Chapter 3

The Enemy Alien Classification, 1941–1944

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the German Jewish immigrant community promptly stated its total and unanimous support for the United States. Under the capital-lettered headline “United We Stand,” the first issue of Aufbau after Pearl Harbor delivered this unequivocal statement:

At this moment, the immigrants who in recent years have found asylum and a new homeland under the Star Spangled Banner, put forth but one desire and pledge: to stand side by side with the American people, to help them to the best of their abilities in the defense of our country and its ideals. These immigrants, composed of people from many countries and speaking many languages, are one in their faith in democracy, their hatred of any kind of dictatorship, and their love for the nation that gave them a home.¹

The statement was translated into several different languages—among them Spanish, French, and Hebrew, representing the different places German Jews had fled to. This declaration of loyalty to the United States was consistent with refugees’ tone before Pearl Harbor and reflects once again their determination to establish themselves as Americans. As with many of their public statements at this time, German Jewish refugees emphasized that they belonged just like the multitude of other immigrants in the United States, rather than focusing on their particular German Jewish identity. Their desire to disassociate themselves from Germany with such statements was partly motivated by the particular political climate of deep suspicion toward immigrants from Axis countries in the United States at the time. Prior to Pearl Harbor, there was concern within the refugee community that America’s entry into the war might exacerbate this suspicion. Yet despite these concerns over its effect on their own status in the

¹Notes from this chapter begin on page 75.
country, the entry into the war meant a great deal to the Jewish refugees from Germany, and clearly something different than for most other immigrants in the United States. Though Aufbau’s declaration highlighted refugees’ determination to defend America in solidarity with any other immigrant group, many refugees had impatiently longed for America to join the conflict in hopes it would change conditions in Europe. Kurt Klein, a refugee who had arrived in the United States in 1937, leaving behind his parents in Germany, recalled his feelings many years later:

I had hoped that, once the war started in Europe, America would get involved because I saw it as the only way to stop that tremendous evil. All of the political developments were absolutely predictable to someone who knew the conditions in Germany and the brutality of the Nazis. So I did expect war to break out, although I didn’t know when that would be. It was a great frustration for me to stand by and see all of these developments that I knew were going to happen without being able to do anything or help my parents more. So it came as a great relief when America entered the war, for as tragic and dramatic [as] that was for its people, it had to be done. Instead of being a powerless bystander, I found out that now I could actually play a small role in the defeat of this monster.²

Klein was no exception. Many hoped that America might come to the rescue of family members and friends who had remained in Europe. Furthermore, U.S. participation in the war seemed to promise an escape from the helplessness many refugees had increasingly felt in the face of what was happening in their former homeland. Many hoped to join in the fight against Hitler.³

The desire to be identified as Americans and to fight as such for American ideals and against Hitler were stifled, however, when the U.S. government classified German Jewish refugees as enemy aliens after America declared war. This designation officially and inescapably reduced refugees, despite all their efforts at Americanization beforehand and demonstrations and declarations of loyalty to the U.S. after it, to their German national origin, and ignored their Jewish identity and specific history with Germany. Thus, U.S. policy toward them significantly influenced their relationship with Germany and their German Jewish identity at this time. While scholars have noted the classification of German Jewish refugees as enemy aliens, they have treated it largely as a technical issue without significant repercussions on that community.⁴ This understanding results largely from a general focus in German Jewish immigrant history on studying the East Coast. The refugee experience, however, varied significantly depending on their place of residence. While the enemy alien classification remained indeed principally a technical issue in the rest of the country, additional regulations and restrictions for enemy aliens living in parts of the Western United States had immediate practical and psychological consequences for the great number of refugees in Southern California, the second largest center of refugee settlement.
There, the classification revived memories of refugees’ recent oppressive past in
Germany while complicating their pursuit of Americanization and their partic-
ipation in the war effort. In their arguments against being classified as enemy
aliens, refugees now emphasized their particular German Jewish identity, and
especially their position as victims of the Nazis—in contrast to their previous
endeavors to stress similarities with other immigrant groups in the United States.

**Distress over Refugees’ Wartime Status in the United States**

The majority of refugees arrived in the United States in 1938, and while they
generally applied for U.S. citizenship soon after, by 1941 most refugees had not
yet fulfilled the five-year residence requirement that would have made them eligi-
ble for naturalization. In the weeks preceding Pearl Harbor, many refugees were
concerned about how it might affect their status as nonnaturalized aliens should
the United States enter the war. Various government agencies, particularly the
Justice and War Departments, were increasingly suspicious and anxious about
refugees, and the media speculated about potential threats refugees and other
aliens posed to U.S. security. There were rumors of the government building
internment camps, and the hostile atmosphere prompted refugees to worry about
their future. Reinforcing insecurities was their knowledge of how other coun-
tries had treated German Jewish refugees once war broke out, with the United
Kingdom’s mass internment of aliens beginning in May 1940, including German
Jewish refugees, the best known and most foreboding example. Several *Aufbau*
articles addressed these insecurities, some subscribing to them, others not. While
one author called for the government to publicize definite, unambiguous infor-
mation “so that much unnecessary mental anguish might be spared to tens of
thousands of the refugees and their families,” *Aufbau* journalist Wilfried Hüls
cautioned refugee readers not to let themselves be drawn into such anxiety. In
his opinion, their fears emanated from rumors, exaggerations, and refugees’ own
past negative experiences, not objective circumstances. He was convinced that
the United States was deeply dedicated to democratic principles, so it would not
infringe on its recent immigrants’ freedom and human rights. Hüls’s conviction
derived from the assurances of politicians and spokespeople who had long advo-
cated for Central European refugees in the United States and had met under his
chairmanship for a symposium on “Recent Immigrants and National Defense”
at the Immigrants’ Conference on 3 December 1941, in New York. There, four
days before Pearl Harbor, Eleanor Roosevelt herself had assured the audience
that “non-citizens need feel no anxiety” about detention or internment.

But Hüls was overly optimistic, and initially many of the community’s fears
were realized. On 8 December 1941, President Roosevelt issued an executive
order declaring all nonnaturalized Germans and Italians over age fourteen “enemy
aliens,” including stateless aliens who had once been citizens or subjects of Germany and Italy.\(^\text{10}\) This meant that the regulations the president had passed just the day before, 7 December 1941, for Japanese Americans now also applied to them. They restricted free movement to and from certain areas, such as the Hawaiian Islands, the Philippine Islands, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Furthermore, no enemy aliens were permitted near military and naval facilities, airports, harbors, power plants, or any places connected to national defense.\(^\text{11}\) There were also restrictions of movement, travel, and change of occupation. Air travel of any kind was allowed only with permission of the Attorney General, Secretary of War, or their respective representatives.\(^\text{12}\) In addition, enemy aliens were not allowed to possess or use firearms, ammunition, bombs, explosives, or material that could be used to produce such things, nor short-wave radios, transmitting sets, signal devices, codes, cameras, or any kind of material such as books, pictures, documents, maps, etc., that could reveal anything about U.S. defense.\(^\text{13}\) Any kind of affiliation or support of organizations deemed potentially threatening by the Attorney General was prohibited as well.\(^\text{14}\) While not all of the regulations affected many refugees on a daily basis, the proclamation generated the most anxiety in its declaration that all enemy aliens could be subject to removal, apprehension, detention, and interment, because speculation about it had existed before the United States entered the war, and because of its breadth and vagueness.\(^\text{15}\)

In the first weeks after German Jewish refugees were classified as enemy aliens, there was much confusion over its specifics and the practical consequences it would have for them. This was especially true because, after they had initially been issued in December 1941, the regulations were subject to change, redesignation, and respecification by the Attorney General and other authorized officials. Confusion was exacerbated by the contrary messages communicated to the community by the designation and enforcement of the act on the one hand, and mollifying pronouncements by public figures on the other. \textit{Aufbau} served as the primary medium communicating information about the regulations to the refugee community while also offering refugees advice on how to act. In the first issue after the attack on Pearl Harbor, \textit{Aufbau} reiterated prior warnings against speaking German in public. It warned refugees to avoid making themselves identifiable as Germans, as there had reportedly been incidents where German speakers had been treated in “displeasing” ways.\(^\text{16}\) It further advised refugees to eschew obviously foreign or conspicuous behavior that could attract negative attention, carry their registration cards at all times, and keep their first citizenship papers where they could immediately be accessed. Beyond such suggestions for refugees’ security, \textit{Aufbau} also urged them to engage in activities that would demonstrate their loyalty and support of the war effort, such as donating blood and purchasing war bonds.\(^\text{17}\)

\textit{Aufbau} also tried to make sense of and justify government actions to the community, thereby projecting compliance and loyalty to the state and the wider
public. *Aufbau* journalists presented a consistent message of trust in the U.S. government and its efforts to prevent hardships for Jewish refugees from Germany and other Axis countries. As it had in the months prior to the U.S. entrance into the war, *Aufbau* frequently referred to statements by politicians and officials assuring the public that loyal aliens would be safe. One such statement, by Attorney General Francis Biddle, declared that many people classified as aliens were “‘aliens’ in the technical sense of the word only” and that the government would make every effort “to protect them from discrimination or abuse.”

