

## WORLD WARRING 1990–2014

### *The Other Theaters*

“I believe America is exceptional.” (President Barack Obama, speech to the UN General Assembly, 2013)

This chapter continues the work of the last by investigating the US Leviathan’s exercise of violent force in four theaters—Central Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Pacific—to complete the account of how global warring became world warring between 1990 and 2014. As in the previous chapter, the concern is to evaluate the role of the anti-terrorist and oil-control public *délires* in the warring as well as to document the consequences of these hostilities. The chapter ends by contemplating those results; which indicate that the New American Empire is indeed exceptional, though in a way unsuspected by the president. Attention turns first to Central Asia.

#### The Central Asian Theater

Much of Central Asia was part of the USSR until its end in 1990. The region stretched from the Caspian Sea in the west to China in the east and from Afghanistan in the south to Russia in the north. The former Central Asian Soviet Republics were Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

Oil had been produced around Baku in Azerbaijan since the 1890s. By the 1980s oil and gas had been discovered in other areas in Central Asia around the Caspian Sea, especially Kazakhstan. US oil company executives came to believe these deposits were considerable. Representative Doug

Bereuter, at a 1998 session of his House of Representatives subcommittee, gushed that “phenomenal resources of oil and natural gas” in Central Asia offered “significant new investment opportunities for a broad range of American companies” (Bereuter 1998: 6–7). So US energy and security elites came to see Central Asia as offering a way to reduce the empire’s energy vulnerabilities by diversifying its supply.

To achieve this goal, US oil companies organized a loose cartel, the Foreign Oil Companies Group (P. Scott 2005), whose members sought to wrest control of the region’s oil from the Russians. The companies—especially Amoco, Unocal, Chevron, and ExxonMobil—participated in a lively “scramble” to sign deals between 1995–1998 (Guan, 2001). Brzezinski, so important in the Carter administration, again became a player. He had participated in the 1950s in missions to the Caspian as a consultant for the Amoco oil company and, early on, had recognized the region’s petroleum resources. As earlier noted, he had mentored Madeleine Albright, and when she rose in Clinton’s foreign policy hierarchy, she took with her Brzezinski’s recognition that there was potential in Central Asian oil (Rutledge 2005: 105). Sandy Berger, who was first Clinton’s deputy NSA (1993–1997) and then his NSA (1997–2001), owned stock in Amoco Oil (Baer 2002: 243–244). He headed an inter-agency group that facilitated government support of US oil companies in their “scramble” for Caspian black gold. Specifically, one CIA officer remembered Berger’s NSC employee Shelia Heslin as working to “carry water” for the Foreign Oil Companies Group (in P. Scott 2005).

Another aspect of the Clinton administration’s Central Asian policy was military. By the mid 1990s the US recognized it needed to increase its violent force in the region (K. Butler 2001). Russian and Chinese firms were already competing for this oil (discussed in Fouskas and Gökay 2005: 147–165). In order to strengthen US military options in this competition, Clinton’s “department of defense established military ties” with Central Asian states, “and US aid began to flow to their armed forces. From there it was a short stop to the deployment of American military advisors, the sale of American arms, and the initiation of joint training operations” (Klare 2004: 1333). CENTCOM was given responsibility for the region.

What a difference a few years can make. As the 1990s wore on, and as oil geologists’ understanding of the Caspian area deepened, it became clear that its energy resources were hardly “phenomenal.” Estimates of oil reserves were whittled down from 200 billion barrels to 40 billion barrels, a pittance compared to the 674 billion barrels estimated in the Middle East. Sarah Emerson, an energy industry specialist, wrote in a report to the new Bush II administration, “The trouble with diversifying outside the Middle East,” for example into Central Asia, “is that it is not where the oil is. One

of the best things for our supply security would be to liberate Iraq” (in Rutledge 2005: 102). We saw in the previous chapter that Bush II’s Vulcans took Emerson’s advice to heart. Nevertheless, acquiring access to 40 billion barrels would still help the New American Empire diversify its oil supply.

A final geographic fact of significance to the global warring that follows: Central Asia was a landlocked area, so moving oil to market was challenging, making “exploitation” of Caspian oil resources “conditional on the timely construction of a network of pipelines” (Rutledge 2005: 103); it being understood that these pipelines had best not run through the US Leviathan’s opponents’ territories, especially Russia and Iran. This has meant that Central Asian wars have actually been fought outside the Caspian Basin in areas suitable for pipelines, which brings readers to global warring in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and then Kosovo.

### **Afghanistan II, 2001–2013: “Digging Bullets Out of the Women’s Bodies”**

Date: February 12, 2010

Place: Paktika Province

Circumstances: In a night raid, U.S. forces attacked a home where 25 people, 3 of them musicians, had gathered for a naming celebration. A newborn was being named that night. One of the musicians went outside to relieve himself. A flashlight shone in his face. Panicked, he ran inside and announced that the Taliban were outside. A police commander, Dawoud, the father of the newborn, ran outside with his weapon. U.S. forces opened fire, killing Officer Dawoud, a pregnant mother, an eighteen year old, Gulaila, and two others.

U.S. / NATO initial response: February 12, 2010—U.S. forces claimed that the women had been killed earlier, in an honor killing. Nato’s initial press release bore the headline: “Joint Force Operating in Gardez Makes Gruesome Discovery.” The release said that after “intelligence confirmed militant activity” in a compound near a village in Paktika province, an international security force entered the compound and engaged “several insurgents” in a firefight. Two “insurgents” were killed, the report said, and after the joint forces entered the compound, they “found the bodies of three women who had been tied up, gagged and killed.”

March 16, 2010—The UN issued a scathing report, stating that the U.S. had killed the women. Villagers told Jerome Starkey, reporting for the *Independent*, that U.S. troops tried to tamper with evidence by digging bullets out of the women’s bodies and out of the walls. (Fragment of narrative of US military operations, Afghanistan. Kelly and Pearson 2010)

The above account taken from reports of American military maneuvers in Afghanistan is laconic. Just the facts: JSOC ninjas on the evening of

12 February 2010 butchered a civilian family in Paktika province, on the border with Pakistan in southeastern Afghanistan. Those killed included a pregnant woman. In an attempt to hide their work, the ninjas dug the bullets out of the women's bodies. Jeremy Scahill, while investigating this incident, asked General Hugh Shelton, the former head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whether there ought to be an internal review of the killings. The general responded, "I'm sorry that they got killed," but added, "our guys were doing what they thought they should do. . . . I don't think it ought to be investigated; I write it off as one of those damn acts of war" (in Scahill 2013: 347). Why "write it off"? Why not investigate Afghanistan II as a whole? The story begins after 9/11.

### *The Afghanistan War II*

Bush II vowed terrible vengeance on the perpetrators of 9/11. This meant the central questions immediately after 9/11 were who and where the terrorists were.<sup>1</sup> Rather quickly—even though Cheney and Wolfowitz *déliréd* Iraq—it became clear that the attack was the work of al-Qaeda. Equally clearly, al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden, were supported in Afghanistan by the Taliban, who were a largely Pashtun group formed in 1994 and led by Mullah Mohammed Omar to bring about an Islamic fundamentalist Caliphate.<sup>2</sup> Rumsfeld (2011: 367) is clear: when "President Bush decided to confront Afghanistan" the Vulcans "wanted to not only destroy al-Qaida in Afghanistan, but to cause al-Qaida and its affiliates everywhere to scramble."

Of course, to get the al-Qaeda in Afghanistan they had to get the Taliban. The Taliban were not one of the mujahideen groups armed and trained by the US during Afghanistan I, though they resembled them and had benefited in at least one way from US activities in Afghanistan I. During Afghanistan I, USAID had awarded a contract to the University of Nebraska at Omaha to produce propaganda books for distribution to *talibs* (students) in madrassas (Koranic schools) to encourage madrassa students to wage jihad against atheist Soviets. The Taliban largely recruited *talibs* out of madrassas, and they too employed the Nebraska textbooks. Lamentably, "once in power" they used them "as instruction manuals in militant Islam" that was directed against American *kuffar* (unbelievers) (Tremblay 2004: 50–51). However, we are getting ahead of the story. Let us return to the end of Afghanistan I.

Following Soviet withdrawal, the 1990s were a time of Afghan warlords competing for control of the state, a competition made bloodier by the CIA's funding and arming of the competitors during Afghanistan I. Eventually, the Taliban defeated its adversaries, with the exception of the

Northern Alliance.<sup>3</sup> Olivier Roy has argued that the Taliban seizure of power “was largely orchestrated by the Pakistani secret service (the ISI) and the oil company Unocal” (in P. Scott 2007: 166). UNOCAL, Union Oil of California (now merged with Chevron), and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), would be big players in events in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.<sup>4</sup> Additionally, the Taliban were allied with the Haqqani Network and Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, whom we met in the section on Afghanistan I. Hekmatyar was a “leading *mujahideen* drug trafficker” and the recipient of approximately a billion dollars in armaments from largely CIA sources (ibid.: 74, 75). The Haqqani Network was led by the Jalaluddin Haqqani and then his son, Sirjuddin Haqqani, who were from the Zadran Pushtun tribe. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the Haqqani received “significant support from the CIA and from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI)” (Council on Foreign Relations 2011a). There was a lethal irony in the CIA’s support of Jalaluddin, for it was he who recruited Osama bin Laden to fight in Afghanistan. In 1996, the Taliban and their allies created the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which controlled 90 percent of Afghanistan, leaving the remaining 10 percent largely under the Northern Alliance’s influence.

A few days after 9/11, the Vulcans knew who had done it and where they were: al-Qaeda, in Afghanistan. An impatient Bush II demanded that the Taliban hand over bin Laden along with other al-Qaeda leaders. The Taliban acquiesced to the idea that bin Laden should leave the country voluntarily, but declined to extradite him in the absence of evidence of his involvement in the attacks. The US refused to provide evidence or even to negotiate. Instead it began Operation Enduring Freedom on 7 October 2001 in alliance with the UK, later joined by France, Australia, Canada, Poland, Germany, and others. This was the start of the global war against terrorism (GWOT). The aim, Wolfowitz said, would be “ending states who sponsor terrorism” (in Diamond 2001).

In response, Mullah Omar, leader of the Taliban at that time, advised that the Taliban, “would just retreat to the mountains” (in Frantz 2001). By the end of 2001 the empire and its allies, employing US airstrikes in support of Northern Alliance ground operations, had routed the Taliban and al-Qaeda; which both did what they had said they would do: they retreated. The US Leviathan’s forces captured all the country’s urban areas, and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan appeared finished. The UN Security Council established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in December 2001 to oversee security and train an Afghan National Army. This meant there had to be an Afghan government for the army to be part of.

At this point Hamid Karzai enters the story. A scion of an elite family in the Popalzai Pushtun tribe, he had opposed the Soviets during their

occupation of Afghanistan, during which time he became “a top contact for the CIA and maintained close relations with CIA Director William Casey, Vice President George Bush, and their Pakistani Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) interlocutors” (Madsen 2009: 1). At some point, “Karzai and a number of his brothers moved to the United States under the auspices of the CIA,” where they “continued to serve the agency’s interests, as well as those of the Bush family and their oil friends in negotiating the CentGas deal.” (ibid.). The entrepreneurially minded brothers also opened a string of three restaurants in the US, but it was the CentGas deal that appears crucial to Hamid Karzai’s future fortunes. This was a proposal (in the 1990s) that a dual oil/gas pipeline be built from Turkmenistan, on the Caspian Sea, south through Afghanistan to the Arabian Sea coast in Pakistan and eventually on to India. This pipeline was given the acronym TAPI (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India). UNOCAL sought to be the major mover in this project. If successful, the pipeline would enrich US oil interests and frustrate those of Iran and China. UNOCAL negotiated with the newly installed Taliban regime. Apparently, “according to Afghan, Iranian, and Turkish government sources, Hamid Karzai” during this time “was a top adviser to ... UNOCAL Corporation” (ibid.). Restaurateur, CIA asset, and oilman, Karzai was America’s man in Afghanistan.

At a conference in Bonn in December 2001, the US assured Karzai’s selection to head the Afghan Interim Administration. This was after a *loya jirga* (grand council or assembly) had been legitimated as the Afghan Transitional Administration in Kabul in June 2002. In the national elections of 2004, Karzai was elected president of the new permanent Afghan government, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. In 2003 NATO assumed leadership of ISAF and, at its height, included troops from forty-three countries, though the US supplied by far the most soldiers. At the end of 2002, many in Washington believed Bush II “had smashed the Taliban and al-Qaeda” (Isikoff and Corn 2006: 22), though they knew Osama bin Laden had slipped away in the mountains of Tora Bora.

“Smashed”? Hardly! Neither the Taliban nor al-Qaeda had been defeated. They were where they said they would be, in the mountains. (The location of these mountains is discussed in the following section on Pakistan.) By the spring of 2003, Mullah Omar, assisted by the ISI, had reorganized the Taliban movement and launched an insurgency against the Afghan government and NATO forces (Rashid 2012: 31). US strategy at this time might be termed “neo-feudal” because it was to rearm “the warlords who ruled the provinces like medieval barons” (ibid.: 95).

Though outnumbered and poorly armed, the Taliban and its allies instituted guerilla warfare against the “medieval barons” with their *amrikaayyi* (American) partners from 2003 through 2005, raiding and ambushing in

the countryside while concentrating suicide attacks upon urban areas. The “T-men” (or occasionally “sandniggers”), as they were called in American slang, were effective. At the same time that the Iraq was snowballing into fiasco in 2006 and 2007, this Taliban offensive enjoyed a major upswing (described in Rashid 2008: chap. 14), which succeeded in re-establishing the T-Men’s control over large swaths of rural southern and eastern Afghanistan.

NATO, under US direction, responded in 2006 by increasing troops and weaponry for operations, especially in southern and eastern regions. The fierce fighting that occurred between 2006 and 2009 did not go especially well for the US Leviathan. By 2008, the International Council on Security and Development, a Paris-based research group, estimated that 72 percent of Afghanistan was under Taliban control (Alexander 2008). Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen said the situation in Afghanistan was “precarious and urgent” (in DeYoung and Weisman 2008). When the eight years of the Bush II presidency finally ended on 20 January 2009, Afghanistan became Obama’s problem. The new president, soon to win the Nobel Peace prize, embraced it as “the war we must win” (Obama 2008).

Obama’s choice to lead the “must win” war was Stanley McChrystal, fresh from Iraq operations as JSOC head with a reputation, according to *Newsweek*, as “a snake eating rebel, a ‘Jedi’ commander” (Hastings 2010).<sup>5</sup> One of the “snake eating rebel’s” first tasks was bureaucratic: he was to write a report outlining the way forward in Afghanistan. He began this report, dated August 2009, by pronouncing the situation in Afghanistan “serious” and “deteriorating” (McChrystal 2009: 1-1), thereby generating a fine procedural hermeneutic puzzle for US commanders. Perceptually they recognized their position in Afghanistan to be “precarious and urgent” as well as serious and deteriorating.

In his report, McChrystal proceeded to procedurally solve the puzzle by offering what some military humorists call a “Self-Licking Ice-Cream Cone,” that is, a military strategy that exists to justify itself. America could triumph, McChrystal judged, with an “integrated civilian-military counter-insurgency campaign” that would require a surge of an additional 40,000 troops (ibid.). This was a reiteration of Petraeus’s COIN, which was unsurprising because McChrystal was Petraeus’s sponsor. McChrystal’s solution immediately ignited fierce hermeneutic politics among Obama’s new security elite team.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates—a holdover from the Bush II administration, where he had replaced Rumsfeld—provides the fullest account of the hermeneutic politics over the decision to surge in Afghanistan (2014: 335–387). Some in the Obama White House feared that the military was attempting to “jam” (gang up on and force) the new president to increase

global warring in Afghanistan. Vice President Biden, NSA James Jones, US Ambassador Karl Eikenberry in Kabul, and a fair number of the NSC and White House staff were against it. However, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who was “always siding with the generals” (Rashid 2012: 92) and General Petraeus, then head of CENTCOM, were for it. Eikenberry’s opposition to the counterinsurgency strategy was weighty. He had been a lieutenant general prior to becoming the ambassador to Afghanistan, where he had served two tours of duty, so he had a greater grasp of Afghan realities than did McChrystal. The Bush II administration holdover Gates favored a middle position, arguing for a 30,000-troop surge. Obama made what Gates called a “tough” decision and sided with his defense secretary (Gates 2014: 384).

Remember the two faces of the Petraeusian COIN: on the one hand, the nice-guy face tried to pacify civilians by helping them; on the other, there stared the creepy-guy face of kinetic killers. McChrystal, of course, had been the JSOC commander during much of Bush’s administration, and what JSOC had specialized in then, especially in Iraq, was targeted killings—kicking down doors, terrorizing families, and assassinating them. Gareth Porter, a historian who was in Afghanistan during much of McChrystal’s tenure, judged the general “was absolutely unqualified to do anything except carry out targeted killing. That’s all he had done for five years from 2003 to 2008” (in Scahill 2013: 331).

Consequently, Special Operations ninja teams increased from four to nineteen during his Afghanistan command. These teams, called “meat eaters” because they were used for the most violent operations, were conducting around twenty raids a month by May 2009, which increased to ninety a month by that November. A fair number of mid-level Taliban leaders were killed, as were some al-Qaeda. Murdering of innocent victims was common. In the first four months of 2010 civilian deaths rose 76 percent compared to the same months in 2009 (Hastings 2010). This was due in some measure to intelligence hitches. Meat eaters relied on Afghan informants who took the liberty of settling scores with their opponents, who might well not be Taliban. The JSOC team that dug the bullets out of the pregnant women’s bodies had probably been duped in such a manner. The head of the butchered family was a government police official.

Drones were introduced into the fight against the Taliban a bit earlier than the surge, during which their operation increased. One military expert said they were “incredibly helpful” in COIN operations, and McChrystal declared them “extraordinarily effective” in gathering the intelligence needed for COIN (Drew 2010). The US was reported to have some two hundred armed drones at that time, and over 1,200 drone strikes were recorded between 2008 and 2012 (Woods and Ross 2012). As in Yemen,



these were used for targeted assassinations of Taliban leaders. Just like JSOC's raids, they tended to harm civilians. US officials from the president on down have claimed that drone raids are precise and cause fewer civilian casualties. However, one study using classified military data between mid 2010 and mid 2011 found drone strikes to be ten times more deadly to Afghan civilians than strikes by fighter jets (Ackerman 2013).

Did the surge work? McChrystal was relieved of command 23 June 2010, ostensibly for naughty remarks he and his staff made about Obama's security elites, which were reported by Michael Hastings (2010) in *Rolling Stone* magazine.<sup>6</sup> He was replaced by Petraeus, who argued in the spring of 2011 that the surge was a success because, as he told the *New York Times*, "the momentum of the Taliban" was "halted in much of the country and reversed in some areas" (in Gall 2011). Incorrect!

During the surge, there was "a notable rise in support for the Taliban and a record number of US soldiers killed" (Scahill 2013: 331). There were more insurgent attacks in 2010 than in any other year since the Taliban insurgency had begun. By 2009–2010, according to Rashid (2012: 116), "many Afghans and Western diplomats realized that the U.S. military surge was not working, and that the Taliban were growing stronger and spreading into every corner of the country." Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Davis, who made an inspection tour in 2011, reported, "I heard many stories of how insurgents controlled virtually every piece of land beyond eyeshot of a US or ... ISAF base" (Davis 2012).<sup>7</sup> The problem became especially acute in and around Kabul, the capital: "Large areas (including towns) were under Taliban control, and development work had come to a standstill" (Rashid 2012: 107). At the time of the McChrystal debacle, Obama told his Defense secretary: "I don't have a sense it's going well in Afghanistan. He [McChrystal] doesn't seem to be making progress" (Gates 2014: 488). After a decade of war against the Taliban, the US was not "making progress."<sup>8</sup>

On 19 November 2010 at a NATO summit meeting in Lisbon, a decision was taken to withdraw NATO forces by 2014. The US military does not include the term "retreat" in its vocabulary but rather speaks of "tactical retrograde." In June 2011, the president announced US troop withdrawal was to begin in the next few months. Of course, Obama announced the drawdown would proceed from a "position of strength" (in CNN Wire Staff 2011), but the reality was different. After a decade of fighting against a far smaller, vastly less well-armed enemy, the New American Empire had failed to defeat its foe. Consequently, the Obama administration did what the Bush II administration had done earlier in Iraq: it began tactical retrograde, or more precisely, it once again cut and ran. Consider the role of the anti-terrorist and oil-control public *délîres* that put Obama's regime into this position.

*Anti-terrorist and Oil-Control Public Délires*: Immediately after 9/11, Bush II declared the GWOT, posing a hermeneutic puzzle: Who did it, and where were they? Very soon they perceived it was terrorists who had done it—Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda—and they were in Afghanistan. Bush II demanded to be given Osama, “dead or alive” (“Transcript of President Bush’s Address” 2001). When the Taliban refused to give bin Laden up either “dead or alive,” they too were perceived as enemy terrorists.

For Americans, 9/11 was a terrible shock. War had always been elsewhere. But now it was on Wall Street, the iconic heart of US global capitalism, and the towers crumbling in flames and smoke were metonyms of that capitalism’s vulnerability. That vulnerability was replayed over and over again as the world watched on television the towers fall repeatedly in each new news bulletin. Bush II and his senior advisors were Vulcans, tough guys dedicated to aggressively providing for the national security. They had failed, and to a handful of terrorists at that. Bush II is very clear about this, recalling in his memoirs that “we would fight the war on terror on the offense, and the first battlefield would be Afghanistan” (2010: 190). So procedurally, Shultzian Permission having been granted because the US homeland had been attacked, the Vulcans solved their hermeneutic puzzle by doing what the relevant anti-terrorism public *délire* instructed them to do: they took the offensive against Afghanistan. It mattered little that the Taliban had nothing to do with 9/11. Above all, then, Afghanistan II was a string of events that resulted from Security Elites 3.0’s implementation of the anti-terrorist iteration of the global domination public *délire*. But was Afghanistan II only about terrorism?

