it's about their party program and not the improvement of the German economic situation." Again, the leaflet's propaganda created a clear dichotomy between the CDU/CSU's own action and results versus the inaction, rhetoric, and ideology of the SPD.⁷⁰

In comparison to propaganda commonly disseminated during the Weimar period, the CDU/CSU messages did not appeal to potential voters in terms of their class or profession.⁷¹ Instead, the CDU/CSU stressed that its achievements and the advantages of the social market economy benefited not merely one segment of West German society, but all West Germans. In this way the CDU/CSU's propaganda played off the common perception that all members of society had suffered equally in the rubble economy following the war and that the currency reform had smoothed over class differences. Furthermore, this approach jibed with Adenauer's strategy of molding the CDU/CSU into a true "*Volkspartei*." For the CDU/CSU to be successful, it must, from Adenauer's perspective, be the party for all West Germans rather than specific groups and subcultures. To Adenauer and the CDU/CSU, politics of social division and class struggle are what characterized the rival SPD. Perhaps the exception to the CDU/CSU's approach was propaganda directed toward women and refugees. These were specific groups that the party leadership sensed it must attract for electoral success. Overall, however, the material dealing with economic issues was not directed at any particular class or group. Despite the central election committee's approach, at the district and regional level, propaganda was often directed towards specific professions and groups of people.⁷² In this way, the party pursued a flexible, multifaceted approach to the election. The national-level party organization produced propaganda that represented the interests of the new West German nation. Meanwhile, the local party organization, which usually stressed the local candidates, could better understand the conditions and background of the voters in a particular district. Each local organization could tailor the party's appeal to local conditions without potentially jeopardizing its opportunity for broad appeal on a national level. In any case, for this election, the CDU/CSU did not yet have a statistical breakdown of the sociological makeup and public opinion of the West German constituency, so it lacked the information for formulating conclusions about the sentiments and mood of the West German electorate as a whole. Local party officials, on the other hand, were much better suited to make such conclusions about their own districts.

Although the CDU/CSU shied away from highlighting any differences involving class, profession, or social status, the party clearly formulated its propaganda in gendered terms. Undoubtedly, in the 1949 election, just as in the elections during the 1950s, women voters were the CDU/CSU's key supporters. The first election to the West German Bundestag in August 1949 reflected a re-emergence of voting and sociological patterns that had been present during the Weimar Republic.⁷³ Claudia Koonz and Renate Bridenthal have argued that the Weimar period, usually noted for the emancipation of women with the granting

of their right to vote in 1918, retained a certain conservatism in terms of women's political and economic roles. Political parties sought the female vote, but they did not encourage the incorporation of women into the party structures. The female vote generally benefited the parties that had traditionally fought against women's rights, such as the Catholic Center Party and the Nationalist Party. Although women made gains in employment during the 1920s, most jobs open to them were unskilled and offered poor wages. Koonz and Bridenthal concluded that, "[w]ithout an appealing alternative, women persisted in their loyalty to the familiar *Kinder, Küche, Kirche* [children, kitchen, church] ethos and saw emancipation more often as a threat than a blessing."⁷⁴ In many respects, this attitude was reaffirmed during the Nazi period. Nazi ideology underscored the separation of spheres where women would remain within the household and ensure the regeneration of the race through their role as mothers. But Nazi ideology did not coincide with reality. Because of the demands of armament, women's employment continued to rise through the 1930s.⁷⁵

With the founding of the Federal Republic, the patterns of women's employment that emerged had links to conditions prior to the upheaval of war. After the war, women continued to work in traditionally male jobs, such as construction or skilled factory work. However, returning German soldiers and POWs increasingly pushed women out of their jobs, especially in the years following the 1948 currency reform.⁷⁶ In fact, by 1950 the percentage of working women was the lowest it had been since the beginning of the twentieth century, with about 31.3 percent of women working, down from 36.1 percent in 1939, when Germany was mobilizing for war.⁷⁷ As the 1950s advanced and the West German economy expanded, the percentage of women working increased again as female employment patterns fell back into the larger trend of the twentieth century, although the percentage did not reach the level of prewar Germany. In any case, employers relegated women to jobs that were the lowest on the pay scale. In addition, public policy discourse during the 1950s concerning issues such as governmental family allowances for children, legislation protecting women's participation in the workforce, and family-law reform attempted to create the idealized "complete" family headed by a husband and wife that was supported by the male's income.⁷⁸ This conservatism toward gender roles suggested that although the *Trümmerfrauen* represented the regeneration of the German nation, they did not signal a fundamental change in public expectations for women and men in society. These attitudes can be seen clearly in the political campaigns in West Germany during the late 1940s and early 1950s.

Undoubtedly, the CDU/CSU leadership understood the importance the female vote was to have for the 1949 election. Alois Zimmer, a founder of the Rhineland-Palatinate CDU and a member of the CDU press and propaganda committee, commented in March 1949 that

I would like to suggest that the attitudes of women in politics and in respect to publicity be taken in greater consideration in the coming months. That we listen exactly to what the

Christian housewife says, so that we do not have to appeal to the Christian housewife in the last 14 days [before the election], and indeed not just to house wives, but rather predominantly to the Christian housewife . . . The election of the CDU will be decided through the vote of the Christian housewife.⁷⁹

The CDU/CSU made this appeal to the “Christian woman” through the selling of the social market economy. As mentioned earlier, the party sought to package its economic program in the form of the social market economy by stressing its antimaterialist, social aspects to the party’s core Catholic constituents, especially Catholic women. As a result, the propaganda the CDU/CSU aimed to ward women underscored the idea that the increased production and consumption resulting from the social market economy were not part of an individualistic goal of materialism, but instead allowed for the reconstruction of a secure West German familial life in particular and the regeneration of the German nation as a whole following the chaos and moral degeneracy that had reigned in the immediate postwar years.