*Aufbau* editors’ stance in reporting on the enemy alien classification was inspired by their belief in the regular, sympathetic pronouncements from the government authorities; it appears the editors aimed to maintain refugees’ hope and calm while sending a message of compliance and goodwill to the authorities.

Individual contributions from refugees to *Aufbau* show that in the weeks after Pearl Harbor, refugees largely went along with this message from the paper and the authorities: they took the classification as a necessary but temporary evil. Alfred Pinkus from Los Angeles, for example, wrote that it must be clear to refugees that the enemy alien legislation was really in their own interest and that they as a group would not want to be spared any discomfort if it meant risking that actual enemies could get away. Elow, who was an active organizer of cultural events for the Jewish Club of 1933 in Los Angeles, expressed his attitude toward the classification in a small poem:

**We Aliens**

What do we have to do?
We have to wait,
until we are called.—
But then we have to be there.

What do we have to do?
We have to wait.
But before we are called,
we have to be ready.

What do we have to do?
We have to wait.
But when we are called,
we have to give everything.
Our life too.—
THAT is what we have to do.

Several *Aufbau* articles mirrored this attitude of service by showcasing the different ways refugees could present their readiness and loyalty in supporting the defense effort: by being active in the State Guard or, if one did not have much
time or money, raising funds for the war by buying war stamps. These articles all suggested that these actions would surely soon lead to the classification being lifted.

Further bolstering refugees’ hope that the classification would be lifted was German legislation expatriating all Jews residing outside of the German Reich, which passed in November 1941. Aufbau characterized this legal separation from the German state as an honor for the Jews and an act to be welcomed. One Ernest Golm put it like this: “In reality, we are not Germans any longer, and we are proud of the fact that all ties that in any way, whatsoever, could connect us with Nazi Germany have been cut for good and all.” Jews had practically been ousted from society in the Third Reich by discrimination, persecution, and alienation in Germany before they emigrated, and, as chapter 2 showed, most refugees viewed themselves as permanent immigrants—they were eager to make the United States their new home, and acquiring American citizenship was naturally part of this. Thus, the German expatriation decree was merely legal recognition of their lived reality rather than a further iniquity. Nevertheless, the announcement of the German decree was particularly welcome at the time, since the United States had not previously legally acknowledged refugees’ actual detachment from Germany. Paradoxically then, and disconcertingly for the community, American legislation harmed refugees’ aspirations while Nazi legislation advanced them. The German legislation did, subsequently, become extremely important in refugees’ strategies to demonstrate their loyalty to the American state and in arguments against their classification as enemy aliens. With this legislation, as an Aufbau commentator wrote,

> the German Government has made abundantly clear to all the world that it considers all Jews residing abroad as enemies. Unfortunately, however, many of them are still regarded by the authorities as German nationals in a formal legal sense. . . . Our fellow American citizens will undoubtedly realize that the term “enemy alien” is hardly applicable to the loyal immigrant from Nazi-occupied countries, and that it has no reality but a questionable, formal, legal meaning.

Some refugees feared that the label enemy alien could become dangerous for them if Americans failed to appreciate that they were only “technically” classified as enemy aliens or were unable to differentiate between “real” and “un-real” enemy aliens. This perspective could be heard particularly on the West Coast, where the enemy alien situation was more unsettling than in the rest of the country. The optimistic tone of Aufbau journalists was intrinsically connected to their residing on the East Coast. In California, with its concentration of defense industries, military locations, and a large Japanese population, the enemy alien issue was pervasive and fraught. In the weeks following Pearl Harbor, many Californians came to perceive people of Japanese ancestry living among them as a threat. Newspapers published accounts of alleged sabotage and
other subversive activities by Japanese people. Consequently, demands to move the Japanese inland and away from strategic defense zones on the Pacific Coast became quite pronounced and sometimes hysterical. While the term “alien enemy” as widely used in the press primarily referred to the Japanese and only mentioned German and Italian aliens in passing, many refugees feared for their own safety and worried that people might direct their suspicions toward them as well. Signs in restaurants saying “enemy aliens keep out” gave credence to these fears. Moreover, this sort of behavior was disturbingly reminiscent of refugees’ experiences in Germany when their countrymen had hung up signs saying “non-Aryans keep out.”

In a statement a group of refugees from the San Francisco Bay Area sent to Attorney General Francis Biddle, they expressed that they believed that terms such as “friend and foe,” ‘ally’ and ‘enemy’ mean so much to the nation in wartime” and that people would likely make judgments based on those names. The writers were concerned that “emergency measures [might be] extended to all those who are called ‘enemy aliens,’” irrespective of their attitude toward the United States. To show refugees’ “true” attitude, the writers emphasized refugees’ dedication to America and its ideals with reference to the German expatriation decree and their own “fight” against Hitler, which had caused them much hardship and suffering (the writers included formerly active political opponents of the Nazis). The writers thus petitioned Attorney General Biddle to have the refugees “be named and treated as ‘refugees from Nazi Oppression’ instead of ‘enemy aliens.’” No such amendment of status was granted, however.

This letter was just one early example of refugees urging government authorities to revoke the enemy alien status. Arguments for the reclassification frequently relied on similar reasoning and all centered around the refugees’ “true identity.” Whereas they had previously referred to themselves simply as immigrants or refugees, Aufbau reporters now frequently used the terms “refugee-immigrants” and “anti-Hitler refugees” to leave no room for doubt about their more specific, anti-German identity, which was loyal to the United States.

On 9 February 1942, Attorney General Biddle announced that all those who had registered as Austrians, Austro-Hungarians, and Koreans under the Alien Registration Act of 1940, and who never thereafter became citizens of Germany, Italy, or Japan voluntarily, were exempted from the alien enemy regulations. The same exemption even applied to former German, Italian, or Japanese citizens who had become citizens of another country before the declaration of war. The refugees did not find these exemptions fully satisfying. As they were keen to point out, Hitler-friendly people were more likely to be found among Austrians, for example, or among some of the other immigrant groups, than among German Jewish refugees. They argued that it was much easier for them to demonstrate their complete lack of allegiance to their homeland because they had not only
been persecuted by Germans but also legally expatriated and expropriated from Germany. Concerning the exemption for individuals who acquired citizenship of another non-Axis country before arriving in America, refugees argued that this could hardly be a criterion for loyalty to the United States. Willy Jacobsohn of Los Angeles, for example, in a letter to the director of the Enemy Alien Control Unit, indicated that he and his wife could easily have obtained Dutch citizenship or a Liechtenstein passport when they had initially fled to those countries from Germany. But they had “refused to do this.” Jacobsohn explained: “The reason was the feeling that we should not apply for another citizenship than the citizenship of the country in which we intend to live permanently, i.e., the United States of America.”

