Chapter 7

“THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’”

Global Warring 1975–1989

“For the times they are a-changin’.”
- Bob Dylan, 26 October 1963

“Tricky Dicky” (as President Richard Nixon was nicknamed by some, not affectionately) resigned for reasons of corruption on 9 August 1974. Nine months later, on 30 April 1975, Saigon fell. The Vietnam War was over, and many people suspected, in the words one of the era’s musical poet, “the times they [were] a-changin’.” After the next three presidential administrations (Gerald Ford, 1974–1977; James “Jimmy” Carter, 1977–1981; and Ronald Reagan, 1981–1989) it was clear: they had changed.

This chapter will explore the change in the relative significance of the political and the economic contradictions. By the end of the 1980s, following the final flare-up of the inter-imperial contradiction, the Soviet Union was gone and the US Leviathan continued, albeit battered by an intensifying dominator/dominated contradiction. Concurrently, the cyclical and systemic economic contradictions intensified to further pound the New American Empire.

The chapter begins by presenting the second generation of US security elites. Next, it examines the situation vis-à-vis the nonviolent economic reproductive fixes of the economic contradictions in the late 1970s and 1980s. It continues by exploring the relaxation of the inter-imperial contradiction between the Kremlin and Washington, and what this meant for the hermeneutic politics behind its violent fixing. Then it examines three of the period’s global wars: the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989) and the Iran-Iraq Wars (1980–1988), along with the lesser US-Libya War (1981–1988). It explains how a new monster-alterity emerged along with new public délire. The goal is to show how each of these conflicts was
influenced by the time’s contradictions. In the end, it will be clear that this was a transitional time preparing the way for the era to follow. Reflect upon the new, imperial security elites—masters and commanders of the US Leviathan.

**Security Elites 2.0**

The original old boys were history by the end of the Vietnam War. Commanding the New American Empire were new gentlemen who had not been present at the creation but had read about it. Certain points characterize these gentlemen. They still were overwhelmingly white men. Women and people of color still needed not apply. Meanwhile, old boys were fewer, in the sense that they came from the old Eastern Establishment. That is to say, fewer of them had graced its schools—the Grotons and Harvards—and more hailed from the country’s Midwest, South, and Far West.

Richard Nixon, from Yorba Linda, California, was by no means Establishment. His father had opened a grocery store and a gas station, but, as Henry Kissinger (1999: 48) remarked, he wanted to belong and so subscribed to “Establishment orthodoxy.” Gerald Ford, his successor, grew up in Grand Rapids, Michigan. The person he knew as his father was a salesman. He went to public high school and on to the University of Michigan, where he was a “jock” (football player). Jimmy Carter came from a comfortable family of peanut farmers in the tiny Georgia town of Plains. His education included Plains High and the Naval Academy, where he acquired a technical background in nuclear energy. Ronald Reagan hailed from the small city of Dixon, Illinois. His father, like Ford’s, was a salesman. He attended Dixon High and Eureka College before attaining Hollywood stardom, co-starring with a pongid in the film *Bedtime for Bonzo* (a film in which he taught morality to a chimp).

A few old boys lingered. The wealthiest, Nelson Rockefeller (Ford’s vice president, 1974–1977), was heir to John D. Rockefeller’s oil fortune. Less wealthy but politically more potent was George H. W. Bush (Bush I), onetime head of the CIA (under Ford, 1976–1977), Reagan’s vice president (1981–1989), and eventually the forty-first president. Bush I’s father, Prescott, had banking interests and had been a senator from Connecticut. Bush I went to Andover, Yale (Skull and Bones), and on to Texas, where he became something of an oil tycoon. Cyrus Vance, Carter’s secretary of State (1977–1980), was something of an old boy. He had attended the Kent School and Yale, where he was a member of the Scroll and Key Society. From there he went to Yale Law and on to serve in security-related positions in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.
Some important figures had immigrant origins. They tended to be “brains.” Kissinger, discussed in the previous chapter, was the most prominent, especially during Nixon’s presidency. Carter’s National Security Advisor (NSA) Zbigniew Brzezinski, the other refugee brain, was born in Warsaw to a noble family. His father, a diplomat, had sought refuge in Canada in 1938. Zbigniew attended McGill University as an undergraduate; moved on to Harvard, where he was awarded a doctorate; and then began teaching political science. Unlike Kissinger, Brzezinski was denied tenure (1959) and went on to Columbia University. A final influential immigrant was Spiro Agnew, Nixon’s first vice president. Less brainy than Kissinger and Brzezinski, he rose from a modest Greek immigrant background to importance in Maryland politics and on to the heights of the vice presidency, from which he resigned due to charges of extortion, tax fraud, bribery, and conspiracy.

A few powerful figures from non-émigré backgrounds were also judged to have “brains.” Casper Weinberger (secretary of health, education, and welfare under Nixon and Ford, 1973–1975; secretary of defense under Reagan, 1981–1989), though sickly in youth, was found to be academically gifted and enjoyed a stellar career at Harvard. George Shultz (secretary of labor 1969–1970 and secretary of the Treasury 1972–1974 in the Nixon administration, and secretary of State 1982–1989 in the Reagan administration) came from comfortable circumstances in New York City. He attended Loomis Chaffee School, did his undergraduate years at Princeton, and acquired an MIT doctorate in economics. He began an academic career at MIT and the University of Chicago, where he fell under the influence of the neoliberals Milton Friedman and George Stigler. Carter brought Harold Brown to Washington to be his secretary of defense (1977–1981). Brown, also from New York, excelled at the demanding Bronx High School of Science and then took three degrees in rapid succession at Columbia University, attaining his doctorate in physics by the age of twenty-one. Eventually he became president of the California Institute of Technology (1969–1977), until Carter picked him to serve in his administration.

Finally, there were high officials who were not old boys, refugees, or brains. Bob Halderman, nicknamed “the Brush” for his distinctive flattop haircut, was Nixon’s chief of staff (1969–1973). His father ran a successful heating and air conditioning business in Los Angeles; from there he went to the University of Redlands, the University of Southern California, UCLA, and thence into advertising at J. Walter Thompson. The Ford administration introduced Dick Cheney (White House chief of staff, 1975–1977, under Ford; secretary of defense, 1989–1993, under Bush I; and Vice President, 2001–2009, under Bush II) and Donald Rumsfeld (White House chief of staff, 1974–1975, under Ford; 13th and 21st secretary of
defense, 1975–1977 under Ford and 2001–2006 under Bush II) to high office. Cheney, the son of a soil conservation agent, was born in Nebraska and raised in Wyoming. He flunked out of Yale as an undergraduate but managed to graduate from the University of Wyoming. Rumsfeld was from a more prosperous background. He grew up in Winnetka, a comfortable Chicago suburb, where his father sold real estate and his mother was a teacher. The young Rumsfeld went to Princeton, and then to Georgetown Law (from which he did not graduate).

As will become clear later in the chapter, these gentlemen, most especially the Republican ones, were as committed to violence as a policy tool as their old boy predecessors had been. Though they had not been indoctrinated in “manly Christianity” at prep schools, many were soldiers with considerable combat experience.2 However, before examining their command of the New American Empire, the chapter analyzes nonviolent reproductive fixing of the vulnerability to the economic contradictions in order to establish their relevance to the global warring of this time.

**Fixless Fixes: Nonviolent Fixing of Economic Reproductive Vulnerability**

Being an empire is not easy. Chapter 5 demonstrated the New American Empire’s vulnerability to cyclical and systemic economic contradictions. Here, a first avenue of consideration concerns attempts to fix cyclical reproductive problems over the years from 1975 to 1989.

**Attempted Nonviolent Fixes of Cyclical Reproductive Vulnerabilities**

The long downturn brought recession in 1973–1974 and 1981–1982. Recessions were, and are, aspects of cyclical economic contradictions, and they pose a reproductive vulnerability: what to do about the bad times they bring? The years 1975–1989, for example, brought deindustrialization in what came to be called the Rust Belt, the industrial heartland of the Midwest and parts of the Northeast. Private and governmental elites responded to this hermeneutic puzzle with a hermeneutic politics that pitted hermeneuts who were free market fundamentalists against those favoring welfare state economics and Keynesianism. The fundamentalists won, and their politics resulted in what might be termed neoliberal fixation. Let us explore neoliberalism.

**The Neoliberal Fix:** Neoliberalism is variously termed a “stage,” a “social order,” and a “strategy” of capitalism (Duménil and Lévy 2011: 5–32). This
is confusing. Stages, social orders, and strategies are different matters. I understand this liberalism as a public délire in different iterations, derived from the liberal class ideology that emerged when economic contradictions intensified during the first two recessions of the long downturn.

John Williamson’s “What Washington Means by Policy Reform” (1990) was perhaps the first explicit statement of the neoliberal public délire. Williamson argued for what he called the “Washington Consensus,” a policy already instituted by capitalist elites in Washington-based institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, US Federal Reserve, and US Treasury Department. At its heart, the neoliberal délire is based upon the following hermeneutic: perceptually economic problems are interpreted as the result of government interference in markets, and procedurally it is understood that this requires elimination of welfare state economics, by moving control of the economy from the public to the private sector. Specifically, Williamson’s article proposed ten policy recommendations:

1. Governments should not run large deficits that have to be repaid by future citizens, because such deficits can only have a short-term effect on the level of an economy’s employment.
2. Public subsidies are wasteful, especially those of pro-poor services, education, health care, and infrastructure investment;
3. Tax reductions for higher incomes and adoption of moderate marginal tax rates are encouraged for innovation and efficiency;
4. Implementation of market-determined interest rates that are positive (but moderate) in real terms is encouraged;
5. Floating exchange rates are recommended;
6. Trade liberalization needs to be practiced with particular emphasis on elimination of quantitative restrictions (licensing, etc.) and of any trade protection provided by law; and on relatively uniform tariffs, thus encouraging offshore outsourcing, competition, and long-term growth.
7. Liberalization of the capital account of the balance of payments is important, allowing people the opportunity to invest in offshore outsourcing and allowing foreign funds to be invested in the home country.
8. Privatization of state enterprises is required, insuring market provision of goods and services.
9. Abolition of regulations of economic practice that impede market entry or restrict competition, except for those justified on safety, environmental and consumer protection grounds.
10. Financialization of capital.
These ten policies were not entirely novel. Rather, they were a reiterating of the nuts and bolts of nineteenth-century liberal public délires. Innovative, though, was the emphasis on privatization and “speculative and predatory” financialization in capitalist accumulation (Harvey 2005: 161). Neoliberalism was instituted not in a single authorization, as when NSC 68 had authorized the global domination public délie, but rather as a series of policy decisions. Those in the US came to be known as Reaganomics; in the UK they were Thatcherism. The iteration imposed upon the developing world, which came to be called “structural adjustment,” began later, at the end of the 1980s and in the 1990s. Neoliberalism treats seeking the commonweal in social being as risible. Rather, it reduces human sociability to choreographed practices of capitalist elites out to clinch the best deal they can, using rules of their making, especially with regard to financial practices. Everybody else is expected to celebrate them or bugger off. How successful has neoliberalism been?

Neoliberalism, according to Duménil and Lévy, has provoked “crisis” (2011). In Harvey's (2005: 19) words, it, “has not been very effective in revitalizing global capital accumulation.” In the US and the UK, “To be sure, inflation was brought down and interest rates fell, but this was at the expense of high rates of unemployment. … Cutbacks in state welfare and infrastructural expenditures diminished the quality of life for many. The overall result was an awkward mix of low growth and increasing income inequality” (ibid.: 88). The dossier on structural adjustment has been, if anything, worse. Joseph Stiglitz, who as a senior official at the IMF assisted in its implementation, demonstrated in his Globalization and Its Discontents (2003) how structural adjustment had stunted African development in the 1990s and had a hand in provoking the East Asian (1997) and Argentine (1999–2002) financial crises. The problem in these cases was that strict, neoliberal monetary and fiscal policies imposed by the IMF, especially on Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, and Argentina, provoked flights of capital from these countries and consequent economic crashes.

However, the neoliberal public délie has done what it was intended to do and gratified the upper classes délires by rewarding them with greater wealth. In the US, starting in the 1970s, wealth inequality “exploded,” with the bottom 90 percent of the population experiencing a “growing erosion of wealth,” being unable to save any of their income (Saez and Zucman 2014). Two aspects of the neoliberal fix—offshore outsourcing and financial innovation—have seemed especially problematic. These are examined next.

