In November 1965, the German Jewish refugee community in Los Angeles invited the local West German consul general to attend a commemoration of the November Pogrom of 1938.1 Afterward, the diplomat reported to the Foreign Office in Bonn that he had told the audience his participation in the event was “an outward sign of the beginning of a new chapter in the relationship between the German and the Israeli people [israelische Volk].”2 The consul’s attendance at such an event, his address, his “new chapter” metaphor, and his clumsy use of “Israeli people” to denote the entire Jewish diaspora neatly encapsulate the thrust of the relationship between German Jewish refugees in the United States and West Germany in the 1950s and ’60s. This relationship had come some way since the end of World War II, and it was important to both sides. At the same time, the consul’s language reveals that it was a relationship fraught with misunderstandings, missteps, and, mostly for the refugees, suspicion. The relationship required continual learning and change. This was possible, because both West German state officials (particularly employees of the Foreign Office) and representatives of the German Jewish refugee community in the United States viewed positive relations as advantageous. In fact, at certain times, the relationship was of a mutually constitutive character, each group shaping the other’s construction of itself.
**West German Foreign Policy Considerations and German Jewish Refugees in the United States**

After the end of World War II, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer clearly grasped that the legacy of the Third Reich was a huge liability for Germany’s international standing. For Adenauer, an important aspect in his conceptualization of foreign policy was to address that legacy in a way that would allow West Germany to secure a solid position in the West. He saw reconciliation with the United States and Western European nations as critical to that project, but the ways in which postwar Germany dealt with Jews also became a key indicator for the Allies of whether the country was successfully making the transition into a “new” democratic, peaceful Germany.³ The high commissioner of the American occupation zone saw this as early as 1949, observing of Germany’s small Jewish community that “what [it] will be, how it forms itself, how it becomes a part and how it merges with the new Germany, will . . . be watched very closely and very carefully by the entire world. It will, in my judgment, be one of the real touchstones and the test of Germany’s progress toward the light.”⁴

American Jews and German Jewish refugees scrutinized these efforts intensely, with particular attention paid to any signs of resurgent Nazism.⁵ Adenauer was very much aware of this, and, in his view, gaining the goodwill of American Jews was essential to Germany’s obtaining “acceptance as a morally equal partner of the West.”⁶ He believed that Jews had outsize influence on American public opinion—an atypical instance of him invoking a popular anti-Semitic stereotype.

Various scholars and contemporaries have debated the extent to which Adenauer’s interest in Jewish issues was motivated by moral concerns or pragmatism. Some have pointed to Adenauer’s ties to a Zionist committee in 1927 and to his good relationship with the Jewish community during his time as Cologne’s mayor during the Weimar Republic as evidence of the sincerity of his convictions. Adenauer does indeed seem to have been genuinely interested in German-Jewish reconciliation and in the wellbeing and secure future of Jews who had suffered at the hand of the Nazis. At the same time, he was also conscious that certain actions in this regard would further his policy goals.⁷ Philo-Semitism became a strategic political instrument that served as the “moral legitimator of the democratic character” of the young Federal Republic.⁸

Thus, in order to project a positive image of West Germany in the United States, the West German government considered it an important task to create good relationships with the American Jewish community in general and with German Jewish refugees in particular. Because German diplomats necessarily had to be enlisted in such an effort, the Foreign Office had to send individuals to the United States who represented the values of the “new Germany” and who were likely to be accepted by the communities they wanted to reach. This introduced complications, particularly given how much of the Foreign Office personnel had
worked there since before the war’s end. As a result, the early postwar Foreign Office had many employees who were distinctly unsympathetic to the Jewish cause, even demonstrably so, thus leaving a very limited pool of candidates who might carry out Adenauer’s policy in the United States. More difficult still, the legacy of Nazism in the Foreign Office could not simply be glossed over.

American Jews and especially German Jewish refugees in the United States closely monitored the presence of Nazis within German government institutions. In the late forties and early fifties, the German press covered debates about the issue, which even led to a parliamentary investigation. In the United States, Aufbau showed German Jewish refugee journalists to be critical, skeptical observers of German society and the new West German state. Discussions about anti-Semitism, denazification, individual responsibility, and the presence of Nazis in the new German government were common.

Since the German Jewish press in the United States was already discussing details of proposed diplomats’ biographies in relation to their history during the Third Reich, Foreign Office posts there could not be filled by just anyone. Officials decided that former Nazis should be discouraged as possible hires, and should absolutely not be assigned conspicuous postings overseas. Areas with large Jewish populations demanded particular sensitivity, which is why the first West German consular staff in New York included several prominent anti-Nazis. Among them was the consul general, Heinz Krekeler, who had never been a member of the Nazi Party (NSDAP) and “presented himself as a strong supporter of German-Jewish reconciliation.” Krekeler was well liked by the refugee community in New York, which had gotten to know him as an “impeccable anti-Nazi.” Krekeler subsequently became the first West German ambassador in Washington, D.C. Heinrich Knappstein, consul general in Chicago, also had no Nazi past.

It was not always an easy matter to implement the new staffing policies. Among the reasons for this was a longstanding bias in the Foreign Office against rehiring individuals who had lost their jobs due to National Socialist exclusion. While this prejudice undoubtedly reflected persistent anti-Semitism and vestigial Nazi loyalties, it also arose from the department’s strong sense of collegiality and a belief that those diplomats who had been ousted had somehow behaved “indecently” to their former colleagues. This was the situation that faced Richard Hertz. In 1951, Hertz was recruited to lead a new German consulate in Los Angeles, which at the time had the country’s second-largest population of Jewish refugees and émigrés. A former German diplomat who was “retired” in 1937 due to his Jewish ancestry, he had spent much of the intervening time in Mexico and the United States, including as a lecturer at a college in the Los Angeles area. Remarkably, the Foreign Office’s choice for Hertz as consul in Los Angeles resulted from their inquiring with the local German Jewish refugee community not only as to how they would regard a West German diplomatic mission in their city but also
whether they could think of a suitable candidate for consul. Hertz’s name was put forward by Harry Salinger, former president of the Jewish Club of 1933. Some in the Foreign Office objected to Hertz’s appointment, believing he could not adequately represent West Germany in the same country where he had lived as an exile. Nonetheless, his experience in the United States, his Jewishness, and his reputation among his fellow German Jews eventually carried the day, having become newly desirable in the context of political reconstruction.

Though the Foreign Office’s personnel decisions appeared unorthodox to some, they were driven by a strategy of posting people who could embody “good West Germans” likely to be accepted by local refugee communities. Through such appointments, the West German Foreign Office began to change its composition, identity, and practices in these places. Even while the headquarters in Bonn at the time remained largely staffed with former Nazis, incremental change was taking place at the periphery. And the Office’s decisions were frequently vindicated by outcomes on the ground. When the consulate opened in Los Angeles, for example, refugees disagreed on whether they should have anything to do with it. The former refugee Heinz Pinner remembered that when he accepted an invitation of the consulate on the occasion of the anniversary of the German Bundestag (parliament), “a storm broke loose in the [local German Jewish refugee] Club. How could you accept the invitation to the Nazis?” For Pinner though, and subsequently for most other refugees in Los Angeles, the identity of the consul mattered. He stated that, in choosing such a man, “Mr. Adenauer had a very lucky hand. They sent us the right man. The first one was one fourth Jewish.”

Invitations to representatives of the refugee community for events held at German consulates were not rare. From the beginning, “German diplomats were anxious to present themselves and their government’s policies” to different groups within the American Jewish community. They frequently reached out to popular and influential individuals among the refugee community, such as rabbis or journalists, because if these people reacted positively, others might also look more favorably at German diplomats and consequently Germany. In this way, the diplomats also sought the support of some individual “pro-German” refugees, such as the New York–based lawyer Fritz Oppenheimer, who had good contacts with the U.S. State Department and West German officials, which he used to promote friendly relations between the two. In addition, German diplomats engaged in “gesture[s] of goodwill” in an effort to reduce animosity among refugees, such as the former chief rabbi of Cologne, to whom New York Consul General Heinz Krekeler made a visit carrying personal greetings from Chancellor Adenauer. Adenauer had been mayor in Cologne prior to the war, and this presumably positive prewar connection was now used to make contact. These efforts were not always successful though. When Krekeler sent Passover greetings to the American Federation of Jews from Central Germany in 1951,
for example, the president of the organization refused to accept them.\textsuperscript{28} In the early 1950s, German Foreign Office outreach efforts to German Jewish refugees received mixed reactions as the community remained mostly skeptical and far from united in its attitude toward Germany.