Another statement contesting the idea that refugees who took citizenship in another country first “excel in loyalty to the United States” was titled “‘Enemy aliens’ is a term which is not a mere technical concept, but has become a vital problem for those concerned.” This shows that, by then, refugees explicitly rejected the technicality argument authorities had been propagating. Another statement contesting the idea that refugees who took citizenship in another country first “excel in loyalty to the United States” was titled “‘Enemy aliens’ is a term which is not a mere technical concept, but has become a vital problem for those concerned.” This shows that, by then, refugees explicitly rejected the technicality argument authorities had been propagating.31 Aufbau reported that many refugees had become somewhat depressed because of this label.

The insecurity in the refugee community about the consequences of their status as enemy aliens reached a new height in mid-February of 1942. After government authorities had repeatedly assured loyal aliens for weeks that they should “not be afraid,” President Roosevelt signed an executive order on 19 February 1942, authorizing the military—that is, the secretary of war and his commanders—to establish military areas where they deemed necessary.32 From such military areas, subsequently created in strategically sensitive spaces along the Pacific Coast, “any or all persons [could] be excluded” by the military commander. This legislation formed the legal basis for the removal and internment of Japanese Americans.33 While it only immediately affected six German Jewish refugee families forced to leave their homes, West Coast refugees were increasingly unsettled about their insecure status.34

The actions Western Defense Commander Lieutenant General John L. De Witt took on 3 March demonstrated that West Coast refugees’ fears were well warranted. While civilian authorities had continually tried to allay refugees’ concerns (and Aufbau had emphasized these efforts), De Witt belied this stance by announcing that all enemy aliens would be gradually evacuated from Military Zone No. 1—the entire coastline of California, Washington, and Oregon, as well as the southern sections of California and Arizona along the Mexican border—with no exemptions for German and Italian enemy aliens.35 Refugees living in these areas were duly shocked. The following excerpt of a telegram the Jewish Club of 1933 sent to the Council for Aliens of Enemy Nationality in New York illustrates the Los Angeles community’s distress, also in relation to the recent traumatic experiences of persecution and flight many therein had endured:
Thousands of antinazi refugees here are in panic and distress as no word about exemptions for victims of nazi oppression and persecution forthcoming... doubly distressed because trusting in francis biddles [sic] assurances about protecting loyal innocent refugees... spiritual strengths and power of endurance will be broken in most of them if they will have to suffer terribly after they learned to rely on the democratic refuge of the united states... much damage is done and being caused continuously by uncertainty... our members urge you to intervene in Washington without delay and to get clear unmistakable statement whether it is really contemplated to remove thousands of refugees from their home exactly like nazis... every day counts as every day brings new harm.36

Given the desperate anxiety De Witt’s announcement engendered among West Coast German Jewish refugees, refugee organizations there intensified their efforts to have the enemy alien classification removed.

The Tolan Committee

Once the United States entered the war and German refugees’ status in the country became ever more precarious, West Coast organizations shifted their attention from helping newcomers get settled by providing social, educational, and cultural activities to representing this group politically and resolving the enemy alien problem.37 Their first action was their participation in the hearings of the Tolan Committee, a select House of Representatives committee named after its chairman, John H. Tolan, and tasked with investigating migration, including the forced movement of large groups for national defense purposes.38 When rumors regarding evacuation plans began circulating, the committee scheduled hearings in San Francisco, Portland, Seattle, and Los Angeles. Representatives of the West Coast German Jewish refugee community hoped that presenting their case before this committee would help bring about exemption from evacuation and the enemy alien classification. In the context of these hearings, refugee organizations also began to coordinate their activities. Refugees first appeared before the committee in Seattle on 2 March. Subsequent to that hearing, Elsa Winners Schwerin, a representative from Seattle, sent a letter to the Los Angeles Jewish Club, reporting about the work the refugees had been doing in their city to fight the classification and commenting on the “wonderful public response” they had received. Schwerin pointed out, however, that the American Jewish community reaction had been quite different, writing, “In fact, a man was sent from the Joint Committee in New York to try keep us away from being publicly heard.” He had “frighten[ed] refugee groups” in San Francisco and Portland, who thereafter refrained from appearing before the committee. It appears that the larger American Jewish community generally did not support German Jewish refugees in the enemy alien matter but responded to the classification...
much like they subsequently did to the discriminatory treatment of the Nikkei, people of Japanese ancestry: extremely cautious, mostly silent, but expressing their trust that authorities were acting correctly. A letter from the B’nai B’rith Anti-Defamation League in Chicago (not one of the areas most affected) replying to a refugee’s appeal exemplifies this attitude: “Please be assured that we are professionally concerned and stirred by the circumscriptions placed upon our brethren. We must be sufficiently objective, however, to be tolerant of some of the necessities imposed upon the government in order to guard against physical and psychological sabotage.” American Jewish organizations dedicated to directly working with refugees, like the National Refugee Service, showed more understanding for their situation and cooperated with them. Ellen Eisenberg explained the Western Jewish community’s silence regarding the treatment of the Nikkei as a sort of paralysis arising from the tension between their dedication to fighting injustice and discrimination and their dedication to the war effort. The lack of vocal support for German Jewish refugees may be seen in the same light. Nonetheless, German Jewish refugees were not discouraged by that. Schwerin reported from Seattle that they did not let themselves be intimidated and that the Tolan Committee had been overwhelmingly sympathetic to their case.

In Los Angeles, refugees also hoped for a favorable reception. At the hearings on March 7, they were represented by Felix Guggenheim from the Jewish Club, Hans F. Schwarzer (another refugee), and also three famous German exiles who had found a haven in Los Angeles: Thomas Mann, Bruno Frank, and Lion Feuchtwanger; Feuchtwanger submitted a written statement. Thomas Mann was not classified as an enemy alien himself because he had taken on Czech citizenship and was thus exempt, but he contributed regularly to Aufbau on topics concerning the refugee community as a whole. Prior to the 3 March declaration, Mann had written President Roosevelt on a topic “close to [his] heart,” advocating that German refugees fleeing the Nazis should be exempt from the enemy alien classification. His prominence in the United States and his engagement in the matter prompted his invitation to speak before the committee. Mann, Frank, Feuchtwanger, and Guggenheim all made similar contributions, focusing on portraying the refugees as victims who had first suffered wrongful treatment under the Nazis and were now suffering from the enemy alien classification. They openly compared the effects of Nazi and U.S. legislation, emphasizing the similar suffering both had entailed for the refugees.

Felix Guggenheim, born in Constance, Germany, in 1904, had arrived in the United States in late 1940 and become active in the Los Angeles Jewish Club, where he led a committee concerned with addressing the problems of the enemy alien classification on the West Coast. In his statement before the Tolan Committee, he explained that refugees still bore the “scars” of Nazism “on their bodies or on their minds” and that it would be “the worst tragedy for them” to be treated as enemies by the country they felt was their new home. Bruno Frank
reinforced this image of the distressed refugee by telling the story of a young refugee girl as an exemplar of many ordinary refugees. When the young woman emigrated, she had to leave her parents behind in Germany. Since her arrival in the United States, she had been writing them letters about her wonderful life in America and promised that she would bring them over, too. Then Frank asked the committee considering the enemy alien classification, “Well, Sir, what should she write now, if write she could. I am no longer among friends? I am considered an enemy now just as the beasts who are torturing you. Forget all about it. It was but a dream. Go to Poland, and die.”

Felix Guggenheim even invoked the idea that U.S. actions could contribute to fulfilling Hitler’s goal and stressed that the classification and plans for evacuation contradicted and hurt America and democracy. The day refugees from Nazi oppression were to be interned, he stated, “would be counted by history as a first class victory of Hitlerism against democracy.”