During the 1990s Afghanistan had become a player in the Central Asian pipeline competition, which pitted the Iranians, Russians, and Chinese against the Americans. An important component of this competition concerned how Turkmenistan’s abundant natural gas would be pumped to markets. Some of this gas flowed to Russia through old Soviet-era pipelines. The Chinese proposed a Central Asia–China pipeline that would pass through Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan to Xinjiang, China. Such a pipeline challenged Western predominance in the energy market. It will be recalled that the Clinton administration had proposed an alternative, the TAPI dual oil/gas line (Rashid 2010: chaps. 12 and 13). If successful it would enrich US petroleum interests, frustrating those of Russia, Iran, and China. Certain US officials who had helped the Taliban in the mid 1990s were now negotiating with them to support the pipeline. Unfortunately, “Unocal unsuccessfully tried to induce the Taliban as late as last summer into making a deal for a major oil pipeline across the country. When the talks broke off, there were rumblings in Washington that the Taliban would have to make way for a more pliable government” (Shor 2001).

Unable to secure Taliban backing for the pipeline, UNOCAL lobbied the US government to aid its search for a way to proceed with its project. The new Bush II administration—which, as earlier noted, was full of oilmen and an oil woman (Rice)—was sympathetic and in early 2001 discussed plans to convince “the Taliban in Afghanistan to accept construction of an American (Unocal) pipeline” (Phillips 2006: 83). The Taliban remained recalcitrant. Consequently, according to Chalmers Johnson (2005: 176), “Support for this [UNOCAL] enterprise appears to have been a major consideration in the Bush administration’s decision to attack Afghanistan.” In 2007, US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher certainly supported Johnson’s claim when he said, “One of our goals is to stabilize Afghanistan, so it can become a conduit and a hub between South and Central Asia so that energy can flow to the south” (in Blum 2012).

It is unclear whether support for the TAPI pipeline was a “major consideration” in the decision to attack Afghanistan in 2001. As noted, 9/11 was a terrible shock to the (US imperial) system, and because it had happened on the Vulcans’ watch, they *had* to punish the terrorists. Thus understood, the fight against terrorism was clearly a key reason for attacking Afghanistan. Further, there were geopolitical considerations. Victory in Afghanistan could give the US a military presence on China’s western border; contributing to the surrounding of China with American military installations, a repetition of the Cold War strategy of militarily encircling the Soviet Union. Moreover, Afghanistan also shares a border with Russia, so establishment of US bases in Afghanistan could have the same effects vis-à-vis that country, aiding then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s policy of re-surrounding Russia to prevent its re-emergence as a superpower.

Nevertheless, it is clear that had the TAPI pipeline been constructed, it would have helped the New American Empire control oil by establishing a power over the distribution of petroleum products to market. As the oil-control public *délire* instructs, if it is perceived that war is necessary to maintain, establish, or increase control over petroleum products, then proceed to war. The Bush II administration—particularly its many oilmen informed of the situation by Karzai and UNOCAL officials—perceived that if they went to war in Afghanistan, they could remove the Taliban obstacle to the TAPI pipeline and increase US control over petroleum. They went to war. Plausibly, implementation of the oil-control public *délire* was a “consideration” in the commencement of Afghanistan II. After all, it killed several birds with one stone—revenge on the terrorists and assistance in maintaining the empire’s “energy security” being two of those birds.

But it was a pipe(line) dream. The presence of global warring throughout Afghanistan made it impossible to construct a pipeline there. On 13

December 2009 President Hujin Tao of China opened the Central Asia–China pipeline (Lomov 2009), revealing how uncompetitive the US had become by being bogged down in a war it fought, at least in part, to secure its own pipeline.

The global warring of Afghanistan II occurred during the perfect storm of intensifying and coalescing contradiction, Shultzian Permission was granted immediately on discovery that 9/11 was authored from Afghanistan, and the ensuing hostilities were implementations of the anti-terrorist and oil-control public *délires*—evidence consistent with the global warring theory.

So, since 2001 the US has been involved in indirect and direct, overt global warring in Afghanistan. It has utilized the most sophisticated drone technology, together with COIN tactics, to advance this fighting, causing many civilian casualties, but all for naught. The Taliban were undefeated as of 2014. No pipeline was built. Recall that Rumsfeld had said that invasion of Afghanistan was supposed to “destroy” al-Qaeda there and elsewhere. Certainly there have been bad moments for al-Qaeda, including bin Laden’s assassination. But although al-Qaeda may have been weakened, it was far from destroyed. Today its affiliates flourish throughout the world. Perhaps this is because the COIN warfare increased the number of terrorists opposing the US and its allies. The JSOC ninjas flitting through Afghan nightscapes and cutting bullets out of pregnant corpses were a fine marketing tool for all varieties of terrorists. It is time to bring Pakistan into the narrative.

### **Pakistan, 2001–2013: The Ally That Was the Enemy**

Where did the Taliban and their allies go after the 2001 US offensive? Peter Dale Scott (2007: 135) reported that “in June 2002, Pakistani national police estimated” that some 10,000 Afghan Taliban cadres and followers and about 5,000 al Qaida fighters were hiding in Pakistan, “with the full support of intelligence authorities, as well as religious and tribal groups.” This figure of 15,000 partisans probably represents a majority of Taliban and al-Qaeda soldiers. Most of the mujahideen were either in the mountains of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Northwest Pakistan, in Baluchistan, or in Pakistan’s portion of Kashmir. During Afghanistan II, the FATA would become critical for the Taliban’s and its allies’ operations. This territory on Afghanistan’s eastern border consists of seven tribal areas—Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan—and the six frontier regions of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Tank, and Dera Ismail Khan. For Taliban and al-Qaeda, it was a

safe area where US troops could not get at refugees. At the hostilities' onset, then, the US Leviathan was fighting in a country where, for the most part, the enemy was absent. The implications of the preceding for Pakistan are explored below.<sup>9</sup>

Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan had generally been a US government client, though the relationship had its ups and downs. The US paid strategic rent in military and economic assistance in exchange for support during the Cold War. Washington was grateful for this backing because India, Pakistan's powerful neighbor, expressed affection for the Soviets. Pakistan's assistance was especially important during Afghanistan I (1979–1988), when the US used it as what security elites termed a “support platform” from which to manage its indirect, covert global warring against the Bear.

Afterward, during the 1990s, relations between Pakistan and the US deteriorated. Islamabad developed nuclear weapons, and Washington began to warm up toward India, which after all was vastly more important than Pakistan and in need of new friends now that its Soviet ally was no more. By 2001, Pakistan was under US economic embargo and had stopped receiving American economic and military assistance.

Everything changed when Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda was recognized as the attacker of the Twin Towers. It was once again urgent that Pakistan serve as a support platform for American *délives*. So, according to the then President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf, his country was told by Richard Armitage, Colin Powell's deputy secretary, that it must join the GWOT or be bombed “back to the Stone Age.” Musharraf thought it a “very rude remark” (in Schorn 2006: 1), he confided to his interviewer on the television program in which he revealed Armitage's ultimatum. But he got the message, and in exchange for billions of dollars largely allotted to the Pakistan military, the US has had Pakistan as an ally in its global warring against Afghanistan ever since.

### *The Friend That Was the “Greatest Threat”*

According to a Center for Strategic and International Studies report, there have been six elements of Pakistani assistance to the New American Empire during Afghanistan II:

First, Pakistan allowed the United States to fly sorties from the south over Pakistani airspace into Afghanistan—vital because of Iran's unwillingness to open its airspace to U.S. planes. Second, Islamabad granted U.S. troops access to a handful of its military bases, although insisting that the bases should not be used for offensive operations. Third, tens of thousands of Pakistani troops provided force protection for those bases and for U.S. ships in the Indian Ocean.

Fourth, Pakistan provided logistical support for the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan, including vast amounts of fuel for coalition aircraft and port access for the delivery of vital supplies. Fifth, the Pakistani military deployed 80,000 soldiers to its western border in a mostly unsuccessful effort to capture or kill Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders fleeing Afghanistan. And sixth, Islamabad provided Washington with access to Pakistani intelligence assets in Afghanistan and Pakistan. (C. Cohen 2007: 3)

However, maybe Armitage should have been more polite, because Pakistan turned out to have been the ally from Hell, as the following text makes clear.

The Pakistani military and its intelligence agency, the ISI, enjoy substantial autonomy vis-à-vis other government branches and since independence have staged five coups that led to the installation of military dictatorships. They have considerable control over foreign affairs, regardless of whether the government is civilian or military, as it is fixated upon thwarting its perceived enemy, India. Pakistani security elites further reckon that in order to frustrate Indian designs, it is vital that Pakistan have influence in Afghanistan so the latter can be used as a buffer against Indian hostile intentions. Critically, creation and maintenance of proxy pro-Pakistani military forces in Afghanistan has been the means the military and ISI use to achieve this influence.

The Afghan Taliban were a project of the ISI. Mullah Dadullah Akhund, a senior Taliban military commander under Mullah Omar, reorganized the insurgents in Pakistan after the debacle of 2001. The ISI assisted him with financial resources, equipment, and training; then helped insert the mujahideen back into Afghanistan in 2003; and thereafter helped Mullah Barador, who took over as Mullah Omar's deputy, find safe havens for his guerillas after operations against NATO forces. Those on the New American Empire's side knew of these safe havens. Karzai had warned the US and NATO that Pakistan was accommodating al-Qaeda and the Taliban, lamenting, "Year after year, day after day, we have said the fighting against terrorism is not in the villages of Afghanistan ... [but] is in the safe-havens" (in Rashid 2012: 10). Obama understood this, declaring on the campaign trail even before his election that "the greatest threat to our security" in Afghanistan "lies in the tribal regions of Pakistan," by which he meant the FATA (ibid.: 43). Pakistan, then, was an ally that was not only an enemy, but the enemy posing the "greatest threat."

*Global Warring in Pakistan, 2001–2013*: Engagement of the enemy lurking in the FATA led to the two major forms of global warring within Pakistan. The first of these is what journalists have come to call the "drone war." To address the "greatest threat," Obama choose to increase the use

of drones that were used to kill al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership largely in the FATA, seeking to eliminate it as a refuge and staging area. Further, the president allowed the CIA to use a “signature strike” policy to decide upon drone operations.

Under this policy it was *not* necessary to know that a target to be attacked actually consisted of “terrorists.” Rather, a target could be hit if it exhibited certain “signatures” of one containing terrorists. One such signature was that the target contained “military-aged males,” regardless of whether these were or were not terrorists (Scahill 2013: 249). Note that “the military slang for a man killed by a drone strike is ‘bug splat,’ since viewing the body through a grainy-green video image gives the sense of an insect being crushed” (Hastings 2012); which means that a signature of Obama’s Afghanistan policy was putting US soldiers in the business of making “bug splats” from “bugs” that might or might not be the enemy.

According to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (Woods 2001), there were well over 300 drone strikes between 2004 and 2011, the majority of them ordered by Obama. They killed an estimated 2,300 people (*ibid.*). Initially the strikes were covert, but their secrecy was revealed because of their tendency to kill just one combatant for every ten civilians killed, according to a Brookings Institution account (Byman 2009).

These strikes provoked hermeneutic politics among US security elites and ordinary Americans. On one side were those who perceived them as immoral and illegal. On the other were a handful of security elites, who understood them to be a cost-effective, efficient way to make bug splats. Among the Pakistani—elite and otherwise—perceptions were more intimate, of kin pulped by Hellfire rockets. John O. Brennan, Obama’s chief counterterrorism adviser (2009–2013), insisted that in the year 2011 the drones had killed only terrorists, no civilians (Shane 2011). Such wrong claims “incensed” Pakistanis scraping up the splats of their loved ones (Rashid 2012: 173). Nevertheless, in the hermeneutic politics over drone use those Security Elites 3.0 who favored drone utilization won, in large measure because President Obama, the person with the authority force resource to approve them, did so. On 23 May 2013, during an address at the National Defense University, the president said he had authorized escalation of drone warfare because it was “efficient,” “legal,” and “moral” (Obama 2013). The Naval Post Graduate School in Monterrey, California, hired a philosopher to argue their morality (R. Carroll 2012).

A second form of US global warring in the FATA centered on what actually were three enemies of the New American Empire in this region—two we know of, al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban—and a third, the Pakistan Taliban, discussed below. After US forces drove al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban into the FATA, and as part of Islamabad’s earlier described

agreement with the US, Pakistan sent its army into the FATA to finish the refugee insurgents in July of 2002.

But once the military action started in South Waziristan a number of Waziri sub-tribes took it as an attempt to subjugate them. Attempts to persuade them into handing over the foreign militants failed, and with an apparently mishandling by the authorities, the security campaign against suspected Al Qaeda militants turned into an undeclared war between the Pakistani military and the rebel tribesmen. (Abbas 2004)

Out of these hostilities there emerged the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (i.e., the Pakistan Taliban) under Baitullah Mehsud. They were allied with the Afghan Taliban, with whom they nevertheless had their differences. The Pakistan Taliban sought to overturn the Pakistan state; the Afghan Taliban were indifferent to this goal. The Pakistan Taliban were more closely allied with al-Qaeda than the Afghan Taliban, who never took an oath of allegiance to al-Qaeda. The Pakistan Taliban shared with al-Qaeda a commitment to global jihad and were willing to train jihadis to attack the US. The Afghan Taliban were nationalists and indifferent to calls for global jihad. Pakistan Taliban expansion has been especially strong in Bajaur and South Waziristan in the FATA and in Swat, the “Switzerland” of Pakistan. Rashid (2012: 26) has said that by 2011 the Pakistan Taliban were “much more dangerous” than the Afghan Taliban.

Facing three enemies in the FATA, the US obliged Pakistan to live up to the terms of its agreement with the US and send its army to rid this area of these foes. In 2004, eighty thousand Pakistani troops invaded the FATA. Between 2004 and 2006 the Pakistani army invaded the FATA eight more times. During these invasions the Pakistani army did not fight especially hard to defeat the insurgents, who were often allowed to discreetly withdraw. The results of these incursions were inconclusive. The army invaded and the various Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters melted into the hills; then the army left, and everybody returned. The inability to root out opponents in the rugged FATA was an important reason for the use of drones; one of which killed Baitullah Mehsud. Nevertheless, neither drones nor invasions were able to “alter the balance of power in the FATA, where the Taliban and al-Qaeda still ruled” (Rashid 2012: 45).

In sum, the US warred in Pakistan in support of its Afghanistan global war. Its warring was intended to eliminate the FATA safe haven. On the one hand, the empire directly warred with drones, at first covertly and then overtly, seeking to decapitate their opponents’ organizations by killing their commanders. On the other hand, it warred indirectly by using the Pakistani army as its proxy to go in with boots on the ground and finish off these opponents. As in Afghanistan, both forms of warring failed. What role, if any, did the anti-terrorist and oil-control public *délires* have in these hostilities?



*The Anti-terrorist and Oil-Control Public Délires*: US warring in Pakistan and Afghanistan conjoined two countries in a single conflict. The Obama administration seemed to realize this in January 2009 when it appointed Richard Holbrooke its special envoy to both Afghanistan and Pakistan, charged with dealing comprehensively with both nations at the same time. Thereafter, Obama security elites would speak of the “AfPak” situation (Prados 2009). Another way to say it is that ultimately, the US Leviathan fought in Pakistan as part of its fighting in Afghanistan. Hence it fought in Pakistan to eliminate terrorists and to help make possible the TAPI pipeline that would run through both Afghanistan and Pakistan. So it makes sense to understand the two public *délires* as having the same relevance to the fighting in Pakistan as they had in Afghanistan.

The global warring in Pakistan occurred during the intensification and coalescence of the cyclical, land/capital, and dominator/dominated contradictions. Shultzian Permission was granted because efforts to negotiate with insurgents in the FATA were unsuccessful—they were already engaged in anti-US hostilities. The fighting, as an extension of that in Afghanistan, involved implementation of the oil-control and anti-terrorist public *délires*—information consistent with the global warring theory.

What were the consequences of these hostilities? Three seem crucial. First, the warring, taking place in a context of Pakistan being both enemy and friend, strained US-Pakistan relations. The Pakistan military and ISI supported the Afghan Taliban, so they could not trust the US. Imperial Security Elites 3.0 could not trust Islamabad’s Pakistani counterparts for the same reason. Pakistanis of all stripes, like Afghans, were appalled at the drone campaign. Sometimes the ISI was informed of drone attacks; at other times it was not. At one point the ISI and the CIA were “fighting in public,” and by fall of 2011 relations between Pakistan and the US appeared to be “utterly breaking down” (Rashid 2012: 57, 160). At issue was whether the US’s global warring in Pakistan would cause it to lose a client, perhaps to a rapidly rising China. All this suggested another place was threatening the bonds of empire.

Second, the warring grew terrorists rather than diminishing them. Prior to the AfPak wars there was no Pakistan Taliban. By 2009 it was a powerful force conducting operations throughout Pakistan and Afghanistan, and plotting to conduct them in the US. Equally, the drone wars seem to have strengthened both the Pakistan and Afghan Taliban. The tactic of turning mid-level commanders into bug splats was never likely to win the AfPak wars. Rather, killing insurgents and civilians in ways that seemed cowardly and immoral to their kin created recruits for a Taliban motivated to seek revenge. To the degree that these tactics were part of a strategy of COIN warfare, they suggest the ineffectiveness of such tactics. After all,

operations that leave more enemies on the field after hostilities are not winners.

Third, the goal of doing something in a war is to help win it. But when Washington's operations in Pakistan failed to reverse the situation in Afghanistan, the empire went into tactical retrograde, leaving more "terrorists" in the field after 9/11 than there had been before it. All in all, US military operations in Pakistan in support of its Afghan adventures have been detrimental to the US Leviathan.

It is time to consider a final Central Asian war that occurred outside of the region, in the Balkans—that in Kosovo.

### Kosovo 1998–1999: "Breaking Up Is Hard to Do"?

The 1960s heartthrob Neil Sedaka had a hit song entitled "Breaking Up is Hard to Do." The discussion of the Kosovo War, which was part of the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, is in part an inquiry into whether the "breaking up" of Yugoslavia was "hard to do." The investigation begins by observing that between 1991 and 2001 in the territory of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, global warring was constant. Two different phases of conflict might be distinguished.

A first phase of warring involved conflicts to the north and west of Serbia: the Slovenian War (1991), the Croatian War (1991–1995), and the Bosnian Wars (1992–1995) that pitted Serbia, led by Slobodan Milošević, against the breakaway territories of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia. These were over by 1995 and, in the cases of Croatia and Bosnia, ended in agreements reached at the Dayton Conference (November–December 1995). The result was that the rebellious provinces became independent states. Thereafter, the second phase of fighting escalated to the south, becoming the Kosovo War (1998–1999) that resulted in the NATO bombing of Serbia (1999), and finally the Macedonia conflict (2001). The New American Empire, together with its NATO allies, participated in both phases of warring, the US conducting extensive bombing operations against Serbia. These wars were a "re-balkanization" that broke the Socialist Federal Republic up into micro-polities. The following discussion covers different explanations of these Balkan Wars, especially Kosovo, leading to a verdict on whether breaking up was hard to do.<sup>10</sup>

#### *Explaining the Balkan Wars*

Explanations of the Balkan Wars seem to fall into two categories. Some find their causes *within* ex-Yugoslavia itself. For example, a number of au-

thors have stressed ethnic animosity. Robert Kaplan's *The Coming Anarchy* (2001) was important in this regard, arguing that in Yugoslavia and elsewhere, the fall of the Soviet Union, together with the weakening of strong socialist governments, led to a rekindling of pre-existing ethnic hatreds that in turn sparked ethnic civil war. Another such approach understood the wars primarily as a result of the rise of intense nationalisms within the different provinces of the former Yugoslavia. When the fall of the USSR ignited these nationalisms, Slovenes, Kosovars, Croatians, and Serbians demanded national sovereignty.

A second approach has emphasized factors that were *external* to the former Yugoslavia. The US and NATO were key external actors in the warring. This perspective has emphasized the geopolitical readjustments that were consequences of the USSR's fall. The Bear's demise meant that its Eastern European post-World War II acquisitions were "free" to choose their destiny. However, from the vantage of the West these newly "liberated" states needed to be un-liberated, that is, incorporated into the New American Empire. This was done in part by expanding NATO eastward, allowing former satellite states to join the European Union, and promoting private and public investment in Eastern European enterprise. Most of the former Soviet Eastern European client states quickly got with the program and joined the EU, became NATO members, and surrendered to neoliberalization. What the US Leviathan was doing to Eastern Europe in the 1990s, the Soviets had done to it in the late 1940s. The dominos were falling to the benefit of Washington, and Old Molotov must have been spinning in his grave.

Yugoslavia, and especially Serbia, proved to be the holdout—the domino that would not fall. Noam Chomsky's (2006: 1) account of the Balkan civil wars concluded that "the real purpose of the war" was to deal with Serbia, which "was not carrying out the required social and economic reforms, meaning it was the last corner of Europe which had not subordinated itself to the US-run neoliberal programs, so therefore it had to be eliminated." Chomsky's opinion might be dismissed as radical. However, Vjeran Pavlakovic (2005 1), a European liberal, supports Chomsky, asserting that Serbia after 1989 did not choose "democratization and economic liberalization," and this noncompliance in the geopolitics of post-Soviet Eastern Europe had to be eliminated.