The currency of the issue of German Jewish relations in the refugee community is exemplified by a debate that the American Federation of Jews from Central Europe (AMFED) organized in the summer of 1950 on the question “Are we as Jews interested in the German Problem and if so, what is our position?”\textsuperscript{29} Without differentiating between the two German states, the debate centered on the refugees’ attitude to Germany at large. Rudolf Callmann, chairman of the Federation’s board of directors, rejected the notion of German collective guilt but stressed that every Jew ought to be aware of his responsibility toward the larger Jewish community. Jews who had not experienced great personal hardship at the hands of the Germans still had to act in ways that would not downplay the atrocities that the German nation had inflicted on Jewry at large. Callmann believed that, in principle, German Jewish refugees should not engage in German problems. He added, however, that life made certain exceptions necessary, which included keeping relations with German friends who had not been implicated in the regime and being in touch with Germans over restitution issues.\textsuperscript{30} The decision about the degree to which such exceptions were permissible fell within the responsibility of each individual, who, as Callmann stressed, should be aware of the principle of nonengagement. Overall, his organization was determined to engage with German problems only in cases that would be in the interest of its members. Rabbi Max Gruenewald, the second speaker of the evening, opposed any attempts to interact with Germans that could potentially minimize what had happened, stating that the “graves were still too fresh.”

The third speaker, \emph{Aufbau} editor in chief Manfred George, however, took a different stance on Jewish engagement with Germany. Without ignoring the “Blutschuld” (blood guilt) of the Germans, he argued that Germany had become a central European problem. Therefore, “particularly if one is an American of Jewish descent from Germany, [one] had the duty to concern oneself with Germany.” This, he said, “was not a question of sentimental ties to personal memories, but the utilization of factual experience for the benefit of the U.S.A. and thus the world.”\textsuperscript{31} Following this objective, one year later George met with Theodor Heuss, president of the Bundesrepublik. The interview George conducted with him was subsequently published in \emph{Aufbau} and was followed by an article in which George pointed to what he believed was the specific duty of the German Jewish refugees: to recognize that there were “a number of significant personalities and circles in Germany with whom communication [and understanding] had never been broken off.”\textsuperscript{32} He emphasized that connections with such German individuals might hold benefits not only for American politics but also for “the Jews in and outside of Germany, and even some day for Israel.”\textsuperscript{33}
Thus, all three speakers, even though generally distrustful of Germany, did not advocate an absolute prohibition or avoidance of relations. Rather, they believed that there were certain ways in which relations with certain Germans or the German state could benefit their community and Jews more generally. This approach, as put forward by George, would become the reasoning of many refugees, particularly representatives of refugee organizations who decided to engage with Germans and Germany.

Among the German officials who did gain the trust of the official representatives of the organized German Jewish community in the 1950s and 60s were West German President Theodor Heuss, the Social Democratic opposition leader Kurt Schumacher, and Chancellor Adenauer. Significant in this thawing of relations was Adenauer’s speech to the German parliament in September 1951, in which he acknowledged the crimes that had been committed “in the German name” and declared Germany’s obligation for moral and material reparations. Adenauer’s speech came after much pressure from Jewish organizations within and without Germany, who had criticized the lack of commitment to restitution on the part of the German government. In 1951–52, the state of Israel, American Jewish organizations, and mainly the newly founded international Jewish Conference on Material Claims against Germany helped secure reparation settlements resulting in payments to Israel and to the Claims Conference, which were first set out in the Luxembourg Agreement of 1952. Adenauer hoped that the reparation payments would have a particularly positive influence on West Germany’s image in the world, certainly among the American public, and would benefit Germany’s efforts at political and economic integration into the West.

The announcement of the restitution settlements was indeed generally received positively around the world. The signing of the Luxembourg treaty and its ratification in 1953 “softened the hostility” of most American Jewish pro-Zionist groups and “also affected the attitude of committed Jewish legislators on Capitol Hill.” Nonetheless, the success of these measures was mixed. The majority of Holocaust survivors, Orthodox groups, and left- or communist-leaning Jews remained hostile toward Germany. Among the German Jewish refugees, there were many who rejected restitution, mainly because they considered it “blood money.” Representatives of the refugee community in the United States largely embraced the prospect of restitution, however. Aufbau’s editors had already greeted Adenauer’s speech as “the first step onto a rightly chosen path,” and the board of the American Federation of Jews from Central Europe sent a telegram to Adenauer expressing their hope that the proclamation would soon be followed by actions.

German diplomats in the United States closely observed Jewish reactions to the Luxembourg restitution agreement and actively undertook efforts to publicize information about it to communities that might not have heard about it on their own, believing in the positive impact of the message. For the German
diplomats, German Jewish refugees were of particular importance to their efforts at creating and advancing the image of a changed Germany in the United States. Partly this was a practical view: the refugees appeared to be generally less critical than American Jewry at large, and they were also easier to reach for the German diplomats, since restitution matters frequently made it necessary for the refugees to be in contact with people at the German consulates, which offered a pretext for dialogue. But the diplomats also believed that the refugees were especially good advocates for the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) because of their particular identity. Having been persecuted by Nazi Germany, they might have been expected to dislike the country and to be the least likely to speak favorably about it. Hence, a favorable inclination toward West Germany on their part was a far better advertisement than, for example, that of non-Jewish German-Americans. In the eyes of many diplomats, the majority of non-Jewish German-Americans represented a Germany of the past. Indeed, there were some German-American groups that still held extremely nationalist and anti-Semitic views from which the German missions made efforts to distance themselves. But even if they had not been so politically out of line with contemporary German aims, many German-Americans seemed to some observers in the Foreign Office to have gotten stuck in “Heimweh-Wunschprojektionen” (projections of homesickness) of the nineteenth century, a way of thinking that had little to do with the image of a modern and cultured West Germany of the twentieth century that the diplomats wanted to project. By contrast, the majority of the German Jewish refugees with whom the diplomats came into contact were much closer to the imagined new West German citizen and therefore more suited as promoters of the new Germany. According to a report by the consulate general in New York, German Jewish refugees also possessed more cultural potential and importance than the vast majority of non-Jewish German-Americans. This was a critical point because the diplomats deemed it especially important to sway Germany-skeptical circles of intellectuals, such as columnists and commentators working mainly for important opinion-shaping newspapers on the East Coast.

**Restitution and Other Troubles**

The overall improvement of the refugees’ perspective on West Germany in light of developments like restitution could not be taken for granted, however. For whenever events occurred that disturbed the image of “a new West Germany,” refugees were forthright in voicing their concerns. When problems arose in the actual execution of restitution in the mid-1950s, the refugees’ initial softening of sentiments toward Germany was almost reversed. Community leaders were well aware of the strategic role that restitution played for West Germany as an instrument of positive publicity for the FRG.
Understanding the role they played in this, namely that their good opinion of West Germany was an important part of legitimizing the new state, they used this position of judgment to exert pressure on the German government. In the case of restitution, they did so by publishing articles in *Aufbau* that heavily criticized both its theory and practice. The editors did so not only to record these opinions as news items—and in doing so publicize their discontent with Germany—but also to send messages, knowing that this public discontent would reach the German authorities. While among German officials *Aufbau* was initially only read by diplomats in the United States, it soon also became important reading for politicians in Germany, particularly those who were working in the field of restitution. By publishing critical articles, the refugees could thus make it clear to German politicians that as long as Germany was not living up to its promises, it could not count on their endorsement. When Nahum Goldmann, president of the Claims Conference, met with West German Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano in 1955 to address the slow pace of implementing indemnification laws, *Aufbau* reporters commented, addressing Brentano more or less directly:

> The foreign minister will be interested to hear that through the manner of execution of the restitution legislation, and the fact that the Dritte Masse Gesetz [name of specific restitution legislation] has not been passed by the Bundestag, much of the credit that West Germany initially gained, will be lost. We hope and wish that West Germany’s foreign minister does not only listen to the Jewish representatives with his ear but also with his heart, and that when he returns to Bonn, he will exert his not inconsiderable influence, so that the necessary reforms in this area will finally be executed.48

Besides allowing them to exert public pressure on the German government in this fashion, the refugees’ position of influence also allowed them a role in the procedures surrounding restitution. Through representatives such as Kurt Grossmann, affiliated with the Claims Conference and the Jewish Agency as well as main *Aufbau* representative and correspondent for restitution cases, and Hermann Muller from the AMFED, the German Jewish refugee community was directly involved in discussing restitution issues with German politicians. In addition, refugee lawyers in the United States often worked directly on individual restitution cases—frequently through their membership in the American Association of Former European Jurists or with the United Restitution Organization—and they also communicated to German authorities their ideas about how restitution should be carried out.50

These connections to German officials and their role in shaping the restitution process gave many of those involved considerable satisfaction. This satisfaction also percolated throughout the wider community, as the refugee press frequently publicized such connections, broadcasting the influence the refugees had gained. Underlying the many articles that appeared in *Aufbau* on this topic is a sense of pride on the refugees’ part for having transformed their status from
that of victims—people who had been persecuted by the German state—to that of people who could make demands on it and were thus, in fact, actively taking part in reshaping it. In an interview in 1972, Felix Guggenheim, a refugee in Los Angeles, explained how he experienced restitution:

Restitution was something you fought for, and you mostly did not get what you should get, and it was a hard fight, and you didn’t have to say thank you for it. . . . On the contrary, the tougher you were, especially in the beginning there were a few attorneys who did not use the law, they used the toughness, and say what do you want. The house the family lived in, 900 people are dead, one is alive. Should he also be dead, so that you could keep the house? . . . In other words, the mentality in the restitution, especially in the first ten years, or five years, was a fighting mentality. It was not, we have to behave and to be nice, so that Germans give us something. This is ours.52

Not every refugee was ready to fight for restitution, which was in the overwhelming majority of cases a lengthy, frustrating, and frequently painful experience.53 Even so, the organized refugee community did not want negative feelings to be the dominant emotional reaction to restitution. Frustration and disappointment were expressed not into the void to dissipate among a community of fellow victims but to a German audience that, for its own good, needed to listen and react in a productive way.

German consulates in the United States played an important role for refugees looking to solve procedural problems with claims and to articulate their frustration. In 1954, the West German Embassy in Washington, D.C., reported to the Foreign Office in Bonn that refugees had submitted great numbers of complaints to several diplomatic missions in the United States about the way the restitution offices in Germany had been handling their cases. In most cases, extraordinarily long delays (some had been waiting for years for a response) were an applicant’s primary complaint. Delays were caused by the complex restitution bureaucracy, while various other problems arose because of restitution office staffing.54 The reports that different German consuls sent to Bonn concerning these complaints further illustrate the strategic role the refugees and restitution held in the West German effort to represent itself as a changed nation. In their letters, the consuls emphasized that disillusionment was growing among the refugee population and warned that this significantly endangered “Germany-friendly public opinion” in the United States.55 They stressed that the refugees, who had been influential in promoting a good image of Germany, were now beginning to express harsh criticism and accusations against the country. The consul general in Chicago, for example, wrote to Bonn that the refugees in his administrative district felt that “perhaps the government and the parliament had the best intention and will to carry out a just restitution, but that these efforts were sabotaged by the civil servants in charge, using bureaucratic excuses.”56 Sporadically, refugees even put forward the thought “that the Federal Republic, by making all their statements
about their intention to make restitution, had only wanted to win over public opinion in the world and in the United States. In reality, however, they intended to let restitution peter out in bureaucratic quicksand.57

Communicating these sentiments and complaints to Bonn, the consuls emphasized to the Foreign Office that it should stress the political dimension of restitution to the responsible offices and people in Germany. Consul General Hertz in Los Angeles wrote that, from abroad, it seemed like the civil servants in Germany who had been entrusted with restitution evaluated the whole matter entirely by applying fiscal and legal measures but neglected the effects their work had on foreign policy. The damage and the loss of prestige that would result from treating restitution matters in such a way, he argued, would be completely disproportionate to the money that Germany might save in the end.58 Other similar statements by German diplomats demonstrate that as a group they saw it as an urgent matter to solve the complications that had arisen in regard to restitution in order to prevent damage to Germany’s image in the United States. Protecting Germany’s reputation was, after all, their job.

Beyond the pragmatic argument regarding diplomacy, however, the diplomats’ letters also reveal a second level of support for more efficient restitution. In addition to arguing that it was important to clear up problems because they jeopardized Germany’s reputation in the United States, they also argued that it was important to do so because the delays were ethically and morally wrong. They emphasized that many of the refugees were old and not well, and that if their restitution cases were to be delayed even longer, they would possibly never be able to make use of the money. In their letters, the diplomats not only confirmed the refugees’ complaints but emphatically described different cases at length in order to demonstrate the existential need that people were in, as many were unable to achieve financial security after having come to the United States as refugees from Nazi persecution.59

The empathy with which these letters were composed and the fact that they portrayed the refugees’ suffering as a consequence of Nazi persecution—at a time when direct references to German responsibility were almost always absent in the responses that reached the consulates from restitution officials in Germany—demonstrates that the diplomats had a stake in the moral obligation that lay behind restitution.60 By contrast, the letters that diplomatic missions received back from the Foreign Office and other offices dealing with restitution, such as the Ministry of Finance, rarely contain any acknowledgment of the moral implications of these restitution problems but rather exemplify the diligent bureaucrat, referring to paragraphs and financial restrictions.

In their acknowledgement of the ethical and moral dimensions of restitution, the German diplomats in the United States managed to project an image of West Germany that many of the nation’s politicians fervently wished to cultivate. It is, in fact, remarkable how much the narrative of the “good Federal Republic of
Germany" was generated by its representatives overseas at a time when the sentiments of much of the German population was at odds with it.61

Restitution proceedings, and particularly problems arising out of the process, led to increased interaction between German Jewish refugees and the Foreign Office, and by extension other German officials. The refugees observed these efforts on their behalf and generally appreciated the ways in which the German diplomats handled their restitution problems, often looking at West Germany in a more favorable way as a result, acknowledging that there appeared to be at least some well-meaning and decent German officials. When asked whether he thought that there existed an understanding of postwar Germany that was fostered by the local consulate, one refugee in Los Angeles answered in the affirmative and added that he believed that this was true also for New York. He stated that there were certainly people who never entered into relationships with the German consulate as a matter of principle, even if they actually needed certain documents. Many others changed their opinions after they experienced positive interactions in restitution matters, however.62 Another refugee pointed to the helpfulness of the consulate staff, “who showed a lot of sympathy for [them].”63

To smooth the stuttering progress of restitution claims and thus move opinion among refugees further toward the positive view of West Germany, the West German government thought it useful to send German officials involved in restitution work to the United States. The idea was first proposed by a representative of the American Association of the Former European Jurists, who thought that if those officials could see with their own eyes what the situation of the restitution applicants was, this would then lead to a more efficient processing of the cases in the restitution offices back in Germany.64 After West German officials concluded that the cost of sending people on this trip would be justified by the result, and after securing additional funds from the American State Department, a small group of officials working on restitution traveled to the United States in the early summer of 1957.65 Besides meeting with people responsible for restitution at the diplomatic missions, the German officials appeared at events set up by the local refugee organizations in New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Detroit, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, which all recorded large numbers of attendees.66 One forum held in Los Angeles by the Jewish Club of 1933 featured Georg Blessin of the Ministry of Finance and Kurt Brockhaus of the Berlin Senate assuring the refugees in attendance of German goodwill and trustworthiness.67 They explained that there was no reason to doubt West Germany’s ability and intention to meet the financial obligations of restitution, and that delays and problems were simply due to administrative and technical difficulties, which were expected to be solved in due course. They clearly sought a sympathetic understanding of these issues among the refugee population, and thus a stay of the public pillorying of Germany for not living up to its obligations. The officials’ trip was successful in uplifting the sentiments and hopes of many refugees in these places, at
least momentarily.68 In response to the Los Angeles event, the editors of the L.A. Club’s publication printed the following: “In conclusion, one dare say that the Federal Government and the City of Berlin chose their best messengers of good will, that no one could have possibly closed oneself off to their genuine good will as representatives of their governments, and that the gentlemen left with a sense of having fulfilled the aim and purpose of their mission.”69

Even though troubles and problems in restitution did not disappear in the following years, the refugee community at large appreciated the attention West German authorities paid to their opinions on the matter and recognized that their protest reached certain individuals with authority. The dedication of individual German diplomats in combination with goodwill missions made the experience with restitution in the United States in some ways a more positive one than it was for people who dealt with civil servants at the restitution offices in Germany itself, underscoring the importance that West German government officials attributed to the refugee community abroad.