One of the CDU/CSU’s most widely distributed series of posters compared conditions in West Germany in 1947 and 1949 by juxtaposing sharply contrasting photographs depicting West Germans in two opposing settings: one as victims of economic and social catastrophe, the other as strengthened individuals taking part in West Germany’s reconstruction. The 1947 photo under the words “hunger, want, misery” portrayed a woman in rags with a child by her side, marking her as one of the approximately 10 million refugees and expellees who streamed into the Western Zones between 1945–1949, or perhaps as someone who had endured the destruction of their homes by Allied bombing (Illustration 2.4). The 1949 photo under the words “forwards! upwards!” showed a woman standing over two children eating at a food-laden table. A brochure distributed by the CDU/CSU portrayed the same photographs with text added: “It cannot go on like this. The suffering and burdens of the mother were immeasurable. Our girls and women have particularly suffered and been sacrificed.” By the next photo, the text proclaimed, “Christian principles free and protect women in jobs and in the family. The demands of the CDU/CSU: New and suitable professions and jobs for women.” In this schema, women were spared the hardships of the immediate postwar years and were now able to care for their children properly. The poster and brochure acknowledged the need for women to work, a message directed mainly to the millions of West German women “standing alone” (*alleinstehend*, the common German term for women without husbands) with their husbands dead, missing, or still held as POWs.⁸⁰ The total absence of men in the illustrations and the portrayal of a woman looking at her watch as her children eat, indicating pressing concerns outside the home, clearly suggests that this woman might be one who was “standing alone.” However, the poster and brochure made clear that “suitable” work for women was not to interfere with their primary task, raising children.⁸¹

This conception of gender roles within the context of postwar conditions was reinforced by another widely distributed poster that proclaimed, “And again the



Illustration 2.4 The success of the CDU

CDU, then: It should get even better” coupled with the graphic transformation of a gaunt woman holding an empty shopping basket, her hand filled with ration cards (Illustration 2.5). As the years progress and her basket fills, she becomes ever more attractive, full figured, and younger looking, suggesting that the work burden and hunger of the immediate postwar years had not only made difficult the



Illustration 2.5 It should get even better!

task of meeting basic needs but also robbed her of her sexual appeal. Not surprisingly, any reference to the common postwar occurrences of rape, fraternization, or cohabitation with a man not a woman's husband were completely silenced in the CDU/CSU posters, saving West Germans from a difficult confrontation with the immediate past. Taken altogether, the CDU/CSU posters indicated the sense that women were becoming more feminine as they regained their role as con-

sumers for the family. But this message was placed into a larger context than the mere meeting of individualistic needs. In one electoral appeal, couched in the form of a letter written to a woman's family member in the Eastern Zone, economic policies were clearly understood in terms of a wider, Christian worldview. As the letter explained, the social market economy had made possible the reconstruction of familiar life and avoided the "leveling" (*Gleichmacherei*) of women's roles that the SPD espoused. For that reason the woman was voting for the CDU ensuring that "a Christian, German rump state can speak for you in the eastern German zone."⁸²

The question remains, however, whether the CDU/CSU intended these posters and appeals for female or male consumption, or both. Were they meant to attract the male voter, who might have been reassured by women returning to recognizable, and in many respects, non-threatening roles? A female voter might have been happily reminded of the relief from the taxing times immediately following the war. One cannot say with certainty because there exists neither explicit discussion by the CDU/CSU of the propaganda's persuasive techniques nor relevant polling data. Like any good propaganda, it offered multiple readings depending upon the viewer's perspective. Yet all of the interpretations pointed in one direction: the CDU/CSU had restored "normalcy" and a sense of agency to Germans' lives, conditions that were defined by the propaganda itself. Undoubtedly, the posters did not necessarily depict a reality experienced by many West Germans whose lives continued to be in upheaval. Instead they reflected what West Germans wanted to be, or at the very least, the way the CDU/CSU perceived how people saw themselves. In any case, electoral appeals reaffirmed what was depicted as women's natural gender role of homemaker and suggested that by fulfilling this role, women were regenerating the nation.

The CDU/CSU propaganda contained little discussion or depiction of male economic roles in the newly formed West Germany. Several posters portrayed shattered factories and buildings devoid of any human beings as transformed spaces now inhabited by working men (Illustrations 2.6 and 2.7). Parallel to posters portraying women as somehow becoming more feminine, these posters indicated that men were becoming more masculine upon their return to the public sphere as producers after their absence as soldiers, POWs, and war-wounded. Brochures contrasted men sprawled on the street in despair at the war's end versus men working as productive parts of the reconstruction of West Germany. This transformation of men from their shattered existence after the war was a theme to be developed further in conservative propaganda. But despite these examples, most of the CDU/CSU's propaganda dealing with economic reconstruction was gender neutral or, if it was gender specific, dealt with women. Undoubtedly an important factor for this strategy was the *Frauenüberschuss* and the weight of the female vote. At the same time, however, the CDU/CSU propaganda echoed an approach ascribed by Julia Sneeringer to the Center Party during the Weimar Period, in which women voters were exhorted to heal the nation of its social and political ills in the privacy of the home. In addition, the CDU/CSU's overall strategy



Illustration 2.6 The success of the CDU

was much like that of conservative parties from Weimar, when, as Koonz and Bridenthal contended, “[w]omen voters were regarded much as American politicians might view the ‘ethnic vote.’ Their ballots were sought, but too large a participation in party leadership was not encouraged.”⁸³ For the most part, this was the case with the CDU/CSU in the early postwar years.⁸⁴



Illustration 2.7 The success of the CDU

What is striking about the propaganda produced by the national-level CDU/CSU organization is that most of it did not, in general, deal head on with the Christian concerns of the party. Only one of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft-supplied leaflets touched upon such a concern. The Rhineland CDU, which was battling the Center Party for votes, complained that none of the posters dev-

oped by the CDU/CSU's working group addressed "cultural-political" issues and focused only on economic issues, which was problematic since posters were the main vehicles for projecting the party's national image.⁸⁵ Brochures and leaflets would mention that the party stood for "Christian responsibility" and "Christian principles" but did not really develop these ideas fully. Just as in the Düsseldorf Principles, the social market economy was not depicted purely in terms of support of the free market. Instead, the CDU/CSU propaganda portrayed the economic system as giving West Germans freedom balanced with an undefined social responsibility. In this way, the party was trying to avoid alienating more religious voters who still advocated Christian Socialism. At the same time, by adopting the social market economy Adenauer clearly wanted to create a new identity for the CDU/CSU and break the perception that the party was merely the continuation of the Catholic Center Party from the Weimar Republic.