The US, in concert with its Western European clients, practiced this elimination by using NGOs in what some have called "color revolutions" to whip up separatist, nationalist sentiments in Yugoslavia's different provinces (Johnstone 1998), and by using the IMF to wreak havoc in their economies, further fueling demands for independence.<sup>11</sup> In November 1990 the US Congress passed the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act,

cutting US aid to any province of Yugoslavia that did not declare independence within six months. Reacting to this assault on sovereignty, Milošević organized a new Communist Party in November 1990 to defend a unified Yugoslavia, thereby preparing for war. Washington answered Milošević with a total economic embargo, devastating the economy with 70 percent unemployment and hyperinflation. Unsurprisingly, under these conditions Slovenia (1991), Croatia (1991), and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992) declared independence. Milošević tried militarily to reverse this, and ugly fighting followed—the siege of Sarajevo, the massacre at Srebrenica. In 1992 the UN sent troops in and the US bombed Serbia (30 August–20 September 1995). This led to the Dayton Peace Accords (1995) and occupation by sixty thousand NATO troops, crowning the success of the re-balkanization policy by guaranteeing the sovereignty of the new micro-states like Croatia, Bosnia, and Slovenia, making them virtual wards of the New American Empire. Sedaka seems to have had it wrong. Breaking up was a piece of cake—when the New American Empire, with a little help from its NATO clients, did the job.

A second external explanation of the Balkan Wars has to do with US and European security elites' solution of the hermeneutic puzzle of the ugliness of the fighting in these Balkan Wars. The solution of the puzzle turned upon a perceptual interpretation of Serbian leadership. Serb leaders—especially Slobodan Milošević, president of Serbia, and Radovan Karadžić, head of the Serbian portion of Bosnia—were constructed as monster-alterities, promoters of ethnic cleansing, genocide, and terrorism that grossly violated human rights. Liberal hawks demanded the “benign imperialism” (the phrase is Kaldor's [1999]) of military intervention against Serbia, whose leaders were so appalling. In this explanation, the US's and its clients' implementation of a liberal hawk iteration of the anti-terrorist hermeneutic was an external cause of the wars.

A problem with this explanation, at least *vis-à-vis* the attack on Kosovo, is raised by David Halberstam, who wrote so perceptively on the Vietnam War. Having also examined the Balkan Wars, he observed that “the last thing” Clinton wanted prior to the Kosovo conflict was further “military intervention in the Balkans” (Halberstam 2001: 397).<sup>12</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell was against it. William Cohen, Clinton's secretary of defense, was against it. His NATO clients were “unsure” about it (*ibid.*). What, then, were the hermeneutic politics that led to the conflict when such powerful security elites were inclined to forgo it?

At this juncture Kosovo enters the narrative. In 1998 the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was using guerilla tactics to vigorously attack Serbian interests in Kosovo, and the Serbs were responding with great energy. According to William Walker, the American head of the Kosovo Verification

Mission, organized by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Serbians inflicted an “unspeakable atrocity” on Kosovars at Račak on 15 January 1999 (in Rowland 1999); in Walker’s interpretation it reached the level of “a crime against humanity” (Halberstam 2001: 410). The Račak incident led to a peace conference at Rambouillet in France (6 February 1999), which failed. General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) of US forces, told Milošević that if he did not withdraw from Kosovo, NATO would “systematically attack, disrupt, degrade, and devastate” Serbia with bombing (in Norris 2005: 5). Peaceful measures had been taken to achieve US goals, but Milošević stood his ground.

Consequently, as the next section shows, Shultzian Permission was granted, and a month and a half after Rambouillet, the US and its allies were “systematically” bombing Serbia. This continued for seventy-eight days, after which Serb forces withdrew from Kosovo. Why did Clinton go to war in Kosovo when it was the “last thing” he wanted? I believe that the anti-terrorist and oil-control public *délire*s, containing elements of the preceding four explanations, help answer this question. Let us now look more closely at the events leading up to implementation of the anti-terrorist public *délire*, which will bring us to the oil-control public *délire*.

*The Anti-Terrorist Public Délire*: It was earlier suggested that US participation in the Kosovo War was a case of US application of the anti-terrorist public *délire*. Let us examine more closely the case for this understanding by examining the actors involved in it. Strobe Talbott, who was close to President Clinton and became, as deputy secretary of state, an important formulator of his foreign policy, recalled that the Kosovo War occurred because, “the West was reiterating a principle that had been taking shape for several years: the government of individual states is not absolute; a national government that systematically and massively abuses its own citizens loses its right to govern” (Talbott and Chanda, 2001: x). How did security elites like Talbott know this? They knew it because hermeneuts told them so. The influential British political commentator Mary Kaldor (1993: 96) told them the Balkan Wars were “grotesque” and “scarcely less horrific” than “Nazism.” Closer to home, the ex-State Department official Louis Sell revealed that Milošević used “brutal tactics of ethnic cleansing” that led to “hundreds of thousands dead” (2002: 5, 8). As already noted, William Walker found these “brutal tactics” in the Račak massacre. Madeleine Albright (1999) insisted Milošević was running a “campaign of terror in Kosovo.” The US Senate declared Serbia “a terrorist state” (K. Talbot 1999). As reported in chapter 9, Hillary Clinton “urged him [President Clinton] to bomb.”

President Clinton's security elites, hermeneuts, secretary of state, and wife hermetically sealed him into his view: perceptually, the Serb government was terrorist; procedurally, the proper course of action was to war against terrorists, so long as there was no peaceful alternative. "Clinton was adamant that Milošević had been given every opportunity, and that there was simply no alternative to bombing" (Norris 2005: 4), so Shultzian Permission was accorded and Serbia was systematically attacked, disrupted, degraded, and devastated. All this suggests that in some measure the US went to war to implement the anti-terrorism public *délire*. However, who Washington treated as an enemy in Kosovo and who it did not suggests that anti-terrorism may not have been the sole factor in its warring there.

In fact, the US also believed the KLA to be a terrorist group. Clinton's Special Envoy to the Balkans Robert Gelbard stated at a press conference in 1998 that "we are tremendously disturbed and also condemn very strongly the unacceptable violence done by terrorist groups in Kosovo and particularly ... the Kosovo Liberation Army. This is without any question a terrorist group" (in Katulis 2000: 15). A double standard is perceptible here: the US attacks one terrorism, yet by doing so it defends another terrorism. This suggests that making the world safe from terrorists was not the only consideration in the empire's Kosovo warring. The next argument shows that issues of oil control were in the pipeline.

*The Oil-Control Public Délire:* After the Balkan Wars ended, a literature emerged that explains this warring in terms of imperialism (Parenti 2002; Johnstone 2002; Collon 2007). Karen Talbot (1999: 18) has suggested that "perhaps above all, this U.S.-led NATO onslaught [against Serbia] is about oil. It is related to the drive to extend and protect the investments of the transnational corporations in the Caspian Sea region, especially the oil corporations."<sup>13</sup>

The years prior to the Dayton Peace Accords coincided with the earlier discussed US oil company investments in the Caspian Basin. Remember, Washington recognized that if these investments were to be realized, pipelines needed to be built westward to get the oil to its European allies. The now re-balkanized Yugoslavia was an excellent terminus for these westward pipelines. Bill Richardson, President Clinton's Energy secretary, expressed this realization in 1998 when he said,

This [US pipelines in the Balkans] is about America's energy security. ... It's also about preventing strategic inroads by those who don't share our values. We are trying to move these newly independent countries toward the West. We would like to see them reliant on western commercial and political interests. ... We've made a substantial political investment in the Caspian and it's important that both the pipeline map and the politics come out right. (In Rees 1999: 2)

Richardson was particularly interested in the Albanian Macedonian Bulgarian Oil Corporation (AMBO) Pipeline. It was to begin in Burgas, Bulgaria, on the Black Sea, where it would receive the Caspian oil; go through Macedonia; and terminate at the port of Vlorë in Albania on the Adriatic, to be sent to markets in Europe and beyond. AMBO, which was founded by Vuko Tashkoviki, an American originally from Macedonia, was to build and operate the pipeline. Its CEO and president was Edward Ferguson, a former director of oil and gas development at Brown and Root Services. The US Trade and Development Agency, (2000:2), believed the pipeline was needed because the oil coming from the Caspian Sea “will quickly surpass the safe capacity of the Bosphorus as a shipping lane.” The scheme, the agency notes, will “provide a consistent source of crude oil to American refineries,” “provide American companies with a key role in developing the vital east-west corridor,” “advance the privatization aspirations of the US government in the region,” and “facilitate rapid integration” of the Balkans “with western Europe.”

A White House spokesperson offered presidential support in 1998, insisting,

The United States, starting with the President, has made this a high object for U.S. foreign policy. As the President said the other day, these pipelines are not often in the U.S. headlines, but the impact that they can have for world energy markets, the impact that they will have for U.S. energy security, the impact that they can have for regional security and security on the eastern flank of NATO and Europe, it's a profound impact. (In Fisher 2002, 82.)

Of course, the pipeline the White House preferred was the AMBO.

Kosovo was located along the proposed route of the AMBO pipeline, and the US believed it needed to control Kosovo to protect the pipeline. For this to occur, Serbia had to be removed from Kosovo. The US acquired this control by supporting the KLA terrorists and attacking the Serbian ones with US-NATO aerial bombardment of Serbia, which, in the words of Strobe Talbott & Chanda (2001: xiii), left Kosovo “a virtual trusteeship, and ward of the UN and NATO.” After the Serb withdrawal from Kosovo, the Pentagon began construction of one of the largest US bases in the world, Camp Bond Steel in southeast Kosovo, to permanently house three thousand US soldiers and an airfield. This gave the US strategic control of the oil route from the Caspian to Europe.

Karen Talbot's suggestion that US fighting in Kosovo was “above all” about “oil corporations” “investments” may be too strong. However, the Clinton administration had made it clear that pipelines from the Caspian were “a high object for US foreign policy” because of their importance for “energy security.” If such security was provided by control over oil, and if it

was perceived that power over pipelines was a way of conferring such control; then procedurally, warring to achieve pipeline control was warranted once other, peaceful ways of achieving such control had failed. We have seen that Milošević's recalcitrance had led Clinton's Security Elites 3.0 to believe peaceful avenues of control in Kosovo were not possible. In sum, the New American Empire fought in the Balkans largely to eliminate one sort of terrorism (while advancing another) and, at the same time, advance its energy security. In this sense, the Kosovo portion of the Balkan Wars might be seen at least in part as an attempt to implement the oil-control public *délire*.

The AMBO pipeline was not built during the Clinton administration. The Bush II administration announced in 2007 that Bulgaria, Albania, and Macedonia had signed an agreement authorizing its construction, with an estimated completion date of 2011 ("AMBO Pipeline Deal" 2007). The Obama administration declared in 2011 that the AMBO pipeline was "still viable," even though it had not been constructed, financing for it had not been secured, and economic and ecological feasibility studies had not been performed (S. Elliott 2011). As of writing, it remains unbuilt.

Again, global warring in Kosovo and the rest of the former Yugoslavia was conducted at a time of intensifying and coalescing cyclical, land/capital, and dominator/dominated contradictions. Shultzian Permission was granted after the Serbs refused to peacefully acquiesce to the US Leviathan's demands, and the global warring involved implementation of the anti-terrorist and oil-control public *délires*. This evidence is all consistent with the global warring theory.

In hindsight, the degree to which global warring in Kosovo was about defending a never-built pipeline was the degree to which it was folly. The old Sedaka song about the difficulties of breaking up had it both right and wrong—wrong, because breaking up Yugoslavia was easy once the empire and its NATO clients exercised violent force to do it; and right in the sense that breaking up Yugoslavia caused well over a hundred thousand deaths while millions endured privation as refugees. For refugees and relatives of the dead, breaking up was hard to do.

Africa was another region where development of oil resources was believed timely for US energy companies' diversification. It is explored next.

## The African Theater

Bush II, during his presidential campaigning in 2000, was asked about Africa's role in US foreign policy. He responded that it did not "fit in the national strategic interests as far as I can see" (in Servant 2003). Wrong.



Within two years, his own officials would be explaining why Africa counted. Let us see why.

Sub-Saharan Africa was a latecomer to the discovery of oil reserves, but since the 1950s there have been numerous finds. In the 1960s, Gabon and Nigeria went online as producers, and others soon followed. Currently, eight producers can be classified as “major”: Gabon, Nigeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Sudan, Congo-Brazzaville, and Equatorial Guinea. African oil production enjoyed a twenty-fold increase between 1960 and 1971, and then doubled between 1981 and 2008 (Fikreyesus 2012). The US imported 15.3 percent of its oil from Africa in 2002, a figure that rose to 22 percent in 2006 and a projected 25 percent by 2015 (*ibid.*). At the turn of the century, Africa’s proven reserves of over thirty billion barrels of oil were still dwarfed by Persian Gulf reserves. However, given that only Nigeria is a member of OPEC of the African producers, oil stoppages due to embargo are less likely. Moreover, much of Africa’s oil is produced near its west coast, which is closer to US markets than the Middle East is. By the 1990s it was clear that African oil represented another way of diversifying the empire’s oil supply and reducing America’s dependence on the “rough neighborhood.” Finally, at the beginning of the new millennium oil began to be discovered in East Africa, in Uganda and Tanzania. African oil was a new prize for the US oil industry and Security Elites 3.0 to win.

Accordingly, as had been the case in Central Asia, an oil industry promotion group was formed—the African Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG)—to lobby for the Bush administration’s recognition that African oil was a “priority” for the New American Empire’s “national security” (Wihbey and Schutz 2002). AOPIG, in turn, began another lobbying group, the US-Africa Energy Association. Walter Kansteiner III, Bush II’s Under Secretary of State for African Affairs, was important in both the US the government and the lobbying groups.<sup>14</sup> He appears to have been central in getting the Bush II administration to grasp the significance of African oil, announcing only two years after Bush II had said Africa was irrelevant to the US that African oil was “a priority” for US National Security.

The growing importance of African oil was associated with an increase in US military involvement on the continent, justified in terms of terrorism. Terrorists had killed the American Special Ops in Somalia and been responsible for the destruction of embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. An African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) was launched in 1996 to deal with such matters. ACRI, consistent with the Clinton administration’s emphasis on humanitarian intervention, trained African troops destined for peace-keeping missions. Under Bush II, the Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCT) and the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) became operational in 2002 in 2004. ACRI,

TSCT, and ACOTA were largely training programs. Under the Old Empires colonial soldiers were trained and organized to fight in their respective empires: the British had their Gurkhas, the French their *tireilleurs senegalais*. The specific goal of the New American Empire was to have, by the early twenty-first century, twenty African battalions trained to fight in support of its *délires*.

Due to the increasing significance of oil, AOPIG and US-Africa Energy Association officials believed that US military forces would eventually be needed to defend the empire's interests in Africa. Consequently, the associations successfully lobbied for a new military command for the sub-continent. AFRICOM, created in 2008, was originally headquartered in a Nazi-era barracks in Stuttgart, Germany. According to its home page, AFRICOM “protects and defends the national security interests of the United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional organizations and, when directed, conducts military operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide a security environment conducive to good governance and development” (U.S. AFRICOM Office of Public Affairs 2013: 2).

In sum, as the years after the 1960s wore on, African oil became increasingly important to the US. By the 1990s prominent Security Elites 3.0 recognized Africa as a priority for the empire's well-being, a priority they took pains to address militarily. There were numerous wars in Africa during the period under consideration. Those in Chad, Sudan, Somalia, and Uganda appear to have involved the US with its GWOT and quest for oil. Let us begin with the Chadian case.

### **Chad: Fighting Terrorism (For the Terrorists) to Get the Oil**

In 1987 President Reagan reassured Chadian President Hissen Habré, “Chad knows it can count on its friends” (in Coll 2012: 159). Reagan was thanking Chad for aiding his administration in its war against Gaddafi. Habré, it will be recalled, became a despot and was indicted for crimes against humanity. He was overthrown in 1990 in a coup by his former general, Idriss Déby—who, certain Chadians bitterly recall, had commanded the operations that inflicted the atrocities that led to the Habré indictment. This section takes up the Chadian story after 1990. It argues that US Leviathan remained a “friend” and did so by helping N'Djamena fight those Deby's government labelled as terrorists -to help get the oil. All of which, it will be clear, has to do with the anti-terrorist and oil-control public *délires*. The narrative begins by explaining why Chad had a friend in the New American Empire.

### *Why Friendship?*

There is a one-word answer to this question: oil. By the 1980s, reserves sufficient to make the country an oil producer had been discovered in southern Chad at Komé, between the small cities of Doba and Moundou. Chad signed an unfavorable production sharing agreement with ExxonMobil in 1988 (see Coll 2012: 159). Nevertheless, ExxonMobil (hereafter Exxon, in a consortium with Chevron and Petronas), supported by a World Bank plan to alleviate poverty, developed the oil fields through the 1990s and early 2000s. Production began in 2003. Three years later 368 wells were in production. During the previous year, Exxon had recouped its investments through oil sales from Chad, and “the project was now profitable” (ibid.: 351). The following year it was judged that the poverty alleviation component of the project had failed (Reyna 2007a, 2007 b; Coll 2012: 367). Meanwhile, China has indicated an interest in Chadian oil and begun operations in the Bongor Basin (Behrends 2011: 92).<sup>15</sup> So Exxon finds itself in a situation of increasing competition.

Exxon made it clear to Security Elites 3.0 that its Chad venture was a good deal for the empire,

Statisticians at ExxonMobil’s ... headquarters ... prepared Power Point slides that emphasized the outsize benefits of the corporation’s activities in Chad ... one thousand American jobs per year ... two hundred expatriate jobs for Americans in the country generating about \$70 million in total revenues; a projected 24 million barrels of direct oil exports to American refineries annually; and more than \$1 billion in profits to American shareholders over about six years. (Coll 2012: 353)

The point here is that Exxon had secured access to Chadian oil. It was bringing in a tidy profit. But there was worrisome competition from the Chinese. US security elites got the message. As Chris Goldthwaite, US ambassador to Chad at the time, expressed it, “the U.S. has one specific interest in Chad, the oil project ...” (ibid.: 175). Chad had a friend in Washington because the US wanted its oil. Friendship, however, imposed a burden on the US due to the nature of the Chadian state, discussed next.

### *A Repressive State*

A recent anonymous, brief piece in the Chadian online journal *Tchad Actuel* ended with the sentence “And dictatorship still has beautiful days” (Anon. 2013a); an ironic ending because the note had been about the repression of Idriss Déby’s dictatorship. Elsewhere I have discussed the nature of Chad’s government (2003b). Nominally, Chad has a republican

form of government. Actually, democracy is extremely restricted. Governance tends toward a dictatorial patrimonialism in which the head of state seeks to remain so, less by winning elections than by organizing networks of patrimonial followers—rent seekers who have been rewarded with force resources drawn from the state. These rewards have been either governmental positions or favors in the private sector that can be awarded by the state. Patrimonial followers, then, are typically officials or private persons awarded government contracts to do something for the state (e.g., building roads or sports stadiums).

Consequently Chad, which is among the world's poorest countries, has had a dual opportunity structure: either you are a beneficiary of the government's patrimony, or you are not. This means the vast bulk of Chadians have really only two possibilities in life. Either they somehow get onto the government's payroll; or they are desperately poor, terribly underemployed urban laborers or rural peasants subject to hunger with each new drought. On becoming a patrimonial follower of the state, one enters a world of villas, automobiles, servants, large bank accounts, and other pleasurable things. The exact population of Chad is unknown. Probably there are between nine and eleven million persons, of whom perhaps only a few thousand are patrimonial followers of any significance.

This means there is fierce competition to become and remain an important patrimonial follower. The competition has been violent. Chadian governments have typically changed in violent coups that usually pit government forces against paramilitary organizations styling themselves liberation armies, often organized by former followers. Chad has had three presidents. The first, François Tombalbaye, was killed in a violent coup (1974). The second, Hissen Habré, was removed by his former follower Idriss Déby (1990). Since that time, some fifteen national liberation armies have formed and operated in southern, northern, eastern and western Chad, all seeking to do unto Déby what he did unto Habré. To be clear, between 1990 and 2014 there was continual conflict in Chad as Déby fought to remain president, just as between 1963 and 1990 he had waged continual conflict to become president. Since independence, the presidency has been awarded by violence.

Repression has been a response to violent attempts to remove heads of state. It has taken two major forms: either the army is deployed in operations to eliminate rebel paramilitary organizations; or security services are used to intimidate rebellious individuals, often by torture or death. During Habré's presidency such repression became extreme. His especially infamous security service, which was known colloquially as "the vultures" and officially as the Documentation and Security Directorate, tortured and executed large numbers of its victims.<sup>16</sup> Déby's repressive measures have

been less spectacular than those of his predecessor but more effective, as he has governed for over two decades.

Recently, an article in *Tchad Actuel* informed readers that “for some time, M. Idris Déby Itno has drummed ... alerting international opinion of a possible menace to Chad from the jihadists, seeking in consequence exterior assistance, above all from the West, which is very sensitive to all that bears on Islamist movements, and their corollary, jihad-terrorism” (Al-Abassy 2013). If “the West” is understood to be the US and its allies, then what the journal was reporting is that Déby was charging his imperial “friend” a strategic rent. Payment of the rent would come in the form of defense of the dictator against those he labeled adherents of “jihad terrorism,” though others might claim that those labeled terrorists were merely those resisting repression. All this allowed Déby to continue enjoying his “beautiful days,” and the US Leviathan to continue controlling Chad’s oil.