**Praise and Criticism**

German diplomats may have managed to handle restitution issues in a way that improved refugees’ perception of West Germany, but this hardly put an end to criticism of the country. The refugees knew that sympathetic officials were not representative of the German population.70 In fact, this context of restitution made possible a new modus of engagement with Germany, in which the refugees were no longer just confined to a weaker position. By the late 1950s, the organized refugee community was deploying both criticism and praise in dealing with West Germany, applauding Germans when they accepted responsibility for the past and demonstrated a democratic commitment to the future, but responding negatively and sharply in response to any perceived backsliding. When at the turn of the year 1960 a series of anti-Semitic incidents—more than 470 cases of swastika smearings and desecrations of synagogues and Jewish cemeteries—occurred in West Germany, German Jewish refugees, as well as all major American Jewish organizations and the Western press reacted with great concern.71 These incidents did not shatter the relationship between German Jewish refugees and German officials, however, but rather strengthened its characteristics, both of praise and criticism. In January of 1960, Aufbau’s pages were filled with analyses and reports on the anti-Semitic occurrences and the state of German society. In these, various regular journalists, as well as special contributors such as well-known community leader Rabbi Joachim Prinz, presented themselves as experts on the topic and voices of authority, offering criticism and advice.72 They issued warnings that the German authorities should not take the incidents lightly and also that they ought to clean up Nazis in their own ranks. At the same time, they complimented
those—for example, officials in Berlin—who in their eyes reacted appropriately to the “Nazi activities.”

At the same time as the refugees engaged in this commentary of praise and criticism, German officials, and particularly diplomats in the United States, reached out to the refugee community in efforts to assure them that such incidents were neither tolerated by the West German government nor representative of the majority opinion of the West German people and would be prosecuted in the German legal system. While such assurances certainly did not relieve the concern of all refugees, they made sure that a dialogue between the refugees and the West German government remained possible. Arguably, it was these events that motivated a more intense dialogue, inspiring interest and commentary on the part of the refugees, while necessitating an intensification of official West German efforts to keep that critical community on Germany’s side. Other events, such as the meeting between Adenauer and Ben Gurion in March 1960 in New York, provided news that aided the development of more positive perspectives on Germany. Besides matters relating to restitution or the Nazi past more generally, the other crucial variable that influenced the refugees’ views on Germany was West Germany’s stance toward Israel.

Rabbi Max Nussbaum as a Voice on Germany

Besides observing the German situation through media outlets, an important way in which refugees formed their image of West Germany was through the opinions of individual refugee leaders who had direct interactions with individual Germans. Their experiences often served as trustworthy evaluations of the West German situation, or were represented as such in Aufbau and even non-Jewish media outlets. The view that West German officials had of Jewish refugees was similarly constructed, through the refugee press and from meeting certain individuals. Rabbi Max Nussbaum, rabbi of Hollywood’s Temple Israel from 1942 until his death in 1974, was one such individual whose opinion on Germany mattered both to refugees and to West German officials. Because Nussbaum was known for a critical stance on Germany and believed to hold influence over public opinion, German officials made a variety of efforts to engage with him.

Born in Bukovina and educated in Breslau and Würzburg, Nussbaum came to Berlin in 1934 and fled from the Nazis to the United States in the summer of 1940. After spending time in Oklahoma as a rabbi and lecturer, he arrived in Los Angeles in September 1942 to take up his position at Temple Israel, whose congregation included many German Jewish refugees, including some he had known earlier in Berlin. Besides his work in the congregation, Nussbaum became active in American Jewish life and over the years held senior leadership positions in large American Jewish organizations, including the vice-presidency
of the American Jewish Congress, the presidency of the Zionist Organization of America, and the chair of the American Section of the World Jewish Congress. Throughout, he maintained an interest in Germany and frequently addressed topics concerning it in public. His background gave him a position of authority in this regard, particularly among American Jews. In 1953, for example, he was one of the delegates of the United Jewish Appeal (UJA) who traveled to Berlin, Paris, and Israel to report back to the UJA about the situation of Jews in these localities. In 1958, upon his return from another such trip, he delivered a sermon in which he also commented on the state of Germany, which he said was “not easy to define.” Nussbaum elaborated: “There are people in the American Government who are completely convinced of the Western allegiance of the Federal Republic. I wouldn’t sacrifice my life on this premise. I am not so convinced of it.” Ruminating on the question of how far West Germany had “rejuvenate[d] itself or went through any experience of cleansing its soul,” Nussbaum referred to a couple of very antithetical speeches he heard in Berlin. At an event to commemorate those who had taken part in the assassination attempt on Hitler on 20 July 1944 and were subsequently executed by the Nazis, Berlin’s minister of the interior, Joachim Lipschitz, appeared as the first speaker. According to Nussbaum, his address was one “which, coming back to Germany after so many years, you expect to hear . . . which made you feel there is a new voice and it may be a new turning point.” Lipschitz, half Jewish and a member of the Social Democratic Party, reminded the audience that it was imperative that they face their responsibility for creating a German past that saw “brutality,” “slavery,” and the murder of millions in death camps.

The second speaker was Gerhard Schröder, federal minister of the interior and member of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). His message was quite different. Nussbaum reported that Schröder had explained that the Third Reich had lasted only for a very short time and that it would be wise to forget about it, the sooner the better. Schröder’s main concern was that the “Fatherland is bleeding because the nation is not unified yet.” Nussbaum’s conclusion from hearing these two speeches was that there were some West Germans, particularly Chancellor Adenauer, President Heuss, and the Social Democrats, who could be trusted. If the future was with them, one could be optimistic. However, should West Germany be dominated by conservatives of the likes of Schröder, who had been a Nazi party member, Nussbaum saw no good outcome.

Thus, in his sermon, Nussbaum offered a warning “to the Western nations not to fall so easily into a trap again” and to beware of trusting Germany, “which may be the cause for another war, and another one, and another one unless the big nations on the outside understand this danger and neutralize it to a point by which she never becomes a great power again.” A version of Nussbaum’s critique appeared a few weeks later in Aufbau, which reached not only refugees but West German readers as well. It was one of many instances in which
Nussbaum was able to reach a broad international audience. The following year, on the eve of Yom Kippur, the news agency Voice of America broadcast a speech by Nussbaum titled “Is Forgiveness Possible?” Directed to the German people via RIAS, the radio station in the American sector of Berlin, the speech featured a characteristic mingling of praise and reproach, warning against “reactionary forces . . . still dreaming of the splendors of a national socialist Germany,” but ultimately conveyed the “hope that the good, decent, and progressive voices in the Bundesrepublik will prevail in this desperate struggle for the German soul. Only then will real atonement occur.”