Although these speakers compared U.S. legislation with Nazism to express how severely the U.S. law impacted refugees, they emphasized that they did not believe the United States—“this great Nation which is fighting for freedom and human dignity”—would actually implement policies like those of the Nazis. They proclaimed their trust that the nation, with agencies like the FBI, would manage to distinguish dangerous aliens from America-friendly refugees. They also suggested that examination boards could be set up to aid in this differentiation process. Such local boards had been established in England to investigate refugees, subsequently exempting loyal refugees from restrictions and identifying them in their registration certificates as “victims of Nazi oppression.” Guggenheim had spent time in England before coming to the United States and now shared his firsthand knowledge of procedures for establishing these boards with the Tolan Committee. In England, reclassified refugees were subsequently allowed to contribute to England’s war effort against the Nazis—which was, all speakers agreed, what the refugees longed for. Emphasizing that reclassification was really in the best interest of America, its citizens, and its aim of defeating the Axis powers, Bruno Frank asserted the loyalty of the refugees: “No group, by its hatred of evil and its love of freedom, could be closer united in spirit to the American soldier than these very people.”

In addition to these speakers from the refugee community, the Tolan Committee received personal and written testimonies on behalf of refugees from individuals in the political arena and community and religious organizations. California’s Governor Olson and Los Angeles’s Mayor Bowron followed an invitation to give their opinion on the enemy alien question, and both supported the establishment of hearing boards for Italian and German aliens, although they favored the evacuation of the entire Japanese population. Carey McWilliams, a vocal civil liberties activist, journalist, lawyer, and, in 1942, director of the Division of Immigration and Housing, also advocated the reclassification of
German Jewish refugees. Similar to the refugee speakers, he argued that “if any group merits special consideration, it is this group.” The support from these public individuals of diverse backgrounds and political affiliations indicates that, within general public opinion, German Jewish refugees were not seen as dangerous persons who should be subjected to the same treatment many deemed necessary for people of Japanese ancestry.

As in Seattle, the atmosphere at the Tolan Committee hearings in Los Angeles was very favorable and friendly toward the refugees. Aufbau reported extensively on the hearings, printing the statements of all the speakers from the refugee community, repeatedly emphasizing high expectations for a positive outcome, not least because so many prominent and influential speakers had participated.

Indeed, the plans to evacuate all German and Italian aliens were not carried out in the end. The testimonies by influential people highlighting German and Italian loyalty and support for their exemption in the general public, largely due to the absence of deep-seated racism that made the case against the Japanese, were reasons for this. Further, evacuating Italian and German aliens did not seem feasible. The preliminary findings of the Tolan Committee, issued on 19 March 1942, suggested that there were too many German and Italians and that evacuating them would impede the war effort. Nevertheless, while the committee recommendations spared these refugees evacuation, it did not exempt them from the enemy alien classification.

**Practical Consequences of the Enemy Alien Classification**

While the classification itself, frequent amendments to the legislation, and uncertainty over possible future legislation precipitated great fear and distress among West Coast refugees, the regulations for German and Italian aliens residing in designated Military Zone No. 1 that De Witt issued on 24 March 1942 had very real material and practical everyday consequences. These included a curfew between 8:00PM and 6:00AM, during which enemy aliens were not permitted to leave their homes, and a travel restriction stipulating that they could not go more than five miles from their residence. After Aufbau’s exceedingly optimistic picture of the Tolan Committee hearings had fueled refugees’ hopes, these new restrictions provoked great disappointment and new fears among them. One San Francisco refugee who had become particularly active in fighting the enemy alien classification wrote a letter to Felix Guggenheim in Los Angeles expressing tremendous disapproval of Aufbau’s treatment of the West Coast situation. He wrote that hope-raising articles about the idea that the “central authorities” were particularly friendly toward the case of the refugees were not justifiable, since they were “certainly not based on any facts.” Such reporting, he believed,
was rather harmful to the fight against the classification on the front line in the West. However, Aufbau’s editor in chief, Manfred George, in a letter to Guggenheim, refuted such accusations from the West Coast that the newspaper had deliberately published false captions to create an optimistic atmosphere and increase its sales.\cite{59} George averred that Aufbau reporters had treated the alien question very carefully and had cooperated quite closely with authorities. This small episode once again highlights the significant discrepancy between East and West Coast perceptions—borne of different political climates and everyday experiences—of the enemy alien classification during this time. Aufbau reporters in New York had more reason to trust the statements of the authorities because the East Coast situation did not feel nearly as threatening to refugees as it did to those on the West Coast, where, despite government officials’ positive messages, the enemy alien classification had negatively impacted refugees from the beginning.\cite{60} While the tension between East and West Coast organizations persisted, those on the East Coast eventually acknowledged the discrepancy. George, in a letter to Guggenheim from September 1942, admitted that evaluating the overall situation from the East Coast was sometimes difficult and may have precipitated misrepresentations.\cite{61}

Aufbau’s projection of trust in the authorities did, indeed, prove to have been optimistic, at least regarding the West. There, the favorable inclination of civilian authorities and public individuals toward German Jewish refugees did not hold sway; their promise that the classification would remain a mere technicality for these refugees proved false. Crucially, this resulted from authority over the enemy alien matter shifting from civilian to military authorities, and also from confusion about which department ultimately held the final authority. Originally, the Justice Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, under the direction of Attorney General Francis Biddle, had jurisdiction over enemy alien matters. Roosevelt’s Executive Order of 19 February 1942 transferred this authority to the War Department, and thus, on the West Coast, to the Western Defense Command headed by General De Witt. So while civilian authorities remained sympathetic to the refugees, they repeatedly emphasized that “questions of curfew and evacuation on the West Coast” were no longer within their jurisdiction.\cite{62} The War Department largely considered the classification a military necessity, though some officials also acknowledged that the refugees had fled Nazi persecution.\cite{63} Ultimately, after various departments sparred over who had the authority to change refugees’ classification, nothing was done about it.\cite{64} Thus, while government officials recognized how unfair the classification was, they never felt the injustice warranted a change. Instead, the government pursued a strategy of stressing the need for the classification for internal security reasons not directly related to refugees, downplaying the effects—“the actual restraint of personal liberties of non-dangerous alien enemies is relatively mild”—and praising refugees for their “spirit of cooperation, which loyal members of the group,
almost without exception, have displayed in conscientiously carrying out their part of the Government’s program.”

West Coast refugees did not react to their inclusion in the curfew restrictions with understanding, however, but rather with unanimous incomprehension. Some became dejected, as an *Aufbau* commentary aptly summarized: “Confidence in the future—so essential for people who have lost a great deal of their past—has shrunk overnight to the vanishing point.” This trope of loss of hope for a good future in the United States in the context of the refugees’ recent past appears in many of their statements related to the enemy alien classification. Dubiously tactful proclamations by officials about the relatively mild inconvenience of the classification compared to what refugees had endured under the Nazis were neither convincing nor effective in calming fears. After all, the discrimination refugees had suffered under the Nazis had itself started in relatively small ways. Furthermore, since promises that the classification was a mere technicality had proved untrue, how could one trust the authorities now? Numerous refugees reacted to the curfew with outrage. In the weeks and months after the restrictions passed, many wrote to the authorities urging them to lift the classification, as the latest orders endangered “businesses and jobs, causing us greatest difficulties and imposing severe hardships upon us, making it impossible to earn a livelihood.”

Although refugees had at times declared their understanding that they were part of a nation at war, and that sacrifices must be made, they had also repeatedly argued that this “great nation” should not support procedures that, as they pointed out directly, were similar to those of the tyrannical dictatorship they had fled.

The curfew and five-mile travel restrictions did indeed impinge severely on their everyday life, especially in the sprawl of Los Angeles. An article in *Aufbau*’s “Westküste” section described the particularly serious impact on occupational groups such as salesmen, storekeepers, truck drivers, various night workers, bakers, and dairy employees, who could not perform their jobs as required, leading many of them to resign. Moreover, inevitably, while such discrimination was not legal, employers were disinclined to hire refugees because their enemy alien status affected their “usefulness.” Professional status did not grant any privilege, either: physicians and nurses were also subject to the restrictions because their status “was not recognized by the army order.” Consequently, they were not allowed to see their patients after 8 p.m., even in emergencies. The flip side of healthcare illustrates the severity of the restrictions: sick “enemy aliens” were not allowed to go to the hospital if it was more than five miles from their home—not even pregnant women in labor when this coincided with the curfew. People were prohibited from going to services at their church or temple by the regulations. High school and university students were especially affected, as *Aufbau*’s West Coast edition pointed out. One young refugee
named Frank Ullmann illustrated this in a letter to Felix Guggenheim of the Jewish Club. Ullmann recounted his persecution by the Nazis as a school boy in Germany and then Sweden, where his family had first fled. After coming to the United States, he experienced school “like a paradise” and had his happiest moments in years when his parents got their first papers. But the enemy alien issue undid this:

Now came the Enemy Aliens question, and because I was a former German citizen by birth, I was to be an enemy alien. I think this is very ridiculous. I, who hate the Nazis more than any American, am called an enemy alien, and the law is again pointing at me to suffer under more pressure.