### *“Beautiful Days”: The Empire Pays Its Rent to the Dictator*

There have been two sets of rebellions against the Déby regime. The first, during the 1990s in the south, directly threatened oil production. The second was largely in the 2000s, mainly in the north and east along the Chad/Sudan border. The narrative moves south.

*Southern Rebellion:* As noted earlier, the non-Muslim south had controlled the central government until 1979, when Muslim rebels from the north, ultimately led by Habré, seized the state. Denied their share of the state’s patrimony, former southern politicians and military rebelled against it throughout Habré’s regime. They were brutally suppressed by troops directed by Déby, who then was commander-in-chief of the Chadian army. Two southern rebellions followed Déby’s seizure of the presidency.

The first was that of the Comité de Sursaut National pour la Paix et le Démocratie (CSNPD), active between 1991 and 1994. The second rebellion, by the Forces Armées pour le République Fédérale (FARF), lasted from 1994 through 1998. The CSNPD was formed by Moïse Ketté, who had served in Habré’s security forces. Operating in the extreme southeast of Chad, he explicitly made oil part of his military strategy, warning that “oil would not flow from Doba’ unless his conditions were met” (Buijtenhuijs 1998: 39). In 1992 and 1993 Déby responded by invading the south with the Garde Républicaine of the Armée Nationale Tchadienne. They “roamed the land in Toyota pick-ups holding six or seven, seeking victims” (Verschave 2000: 165) in “an uninterrupted series of massacres, rapes, and village burnings” (ibid: 152). The CSNPD responded to this campaign by threatening to “sabotage government-supported oil exploration” (MAR

2004: 10). Déby urgently needed tranquility because the “oil giants” were “all investigating oil resources” (ibid.: 11). So in August 1994, the government and the CSNPD signed a final peace agreement. Ketté ended his resistance, and the government agreed to remove its troops from the south.

Some in the CSNPD regarded Ketté’s final peace accord with Déby as a sellout and formed FARF under the leadership of Laoukin Bardé in 1994. FARF made no secret of its fighting for oil—as one leader put it, “I’m ready to die for oil” (Petry and Bambé 2005: 101). Government troops and FARF engaged in sporadic fighting from the end of 1994 through 1995. In the spring of 1996, the intensity of the fighting increased into what one observer labeled a “regime of terror” (Verschave 2000: 166). On 30 October 1997 Bardé’s headquarters were attacked in Moundou in yet another round of fighting there, and many FARF leaders were killed. One account of this fighting reported: “They killed local personalities passing by, they molested a bishop, kidnapped children, killed their parents. Forbid burial, throwing bodies to the pigs” (in Verschave 2000: 166). Thereafter, security forces numbering an estimated five thousand “spread the terror” in an offensive throughout southwestern Chad (ibid.: 167): Fighting lasted until 1998. Peace accords were signed in May. Bardé chose exile but was betrayed by his own kin and killed, after which FARF effectively ceased to exist. Armée Nationale Tchadienne troops remained in the south, which became effectively an occupied territory. Déby had defended Exxon, assuring his control over the oil-producing region of Chad and of any wealth it might provide to his government. There would be future fighting, but it would be over who got the oil spoils.

*Northern Rebellion:* Almost immediately after the defeat of the south, a number of rebel movements formed and began operating in the north and east of Chad. Their acronyms were a changing, confusing alphabet soup as they formed, died, and/or combined with others. All relied upon partisans from Muslim ethnic groups, all were opposed to Déby, and all had leaders who came from or wanted into the Chadian central government with its growing oil revenues. Among the more important of these groups was the *Front Uni pour le Changement* (FUC), founded in 2005 as an alliance of eight different movements and led by Mohammed Nour Abdelkerim. There was also the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD), founded a year after the FUC. Though it was headed by Mahamat Nouri, a former ambassador to Saudi Arabia, it was unlikely to flourish in Déby’s administration because Nouri was an Anakazza Gorane, the same ethnic group as Habré. There was also the Rally of Democratic Forces (RDF), which was headed by Tom and Timan Erdimi. Either cousins or nephews of Déby, they had held posts in his government but broke

with him to occupy higher positions. At times the Sudanese government has supported some of these movements.

Since 2005 these groups have been especially active against Déby's government. By and large their operations have been in the extreme east, where the town of Adré has been attacked twice. There have been two extraordinary campaigns against N'Djamena, Chad's capital in the extreme west. In April of 2006, the FUC set out in Toyota pickups loaded with soldiers, weapons, food, and water, and drove 1,000 kilometers from the Sudanese border to N'Djamena, which they attacked on 13 April. They were quickly driven off. This came to be known as the First Battle of N'Djamena. Thereafter, the FUC signed a peace treaty and Mohammed Nour Abdelkerim achieved his dream of becoming Chad's defense minister, a post he held for only seven months before slipping back into opposition. Then in 2008, UFDD and RFC forces did it again, attacking N'Djamena on 2 February. This time the fighting was more intense. For a while it was touch and go. France offered Déby asylum if he wanted it. By 4 February the battle had swayed to the government's side, and the rebels drove back to the Sudanese borderlands.

In 2009, Chad and Sudan signed a peace accord. Since that time Déby has successfully eliminated Sudanese support for the rebels. They have weakened, divided, and signed peace treaties. In 2013 Chad's Communications minister announced, "There is no Chadian rebellion. . . . In Chad there is calm, peace, and stability" (AFP 2013a). On 21 May 2013, Timan Erdimi, now a leader in the United Resistance Forces, announced from Qatar that hostilities against Déby had recommenced.

One may ask why the civil wars in Chad are being discussed, as they appear to have nothing to do with the US and everything to do with the violent politics of African patrimonial states. This is partially, but not entirely correct. Déby and his foes *are* fighting for control over state-derived force resources. But the New American Empire is a participant conducting covert global warring in ways that are consistent with the oil-control and the anti-terrorist public *délires*. This assertion is justified next.

*The Anti-terrorist and Oil-Control Public Délires:* Consider first the oil-control public *délire*. The US Leviathan, through the good offices of Exxon and its PSA with the Chadian government, largely controls Chadian oil. Déby, in turn, has made it clear he defends Exxon. However, the continual civil war makes it equally essential that Déby be defended. The US Leviathan does this, projecting violent force into Chad in two ways: either directly or indirectly, through a proxy.

There are both CIA and JSOC Special Ops in Chad. Their exact numbers are unclear. At some point General Stanley McChrystal was in Chad,

presumably to either initiate or strengthen JSOC there. He is said to have run some missions with Mel Gamble, the CIA head of the Africa Division, Directorate of Operations (Coll 2012: 173). The full range of US Chadian operations is unknown. It was reported in 2003 that the Americans were building an airstrip in the desert just north of N'Djamena. The US conducts training, especially in COIN tactics.<sup>17</sup> It equally provides military equipment and intelligence. Under some conditions it provides logistical support, as well as certain types of operational assistance. By 2007, according to a diplomatic cable from the American embassy in N'Djamena, Déby's military had two battalions of US-trained troops, twenty of whom were killed that year in fighting in the east (N'Djamena 933 2012: 2). These battalions were the neo-colonial iteration of the colonial *tirailleurs senegalaises*.

The US is also supported by a proxy, one the most powerful client states in its empire. This is France, the former colonial power in Chad. Upon Chadian independence, France and Chad signed a defense accord to defend the government in power. France has not always honored this agreement but has continually used the accord to project military force into Chad. Paris has two permanent bases in the country: a larger one in N'Djamena, next to the airport; and a smaller one in Abeché in the east near the Sudanese border. Each base has a complement of air force personnel and commandos (sometimes the Foreign Legion).

France militarily participated in both the southern and northern rebellions during Déby's rule. The same French units that are held to have trained the militias that conducted the massacres in Rwanda are reported to have trained the Garde Républicaine. Chadian police and soldiers in the south, "trained by French instructors, continued the assassinations: local officials, high school students, peasants ... torture was made banal" (Verschave 2000: 167). Certain scholars of French politics might scoff at the idea that France has acted as a US proxy in Chad. Such skepticism is unwarranted. France and the US do coordinate security concerns. After all, what is good for Washington is good for Paris. So Chad provided the soldiers, and the US and France trained them, armed them, provided them with intelligence, and helped out when the situation required.

The oil-control public *délire* is one where US security elites perceptually identify a threat to US oil control, and procedurally act to eliminate that threat. In the 1990s and early 2000s, US Security Elites 3.0 perceptually interpreted the Chad case as one where armed rebels were seeking to destroy Déby, who was defending the US's control of oil there. This meant it was procedurally appropriate to expend violent force in support of Déby, that is, in support of the empire's control of oil. US exercise of violent force, understood in this context, appears consistent with application of the oil-control public *délire*. What about the anti-terrorist public *délire*?



A paragraph concerning Chad in the 2013 State Department document “Country Reports on Terrorism” provides some insight into this topic. The document announced that for the year 2012,

Countering terrorism threats in Chad was a priority at the highest levels of Chad’s government, with a particular focus on countering potential terrorist threats from across the Sahel region. Special Operations Command Africa, through the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Trans-Sahara, maintained a Special Operations Forces Liaison Element in Chad to support Chadian counterterrorism forces with training and logistical support. (State Department 2013)

By the second decade of the new millennium, this quotation indicates, *both* Déby’s government and that of the US had come to perceive Chad’s enemies as terrorists. Procedurally, then, Chad had come to have a “particular focus on countering” this menace, which the US military, in the form of the Special Operations Forces Liaison Element, supported. In other words, the US Leviathan’s military force projection into Chad was to combat terrorism.

How this came to be can be speculated upon: Chad has had a friend in Washington since the Reagan administration, and N’Djamena had had a CIA presence since well before Reagan. In the earlier days of national liberation movements’ rebellions against N’Djamena, the Chadian government largely called its opponents *bandi* (bandits). However, in the days following 9/11 and the onset of the GWOT, the US recognized that Africa was ripe for terrorist activity, especially in more rugged areas like the Sahara. Thus the CIA and JSOC “charged into African capitals long neglected” (Coll 2012: 173). Recall that AFRICOM was created in 2008 to address concerns over terrorism. Half of Chad is in the Sahara, where US anti-terrorist military programs and personnel began to be increased so as to include the JSOC. US anti-terrorist officials like Stanley McChrystal would have informed Chadian officials that the enemy were no mere *bandi* but something far more sinister—terrorists—but that their “friend” was there to help them. In this sense, US military operations in Chad were an implementation of the anti-terrorist public *délire*.

In Chad as in other countries, the US Leviathan conducted its covert indirect and direct global warring at a time of a perfect storm of the three coalescing and intensifying contradictions. Shultzian Permission had been granted because the Chadian government was already experiencing violent insurgency, and Déby could only be helped with violence. The global warring involved implementation of the anti-terrorist and oil-control public *délires*. These facts are supportive of the global warring theory.

Finally, consider the actuality of US military operations in Chad. First, the US Leviathan is Déby’s “friend” because Déby supports Washington’s control over N’Djamena’s oil. Second, Déby’s rule—his “beautiful days”—

proceeded via terrorization of his people, especially in the southern portion of the country. Thus, by fighting to support Déby, the New American Empire has fought terrorism to support the beautiful days of an undemocratic, authoritarian terrorist. The narrative now turns to the Sudan, a country that is not a friend of the Security Elites 3.0.

### Sudan: The Humanitarians' Blunder

Good afternoon. Today I ordered our armed forces to strike at terrorist-related facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan because of the imminent threat they presented to our national security. (President Bill Clinton, 1998a)

In a televised 1998 presidential speech to the whole country, President Clinton looked his fellow citizens in the eye and, in the middle of the Monica Lewinsky scandal, announced that the US had attacked “terrorist-related facilities in ... Sudan” because they threatened “national security,” an assertion that strained credulity. Sudan, after all, was an impoverished African country, often derided as a failed state and a humanitarian disaster, whose military lacked any ability to strike America.

Some interpreted the president’s announcement as a ploy to divert attention from his sexual indiscretions. Others were concerned that the Sudanese government had given refuge to Osama bin Laden, even though Khartoum had expelled him three years prior to Clinton’s attack and had offered to deliver him to the US (Baer 2002). Whatever else it was, the Sudanese situation was consequently the reverse of that in Chad: it was an enemy of Washington and by the 1990s a declared terrorist state. Clinton’s liberal hawks’ bungling in Sudan would allow its anti-terrorism *délire* to wreck its oil-control *délire*.

#### *The Blunder*

Sudan is a bigger oil producer than Chad, producing 514,300 barrels per day in 2010, and may actually hold Africa’s greatest unexploited oil reserves (Hennig 2007: 1).<sup>18</sup> Oil was found in the non-Muslim, southern region of Sudan, and it was further possible that it might also be found to the northwest in southern Darfur. Muslim northerners dominated the central government; meanwhile, southerners, largely from the Dinka and Nuer tribes, violently contested the central government’s authority in the south, as they have done since the mid 1950s.<sup>19</sup> There were two periods of war in the south—the First (1955–1972) and the Second (1983–2005) Sudanese Civil Wars. Led by John Garang, the south won the Second Civil War and became the independent Republic of South Sudan in 2011.

The New American Empire was not indifferent to the control of the oil, as it was a way of diversifying the American oil dependence beyond the Persian Gulf. Originally, US oil companies flourished in Sudan. Chevron was granted an oil concession in 1974 and began prospecting. By the late 1970s and early 1980s it had discovered considerable deposits in the Muglad and Melut Rift basins in the south. Chevron was pumping by the late 1990s; hence, a US oil company effectively controlled much of Sudanese oil production at this time.

Then, according to Don Petterson (2003: 225), US ambassador to Sudan in the 1990s, “To help forestall legislation pending in the Congress that would have applied sanctions against Sudan in a way that would have limited the executive branch’s options ... the administration issued an executive order curtailing U.S.-Sudanese commerce and trade.” So, due to legislative and executive branch haggling over their authorities, in 1997 Clinton signed Executive Order 13067, effectively embargoing trade with Sudan. This angered President Bashir, who denounced the US “as a thief plundering and robbing Sudan’s wealth” and threatened “holy war” (ibid.: 225). Now that it was illegal for US oil companies to operate in Sudan, Chevron left. Currently, Sudanese oil is produced largely by the China National Petroleum Corporation, as well as by certain Malaysian and Indian companies.

Thus, during the Clinton administration the US Leviathan largely lost control over Sudanese oil, and Clinton’s security elites did it to themselves with Executive Order 13067. This blunder is the focus of the following analysis, which pays attention to the role of the oil-control and anti-terrorist public *délires*. While attempting to implement an anti-terrorist agenda, a group of liberal hawk humanitarians that called themselves “the Council” interpreted what was happening in the 1990s Sudan, and in so doing were in large part responsible for the blunder. Documentation of this assertion begins with an exploration of the fluctuations in relations between Khartoum and Washington since President Reagan.

President Carter, whose Carter Center has worked in the Sudan since 1986, remarked that “the U.S. government has a policy of trying to overthrow the government in the Sudan” (in Shillinger 1999). The problems began during the Clinton administration, when the empire’s relations with the Sudanese government deteriorated precipitously. Earlier relations had been better. Gafaar Nimeiry, a military officer, seized control of the country in a 1969 coup. For a portion of his rule, Nimeiry was an “important ... client” of the US, who during the Reagan years allowed the US Leviathan to use Sudan as a base for its operations against Libya (Schmidt 2013: 204). Sudan went so far as to allow a CIA outpost to operate in Darfur.

However, Nimeiry was overthrown in 1986 and replaced by Sadiq al-Mahdi, the great-grandson of the Mahdi who had led the Mahdist Revolt

(1881–1899) against Anglo-Egyptian rule. In 1989 he was replaced in another coup by Omar al-Bashir, a military leader who was strongly supported by Hassan al-Turabi, head of the National Islamic Front. Bashir and Turabi were both Islamists from the Sudanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and their Islamism alarmed Washington: it seemed tainted with terrorism because Turabi had invited Osama bin Laden to reside and conduct his affairs in Sudan. He came in 1991. More ominously, the *9/11 Commission Report*, the official government account of why 9/11 occurred, claimed that

Turabi sought to persuade Shiites and Sunnis to put aside their divisions and join against the common enemy. In late 1991 or 1992, discussions in Sudan between al-Qaeda and Iranian operatives led to an informal agreement to cooperate in providing support—even if only training—for actions carried out primarily against Israel and the United States. (Kean and Hamilton 2004: 61)<sup>20</sup>

Doubtless, the new Clinton administration was privy to this intelligence, which provoked a hermeneutic puzzle: how to deal with a Sudan apparently turning toward the dark side of terrorism? It is at this juncture that the Council enters the story.

### *The Council*

The African bureau was the primary locus of policymaking for Sudan. (Pettersson 2003)

Don Pettersson, the US ambassador to Sudan during the early 1990s, had it wrong in the above quotation. The “primary locus” for policymaking vis-à-vis Sudan during those years was an Italian restaurant near Washington’s Dupont Circle. Here “the Council”—a cabal of six men and a woman—met and deliberated the fate of Sudan.<sup>21</sup> They regarded themselves as good folk and righteous humanitarians, and they—not the ambassador roasting out in the backwater of Khartoum—were the ones with disproportionate influence on US Sudanese operations during the Clinton administration.

The first Council member was Brian D’Silva. He had met with John Gaurang in 1978 when the two were graduate students in agricultural economics. Charismatic to many who met him, Gaurang would lead the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), the military arm of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Gaurang was a hybrid elite who attended Iowa’s Grinnell College and then Iowa State University, as well as Advanced Officers Training in Fort Benning, Georgia. D’Silva became Gaurang’s champion in the United States. Francis Deng, a Dinka from southern Sudan, Sudanese diplomat, and scholar who had lived for a long while in the US, was a second member of the Council. He offered other Council members connections to southern Sudan.<sup>22</sup>

Two other members, Roger Winter and John Prendergast, came from humanitarian work, especially in the Sudan. Winter, whom one admirer called “a Saint” (E. Griswold 2008), had worked in the Carter administration but “vowed never to work in the government again, preferring the less bureaucratic non-government sector” (R. Hamilton 2012: 4). So in 1981 he became the executive director of the US Committee for Refugees. One document described Prendergast as a “rockstar” (Bealy 2013). He was identified by his speakers’ bureau as a “human rights activist” and a “friend” of George Clooney (APB 2013).

Ted Dagne was another Council member. He was an Ethiopian refugee who had worked in a variety of positions in the US Congress, and established an “intense friendship” with Garang (R. Hamilton 2012: 2). At some point in the mid 1990s, Susan Rice, who then was rapidly rising within the State Department ranks, became an occasional member of the Council; as did Eric Reeves, an English professor at Smith College, an elite women’s school. Rice would turn out to be the most powerful member of the group. Reeves, a Shakespeare and Milton expert, would turn out to be its puritanical scold. Playfully, the group had nicknames for each other. Dagne was the “Emperor,” Reeves was “Deputy Emperor,” Winter the “Spear Carrier,” Prendergast the “Councilor in Waiting,” and Deng the “Diplomat.” Rice and D’Silva do not seem to have had nicknames. The nicknames had an imperial ring—Emperor, Deputy Emperor, Spear Carrier. These humanitarians were not play-acting during their restaurant trysts. They were plotting imperial outcomes.

“*Too Deformed to Be Reformed*”: A way of grasping the nature of their intrigues is to reveal the hermeneutic the Emperor and his Council brought to their interpretations. First and foremost it was a narrow one. Though different members of the Council operated in other African countries—especially Rice, Winter, and Prendergast—the reality the Council members focused on when acting as Council members was the hermeneutic puzzle of the Sudan. Specifically, they perceptually understood Sudan as a place with a civil war pitting Muslim north against Christian south. As Winter put it, according to *New York Times* correspondent Eliza Griswold (2008), in Sudan “there’s a good guy and a bad guy.” The “bad guy” was the Sudanese government in Khartoum that terrorized its own populations. The “good guy” was the SPLA, and its political arm the SPLM, in the south (who also terrorized their own populations). Perhaps the affection for the SPLA/M existed because the Council “was united by its respect for Garang” (R. Hamilton 2012: 4). Winter put the good guy/bad guy matter as follows: “You have these well-trained guys in Khartoum who are murderers and never keep an agreement” (in *ibid.*: 4). Of course, members of

the Council acknowledged that SPLA “fighters committed horrific crimes during the war” (ibid.: 4). Different factions within the SPLA battled each other. Perhaps the most enduring strife pitted Riek Machar against first Garang and then his successor Salva Kiir.<sup>23</sup> Additionally, there were southern factions outside the SPLA that fought each other and the SPLA. All this conflict tended to utilize terrorist tactics. Prendergast’s own book, *Crisis Response: Humanitarian Band-AIDS in Sudan and Somalia* (1997), explicitly announced that the SPLA/M “terrorized the southern population” (in Hoile 1999: 50). So the Council’s perceptual interpretation of Sudan as divided into good and bad guys was a misinterpretation. Both sides in the civil warring terrorized, so the country was actually divided into bad guys and bad guys.