The crimes of the Third Reich received renewed attention in the early sixties thanks to the Eichmann Trial and the Auschwitz Trials, along with the newly created Central Office of the State Justice Administration for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes in Ludwigsburg. At the same time, several German actions communicated the opposite impression—that a German desire for atonement and reconciliation with the Jewish people was rather distant. Thus in 1964–65, the German parliament debated a bill that would extend the statute of limitations in order to allow for the continued persecution of Nazi war criminals. In the late fall of 1964, amid parliamentary debate, the West German government announced that it would not extend the statute of limitations for Nazi war crimes, leading to widespread public censure. Nussbaum again spoke up, condemning the West German policy in a letter to the Los Angeles Times, where he devoted particular attention to what this meant for the nation’s relationship with Jews: “If the Germany of today desires to be a member of Western society, not only on a political but on the purely human level, and it expects, as it says it does, a future dialogue with the Jewish people—then it has to solve its human problems first by a complete repudiation of its horrendous past.”

Nussbaum once more took a prominent critical stance following the German government’s decision to allow the nation’s scientists and engineers to work for the Egyptian armament industry. Nussbaum argued that the Germans were not only not taking responsibility for destroying Jewish lives in the past but were again threatening Jewish wellbeing in the present and future. In early 1965, the crisis around these issues peaked when the West German government stopped its regular armament shipments to Israel because Egypt’s President Nasser threatened to recognize the sovereignty of the East German state. Egypt’s recognition of East German sovereignty would have forced West Germany to either abandon one of its key policies—the Hallstein Doctrine, which stipulated that the FRG would not maintain diplomatic relations with a state that recognized the German Democratic Republic (GDR)—or cease diplomatic relations with Egypt. The West German government’s halting of weapons shipments to Israel met with great domestic and international criticism, and created, according to one German diplomat, “possibly the Federal Republic’s worst foreign policy crisis since its foundation.”
The response of the refugee community in the United States was fervent as well. At the initiative of members of the Jewish Club of 1933, the Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles formulated a direct appeal to the FRG to change its policy. In late February, this appeal was followed by a community-wide protest meeting held at Temple Israel of Hollywood and featuring Rabbi Nussbaum as the main speaker. Nussbaum’s speech was a fierce criticism of the actions of the West German government and culminated in this powerful pledge:

The Jewish Community of the United States—and for this matter the Jewish Community all over the free world—has no intention of taking this dangerous development lying down. We voice our sense of shock . . . . We will not rest and will not pause until Germany undertakes in repentance the following acts of atonement: the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel; the recalling of the German scientists from Cairo; the extension of the Statute of Limitations; and the resumption of aid to Israel. We will mobilize all forces, Jewish and non-Jewish in this country, and all men of good will wherever they are, to bring about the victory of morality over expediency, of commitment against surrender and of moral responsibility against political blackmail.

Germany’s actions, particularly its changed behavior toward Israel, were not only significant for Nussbaum but, judging from an eyewitness to the event, also for the audience: “Many who had believed in a new Germany, sat there numb and struck in horror. Everybody realized the deadly seriousness [tödlichen Ernst] of the report.” Shock, as Nussbaum emphasized, was not to be the continuing response to West Germany’s behavior, however. Rather, he called for concerted protest, being aware of West Germany’s particular deference to Jewish opinions. Amid a wide variety of domestic and international critics, diplomats paid particular attention to German Jewish refugee voices because these local developments were neither isolated cases nor unpublicized. A report on the Los Angeles event appeared in Berlin in a publication of the Bund der Verfolgten des Naziregimes (Union of persecutees of the Nazi regime), the purpose of which was to monitor the democratic development of West Germany. Its author, a German Jewish refugee, wrote, “If one bears in mind that similar meetings took place in almost all American states, any predictions about the consequences for the Federal Republic are obvious.” The title of the article disclosed the author’s feelings on the public outcry directly: “The New Image of Germany Is Destroyed!”

Notwithstanding such dire predictions, the West German government did take action to resolve at least part of the crisis and to safeguard its image, which nevertheless did not emerge unscathed. When in late May 1965 Chancellor Ludwig Erhard decided to establish full diplomatic relations between West Germany and Israel, Max Nussbaum, like many other public figures inside and
outside of Germany, publicly endorsed this development. His statements on
the event were published in several newspapers, such as in a Los Angeles Times
article, which quoted him as saying that “the German-Israeli link could usher
in a new era of happy relations between Germans and Jews.”101 Readers of these
newspapers could get a sense that West Germany was now moving in the right
direction again.

Rabbi Nussbaum further promoted this sense of optimism in regard to West
Germany when, in 1965, shortly after making these remarks, he traveled to
Germany at the invitation of the German government. As part of its program
of public diplomacy, the German government had been inviting “politically and
culturally significant” personalities from foreign countries to visit the Federal
Republic and West Berlin.102 These individuals were often journalists, represen-
tatives of political parties and civil society organizations, clergy, and academ-
ics—in short, opinion and decision makers in different domains of society.103 In
Germany, they were given carefully planned itineraries that included meetings
with leading German figures from their field of expertise or area of interest. The
idea behind these “guest” or “visitor programs” or “information trips,” as they
were variously called, was that these individuals would gain positive impressions
of Germany and report them to their communities upon their return. As such,
this was a general outreach and publicity program not aimed specifically at Jews.
Nevertheless, Rabbi Nussbaum’s visit was significant in that he was a Jew and
that he accepted the invitation.

Indeed, the West German Foreign Office supported Nussbaum’s invitation
precisely because he was Jewish. The idea to invite him originally came from
Heinz Galinski, then chairman of the Jewish community in West Berlin, who
referred to the precedent of the Foreign Office having extended invitations to
several rabbis in the recent past. Galinski suggested Nussbaum’s invitation in
1961 because he wanted him to speak to the Jewish community in Berlin and to
be able to “form his own impressions about the actual situation” in Germany.104
He added that he believed that a visit by Nussbaum would be in the interest
not only of the Jewish communities in West Berlin and West Germany but also
of the federal government. The Foreign Office approved Nussbaum’s invitation
after an examination of his case through the consul general in Los Angeles, who
reported that Nussbaum was a man of “recognition and respect far beyond his
local sphere of influence.”105

While Max Nussbaum was initially invited to go to Germany in 1962, he did
not actually go until July of 1965, and his acceptance of the invitation was not a
matter of course, as he relayed to a refugee audience after his return:106

I, personally, had received many such invitations before, and I did not accept them
because it is . . . much more difficult for me to detach myself psychologically, sub-
consciously, emotionally from what has happened. But quite aside from the personal
angle of sentiment, I felt that the time had not come yet till now to go as an official
guest of the government. I have been back, of course, many times as the guest of the
Jewish Community—but as guest of the government, that was another story. I felt
that one had to wait, at least in my concept of it, and to see this ‘new’ Germany along
several lines.\textsuperscript{107}

Thus, Nussbaum’s decision to visit, and to offer the partial endorsement of the
FRG that he felt the visit would imply, depended upon the politics of the German
government and the behavior of the German people. The rabbi explained that he
wanted to see how seriously the West German government would take the trials
against leading Nazis and whether it would extend the statute of limitations. He
also wanted to see what would happen with restitution and indemnification legis-
lation to the Jewish people and Israel. “Most of all,” he said, “I wanted to wait for
the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel. All of these four steps and
many others have, in the meantime, been taken by the German government—
not to our full satisfaction, but taken nevertheless.” Considering these “steps in
the right direction,” Nussbaum felt it was the “proper time to go and study this
‘New’ Germany of today.”\textsuperscript{108}

Good publicity for West Germany being the aim of the program, the invita-
tion itself was supposed to be an honor for the guest, which was only the begin-
nning of what was to be a good experience in Germany. For Rabbi Nussbaum,
however, while presumably feeling somewhat honored, it was nevertheless a dif-
ferent experience, as his relationship with Germany was much more fraught than
that of the average visitor. Also, Rabbi Nussbaum was a representative of a large
German Jewish community and as such he needed to justify such a significant
move as implicitly endorsing the FRG by a visit as the government’s guest. He
stressed to his Los Angeles audience that he was not a pawn in a strategic game
but that he took part in setting the rules himself—beginning with his delayed
acceptance of the invitation and ending with his critical report to the commu-