I am ashamed to tell my fellows that I am not able to come to them to study or have fun in the evening. I only hope that I also will get the opportunity to do something; I think a job against the Nazis, I can work and will.

Guggenheim received several such letters highlighting how the restrictions caused refugees various hardships and inhibited their Americanization and participation in the war effort. Another letter was written by seventeen-year-old William Schwarzer, who had been elected to a leadership position within the Eagle Scouts and could not perform his duties because of the curfew. It exemplifies how the classification struck at the heart of all that was so significant and intrinsically entangled for them: their past experiences of oppression, their dedication to America, and their desire to contribute to the war effort:

Ever since we have been living here, we have tried to the best of our ability and quite successfully to live as good American citizens do: our language has been American, our rule of life has been the Bill of Rights, our law has been the Constitution, our inspiration has been the stars and stripes. It has been our sincere objective to obey and respect all the rules and regulations set up by the government. The curfew order, however, will make it impossible for us to live an American way of life and prepare ourselves for citizenship. This differentiation, segregation, and prejudice had been the cause of our emigration from Europe. We came here with the hope of enjoying liberty under the law, justice and equal rights. Our part in securing the final victory in this war is not one of brooding within our homes from eight to six, sinister, sad, and grim, under the constant observation and suspicion of officers and agents. We can do more, Sir, much more, if we would only be given a chance. Let those who are loyal, cooperative and harmless go free and hold the suspicious and guilty.

Schwarzer’s words once again clearly express the misery refugees felt at having escaped discrimination in one place only to encounter it in another, particularly since they were transparently patriotic in their intentions and deeds. To some, the promise of the American dream appeared to have failed. Schwarzer’s equation of what he (and most refugees) saw as the arbitrary injustice of the oppression in Germany and the beginning of similar practices in the United States betrays the
depths of the disappointment and fear for the future caused by the singling out of German Jewish refugees as enemy aliens.

**Fighting the Legislation:**

**Alleviating Its Effects, Disputing Its Application**

West Coast refugee organizations became important sources of help for German Jewish refugees trying to deal with the consequences of the new restrictions. These organizations intensified their mutual cooperation, which had begun before the Tolan Committee hearings, when the Coordinating Committee of Refugee Immigrants was established in mid-March 1942. Members of this committee were representatives from major cities with German Jewish populations situated in Military Area No. 1. Delegations were somewhat proportionate to the size of their respective refugee communities; there were three representatives from San Francisco, three from Los Angeles, and one each from Portland and Seattle. Committee members believed that individual actions by refugees, such as sending letters to different officials, might actually hurt rather than help the group’s cause, and that a few knowledgeable people from broadly representative institutions could achieve better results by establishing relationships with civilian and military authorities.73 These West Coast refugee activists aimed to immediately alleviate the direct consequences of the enemy alien classification while simultaneously working to get it revoked for stateless Jewish refugees. Initially unable to attract the help of the broader American Jewish community in their protest against the classification itself, these refugees did work with Jewish organizations, mostly those that had supported them in refugee issues since their arrival, such as the National Council for Jewish Women, when dealing with the practical consequences of the legislation. They also worked with local state offices and increasingly with the American Federation of Jews from Central Europe, the umbrella institution for German Jewish groups in the United States, with headquarters in New York City. To ease the hardships of the travel restrictions and the curfew, the Los Angeles Jewish Club helped individual refugees acquire exceptions from the Office of Civilian Defense and the city and country defense councils, and specifically designated officials authorized to issue permits.74

Sometimes local authorities had compassion and understanding for the refugees’ situation and the complications of the permit processes, as Hedy Wolf’s story shows. Her husband Ernest had a teaching position at a military academy in Glendale, while she was working at a doctor’s office in downtown Los Angeles, about ten miles from their residence:

So at that time, we lived in different places. I took the bus to go see him. For several weeks, every Friday afternoon or Saturday morning, I had to go to the consul general
and ask for permission to travel to my husband. He was a very nice young man. At first he gave a permit to me each week. Later on, since he understood the situation real well, he laughed and gave me a permanent permit so I wouldn’t have to come each week. I remember this very well because not so many nice things happened.  

Nevertheless, Hedy could not stay with her husband overnight, as every enemy alien was required to be in her own home at night. Such effects continually reinforced the community’s overall unhappiness over the injustice of the enemy alien designation and its inappropriateness for refugees, who, far from truly being enemy aliens, urgently wished to become Americans. To quote Hedy Wolf again: “I wasn’t German anymore. I wasn’t American either. We were without a country. What bothered me was that I did not belong, that I had no passport.”

Since the state had structurally blocked the path to citizenship with the enemy alien classification, refugees channeled their motivation to become Americans into a fight to get the status revoked to symbolize their attempt to become full-fledged Americans. Paradoxically, in this fight to gain official permission to become American, their central strategy was to focus on their German Jewish identity to differentiate themselves from one of the state’s enemies, Nazi Germany. In individual letters to authorities, refugees used their stories of victimization in Nazi Germany to point out the injustice of the enemy alien classification from the beginning. The organized refugee community intensified this narrative throughout the war. In their appeal to U.S. authorities, they continued to stress their victimhood and always positioned their fight against the enemy alien classification within the larger context of the war. Sensitized to the situation on the West Coast, the American Federation of Jews from Central Europe (AMFED) began taking the enemy alien classification more seriously and supported the efforts refugees in the West had started. In a memorandum to its member organizations, for instance, AMFED proposed to collect data about refugees that would identify them specifically as stateless Jewish victims of Germany. The federation sought evidence of “specific damage” individual refugees had endured in Germany, such as dismissal from their profession due to their Jewish origin, or arrest and imprisonment in concentration camps. The data would then be used to issue affidavits guaranteeing a “non-enemy” identity for the refugees. Although it is unclear whether these suggestions were ever systematically implemented, the idea illustrates refugees’ strategic focus on their German Jewish identity to facilitate their quest to become Americans.

Finally, in their appeals to various authorities to revoke the enemy alien classification, refugees also stressed that their German Jewish background, contrary to making them “enemies,” could actually be of strategic advantage to the United States in the war effort. They characterized their community as having both intimate knowledge of the common German enemy and great motivation to do something to combat it. In Los Angeles, the Jewish Club proactively offered its
assistance in a letter to the local FBI office: “We would be only too glad to be at your service at any time and for any information and cooperation we are able to give.” The FBI’s reply was fairly typical of many U.S. authorities the refugees appealed to; it was politely grateful for the refugees’ offer but extremely noncommittal, giving no indication of what refugees might do to make themselves useful. The implication that such help would define the refugee community as allies, if not actually Americans, and certainly make the enemy alien designation absurd, was entirely ignored.