The Offshore Outsourcing Fix: American enterprise has been able to de-territorialize outside the US due to the development of free trade zones.
Deadly Contradictions

and its ability to abolish economic regulations that impede US companies’ overseas market entry, in conjunction with improved communication and transportation technologies. Starting in the late 1970s and increasingly in the 1980s, initially in manufacturing and later in services, operations previously performed at US companies were assigned to other parts of that company or other enterprises located elsewhere. This was “outsourcing.” For example, a telephone company might outsource its customer service division to India. If the outsourcing was done overseas, it was “offshore outsourcing”; which at the turn of the twenty-first century was estimated to increase businesses’ productivity and competitiveness ten- to a hundredfold (Corbett 2004). By the 1980s, offshore outsourcing had become a “tidal wave” (R. French 2006: 4) and was a cause of deindustrialization. Iconically, Nike closed all its American sneaker plants by the end of the 1980s and turned to producing sneakers in Indonesia, China, and Vietnam.

The evidence of offshore outsourcing’s virtues is disputed. On the one hand, neoliberal hermeneuts insist that it benefits the US economy, claiming it “is unlikely to have accounted for a meaningful part of the job losses in the recent downturn or contributed much to the slow labor market rebound” (Mankiw and Swagel 2005: 2). The particular “recent downturn” Mankiw and Swagel were talking about was the 2001 recession, which leads to an observation: The 2001 recession led to a “phantom recovery” (Reich 2010: 6), followed by the 2007–2009 Great Recession of the US economy. Thereafter, unemployment rates were still higher than in the 2001 recession.

Contradicting Mankiw and Swagel is a literature arguing that offshore outsourcing indeed harmed US labor through the loss of blue-collar and middle-management jobs (Hira and Hira 2005; Dorgan 2007). Further, offshore outsourcing has contributed to decline in the levels of income generated by the jobs remaining in the US economy. Higher-paying industrial work has been outsourced and replaced by lower-paying service industry jobs at Wal-Mart, McDonalds, and the like (Reich 2010: 53). Michael Spence and Sandile Hlatshwayo demonstrate that at present there is a “long-term structural challenge with respect to the quantity and quality of employment opportunities in the United States” (Spence and Hlatshwaya 2011). Such evidence indicates that whereas offshore outsourcing brought cost savings to US economic elites’ enterprises, it reduced employment opportunities, especially for well-paid labor, for everyone else. Consider now financial innovation.

The Financial Fix: The tribulations of industry have, one can argue, triggered a financial turn in US capitalism. Manufacturing had been in decline since the 1970s recession, falling from 23 percent of GDP in 1970 to
only 11 percent in 2009 (Smil 2011). Manufacturing was a less interest-
ing investment because there was less of it. As a consequence, Foster and 
McChesney (2009: 10–11) report that, “unable to find an outlet for its 
growing surplus in the real economy” (i.e., manufacturing),
capital (via corporations and individual investors) poured its excess surplus/
savings into finance, speculating in the increase in asset prices. Financial insti-
tutions, meanwhile, on their part, found new innovative ways to accommodate 
the vast infl ow of money capital and to leverage the financial superstructure of 
the economy up to ever greater heights with added borrowing—facilitated by 
all sorts of exotic financial instruments, such as derivatives, options, securiti-
zation, etc.

... The result was the creation of ... extraordinary growth of financial profits.

Thus, following the late 1970s deindustrialization, the financialization of 
capital deepened in the 1980s and came to an “apogee” in the first years 
of the twenty-first century (Callinicos 2010: 74). This, then, was neoliberalism’s financial fix, and the “extraordinary” profits certainly seemed to reduce the vulnerability caused by the long downturn.

It had long been believed that the financial sector becomes increas-
ingly significant as capitalism develops. Rudolf Hilferding ([1910] 1981) 
argued at the turn of the twentieth century that growing concentration 
and centralization of capital led to fusion of banking and industrial en-
terprise under the dominance of the former, creating an era of monopoly 
finance capitalism. Critically, Hilferding understood finance as investing in 
the “real” economy—manufacturing and infrastructure—and ultimately 
in economic growth. There has certainly been a concentration and cen-
tralization in the US economy, especially since the end of World War II.

However, the financial practices that emerged, as we are about to learn, 
have not integrated banking with manufacturing enterprise. Especially 
since the 1990s, finance in the US has instead grown more concentrated, 
greater in value, and more autonomous. The big banks still do the tradi-
tional business of handling ordinary customer accounts (i.e., “retail” bank-
ing), but the bulk of their capital is now used for investments involving 
their own capital, not that of their customers, for their own profit. It is from 
this “proprietary trading” that their high profits are derived.

Additionally, a “shadow banking sector”—hedge funds, private equity 
firms, and structured investment vehicles—has been growing. “Hedge funds” 
are investment firms—usually available to only a small number of 
affluent persons who aggressively manage investment portfolios—that em-
phasize exotic financial instruments, such as leveraged derivatives in both 
domestic and international markets, with the goal of generating high re-
turns. “Private equity firms” are companies that, through leveraging, ac-
quiere publicly listed companies, take them off the stock market, reorganize them to increase their profitability, and then resell them at considerable profit. A “structured investment vehicle” is a type of fund invented by Citigroup in 1988. Its strategy is to borrow money by issuing short-term securities at low interest and then to lend that money by buying long-term securities at higher interest, making a profit for investors from the difference. Both the huge investment banks and the shadow banking community leverage heavily to invest in exotic financial products, such as derivatives, CDOs, CDS, MBS.5

Critically, this alphabet soup of exotic financial instruments is non-Hilferdingian. They are not investments in production; rather, they are actually bets that already existing assets will achieve certain values. Such financial securities—the basis of the neoliberal financial fix—began to be introduced in the 1980s, following falling rates of profit for both financial and nonfinancial corporations in the 1970s. By the late 1980s they had rejuvenated these profit rates (Duménil & Lévy 2011: 67), increasing the wealth of persons owning the new exotic financial instruments. However, they did nothing to solve the New American Empire’s other economic problems, principally slower growth, stagnant or declining incomes, and a deteriorating labor market. In sum, the evidence indicates neoliberalism might be characterized as a form of simultaneity boom that is burst, that is, booming wealth for the privileged that busts wealth for everyone else.

The neoliberal iteration of the liberal public délit was in place by the end of the 1980s. Nevertheless, the US economy remained in “crisis,” and while the cyclical vulnerabilities continued unfixed, systemic ones emerged.

Attempted Nonviolent Fixes of Systemic Reproductive Vulnerabilities

Our inquiry now focuses upon elites’ attempts to fix the reproductive vulnerabilities posed by the initial intensification of a capital/land systemic contradiction, which manifested itself either as global warming or movement toward peak oil. Global warming is examined first.

Global Warming—“Hardly addressed”: In 1958 Charles Keeling developed a device to measure the concentration of CO₂ in the atmosphere. A decade later, Syukuro Manabe and his collaborators (Manabe and Weatherald 1975) produced complex computer models that predicted temperature rise resultant from CO₂ increase. Together these made it possible to precisely measure global warming, making it possible to know whether there was an intensifying capital/land systemic contradiction.
Hermeneutic politics as to the meaning of CO₂ emissions had begun by 1975. Broadly speaking, there were environmentalist (eco-activist or the green movement) and anti-environmentalist (climate skeptic) sides in this politics.⁶ Environmental researchers, largely from the biological sciences and climatology, argued that the earth and humanity were threatened by global warming, and that major interventions were needed to reduce this danger. Anti-environmental hermeneuts, largely from industry and economics, lambasted the environmentalists as “doomsters,” while assuring people that markets would fix the problem.⁷

The course of their politics has been as follows: Prior to 1975, compelling evidence was lacking that greenhouse gases produced warming. There was actually some thought during this time that the world might experience a period of cooling. A 1975 National Academy of Sciences (NAS 1975) report insisted that climates could change and that there was need for more research to explain how. Two UN agencies, along with the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), were chosen to conduct the NAS-requested research. In the middle of the 1980s, a joint UNEP/WMO/CSU conference issued findings of this research and concluded that greenhouse gases “are expected” to cause significant warming in the next century (WMO 1985). In 1988 the WMO and UNEP formed the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to conduct research on global warming and devise policies for addressing it. In 1989 fossil fuel and other industries formed the Global Climate Coalition to inform politicians and ordinary folk that climate science was too uncertain to justify any policies the IPCC might recommend (Weart 2008: 210). The following year the IPCC presented its first report. In the years 1959 through 1987, CO₂ emissions grew from roughly 315 ppm to 349 ppm (CO2Now.Org 2014), at around the rate predicted to cause ecological harm. Newell and Paterson (2010: 34) testified, “Global carbon emissions continue to grow, largely in line with global GDP.” Because the growth of GDP is a measure of the growth of capitalist accumulation, this indicated that most of the emissions either directly or indirectly resulted from capitalism. Capitalism and environmental change were, as Adrian Parr (2013: 6) put it, linked in an “earth shattering moment.” Here, then, was recognition of grave reproductive vulnerability. To address it, the IPCC report recommended “a programme of global, comprehensive and phased action for the resolution of global warming” (IPCC 1990: 56).

Since that time there have been attempts, in the private and the governmental sectors in the US and in other countries, to implement such a “programme.” In private attempts to combat global warming, two sorts of
fixes predominate: those of capitalist enterprise and those of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Consider first the NGOs.

There are literally thousands of NGOs against global warming across all sorts of political and religious divides. Some are mainstream organizations, like the World Social Forum, the National Wildlife Federation, and the Environmental Justice Organization. Others are more specialized: for parent activists there is Green Parenthood; for bird-watchers there is Bird Life International; for fundamentalist Christians there is the Evangelical Climate Initiative; for Zionists there is the Green Zionist Alliance; for those into the Internet there are 350.org, DoSomething.org, and StopGlobalWarming.org; for social networking devotees climatic change can be fought on MySpace and Facebook. Finally, for those with erotic inclinations there is Fuck for Forest, a Norwegian NGO that raises money to rescue the world’s rainforests doing what the name of their organization says they do (Dicum 2005).

Nevertheless, global warming has continued unabated in the period being considered (1975–1990). Why? In part this is because the anti-Global Warming NGOs participate in hermeneutic politics with limited force resources. They have only enough money, workers, and tools to create and transmit cultural messages, little more. But simply producing messages is not sufficient. Notably, global warming opponents lack control over the force resources that actually produce global warming. These forces—factories and the like that emit CO₂—are owned by either capitalist corporations that profit from production of greenhouse gases, or government institutions that have both the authority and the violent force resources to terminate this production, but instead support capitalist enterprise. Further, corporations responsible for CO₂ emissions support climate-skeptical NGOs (discussed in Hoggan and Littlemore 2009) to broadcast the opposing message that global warming is a lie—apparently successfully, because as late as 2014 many Americans expressed doubt over global warming (Agiesta and Borenstein 2014). In short, if producing a message is a bit like blowing a horn, what environmental NGOs have done is blown their own horns. Few appear to have heard.

The second private activity that is supposed to reduce greenhouse emissions is capitalism itself. Here the notion has been that carbon markets could be created. Newell and Paterson (2010: 24–25) have described how such markets might work, explaining that “two main mechanisms are particularly important” for creating carbon markets:

On the one hand are environmental taxation measures where the government imposes taxes on particular pollutants like carbon dioxide. On the other hand are emissions trading schemes, where an overall emissions limit is decided, a number of permits adding up to this limit are distributed to actors according to
some principle of distribution, and then actors are allowed to trade the permits amongst themselves. With both measures the main rationale is that they leave the decisions about how to achieve particular environmental goals up to individuals and companies. Governments set either general incentives (in the case of taxes) or overall limits to pollution levels (in the case of emissions trading) and leave markets to work out who will reduce emissions when and where.

In principle, the idea of creating carbon markets to fight global warming is plausible; but in practice such markets appear “a bit of a scam” (ibid.: 129); the problem being that there may be but little profit to be had in carbon trading unless the tolerated levels of carbon emissions are set so high that they do little to limit greenhouse gas buildup.