Just how bad did the Emperor and his followers think the Khartoum bad guys were? Prendergast was expressing the Council’s views when he told Rice that Bashir’s government was “too deformed to be reformed” (in R. Hamilton 2012: 3). Reeves (2004) went further, labeling Bashir’s government “a serially genocidal regime”—strong words implying either that Khartoum should undergo regime change or that Sudan should be dismembered by providing backing to SPLA “good guys” to do the job. When Bush II was implementing violent regime change in Iraq, Reeves jumped at the idea of doing the same in Sudan; but most Council members supported the latter possibility. Backing the south, they believed, should come in many forms, ranging from propaganda monsterizing the “Arab” north to assisting the SPLA in its fighting. Council members believed that Shultzian Permission should be granted for US Sudan operations because the US was facing a government that was “serially genocidal.”

Thus, the Council’s hermeneutic was perceptually that Sudan was divided into good guys and bad guys; and procedurally that support, up to and including military intervention, should be accorded to the good guys but covertly, so the US could be viewed as humanitarian good guys (Autesserre 2002). There was nothing especially humanitarian here. It was a clique of Washington security elites pursuing an imperial goal of controlling a world region.

It might be asked who the Council members *really* were—humanitarian *bons vivants* chowing down at a DC watering hole, or something more ominous? Keith Harmon Snow, a progressive war correspondent who covers Africa, thought he saw something darker. He notes that Rice, Winter, Prendergast, and Dagne operated in other areas of Africa too, especially the Horn and Great Lakes, “supporting and covering up” Western low-intensity military operations (K. Snow 2012). He identifies them as “intelligence operatives” (ibid.), quoting Jean Marie Higiroy, an erstwhile official in the Rwanda government, as saying, “Roger Winter is an intelligence op-

erative” (in *ibid.*). Spain’s Juan Carrero Saralegui, a human rights activist with expertise in Rwanda, has also identified Winter as an intelligence officer (in *ibid.*: 9). It is not unusual for the CIA to covertly insert personnel into private institutions and NGOs functioning in areas where the intelligence community has an interest. Winter’s position as executive director of the US Committee for Refugees would be just such a position. Alan Boswell (2012), reporting for McClatchy, observed that in 2012 Dagne, while working in the new Republic of South Sudan, was “an embedded go-between, and source of intelligence.” If he was an intelligence “source” in 2012, it is not improbable that he carried out the same function during the 1990s.

The Council members’ power derived from the positions they held in the Clinton administration, and it is time to discuss these. The most powerful person, that is, the one with the biggest window of authority, was Susan Rice. As was said of her in chapter 8, she “grew up with ... privilege and ... connections.” During the 1990s those “connections” paid off. Rice received her doctorate in 1990. Three years later she joined the NSC. In 1995 she became the NSC director for Africa, a post she held for two years. Then, in 1997, she switched to the state department—nine months after her lifelong family friend, Madeleine Albright, became secretary of state—and was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, the highest US government position dealing with African affairs. Privilege has its plunder: seven years from her doctorate, Susan Rice, age 33, was the security elite who ran Africa for the US government. Some State Department professionals, according to a *Washington Post* article, charged she was “not truly an ‘Africanist’” (Parker 1998). Another source reported that “the poverty of her knowledge of Africa ... shocked the Africa diplomatic corps in Washington” (EIR Investigative Team 1998).

No matter the extent of her ignorance, Rice had her advisers, among whom John Prendergast, her council compatriot, was key. In 1996 she brought him into the NSC, and when she left he replaced her as the Africa director. Roger Winter remained with the US Committee for Refugees at this time but was believed to be her “closest advisor on Africa” (*ibid.*). Rice, Prendergast, and Winter were a “team,” Winter said in September of 1997, “to lead the United States into support of a war against the government of Sudan” (in A. Hassan 2009). They would, we shall see, lead the US not only to support a war against Khartoum, but to conduct it covertly.

D’Silva and Dagne played supporting roles on the Council “team.” D’Silva went on to a career in USAID, specializing in the Sudan, from which position he argued the case for southern Sudan. Dagne worked for the US Congress, where for much of that time he was employed by the Congressional Research Service, an institution whose function is to

provide Congress with the “objective” information it needs to legislate. Dagne wrote reports on Sudan, several of which were notorious for their bias in favor of the SPLA (see Dagne 1997, 2002). He went on to work for the House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Africa, where, with the assistance of Representative Donald Payne, he created a network of pro-southern Sudan representatives.

The Emperor also had something of an intelligence role within the Council. This was because, as Herman Cohen (2000: 83), Bush I’s assistant secretary of state for Africa, remembered, Dagne was a “good friend” of SPLA leader John Garang and hosted meetings for him in his Washington home. Rebecca Hamilton (2012: 2–3) describes “an intense friendship” between Garang and Dagne; in the course of which “they spoke on the phone every day.” These phone calls clearly provided considerable SPLA/M intelligence, which was certainly shared with other Council members and allowed them to coordinate their southern Sudanese politics.

By the mid 1990s, Rice and Prendergast occupied the two highest positions concerning Africa in the NSC and the State Department. Their superiors—first Anthony Lake and then Sandy Berger in the NSA, and first Warren Christopher and then Madeleine Albright in Foggy Bottom—were not Africanists and were distracted by more pressing events, especially in the Balkans. D’Silva and Dagne gave the Council strong representation in USAID and Congress. Dagne gave them the best, latest inside information on what was happening in Sudan from the perspective of the SPLA leader. Therefore, if the Council did not hermetically seal off all but their own understandings during the hermeneutic politics of Sudan in the 1990s, they certainly tried to do so. It was hard to be pro-Khartoum when the Council told everybody, as Prendergast had, that Bashir’s government was “too deformed to be reformed.” What was the consequence of the Council’s near hermetic seal on Sudanese politics?<sup>24</sup>

*Losing the Oil:* Washington’s relations with Khartoum remained relatively strong through the end of Bush I’s administration (H. Cohen 2000). However, as we have seen, concerns began to arise about Khartoum’s Islamist terrorist connections.<sup>25</sup> The Clinton era began on 21 January 1993. A month later (26 February 1993) the first bombing of the World Trade Center occurred. On 12 August 1993 Sudan was placed on the list of countries that supported terrorism. Of the Council members, only Susan Rice was at this time in a position to have had any role in this decision. What her role was is unclear. However, as the ex-president Jimmy Carter recalled, “In fact, when I later asked an assistant secretary of state” what evidence they possessed to place Sudan on the list, “he said they did not have any proof, but there were strong allegations” (in Hoile 1999: 9). Certainly Susan Rice



was in a position to make “strong allegations” of the terrorist nature of the Khartoum government.

The years 1996 and 1997 would be the most important for the Council’s influence on Sudanese affairs. In 1996 the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act went into effect. This congressional legislation was not directly aimed at the Sudan, but it affected Sudan because it barred US individuals and companies from dealing with terror-sanctioning countries. Sudan was on the list of terror-supporting countries, so US companies were forbidden to operate there.

At this point oil enters the picture, and with it some hanky-panky. Occidental Petroleum, founded by Armand Hammer, was one of the larger US oil and gas multinationals. Ray R. Irani was Occidental’s chairman in 1996. Both Hammer and Irani had been friends of Senator Albert Gore Sr., whose son Albert Gore Jr, was the US Vice President in 1996. Occidental’s chairman slept in the Lincoln Room of the White House on 27 March 1996. Two days later Occidental’s PAC gave \$100,000 to the Democratic National Committee. Five months further on, the Antiterrorism Act (23 August 1996) took effect. On the very same day the Treasury Department created an exception to the act and allowed Occidental Petroleum to pursue an oil deal with the Sudan (“More Information on Sudan” 2013).

The year 1996 was also important because by this time “the Clinton administration” had embarked on “a policy of assisting the SPLA militarily” (Hoile 1999: 7). Specifically, the administration “openly and unambiguously encouraged the governments of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda not only to afford the SPLA safe rear bases, but also to spearhead and support rebel incursions into the Sudan” (ibid.: 8). Further, in order to encourage these countries, which the US called the “front line,” Washington decided in 1996 “to send over \$20 million of military equipment” to them “to help the Sudanese opposition overthrow the Khartoum regime” (A. Hassan 2009a). Clearly, the US was fighting in the Sudan through its proxies, especially Uganda and Eritrea, though there appear to have been “several Operational Detachments—Alpha teams (also called A-Teams) of the US army ... operating in support of the SPLA” (Hassan 2009a).

Who was responsible for this violent turn? By 1996 both Rice and Prendergast were in place in the NSC. Both desired support of the SPLA. Prendergast, as we have just seen, was in direct contact with rebel leaders. Anthony Lake, who at the time was the NSA and their boss, was involved in a failed bid to secure nomination as the CIA head. Lake needed NSC members’ backing to lend credibility to his CIA bid, so it is likely that he acceded to Rice and Prendergast’s desires. Of course, Sudan’s government was not oblivious to the fact that it was involved in a proxy war with Washington, and it did a number of things. Most significantly, in November

1996 it barred Occidental from any oil deal in Sudan. Chevron stayed, but Occidental was out. The US suspended embassy operations in Khartoum.

In 1997, Rice was promoted to assistant secretary of state for Africa. Prendergast was in charge of Africa in the NSC. Khartoum was trying to reconcile with the US, but Prendergast and Rice were arguing against reconciliation (D. Rose 2002). Late in 1997, Prendergast announced that the US government viewed the Bashir regime as “the principle threat to US security interests on the Continent of Africa today” (in Hoile 1999: 8). On 5 November 1997, Clinton issued Executive Order 13067, which echoed, and upped, the rhetorical level of Prendergast’s words. Khartoum was said to “constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States” (Executive Order 13067: 1). Transactions between US businesses and Sudan were prohibited. There were no exceptions. Chevron left. This was the blunder: in fighting one terrorism (that of Khartoum) in support of another (that of the SPLA), they had lost the oil.

*What Happened Next?* If the US Leviathan wanted Sudan’s oil, the foregoing events put it in the position of having to fight on to defeat Khartoum, thereby winning independence for the south. Only then, because the oil was in the south, might US oil companies be allowed to return. This was exactly what occurred, and as Julie Flint (2009) has remarked, “the war for oil was terrible.”

Bush II became president in 2001. Prendergast and Rice lost their positions, but the Bush administration continued support of the SPLA/M. There is evidence that the Vulcans sought to further militarily weaken the Khartoum government by exacerbating rebellion in Darfur, where anti-Bashir guerilla movements (the Sudanese Liberation Army [SLA] and Justice and Equality Movement [JEM]) emerged and in 2003 began attacking government military installations in Darfur (Reyna 2010). Khartoum, already militarily occupied with the situation in the south, responded by encouraging an Arab militia, the *janjaweed*, to attack the SLA and JEM. One reason the Khartoum government may have been so eager to assert control in Darfur was the prospect of oil there.

There had been rumors of oil since the 1990s. Julie Flint (2009) reports, “In April 2005, Energy Minister Awad al-Jaz grabbed headlines by announcing discovery of a giant oilfield in southern Darfur that he said was expected to produce 500,000 b/d within months. . . . But announcements of success were premature and proved illusory.” The reality of oil in Darfur is unknown. What is real, however, is its possibility, in the minds of both the Khartoum government and American officials. The US military’s hand in the fighting that ensued in Darfur was covert. However, “it is . . . well

documented that the US through its closest African allies, helped train the SLA and JEM Darfuri rebels that initiated Khartoum's violent reaction" (Hennig 2007: 1). Information gathered during fieldwork bears upon two aspects of US intervention in Darfur. First, the Israelis were involved in preparing SLA members for combat, and some of them were taken to Israel for training. The Israelis are unlikely to have operated without US collusion. Second, one account I obtained insists that US training of Darfuri militias—which seems to have been performed by US proxies—occurred *prior* to their attacks on the Khartoum government's military installation. It was these attacks that provoked the government to organize the *jan-jaweed* counterattack, and it was the ferocity of this counteroffensive that allowed propagandists like Reeves to proclaim Khartoum's Darfur policies to be "genocidal." If my sources are correct, then US global warring in Darfur helped incite Reeves's "genocide."

The Second Sudanese war was grim. An estimated 2 million persons died. By 2003 both sides were exhausted. Peace talks were begun and advanced so that in 2005 a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed, whose terms were for six years of southern autonomy, followed by a referendum on the question of whether the south would become independent. Garang was killed in a plane crash in 2005 and did not see the fruits of his leadership.<sup>26</sup> The referendum vote went for independence, and in 2011 the Republic of Southern Sudan was born. In 2013, Barnaba Marial Benjamin, South Sudan's Information minister, announced, "We need your [the US's] technology and financial support to boost our private sector," further clarifying that "the US stood with us during the difficult period of our liberation war. Now we need American support to develop that new nation" (UPI 2013). High on the minister's development wish list was "support" for the petroleum sector. It is time to tie the US Leviathan's conduct during the Second Sudanese War to the anti-terrorist and oil-control public *délires*.

*The Anti-terrorist and Oil-Control Public Délires:* Usually, the two *délires* have worked hand in hand to help the US pursue imperial designs. In the instance of Sudan, however, they got in each other's way. The Council sought to implement its hermeneutic, and in doing so it was implementing the anti-terrorist *délire*. At the same time, private US oil firms, especially Chevron, had quite successfully acquired control in the southern oil fields and in so doing were peacefully implementing the oil-control *délire*. But then the security elites in the political system floundered. In trying to fight the state terrorism of Khartoum, they initiated indirect, covert warfare against Sudan, warfare that was *not* covert to Bashir. President Clinton, acting as an agent of the anti-terrorist *délire*, forbid all US business in Su-

dan, obliging Chevron and Occidental to cede the Sudanese oil to the Chinese. The New American Empire did it to itself.

A good question to ask at this point is, why did operations to support the anti-terrorist *délire* get in the way of those to support the oil-control *délire*? Three reasons come to mind. The first is the existence of the Council. In no other case of global warring at this time was there an institution like the Council. It predisposed the executive-branch hermeneutic politics concerning Sudanese affairs during the Clinton years, and its predispositions were to destroy the monsters in Khartoum, no matter what.

Second, at the same time that the Council flourished, fundamentalist Christians who ran missionary operations in southern Sudan began a monsterization campaign against the North. Khartoum was full of “Arabs” with “heathen” practices like Islam, who even enslaved good Christian southerners. Groups like Christian Solidarity International (CSI) set out to “redeem” the slaves. Little matter that, as Declan Walsh (2002) reported, CSI was pretty much a “scam.” Some southern villagers said to have been enslaved lined up to have their freedom purchased—again and again. Conservative US media outlets like Fox News trumpeted CSI’s and other Christian groups’ good work in the anti-slavery campaign (Espinoza 2011). Together missionaries and media advanced the Council’s interpretation of the Khartoum government as a lair of monsters, thereby strengthening the Council’s hand.

Third, there was the question of fear. The rumor was out: Sudan’s terrorists were gunning for US security elites. At one point, US intelligence indicated that Sudanese terrorists intended to assassinate NSA Anthony Lake (Gay 2013), who then was spirited away and hidden for a while. I knew of a Foreign Service officer, nominated for a high position in the US embassy in Khartoum, who had heard that the terrorists were going to go after Americans. She had a family with young children and turned down the nomination, fearing for her family. The Council’s operations, then, reinforced by those of the Christian missionaries and by fears of becoming targets of terror, pushed Clinton’s liberal hawks to fixate upon the anti-terrorist *délire* at the expense of its oil-control counterpart.

So it was a war between good and evil. “Good guy” Council humanitarians fought the “bad guy” Sudanese terrorists; and after killing the US oil business in Sudan they had to fight longer to try to make a new country in which oil was found so that the US might again win Sudanese oil. Of course, money, weapons, training, and A-team operatives provided by the humanitarians intensified the warring.<sup>27</sup>

The covert indirect and direct US global warring in Sudan occurred during intensifying and coalescing cyclical, land/capital, and dominator/dominated contradictions. Shultzian Permission was granted because the

Council was convinced that Khartoum was perpetrating genocide, and that violence was the only way to deal with such monster terrorists. The security elites' global warring was a way of implementing the anti-terrorist and oil-control public *délires*—information that is consistent with the global warring theory. Lamentably, from the perspective of Washington, operations to implement the anti-terrorist public *délire* blocked those to implement the other *délire*.

What were the consequences of this US intervention in the Second Sudan Civil War? Sudan has suffered the same fate as Yugoslavia—it is Balkanized. Now there are the old Sudan, still with an authoritarian government, and the new Republic of South Sudan, with an authoritarian government that just might help US oil giants regain control over Sudanese oil. By 2014, however, oil production looked compromised: not only was the Republic of South Sudan authoritarian, but it had also begun a civil war with troops of Riek Machar, who was now the vice president, fighting those of Salva Kiir, now president. John Prendergast, now co-founder of Enough, a human rights NGO, told the *New York Times*, “This was a fire waiting to be ignited” (Kulish 2014: 1). What he neglected to tell the *Times* was that he and his Council compatriots, inasmuch as they helped create South Sudan, were responsible for piling up the combustibles burnt in the fire.<sup>28</sup>

A final point, it turns out, is that the “terrorist-related” facility that President Clinton attacked in 1998 was a pharmaceutical factory that produced half of Sudan’s medicines (Scahill 2013: 126). The focus now turns to the Horn of Africa.

### **Somalia: Growing Terrorism the CIA and JSOC Way**

Siad Barre was the longtime (1969–1991) president of Somalia, which had been a place of complex civil war long before the 1991 rebellion that overthrew him.<sup>29</sup> The UN intervened in the fighting after Barre’s downfall in response to the ensuing insecurity and famine. Bush I elected to allow the US Leviathan to lead the intervention and then, within weeks of this decision, left office, to be replaced by Clinton. On 3 October 1993, a helicopter carrying JSOC Special Ops in pursuit of Mohamed Farah Aidid, a rebel leader, was shot down. Thus began the Black Hawk Down incident. The commandos were killed; the dead body of one was dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital; and the Clinton administration withdrew its troops, recognizing that Somalia was the very model of a modern major “collapsed” state. The question was what the US Leviathan would do next, and why. I will argue that *délires* about oil and terrorism led

to military operations—spearheaded by the CIA and JSOP after 2001—that helped grow terrorism in Somalia not once but twice. The argument begins with Siad Barre, the collapse of the Somali state, and fighting for oil that had not yet been found.

### *Fighting for Oil They Had Not Yet Found*

Siad Barre came to power in 1969, the same year as Gaddafi, in a military coup. Like Gaddafi, Barre was influenced by socialist ideas. Comrade Siad (“Jaalle Siyaad”) declared that he would rule through a Supreme Revolutionary Council, adjusting scientific socialism to Somalian realities with a touch of the Koran and a strong dose of Somali nationalism. Assisted by the Soviet Union, Barre sought to modernize the economy on socialist lines. Private enterprise was nationalized, attempts to stimulate industry followed, and considerable effort was put into export banana cultivation. The nationalism took the form of an invasion of the Ogaden (1976) in Ethiopia, an attempt to wrest this Somali-populated region away from the Ethiopians.

By the end of the 1970s, however, nothing had worked. Economic performance was poor. By 1978, manufactured goods exports were almost nonexistent. Earnings from livestock exports were insufficient to prevent foreign debt from increasing rapidly. The Ogaden War (1977–1978) collapsed after the Russians switched sides and backed the new Communist government of the Derg in Ethiopia, and high military spending was already further constraining development. This obliged the Barre regime to negotiate with the IMF, which ended in Somalia being obligated to implement structural adjustment during the 1980s. This further harmed the economy, so much so that by 1989 and 1990 Somalis were suffering nationwide commodity shortages (Abdi 2011).

Comrade Siad governed not only as a modern socialist, but equally as an African patrimonialist. Order in his regime was maintained, in part, because public and private persons were rewarded in different ways with portions of the state’s patrimonial pie. Worsening economic conditions meant that this already meager patrimony became even scarcer. Further, suspicions generated by the defeat in the Ogaden led to onetime patrimonial allies being dismissed or worse. These conditions led certain officials to form paramilitaries that sought Barre’s ouster by force. At the end of the 1980s, the Derg aggravated this situation by supporting certain rebel movements. Siad fought to curb these rebellion but failed, and in 1991 he was driven from power.

Then, the state collapsed. Together, different rebel paramilitaries had exercised enough military force to oust Barre, but now that the hated des-

pot was gone, they turned on each other. Some called it anarchy, but the fighting followed a logic in which warlords fought other warlords to capture control over the central government, none having sufficient violent force to defeat all the others. Added to this was the fact that by the early 1990s, Somalia was beset by drought and famine. It was a humanitarian quandary.

The UN acted to ameliorate the situation: UNSC Resolutions 733 and 746 (1992) authorized United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) to deliver humanitarian assistance and help reinstate the state. UNSC Resolution 794, also passed in 1992, provided the military muscle, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), to allow UNOSOM to do its job. Bush I, as we have seen, decided that the US would lead UNITAF, whose mission was called “Operation Restore Hope.” Bush I explained his rationale for intervention to the American people in a televised address on 4 December 1992:

I want to talk to you today about the tragedy in Somalia and about a mission that can ease suffering and save lives. Every American has seen the shocking images from Somalia. The scope of suffering there is hard to imagine. Already, over a quarter of a million people—as many people as live in Buffalo, New York—have died in the Somali famine. (In Yearman [2007] 2011)

So Bush I saw to it that the US took command of UNITAF and contributed roughly 25,000 soldiers to it, including JSOC ninjas.

Bush I was a successful oilman, and at the time, according to Keith Yearman ([2007] 2011), “Nearly two-thirds of Somalia was allocated to the American oil giants Conoco, Amoco, Chevron and Phillips.” These “giants” were prospecting for oil because Somalia’s geomorphology was promising, though none had yet been found in sufficient quantities to pump. Bush’s security elites were well aware of the US oil exploration. Conoco in particular had been courting the State Department, helping it out and supplying information about the prospecting. Arrangements were made for President Bush I to send a letter of appreciation to the head of Conoco, thanking the company for all its assistance. There is no direct proof that Bush I committed US troops to UNITAF in order to better protect the empire’s oil interests. Still, it is plausible that that idea of securing oil interests while earning humanitarian merit played a role in his decision to send the 25,000 troops, which is what suggests that the empire was at least partly fighting for oil, even though it had not yet found any.