War Effort

The fact that the enemy alien classification hindered the refugees in participating to their full potential in the war effort was of utmost concern to them. An obvious way young male refugees had been able to contribute prior to Pearl Harbor was to become a soldier in the U.S. Army. According to the Selective Training and Selective Service Act of 1940, refugees holding first papers were eligible to be drafted for military service. After Pearl Harbor, however, all enemy aliens were initially excluded from military service regardless of where they lived or whether they had first papers. Shortly thereafter, when enemy aliens were again considered for service, they had to pass a screening to prove their trustworthiness and dependability. All male enemy aliens between twenty-one and thirty-five years, along with all other Americans of that age, had been registered with their local draft boards since the Smith Act of 1940, and they now received special forms for documenting their personal history and political conviction. If the alien was deemed “acceptable”—a decision within the authority of the commanding general of the army zone in which he lived, which could take several weeks—he would then be eligible for the draft. Yet even after joining the army, refugees were subjected to certain restrictions on account of their enemy alien classification. Most refugees who joined the army in the first year of active U.S. involvement in the war were initially placed in noncombat units because the military refused to entrust them with weapons. Certain positions were also initially closed to enemy aliens, like physicians in the Army’s Medical Corps, and they could not become officers until they were naturalized. Not until spring 1943 were enlisted refugees exempted from the enemy alien classification. At that time, the government, under “congressional pressure and other requests by the general staff office,” lifted all previous restrictions, thereby acknowledging the refugees’ special qualifications simply due to their background, and finally accepting, at least within the military, the argument refugee organizations had made all along. Until then, the enlistment restrictions affected all refugees equally, regardless of where they resided. There were only slight differences between regions due to the authority local draft boards had.
On the home front, however, refugees’ opportunities to participate in the war effort differed significantly depending on their region of residence. While the organized refugee community strongly encouraged supporting the war, the curfew and travel restrictions on the West Coast made it initially difficult for refugees there to do so. First aid and training courses for vital wartime occupations like welders or technicians, for example, were frequently held during curfew hours. Refugees reported that they could not donate blood if the Red Cross Donor Service was not within the five-mile zone. When the Los Angeles Jewish Community turned out for a mass meeting “to protest publicly against Nazi atrocities and massacres” in August 1942, German Jewish refugees could not participate because it happened after the eight o’clock curfew. Their note to the Jewish Community Council concisely articulates the absurdity of the classification: “But we as the first victims of the evil forces you are protesting against will join you in spirit and hope for an outstanding success of the mass demonstration against Nazi barbarism.”

One way all refugees could engage in the war effort was to raise money. In spring 1942, several private donors and refugee organizations on the East Coast formed the Loyalty Committee of Victims of Nazi-Fascist Oppression, which started a fundraising campaign to purchase a fighter airplane for the American Air Force. A regional satellite of this committee on the West Coast was headquartered in Los Angeles under the chairmanship of Leopold Jessner; other members of the Jewish Club, as well as some prominent émigrés like Lion Feuchtwanger, Max Horkheimer, and Heinrich Mann, also actively participated. The campaign was inspired as much by the refugees’ desire to contribute to the war effort as by their desire to demonstrate their earnestness to the American public. As one appeal to the refugee community for donations described it, the Loyalty Campaign was a “liberation” during a time when refugees were forbidden to act under the enemy alien classification and as an antidote to the “lethargy” many experienced as a result. In addition to favorable reception in the refugee community, the Campaign garnered positive attention in the American press as well as from government officials. In October 1942, the Loyalty Committee was able to present a check for $48,500 to the War Department—funds which were, indeed, used to purchase an Air Force fighter plane. The refugees’ struggle for recognition in their new country was symbolically validated in its name: “Loyalty.”

Refugees on the West Coast could really take up more proactive war efforts only after De Witt lifted the curfew and travel restrictions for German enemy aliens on 23 December 1942. He explained that they were no longer needed since “other security measures had been provided.” While the refugees were naturally relieved at this ruling, the Jewish Club in Los Angeles reiterated their ongoing dissatisfaction with the classification, which “put [them] in the same file as the Nazis.”
Nevertheless, the refugees welcomed the end of the curfew and travel restriction as an opportunity to dedicate themselves fully to the American war effort. The organized community was instrumental in furthering individual refugees’ participation. In Los Angeles, the Jewish Club had been negotiating for German Jewish refugees to take part in the activities of the local Defense Council. In April 1943, the club enthusiastically informed its members that they were now eligible to join the U.S. Citizens Service Corps “on the same basis as citizens” and appealed to refugees to enlist, as “not a single refugee family will want to be missing when we present our list of volunteers to the Civilian Defense.”

The Jewish Club was designated to officially register all refugees on behalf of the Citizen Defense Volunteer Office, whether they were members of the club or not, and to assure that those registered were loyal and reliable. Refugees could volunteer in several different corps divisions, such as the Salvage Collection Service, the Price and Ration Board, the Health and Hospital Service, Childcare Service, Transportation, or Block Leader Service. The Club received numerous applications for volunteer work, including one letter by Ernst Kleinmann and his wife asking whether they could be useful as volunteers, even though both were severely physically handicapped with arthritis and eye problems. Thus, the enthusiasm to contribute to the war effort was even shared by some of the older refugees, whom the historiography has often depicted as less interested in active participation in American organizational life.

With the curfew and travel restrictions lifted, refugees could now also contribute to the war effort by organizing social events, previously very difficult to carry out. After entertainment had taken second place to the Jewish Club’s political work, the club now organized numerous events relating to the war effort. It routinely organized Blood Donation Campaigns, and, like Aufbau, published the names of those who repeatedly and ardently gave their blood “for the victory of the United Nations.” Like other Jewish refugee clubs across the United States, it also held Victory Campaigns, including Victory Knitting and Sewing, and Victory Parties, all of which served to raise funds. Even cultural events not explicitly related to these victory campaigns were put to the service of the war effort. The following words of introduction at the opening of a club event show how much the war dominated refugees’ mindset and also how important it was for them to clarify their stance toward Germany:

We are looking forward to an evening of relaxation and amusement of laughter and entertainment . . . . Such an hour of pleasantness will not make us forget the sorrows and sacrifices or our war-torn world, the expedient use of the German language will not make us forget our hate against Nazi Germany and our progress in America, and the jokes and the music will not let us forget our duties in this hour and every hour of this war for freedom and survival.
While cultural events helped raise funds for the war, war bonds were the most common financial contribution, and in Los Angeles the refugee community was at the forefront of these activities with the initiator and chairman of the War Savings Committee being a German Jewish refugee. In 1944, L.A.’s refugee club also took on leadership roles in other local anti-Nazi activities. For example, it was in charge of the Victory House in Pershing Square used for staging an Anti-Nazi War Bond Drive. This was great progress, considering that refugees had not even been able to attend an anti-Nazi protest because of the curfew in 1942.

Once the revocation of the curfew and travel restrictions allowed the refugees on the West Coast to move on with living more normal lives and to finally tangibly oppose the Nazis, the urgency with which they had discussed the enemy alien classification ever since its passing diminished. By late 1943, the refugee press addressed this issue much less frequently. Nevertheless, the classification continued to impede refugees’ efforts to become naturalized American citizens. As noted above, the passing of the enemy alien classification in 1941 put naturalization for all enemy aliens, regardless of place of residence, on hold. It also implemented a ninety-day investigation period, during which the Immigration and Naturalization Service reviewed the applicant’s loyalty. West Coast refugees had faced an additional obstacle during the curfew period because they were often unable to participate in naturalization-assistance programs, such as language and citizenship classes, which were generally offered in the evening.

Moreover, the investigation process frequently took much longer than the proposed ninety days, and sometimes longer than six months. Authorities attributed the delay to a lack of personnel and technical problems rather than difficulties in confirming applicants’ loyalty. However, refugees were concerned that the public might perceive this differently. The case of Harry Salinger, a refugee in Los Angeles, shows the distress and practical disadvantages caused by his delay in naturalization. Salinger had been a judge in Germany and was one of the few refugees who studied law all over again in the United States. Yet his admittance to the bar exam was dependent on U.S. citizenship, and the longer he waited for it, the more he worried about his professional future because the bar exam was only valid for one year. Also, he was concerned about how the American public, especially other lawyers, would perceive his delay in being admitted to the bar. In a petition to Earl G. Harrison, Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, to treat his case as one of “extreme hardship,” he explained,

Every time I meet one of them [other lawyers] I am asked whether I have been admitted in the meantime. If my answer has to be “no” for a long time to come, my reputation as to loyalty must gradually deteriorate as it will be very difficult to give an explanation for the delay which satisfies their doubts. As a good reputation of an
attorney is one of his main assets the damaging effect of an unforeseen delay in my naturalization procedure is obvious.\textsuperscript{107}

Much scholarship on German Jewish refugees in the United States has identified problems they had integrating into American life as resulting from their specific background and from their individual characteristics (age, profession, etc.). But Salinger’s case illustrates once again that discriminatory U.S. legislation also constituted a major impediment to their integration irrespective of their individual motivation to do so.