The discussion turns now to governmental attempts to constrain global warming. There have been two sorts of governmental policies and programs to address global warming: those coming from individual countries’ governments; and those from multinational governmental agencies, especially the UN. Bilateral attempts to fight climate change have been most successful in Europe, and less so in the rapidly industrializing economies of Asia, notably India and China. In 2007, China surpassed the US as the world’s largest emitter of CO₂ (Vidal and Adam 2007). In the US the summer of 2010 looked promising: a comprehensive bill in the Senate would have imposed a carbon emissions cap. However, energy industry interests opposed it, and a grand bargain was proposed to mollify them: oil companies would be allowed to drill in US coastal waters, where such drilling was forbidden, in exchange for accepting a carbon cap. Nevertheless, the bill failed, and the Senate continued its bipartisan record of doing nothing about global warming.

What about multinational governmental efforts to combat global warming? Global attempts to reduce greenhouse emissions have been coordinated by the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which conducts studies and, based upon them, formulates policy it hopes countries will agree upon at international meetings. Should agreement be reached on these policies, they will attain the status of international law; that is, in our terms, they would form an anti–global warming public délire. So far the most important of these climate change conferences has been the 1997 Kyoto Climate Conference, where the Kyoto Protocol was accepted, meaning the countries agreed to cut CO₂ emissions back to 5 percent below 1990 levels. The Clinton administration accepted the protocol. However, under Bush II the US reversed itself (March 2001). Meanwhile, China was never party to it. With both the US and China refusing to cut greenhouse gas emissions, the protocol was effectively dead. The 2009 UNFCCC summit in Copenhagen was supposed to revive the Kyoto Protocol. It failed. A 2010 UNFCCC summit in Cancun was in-
tended to remedy the disappointment of the Copenhagen meeting. The Cancun conference featured less rancorous participant discourse than Copenhagen had, but it too failed. The Paris Climate conference in 2016 secured a global commitment to reduce CO$_2$ emissions, but failed to mandate how each country would do so. Multinational attempts to create an anti-global warming public délire have been characterized by failed iteration 1 (the Kyoto Protocol), failed iteration 2 (the Copenhagen summit), failed iteration 3 (the Cancun conference), and uncertain iteration 4 (the Paris conference).

Peaceful fixing of the reproductive vulnerability of global warming from 1975 to 1989 was a chimera. The belching of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere at high levels continued unabated. Neoliberal capitalism was “underpinning … massive environmental changes” that included “climate change” (Parr 2013: 3). Next we consider attempts to nonviolently reproducingly fix the systemic contradiction resulting from peak oil.

**Peak Oil—“Off a cliff”**: Recall that chapter 5 explained that if demand for oil increased when amounts of oil supplied were stagnant or decreasing, then the capital/land contradiction was intensifying. World oil discovery per decade peaked in 1959 and declined through 1989 (Ruppert 2009), suggesting oil supply problems. Over this time, world demand for oil had swiftly increased, due especially to rapid growth of Asian economies that began during this period. Clearly, there was evidence of a reproductive vulnerability due to intensification of oil moving toward its peak in the years 1975 through 1989. What has happened as a result?

The result has been ferocious hermeneutic politics. Environmental hermeneuts broadcast the message that peak oil was coming, and it was not going to be nice. Anti-environmental hermeneuts responded that such claims were phantasmagoric. As in the global warming hermeneutic politics, NGOs fighting peak oil lacked the force resources to do anything other than produce messages. Consequently, neither US private enterprise nor the government in the period under consideration confronted the impending arrival of peak oil. President Jimmy Carter was certainly aware of it in April 1977, when he began a televised speech by announcing, “Tonight I want to have an unpleasant talk with you.” The disagreeableness concerned the fact that “the oil and natural gas we rely on for 75 percent of our energy are running out” (Carter 1977: 1, 6). Carter was derided as alarmist. Nothing was done to effectively eliminate the unpleasantness—not by Carter; nor by his successor, Reagan. Accordingly, by the early twenty-first century it was judged that “the supply of the world’s essential energy source is going off a cliff” (Arguimbau 2010: 1).
Commodity Chains and Problems of Fixing Peak Oil: An additional vulnerability faced the New American Empire because its ability to nonviolently fix the problem of peak oil, even had it wanted to do so, was reduced over the years 1975–1989, as the US lost extensive power over petroleum production and distribution. Oil force resources are transformed into commodities and circulated in commodity chains, and an understanding of these helps to account for the decline in US control over oil.

A “commodity chain” (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1986) is a particular type of a string used by firms to gather resources, transform them into goods, and finally distribute them to consumers. Oil global commodity chains have five sorts of spatially and temporally related operations: exploration (discovering oil deposits), production (removing crude oil from the ground), transportation (moving crude oil from production site to refining site), refining (transforming crude oil into marketable commodities), and finally distribution (moving petroleum products to various distributors, who sell them to consumers). Oil commodity chains became global in the early twentieth century. Concentration had emerged in them by the 1930s among a few companies called “the majors.” Predominantly American transnationals, these included Esso (US), Mobil (US), Texaco (US), Gulf (US), BP (UK), Shell (Dutch, UK) and the CFP (French). Their commodity chains were largely vertically integrated through the 1960s, which relaxed competition within them because the different links in the chain were part of the same company. US power over oil production was considerable because its transnational enterprise effectively owned all the institutions in the commodity chains.8

However, there was a contradiction between the majors and the governments in the territories where oil was produced: the more revenues went to the majors, the less they went to governments in producing regions. This is the oil company/petro-state contradiction mentioned in chapters 1 and 6. Payments made for the use of a natural resource are rents. Rents paid by petroleum firms were generally low through the 1960s. After all, prior to the 1960s many of these governments were colonial ones that, being appendages of the core governments, saw little reason to interfere with their oil companies’ profits. Thus, as long as the old empires were strong, the oil company/petro-state contradiction was relaxed vis-à-vis the oil businesses.

Two transformations intensified the contradiction and loosened the majors’ governance of global oil commodity chains. The first of these involved nationalism, the key ideological force resource that in the last chapter’s discussion was directed by colonies against the old empires after World War II. Local elites in oil-producing areas knew of the copious flow of capital to the majors from oil, so their nationalist ideologies aimed to increase
their share by stressing oil nationalization and the creation of national oil production companies—for example, Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) in Mexico in 1938—or profit-sharing agreements like the 1943 Hydrocarbon Law in Venezuela. Oil nationalism had spread to the Middle East by the 1950s (Iran nationalized its oil in 1952) and became a veritable flood in the 1970s (Rutledge 2005: 45, 86). Saudi Arabia’s Aramco, largely owned by companies that would become ExxonMobil, was nationalized by 1976. Iraq started nationalization in 1961 and had completed it by 1972. Kuwait had nationalized by 1975. By 1976, twenty oil-producing countries accounting for 74 percent of nonsocialist oil had nationalized their oil production operations (Kobrin 1985: 3). This meant, according to Ayoub (1994: 57), that “between 1973 and 1982, [the majors] lost around 50 percent of their share of the crude oil market, from 30 million barrels per day (MMbbl/d) to around 15.2 MMbbl/d.” Consequently, “during the 1970s … virtually all of the oil resources outside of North America passed from international petroleum companies to the governments of the oil producers” (Morse 1999: 4). At the turn of the millenium, only about 7 percent of the world’s oil and gas resources were in countries allowing free rein to private petroleum companies (McNulty 2007).9

Hence, national oil companies had replaced the majors as the producer link of the oil global commodity chains. The producer link in the oil commodity chain had gone from being a force resource of the economic system of the New American Empire to being a force resource of petro-states. Henry Kissinger groused in 1972 that this reduced the US’s “ability to set the world oil price” (in Rutledge 2005: 43). It certainly did, and according to Morse (1999: 5), “the balance of power in the market was tipped toward sellers,” allowing “oil prices to be raised at the discretion of governments [of oil producing countries], which if they so desired could increase rents from oil exploitation and force a shift in income and wealth from the consuming countries.” Kissinger declared this state of affairs to be an “energy crisis” (1999: 696). His attempted fix of it was diplomatic and featured a “Consumer/Producer Dialogue” (ibid.: 697–700), which did not change the fact that oil producers, starting in the 1970s, had far greater control over their oil.

A second transformation further diminished the New American Empire’s control over oil. This was the emergence of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).10 Founded in 1960, OPEC is a cartel whose chief goal has been to coordinate oil producers’ policies to better wrest control over oil supply and prices. Though OPEC has not been completely successful, it has been influential in bringing robust, additional revenues to petro-states. By the late 1960s its members’ share of oil exports rose to nearly 80 percent of the global total, fortifying its bar-
gaining clout (E. Rose 2004: 433). OPEC used this clout to further the nationalization of foreign oil assets and oil price increases. For example, “At its twenty first meeting in Caracas, in Venezuela December 1970, OPEC demanded and got an across-the-board price increase of thirty-three cents a barrel for crude oil and a minimum tax rate increase of 55 percent from the oil firms” (ibid.: 434). Over the next three years, “OPEC dictated price increases and the beginning of the widespread movement on the part of some of its members to nationalize all or part of the oil companies’ assets within their Territories” (ibid.: 434).

Two indicators reveal the loss of US power due to diminished price control. One concerns capital flows. James Akins (1973: 480) indicated something of the magnitude of monies acquired by non-US oil-producing companies because of nationalization and OPEC when he reported, “With the possible exception of Croesus, the world will never have seen anything quite like the wealth which is flowing and will continue to flow into the Persian Gulf”—and, he might have added, other areas of oil production in Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America. The second indicator is the ability to use oil as a weapon to harm the US. For example, in fall of 1973, when the “Yom Kippur” Arab-Israeli War broke out, the US supported Israel. In response, Arab states, through OPEC, organized an oil embargo on the US and its Atlantic community clients. Oil prices skyrocketed in what became known as the “first oil shock.” This embargo provoked the steep 1973–1974 recession in the US. A second oil shock occurred in 1979. That February the Iranian Revolution (discussed later in the chapter), began, whereupon the US oil companies lost access to Iranian oil. Here was a second exercise of power over oil supply within six years. Both events provoked steep price inflation, both hurt the US economy, and both were beyond imperial America’s power at the time.

The New American Empire’s sizable loss of the production link in the oil commodity chain would have been of lesser importance if US oil production had not, for the moment, passed its peak in 1970, more or less according to Hubble’s predictions. Thereafter, the US grew increasingly dependent upon foreign petroleum, importing roughly 33 percent of its oil in 1973, 53 percent in 1998, and 62 percent in 2008 (Kunstler 2006: 42, 44). Further, “over half of crude oil imports come from unstable or unfriendly countries” (Center for American Progress: 2008). Hence the US acquired the oil supplies necessary for its capital accumulation from commodity chains whose production links were in hostile countries with the potential to deny supply and thereby compromise capital accumulation. Consequently, even if US elites intended to address peak oil by reducing the oil supply, they were poorly situated to do so because regulating what you imperfectly control is like driving a car with a faulty engine.
Deadly Contradictions

Like Achilles

To summarize the preceding discussion, the New American Empire may be the most powerful social being ever, but like Achilles, it has its vulnerabilities. Between 1975 and 1989 cyclical and systemic contradictions intensified and coalesced, contributing to an “inadequate performance of the American economy” (Bernstein and Adler 1994). Fixes were sought, peaceful ones. They failed. Consequently, during these times of late modernity the US Leviathan sailed contradictory seas with fixless fixes.

Indeed, the times were “a-changin’,” and not for the good. There was a sense that the US was in decline. A whole school of scholars called “declinists” emerged to argue this case (D. Snow 1999). A counter-literature arose to cheer elites up. One of its hermeneuts, Joseph Nye (Princeton University’s Colonial Club, followed by a Harvard Distinguished Service Professorship) reassured everybody, as the title of his book put it, that the US was Bound To Lead (1991). But the question was, lead to where? The following section begins to answer this question.

Hermeneutic Politics in a Time of Fixless Fixes

Every president since Richard Nixon has recognized that ensuring Persian Gulf security and stability is vital to U.S. interests. (Brzezinski, Scowcroft, and Murphy 1997: 20)

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft, and Richard Murphy were not nonentities. Brzezinski was Carter’s NSA, Scowcroft performed the same chores for Bush I, and Richard Murphy was a former assistant secretary of state and a Middle Eastern expert. Elite of (security) elites, their Foreign Affairs article interpreted what was “vital to U.S. interests”; and “vital” was the Persian Gulf—at the time largely unknown to most Americans. The Gulf is a body of water flowing from the Indian Ocean through the Straits of Hormuz into the heart of the Middle East. Most of the eastern shore of the Gulf is Iran; the western shore is Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates; to the north is Iraq.