Unfortunately, fiasco loomed. Bush I exited the presidency in 1993, leaving the US soldiers sweltering in Somalia, where gradually their mission evolved from purely assisting humanitarian operations to taking sides in the warlord wars. Mohamed Farrah Aidid, the most formidable of the warlords, challenged the UN and found himself opposed by UNISOM. JSOC meat eaters were sent to capture him. As we already know, this

provoked the Black Hawk Down incident, precipitating withdrawal from Somalia. The Clinton administration formally ended its mission to Somalia in 1994. The UNISOM mission likewise ended in failure the next year.

Humanitarian intervention had ended with the humanitarians bolting for the exit from Somalia. The following years witnessed further proliferation of clan-based militias, each holding allegiance to a particular warlord. Operation Restore Hope might more aptly have been termed Operation Continue Hopelessness. No one warlord or combination of warlords possessed sufficient force to form a national government. As a former Somali foreign minister recalled, “It was as if the Somali state was over and everybody wanted to create his little turf to collect money and to become powerful just for personal gains, not for national gains” (in Scahill 2013: 127). However, the Americans were to return with the new decade.

With the start of the GWOT after 9/11, Bush II’s people began to worry about terrorism in Somalia. As Paul Wolfowitz, then Rumsfeld’s Deputy Defense Secretary, put it in late 2001: “People mention Somalia for obvious reasons. It’s a country virtually without a government, a country that has a certain al-Qaeda presence already” (in Scahill 2013: 123). Rumsfeld himself said, as reported by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “Somalia has been a place that has harbored al-Qaeda and, to my knowledge, still is” (Drones Team: 2012b). Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz oversimplified a more complex situation.

It was true that there was an al-Qaeda presence in Somalia throughout the 1990s. But they had not been especially successful. They tried to ally with the homegrown Islamist group al-Ittihad al-Islami, but the alliance went sour. Al-Qaeda’s success was so limited that, as one experienced observer concluded, “U.S. intelligence officials came up with a verdict that Somalia was actually inoculated from foreign terrorist groups, that it’s just fundamentally inhospitable, that the clan system is so closed to foreigners that there’s just no way that these groups can operate” (in Cohn 2010: 3). The Vulcans did not get this message.

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism has revealed that “the US has been carrying out extensive covert military operations inside Somali since 2001,” executed by the JSOC and CIA, the latter possessing a “secret” base at the Mogadishu airport (Drones Team 2012b: 2). These soldiers were “routinely” used “for surveillance, reconnaissance, and assault and capture operations.” They were supported by “helicopters, airstrikes, AC-130 gunships,” and, during the Obama regime, by drones (ibid.: 2). Thus, starting in 2001 the empire was back, with boots on the ground in direct global warring.

One of Washington’s strategies was to seek alliances with warlords, paying them and providing them with weapons to attack Islamists—any Is-



lamists, including al-Qaeda. Regarding this strategy, the previously quoted Somali foreign minister commented that Washington “thought that the warlords were strong enough to chase away the Islamists or get rid of them. But it did completely the opposite. Completely the opposite. It was folly” (in Scahill 2013: 129). This was so because Somalis resisted both the warlords and their Yankee overlords by creating institutional alternatives to the warlords. Al-Qaeda assisted them in this process.

One of these alternatives was the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a coalition of eleven courts that was forged to provide judicial order in different regions of Somalia. The law they used was Islamic (*sharia*), so they came to be called sharia courts. Because ICU used Islamic law, the Americans saw them as Islamists allied with al-Qaeda, and therefore as the enemy. The US supported the ICU’s rivals, the CIA-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The ICU was popular throughout much of Somalia, as it returned a semblance of law and order. It also had its own militias. These were largely victorious, and in June 2006 the ICU moved into Mogadishu and began to govern.

Somalis look back on this time as one of peacefulness and honest rule. Tranquility was fleeting, in part because even though the TFG was “feeble, faction-ridden, corrupt, and incompetent” (Prendergast in Hanson and Kaplan 2008), the Vulcans judged the ICU to be an Islamist regime supportive of terrorists. So in 2006–2007 Bush II’s security elites did the TFG a favor by enlisting Ethiopian troops, who attacked the ICU. There was debate as to whether the Ethiopians would have attacked regardless of US support. Carl Bloise (2007) has written, “Forget about all that stuff about Ethiopia having a ‘tacit’ o.k. from Washington to invade Somalia. The decision was made at the White House and the attack had military support from the Pentagon. The governments are too much in sync and the Ethiopians too dependent on the U.S. to think otherwise.” The Americans provided JSOC ninjas, CIA operatives, intelligence, and air support to their Ethiopian proxies. The ICU was routed.

Thereafter, the US and the Ethiopians stayed on as an occupying force. A spirited violent resistance to the occupiers was mounted, and continues. Al-Qaeda helped support the opposition to the TFG and their imperial helpers. By the end of 2008, humbled by paramilitaries like al-Shabaab, the Ethiopians had had enough. They withdrew, turning over defense of the TFG to African Union Mission in Somalia forces (AMISOM) consisting largely of Ugandan and Kenyan troops trained and armed by the US.

Al-Qaeda, which overall had been something of a failure in Somalia during the 1990s, became “resurgent” during this period (Cohn 2010: 3). This upswing was due its support for al-Shabaab (literally “the Boys” in

Somali), the ICU's youth militia. Al-Shabaab had been relatively insignificant prior to the attack by the Ethiopians.<sup>30</sup> But after this attack, tutored and supplied by al-Qaeda and responding to the US-Ethiopian occupation, it conquered large portions of Somalia between 2007 and 2009. Consequently, Scahill says, "US policy had backfired spectacularly, transforming a ragtag group of relative nobodies in Somalia in just a few short years, into the new heroes of al-Qaeda's global struggle," so that the US Leviathan was strengthening "the very threat it was intended to crush" (2013: 229, 494).

In the years following 2009, the JSOC and AMISOM mounted a counter-offensive. Al-Shabaab was driven from Mogadishu in 2011 and forced to return to rural guerrilla tactics. That same year Obama began a policy of targeted assassinations by drones. However, al-Shabaab has survived. In 2012 Obama's security elites offered a bounty of many millions of dollars for information concerning al-Shabaab leaders. Al-Shabaab, for its part, offered a twelve-camel reward to anyone who could provide information on President Obama's whereabouts, and a two-camel reward for information about the secretary of state (CNN Wire Staff 2009). Al-Shabaab attacked a crowd watching a soccer match in July 2010 in Kampala, Uganda's capital, killing seventy-four. In September 2013 it attacked an elite Nairobi shopping mall, killing at least sixty-seven. It struck again in February 2014 with a suicide bombing back in Mogadishu, suggesting, according to one diplomat, that it could "strike at will" (Sheikh and Omar 2014). Whether this is correct is unclear, as the JSOC and AMISOM offensive has been extensive. Nevertheless, some fret that al-Shabaab is a threat to the US homeland (Samatar 2013). Consider the implications of what has happened in Somalia since 1991 as they relate to the anti-terrorist and oil-control public *délire*s.

*The Anti-Terrorist and Oil-Control Public Délire*s: To Bush II's Security Elites 3.0 after 9/11, Somalia looked like a failed state awash in terrorists including al-Qaeda, presenting the risk that when the state returned it would be governed by those terrorists. So starting in 2001, the Vulcans elected to fight al-Qaeda there, even though their intelligence told them that it had not flourished in Somalia. They granted themselves Shultzian Permission because ever since the fiasco of the Black Hawk Down incident, Washington had believed peaceful interactions with terrorists were not possible. This, then, was implementation of the anti-terrorist public *délire*.

The situation with oil was more complex. Two reasons for the empire's warring in Somalia pertained to oil. Recall that prior to Siad Barre's ouster, nearly two-thirds of the country's territory had been granted as oil con-

cessions to US oil companies and prospecting was actively pursued. This meant that, among other matters, when Bush I sent in US troops he was providing military protection to US oil firms. This protection, if successful, would have permitted Conoco and other US oil companies to control Somalia's oil production. Unfortunately, the global warring Somalia experienced after 1993 ended oil exploration. In 2013, though, exploration was set to begin anew (Manson 2013).

The second reason for the US's military interest in Somalia concerns the fact that the country juts into the sea lanes by which Persian Gulf oil travels from producers to markets. A hostile regime in Somalia exposes those sea lanes and could play havoc with the transportation of oil, jeopardizing its distribution and the realization of its profits with nasty consequences for both the US and the global economy. So, in waging global war on Somalia, the empire fought to control distribution of Persian Gulf oil. Thus, global warring in Somalia aided the empire's global control of oil in two different ways and as such was an implementation of the of the oil-control public *délire*.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asserted before a Congressional committee in 2013 that Somalia was “a success story” (McCarthy 2013). Really? US global warring began with the butchering of America's elite troops; led on to CIA and JSOC operations supporting warlordism and growing the ranks of two terrorist organizations, al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab, all the while contributing to many, many innocent civilians deaths. It seems inappropriate to claim operations designed to fight terrorism were a “success” when what they did was increase terrorism. Now, however, attention turns to Uganda.

### Uganda: “Beacon of Hope”?

Winston Churchill once called Uganda “the pearl of Africa” (Sseppuuya 2012). The “pearl”—a small (91,136 square miles), landlocked county—is in many areas a high, lush, tropical place of haunting natural beauty. Its major advantage lies in the fertility of its soils, which produce subsistence crops and some coffee. Compared to African goliaths like Nigeria and South Africa, Uganda appears an unimportant place. Nevertheless, during a 1997 African tour Secretary of State Albright found it “a beacon of hope” (in Lischer 2006: 88). Perhaps this was because by the 1990s, Uganda had become the little proxy that could. How this transpired, and how it relates to the anti-terrorist and oil-control public *délires*, are explored next in a reconnaissance that begins with a discussion of Uganda's checkered post-independence political history.

## *Two Despots and a Lot of People Dead*

Independence was achieved in 1962, when Milton Obote became the first president. Seven years later he suffered an assassination attempt, and thereafter his regime tended toward repression. Opposition political parties were banned. A state of emergency was declared and remained in place for much of his rule. A secret police, led by Obote's cousin, oppressed a large number of people. Idi Amin, then commander of Uganda's army, appeared to have saved the day in 1971 when he overthrew Obote in a coup.

But there was a problem: Amin was an even more forbidding despot. A *Time* magazine article depicted him as a “killer and clown, big-hearted buffoon and strutting martinet” (“Amin” 1977). According to one estimate, this “big hearted” guy, with the help of his secret police, killed 500,000 of his fellow citizens (Keatley 2003). Eventually the US grew weary of Amin. The US ambassador to Uganda in 1973 described Amin's government as “racist ... brutal, inept, bellicose, irrational, ridiculous, and militaristic,” not to mention “xenophobic” (Melady 1973) and shut its embassy.

In 1979 the Tanzanian army invaded Uganda after Uganda threatened to invade Tanzania. Amin was driven from power. In the subsequent scramble to control the presidency, Obote once again became president, directing a repressive policy against Amin's supporters. This provoked a civil war that eventually led to Obote's defeat in 1985, though not before his regime was accused of having killed up to 300,000 people (Amnesty International 1985). The first twenty-three years of Ugandan independence can be summarized a two despots and a lot of people dead—and then there was Yoweri Museveni.

## *The US Leviathan Finds Its “Beacon of Hope”*

Museveni, like Déby in Chad, has been a consummate military leader. He had led a rebel movement against Amin, and when Obote took power Museveni created a new rebel movement against him, the National Resistance Army, which eventually was successful. Additionally, Museveni is a born-again Christian—one of the few such fundamentalists to have embraced Marxism, which he did while studying at the University of Dar es Salaam with, among others, Walter Rodney.

However, once in the presidency, Museveni disremembered and disrespected Marx, and got along just fine with the neoliberal structural adjustment programs that the US was foisting on developing nations at the time. This included IMF loans. Initially, the influx of IMF capital appeared to help the economy. His government appeared to have successfully fought the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Further, he turned the Uganda People's Dem-

ocratic Force (UPDF) into an efficient institution of counterinsurgency. Museveni represented, and favored, peoples from the southern part of Uganda. He harassed peoples in the north, especially the Teso, Kakwa, Lugbara, Acholi, and Lango. Unsurprisingly, a number of rebel movements developed there, including the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) and the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) led by Alice Lakwena.

By the 1990s the UPDF was suppressing these insurgencies, and by 1996 it had begun forcing northern peoples into camps resembling concentration camps. The UPDA and the HSM were crushed, but out of the latter rebellion came the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony. It was at this time in 1997 that Secretary Albright celebrated Museveni as her "beacon of hope." Howard French (1997), the *New York Times* reporter who covered this story, noted she did so "largely for security reasons"—US security, that is, not the security of occupied northern Ugandans. Museveni might have been a onetime Marxist, a born-again Christian, and a failed structural adjuster; but above all else, from the perspective of Security Elites 3.0, the man could do COIN.

*They Made Him into a Cheap Proxy:* Accordingly, Washington security elites have courted Museveni's military prowess, beginning in the Clinton administration. He obliged, and the State Department has designated Uganda a "key US partner" and "a leader advancing efforts to resolve conflicts throughout the region" ("US Military Involvement in Uganda" 2012). Richard Vokes (2013), using data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, documents the magnitude of military funding, finding,

that between the periods 2002–2006 and 2007–2011, Uganda's arms imports increased by 300 percent. During 2006–11, Kampala imported 38,000 small arms and light weapons (nearly 20 percent of the total across Africa), whilst in 2011, Uganda's total defense expenditure exceeded US\$1 billion—by far the highest in the region.

It was US financial backing that enabled Uganda to indulge in this arms buildup. Baldor (2012) reports that Uganda received \$41 million in 2012. These figures probably underestimate US military support for Uganda. They do not include funds coming from the CIA or those supporting UPDF's contingent in the UN's AMISOM operations in Somalia, where Uganda's has been the largest, on the order of about 6,000 soldiers at any one time.

According to Remigius Kintu (2011), writing from Goma in the Great Lakes region, this imperial support has made "Uganda ... the headquarters of a sinister U.S. and British military conspiracy to plunder the region." Certainly, UPDF soldiers have been active. Since the beginning of

the US alliance they have been in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, the Central African Republic, what is now the Republic of South Sudan, Liberia, the Darfur region of Sudan, the Ivory Coast, and as far away as East Timor. The Ugandan government has embraced its anti-terrorist role. A major Ugandan newspaper expressed this in a headline announcing “U.S. boosts Uganda’s fight against terrorism” (Candia 2012). Moreover, Uganda sees itself as having a regional role in eliminating terrorism. For example, as reported in 2013, a Rwandan newspaper announced that “Uganda’s Minister of Internal Affairs,” Hillary Onek, “called for collaboration of East African nations to fight terrorism” (“Ugandan Minister Calls for Joint Efforts” 2013).

Here it should be clarified that the amounts of money the US has invested in paying a strategic rent to Uganda to provide military service are trifling, compared to the amounts invested in other world areas (which run from the billions to the trillions). The Security Elites 3.0 got a good deal. Museveni and his soldiers are a cheap proxy. UPDF soldiers die so that US ninjas do not. The next section will illuminate certain consequences of this by considering US policy toward Uganda in the context of the anti-terrorist and oil-control public *délires*.

*The Anti-terrorist and Oil-Control Public Délires*: First, the fact that Washington has paid Uganda to hunt its terrorists since the 1990s is yet another instance of the implementation of the anti-terrorist public *délire*. But what about oil? For a long time there was no oil. Uganda produced coffee, bananas, and proxies. Then, between 2002 and 2007, commercially exploitable reserves of oil were located along the Albertine Rift on the shores of Lake Albert close to the Democratic Republic of Congo (“Uganda’s Oil” 2010). An estimated 2.5 billion barrels of reserves have been found, enough to make Uganda a mid-level producer (EIA 2013). In 2012, Uganda signed PSAs with a consortium of Anglo-Irish (Tullow), French (Total), and Chinese (China National Offshore Oil Corporation) companies. The oil-control public *délire* predicts that the US Leviathan will move to facilitate establishing some control over this oil. In 2011, in one of the first direct interventions by AFRICOM, one hundred JSOC ninjas were sent to Uganda. They were there to help hunt down the LRA head Joseph Kony, even though the LRA, having been reduced to a few hundred followers, was not a credible terrorist threat and certainly not a terrorist threat in Uganda, because it was no longer there.

However, the Americans knew, and the Museveni government was aware, that oil provokes conflict. An oil geologist and a Congolese soldier were killed in clashes along the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2007. Two years later, the *New York Times* reported that “con-

flicts between rebel militia operating in the region and Congolese, Ugandan and United Nations forces are common” (Browne 2009). Here, then, was a reason for the presence of US Special Ops: they were there to help ensure that any violent altercations that arose could be attended to by US soldiers in the interest of the empire. In other words, they were preparing the battlefield for implementation of the oil-control public *délire*.

The use of Uganda in support of imperial *délires* has had consequences for Ugandan governance. Over the years Museveni has become something of a despot. According to Charles Okwir (2011), he is a slightly more sophisticated version of Idi Amin. His regime indulges in “the harassment of ... political opponents, detention without trial, torture, extra-judicial killings, suppression of protests and homophobic witch-hunts” (Tatchell 2009). The same 2005 law under which Uganda returned to multiparty politics also removed presidential term limits, and as Museveni rigs elections, it effectively grants him the authority to rule for life, undermining democratic processes. This will give him time to continue his most successful development intervention: growing his personal wealth. A Ugandan source identified Museveni as the sixth richest world leader, worth \$11 billion (“Museveni Is No. 6” 2008).

More generally, Paul Omach, a professor of security studies at Makerere University in Kampala, has said, “The paradox of external military assistance in authoritarian states is that it ends up supporting authoritarianism” (in “US Military Involvement in Uganda” 2012). There is an irony here. The US opposes Sudan’s Omer al-Bashir, an authoritarian gentleman, but supports such rulers as Museveni in Uganda and Déby in Chad. The only difference between the former ruler and the latter two is that Museveni and Déby, with their neo-colonial iterations of colonial *tirailleurs senegalais*, enthusiastically help the Security Elites 3.0 implement the anti-terrorist and oil-control public *délires*. Let us move from Africa to Latin America, so as to consider the circumstances concerning energy resources in the New American Empire’s “backyard.”

## The Latin American Theater

The “backyard” of course was the Caribbean, Central America, and South America, where there is a considerable history of resistance to *Yanqui imperialismo*, sometimes with socialist alternatives. These were everywhere violently repressed by *Yanqui imperialistas*, so much so that by the end of the Cold War the US Leviathan “had executed a reign of bloody terror” through indirect, often covert global warring “in the name of containing

Communism” (Grandin 2006: 4; see also Gill 2004; Brands 2010; Grow 2008).

With regard to petroleum energy, Latin America was estimated in the year 2000 to hold 20 percent of the world’s known oil reserves. Latin American oil was easy to transport, closer to North American markets, and hence less expensive, which made Latin America a significant oil and gas supplier to the empire beginning in the early twentieth century. By 2010 it provided the US with roughly a quarter of its oil (“Latin American Oil Exports” 2010). Through much of the 1990s Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia were major suppliers of oil imports to the US. Additionally, Bolivia was an oil and gas producer and Ecuador, a gas producer. Brazil, with recently discovered oil fields off Rio de Janeiro, is an emerging oil and gas giant. Mexico in the 1990s turned to neoliberalism and, through the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), integrated itself more closely with the US economy. However, by the end of the Cold War—lamentably, from the perspective of Security Elites 3.0 and their Latin American clients—leftist politics had re-emerged. This happened in Venezuela and Colombia, with strikingly different results. Consider the situation in each country, beginning with Venezuela and concentrating upon Hugo Chávez.

Chávez, born in 1954, led Venezuela from 1999 until his death in 2013. Instead of coming from a *casa grande* (upper-class family), Hugo, descended from Native American and black ancestors, was born in a hut with a mud floor to a poor family from the *llaneros* (plains). Not a hybrid imperial elite, he nevertheless was fascinated by one *Yanqui* thing: the boy from the outback grew up a lover of *béisbol*, dreamed of playing in Yankee Stadium, and joined the military to be able to play the game. Eventually he became a paratroop officer and a player in his country’s *politica*, which consisted of the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats governing in alternation (from 1958 through 1998). Regardless of which party was in power, governance was done in corrupt ways that favored the capitalist *clase dominante*.

Chávez developed an antipathy for Venezuelan elites and a desire to lead social revolution. He helped organize the Fifth Republic Movement, founded in 1997, and led it to victory in the 1998 national elections. As president he introduced Bolivarianism, a political ideology that emphasized participatory democratic councils, the nationalization of key industries, and poverty reduction policies, including those that increased government subsidizing of health and education. Once elected, among other matters, Chávez leveled a fierce attack upon Yankee imperialism that culminated in his 2006 speech to the UN General Assembly in which he labeled Bush II



“the Devil.” Many around the world agreed, though to US Security Elites 3.0 Chávez was not only an impertinent demagogue but also the fourth largest supplier of oil to the devil’s empire.<sup>31</sup>

After the Soviet Union’s collapse and China’s enchantment with capitalism, Venezuela, like Cuba, remained one of the few apparently successful leftist experiments. Hermeneuts in both the US and Venezuela spent an enormous amount of energy deriding both Chávez and his socialist project. Just how far this derision went is explored below, after a brief consideration of Colombia.