However, Salinger’s petition also underscores refugees’ efforts to fight the enemy alien classification and its ramifications in order to reach their goals. During the war, the Political Committee of the Jewish Club of 1933 negotiated with government organizations and authorities on behalf of numerous refugees over delays in their naturalization.\textsuperscript{108} By the end of 1944, Felix Guggenheim proudly commented on his organization’s success in overcoming roadblocks to refugees’ naturalization and Americanization. In his report after a meeting in New York, he noted,

I realized for the first time how well things have developed in this respect on the West Coast. Only 2 years ago we were confronted with dangerous consequences of the enemy alien legislation; curfew, threat of evacuation and the treatment of refugees as . . . German . . . aliens seemed to stop our Americanization during the war and even to jeopardize our solidarity with American Jewry. To-day thanks to concerted action of American-Jewish organizations and refugee-organizations and thanks to the attitude of the government-agencies concerned, we have in LA the fastest-working naturalization procedure, compared with all other cities, and we see a much closer cooperation and integration of new Americans and old Americans than anywhere else in the USA.\textsuperscript{109}

In this way, West Coast refugees once hardest hit by the enemy alien classification and its consequences were eventually able to Americanize faster than refugees in other parts of the country due to their organizing and activism. Despite the psychological and practical hardship the classification had caused them, they had not become disillusioned with the United States or more closely attached to Germany or nostalgic about their German past. Rather, they engaged in political activism, focusing strategically on their German Jewish identity to fight the association with Germany the government imposed on them, because it allowed them to construct themselves as enemies of Nazi Germany and acceptable future Americans. They embraced their legal separation from Germany and their anti-Nazi and pro-American stance. Ultimately, they drew strength from their ability to operate effectively within the democratic structures of the United States. To do this, like many immigrants before them, they transformed some of their communal organizations into political institutions of advocacy and, building new
institutions, strengthened their intracommunal networks. Taking part in the U.S. political process, they experienced significant flaws in democratic structures firsthand. Nevertheless, they were not afraid to appeal for better treatment when they perceived the United States to be violating its own democratic ideals. The refugees’ classification as enemy aliens persisted throughout the war. However, as the above quote illustrates, the initially severe discriminatory effects of the legislation diminished, and the refugee community ultimately won its fight to be legally accepted as future Americans. From 1943 to the end of the war, some refugees were occupied even more directly with Germany when they returned to Europe as soldiers of the U.S. Armed Forces.

Notes

1. Aufbau 7 (12 December 1941).
3. American Jews welcomed America’s entry into the war with similar feelings: American patriotism and relief that something could finally be done to fight “the Jewish people’s greatest enemy of modern times.” Diner, Jews of the United States, 221.
5. Davie, Refugees in America, 189.
7. For more detail, see, e.g., Cesarani and Kushner, eds, The Internment of Aliens; and a novel based on the internment experience of a young German Jewish refugee woman, Ruth Borchard, We are Strangers Here. New Zealand also interned German Jewish refugees. See, e.g., Beaglehole, “Locked Up and Guarded.”
9. Aufbau 7 (12 December 1941); “Keine Konzentrationslager für loyale Nichtbürger,” Aufbau 7 (12 December 1941).
12. Ibid., 886.
13. Ibid., 887.
15. Ibid., 888.
17. Ibid.
18. “Loyal Non-Citizens Safe: No Wholesale Distrust,” Aufbau 7 (19 December 1941); and New York City Mayor La Guardia’s statement, Aufbau 7 (26 December 1941).
19. See letter from Manfred George to Felix Guggenheim, 26 June 1942, Felix Guggenheim Papers (hereafter FGP), Box (hereafter B) 25, Correspondence 1940–1952, General A, Feuchtwanger Memorial Library, Special Collections, USC Libraries, University of Southern California.
22. See, e.g., different articles in Aufbau 8 (23 January 1942); and Aufbau 8 (30 January 1942).
25. Eisenberg, “Civil Rights,” 112. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, all ethnic Japanese were treated as if there were enemy aliens: 736 Japanese immigrant leaders were confined, and in the following months up to February, the FBI detained 2,912 people (Hane, “A Round Table,” 570).
27. Letter from Richard B. Goldschmidt (professor at University of California), Oscar Meyer (former leader of Democratic Party in German Reichstag), and over thirty German refugees to Attorney General Francis Biddle, Jan. 31, 1942, FGP, B107, Correspondence, Enemy Alien Issues incl. Tolan House Committee 1 of 2.
28. Ibid. See also, Aufbau 8 (13 February 1942).
29. Letter from Richard B. Goldschmidt, Oscar Meyer, and over thirty German refugees to Attorney General Francis Biddle, Jan. 31, 1942, FGP, B107, Correspondence, Enemy Alien Issues incl. Tolan House Committee, 1 of 2.
32. The local U.S. States Attorney was invited to speak to refugees at the Fairfax Temple in Los Angeles and told them to “not be afraid” since recent evacuation proposals had generally only referred to the Japanese. “Kein Grund zur Panik,” Aufbau 8 (13 February 1942).
33. Eventually, 119,803 individuals of Japanese descent were incarcerated in internment camps, 65 percent of whom were American citizens. Hane, “A Round Table,” 570.
34. “Die Sicherung der Westküste,” Aufbau 8 (27 February 1942). Another article reported that a lot of people became slightly depressed about being called “enemy,” even if this was only supposed to be a technicality. Aufbau 8 (27 February 1942).
35. “Proklamation No. 1,” Aufbau 8 (6 March 1942).
36. FGP, B107, Correspondence, Enemy Alien Issues incl. Tolan House Committee, 1 of 2.
37. See Aufbau 8 (6 March 1942). See also, “Information Regarding Organizations of Recent Immigrants,” questionnaire distributed by the Committee for the Study of Recent Immigration from Europe, 1945, 1.
38. Popularly called the Tolan Committee, after its chairman John H. Tolan, the committee began working in 1940 as the Select Committee to Investigate the Interstate Migration of Destitute Citizens, dealing with issues surrounding the Dust Bowl migration. With rising military concerns and people migrating to work in defense industries, the committee changed its focus and name to the House Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration in 1941.
39. Letter from Elsa Winners Schwerin to Leopold Jessner, 2 March 1942, FGP, B107, Correspondence, 1942–1943, Enemy Alien Issues incl. Tolan House Committee, 2 of 2; see the excellent study by Eisenberg, The First to Cry Down Injustice?
40. Letter from Richard E. Gutstadt to Mr. Berges, September 18, 1942, FGP, B108, Correspondence 1942, Enemy Alien Issues.
42. See Frey, “Thomas Mann.”
43. From Thomas Mann’s testimony before the Tolan Committee, ibid., 207.
44. Ibid., 204.
45. Guggenheim had worked in publishing in Germany and had held a leading position with the Deutsche Buch-Geimschaft. He fled Germany in 1938 and, following a circuitous route with a longer stay in England, arrived on the West Coast of the United States. In Los Angeles he first made a living by renting out apartments in a building he was able to buy. In 1942, he started a small publishing house, Pazifische Presse, which published German-language works by some famous writer refugees in Southern California. See Michaela Ullmann, “Felix Guggenheim” in Immigrant Entrepreneurship, ed. Wadhwani.
47. Frey, “Thomas Mann,” 212. When speaking about Poland, Frank references the publication of “horrid pictures in last week’s LIFE magazine, showing heaps of naked, emaciated corpses, piled upon one another like so much rubbish, ready to be flung into the common pit.” Ibid., 205.
49. These are Thomas Mann’s words, quoted in Frey, “Thomas Mann,” 208.
52. See National Defense Migration, Hearings before the Select Committee, 11629–52. Aufbau maintained that Fletcher Bowron’s reason for not regarding Jewish refugees as suspicious was based on their “race.” Ralph Nunberg, “Tolan Committee für Reklassifizierung in der Alien-Frage,” Aufbau 8 (6 March 1942). Race was also the reason many officials and American citizens believed all people of Japanese ancestry should be interned. Some refugees also engaged in a wholesale condemnation of people of Japanese ancestry, saying, e.g., that checking the refugees’ loyalty was naturally much more difficult, considering that they “as individuals intellectually and by way of their tradition come from an entirely different culture.” “Zur Alienfrage,” Aufbau 8 (20 February 1942). See also Eisenberg, The First to Cry Down Injustice?
54. See, e.g., “Loyalty Board an der Westküste,” Aufbau 8 (13 March 1942); “Hoffnung für Staatenlose,” Aufbau 8 (20 March 1942); and “Einheitsaktion an der Westküste,” ibid.
57. Lourié, Social Adjustments, 148.
58. Letter from Richard G. Grau to Felix Guggenheim, March 25, 1942, FGP, B107, Correspondence, 1942–1943, Enemy Alien Issues incl. Tolan House Committee, 2 of 2. Grau refers to the articles on the Tolan Committee in Aufbau 8 (20 March 1942), and particularly the front-page statement “Hoffnung für Staatenlose.”
59. Letter from Manfred George to Felix Guggenheim, June 26, 1942, FGP, B25, FGP, Correspondence 1940–1952, General A.
60. Eisenberg, The First to Cry Down Injustice?, also points to the discrepancy between East and West in reporting on enemy alien issues in other newspapers.
61. Letter from Manfred George to Felix Guggenheim, September 19, 1942, FGC, B108, FGP, Correspondence 1942, Enemy Alien Issues.
62. Undated document, FGP, B107, Correspondence 1942–1943, Enemy Alien Issues incl. Tolan House Committee, 1 of 2. See also letter from Edward J. Ennis, Director Enemy Alien Control
Unit, to Mr. Rosenfeld, April 4, 1942, FGP, B107, Correspondence 1944–1945, Committee for the Study of Recent Immigration from Europe.