Why, when the US economy appeared to be going to hell in an (economic) handbasket, did the Security Elites 2.0 suddenly start worrying about a nowhere? Furthermore, what had happened during this time to the dreaded monster-alterity, the Soviet Union? Answers to these two questions turn upon the sharpened economic contradictions and the fate of the inter-imperial contradiction. Brzezinski and friends (1997: 317) explained that the Gulf was “vital” because its “oil will continue to be crucial to the economic well-being of the industrialized world for the foreseeable
future.” If the phrase the “industrialized world” is understood to be the US and its imperial clients, then the Gulf was vital because it could provide “economic well-being,” attainment of which would relax the economic contradictions.

An additional reason US security elites began fixating upon the Gulf and its oil was that another contradiction had largely disappeared. The USSR, still fearsome in the 1970s, had by 1989 been largely deconstructed. Removal of the old Soviet monster-alterity relaxed the inter-imperial contradiction—but a new monster-alterity arose to terrorize US security elites. The hermeneutic politics within this story are told in the next few sections, beginning with the Nixon and Ford administrations.

Relaxing the Inter-imperial Contradiction:
The Nixon Doctrine and the Twin Towers

Kissinger claimed in his memoirs that the US had withdrawn from Vietnam on “honorable terms” (1999: 92). Anybody who saw the films of the Americans fleeing the CIA station in April 1975 knew that they had fled in dishonor. Thereafter, the New American Empire itself appeared to be in “turmoil” (ibid.: 99). Within the continental US, starting in the late 1960s and continuing through the 1970s and 1980s, there were riots and assassinations. Outside its continental borders, client-nations were nervous about their Washington connections, and foes looked for gains. The Nixon administration was especially worried that Moscow might seek “to destabilize Europe and other strategic regions” (ibid.). Nixon and Kissinger judged the situation to be one requiring threat reduction. Accordingly, they sought détente with the Soviets and China (Litwak 1986; Bowker and Williams 1988).

Strategic arms limitation talks with Russia were initiated and resulted in the SALT I Treaty (1972), which reduced the numbers of nuclear missiles menacing the two countries. Additionally, the Helsinki Accords (begun July 1973, finalized August 1975) were negotiated, guaranteeing post–World War II European states’ territorial integrity and formalizing their agreement to refrain from the threat or use of violence between them. With regard to China, the US lifted its trade embargo (April 1971) and Nixon visited China (February 1972). Détente between America and its monster-alterity reduced the inter-imperial contradiction. But whereas one contradiction appeared relaxed, another began to be perceived.

Oil nationalization, OPEC’s growth, and the Arab-Israeli War’s oil embargo all happened during Nixon’s presidency, flooding his security elites’ I-spaces with the sense that there was a new difficulty in the world. Kissinger put it as follows in a speech of December 1973:
We must bear in mind the deeper causes of the energy crisis: It is not simply a product of the Arab-Israel war; it is the inevitable consequence of the explosive growth of worldwide demand outrunning incentives for supply. The Middle East war made a chronic crisis acute, but a crisis was coming in any event. Even when prewar production levels are resumed, the problem of matching the level of oil that the world produces to the level which it consumes will remain. (1982: 896)

Kissinger’s “energy crisis” was a recognition, and interpretation, of the land/capital contradiction, in the sense that it acknowledged a “crisis” based on capital’s great demand for petroleum energy, a demand that might outstrip its supply.

Unquestionably, however, the New American Empire still aimed to dominate, which posed a new hermeneutic puzzle. In the era of “energy crisis,” while being nice to communists, who, and how, did you plan violence in order to dominate? The Nixon Doctrine was an initial answer to this question. Announced during a presidential press conference in Guam (1969), it specified that “in cases involving [non-nuclear] aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense” (Nixon 1969). There were two parts to this doctrine. The first said that if a country was “directly threatened,” it would have to defend itself with its own “manpower.” Here was a promise to ordinary Americans that there would be no more sending of their “boys” to die in jungles.

However, the second part of the Nixon Doctrine meant that allied countries linked by treaties would receive “military … assistance.” So it proposed indirect global warring and military satrapies in the [developing] far reaches of the empire, and in doing so was an iteration of the global domination public délire. Michael Klare (2004) has noted that its implementation initiated US military assistance to the Persian Gulf. The Nixon Doctrine, then, answered the question, who do you kill when the Soviets become less threatening? The answer was, you choreograph killing of those who threaten US control over Persian Gulf oil.

In 1973, during his 4th Report to Congress, Nixon announced that Iran and Saudi Arabia had become the “twin towers” of US foreign policy in the Persian Gulf. As such, they were a bit like the marcher lords in medieval England, who as proxies for the British crown protected the imperial boundaries from Welsh or Scots raiders. Iran and Saudi Arabia, armed by the US, would do the same for America’s Middle Eastern interests. Nixon told one audience that this policy was desirable because the “assurance of the continual flow of Middle Eastern energy resources is increasingly important to the United States, Western Europe, and Japan” (in Nakhieh
1982: 99). However, it would turn out that the Nixon Doctrine contributed to a US “strategic insolvency” in the Persian Gulf. Such insolvency is any situation where the force resources available for procedural choreographing are insufficient for the intended operation. This insolvency emerged in the presidencies following Nixon’s, considered next.

The Carter Administration’s Very Busy Time

Tricky Dicky succumbed to a temptation to steal information about his rivals in the 1972 presidential campaign. Due to the ensuing Watergate Scandal over this theft, Nixon resigned the presidency on 9 August 1974. Vice President Gerald Ford succeeded Nixon and largely continued his predecessor’s policies. This included détente. The Helsinki Accords were signed in 1975. Ford lost the 1976 elections to a relative newcomer to national politics, Jimmy Carter, a Plains, Georgia peanut farmer and governor (1971–1975). He would have a busy time of it.

The man from Plains (1977–1981) assumed the presidency as the cyclical economic contradictions of the long downturn manifested themselves as stagflation (high inflation and low employment). Carter would strengthen Nixon’s Persian Gulf policy; wrestle with the Soviet monster-alterity, which would be first perceived as less threatening and then as very much more threatening; suffer the failure of Nixon’s Persian Gulf policy because of US strategic insolvency; and, finally, devise a fix of it. All of this made for a very busy time of it during his administration.

Sam Huntington and the Clash of Civilizations: President Carter took office in 1977. Immediately thereafter, his NSA Zbigniew Brzezinski set up office and invited Sam Huntington, a safe Soviet hand, to be his coordinator of planning. Huntington was a friend from Harvard days when they were both young professors denied tenure. Harvard would later repent and invite both back. Only Huntington returned to Harvard and a career as high-class hermeneut.

The Clash of Civilizations was perhaps his most celebrated text. Here he claimed, “The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion, but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence” (1996: 51); that is, Westerners killed well. Another affirmation—the one considered most prescient or outrageous—was that civilizations were cultures, and that there would be future conflict between Islamic and Western civilizations because their cultures clashed. Following Carter’s election, Brzezinski needed someone to help formulate the administration’s Soviet and other foreign policies. Huntington responded by cultivating a new interpretation of the USSR. Additionally, he authored a hermeneutic de-
ception based on his prediction that the future of US warring involved hostilities between Islam and the West. A word is in order concerning what was happening to the Soviets at this time.

The economic problems of the Soviet Union paralleled those of the US. In fact, the Bear was in far worse shape. According to one study, “Soviet growth over 1960–1989 was the worst in the world” (Easterly and Fischer 1994: 1). As early as 1971 the Soviets were admitting their economy had “slowed to a crawl” (Cahn 1998: 18). This period of real difficulties began about the mid 1970s, something the Russians themselves recognized. Gorbachev called this time an “era of stagnation” and insisted it was “the lowest stage of socialism” (Ulam 2002: 275). The downturn might have been worse, had it not been for Soviet oil and gas resources.

At the same time that Soviet economic problems were emerging, some in the US—elites and ordinary folk—were warming to the Bear. In part, this was a fruit of détente. Following a survey of attitudes toward the Soviets, Anne Cahn reported, “in 1974, the general mood of the United States was positive and upbeat concerning relations with the Soviet Union” (1998: 7). It was in this context of a faltering Soviet economy and increased US tolerance of the Bear that Huntington formulated the new Carter administration’s security policy. The result was Presidential Directive (PD) 18, signed by Carter on 26 August 1977.14

PD 18 began by announcing, “in the foreseeable future, US-Soviet relations will continue to be characterized by both competition and cooperation” (PD 18 1977: 2). Further,

In the competition … the United States continues to enjoy a number of critical advantages: it has a more creative technological and economic system, its political system can adapt more easily to popular demands and relies upon freely given popular support, and it is supported internationally by allies and friends who genuinely share similar aspirations. (Ibid.)

Here was an interpretation of the Soviets that differed from the early Cold War one. Nitze’s “fanatic” and “ruthless” USSR was absent in PD 18, replaced by a social being with whom there could be “cooperation.” Huntington’s Bear seemed a Teddy Bear in contrast to Nitze’s nightmarish monster-alterity. Huntington’s softened view of the Soviets was backed by Carter, who in a 1977 Notre Dame University speech advised that the US should eschew “inordinate fear of Communism” (in Brzezinski 1983: 460). Together Huntington and Carter might be said to have constructed a Teddy Bear hermeneutic of the Soviets, in which perceptually they were not to be feared, and procedurally there could be cooperation as well as competition.
Nevertheless, even though there was cooperation, the Carter administration believed there should be military support for any competition that might occur. PD 18’s “Global Contingencies” section declared an important change in US military policy. It announced that “the United States will maintain a deployment of force of light divisions with strategic mobility independent of overseas bases and logistical support. … These forces will be designated for use against both local forces and forces projected by the USSR based upon analyses of requirements in the Middle East” (PD 18, 1977: 5). Implicit in PD 18 was that the “light divisions” would be used, if necessary, to protect US oil interests. Betts (2004: 8), commenting on PD 18’s significance, states, “The Carter administration was the first to turn military planning toward the Persian Gulf and to missions only partly defined by the Soviet threat.” Betts is not entirely correct—recall that Nixon had announced that protection of Persian Gulf oil would be “increasingly important” for the New American Empire, and had inaugurated the twin towers as military neo-colonies to do this protection. So it was Nixon’s security elites that started Persian Gulf military planning. However, it was Huntington, speaking for the Carter administration, who for the first time sanctioned sending US soldiers to defend Middle East interests. The Nixon Doctrine was an iteration of the global domination public délire instituting planning for indirect global warring in the Persian Gulf. PD 18, another iteration of this public délire, went a step further and recommended direct use of US troops there, though no “light divisions” were ever actually committed under Carter.

It is at this juncture that the tale of “Huntington’s Hermeneutic Deception” can be told. In the early 1990s, following the fall of the Soviets, there was curiosity about what a post–Cold War world would look like, and Huntington’s idea of Islamic-Western conflict found favor. Cultural (including religious) identity would be the primary source of post–Cold War conflict, and clashing Islamic and the Western identities would be a primary source of war. This view made Huntington into a “rock star” hermeneut. He was the seer who had peered ahead and seen the future: an Islamic monster-ality (living, of course, where the oil was).

However, nowhere did Huntington tell readers that in 1977 he himself had initiated a plan to send US violent force to the Middle East to assist in the defense of the New American Empire’s oil interests there. Withholding this information was deceptive because it hid how Persian Gulf conflict resulted from implementation of a policy begun under Nixon, strengthened under Carter, that allotted US violent force to the Middle East where it was used in ways Security Elites 2.0 believed would help to control oil. The sham in Huntington’s hermeneutic deception is that it attributes US–
Middle East conflict to cultural differences, thereby obscuring the fact that the conflict was about the ability to control oil to help in the empire’s reproduction. It is time to move beyond Huntington to changes that bedeviled Carter toward the end of his presidency, when one of the twin towers collapsed and the Bear went over the mountain.

1979—Bad Times:

Goat fuck: a monumental screwup. (Urban Dictionary, )

Refined types might label a bad year “annus miserabilis.” Those of an earthier disposition might call it “a real goat fuck.” Perhaps the latter term better expresses the actuality of the third year of Carter’s presidency. His 1979 miseries were ultimately over threats to the empire’s control over energy.