Bogotá was a major oil exporter to the US by the 1990s. It was also the home of long-standing leftist insurgencies. The first of these was led by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Peoples’ Army (FARC-EP), founded as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party in 1964. At its height it had perhaps eighteen thousand soldiers struggling for the welfare of rural peasants. As of 2013 FARC-EP had suffered setbacks but ultimately remained undefeatable. A second major Colombian insurgency was that of the National Liberation Army (ELN), founded in the same year as FARC-EP; but a smaller organization, with perhaps four thousand soldiers at its height. The ELN, whose leaders were directly inspired by the Cuban revolution, has espoused an ideology that mixes Marxism with Liberation theology.<sup>32</sup>

Both FARC-EP and the ELN view Yankee imperialists as the enemy and US oil companies in Colombia as agents of this imperialism. At their height in the early 1990s, FARC-EP and the ELN controlled an estimated 30 to 35 percent of Colombia’s territory. Attacks on oil installations featured prominently in their tactics.<sup>33</sup> US Security Elites 3.0 were aware of the danger of Colombian insurgency. Marc Grossman (2002: 36), Bush II’s Under Secretary of State for political affairs, told Congress in 2000 that “FARC and ELN also represent a danger to the \$4.3 billion in direct U.S. investment in Colombia”—much of which was investment in petroleum resources, he might have added.

However, the Security Elites 3.0 did not worry excessively over this anti-imperialism. As we have seen, the Americas were the region where the US had successfully waged indirect, covert global wars. Client militaries through the region were well armed and well trained. Between 1950 and 1979 the US gave \$2,252.6 million to militaries south of the border, providing another \$5,071.5 millions from 1980 to 1993 (Klare and Andersen 1996: 29–30). Some sixty thousand soldiers had been trained at the School of the Americas “in combat skills and counter-insurgency doctrine” (Gill 2004: 6). So the apparatus of indirect global warring was securely in place throughout Central and South America. Consider its operation in Colombia and its possible inception in Venezuela.

## Colombia: A War on Drugs to Get Terrorists to Protect the Oil

In 2014 the US was involved in global warring in Colombia, and had been for a long time. In principle, this involvement was part of the US war on drugs. As in Uganda, Chad, Sudan, and Somalia, in Colombia there was civil war between the governing regime and private militias. The US entered this war on the side of the government. Bush II explicitly linked US assistance to terrorism in his 2002 National Security Strategy, asserting, “In Colombia, we recognize the link between terrorist and extremist groups that challenges the security of the state and drug trafficking activities that help finance the operations of such groups” (in Marcella 2008: 1).

“Plan Colombia,” originally conceived by Colombia’s President Andrés Pastrano in the late 1990s and funded in part by the Clinton administration in 2000, was developed to fight this war on terrorists who in part financed their operations through profits from drug sales.<sup>34</sup> After 9/11, the Bush II administration proposed “an integrated counterinsurgency campaign,” in Secretary Rumsfeld’s words (Rumsfeld 2011: 629), that increased US support to Plan Colombia. Between 2000 and 2005 the Plan, supplemented by other forms of U.S. foreign assistance, provided \$4.5 billion to Colombia (Veillette 2005: 1), of which some 78 percent goes to the Colombian military and police. Why has American assistance been so generous?

Doug Stokes (2005) and Francisco Ramirez Cuellar (2005) have both criticized Plan Colombia, arguing that it is less a war on drugs than a war against leftist guerrillas, and that as such it exhibits a continuity with Cold War imperial *délires*. Colombia’s two most important Marxist movements, the FARC and the ELN, were both classified as terrorist organizations in 1997. Certainly, in part, imperial munificence to Colombia pertains to the fight against communists now interpreted as narco-terrorists. However, recall that there is oil in country.

In fact, Bogotá was the eighth largest supplier of oil to the US in the first decade of the new millennium (Energy Global 2010). Occidental Petroleum—the same company that had hoped to expand into Sudan—was, and is, the major US oil company in Colombia, where it has operated since 1983 in Arauca Province. The FARC and ELN threatened Occidental’s operations there. Between 1986 and 1997, one account has it, around 79 million barrels of crude oil were spilled as a result of terrorist attacks on pipelines, and attacks on pipelines totaled 619 between 2001 and 2004 (Marcella 2003). Clearly, such “armed conflict ... led to production decreases” (Veillette 2005: 10).

The Colombian state had fought FARC and the ELN for decades before implementation of Plan Colombia. However, when the plan went into effect it instituted a major increase in the violent force at Bogotá’s disposal.

Between 2000 and 2008, according to the US Government Accountability Office (GAO), funds went to

- An *Army Aviation Brigade*, to equip and train helicopter army unit with on the order 55 helicopters;
- The *National Police Service*, to provide support for the order of 90 police aircraft; The *National Eradication Program*, whose function was to eradicate coca and opium crops;
- An elite *National Police Commando Brigade*, known as Junglas (Jenzen-Jones 2011), to train and equip them;
- A *Counter-narcotics Brigade* to train, equip, and construct a base for about 1,800 soldiers;
- A *Joint Special Forces Command*, to train and equip about 2,000 soldiers;
- A *Police Presence in Conflict Zones Program* to train and equip 68 squadrons of police, with each squadron composed of 120 police;
- A *Coastal and River Interdiction Program* to train and equip navy and marine units that included 8 coastal interdiction and 95 river patrol boats;
- An *Air Interdiction Program* that included provision of surveillance planes and radar installations;
- An *Infrastructure Security Program* that provided Special Ops training and equipment for approximately 1 brigade to guard oil infrastructure. (GAO 2008)

Of course, this latter brigade has protected the Arauca/Caribbean pipeline vital to Occidental. Arauca itself “hosts the greatest concentration of U.S. military advisors and has Colombia’s worst human rights situation” (Weinberg 2004: 1).

Not only were the Colombian armed forces strengthened by US military support in the war against FARC and the ELN, but they were further aided in their warring by reactionary paramilitaries. These did not originate as a Colombian idea; rather, they were Washington’s suggestion. A US Special Warfare team headed by General William Yarborough recommended in 1962 that private militias be created to operate in support of the state (Livingstone 2004). Colombia accepted the recommendation, and paramilitaries were in operation throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Then, in 1991, the Colombian Defense Ministry issued the Armed Forces Directive 200-05/91 based on CIA and US Southern Command advice, which specified the techniques for the dirty war that characterized the 1990s and early 2000s (Human Rights Watch 1996). Clandestinely, US Special Ops taught these techniques.

Equally covertly, the paramilitaries were aided by certain US businesses in Colombia, including Chiquita Brands, Drummond Coal, and Coca-Cola (Chomsky and Cuellar 2005). A process of demobilizing the paramilitaries supposedly began in 2003. According to Human Rights Watch (2010), it was unsuccessful. Through the years, Colombian paramilitaries—whether Muerte a Secuestradores, Servicios Especiales de Vigilancia y Seguridad Privada, or Autodefensas Forces de Colombia—have practiced especially brutal counterinsurgency.<sup>35</sup>

*Anti-terrorist and Oil-Control Public Délires:* US military operations in Colombia have been substantial. They are sometimes overt, mostly furtive, and normally indirect. The Clinton administration's embrace of Plan Colombia was an implementation of the anti-terrorist public *délire* insofar as it was directed at the FARC and ELN, which had been designated terrorist. However, Plan Colombia also directly helped Occidental Petroleum and its subcontractors maintain capital accumulation by literally riding shotgun on their pipeline. Thus it helped Occidental maintain its control over its portion of Colombian oil and is an implementation of the oil-control public *délire*.

What is the logic of US global warring in Colombia? Security Elites 3.0 have interpreted Colombia as a “weak state” (Marcella 2003: ix). They understand Bogotá as resembling the African central governments whose force resources were not powerful enough to eliminate violent competitors for state resources. In such a situation, granting of Shultzian Permission was advisable because Colombia was already at war with its rebels. Consequently, US security elites adopted the solution applied in Chad, Somalia, and Uganda, bolstering Colombia's violent force. The result was indirect warring in Colombia that contributed to grim human rights abuses (Livingstone 2004; Dudley 2004; Hristov 2009; R. Kirk 2003; P. Scott 2003). So in Colombia, the US has been fighting a war on drugs, to get the terrorists, to protect oil—a string of events whose logic leads toward “state terror” (Stokes 2005: 57–84). Attention turns now to seven new US military bases planned for Colombia with implications for Venezuela.

### Venezuela: “All Contingencies Are in Place”

Washington was wary of Venezuela once Chávez took to hurling invectives at its security elites—notably calling out in the UN that Bush II was “the Devil.” Worse than throwing verbal abuse, Chávez helped raise world oil prices, weakened the control and profits of the majors, and introduced innovative plans to use wealth from oil to assist the poor rather than affluent

elites. For example, in January 2012, the US Congress cut funding to the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program by 25 percent just as the winter cold was beginning and heating oil prices were exceptionally high. In that same year, Chavez provided free heating oil to 100,000 poor American families through CITGO, a subsidiary of the Venezuelan national oil company (Wilkins 2013).

Of course the Devil was in the details. The US needed Venezuela, which in 2012 was the world's fourth largest exporter of crude oil to the US. It had the largest proven reserves in the western hemisphere and perhaps the world (Rowling 2012). Oil prices rose in the US when supplies were disrupted in late 2002 and early 2003 by a strike at *Petróleos de Venezuela*, the state-owned oil company. Further, the US has been in competition with China over Venezuelan oil. Senator Richard Lugar, chair of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (2003–2007), said in a letter to the GAO that “we must make sure that all contingencies are in place to mitigate the effects of a significant shortfall of Venezuelan oil production, as this could have serious consequences for our nation's security and for the consumer at the pump” (Webb-Vidal and Cameron 2005). This section documents certain of the Security Elites 3.0's “contingencies” to defend against a “shortfall” of Venezuelan oil.

First, consider a coup attempt against Chávez, who on 13 November 2001 passed a package of forty-nine laws crucial to instituting the Bolivarian revolution. Two of these especially incensed the Venezuelan *clase dominante*. The first was a law aimed at *Petróleos de Venezuela* requiring that more oil revenues be distributed to the poor. The second, a land reform law, provided for expropriation of unused land on large estates, the better to equitably distribute land resources. On learning of these laws, the bombastic *Daily Beast*, a US Internet journal, wondered, “Is Hugo Chávez Insane?” (Gunson 2001).

Thereafter, certain Venezuelan economic and military elites plotted to remove the “insane” guy from office. First there were anti-government protests; then, on 11 April 2002, a coup was initiated. It may have been the world's fastest failed coup. Chávez was expelled from his presidency on 11 April but was then restored on 13 April by massive public support and a military loyal to him. He was initially detained by members of the military and pro-business elites affiliated with the Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce (Fedecámaras). Pedro Carmona, manager of several petrochemical companies and head of Fedecámaras, was declared the interim president. He immediately voided the country's 1999 Constitution and dissolved the Venezuelan National Assembly and the Supreme Court. However, the coup provoked an immediate, popular, pro-Chávez uprising that the Metropolitan Police failed to suppress. Moreover, significant ele-

ments of both the military and the anti-Chávez movement were unwilling to support Carmona. The pro-Chávez Presidential Guard eventually recaptured the Miraflores presidential palace, prompting the collapse of the Carmona government and Chávez's return.

What was the Bush II regime's role in the coup? Unsurprisingly, it denied everything. After all, the Vulcans had their hands full, given that they were attacking Afghanistan and plotting the same against Iraq at the time. Nonetheless, the evidence, argued vigorously by Eva Golinger (2006, 2007), suggests that Security Elites 3.0, between other wars and plots, managed to squeeze in some clandestine complicity in the failed coup. Golinger—who is openly a revolutionary who supported Chávez—has her critics (see “El Código Chávez” 2005). Yet in 2009 ex-President Carter told a Venezuelan newspaper, “I think there is no doubt that in 2002, the United States had at the very least full knowledge about the coup, and could even have been directly involved” (in “US ‘Likely Behind’ Chavez Coup” 2009). Meanwhile, on the Venezuelan side Admiral Carlos Molina, a major coup leader, has said, “We felt we were acting with US support” (in Avilés 2009; for information asserting a US role in the coup attempt see Taglieri 2002 and Fuentes 2002).

Golinger (2006) asserted that the CIA used the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and USAID as a cover for its activities related to the coup. Perhaps the most compelling evidence of Washington's involvement in the coup comes from a document of its own that ostensibly downplays this possibility. Senator Christopher Dodd, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, requested a study of the US role in the 2002 failed coup that was conducted by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG). The report judged,

While it is clear that NED, Department of Defense (DOD), and other U.S. assistance programs provided training, institution building, and other support to individuals and organizations understood to be actively involved in the brief ouster of the Chávez government, we found no evidence that this support directly contributed, or was intended to contribute, to that event. (OIG 2002: 3).

The NED was previously discussed regarding its involvement in the Balkans. In principle, it is a NGO; in reality, it is funded by the US Congress. In principle, its goal is to strengthen democratic institutions; in practice, it has been associated with the “color revolutions” in which existing regimes are subverted by agents with NED training, organization, and financial support (Chaulia 2006). The string of events involved in such subversions is, as Meyssan (2012) explains, to “exacerbate all underlying frustrations, blame the political apparatus for all the problems, manipulate the youth according to the Freudian ‘patricidal’ scenario, organize a coup, and then

propagandize that the government was brought down by the ‘street.’” This is precisely what the DOD and NED officials tried to do in Venezuela; which suggests US indirect and covert involvement in the attempt to overthrow Chávez, an attempt that involved exercise of violence force on the part of the coup plotters. Unfortunately, from their perspective, they failed. What has been the US response to the Bolivarian revolution since 2002?

In its remaining years, the Bush II administration, preoccupied elsewhere, largely restricted itself to verbal sparring with Venezuela. Initially, the Obama administration’s security elites made comments suggesting they would follow Bush II’s lead. Then, seven months after assuming office, the Obama administration deviated from the Vulcan policy of verbal scolding and announced that it planned to increase military operations in Colombia by “constructing 7 new US military bases” and providing additional US troops for those bases (Briss 2009). What did these bases have to do with Venezuela?

The Obama regime has publicly stated that the bases are for counter-narcotics operations. John Lindsay-Poland, co-director of the Fellowship of Reconciliation’s Task Force on Latin America and the Caribbean, has suggested another answer to this question. He queries the bases’ proposed location, observing that

none of them are on the coast of the Pacific Ocean, where aircraft from the Manta base patrolled for drug traffic—supposedly with great success. ... Three of the bases are clustered near each other on the Caribbean coast, not far from existing U.S. military sites in Aruba and Curacao—and closer to Venezuela than to the Pacific Ocean. Why are U.S. negotiators apparently forgoing Pacific sites, if counternarcotics is still part of the U.S. military mission? (In Briss 2009)

The bases would be on the Pacific coast if they were to be used to interdict narcotics. But none are on the coast, and three are “closer to Venezuela than the Pacific Ocean.” Perhaps the new bases are about a new “lily-pad” military strategy vis-à-vis Venezuela, discussed further below.

The border area of Columbia and Venezuela, especially where the Colombian department of Arauca borders the Venezuelan state of Apure, has become tumultuous. On the Venezuelan side, the “terrorist” FARC and the ELN sometimes take refuge. Colombian paramilitaries sometimes go after them and stay as enemies of the Venezuelan government. Concerning these Colombia infiltrations of the borderlands, Eva Golinger (2010 reported that in 2009,

the Venezuelan government captured three spies from the Colombian intelligence agency, DAS, and discovered several active destabilization and espionage operations against Cuba, Ecuador and Venezuela. The operations—Fénix, Sa-

lomón and Falcón, respectively, were revealed in documents found with the captured DAS agents. Approximately two weeks ago, 10 bodies were found in Táchira, a border zone with Colombia. After completing the relevant investigations, the Venezuelan government discovered that the bodies belonged to Colombian paramilitaries infiltrated inside Venezuelan territory. This dangerous paramilitary infiltration from Colombia forms part of a destabilization plan against Venezuela that seeks to create a paramilitary state inside Venezuelan territory in order to breakdown President Chávez's government.

Luis Tascon, a member of the Venezuelan parliament and a Chávez supporter, describes the nature of this “paramilitary state”: “The paramilitaries were created to fight Colombia’s left-wing guerrillas. But right now, what is happening are incursions into Venezuela. The paramilitaries have bought large farms; they have relations with figures from the opposition, with large landowners who pay for the service of providing security.” Additionally, Tascon says, they “control the business, principally in Cucuta—with the support of the Armed Forces of Colombia [FAC], and the assistance of the Venezuelan opposition” (in McIlroy and Wynter 2006: 1). What seemed to be developing in the Venezuelan borderlands in the first decade of the new millennium was implantation of Colombian paramilitaries, creating a space of counterrevolutionary forces aimed at the Bolivarian revolution. Whether this was done with Washington’s connivance remains unclear. Of course, the US has long used reactionary paramilitaries as its proxies in Latin and Central America, an infamous example being the Contras in Nicaragua.

The positioning of the proposed bases “closer” to Venezuela may be part of a strategy to assist borderland subversion. David Vine (2012), writing of the Pentagon’s evolving tactics and strategies following 9/11, observes that “Washington’s garrisoning of the planet is on the rise, thanks to a new generation of bases the military calls ‘lily pads’ (as in a frog jumping across a pond toward its prey). These are small, secretive, inaccessible facilities with limited numbers of troops, Spartan amenities, and prepositioned weaponry and supplies.” Obama’s proposed Colombian bases would make splendid “lily pads.” JSOC ninjas could spring toward their prey, giving support to operations by contra paramilitaries in Venezuela.

At present, the fate of Washington’s lily pads is unclear. According to Lindsay-Poland (2011), the US military signed contracts to construct the Colombian bases in 2010, even though

Colombia’s Constitutional Court struck down the agreement that would give the United States military use of seven bases. ... Yet, even after the agreement was declared “non-existent” by Colombia’s highest court, the Pentagon initiated unprecedented amounts of new construction on bases in Colombia. The contracts place in serious doubt the Pentagon’s respect for Colombian sovereignty.



What they do not place in doubt is the Pentagon's adoption of lily pad tactics as an iteration of preliminary global warring to choreograph sabotage of the Bolivarian Revolution.

Even as the US prepares for military operations against Venezuela, it continues its support of subversion. Golinger (2010) reports that "the FRIDE Institute, a Spanish think tank, prepared with funding from the World Movement for Democracy (a project of the National Endowment for Democracy, or NED), has disclosed that international agencies are funding the Venezuelan opposition with a whopping \$40–50 million USD annually." This money is received from the US and its European clients and "given to the right wing opposition political parties, Primero Justicia (First Justice), Un Nuevo Tiempo (A New Time) and COPEI (Christian Democrat ultra-conservative party), as well as to a dozen or so NGOs, student groups and media organizations" (ibid.).

*The Anti-terrorist and Oil-Control Public Délire*: Possibly, the US imagines Colombia as a Latin American iteration of its Pakistani operations; that is, as a platform for military operations in a bordering country. Whether the empire will use Colombian lily pads to attack terrorists in Venezuela remains to be seen. If it did, it would be implementing the anti-terrorist public *délire*. The potential prize in this struggle is great. Should the US prevail and install a client regime in Caracas, US oil companies would benefit.

Further, returning Venezuela to client status would give the US government an advantage over China in the competition over Venezuelan petroleum products. Moreover, if it turns out that Venezuela does have the largest oil reserves in the world, then it is a major "prize" to be won in the struggle to control hydrocarbons. For the moment, the US might be said to be preparing the battlefield in Venezuela, first by weakening the central government by assisting its opposition, and second by setting up lily pads to support the portion of the Colombia-Venezuela border where counter-revolutionaries are being developed. The focus now turns to the Pacific.

## The Pacific Theater

In the first half of the twentieth century, the vast Pacific region stretching from the Americas to Asia was where oil was not, or at least was not very much. After World War II, the only significant Pacific oil producer was Indonesia. During the 1970s, however, US oil production was in decline, sources of oil and gas were becoming hard to find, and the possibility of global peak oil surfaced, all of which prompted the realization that there

was an energy “crisis.” It was time to begin prospecting for oil in challenging places.

Previously, as earlier reported, exploration for oil in difficult places like the seas had been limited for financial and technological reasons. However, the conjuncture of improved prospecting and drilling technologies and higher petroleum prices stimulated offshore exploration in the late 1970s and 1980s, triggering a veritable black gold rush in the 1990s. Oil and gas were found in the Gulf of Mexico, in the North Sea, offshore on the west coast of Africa, and off the coast of Rio de Janeiro in Brazil. By the 1990s offshore oil exploration had moved to the Pacific Basin, involving China, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Australia, and the Philippines, often in areas over which there were competing sovereignty claims. The prospecting went well. By the early 2000s, at least one source estimated reserves in the South China Sea (stretching from the Strait of Malacca to the Strait of Taiwan) of about 213 billion barrels, approximately 80 percent of Saudi Arabia’s reserves (Kashi and Wang 2013). In at least one country, the Philippines, oil was discovered in a region where there was an anti-government insurgency. This situation is investigated next.