Nussbaum initially shared his observations and opinions in a sermon he gave
at Temple Israel shortly after his return, but parts of his report on Germany
also reached audiences beyond Los Angeles, as they were published in several
American Jewish press outlets.\textsuperscript{111} German newspapers had reported on his actual
visit.\textsuperscript{112} Nussbaum’s report was complex and nuanced in both its approval and
disapproval. For example, while criticizing Germany’s lack of sensitivity when
it came to picking its first ambassador to Israel, he explained that he was nevertheless certain that the man who was chosen—Rolf Friedemann Pauls, who had been a Wehrmacht officer—would do an excellent job. Further, Nussbaum said that while deep-rooted anti-Semitism was still present in Germany, there were many Germans who opposed it. He reported on meetings with high officials and young Germans, and, while he was particularly optimistic about the young generation, he suggested that Germany should do more in the realm of “Education toward Democracy.” And near the end, he reflected on future prospects for the German-Jewish relationship:

I do not believe that the time has come either for forgiving or for forgetting. No fair-minded German even expects it of us, and I don’t believe the Jewish people will, for a long time, be ready for either of these two steps. The time has, however, come for the commencement of a dialogue, especially with the young German generation. . . . The dialogue that we ought to begin now will not necessarily always be friendly, and it may have to carry a sharp vocabulary; but the time for discussion has come nevertheless. This is after all not the Nazi Germany of yesterday. There are liberal forces struggling bravely for reshaping the soul of the German nation. These forces are still small, and they have to be encouraged by somebody. And who is in a better position to fulfill this historical function than we the Jewish people? By doing so, we may in time open a new chapter of the German-Jewish relationship; help foster better understanding between Bonn and Jerusalem; and make a contribution to the peace of our generation.

Here again, a former refugee perceived the relationship as one in which Jews would hold the senior position or, at least, a position of guidance with respect to the new Germany.

There is evidence to suggest that Nussbaum’ speech met with widespread approval. A report from an employee of the German consulate who had attended the event stated that a small minority in the audience had expressed that they felt Nussbaum was too harsh and “unforgiving” toward Germany in his speech. Given that German observer’s likely bias, the majority of the assembled must have appreciated Nussbaum’s report for its presentation of the complexities of the German situation. As an important moral leader and trusted person, Nussbaum legitimated dialogue with decent Germans. For at least some Jews, Nussbaum’s trip and his report suggested an approach to navigating one’s personal relationship to Germany and its people. His own critical stance and the position of moral authority he attributed to Jews offered a relatively comfortable basis for engaging Germany, allowing them to explore their relationship with that country as more than simply one of antagonism.

For German government officials, meanwhile, Nussbaum’s visit to Germany was also a success, as a report from the Los Angeles consulate to Bonn concluded. While a representative from the German consulate in Los Angeles who had
attended the rabbi’s lecture was somewhat irritated that he presented so many negative impressions, the report to Bonn noted that “positive statements from the mouth of a man—who had hitherto only been disapproving toward us—weigh doubly, [thus] one can view the result of Dr. Nussbaum’s Germany trip as satisfactory.”

He added that Nussbaum ultimately offered his congregation “a favorable impression of the direction of the politics of the Federal Republic.”

That Rabbi Nussbaum’s visit did in fact change his own attitude toward Germany can also be seen in his acceptance, while still in Germany, of another official invitation—this time extended by the mayor of Berlin. He took this trip in January of 1966. Yet another invitation from the Foreign Office came in 1967, initiated by the West German ambassador to Israel, Rolf Friedemann Pauls, acknowledging Nussbaum’s growing positive inclination toward Germany after the first two visits. While developing this optimistic outlook, Rabbi Nussbaum never lost his critical edge, however, and continued to make suggestions on how West Germany could do better.

For the diplomats, Nussbaum’s knowledge and interest in Germany and his standing within the American Jewish community made him a useful liaison between that community and the FRG, a role he did not reject. An example of this is Nussbaum’s correspondence with Heinrich Knappstein, West German ambassador to the United States in 1966, on the occasion of the appointment of Kurt Georg Kiesinger as West German chancellor. Because Kiesinger had been a Nazi Party member and head of the Foreign Office’s International Radio Propaganda Office during the Third Reich, his appointment received much opposition within West Germany as well as criticism in the international press. In this situation, Ambassador Knappstein reached out to Nussbaum, sending him the minutes of Kiesinger’s denazification court trial, which had placed him in the “exonerated group.” Based on these findings, Knappstein believed that Kiesinger “did more to oppose the National Socialism [sic] regime in Germany and thereby risked his life to a greater extent that [sic] many a ‘good citizen’ who did not join the party and simply bent his head to allow the storm of National Socialism to pass over him.”

Knappstein was interested to hear Nussbaum’s opinion on the verdict, which mattered to him particularly because Nussbaum was chairman of the American Section of the World Jewish Congress at the time and, as such, potentially able to influence the stance of a greater Jewish community on the Kiesinger issue. After all, he had shown himself to be a critical observer and judge of the German scene and must have appeared trustworthy in the eyes of many in the highly critical wider American Jewish community.

Moreover, Nussbaum was one of the few people in the organization who could in fact read the trial minutes in the German language. Max Nussbaum’s response to Knappstein was again careful in balancing praise and criticism of German actions. He thanked Knappstein for his “thoughtfulness,” expressing that he found the minutes “impressive” and that it put “the whole story in a
somewhat different light.” While he agreed with respect to Kiesinger’s individual merits, Nussbaum stressed that the real problem was the ongoing insensitivity of West German officials, who did not see that a man with former Nazi party membership would be a problematic choice to lead this “new” Germany, irrespective of the extent of his engagement with Nazi activities. He closed the letter by appealing to Knappstein’s own anti-Nazi background and the hope that the new grand coalition government in West Germany would learn from the mistakes of the past and “steer Germany in the direction of a true democracy—a goal so genuinely desired by you and me alike.”

This episode shows that by the mid- to late 1960s, a working relationship had developed between certain German Jewish refugee leaders and German government officials in matters that dealt with the legacy of the Nazi past. During the 1960s, German responsibility for the Nazi past was gradually beginning to become part of West German self-understanding, and consideration for Jewish opinion was an essential part of this self-understanding. Yet this episode also resembles the example at the outset of this chapter, where a German diplomat called American Jews “Israeli people.” Both examples show that there existed a significant gap between the German understanding of Jews and the Jewish perception of Germany and Germans. In response to the myopia of the German government regarding Kiesinger’s Nazi past, Nussbaum pointed out that it was “only 21 years” after the war and that the “world hasn’t forgotten yet” and that “it is the symbol of Nazi membership, even if it was a nominal one only, that stirs the emotions.” While some Germans were beginning to actively engage with their Nazi past, they still had much to learn about how it was viewed from other perspectives, especially that of German Jews, and not least that they could not unilaterally determine how to evaluate that past and when to declare it “absolved.” The interaction between Knappstein and Nussbaum, resembling that of student and teacher, is representative of the larger relationship between Germans and Jewish refugees at the time.

**Social Interactions**

As a consequence of increased interactions between German officials and the refugee community in the realms of politics and public diplomacy, mostly on restitution matters, social interactions increased as well. These interactions took place in various ways. Former German Jewish refugee lawyers and doctors frequently were associated with West German consulates as so-called *Vertrauensanwälte* and *Vertrauensärzte* (independent legal counselors and physicians to whom the consulates referred clients), and these professional contacts sometimes developed into friendly personal relationships, as they did in the case of John Baer, who lived in Los Angeles. Baer had initially “had strong emotional reservations against the
resumption of any kind of relationship with Germans.”¹²⁴ His opinion changed, however, when he found out that most of the consulate’s employees belonged to a younger generation of Germans who had grown up after the war and who shared his view that “they carried a heavy responsibility for the future.” He found his conversations with them “a most interesting and encouraging experience, which in many instances led to lasting personal friendships.”¹²⁵

Additionally, refugees and consulate members participated in each other’s social events. In Los Angeles, for example, while the German consulate had initiated invitations to people from the refugee community, these were subsequently reciprocated, and in the 1960s representatives from the local consulate became regular attendees at events of the Jewish Club of 1933. William Stagen, one-time president of the Club, said, “I don’t recall any important affair, official affair, where we don’t invite the German consulate. And most of the time there are either representatives, in most cases probably the Consul General himself and his wife who appear.”¹²⁶

These occasions were beneficial to both parties. For the German diplomats, they offered insight into the attitude of the émigrés, and at the same time a chance to demonstrate their good will, their support of the refugee community, and Germany’s interest in refugee matters. On occasion, the consular staff were able to give speeches at these events, addressing concerns that the refugees had about occurrences in Germany, while also guiding their attention to topics the Foreign Office deemed important. For the refugees, having German diplomats at their functions created a forum in which they could address the West German state publicly on matters of importance to the community. They used the diplomats as mediators to further their interests, as they could be certain that a report from the event and their praise or criticism of German actions would reach the Foreign Office in Bonn. In addition, by frequently inviting both the West German and the Israeli consuls to their events, the refugees in the United States furthered the German-Israeli relationship, which, as we have seen, was particularly important to them.