Early in his administration Carter had given a remarkable nationally televised speech (April 1977) suggesting a new energy policy. In that speech he announced that America faced “a problem unprecedented in our history,” which if not fixed could lead to “catastrophe” (Carter 1977: 1). Strong language: “unprecedented” trouble that could lead to catastrophe. The problem was that the US was “running out of gas and oil” (ibid.: 1). Here was a second indication, following the Nixon administration’s discovery of the energy crisis, of a growing fixation upon petroleum resources. The catastrophe Carter worried about was believed to be something for the future. Meanwhile, another sort of oil problem emerged then and there in Carter’s third year.

The old Iranian memoirist whom readers have already encountered in the analysis of the coup against Mossedegh had opined, “All your trouble started in 1953” (Kinzer 2008: xxv). The “trouble” was “blowback” (originally a CIA term for an unintended power of some exercise of force), which started when Eisenhower and the Dulles brothers eliminated Mossedegh in favor of the shah. One unintended power generated by the coup—the blowback—was resistance to the shah and his repression. On 17 January 1979, this opposition culminated in the shah’s flight. Two weeks thereafter (1 February) his strongest critic, the Ayatollah Khomeini, returned from exile. Two months later, with Khomeini firmly in control, Iran became an Islamic Republic (1 April). OPEC’s response was to raise oil prices (28 June) by 24 percent, sending energy costs for Americans sky-high. Two months thereafter President Carter, while out canoeing in the bogs of Plains, was attacked by a “killer rabbit” (Combs 2010).

On 4 November 1979, “students” seized the US embassy staff in Tehran, who would end up being held hostage for 444 days. The blowback was complete. To make matters worse, at the very end of the year the Red
Army crossed the Hindu Kush mountains and invaded Afghanistan (27 December). Now that they controlled Afghanistan’s high ground, the Soviets were within striking distance of Persian Gulf oil. At this juncture the strategic insolvency of the Nixon Doctrine became clear. One of the military satraps supposed to defend US interests had become an enemy. There were almost no US violent force resources in the Persian Gulf—there was only Huntington’s PD 18 suggestion that such resources should be moved there. The oil crisis had considerably worsened for the US Leviathan. Now, tied to the actuality that peak oil was approaching, was the fact that the empire was doubly politically threatened, for even as Washington had lost control over Iranian oil, the Soviets had placed themselves in a position more favorable to seizing Persian Gulf reserves.

Carter had other problems too, closer to home. Earlier it was noted that on 15 July 1979 Carter spoke to the country in a nationally televised speech, warning that the country faced a “fundamental threat,” a “crisis of confidence” (Carter 1979). He had been speaking largely about energy problems, but certain Republican elites thought with confidence that the problem was Carter’s, not the country’s. During the 1970s they adapted an existing institution to boost conservative hermeneutic politics by offering non–Teddy Bear interpretations of the Soviets, which would be used to help terminate the Carter presidency. Ponder next the development of this institution, the “think tank”—the heavy artillery of hermeneutic politics.

Think Tanks and a Return to the Monster-Alterity Hermeneutic: In 1971 Lewis Powell (1971), a tobacco industry lawyer who became a Supreme Court Justice, wrote a memorandum to the US Chamber of Commerce urging conservatives to “finance think tanks, reshaping mass media and seeking influence in universities and the judiciary.” Think tanks are, and were, institutions for creating hermeneutics reflecting some elite group’s interests; that is, they were, and are, private agencies conducting policy research that brings their hermeneuts’ “expertise” to bear on how to perceive problems and what to do about them.\(^\text{18}\)

Think tanks had existed prior to the 1970s, but during this period, as the US supposedly drifted without “confidence,” wealthy patrons created a number of new ones promoting conservative interests. The Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute were the two most important. Think tanks could conduct more forceful hermeneutic politics for their controllers because they concentrated more hermeneuts upon hermeneutic puzzles to better prepare compelling interpretations of those puzzles. So what did the Republican think tanks think during the 1970s?

One puzzle they delighted in solving was, how to understand the Soviets? A new strand of conservative politicians offered a solution to this
puzzle. These were the “neoconservatives” (or “neocons”); a term coined by Michael Harrington (1973) to describe a brand of US conservatism that emphasized aggrandizing US economic and, especially, military power. Its origins were in the 1960s and the revolt of certain Democratic media hermeneuts, especially Irving Kristol and Norman PodhoraItz, against the then prevailing Democratic Party’s dovish politics. Neoconservatism spread rapidly among Republicans during the 1970s, particularly in the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute. It influenced young Ford administration officials such as Richard Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Pearle. The American Security Council, a neocon think tank led by John Fisher, created the Coalition for Peace through Strength, which warned perceptually that the Bear was not a Teddy Bear but the ravening monster-alterity conjured by Nitze. This group was in full voice by 1979.

Notable among the hermeneuts who adopted anti-Soviet politics were Harvard’s Richard Pipes and the ex-president Richard Nixon, who sought to be born again by abjuring détente and converting to the neocon faith. In his book The Real War, Nixon claimed the US was already in World War III with the Soviets and warned that between the end of the Vietnam War and 1979, eight countries in the developing world had been “brought under communist domination”—a hundred million people in five years, he worried—to which the US must respond by rolling “back the tide of Soviet advance by … showing a steadfast determination to do what is necessary” (1980: 3, 305). The neocons were warning that the inter-imperial contradiction was still intense, and that consolidating the ability to implement violent reproductive fixes for this situation was prudent. This Republican, neocon hermeneutic was actually a return to the 1950s monster-alterity hermeneutic originally formulated by Democratic old boys in NSC 68.

Was this hermeneutic questionable? The CIA certainly appeared to believe so. Some developing countries—Nixon (1980: 3) named Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South Yemen, Mozambique, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam—had adopted “socialist” regimes in the 1970s. Still, how much this was due to Soviet action and how much to the countries’ own nationalist politics was a matter of debate. Critically, according to CIA analysts, it was clear that the USSR was in economic trouble. A 1985 NIE, largely the CIA’s handiwork, judged that “the growth of the Soviet economy has been systematically decelerating since the 1950s” (Berkowitz and Richelson 1995). Furthermore, the CIA regularly reported decline in Soviet growth rate and called attention to the deep structural problems that pointed to continued decline” (MacEachin 2007). So the CIA, if unchallenged, suggested that the neocon anti-Soviet hermeneutic was fantasy.
To counter the CIA, influential conservatives managed to convince the Ford administration to evaluate the CIA’s interpretation of Soviet strength. The group of neocons that made this evaluation came to be known as “Team B” and was headed by Richard Pipes with assistance from Paul Wolfowitz and Paul Nitze. Team B’s principal finding, initially kept secret, was that the CIA underestimated the Soviets, who were involved in a “drive for dominance based upon an unparalleled military buildup” (Committee on the Present Danger 1977; see also Pipes et al. 1976).

Today, Team B’s conclusions are dismissed as incorrect. Fred Kaplan, for example, reported, “In retrospect, the Team B report (which has since been declassified) turns out to have been wrong on nearly every point, while the CIA’s reports in those same years look pretty good” (F. Kaplan 2004; see also R. Morris 2007a: 5). Given such actualities, Anne Cahn, who worked for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and wrote the most complete evaluation of Team B (1998), declared Team B’s findings of Soviet military strength to be “fantasy” (in Hartmann 2004). Even Kissinger had offered “condemnation” of Team B’s report (Vest 2001: 20).

However, as the Ford administration drew to a close, certain neocons in it—particularly Rumsfeld and Richard Cheney (then White House chief of staff)—defended Team B’s findings, not by demonstrating that the critiques of it were invalid but simply by asserting its message to be true. Rumsfeld, for example, who has just been seen unfavorably comparing US to Soviet military strength, nevertheless insisted that “no doubt exists about the capabilities of the Soviet armed forces” and that these capabilities “indicate a tendency toward war fighting” (in Vest 2001: 20). Thus, at the end of Carter’s first term as a new election approached, a fierce hermeneutic politics vied over two competing interpretations of the Soviets. Ronald Reagan, the conservative Republican challenger in the 1980 presidential campaign, battered Carter with the neocon monster-alterity hermeneutic, promising to restore America.

**Restoration?**

At the 1976 Republican Presidential Convention leading up to the election Carter won, Reagan gave a speech vowing “To Restore America.” Ford won the Republican nomination that year but lost to Carter. Four years later, campaigning on a neocon platform, Reagan—nicknamed Dutch by his father, who thought he looked like a little fat Dutch boy—returned the Republicans to the White House. Many of his followers believed, and still believe, that he was able to successfully “restore” the country. Before considering this restoration, it will be helpful to know something of Reagan’s approach to governing.
Bob Woodward, one of the journalists who broke the Watergate story, interviewed Reagan's CIA Director, Robert Casey, one of Dutch's close political allies, concerning the president's management style:

Casey continued to be struck by the overall passivity of the President—passivity about his job and about his approach to life. He never called the meetings or set the daily agenda. He never once told Casey “Let’s do this.” ... Casey noted in amazement that this President of the United States worked from 9 to 5 on Monday, Tuesday and Thursday, and from 9 to 1 on Wednesday, when he would take the afternoon off for horseback riding, or exercise; and on Friday he left sometime between 1 and 3 for Camp David. During the working hours in the Oval Office, the President often had blocks of free time—two, even 3 hours. He would call for his fan mail and sit and answer it. (B. Woodward 1987: 403–404)

Did Dutch restore the US before or after answering fan mail?20

Restoration was to be through two “core programs”: accelerated military spending and Reaganomics (Oye, Lieber, and Rothchild 1987: 5). One component of the military budget was the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or Star Wars), which proposed utilization of ground- and space-based anti-ballistic weapons to defend against incoming nuclear missiles. Star Wars proposed exotic weaponry—X-ray lasers, chemical lasers, hypervelocity rail guns, and the like—and was criticized by a number of experts as technologically unfeasible (FitzGerald 2001).

A second component of Reagan’s increased military spending involved what came to be known as the Reagan Doctrine (J. Scott 1996). Bodenheimer and Gould (1989) credit the conservative Heritage Foundation, especially Michael Johns, with developing the ideas behind it. In 1985 the doctrine was formally presented in a speech Reagan made to Congress, though it had actually been in implementation since the early days of the administration. The Reagan Doctrine provided military support, covert or overt, to anti-communist rebels in countries that had adopted communist governments. The increased military spending, it should be noted, actually continued expenditures that had begun late in Carter’s tenure, including assistance to anti-Soviet rebels in Afghanistan. The Reagan Doctrine might be seen as another procedural iteration of the global domination public délire.

Reaganomics, the second of the “core programs,” was the most complete implementation of neoliberal public délire attempted up to that time. Tax cuts for the upper class were central to this neoliberalism, with the Economic Recovery Act (1981) reducing the top rate of taxation from 70 percent to 50 percent of total income and the Tax Reform Act (1986) further reducing it from 50 percent to 28 percent of total income. Reduced tax payments by the wealthy permitted them to become still richer, fueling
inequality between wealthy and the rest. Reduced revenue from tax cuts in conjunction with increased military spending obliged sharp increases in government borrowing, with the nominal national debt going from $900 billion to $2.8 trillion during the Reagan administration. Once it started, the debt continually developed to such a magnitude that by 2012 it was at $16 trillion, exceeding the 2010 US gross domestic product. This debt level was said to threaten global economic stability. Thus, if one consequence of implementing Reagan’s two “core programs” was initiation of a borrowing trend that elevated national debt to dangerous levels, it is arguable that Dutch began a string of events increasing the New American Empire’s fiscal vulnerability.

Importantly, there was foreign policy overlap between the Carter and Reagan administrations. This included endorsement of the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf. As Lieber reported, “Reagan reaffirmed the position of his predecessors in maintaining American interests in the Persian Gulf” (Oye et al. 1987: 183). One way he did so was to follow Carter’s lead and “bolster” a US military force capable of handling “possible Gulf contingencies” that became known as the Rapid Deployment Force and “accounted for substantial increases in the defense budget” (ibid.: 182).

Let us summarize the chapter’s arguments to this point.