Undoubtedly, representing Christian interests was an essential part of the CDU/CSU's identification. At the party's mass rally held on 21 July in Heidelberg, Adenauer concluded his speech that the election was a choice between a Christian or socialist government within the context of emphasizing the SPD's inability to protect a Christian Western Europe against the threat of communism. But this was after he had first highlighted the importance of this Bundestag election for the future of West Germany, extolled the CDU/CSU's economic achievements in the Frankfurt Economics Council and work within the Parliamentary Council, and castigated the SPD for supporting the failed planned economy. Following Adenauer, Gustav Heinemann, the mayor of Essen and the Federal Republic's president between 1969 and 1974, spoke of the necessity to create an interconfessional Christian party made up of Catholics and Protestants and urged Protestants to support the CDU/CSU and not to cast their votes for splinter parties that would complicate building an effective government. But at the same time the CDU/CSU leadership realized that stressing the Christian elements of the party too strongly might scare off the nonreligious, middle-class, Protestant vote, which was an essential component in creating broad support for the party. Instead, the CDU/CSU projected a vision in which those who desired, could clearly see the Christian elements in the CDU/CSU message, but it was not put forth too aggressively toward those it might alienate. Even during the formulation of the Christian Democratic movement and his struggle against Christian Socialism within the CDU, Adenauer realized that the party could not excessively underscore its Christian nature.⁸⁶ In fact, during the 1949 campaign members of the press and propaganda committee suggested that the party should begin heavy discussion of its "cultural politics" (*Kulturpolitik*) only two or three days before the election so as to undermine the SPD's claim that the CDU/CSU sought to be elected through support from the Church.⁸⁷

To some extent, the CDU/CSU could safely moderate the Christian elements in its national-level propaganda without jeopardizing its identity among many voters as the "Christian party." It is clear that within the individual dioceses throughout West Germany, the Catholic church mobilized their flocks for the CDU/

CSU. Although national statistics are not available, the situation of the archdiocese of Cologne might well illustrate larger, national developments. In that archdiocese, which included the heavily Catholic areas of not only Cologne, but also Düsseldorf, Essen, and Bonn, the Catholic Church held numerous rallies led by church officials, sent tens of thousands of speech outlines to church and lay leaders, and distributed 650,000 leaflets prior to the election.⁸⁸ The Rhineland CDU reported that the Catholic Church was leading an intensive propaganda campaign to get nonvoters out to the polls and urging voters to cast their ballots only for “Christian candidates.” Undoubtedly, some of these votes went to Center Party candidates, but the Church’s influence was also beneficial to the CDU/CSU as the Center Party’s share of the vote continued to decrease compared to previous state and local elections.⁸⁹ In addition, party leaders emphasized the party’s Christian elements at the regional and local level, since it was at these levels that the party generated propaganda that appealed to voters in terms of their religious background. The regional party organization in the North Rhine area commented that leaflets targeting both practicing Catholic and Protestant voters were created and distributed on the Sunday of the election. In addition, several leaflets announcing rallies posed the question of “Christian freedom or Marxist compulsion [*Zwang*],” a change from the theme advanced by the propaganda from the CDU/CSU’s working group.⁹⁰ Other local party organizations pushed the idea of the CDU/CSU as the Christian party, illustrated by a leaflet distributed in Dorsten, a small city on the northern edge of the Ruhr area. This leaflet presented voters with the choice between the “cold materialism of the East threatening us ever constantly” or the “Christian worldview.”⁹¹ This emphasis on cultural issues was especially apparent in areas of the Rhineland and Westphalia where the CDU was facing a strong Center Party presence and had to work hard to win over voters who might have lingering loyalty to the Center Party from the Weimar years.⁹² Local leadership from this area realized that gaining what were called “Christian nonvoters” was a key element to the party’s success.⁹³ From a broader perspective, however, the CDU/CSU’s national leadership realized that ultimate success lay beyond merely attracting voters to the party on the basis of the “cultural” elements.

As in election campaigns everywhere, the district-party organizations carried out much of the campaign’s grunt work. The district-level organizations were responsible for distributing pamphlets, placing posters, developing leaflets for the local candidates, maintaining contacts with the local press, getting supporters out to vote, and generating the funds to run the campaign. This meant that the CDU/CSU campaign floundered in areas with weaker organizations—especially outside of the CDU’s stronghold in North Rhine–Westphalia.⁹⁴ But the CDU/CSU’s loose overarching structure allowed the local party leaders to fine-tune the campaign message according to local conditions and tastes. Bruno Dörpinghaus, while forming the press and propaganda committee, entertained suggestions from the regional party organizations regarding membership of the body and sought committee representatives from all regional party organizations.⁹⁵ With this

approach, the CDU/CSU propaganda reflected the views of party members from across West Germany.

However, as previously mentioned, the campaign also left a considerable amount of room for the regional and district party organizations. This flexibility was also indicated by the fact that the social market economy could be portrayed in different contexts, depending on the local conditions. In a CDU election newspaper from the northern, agricultural, Protestant area of Ostfriesland, the social market economy was not portrayed as part of a defense against the godless materialism of socialism; rather, it was emphasized that the economic program had ended the ration-card economy and decreased unemployment. The newspaper responded to the challenge of the nationalist German Party, which enjoyed considerable local support, by portraying this rival party as endangering the unity of Germany and stressing that the CDU, although it represented multiple classes and national interests, was attentive to the importance of the farmer in the national economy and national life. In this way, the CDU of Ostfriesland molded its appeal to the local audience, although it still used the social market economy as a focal point.⁹⁶

In the south, although there was considerable tension between the CDU and the CSU, its Bavarian sister party, the two parties did coordinate the campaign to a certain extent. Clearly the CSU wanted to maintain its autonomy from the CDU, both organizationally and in the content of some of its propaganda, but the party received from the Arbeitsgemeinschaft the same propaganda material and election newspaper, *Union im Wahlkampf*, as the regional and district CDU organizations. The CSU did not stress all of the same themes as the CDU and highlighted certain “Bavarian issues,” but it placed a similar emphasis upon Erhard’s social market economy as a defining division between itself and the SPD—as evidenced by Erhard’s appearance at the CSU’s 16 July rally that launched its campaign.⁹⁷

The SPD campaign organization was similar to the CDU/CSU’s in the sense that it was the best organized of the parties in the field. If anything, the SPD was more centralized than CDU/CSU. As early as late 1948 a *Wahlkampfprogrammkommission* (election campaign program commission) was created, on which the leading figures of the party were represented.⁹⁸ The campaign leadership was centered in the party headquarters in Hanover under the guidance of Fritz Heine, who had coordinated SPD campaigns in the late Weimar period.⁹⁹ In addition, the SPD had a relatively large number of party members (683,000 versus the CDU/CSU’s 265,000 in 1950) whose dues and contributions enabled the party to finance the campaign.¹⁰⁰ Although the local SPD leadership was responsible for carrying out many propaganda activities, it was generally the top leadership of the party that generated the propaganda itself.¹⁰¹

The SPD’s counterpoint to Erhard’s role as the personality representing and promoting the party’s economic policy was the party’s chairman, Kurt Schumacher. Schumacher, who led the party until his death in August 1952, is best described as having a powerful personality and dogged determination. He volunteered for service in World War I and lost an arm from battlefield wounds. During the