63. See also telegram by John J. McCloy, ibid.


68. “Sorrow Comes to the West Coast: The Curfew Regulations and Their Consequences,” Aufbau 8 (3 April 1942).

69. Letter from Richard Grau to Dean Edwin D. Dickinson, Department of Justice, July 12, 1942, FGP, B108, Correspondence 1942, Curfew Restrictions and Richard O. Grau.

70. “Sorrow Comes to the West Coast: The Curfew Regulations and Their Consequences,” Aufbau 8 (3 April 1942). This also includes reprinted excerpts from the Los Angeles newspaper Daily News.


73. See, e.g., letter from Richard O. Grau to Felix Guggenheim, August 16, 1942, FGP, B108, Correspondence 1942, Curfew Restrictions and Richard O. Grau.


76. This was Hedy Wolf’s answer to the question of how she felt about being a German at the time. Ibid., 236.


78. Letter from the Jewish Club to Richard Hood, FBI Los Angeles, May 18, 1942, FGP, B108, Correspondence 1942, House Committee Investigation National Defense Migration and FBI.

79. In a letter to J. Edgar Hoover from 16 May 1942, Guggenheim wrote that it was the refugees’ “only wish . . . to contribute [their] share to the common war enemy.” FGP, B108, Correspondence 1942, House Committee Investigation National Defense Migration and FBI.

80. After Pearl Harbor, all males between eighteen and sixty-four were required to register with the draft board, and the duration of military service was extended.

81. In reaction to the large number of refugees already in the army, the government passed the Second War Power Bill on 28 March 1942, which relaxed naturalization procedures. To be naturalized in the army, an alien was not required to have resided in the country for a certain length of time, which was the main reason most refugees had not become citizens yet. The only time constraint for naturalization was a minimum of three months honorable service in the army. However, many refugees appear to have been naturalized only before they left on their assignments to Europe or the Pacific. Joining the army was the fastest way for a refugee to become an American citizen. “Reklassifizierung im Heer,” Aufbau 8, no. 13 (27 March 1942): 1. The information about alien physicians not being admitted into the military as doctors is taken from They Can Aid America: A Survey of Alien Specialized Personnel (New York:

82. Franklin, “Victim Soldiers: German-Jewish Refugees in the American Armed Forces during World War II,” B.A. honors thesis, Clark University, Worcester, MA, 2006, 44–45. However, those who had joined before Pearl Harbor were apparently not transferred to noncombat units if they were still enemy aliens.


85. From a Memorandum on Curfew Restrictions, FGP, B108, Correspondence 1942, Curfew Restrictions and Richard O. Grau.

86. Jewish Club of 1933 to Los Angeles Jewish Community Council, undated, FGP, B108, Correspondence 1942, Jewish Club of 1933.

87. Other participating organizations were the American Federation of Jews from Central Europe, the Immigrants’ Conference, the New World Club, the American Association of Former European Jurists, the Italian Jewish Club, the Netherland Jewish Society, Selfhelp of Emigrés from Central Europe, Selfhelp of Emigrés (Chicago), the Jacob Ehrlich Society, and the Immigrant Jewish War Veterans. *Aufbau* 8 (10 April 1942).

88. “‘Loyalty’ an der Westküste,” *Aufbau* 8 (10 April 1942).

89. *Aufbau* 8 (17 April 1942).


91. *Aufbau* 8 (17 April 1942).

92. “Die Immigration überreicht ihre Spende,” *Aufbau* 8 (6 November 1942), 9 (26 February 1943), and 10 (26 March 1943).

93. “Curfew Law Ended on West Coast for German Aliens; Over 1,000 Forbidden Zones Also Abolished by De Witt,” *Special Information Bulletin*, National Refugee Service, December 31, 1942, FGP, B108, Correspondence 1942–44, National Defense Migration Hearing and German Alien Curfew. It is not clear what these other security measures were at this point. I assume, however, that the authorities had collected enough information about the enemy aliens in Military Zone No. 1 and thus had enough evidence that supported the argument (long held by different authorities) that the majority of those classified as German enemy aliens did not pose a threat.

94. Undated document, most likely from the beginning of 1943, FGP, B108, Correspondence 1942–1944, National Defense Migration Hearings and German Aliens.

95. Announcement to members and anti-Nazi refugees from Jewish Club of 1933, Inc., Committee for Refugee-Immigrants of Southern California, April 16, 1943, FGP, B107, Correspondence 1943, Immigrant Organizations.


97. Letter from Ernst Kleinnmann to Jewish Club of 1933, Inc., from April 23, 1943, FGP, B107, Correspondence 1944–45, Committee for the Study of Recent Immigrants from Europe.


100. Undated document, FGP, B107, Correspondence 1944–1945, Committee for the Study of Recent Immigration from Europe.

thousand people to attend ("Refugees will stage pageant at Bond Rally," undated excerpt of an article, Collection of the Benefactors of the Jewish Club of 1933).

102. Undated document, probably speech manuscript, FGP, B108, Correspondence 1944, German Jewish Refugee Issues.


105. Letter from Klaus Schaefer to William Stagen, August 3, 1942, FGP, B108, Correspondence 1942, Enemy Alien Issues, and other correspondence about this topic in B107 and B108. The problem with the delay in naturalization was a national issue and one that was also taken up in Aufbau.

106. Letter from Ann Petluck, NRS to Felix Guggenheim, FGP, B108, Correspondence 1944, German Jewish Refugee Issues.

107. Ibid.

108. See different correspondences in FGP, B107 and B108.

109. Speech at joint meeting of B’nai B’rith and Jewish Club of 1933, FGP, B107, Correspondence 1944–1945, Committee for the Study of Recent Immigration from Europe. Refugees took great pride in obtaining American citizenship. During 1943, the club started publishing the names of those members who acquired it. “Als Bürger eingeschworen,” and “Jewish Club of 1933, Inc.,” Aufbau 9 (15 October 1943).