Times ‘A-changin’

Recall that Bob Dylan had said, for the period under discussion, that the times were “a-changin’”. The changes had to do with two sets of contradictions. The US was transitioning from economic good times to more distressed ones as the New American Empire faced intensifying cyclical and systemic contradictions that rendered its reproductive fixes fixless. But even as the US experienced economic problems, the Soviets faced graver ones, throwing US-Soviet relations into flux as the hermeneutic puzzle of the state of the inter-imperial contradiction became more puzzling. There were two responses to this trouble over contradictions. The first was the emergence of a hermeneutic politics anxious to address the reproductive vulnerability of the increasing economic contradictions by controlling the world’s energy. The Near East became recognized as a place to control—violently, if necessary, since oil was the major energy source and most of it was there. This recognition was expressed in the Nixon Doctrine and PD 18 iterations of the global domination public délire. However, strategic insolvency developed because neither iteration provided sufficient violent forces resources to actually control the Persian Gulf.

The second response was a hermeneutic politics that also went in two opposing directions regarding the inter-imperial contradiction. Nixon’s
détente and Huntington’s announcement that there could be “cooperation” with Moscow, in conjunction with the Soviet economic debacle, led to the Teddy Bear perception of the Soviet threat. Hermeneuts in neocon think tanks responded to this perception with a fierce counterhermeneutic politics that revived the Soviet monster-alterity.

Consequently, the masters and commanders of US imperialism sailing the [economically] troubled seas of 1975–1989 worried both about a new enemy out there—whoever threatened US control of Persian Gulf oil—and the old enemy, who might be a Teddy Bear or a monster-alterity Bear, depending upon who was talking. This dual-enemy time is the context in which the global wars the New American Empire was involved in at this time are considered. Let us introduce global warring between 1975 and 1989.

US global wars during this period reflect the Security Elites 2.0’s dual-enemy interpretations of what threatened the US imperial project in the roiling contradictory seas of the time. The Security Elites 2.0 entered global wars in response to events pertaining to either the inter-imperial contradiction or the economic contradictions, and the need to control oil to manage them. They directed global wars in the Middle East and Central Asia, including the Lebanon Civil War (1975–1990), the Afghanistan-Soviet War (1979–1989), and the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988); in Africa they masterminded conflicts in Libya (in the 1980s), Angola (1981–1989), Mozambique, and Sudan. There were also wars throughout the period in the Americas. 22

In terms of magnitude the hostilities fall into two categories. There were major wars utilizing huge amounts of violent force over many years with tremendous casualties; and there were lesser ones that one observer termed a “theatrical micromilitarism” (Todd 2003: 144). Even though the theater featured smaller exercises of violent force over shorter times, it often involved very considerable killing. The major wars were the Afghanistan-Soviet War and the Iran-Iraq War. All the others were far lesser.

Three wars of this period are analyzed. They include the two greatest conflicts: Afghanistan I, where the Americans sided with Afghan rebels against the Soviets; and the Iran-Iraq War, in which the US sided with both Iran and Iraq, eventually coming down on the side of Saddam Hussein. These hostilities were about how the US dealt with the inter-imperial contradiction (in Afghanistan I) and with the need to control petroleum resources due to the economic contradictions (in both Afghanistan I and the Iran-Iraq War). Additionally, the Libyan conflict—one of the more “theatrical” of the micro-wars—is considered for its importance in developing an iteration of the global domination public délire that set the stage
for the New American Empire’s violence after 1990. For now, attention turns to the remote, rugged land of Afghanistan.

**Afghanistan I**

... they plotted to personally “give the Soviets their Vietnam” as Brzezinski was fond of saying. (R. Morris 2007a: 7)

Warfare in Afghanistan is analyzed twice in this text. The first analysis covers the years 1979–1989, when the Soviets fought Muslim rebels (*mujahideen*) who were rebelling against the Bear’s client regime in Kabul. During this war, the Americans handed the Soviets their Vietnam, “as Brzezinski was fond of saying.” The second treats the time from 2001 to the present, when the Americans took on those same mujahideen, who gave US security elites a Vietnam all over again. The first war is termed Afghanistan I, the second Afghanistan II. Afghanistan II is a topic in a later chapter. The story of Afghanistan I is what happened after the Bear went over the mountains.

**The Bear Went Over the Mountains**

The Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev sent the 40th Army across the Hindu Kush to Kabul on 25 December 1979. There it assassinated President Hafizullah Amin and replaced him with Babrak Karmal. Nine years later the final Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, ordered withdrawal to commence on 15 May 1988. Withdrawal ended on 15 February 1989. Two years further on, the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Let us first consider why the Soviets went over the mountains.

“A Fatal Mistake”: In 1954 John Foster Dulles decreed that Afghanistan was of no “security interest” to the US (Kakar 1995: 9)—it was too far away, with no obvious natural resources. Consequently, the New American Empire was largely indifferent to it through the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. The only US initiative was a big, 1950s United States Agency for International Development irrigation project in the Helmand Valley (Zakhilwal 2009). However, Afghanistan had been of security interest to the Soviets since Czarist times. After all, it was on their southern border. Here the Russian and British Empires had played the “Great Game” competing for Central Asian dominance. Great Britain had unsuccessfully tried to colonize Afghanistan starting in 1836, but by the late nineteenth century it had be-
come an independent country with a monarchy. When the Soviets came to power they sought good relations with their southern neighbor.

In 1953, Mohammad Daoud became prime minister of Afghanistan under his first cousin, King Mohammed Zahir Shah, and the country entered Cold War politics for the first time. Daoud wanted to modernize his homeland. The Soviets were interested in supporting him to thwart Afghanistan’s entry into the US camp. By the early 1960s Kabul was thoroughly “entangled” with Russia in “economic, military, and educational fields” (Kakar 1995: 10). The Afghan communist party, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, formed in 1965. It came to have two fiercely opposing factions. The Parcham (Flag) was a more urban bloc, more moderate and pro-Moscow, whose most important leader was Babrak Karmal. The Khalq (Masses) was more rural, radical, and at times equivocal toward the Soviets. Its two main leaders were Nur Mohammed Taraki and Hafizullah Amin.

Daoud was obliged to leave the prime minister’s office in 1963. A decade later he staged what came to be known as the Republican Revolution, overthrowing the monarchy and, as President, instituting a modernizing republic. All this was done with the assistance of Parcham military officers, giving them influence within Daoud’s government and drawing Afghanistan closer to Soviet client state status. The new government’s various “modernization schemes” stirred “the emergence of an Islamist movement in Afghanistan” that fervently opposed such policies (Kakar 1995: 85). President Daoud responded with heavy-handed, repressive anti-Islamist measures that provoked a widespread but failed insurrection in 1975. Furthermore, he purged his Parchami colleagues in government. Finally, he turned on the Khalq. At this point, Amin instructed Khalq military leaders to overthrow the government. This became the 25 April 1978 Saur Revolution (Saur being the Persian name for April). It succeeded. Daoud was assassinated, and Parcham’s head, Babrak Karmal, fled to Russian exile, leaving the Khalq to govern.

Taraki became president and signed a Twenty-Year Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union (December 1978), greatly expanding Soviet aid to his regime by making Afghanistan the Soviets’ “newest client state” (Grau and Gress 2002: xxii). It is important to note that the USSR had a particular public délire bearing upon their clients. This was the Brezhnev Doctrine (first articulated in 1968), which asserted that if anti-socialist forces tried to move a socialist state toward capitalism, the USSR would intervene (Ouimet 2003).

Unfortunately for the Russians, Afghanistan would turn out to be the client state from Hell, in large measure because of the two strings of events that dominated Afghan politics for the next year and a half. First, by implementing socialist policies the Khalq stoked growing Islamist fury, sparked
especially by Taraki’s launching an unpopular land reform (January 1978) in addition to permitting women to enter political life and attempting to end forced marriage. The Islamist opposition erupted into violence that came to be known as the Herat Uprising (March 1979). A second string of events, occurring concurrently with the growing revolt, stemmed from intensifying intra-Khalq competition between Taraki and Amin over the presidency.

The Herat Uprising had been grave. Russians were killed, and Russians were required to contain it. After the uprising Taraki traveled to Moscow to request additional military support. In a 1979 telephone conversation with Taraki, Premier Alexei Kosygin asked about the gravity of the uprising. Taraki responded, “The situation is bad and getting worse” (Kosygin and Taraki 1979). Startled, Kosygin next asked, “Is there anyone on your side?” Taraki replied, “There is no active support on the part of the population” (ibid). The conversation continued as Taraki pleaded for Soviet intervention. Kosygin refused, explaining that “we believe it would be a fatal mistake to commit ground troops. … If our troops went in, the situation in your country would not improve. On the contrary, it would get worse” (in Walker 1993: 253). He was prescient.

At roughly the same time, Taraki and Amin were doggedly launching assassination attempts against each other. One of Amin’s succeeded, and Taraki was smothered (14 September 1979). Consequently, in the fall of 1979 Moscow faced a situation in which its client regime had proven dysfunctional due to intra-clique competition, while bloody rebellion spread throughout the land. The new president, Amin, was both excessively repressive and desperate to find new allies. A month into his rule he told the US chargé d’affaires, “If Brezhnev himself should ask him [Amin] to take any action against Afghan independence … he would not hesitate ‘to sacrifice his life’ in opposition to such a request” (in Kakar 1995: 42); effectively signaling he was nobody’s client and wanted “independence.”

This situation imposed a hermeneutic puzzle on the Bolshevik security elite: What to do about an Afghanistan “spun out of control” (Grau and Gress 2002: xxiii)? Minutes of a 4 October conversation between Brezhnev and Eric Honecker, the leader of East Germany, indicated Brezhnev’s state of mind regarding Amin and the state of affairs in Afghanistan. Brezhnev worried that “In some provinces … military encounters continue with the hordes of rebels who receive direct and indirect support from Pakistan and direct support from Iran, from the USA and from China” (Brezhnev 1979). A month later (31 October 1979) the Soviet Politburo registered concern that Amin was cozying up to the Americans while also seeking alliances with members of the “conservative opposition” (Kakar 1995: 44). Amin seemed to be betraying his own revolution. Karmal, in Russian exile, de-
nounced Amin as “an agent of the CIA” (in Bonosky 1985: 41). Thereafter matters moved quickly.

Yuri Andropov, head of the KGB, informed Brezhnev in a memorandum in early December that “alarming information” had “started to arrive about Amin’s secret activities, forewarning of a possible political shift to the West” (Andropov 1979). The exact date of the memorandum is unclear, but according to Anatoly Dobrynin, then the USSR’s ambassador in Washington, it was an important factor in Brezhnev’s decision on Afghanistan. Brezhnev called a meeting of the inner circle of the Politburo, attended by Andropov, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Second Secretary of the Communist Party and chief ideologue Mikhail Suslov, and Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov. Andropov and Ustinov argued for direct Soviet intervention, justifying such action as a response to the CIA’s efforts to create a “new Great Ottoman Empire which would have included the Southern republics of the USSR” (Lyakhovsky 1995: 109–112). Four days later, on 12 December 1979, the Politburo met and decided to replace Amin and dominate Afghanistan through Karmal and his Parchami.

For the Soviets, then, the hermeneutic puzzle of Afghanistan was solved by the end of 1979. Perceptually it was understood that their worst enemy, imperial America, sought to loosen Moscow’s grip on a new client, a situation calling for application of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Consequently, procedurally, the Bear went over the mountain (the Hindu Kush range to be precise), and the 40th Army invaded on Christmas Day. As Kosygin had warned, it was a “fatal mistake.”

Rollback: From 1980 to 1985, the Soviets occupied Afghanistan’s cities and main communication routes. In response the mujahideen waged a guerrilla war, locally organized by regional warlords. After four years of war, mujahideen bands were operating from at least 4,000 bases (Roy 1990). Most of them were affiliated with, and supplied by, seven expatriate Islamic parties headquartered in Pakistan. Major commanders included the brutal Gulbuddin Herkmatyar, who led the Hizb party and was favored with CIA funding (Bergen 2001: 69); Ahmad Shah Massoud, leader of the Northern Alliance, called the Lion of Panshir because of his fighting skills; and another skilled guerilla fighter, Jalaluddin Haggani, whom Congressman Charlie Wilson called “goodness personified” (Crile 2007). Commanders typically led three hundred or more men, controlled several bases, and dominated a district or subdivision of a province. Massoud was a “deeply read student of Mao” (Coll 2004: 116), and his and other commanders’ tactics were Maoist in the sense that they sought to “avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw.” Mujahideen operations therefore relied heavily on sabotage, including attacks on Soviet military installations,
government offices, power lines, pipelines, radio stations, air terminals, hotels, cinemas, and the like.