Third Reich he spent almost ten years between July 1933 and March 1943 in four different concentration camps. Although physically shattered, in the spring of 1945 Schumacher set to work reconstructing the SPD in Hanover, where he stayed with his sister following his 1943 release from Dachau, and throughout the three western occupation zones. His ideas and actions proved to be the decisive force in the party's theoretical and ideological positions even after his death and until the adoption of the Bad Godesberg Program in 1959. Named chairman of the party on 9 May 1946, Schumacher was a pragmatic Marxist who viewed Marxist doctrine as merely a guide or method that would lead to social democracy. With this view, he emphatically rejected communism in East Germany as a degenerate form of Marxism. Nevertheless, Schumacher continued to adhere to an economic explanation for historical development and believed in a continuing class struggle. In order to achieve an "economic democracy" he advocated the socialization of certain key industries, such as raw material sectors. Mixed in his social democratic principles, he also retained a sense of German nationalism stemming from his West Prussian roots. He called for the reestablishment of Germany's 1937 borders and continually railed against Adenauer for his pro-Western policy, often calling him the "chancellor of the Allies."¹⁰²

Schumacher's view of the economy was clearly reflected in the propaganda produced by the SPD during the first Bundestag election. The *Wahlaufruf* (election statement) issued in July laid out the party's positions; much of the document attacked the CDU/CSU's economic policies in terms of class conflict. Among other things, it called for planning of the economy, full employment, improved living standards, and socialization of specific industries. It accused the policies of the Bizone's Economics Council of making "the poor even poorer, and the rich even richer."¹⁰³ Schumacher endorsed these SPD positions in his speeches throughout the campaign. In one election address delivered in Koblenz on 28 July 1949, Schumacher described the "Frankfurt economic policies" as "class struggle from above" (*Klassenkampf von oben*). They had merely heightened the differences between the rich and poor. In addition, the bourgeois parties had nothing to do with the economic upswing that West Germany had enjoyed since the currency reform. The currency reform, Schumacher correctly asserted, was merely the policy of the Allied powers. In addition, Schumacher argued that any economic improvement was the result of factors such as a milder winter in 1948/49, a good potato harvest, and the influx of Marshall Plan funds.¹⁰⁴ With the upswing of the economy and the increased availability of basic consumer goods since the currency reform, the SPD was already on the defensive on economic issues, yet the SPD leadership clearly wanted to press the CDU/CSU on the issue. One memorandum from the *Parteivorstand* (executive committee) of the SPD and Fritz Heine to local party leaders, dated 4 August 1949, ten days before the election, emphasized that they must make sure to criticize the Erhard/CDU/CSU economic policy. In addition, the memorandum stressed that the contributions of industry and banking to the conservative parties, especially the CDU/CSU, provided good opportunities to attack.¹⁰⁵

Most of the leaflets distributed by the SPD concentrated upon the poor conditions within Germany, trying to remind West Germans that circumstances for many continued to be desperate. The leaflets did not delve deeply into specific economic policy, but instead highlighted the squalid living conditions, unemployment, high prices, and dislocation that beset many West Germans. In contrast to the CDU/CSU's portrayal of the economy, the SPD painted conditions not as improving, but quite the contrary, as becoming worse. The social market economy was associated with failure and desperation, not prosperity. If left to its own devices, the CDU/CSU would leave West Germany in ruins, illustrated in a leaflet picturing Erhard with his head in a textbook on the social market economy blindly leading the Western Zones over a precipice surrounded by destroyed buildings (Illustration 2.8).

In addition, the SPD emphasized the ties between large industry and the "bourgeois" parties. One leaflet, and an accompanying poster, read: "Political Power through Money." It explained that leading industrial organizations had met in July 1949 in order to gather funds for the "Erhard exploitation economy" (*Erhard'schen Ausbeuterwirtschaft*). The leaflet pointed out that firms were expected to contribute DM 2 to 4 for each of their workers to the bourgeois parties. Therefore, the SPD argued, industry was trying to buy CDU/CSU representatives. In sum, parties that sold out to industry exemplified the exploitation of the masses through high prices, mass unemployment to keep wages low, continuation of the housing emergency, and the dismissal of the *Lastenausgleich* (a plan to even out war damage costs across the population).¹⁰⁶ Erhard was no more than a puppet of industrial special interests, while the "average" person was left struggling to make ends meet.

The SPD's propaganda was a bit mundane in comparison to the CDU/CSU's. The posters distributed by the SPD were less visually striking overall and much of the SPD's propaganda was based upon lengthy program statements about economic planning and socialization that were relatively taxing to read. While both the SPD and CDU/CSU propaganda exploited many of the prejudices and stereotypes common among West Germans, the SPD concentrated upon the negative developments in the economy. As indicated by some public opinion surveys taken between the currency reform and the August 1949 election, pragmatic economic concerns were at the forefront of West Germans' minds, surpassing any political idealism. The objections voiced by SPD against the CDU/CSU were rather abstract in many respects. Appeals to the worker on grounds of social justice did not appear as tangible as the CDU/CSU's emphasis upon the real, material gains that had been achieved allegedly as a result of its policies. In addition, claims that conditions had gotten worse for West Germans were a tough sell. In fact, the general trend in opinion among West Germans was that economic conditions were improving. A July 1948 poll from the Institut für Demoskopie reported that 37 percent of respondents believed that their economic conditions had improved since the currency reform, versus 42 percent who believed that they had worsened. By March 1949, 47 percent indicated conditions had improved contrasted




Illustration 2.8 With Professor Erhard into the abyss!

with only 3 percent who regarded their conditions as worse.¹⁰⁷ Although circumstances were still undoubtedly difficult, the general mood was gradually optimistic. Within this context, the SPD's message could appeal to only one social class: the working class. Thus in the first Bundestag election, the SPD was wooing its traditional base of support but not attempting to reach out to new sources of electoral support. This was in direct contrast to the CDU/CSU's approach of creating multidimensional propaganda that had broader appeal. In this respect, the CDU/CSU and the SPD were already diverging in their sense of how to work successfully within the new political context of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Another important difference between the two main parties had begun to emerge by the 1949 campaign: the structure of party financing. The costs of the campaign are very difficult to quantify precisely because so much of the money was spent on the district and regional level. It is clear that in the first federal election of the new Federal Republic, the CDU/CSU's financial resources were limited. Early in the campaign, Adenauer stressed that the regional and district organizations had to gather their own funds for running the campaign.¹⁰⁸ Adenauer reinforced this position in an 8 May meeting of the press and propaganda committee when he commented that although the leadership of the CDU/CSU working group was assisting individual regional party organizations in financing the campaign, "this should not, however, divert attention from the fact that the main burden of the election is to be carried by the individual regional organizations and the local organizations respectively."¹⁰⁹ Udo Wengst, historian of the West German political system, has suggested that the main CDU/CSU working group sought to use its superior financial resources to wield greater influence on the regional party organizations. Because of their poor financial situation, regional party organizations were dependent upon the Frankfurt working group for much of the campaign propaganda material. For example, the Rhineland CDU reported using 42,000 of their own posters in the campaign, while they were provided with a total of 307,850 posters from the working group. With superior resources, Frankfurt could dominate the themes pursued in the propaganda material, especially on economic issues.¹¹⁰