### **The Philippines: Always There, Always Ready**

The history of US imperialism in the Philippines begins in 1898. Following the Spanish-American War, the different islands of the Philippines passed from Spain to the US and became a formal US colony. Filipinos resisted, and from 1899 until 1913 there was brutal insurrection against Washington. Formal imperialism continued until 1946, when the US granted independence but nonetheless retained two large naval and air force bases at Subic Bay and the former Clark Field. These bases were a significant part of the military underpinning of US informal imperialism in Asia. The Philippines requested that the US remove the bases in 1991–1992. The request was respected, but the US continued to station large numbers of troops in the Philippines, with 30,000 to 50,000 reported in 2008 (Flounders 2008). At least some of these soldiers were JSOC, specifically the Joint Special Operations Task-Force Philippines (JSOTF-P), which operates with units of the Philippines military to conduct “humanitarian missions” that are “are really military operations” (*ibid.*).

Oil and gas deposits were found in 2005 on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao, which the US considers a “breeding ground” for terrorism (Bhattacharji 2009). Rebellion against the Philippine government on this and other southern, isolated islands has dragged on for forty years, in large part because a large, impoverished Muslim population is struggling for

land and political control in their homeland. Unsurprisingly, “the U.S. State Department has considered the southern Philippines a ‘terrorist safe haven’ since the classification was created in 2006” (ibid.). The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has been a major militia struggling against Manila.

With the discovery of oil, these struggles became even more significant, now that enormous potential oil revenues were at issue. Unsurprisingly, fighting flared between MILF and the government. Most of the combat has been in central Mindanao, which is rich in oil and gas reserves. The fighting has been heavy, resulting in approximately 150,000 fatalities since the late 1960s and almost three million people displaced since 2000 (McLeary 2013). Have US troops been involved in this fighting?

No Washington spokesperson has announced the sending of US troops to the Philippines, so if imperial participation is occurring, it is covert. Nevertheless, it is occurring. A Rand Corporation report describes “...a 14-year effort to address transnational terrorist threats in the historically restive southern Philippines...” (Robinson et.al. 2016: xi). The U.S. ‘area of operations’ in the Philippines presently covers 8,000 square miles, including the entire island of Mindanao” (Flounders 2008). Further, Miriam Santiago, an influential member of the Legislative Oversight Committee on the Visiting Forces Agreement of the Philippines Senate, has claimed that US troops are in combat in Mindanao, asserting that a Colonel David Maxwell, commander of the JSOTF-P, acknowledged this to be the case (Calica 2009).

What can be said about other US interventions in the Philippines? Subic Bay on the northwest coast of Luzon, the largest Philippine island, was the biggest American naval base outside the continental US until it was closed in 1992 and replaced by Subic Bay Freeport Zone. By 2013 increased US Navy ship visits, especially to Subic Bay, were attended by increased joint Philippine-US naval exercises. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has said that 60 percent of US naval assets will be based in the Pacific by 2020 (Kashi and Wang 2013). These activities were part of a major shift in the US’s military resources, a change President Obama announced to the Australian Parliament in November 2011, when he said, “As we end today’s wars, I have directed my national security team to make our presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top priority” (Obama 2011). This shift has been called the “Asian Pivot.” The Philippines, with its superb naval facilities at Subic Bay halfway across the Pacific, is an important element of that pivot.

US Security Elites 3.0 realize China is expanding its military power in the region, and the pivot is a way of protecting US security interests in the Pacific. Obviously, a key security interest is control over hydrocarbons. Importantly, as Mikkal Herberg (2013) puts it, summarizing the findings of a 2012 energy security workshop, “Asia has become ‘ground zero’ for

growth in global energy and commodity markets. The region's rapid economic growth is driving an enormous rise in the consumption of oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) to fuel booming motorization and industrial growth. This energy boom has been centered in China." China itself has begun extensive exploration for oil and gas in the South China Sea. It is in this light that the increase in naval activity in the Philippines should be understood, for as Kashi and Wang (2013) point out, "in Subic Bay ... the U.S. military is trying to protect a vast store of largely untapped energy reserves from being monopolized by China or any other country" by defending "energy shipping routes." In critical structural realist terms, this means that the Asian Pivot has made the Philippines a key place of preliminary global warring. What does such information imply for the anti-terrorist and oil-control public *délires*?

*The Anti-terrorist and Oil-Control Public Délires*: A striking point concerning the Philippines case is how quickly the US Leviathan was on the job. In 2005 oil and gas were found in Mindanao. A year later, the State Department declared it a "terrorist safe haven." In 2009 Colonel Maxwell admitted his JSOC ninjas were used "in battle in Mindanao." Within four years, that is, the anti-terrorist and oil-control public *délires* had been implemented in a new area where terrorists needed killing and oil needed controlling. Two years later, in 2011, it was time to take on the Chinese. The US naval presence expanded in and about Subic Bay as part of the Asian Pivot to better control oil by controlling sea lanes, with the objective of either denying hydrocarbons to China or keeping China from denying oil to the empire's clients. The US military, in the Philippines as elsewhere, was always there, always ready.

So the empire's Asian Pivot relies on naval force to control hydrocarbons in the Pacific. Here it is helpful to call attention to the fact that surface naval vessels are vulnerable to technologically astute foes, and the Chinese are technologically astute and militarily powerful.<sup>36</sup> Deployed against a potent foe, the Asian Pivot's force utilization strategy thus seems a problematic choreographing of the US Leviathan's violence. This ends the journey to the US Leviathan's warring in the years since 1990, a time when its masters and commanders elevated global to world warring. Now it remains to clarify what has been discovered on this journey.

## Conclusion

I begin with consideration of the present chapter, then take note of a ghost from the past, and conclude by discussing general findings from both this

chapter and the prior one. First, the anti-terrorism and oil-control public *délires* played roles in imperial global warring in *all* the ten countries analyzed in this chapter. Sometimes the anti-terrorist public *délire* seems to have played the more dominant role, as appears to be the case in Afghanistan and Kosovo; but in all the cases there was some form of oil control to be potentially won. Usually, the two *délires* operated jointly, so that implementation of the anti-terrorist *délire* facilitated implementation of its oil control counterpart. The sole exception to this was in the case of the Sudan, where implementation of the anti-terrorist *délire* hindered that of the oil-control public *délire*.

The consequences of US global warring varied from theater to theater and from country to country within theaters. Nevertheless, by 2013 two general consequences are striking. Generally, and especially in the Central Asian theatre, the warring increased the force resources of terrorism by creating new terrorists. Similarly, in none of the theatres did the fighting conspicuously increase imperial control over petroleum resources. Thus, the fighting largely failed to achieve the implementation of the anti-terrorist and oil-control public *délires* that were the reason for fighting.

In March 2014, a ghost from the past reappeared. Vladimir Putin took umbrage at the regime change in the Ukraine that had led to the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovich (22 February 2014), who favored closer ties with Russia. A number of observers believed that the events in the Ukraine were due to the country's "destabilization" (Roberts 2014), organized in considerable measure by Washington and its EU clients. After all, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland admitted that since 1991 the US had spent \$5 billion to influence Ukrainian affairs (Johnstone 2014).<sup>37</sup> From the Russians' vantage, this was an intensification of the inter-imperial contradiction on their western border. President Vladimir Putin responded by militarily detaching the province of Crimea from the rest of the Ukraine. On 18 March 2014, while the Russian national anthem played, Putin and Crimean leaders signed a treaty to make Ukraine's region part of the Russian Federation. The Bear was back.

The import of the "Asian Pivot" and the return of the Bear is unclear. *Deadly Contradictions* has voyaged through a medium time frame—that of the New American Empire. Perhaps in 2014 a new time frame was emerging, with China and Russia the targets of the US Leviathan. Regardless of what was to come, it is time to draw general conclusions about what happened as the New American Empire fought its way through the sea of human being from 1990 through 2014.

*Six Findings:* There are six common findings. First and foremost, imperial global warring has spanned the world. The US has been conducting a world

war, but of a new type. There is no single set of enemies like the Germans in World War I or the Axis powers in World War II. In the current world warring, the foe can be any political entity, from a particular organization (like al-Qaeda) to a particular country (like Iraq), so long as Washington's imperial hermeneutic politics have targeted that entity as violating the anti-terrorist and oil-control public *délirés* and Shultzian Permission has been granted. This has happened at least sixteen times since 1990.

Second, the empire has not won the “prize.” If neoliberalism was not working, security elites understood, then acquiring power over the world's oil would facilitate the New American Empire's domination of the global economy. But its military operations have not resulted in any clear increase in its control over oil. Iraq is running its oil sector with considerable autonomy. The empire may have limited the amount of oil Iran sells, but it in no way does it govern Iranian oil. Imperial attempts at pipeline politics have been something of a pipe dream. If any country has substantially improved its control over oil since 1990, it has been the Chinese. It did so nonviolently, by purchasing oil assets.

Third, imperial global warring has been good for terrorism, perpetrated by both resistance terrorists seeking to frustrate the US's *délirés* and state terrorists. Of course, the greatest state terrorist is the New American Empire itself, with its ninja Special Ops tromping about the world making bug splats, blowing unborn children from some mothers' bodies, and carving bullets out of other women's corpses. Consequently, these US ninjas or their proxies—and especially their Israeli proxies—have enraged peoples throughout the world and turned them in the direction of terrorism. Ironically, what the empire does inflames terrorism, the very thing it seeks to rid itself of.

Fourth, as some have claimed, the US is an empire by invitation. If that is the case, then the invitation has begun to wear thin due to global warring. US warring in Iraq caused several of its close European clients, especially France and Germany, to worry about its operations. Saudi Arabia is angered by US policies in Syria. US sanctions against Iran have likewise strained the bonds of amity with European and Asian clients. Pakistan has been turned into a friendly enemy. Even the English “poodle” rebelled at US plans to attack Syria. Global warring appears to be fraying the bonds of empire.

Fifth, imperial global warring has often left the states it visits less stable. From its very earliest days the empire has trumpeted its exceptionalism as the “city on the hill”, divinely chosen to bring good things like democracy and liberty to humanity. More recently, though, in the name of democracy and liberty it has brought more authoritarian regimes. The US is exceptional, but its elites are oblivious to the nature of its exceptionalism. It is

indeed incomparable in having brought to the world an empire whose invitation is wearing thin—an empire that generates terror, instability, and undemocratic governance, all of which is disorder in the sea of human being.

Sixth and finally, chapter 8 showed how events after 1990 led to a perfect storm of intensifying and coalescing contradictions, producing reproductive vulnerabilities and the need for fixes. Economic elites tried the fix of neoliberalism. The fix was unsuccessful. Economic elites then froze in uncertainty. Fixating upon these same events, Security Elites 3.0 created new liberal hawk and Vulcan hermeneutics that strengthened the oil control and anti-terrorist iterations of the global domination public *délire*. Crucially, these provided guidance as to how to interpret perceptions concerning when to proceed to war. Chapters 9 and 10 have examined the import of these *délires* by reviewing sixteen hostilities, some small, some major. They showed that in each of these events, Security Elites 3.0 arrived at perceptions that required they progress to violent operations to control oil and/or combat terrorists. The result has been global warring throughout the world. President Obama, like many presidents before him, believes the US to be “exceptional.” For many people in the world, as the New American Empire sought to fix its contradictions by conducting World War III between 1990 and 2014, what was coming to a theater near them was global disorder. This was exceptional indeed!

## Notes

1. Discussion of the US’s problems in Afghanistan, the Taliban, and the interconnection of the Taliban and Pakistan are in Rashid (2008, 2010), Seth Jones (2009), and Bergen and Tiedemann (2013). Hastings (2012), instrumental in the downfall of General Stanley McChrystal, takes the conflict through 2011. McChrystal (2013) has a memoir telling his side of the story.

2. The Pushtun (often called the Pathan by the British) are described in Barth (1965) and Ahmed (1980).

3. The Northern Alliance was just that, an alliance of northern Afghani, mostly Tajiks, with some Uzbeks and Hazaras. Its two original leaders were Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Massoud.

4. The ISI provided the Taliban with weapons and ammunition, paid wounded fighters’ medical bills, financed and assisted in training camps, and provided intelligence (O. Jones 2003).

5. Actually, Hastings (2010) made clear that the “snake eater” McChrystal preferred more mainstream American cuisine.

6. On 18 June 2013 Hastings died in a fiery car crash at only thirty-three. The web “went wild” over his death (Stebner 2013), as the circumstances of his accident were suspicious. He was reported to have received death threats from the military because of his *Rolling Stone* article (A. Newman 2013).

7. According to Rashid (2012: 18), by the end of 2010 “none” of Obama’s White House or State Department security elites believed “the war could be won.”

8. Gates offers a more sympathetic account of the surge in Afghanistan than that presented in the text (2014: 474–501). However, he offers no evidence that it was a success, nor evidence refuting those who said it was not a success.

9. Rashid (2008, 2010, 2012) is most useful concerning Pakistan, the Taliban, and their entanglement with the US starting in the 1980s. Owen Jones (2003) and Butt and Schofield (2007) also offer useful accounts of Pakistan's geopolitics. Brown and Rassler (2013) and the Council on Foreign Relations (2011a) analyze the Haqqani Network. Ahmed (2013: 43–96) writes of the fighting in Waziristan, which he calls “the most dangerous place in the world.”

10. Accounts of the Balkan Wars can be found in Glenny (1996), Susan Woodward (1995), and Silber and Allan (1997).

11. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, color revolutions occurred in the post-socialist world and the Middle East. They tended to be organized at least in part by American NGOs. Perhaps the most important of these was the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), tasked to bring about capitalism and democracy in targeted countries. The NED granted US government funds to NGOs such as the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, International Republican Institute, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, International Research and Exchanges Board, and Freedom House. These then used the monies to help organize civil resistance. The color revolutions were reactionary insofar as they sought to create clients for the New American Empire. Slovakia (1998), Croatia (2000), and Serbia (2000) experienced color revolutions. Chossudovsky (1997) is useful concerning the IMF's role in Yugoslavia's re-balkanization.

12. Useful concerning the Kosovo War is the memoir of Wesley Clark (2002), the commanding US general. Daalder and O'Hanlon (2001) provide the perspective of US security elites. Judah (2002) has an excellent account.

13. Others arguing for the importance of oil in US decisions to war in Kosovo include Pilger (1999), Fisher (2002), Ghazali (2008).

14. Kansteiner appears somewhat “shady.” He was an executive chairman of Sierra Rutile Limited, a mining enterprise compromised in the Sierra Leone Civil War. Sierra Rutile was at one time owned by Max and Jean-Raymond Boule and Robert Friedland, alleged to be linked to clandestine networks of offshore holdings and front companies involved in weapons trafficking, money laundering, and human rights atrocities. Kansteiner's involvement with Sierra Rutile during the time of Boule and Friedland is unclear (K. Snow 2008).

15. Schareika (forthcoming) offers an interesting accounting of Chinese oil enterprise in Chad, suggesting that it is a strong competitor of Exxon.

16. There was considerable US support for Habré's Documentation and Security Directorate, which is thought to have killed up to forty thousand people.

17. In a 2007 article in *National Geographic* about Chad's Zakouma National Park, J. Michael Fay wrote, “I saw a large helicopter to the southeast,” adding that it “made straight for our truck. We could run, but we couldn't hide. It was a Russian-made Mi-17 with a missile launcher, the same type that had mistakenly fired the day before on a column of Chadian and American soldiers north of the park” (in K. Snow 2012: 7). Fay clearly indicates US troops were operating with their Chadian counterparts. What the helicopter was up to is unclear.

18. The best account of Sudan's civil wars is Douglas Johnson (2003). Jok (2007) is also useful. Natsios (2012), head of USAID during the Bush II administration, and Petterson (1999), who was US ambassador to Sudan in the early 1990s, write from US officials' perspective. Reyna (2010), Flint and de Waal (2008), and Mamdani (2010) analyze the Darfur warring. Morrison and Cooke (2006) discuss the Clinton administration's Africa policy.

19. The tendency to divide Sudan existed prior to its balkanization into an Arab, Muslim north and a black African, Christian south—which is an oversimplification, as there is no “racial” divide even though at times different Sudanese political actors have attempted to construct one. Nevertheless, most Arabs tend to be black, as do most non-Arabs. There are numerous non-Arab ethnic groups in the north. Many in the south are not Christian, and



many of those claiming to be Christian adhere to practices and beliefs that originated in southern Sudanese religions.

20. The accuracy of the *9/11 Commission Report's* claim that Turabi was attempting to organize terrorists for war against the US is unconfirmed. A fair amount of early 1990s US intelligence about the Sudan has turned out to be unreliable.

21. Literature on the Council is limited. Rebecca Hamilton (2012), Gay (2013), David Rose (2002), Hoile (1999), and Keith Snow (2012) fill in parts of the picture.

22. Francis Deng wrote the epilogue of a book edited by Professor R. E. Downs and myself (1988). He was not contacted for this section of *Deadly Contradictions*.

23. In the early 1990s the SPLA split into rival factions—the SPLA-Mainstream, led by Garang, and the SPLA-United, led by Riek Machar. The factions warred with each other, provoking mayhem and terror among their opponents.

24. The Council did not have a complete hermetic seal over US-Sudanese affairs. In an originally secret interview, Donald Petterson (2003: 5) indicated he “believed” that the “policy espoused” by Rice and Prendergast “was not achieving its goals.”

25. Petterson (2003) documented Washington’s concern with Sudan’s support for terrorism in 1992–1993. It is now acknowledged that US intelligence on Sudan at that period was defective. It would be important to know how much of it derived from the Council.

26. The circumstances of Garang’s death in an airplane crash seem suspicious to some. Garang was more disposed to a unified Sudan than other South Sudan leaders, especially Salva Kiir, who benefited from the plane crash by becoming the undisputed leader of the SPLA/M. Garang’s ex-wife and son supported Machar in the 2013–2014 political hostilities between Machar and Kiir (Ouga and Baguma 2013).

27. Some have questioned how significant US support of the SPLA was to Khartoum’s defeat. Autesserre (2002: 1), writing prior to the termination of the Second Sudanese War, asserted that American assistance was “not enough to enable them to win the war.” Washington’s backing was largely covert, so its magnitude is unknown. Two main forms of violent force resources were supplied. The first was “humanitarian” aid that came in the form of food, which was a weapon in two ways. First, the SPLA took a fair portion of it to feed its own personnel. If, as Frederick the Great quipped, “an army marches on its stomach,” the US was responsible for filling SPLA stomachs. The second way food served as a weapon had to do with Khartoum’s strategy against the South: to starve it into submission. The provision of food to southerners weakened this strategy. The second sort of violent force resources provided by Washington was more conventional; it included weapons and training. How important was US assistance to South Sudan’s secession? Secessionist movements have usually failed in post-colonial Africa, implying that US help was substantial.

28. The Sudanese Civil Wars were already ongoing when the US intervened. Permit some speculation on their “root causes” (D. Johnson 2003). These, according to Douglas Johnson (ibid.: xvi), were the result of “patterns of violence developed in Sudanic states before the 19<sup>th</sup> century, establishing an exploitative relationship between the centralizing power of the state and its hinterland.” Additionally, two structural features in the African postcolonial state are relevant to understanding Sudan’s, and other African states’, descent into civil conflict. The first of these features is the frailty of institutional means for addressing intra-elite competition. African states try to use patrimonial practices, as described in the section on Chad, to moderate conflict by building elite alliances. However, such practices often increase competition because of jealousy at not being a patrimonial ally, anger at being a discarded patrimonial ally, or desire to be a more important patrimonial ally. The second structural feature is the weakness of the central governments’ violent force resources. Militaries are small, poorly trained, and poorly armed. Weapons are widely possessed by civilian populations. This means that states do not control the means of violence in any Weberian sense, which makes it easy for disaffected patrimonial elites to begin hostilities and difficult for central governments to terminate them.

29. Harper (2012), Elmi (2010), Marchal (2007), and Hagmann and Hoehne (2009) analyze the intricacies of Somali conflict. Seahill (2013) provides the most complete account of US operations.

30. The best current account of al-Shabaab is Stig Jarle Hansen (2013).

31. Kozloff (2007) has written of Chávez and the political economy of his time.

32. Liberation theology, which began in the 1950s and 1960s in Latin America, is both a Catholic theological and revolutionary political movement. One advocate terms it “an interpretation of Christian faith through the poor’s suffering, their struggle and hope, and a critique of society and the Catholic faith and Christianity through the eyes of the poor” (Beryman 1987).

33. Brittain (2010) and Stokes (2005) have written about FARC-EP. Little work has been done on the ELN, but Craig-Best (2000) allows the ELN leader Antonio Garcia to speak for it.

34. Veillette (2005: 8) reports that “the United Nations estimates that the FARC’s average annual income is \$342 million of which \$204 million comes from the drug trade.”

35. A covert CIA-JSOC program discovered by the *Washington Post* sought to decapitate FARC and the ELN by assassinating their leaders using precision-guided munitions (Priest 2013). The program appears to have begun early in the Bush II administration and been continued by Obama. It is a variation, and perhaps something of a forerunner, of the drone warfare practiced in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Africa.

36. The Chinese have formulated a strategy, called Assassin’s Mace, to destroy multiple US aircraft carrier groups at one time (Corpus 2006).

37. One source explains the regime change as follows: “It seems as if Washington and Brussels played in Ukraine ... all the techniques for Regime Change the Anglo-Saxons practised in Third World countries since Napoleonic times. First, the banks got Ukraine in debt for 138 billions ... which limits independent policies and is always a source of corruption. Second, there was financial support for very different political parties in order to convey them toward a common political goal. Third, a press campaign to discredit the government and demonize its leaders. Fourth, the financing and training of groups to foment violent unrest. Fifth, the use of snipers to fire against the police and the protesters to create rage and violence. ... Sixth, the same trick practised ... [of] Parliamentary Coup” (Mazzei and Zigon 2014).