The Soviet Army countered with large-scale offensives against basmachi (“bandits,” the dismissive Russian term for their opponents) territories. Nine offensives were launched between 1980 and 1985. Six went into the strategically important Panjshir Valley, successfully defended by Massoud. Heavy fighting also occurred in provinces bordering Pakistan that were safeguarded by Haggani. Nothing worked for the Soviets. Roughly 60 percent of the country had effectively escaped Soviet control by 1984 (Coll 2004: 89).

The Soviets were not only faring poorly against the basmachi: at the same time, they were also experiencing rapid regime turnover. Brezhnev died in 1982 after an eighteen-year reign, followed by Yuri Andropov (12 November 1982–2 September 1984), and then Konstantin Chernenko (13 February 1984–10 March 1985). The Central Committee of the Communist Party elected Mikhail Gorbachev the Politburo general secretary and head of the Soviet Union on 11 March 1985. He won by a single vote over hardliner Viktor Grishin. Change at the top strained policy making—the Soviet Union had had four rulers in four years, at the end of which came Gorbachev, a “new man” (Konchalovsky 2011: 5). He was young, the youngest member of the Politburo at the time and the first head of the USSR to have been born after the Revolution. Worried about his country’s economic stagnation, he advocated innovative ideologies, notably perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness, transparency).

Another new idea of Gorbachev’s was to end the Afghan conflict within one or two years, the 40th Army being granted this much time to win, if they could. There followed a “surge” in 1985. Troop strength was raised to 108,000 soldiers. Some 2,000 spetsnaz (special forces) were introduced in elite commandos supplied with advanced Mi-24D Hind attack helicopters. In response, in September 1986, the US shipped Stinger missiles to the rebels, rendering the Hind helicopters vulnerable. The result was the bloodiest year of the war.

Nothing worked for the 40th Army. It had been given its chance, and after two years fully 80 percent of Afghanistan was under mujahideen control. The Politburo met on 13 November 1986 and authorized pulling out from Afghanistan. On 14 April 1988 the Geneva Accords were signed between Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, and the US concerning the string of events that would serve as the Russian’s withdrawal. A few months later the first troops left. By February 1989, the last troops were gone. The Bear had slunk back over the mountains to its lair, itself abuzz with perestroika. Secretary of State George Shultz (1993: 1094) rejoiced: “The Soviets had been rolled back.”
The conflict had been grim. According to Russian sources some 14,500 Soviet soldiers were killed, between one and two million Afghans died overall; about another three million were wounded; and five million were made refugees (RT 2014). Concerning the fighting, one ordinary Russian private announced that he knew “the smell of a man’s guts hanging out; the smell of human excrement mixed with blood … the scorched skulls grinning out of a puddle of molten metal, as though they had been laughing, not screaming as they died” (Alexievich 1992: 16; [insert added for clarity]). The US got rollback. Ordinary folk got “the smell of a man’s guts hanging out.” Politburo elites got a “fatal mistake.” Had it all been the Soviets’ doing? Was there American meddling in Afghanistan? Answering these questions leads to a hermeneutic politics at the highest levels of authority in the Carter Administration during that goat fuck of a year.

“Open-mouthed shock”: The Hermetic Seal in the Hermeneutic Politics of Afghanistan I

Christopher Hitchens (2007: 1) reported that Carter reacted with “open-mouthed shock” when informed of the Soviets’ Christmas Day invasion of Afghanistan. Such a response suggests that indeed, the US had not been earlier involved in Afghanistan’s domestic politics and that the Soviet invasion came as a surprise. Certain information, however, suggests another interpretation of Carter’s shock. This evidence bears upon the Carter administration’s hermeneutic politics vis-à-vis the Soviets’ Afghan adventures. These politics involved three principal security elites with authorities over the exercise of violent force: Carter himself, NSA Brzezinski, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Let us specify the main puzzle of the politics.

The 1978 Saur Revolution meant that the US/Soviet inter-imperial contradiction was intensifying. After the fall of Saigon, Nixon said seven dominoes had fallen. Now there was an eighth, Afghanistan. This posed a hermeneutic puzzle: what to do about Afghanistan turning communist? The resolution of this problem turned on a hermetic seal that removed one of the principals from contributing to its resolution.

“The power to interpret”: The Making of a Lord High Hermeneut:

The Carter Administration was affected by deep divisions on national security issues between the “hawks and the doves.” (MacEachin, Nolan, and Tockman 2005: 9)

During the Vietnam War, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had been divided between hawks and doves. In the Carter administra-
tion the same division re-emerged in the hermeneutic politics concerning the USSR. Doves during the Vietnam War wanted less aggressive action against North Vietnam; hawks wanted more. In Carter’s time doves wanted to strengthen the process of US-Soviet détente. Hawks largely accepted neocon ideology and sought Soviet rollback, violently if necessarily.

Vance was the administration’s chief dove. He told readers in his memoirs, written immediately after leaving office, that “American military strength alone, although fundamental … was no longer a sufficient guarantee of nuclear stability” (1983: 26). To ensure this “stability,” he said he had “supported a policy of regulated competition coupled with reciprocity … ‘détente’” (ibid.: 6, 27). Brzezinski (sometimes called Zbig, sometimes losing the Z and sounding like Big) was the administration’s chief hawk—though a sly one, for at times he cooed like a dove. For example, at the beginning of his memoir, he declared that in the early stages of his relationship with Carter, “I repeatedly emphasized that détente with the Soviet Union was bound to be competitive and that we must strive to inject into it some genuine reciprocity” (1983: 50). Brzezinski seems to have been echoing his friend Huntington by saying there could be “cooperation” if there was reciprocity.

However, there was another Brzezinski, one who believed that in the “contemporary world” there were “ugly realities,” the USSR being especially ugly due to its becoming “more daring” and showing a “growing self-assertiveness” (ibid: 42, 146, 56). Specifically, he worried about a supposed Soviet military expansion, telling readers on the very first page of his memoir, “I had become increasingly concerned about longer-term political implications of growing Soviet military power, and I feared that the Soviet Union would become increasingly tempted to use its power either to exploit Third World turbulence or to impose its will in some political contest with the United States” (ibid.: 3). In this quotation Brzezinski reveals the neocon hawk concealed within the wings of a dove.

The term “rollback” was not in Brzezinski’s vocabulary, nor is it in the index of either his memoirs or his later The Grand Chessboard (1997). Following the Saur Revolution, though, he became a master of its implementation, to Vance’s distress. Brzezinski (1983: 39) noted that the “prevailing wisdom in Washington” during the Carter years was that he and Vance were “bitter enemies.” Whether their enmity was bitter is difficult to assess. However, they certainly were enemies, and Brzezinski was, as we shall see, able to hermetically seal his opponent out of participation in interpreting the puzzle of what to do about communist Afghanistan. Let us follow their rivalry.

at the swearing-in ceremony for his Cabinet members (23 January 1977) indicate what that position was. The new NSA was introduced as the president’s “closest advisor in tying together our economics, foreign policy, and also defense matters” (in Brzezinski 1983: 17). Carter (1982: 54) wrote in the memoirs of his presidency, Keeping Faith, that he and Brzezinski “got along well” and that, “next to members of my family, Zbig would have been my favorite seatmate on a long-distance trip.” What of Carter’s relations with Vance? The president once confided to Brzezinski “that he was frustrated by the inability of the State Department to come up with any innovative ideas” (1983: 42)—a big problem, because Carter was in effect complaining that Vance’s State Department didn’t help him know what to do.

Another problem was deeper and less susceptible to articulation—a “guy thing” that the Kennedys would have understood. Zbig put his finger on it when he observed that Vance had a “deep aversion to the use of force” and that this antipathy was “a most significant limitation on his stewardship” (ibid.: 44). Put differently, when push came to shove, Vance was not man enough to shove. Nevertheless, Carter (1982: 51) also said that Vance and his wife became “the closest personal friends to Rosalynn and me” during his administration. Accordingly, Carter “got along well” with Brzezinski, and Vance was his “closest” friend.

What advantages did the former have over the later? Vance may have been Carter’s “closest” friend, but Brzezinski was his “closest advisor” on foreign policy and defense. After all, State did not produce “innovative ideas.” Additionally, Brzezinski had far more direct access to the president than Vance because his office was in the White House and every morning he briefed the president on intelligence matters. This meant, he recalled in his memoirs, that on “a typical day, the president would phone me several times, asking me to drop by, or to make a factual inquiry” (Brzezinski 1983: 65). So Brzezinski was Carter’s closest foreign policy guy, physically located to exploit this role, and not squishy on violence like Vance.

Another reason Brzezinski was so influential with Carter had to do with the way Zbig had organized security decision-making within the administration to favor himself. It is Vance who tells this story. The National Security Council in the Carter Administration handled most foreign policy and security matters. It consisted of “only two committees: the Policy Review Committee (PRC) … and the Special Coordination Committee (SCC)” (Vance 1983: 36). Vance controlled the PRC, which was concerned with formulation of policy; Brzezinski, the SCC, which dealt with crisis management. However, the SCC’s functions were broadly written to include handling of “cross-cutting issues requiring coordination in the development of options and the implementation of Presidential decisions” (in ibid.: 36).
The SCC had policy-making authority because policy, by its very nature, involves “cross-cutting issues.” Further, “Brzezinski proposed and the president approved a procedure for recording the views and recommendations coming out of the SCC and the PRC…. Brzezinski would submit a presidential directive (PD) to Carter for signature” (ibid.: 37). The PDs were not “circulated to the SCC or PRC participants for review before they went to the president” (ibid.: 37).

This allowed Zbig to frame all matters going up to the president from the NSC as he saw fit. Vance, understandably, “opposed this arrangement” (ibid.: 37). Carter overrode Vance’s opposition, effectively handing Brzezinski, as Vance expressed it in his memoirs, “the power to interpret” (ibid.: 37). In short, Brzezinski’s backing from his president made him Mr Big, a real Pooh-Bah—the lord high hermeneut of foreign policy hermeneutic puzzles. In the next section, the lord high hermeneut goes Bear hunting.

The Pooh-Bah Traps a Bear: The 28 April 1978 Saur Revolution meant the dominoes were falling again, posing a hermeneutic puzzle: what should be done about this? Vance (1983: 385) advised that the US should “continue limited economic aid” to maintain influence with Kabul. From a hawkish perspective, this was a policy of appeasement. A few months after the coup, rumors began to surface from Kabul hinting at the possibility of a westward turn. Vance advised that the US “not get involved” (ibid.: 386). Vance’s memoirs do not mention what Brzezinski was doing in the time between April 1978 and December 1979. In fact, Zbig was busy outing his neocon hawk persona. Non-involvement coupled with appeasement was the last thing he intended as he went about implementing his interpretation of the Saur Revolution. But to understand what this was, we need to return to Brzezinski’s Columbia days.

In 1968–1969, during the pandemonium of Columbia University’s student rebellion, Brzezinski ran a seminar on “Soviet Nationalities Problems.” It plotted rebellion. One of the participants in the seminar was Alexandre Bennigsen, a count from St. Petersburg whose family had sided with the White Russians during the Bolshevik Revolution and was accordingly obliged to flee. The Polish and Russian ex-aristocrats were reported to have formed a “natural affinity” during the seminar (Dreyfuss 2005: 252). Bennigsen “fostered a movement of scholars and public officials who believed in the viability of” what he called “the Islamic card” (ibid.), believing that some ethnic groups within and bordering the USSR harbored anti-Soviet grievances that would erupt in reactionary rebellion if certain lines were crossed. For Muslim nationalities, such lines were breached upon implementation of policies and practices that violated deeply felt Islamic belief. Playing the Islamic card was a neocon enterprise that involved aiding those
Muslim nationalities’ rebellions, which flared subsequent to Russian red-line transgression. Two other neocon scholars—Harvard’s Richard Pipes and Princeton’s Bernard Lewis—largely agreed with Bennigsen’s views (Dreyfuss 2005).