However, the CDU/CSU did not raise sufficient funds to conduct the campaign fully. A 19 May meeting of the press and propaganda committee described the financial situation as "bad" and "a catastrophe."¹¹¹ A 21 June report from the *Landessekretariat* (Regional Secretariat) of the Rhineland CDU to district organizations complained that they had not been devoting enough effort to raising the funds needed to conduct the campaign. In addition, they had not been transferring the agreed upon funds to the regional party organization. Without these resources the regional organization would be unable to continue its election campaign work.¹¹²

One assessment by the CDU/CSU leadership estimated that the federal election campaign cost DM 575,000.¹¹³ Presumably this figure represents the amount that the working group spent on the campaign and not the money spent by the zonal, regional, and district organizations. In comparison, the SPD's executive committee doled out DM 250,000 for the 1949 campaign, and over DM 1,000,000

was spent by the entire SPD.¹¹⁴ Undoubtedly the CDU/CSU spent more on its election campaign than its SPD rivals did.

It is also difficult to estimate industry's contribution to the CDU/CSU's campaign. Early in the campaign, Adenauer urged the regional and district party organizations to raise moneys from all levels of society, including commercial and industrial interests.¹¹⁵ A final campaign report from the Rhineland CDU said that in the spring of 1949 "a circle of industry decided for a collection of a political fund," but it is not clear how much the group contributed.¹¹⁶ A collection of documents gathered together by the SPD, "Unternehmermillionen kaufen politische Macht" (Industrial millions buy political power), reported that leading industrialists met in May 1949 in order to facilitate "the gathering of funds from industry for the support of advertisements for the bourgeois parties." Other meetings of industrial leaders expressed the need to assist "the parties supporting the economic policy of Professor Erhard."¹¹⁷

But at the same time, Adenauer did not want the CDU/CSU to become too close to industrial interests. At a 19 May meeting of the press and propaganda committee, Adenauer again emphasized the need for the regional party organizations to raise their own funds. When one representative suggested local party organizations go to the respective *Industrie- und Handelskammern* (Chambers of Commerce, IHK), Adenauer responded quickly and sharply: "We must absolutely avoid the appearance that we are a party of business. . . . We must organize a general, large group made up of bureaucrats, employees, workers, and farmers, and along with that, we must attempt to attract large contributions."¹¹⁸

In the end, Adenauer and the CDU/CSU were disappointed at the amount of funds they managed to raise from industry. At the 19 May meeting, Walter Strauß, head of the legal office of the Bzone, noted that he had approached leaders of industry regarding the funds they were willing to give to the campaign. Many of the small and medium-sized companies could not contribute because the tax laws hindered their taking campaign contributions as a tax deduction.¹¹⁹ Adenauer commented in a 2 June meeting of the CDU's British zonal committee that all expectations of raising a great, central fund had been dashed. In general, the central working group could only help the regional party organization in a few situations, so that regional operatives must expect to finance themselves.¹²⁰ Some estimates of the funds contributed by industry range from DM 2 million to DM 4 million, although that appears to be a bit high. Industrial associations eventually agreed that their overall contributions would be divided as follows: CDU/CSU 65 percent, FDP 25 percent, and the DP 10 percent.¹²¹ Although the system was still in its infancy as of 1949, the practice of industry contributing funds mainly to the bourgeois parties already was forming. This system was to become much more effective and far-reaching in the federal elections of the 1950s. The difference in funding between the bourgeois parties and the SPD was not yet overwhelming, but a pattern had been set nevertheless.

The CDU/CSU achieved a slim plurality in the 1949 election, securing 31 percent of the vote to the SPD's 29.2 percent. An analysis of the election shows

that many of the patterns familiar to Weimar elections remained. The propaganda was reminiscent of that produced during Weimar campaigns, in which platform statements and crude, emotional propaganda played large roles. In addition, since a large number of relatively small parties had won seats, eleven different parties were entering the Bundestag. But this situation was to change in the Bundestag elections of the 1950s. The major parties of the Federal Republic party system—the CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP—would emerge as dominant. In addition, in the future elections the CDU/CSU would develop new, more modern, sophisticated electioneering methods that were increasingly based upon techniques developed in commercial advertising and public opinion polling. In many different ways, the CDU/CSU was to fashion its image by drawing upon the emerging mythology surrounding the social market economy and the economic miracle. In the 1949 election, the party successfully employed the dichotomy of “market or planned” to act as a wedge issue against the SPD and positioned itself as the party establishing an antimaterialist, Christian West German community disconnected from the Nazi past. In the future, the CDU/CSU increasingly sought to cash in politically by taking credit for the creation of West Germany as the “*Wirtschaftswunderland*” in which individual consumerist desires were fulfilled and consumerism was safely defined as part of waging a geopolitical war against the godless communist East.