Two other incentives for inviting the German diplomats to their functions as well as participating in events at the West German consulate demonstrated the community’s engagement with matters beyond the Nazi persecution of Jewish Germans. First, many refugees greatly appreciated German culture, and such events allowed for conversations with educated Germans. Second, the refugees enjoyed the prestige conferred by the presence of senior diplomats and state representatives. The presence of these officials at their functions was always particularly noted in their publications. To give another example from Los Angeles: upon the arrival of a new consul general in 1967, the Jewish Club made it a point not only to send him a welcome message but also to publish it in their newsletter.¹²⁷ These last two factors should not be interpreted in any respect as a wish to once again become German or to repatriate; however, they demonstrate
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a re-engagement by the refugees with their identity as middle-class Germans. For the German diplomats, on the other hand, the German Jewish refugees were important ambassadors for German culture in the United States and for German-American understanding. In one report from Chicago, a German diplomat described the “emigrants of the Hitler-period” (not specifying a Jewish identity) in this way: “They represent a valuable bridge between the German and American mind and help to give German visitors insight into American life and to create a platform to bring German ideas to the Americans.”

Over the years, friendly personal relations sometimes developed between individual members of the refugee community and the consuls, often over shared interests in German culture or German political or business matters. These interactions would go beyond the formal events of the Consulate and the organized refugee community. For example, the former president of the Los Angeles Jewish Club, Felix Guggenheim, and his wife had a close friendship with Consul General Constantin von Dziembowski and his wife. Even after von Dziembowski left his post in Los Angeles, the couples kept in touch, visited each other in Germany and in California, and maintained a regular correspondence. Relationships like these were possible in the first place only when the German representatives appeared to be genuinely concerned about their country’s past and interested in reconciliation. Then, if they were socially compatible, friendships could be formed. Thus, Annelise Bunzel explained that her friendship with one consul and his wife commenced over the couples’ mutual love of dachshunds and the fact that neither of them had children. These friendships between German Jewish refugees and German officials marked significant turning points in the history of postwar German Jewish relations.

To be sure, the growing relationship between the refugee community and the German state remained fraught with tension. Many refugees steadfastly refused to have anything to do with Germany and Germans, and there were ongoing tensions over restitution and German politics. Nevertheless, considering that at the end of World War II there was almost no direct interaction between the refugee community and Germany, the 1950s and 1960s marked a dramatic change. While initially the contacts were predominantly based on strategic considerations, the dynamic that evolved in the interaction between German officials and refugees played a significant role in the transformation of the German state. In their efforts to shape public opinion on West Germany, some German officials practiced and projected how one might be a member of a democratic Germany. Overall, personal interactions between Germans and refugees in the United States frequently resulted in an increased acceptance of dialogue and even an improved image of West Germany on the part of the refugees. The refugees did not allow themselves to be instrumentalized. Instead, knowing the German need for Jewish legitimization, they used public demonstration of their interests.
to exert pressure on the West German government and the representatives in the United States, whom they frequently came to trust, to follow the path they had pledged to take.

Finally, the satisfaction many refugees gained from their new position of empowerment ought not to be underestimated. It allowed them to engage once again in a relationship with the country many of them felt pained to have lost. For many, however, this was not a relationship that was dominated by nostalgia for the past before emigration. Rather, it was a relationship that allowed them to remain content in their new country but at the same time retain an interest in their former home. Moreover, the special relationship with Germany enabled some of them to embrace their identity as refugees, which for a long time had carried a negative connotation in the United States.

Notes

Several brief passages and some of the overall analysis in this chapter first appeared in Anne Clara Schenderlein, “Making German History in Postwar Los Angeles: German Jewish Refugees, Rabbi Max Nussbaum, and West German Diplomats,” Jewish Culture and History, 17, no. 1–2 (2016): 133–51.

1. The Austrian and Israeli consul generals were invited as well.
2. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin (PA AA), Box (B) 32, Folder (F) 211, letter from Consulate General (CG) LA to Foreign Office (AA) Bonn, Nov. 11, 1965.
3. While historians have written about Germany’s special postwar relationship with the broader American Jewish community and Israel, they have largely overlooked the role that German Jewish refugees played for postwar Germany. See, e.g., Shafir, Ambiguous Relations; Hindenburg, Demonstrating Reconciliation; Wolfsohn and Bokovoy, Eternal Guilt?; Hansen, Aus dem Schatten der Katastrophe.
5. See Shafir, Ambiguous Relations, 179.
6. Ibid.
9. The continuity in the Foreign Office between the Third Reich and the Bundesrepublik has been explored most recently in Conze et al., Das Amt und die Vergangenheit.
10. Ibid., 475–88.


17. See Shafir, Ambiguous Relations. For more detailed information on these diplomats’ biographies, see Lambach, Our Men in Washington.

18. Conze et al., Das Amt, 536–37, and 542–44.

19. Biography of Richard Herz, provided in email conversation by archivists from PA AA.

20. Chronicle of the Jewish Club of 1933, compiled and composed by Alvin Barbanell, Private Collection.


22. Because of the large number of former Nazi Party members who worked in the Foreign Office, it was not always possible to prevent their being posted to German missions in the United States. It seems, however, that the Foreign Office selected its appointments carefully and considered factors beyond party membership. Shafir, Ambiguous Relations, 180, 418n3, n11, and 191.


24. Ibid.

25. For more detail, see Shafir, Ambiguous Relations, 191.

26. Ibid., 185.

27. Ibid., 184.


31. Ibid.


33. Ibid.

34. Rather close relationships developed between some of the German politicians and the representatives of the refugee community. Manfred George and Theodor Heuss, e.g., became very friendly and communicated regularly about political and private matters until Heuss’s death. See Bauer-Hack, Die jüdische Wochenzeitung Aufbau, 143.

35. See Goschler, Wiedergutmachung, 200–1; and Bauer-Hack, 142–43.

36. Constantin Goschler has shown that “public opinion in the United States proved to be the strongest weapon in the struggle for compensation.” See his “German Compensation to Jewish Nazi Victims,” 400.

37. Shafir, American Jews and Germany, 362.


40. Ibid.

45. The refugees were far from alone in their concerns. There existed widespread skepticism within American public opinion about West Germany's commitment to restitution and the stability of the new democracy. In the American press, concerns about a renewed rise of National Socialism and anti-Semitism were rife. See Frei, “Die deutsche Wiedergutmachungspolitik,” 218.
50. See, e.g., Hocketts, “Anwälte der Verfolgten.”
53. An extensive and excellent body of scholarship attests to that. Correspondences between former German Jews and restitution offices certainly included many in which the voice of the German Jew did not convey the confidence and entitlement to restitution that Guggenheim expressed. While German Jews most often expressed frustration and complaint, in some letters they formulated their requests with extreme politeness and humility. There were even letters in which the refugee writers sounded as if the Germans were doing them a favor and as though they were sorry for the work their application created for the German officials. For more on restitution and its reception among those who applied for it, see, e.g., Fischer-Hübner, eds, *Die Kehrseite der “Wiedergutmachung”; Frei et al., eds, Die Praxis der Wiedergutmachung; Hockerts, “Anwälte der Verfolgten”; and works by Cordula Lissner and Tobias Winstel.
55. These are the words used in the “regards” line of several of the letters from the consuls. Different documents in PA AA B81, F334.
57. Ibid.
61. See, e.g., Bergmann and Erb, *Anti-Semitism in Germany*; and Stern, *Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge*.
While Atina Grossmann writes that “interactions with representatives of German consulates” were “almost always distinctly unpleasant” (Grossmann, “Family Files”), the experience in Los Angeles seemed to have been overwhelmingly positive. Mitteilungsblatt 20, no. 2 (February 1966). See also Winstel, “Über die Bedeutung der Wiedergutmachung,” especially 208–9.