Notes

1. Konrad Adenauer, “Regierungserklärung,” in Adenauer, *Reden, 1917–1967: Eine Auswahl*, ed. Hans-Peter Schwarz (Stuttgart, 1975), 153–169.
2. Eschenberg, *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Jahre der Besatzung, 1945–1949*, 533–536.
3. Jürgen W. Falter, “Kontinuität und Neubeginn: Die Bundestagswahl 1949 zwischen Weimar und Bonn,” *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 22, no. 3 (1981): 236.
4. In the 1949 Bundestag election, a party gained a seat in the Bundestag either by winning the vote in an individual constituency or obtaining at least 5 percent of the vote in a *Land*, or state. This was changed before the 1953 election, in which a party needed either to win a seat directly or gain 5 percent of the vote *nationally*. Before the 1957 election the law was changed again so that a party needed to gain three seats directly or collect 5 percent of the vote nationally in order to enter the Bundestag.
5. Rohe, *Wahlen und Wählertraditionen in Deutschland: Kulturelle Grundlagen deutscher Parteien und Parteiensysteme im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, 165.
6. *Ibid.*, 170–171; Schmitt, *Konfession und Wahlverhalten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 128; and Schmitt, “Religious Cleavages in the West German Party System,” 186–201.
7. For a discussion of Weimar election propaganda, see Dirk Lau, “Wahlkampf der Weimar Republik: Propaganda und Programm der politischen Parteien bei dem Wahlen zum Deutschen Reichstag von 1924 bis 1930” (Ph.D. diss., University of Mainz, 1995); Thomas Childers, “The Social Language of Politics in Germany: The Sociology of Political Discourse in the

- Weimar Republic," *American Historical Review* 95, no. 2 (1990): 331–358; and Julia E. Sneeringer, *Winning Women's Votes: Propaganda and Politics in Weimar Germany* (Chapel Hill, 2002).
8. For discussion of the CDU/CSU's antimaterialist view of the economy, see Mitchell, "Materialism and Secularism: CDU Politicians and National Socialism, 1945–1949," and Mitchell, "Christian Democracy and the Transformation of German Politics, 1945–1949."
 9. Hans-Otto Kleinmann, *Geschichte der CDU, 1945–1982* (Stuttgart, 1993), 54–55; Eschenburg, *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Jahre der Besatzung, 1945–1949*, 187–188; and Mitchell, "Materialism and Secularism: CDU Politicians and National Socialism, 1945–1949," 288–290.
 10. Horst-Albert Kukuck, "Etappen im Ringen um eine Wirtschaftskonzeption der CDU 1945–1949," in *Politische Parteien auf dem Weg zur parlamentarischen Demokratie in Deutschland*, ed. Lothar Albertin and Werner Link (Düsseldorf, 1981), 239–260; and Mitchell, "Materialism and Secularism: CDU Politicians and National Socialism, 1945–1949," 278–308. See also Ambrosius, *Die Durchsetzung der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft*, 39; and Franz Focke, *Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung* (Wuppertal, 1978), 253–255.
 11. "Das Ahlener Programm," in *Konrad Adenauer und die CDU der britischen Besatzungszone, 1946–1949: Dokumente zur Gründungsgeschichte der CDU Deutschlands*, ed. Helmuth Pütz (Bonn, 1975), 280.
 12. Kukuck, "Etappen im Ringen um eine Wirtschaftskonzeption der CDU 1945–1949," 247–249. See also Ambrosius, *Die Durchsetzung der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft*, 39.
 13. Ambrosius, *Die Durchsetzung der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft*, 39–43; and Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution, and Reconstruction*, vol. 1 (Providence, 1995), 358–381.
 14. Pütz, *Konrad Adenauer und die CDU der britischen Besatzungszone*, 149.
 15. Konrad Adenauer, *Memoirs, 1945–1953*, trans. Beate Ruhm von Oppen (Chicago, 1965), 45; and Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer*, vol. 1, 328–358.
 16. Nicholls, *Freedom with Responsibility*, 234–235; Kukuck, "Etappen im Ringen um eine Wirtschaftskonzeption der CDU, 1945–1949," 252–254; Goeffrey Pridham, *Christian Democracy in Western Germany: The CDU/CSU in Government and Opposition, 1945–1976* (London, 1977), 28–37; and Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer*, vol. 1, 328–381.
 17. Brigitte Kaff, ed., *Die Unionsparteien, 1946–1950: Protokolle der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der CDU/CSU Deutschlands und der Konferenzen der Landesvorsitzenden* (Düsseldorf, 1991), 258–259.
 18. *Ibid.*, 397–398.
 19. Kukuck, "Etappen im Ringen um eine Wirtschaftskonzeption der CDU, 1945–1949," 252–258; and Schwarz, *Adenauer*, vol. 1, 420–424.
 20. "Marktwirtschaft moderner Prägung," in Pütz, *Konrad Adenauer und die CDU der britischen Besatzungszone*, 657.
 21. *Ibid.*, 658.
 22. *Ibid.*, 659.
 23. *Ibid.*, 657–658.
 24. *Ibid.*, 665.
 25. *Ibid.*, 740.
 26. "Stenographische Niederschrift über die Sitzung des Zonenausschusses der CDU der britischen Zone am 24. und 25. Februar 1949 in Königswinter," in Pütz, *Konrad Adenauer und die CDU der britischen Besatzungszone*, 838; and Nicholls, *Freedom with Responsibility*, 236–238.
 27. Rudolf Uertz, *Christentum und Sozialismus in der frühen CDU: Grundlagen und Wirkungen der christlich-sozialen Ideen in der Union 1945–1949* (Stuttgart, 1981), 196.
 28. "Stenografische Niederschrift über die Sitzung des Zonenausschusses der CDU der britischen Zone am 24. und 25. Februar 1949 in Königswinter," in Pütz, *Konrad Adenauer und die CDU der britischen Besatzungszone*, 854–855.
 29. *Ibid.*, 858.
 30. Pridham, *Christian Democracy in Western Germany*, 247.

31. Rundschreiben Dörpinghaus an die Landesvorsitzenden und Landesgeschäftsführer der Union, 12 January, 1949, I-009-012/7 (NL Dörpinghaus), Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik der Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung, Sankt Augustin (hereafter ACDP).
32. Udo Wengst, "Die CDU/CSU im Bundestagswahlkampf 1949," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 34, no. 1 (1986): 3–4.
33. Rundschreiben Dörpinghaus an die Landesvorsitzenden der CDU/CSU, 7 March 1949, I-009-012/7 (NL Dörpinghaus), ACDP; and Kaff, *Die Unionsparteien, 1946–1950*, 402–404.
34. Am 8. März tagte im Adam Stegerwald-Haus zu Königswinter der Presse- und Propaganda-Ausschuss der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der CDU/CSU, I-009-006/2 (NL Dörpinghaus), ACDP.
35. See, for example, CDU des Rheinlandes Landessekretariat Köln-Marienburg, Die Bundestagswahl vom August 1949, VII-003-001/3, ACDP.
36. Aktennotiz Gottauts vom 18.2.1949 über eine Besprechung am 17.2.1949, I-009-008/3 (NL Dörpinghaus), ACDP.
37. Kaff, *Die Unionsparteien, 1946–1950*, 397.
38. *Ibid.*, 624.
39. Merritt and Merritt, *Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The OMGUS Surveys, 1945–1949*, 41.
40. Kaff, *Die Unionsparteien, 1946–1950*, 402.
41. *Ibid.*, 456–457.
42. *Ibid.*, 622–623.
43. Wengst, "Die CDU/CSU im Bundestagswahlkampf 1949," 28–30.
44. Stenographische Niederschrift der Sitzung des Zonenausschusses der CDU in der britischen Zone, 30 March 1949, I-009-004/1 (NL Dörpinghaus), ACDP.
45. Stenographische Niederschrift über die 21. Sitzung des Zonenausschusses der CDU für die britische Zone am 2. und 3.6.1949, I-009-004/1 (NL Dörpinghaus), ACDP.
46. *Ibid.*
47. VII-003-001/2, ACDP.
48. Wengst, "Die CDU/CSU im Bundestagswahlkampf 1949," 38.
49. Pütz, *Konrad Adenauer und die CDU der britischen Besatzungszone*, 866.
50. *Ibid.*, 867–868.
51. Mitchell, "Christian Democracy and the Transformation of German Politics, 1945–1949," 283–349.
52. Pütz, *Konrad Adenauer und die CDU der britischen Besatzungszone*, 868.
53. *Ibid.*, 869.
54. Wengst, "Die CDU/CSU im Bundestagswahlkampf 1949," 25.
55. *Ibid.*, 24.
56. Bericht über den Wahlkampf, 22 August 1949, RW 100/17, 204, Nordrhein-Westfälisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Düsseldorf (hereafter NWHStA).
57. "Erhard," *Union im Wahlkampf: Informations- und Rednerdienst der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der CDU/CSU Deutschlands*, 13 July 1949, 1.
58. *Ibid.*, 1.
59. "Männer und Frauen des Wahlkreis Ulm-Heidenheim," B102/9085, BA Koblenz. This was a speech that Erhard repeated during his stump tour throughout West Germany.
60. *Ibid.*, 2.
61. *Ibid.*, 3.
62. Kaff, *Die Unionsparteien, 1946–1950*, 455.
63. Rundschreiben Dörpinghaus an die Mitglieder des Presse- und Propagandaausschusses, der Arbeitsstabes und die Landesgeschäftsführer vom 12.5.49, I-009-006/2 (NL Dörpinghaus), ACDP.
64. Kaff, *Die Unionsparteien, 1946–1950*, 625.
65. CDU des Rheinlands, Landessekretariat Köln-Marienburg, Die Bundestagswahl vom August 1949, VII-003-001/3, ACDP, 3.

66. Ibid.
67. Heineman, "The Hour of the Women: Memories of Germany's 'Crisis Years' and West German National Identity," 364–371.
68. CDU des Rheinlands, Landessekretariat Köln-Marienburg, Die Bundestagwahl vom August 1949, VII-003-001/3, ACDP.
69. Sie werden ja sicher wählen, VII-003-001/3, ACDP.
70. Warum will die SPD die Erfolge der sozialen Marktwirtschaft der CDU/CSU nicht anerkennen? VII-003-001/2, ACDP.
71. For an examination of electoral appeals in the Weimar Republic based upon class or profession, see Childers, "The Social Language of Politics in Germany: The Sociology of Political Discourse in the Weimar Republic," 331–358.
72. See, for example, a report on the CDU activities for the British Zone in distributing leaflets directed toward women, students, refugees, young people, former prisoners of war professionals, and the elderly. CDU der Zonenausschuß für die Britische Zone, 13 October 1949, I-009-004/2 (NL Dörpinghaus), ACDP.
73. For more on women in Weimar Reichstag elections, see Sneeringer, *Winning Women's Votes*.
74. Renate Bridenthal and Claudia Koonz, "Beyond *Kinder, Küche, Kirche*: Weimar Women in Politics and Work," in *When Biology Became Destiny: Women in Weimar and Nazi Germany*, ed. Renate Bridenthal, Atina Grossman, and Marion Kaplan (New York, 1984), 56.
75. Ute Frevert, *Women in German History: From Bourgeois Emancipation to Sexual Liberation*, trans. Stuart McKinnon-Evans (Oxford, 1989), 217–239. For an examination of Nazi propaganda in regard to women, see Leila J. Rupp, *Mobilizing Women for War: German and American Propaganda, 1939–1945* (Princeton, 1978).
76. Doris Schubert, ed., *Frauen in der deutschen Nachkriegszeit, Vol. 2. Frauenarbeit, 1945–1949: Quellen und Materialen* (Düsseldorf, 1984), 76.
77. Angelika Willms, "Grundzüge der Entwicklung der Frauenarbeit, 1880–1980," in *Strukturwandel der Frauenarbeit, 1880–1980*, ed. Walter Müller, Angelika Willms, and Johann Handl (Frankfurt am Main, 1983), 35.
78. Moeller, *Protecting Motherhood*, 1–7 and 211–228.
79. Kaff, *Die Unionsparteien 1946–1950*, 433.
80. In May 1945, there were 12 million German soldiers in Allied POW camps. Even in March 1947, 2.2 remained. Kramer, *The West German Economy*, 10.
81. One third of German households in 1950 were headed by single women. Schissler, "Women in West Germany," 117. For an examination of "women standing alone," see Elizabeth D. Heineman, *What Difference Does a Husband Make? Women and Marital Status in Nazi and Post-war Germany* (Berkeley, 1999).
82. "Liebe Lore" *Die Rheinische Volksblätter*, VII-003-001/2, ACDP.
83. Sneeringer, *Winning Women's Votes: Politics and Propaganda in Weimar Germany*; and Bridenthal and Koonz, "Beyond *Kinder, Küche, Kirche*," 54.
84. Generally women did not hold leading positions within the party. A letter from the CDU/CSU's central committee to state-level party organizations commented that it would be desirable if several regional party organizations named a woman to their delegation to the election committee. Tagung des Wahlrechts-Ausschusses, 19 March 1949, VII-003-001/1, ACDP. Minutes from a press and propaganda committee meeting indicate that candidates for the elections were to be selected by the following qualifications: (1) Politicians and Parliamentarians with experience (2) Experts in legal issues (3) Experts in economics, finance, agricultural and cultural policies (4) Women, refugees, members of the *Junge Union* (CDU's youth organization), and those bombed out by the airwar, indicating a certain "tokenism" that was present in the party. Presse und Propaganda Ausschuß der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der CDU/CSU, 8 May 1949 I-009-006/2 (NL Dörpinghaus), ACDP. Gabrielle Bremme reported that in the 1950s only 8.8 percent of the members of the CDU's Bundesparteivorstand (Federal Executive Committee) were female. Bremme, *Die Politische Rolle der Frau*, 164.