64. See, Bauer-Hack, Die jüdische Wochenzeitung Aufbau, 200.
65. See ibid., 200–1.
66. Ibid., 201.
69. Ibid.

70. At the annual meeting of the AMFED in May 1956, Benjamin Ferencz (not a German Jewish refugee but someone who had spent considerable time in Germany in the postwar period) presented his observations on the German scene. About restitution and trustworthy officials, he said, “As far as the attitude of the officials is concerned, it depends upon the official. If you are talking to the Federal Chancellor—his attitude is marvelous. Without the attitude and the spirit of Chancelor [sic] Adenauer, I am quite sure, this program would have taken a substantially different turn. That spirit passes down through the ranks in various degrees.” About the people who worked in the restitution office who might have questioned restitution, he wrote, “Such approaches are largely deficiencies of small people, without vision, understanding or sympathy. They are not policies of the Federal government” (22). About the general population, he reported that there was a “complete lack of any sense of guilt and remorse about what happened” (29). “Generally, however, throughout the country, there is no sense of shame, there is no sense of guilt, there is no remorse, there is a feeling that something unpleasant happened that should be quietly forgotten” (30). Benjamin B. Ferencz, “Observations after Ten Years in Germany,” in American Federation of Jews from Central Europe, Inc., Annual Meeting, Reports and Addresses (New York City: AMFED, 1956).
71. On the reaction of different sections of the American Jewish community, see Shafir, Ambiguous Relations, chapter 11.
72. See “Protest des Council of Jews from Germany” Aufbau 26 (22 January 1960). Further, the community organized events, such as the lecture “Vortrag über Deutschland” by Bruno Weil at the New York New World Club (Aufbau 26 [15 January 1960]). Aufbau journalists did not exclusively blame Germany for the attacks but pointed to an international fascist conspiracy. See Aufbau 26 (8 January 1960) and subsequent issues.
75. Before and during the Eichmann Trial (1961/1962), officials in the Foreign Office were also very sensitive to fostering a good image of Germany. For that reason, one diplomat suggested that Germany circulate books on German resistance during the Nazi period through the German missions. PA, AA, B32, F11.
76. The GDR, interestingly, really did not play much of a role here. A more thorough investigation of how perhaps the refugees looked at West Germany more positively because it engaged with Israel, unlike the GDR, would be important.
77. See Barth and Nussbaum, eds, Max Nussbaum, for more details on his life.
78. Historian Michael A. Meyer’s family was among those who joined the Temple because they had known Nussbaum in Germany. Personal conversation with Michael A. Meyer, Cincinnati, OH, 5 September 2012. See also Barth and Nussbaum, eds, Max Nussbaum, 16.
79. See Barth and Nussbaum, eds, Max Nussbaum, 18–20, for exact dates and details.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. See Max Nussbaum, “Journey with History,” Aufbau 24 (3 September 1958), part 1; and Aufbau 24 (26 September 1958), part 2.
87. Script, “Is Forgiveness Possible?” Ms. Coll. 705, 5/6, 1959, AJA.
88. For a short overview, see Siegfried, “Zwischen Aufarbeitung und Schlußstrich.”
90. See Hindenburg, Demonstrating Reconciliation, 127.
91. Heinrich Knappstein, West German ambassador to the United States at the time. Hindenburg, Demonstrating Reconciliation, 129.
92. Ibid.
94. Die Mahnung, 15 March 1965, newspaper clipping in Ms. Coll. 705, 7/1 1965, AJA.
95. See also Shafir, Ambiguous Relations, 195; and Hindenburg, Demonstrating Reconciliation, 190–91.
96. See also Miquel, “Explanation, Dissociation, Apologia,” 58.
98. The author of the piece, Walter Wicclair, was a refugee himself. As an actor and director who had been ousted by the Nazis, he became active in the postwar period in calling attention to theater in the Third Reich and Nazi actions against artists. Ibid.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
104. Letter from AA Berlin to AA Bonn, March 1, 1961, PA AA, B32, F179. Galinski’s choice of the phrase “actual situation” likely results from the fact that Jewish observers from outside were sometimes more skeptical about the existence of Jews in Germany. The head of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, Van Dam, at times criticized foreign Jewish organizations for meddling in matters that concerned the Jewish community in Germany (PA AA, B32, F107). During the height of anti-Semitic incidents in 1959–60, Van Dam believed the situation was not as bad as presented in the press and that “Antigermanism” was one reason foreign countries paid so much attention to the anti-Semitic incidents.
106. PA AA, B32, F179 and F232.
107. Max Nussbaum, “How New Is the ‘New’ Germany?” July 23, 1965, Ms. Coll. 705, 7/1 1965, AJA. The speech was the sermon of the Friday night service at his temple but was also advertised as a lecture in the newsletter of the Jewish Club of 1933 under the title “Das neue Deutschland—ist es neu?” Mitteilungsblatt 19, no. 7 (July 1965).
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
112. Tagesspiegel, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Münchner Merkur.
113. Max Nussbaum, “My Impressions of the ‘New’ Germany,” July 27, 1965, Ms. Coll. 7057/1 1965, AJA. The text is dated July 27 but it appears to be an almost identical version of the original sermon, of which no complete version is archived.
114. Ibid.
116. Ibid.
117. Deutschlandreise des Rabbiners Dr. Max Nussbaum, Präsident der Zionist in den USA, CG LA to AA Bonn, August 20, 1965.
118. See, e.g., CG LA (Kiderlen) to AA Bonn, zu Hd. des Herrn Leiters Referats L 3 o.V.i.A. Vertraulich! PA AA B 32 F 246, LA, Feb. 28, 1967.
121. Ibid.
122. Constantin Goschler and Anthony Kauders explain the developments in the relationship between Jews in Germany and non-Jewish Germans and the ways in which some German Jewish “dignitaries” saw themselves also as important mediators of democracy, and mediators between the Federal Republic and Israel and Jews more generally. In Brenner, ed., Die Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland, 355ff.; Gassert and Steinweis, Coping with the Nazi Past. For a short overview, see Jarausch, "Critical Memory and Civil Society"; Geller, Jews in Post-Holocaust Germany.
123. Historians of restitution have described the processes and practices of restitution as learning processes. I agree with that characterization and would extend it to the larger field of dealing with the Nazi past and communication and understanding between Jewish refugees and non-Jewish Germans. See Brunner et al., “Komplizierte Lernprozesse.” The publication of the correspondence in the Review of the World Jewish Congress communicated the balance of power in this relationship to a considerable audience.
125. Ibid.
127. Mitteilungsblatt 21, no. 9 (September 1967).
128. PA AA, B32, F211: “Bericht über das Deutschtum in Chicago,” from CG Chicago to AA Bonn, March 1962. This raises the question of which kinds of outreach were directed specifically at Jewish refugees or refugees/emigrants more generally. In Los Angeles, the communities partly overlapped, and invitations to cultural events at the consulate seemed to have gone out to all.


131. See chapter 1. Interview Annelise Bunzel.

132. One revealing example is the reaction of some refugees to a speech Rabbi Joachim Prinz, a former rabbi in Berlin and then president of the American Jewish Congress, gave in Los Angeles in late 1962. His rather critical account of Germany caused some people to accuse him of wanting to “incite new hatred.” In the aftermath of the speech, the local consulate received calls from various German Jews, including one rabbi, who wanted to express their disapproval of Prinz’s remarks—a gesture akin to reassuring a hurt friend of one’s loyalty in the face of criticism. This reveals that some refugees felt somewhat closer to West Germany than to the larger American Jewish community. PA AA, B32, F154: Letter, General Consul Kiderlen, Los Angeles, to AA Bonn, Dec. 7, 1962.