85. CDU des Rheinlands, Landessekretariat Köln-Marienburg, Die Bundestagswahl vom August 1949, VII-003-001/3, ACDP.
86. See "Wahlrede bei einer CDU/CSU-Kundgebung im Haidelberger Schloß" in Adenauer, *Reden, 1917–1967: Eine Auswahl*, 137–149; Wengst, "Die CDU/CSU im Bundestagswahlkampf 1949," 42–45; and Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer*, vol. 1, 336 and 353–354.
87. Am 8. Mai tagte im Adami Stegerwald-Haus zu Königswinter der Presse- und Propaganda-Ausschuß der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der CDU/CSU, I-009-006/2 (NL Dörpinghaus), ACDP.
88. Klaus Gotto, "Die deutschen Katholiken und die Wahlen in der Adenauer-Ära," in *Katholizismus im politischen System der Bundesrepublik, 1949–1963*, ed. Albrecht Langner (Paderborn, 1978), 22–25.
89. CDU des Rheinlands, Landessekretariat Köln-Marienburg, Die Bundestagswahl vom August 1949, VII-003-001/3, ACDP.
90. Leitsätze über die organisatorische und propagandistische Vorbereitung der Bundestagswahl, III-002-251/2 (LV Westfalen), ACDP.
91. Männer und Frauen des Amtsbezirkes Gahlen, RWV 48, 122, NWHStA.
92. In some cases, the CDU gathered the names and addresses of Center Party members and followers and sent them CDU material directly. See, for example, Rundschreiben Nr. 4, Kreispartei Dinslaken, 13 June 1949, RWV 48/198, 117, NWHStA; and CDU des Rheinlands, Landessekretariat Köln-Marienburg, Die Bundestagswahl vom August 1949, VII-003-001/3, ACDP.
93. Vorbereitung und Durchführung des Wahlkampfes, RWV 48, 118, NWHStA.
94. Geoffrey Pridham, *Christian Democracy in Western Germany*, 63–64; and Wulf Schönbohm, *Die CDU wird moderne Volkspartei: Selbstverständnis, Mitglieder, Organisation und Apparat 1950–1980* (Stuttgart, 1985): 45–47.
95. Kaff, *Die Unionsparteien, 1946–1950*, 400–401 and 452–453.
96. Für Einheit, Frieden, und Recht: Wahlzeitung der Christlich Demokratischen Union, Bezirksverband Ostfriesland der CDU, VII-003-001/1, ACDP.
97. Wengst, "Die CDU/CSU im Bundestagswahlkampf 1949," 1–41.
98. Protokoll der PV-Sitzung, 10 and 11 December 1948, SPD Parteivorstand Protokolle 1948, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie, Bonn (hereafter AdsD).
99. Marie-Luise Recker, "Wahlen und Wahlkämpfe in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1949–1969," in *Wahlen und Wahlkämpfe in Deutschland: Von den Anfängen im 19. Jahrhundert bis zur Bundesrepublik*, ed. Gerhard A. Ritter (Düsseldorf, 1997), 296.
100. Gordon Smith, *Democracy in Western Germany: Parties and Politics in the Federal Republic* (New York, 1986), 135.
101. Jürgen Niemann, *Auftakt zur Demokratie: Die Bundestagswahlkampf 1949 zwischen Improvisation und Ideologie* (Bochum, 1994), 54–55.
102. Diane L. Parness, *The SPD and the Challenge of Mass Politics: The Dilemma of the German Volkspartei* (Boulder, 1991), 50–59; Harold Kent Schellenger, Jr., *The SPD in the Bonn Republic: A Socialist Party Modernizes* (The Hague, 1968), 32–41; and Kurt Klotzbach: *Der Weg zur Staatspartei: Programmatik, praktische Politik und Organisation der deutschen Sozialdemokratie, 1945 bis 1965* (Bonn, 1982).
103. Für ein freies Deutschland in einem neuen Europa, SPD-LO Hamburg, Mappe 1972, AdsD.
104. Speech by Dr. Kurt Schumacher in Koblenz, 28 July 1949, Bestand Schumacher, Mappe 48, AdsD.
105. SPD-LO Hamburg, Mappe 105, AdsD.
106. Politische Macht durch Geld, ZSg 1-90/52, BA Koblenz.
107. *Das Soziale Klima: Ein Bericht über Umfragen in Deutschland 1948–1951*, Institut für Demoskopie, ZSg 132/154, BA Koblenz.
108. Kaff, *Die Unionsparteien, 1946–1950*, 400.
109. Rundschreiben Dörpinghaus' an die Mitglieder des Presse- und Propagandaausschusses, des Arbeitsstabes und die Landesgeschäftsführer, 12 May 1949, I-009-006/2 (NL Dörpinghaus), ACDP.

110. Udo Wengst, "Die CDU/CSU im Bundestagwahlkampf 1949," 49–50; and CDU des Rheinlands, Landessekretariat, Die Bundestagwahl vom 14 August 1949, VII-003-001/1, ACDP.
111. Kaff, *Die Unionsparteien, 1946–1950*, 603.
112. Christlich Demokratische Union des Rheinlandes, Rundschreiben 20/49, 21 June 1949, II-94-44 (Kreisverband Rhein Sieg), ACDP.
113. Kaff, *Die Unionsparteien, 1946–1950*, 624.
114. Protokoll der PV-Sitzung, 6 January 1953, SPD Parteivorstand Protokolle 1953, AdsD.
115. Protokolle des Presse- und Propagandaausschusses, 8 May 1949, I-009-006/2 (NL Dörpinghaus), ACDP.
116. CDU des Rheinlands, Landessekretariat, Die Bundestagwahl vom 14. August 1949, VII-003-001/3, ACDP.
117. Protokoll der Außerordentlichen Sitzung der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Steine und Erden on 8.6.49 and Rundschreiben des Hauptgeschäftsführers der Wirtschaftsvereinigung der Bauindustrie vom 10.6.49, in "Unternehmermillionen kaufen politische Macht. Finanzierung und Korruption der Regierungsparteien durch die Managerschicht der Wirtschaft," a report published by the executive committee of the SPD and held in the library of the AdsD, 103 and 58.
118. Kaff, *Die Unionsparteien, 1946–1950*, 604.
119. *Ibid.*, 603.
120. Stenographische Niederschrift über die Sitzung des Zonenausschusses der CDU in der britischen Zone, 2 and 3 June 1949, I-009-004/1 (NL Dörpinghaus), ACDP.
121. "Unternehmermillionen kaufen politische Macht," 57, 58.