Brzezinski concurred with all three scholars’ opinions. Their views might be said to have constituted an Islamic card hermeneutic whose perceptual recognition was that some Soviet actions violated red lines of Islamic belief and/or practice, provoking rebellion; and whose procedural choreography was to aid those in rebellion against Soviet violation of Islamic doxa. Bennigsen, Lewis, and Pipes were largely ivory-tower scholars in no position to actually play the Islamic card. Brzezinski—lord high hermeneut—did it for them in 1977 by organizing the Nationalities Working Group (NWG), an “inter-agency” body including the State Department, NSC, CIA, and Defense Department, which collaborated on policy designed to weaken the USSR by inflaming ethnic grudges against it, especially those of Islamists (Dreyfuss 2005: 251–256). Brzezinski’s founding of the NWG might be said to have been the founding of an Islamic card iteration of the global domination public délire.

Even before the Saur Revolution, according to Roger Morris (2007a), the CIA had a record of supporting Islamist mujahideen against the Afghan government. In 1973 the agency, in conjunction with Pakistan, Iran (then still under the Shah), and China, covertly assisted Islamic rebels against the newly installed Daoud regime. Three weeks after the Saur Revolution, again according to Morris (2007a), Brzezinski was in China drumming up support against the USSR by warning of a “Soviet peril” in Afghanistan. Further, still according to Morris, “By fall 1978, more than a year before Soviet combat troops set foot in Afghanistan, a civil war, armed and planned by the U.S., Pakistan, Iran, and China … had begun to rage in the same wild mountains of eastern Afghanistan” (2007a).

According to Richard Cottam, a CIA official advising the Carter administration at this time, in 1978 Brzezinski was arguing for a “de facto alliance with the forces of Islamic resurgence” (in Dreyfuss 2005: 241). Henry Precht, a State Department official participating in the decision making, also recalled Brzezinski insisting “that Islamic forces could be used against the Soviet Union. The theory was, there was an arc of crisis, and so an arc of Islam could be mobilized to contain the Soviets” (in P. Scott 2007: 67). Hence, both State and CIA officials reported Brzezinski as advocating playing the Islamic card in 1978.

US government planning vis-à-vis Afghanistan began to quicken in early 1979, at least in part because the mujahideen rebellion was strengthening. The fact that the mujahideen were already fighting meant that whatever Washington did had to recognize that the time for peaceful fixes
had passed. The mujahideen rebellion, in this sense, granted the Carter administration Shultzian Permission. Gates ([1996] 2007: 144) reported that on 5 March the CIA sent Brzezinski’s SCC a “covert actions options” memorandum proposing different possibilities of exploiting this situation. The very next day the SCC met and requested more details concerning these options. Slightly over three weeks later (30 March), there was a follow-up mini-SCC meeting, at which “Walt Slocombe, representing Defense, asked if there was value in keeping the Afghan insurgency going, ‘sucking the Soviets into a Vietnam quagmire?’” (ibid.: 144–145). Arnold Horlick, representing the CIA, according to Eric Alterman’s (2001) account of it, “warned that this was just what we would expect.” A week later at a full-scale SCC meeting (6 April), the policy of covertly intervening on the side of the mujahideen was formally accepted. Roger Morris (2007a) claimed that after this gathering, “Gates, Brzezinski, and Carter” had “a deliberate plot to ‘suck’ the Russians into Afghanistan.” This string of meetings indicates that by early April 1979, Brzezinski’s Islamic card iteration of the global domination public délire was moving toward implementation in a “plot” to “suck” the USSR into a “Vietnam quagmire.”

By May 1979, according to Alfred McCoy (2003: 475), the CIA had begun working with rebels and other mujahideen leaders, especially Gulbiddin Hekmatyar, as chosen by the Pakistani Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence. Hekmatyar, who would receive about half of all US funding to the mujahideen, was relished by at least some CIA officials, perhaps because of his brutality, which included a reputation for skinning prisoners alive (Dreyfuss 2005: 267–268). On 3 July Carter signed the first “finding” to covertly assist the mujahideen. In principle, this document authorized nonlethal assistance, but in actuality it allowed “support” that took “the form of cash” (Gates [1996] 2007: 146) that could be used to purchase weapons.

The July finding began actual implementation of the Islamic card. As Brzezinski (1998: 76) has acknowledged, on “that very day I wrote a note to the president … [saying] that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention.” Further, Brzezinski (1983: 427) reports in his memoir that a month later Carter asked him for “contingency options” outlining US choices in case of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. So the Bear trap was baited and the mujahideen supported it. On Christmas Day the Soviets invaded and the trap was sprung. All this suggests that Carter responded to the Soviets’ aggression with “open mouth shock” out of astonishment at the success of his lord high hermeneut’s Bear trap. A point remains to be clarified: where was Secretary of State Vance? Gates ([1996] 2007: 143–149), who was in Carter’s security apparatus at the time, makes almost no mention of Vance in his account of the
Deadly Contradictions
decision making that led up to Carter’s making the Islamic card a public délire. In fact, Foggy Bottom is mentioned only once in his account (at the 30 March SCC meeting). Roger Morris (2007a), speaking of the period between the Saur Revolution and the Soviet invasions, says there were CIA “covert actions” and that this “intervention” was “kept secret from their hated rival, Secretary of State Vance.” Marshall Schulman, a steady hand who had worked for Dean Acheson and was Vance’s special adviser for Soviet affairs, confirmed Morris’s assertion when he said Vance, “was unaware of the covert program at the time” (Alterman 2001). How is one to construe Vance’s and Foggy Bottom’s obliviousness?

Brzezinski has said that judgments about what to do after the Saur Revolution “were being made in a highly charged atmosphere.” Among other things, Carter’s political stock was plummeting. At precisely this time, according to Brzezinski (1983: 437), Carter “gave increasing signs of dissatisfaction with Vance,” so he (Brzezinski) became even more the “primary” security adviser; shutting Vance and the entire State Department out of decision making. Vance was hermetically sealed out of the hermeneutic politics concerning what to do about the Saur Revolution, leaving only the lord high hermeneut whose interpretation was to implement the Islamic card hermeneutic. It was done. The trap was set and sprung. It remained to kill the Bear.

Killing the Bear I: Allowed to stand, the Saur Revolution worsened the inter-imperial contradiction, threatening another domino’s fall. Brzezinski’s Islamic card iteration of the global domination public délire solved this reproductive vulnerability with a violent reproductive fix. The problem now became to ensure that the fix worked, because the full weight of a Soviet army was committed to ensuring that the Afghan domino did fall.

Brzezinski described in 1997 what the Carter administration did to ensure that the trapped Bear was killed, saying he had gone
to Pakistan a month or so after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, for the purpose of coordinating with the Pakistanis a joint response, the purpose of which would be to make the Soviets bleed for as much and as long as is possible; and we engaged in that effort in a collaborative sense with the Saudis, the Egyptians, the British, the Chinese, and we started providing weapons to the Mujaheddin, from various sources again—for example, some Soviet arms from the Egyptians and the Chinese. (Brzezinski 1997: 2)

So it would be a death by bleeding. In the above quotation Brzezinski describes its initial organization. The CIA, from the American side, would organize the bloodletting in Operation Cyclone, the longest and most expensive CIA covert operation up to that time. By July 1980 the operation had been “dramatically expanded” (Gates [1996] 2007: 148–149).
The year 1980 would be Carter’s last as president. As indicated earlier, it was another difficult year, featuring an unpopular boycotting of the summer Olympics in response to the Russian invasion; mortification at the hands of the Iranians who had captured US embassy staff in Tehran and refused to return them, compounded by a failed attempt to rescue them (which earned Vance’s resignation); and perhaps even greater humiliation at the hands of Carter’s political opponents—Teddy Kennedy on the left and Reagan on the right, the latter of whom trounced Carter in the next presidential election. Among the last acts of the Carter Administration “was a meeting between Turner [Carter’s CIA Director] and Brzezinski on October 29, where the latter complained ‘over and over’ that he didn’t think CIA was providing enough arms to the insurgents and wanted the Agency to increase the flow” (Gates [1996] 2007: 149). Brzezinski would get his wish.

**Killing the Bear II:** The Reagan administration, which began 21 January 1981, killed the Bear. However, a strategic question was how much support for the mujahideen was so much that it would provoke the USSR to act beyond the Afghan border, possibly destabilizing Pakistan. Howard Hart, the CIA bureau chief in Pakistan and a Security Elite 2.0 par excellence, had the answer in 1983, telling his superiors, “The fuckers haven’t got the balls, they aren’t going to do it … so don’t worry about it” (in Coll 2004: 70). The “fuckers” were the Soviets. The “it” they were not going to do was to extend military operations into Pakistan. “The stage was set,” according to Gates, for a “vast future expansion … all run by the CIA” ([1996] 2007: 149).

This expansion would be propelled in part by the activities of Representative Charlie “Good Time” Wilson, a tall, alcoholic Texas congressman with a “maniacal” desire to assist Operation Cyclone. Beginning in 1984, he “began to force more money and more sophisticated weapons systems into the CIA’s classified budget” (Coll 2004: 91). A year later Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 166 (1985), which led to “massive escalation” of the CIA’s role in Afghanistan. In April 1986 US Stingers (ground-to-air missiles) were authorized for the mujahideen. They entered operation at the end of September. By 1987 funding to the mujahideen was at the level of $630 million per year. But by then it was all over: on 13 November 1986 the Politburo decided to evacuate Soviet troops. The Reagan administration took credit for the victory. Secretary of State Shultz (1993: 1094) exulted: “The Soviets had been rolled back. The Brezhnev Doctrine had been breached … the event was monumental.” Certainly the Bear was killed during the Reagan administration, but the Reaganites organizing the killing were mere actors playing their roles in
strings of events earlier choreographed along the lines of Brezinski’s Islamist card. Let us draw together the strands of the analysis of Afghanistan I.

The Saur Revolution appeared to hand the Soviets a new chunk of territory for their empire, worsening the inter-imperial contradiction between themselves and the US. The security elites’ hermeneutic politics to resolve the reproductive vulnerability posed by the increased contradiction resulted in Vance being hermetically sealed out of fixing the puzzle; leaving his nemesis, Brzezinski, responsible for finding a fix. The difficulty of the hermeneutic puzzle facing the lord high hermeneut increased once the mujahideen began armed insurrection against the communists in Kabul, both because the uprising took nonviolent fixes of the vulnerability off the table, granting Shultzian Permission, and because of the dangers to US should it directly violently oppose the Soviet Union. Brzezinski responded to this situation by interpreting it as one requiring the playing of the Islamic card. Carter’s 3 July 1979 finding started its implementation. Reagan’s March 1985 NSDD 166 authorized a “massive” increase in the violent force allocated to implementation. Consequently, the New American Empire fixed the reproductive vulnerability imposed by the Saur Revolution by engaging in covert, indirect global war in Afghanistan. It worked. By 1989 the mujahidin had killed the Bear. Two years later on 25 December 1991, Gorbachev resigned and the Soviet Union itself was history. The Cold War was over. The Security Elites 2.0 congratulated themselves on winning it.

One final observation and a query bear mention here. The observation is that although Afghanistan I was a Cold War conflict related to the US/Soviet inter-imperial contradiction, it also concerned the emerging economic contradictions and attempts to fix them through the control of oil, discussed earlier in the chapter. Afghanistan was geographically a place from which a determined country could strike at the Persian Gulf. If Afghanistan was an imperial Soviet client, the Bear was therefore poised for assault on Middle Eastern oil. The security elites, as the chapter made clear, were aware of this reality. To warn off the Soviets and anybody else from oil country, Carter, in his State of the Union address on 23 January 1980, proclaimed what became known as the Carter Doctrine. Perceptually, it began by observing that

the region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance: It contains more than two-thirds of the world’s exportable oil. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz, a waterway through which most of the world’s oil must flow.

Procedurally, it warned,
Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force. (Carter 1980)

The Carter Doctrine was, and is, blunt: The New American Empire claimed control of the Persian Gulf, and by implication its oil, for itself. Attempts to eliminate this control would “be repelled by any means necessary”—tough talk. The Carter Doctrine might be called the oil-control iteration of the global domination public délire and is, as will become clear in the following sections, a central iteration of that public délire in the post–Cold War period.

The query is whether the US Leviathan’s conduct of covert, indirect global warring actually won Afghanistan I and caused the dissolution of the Soviet Union. If so, then Brzezinski’s, Reagan’s, and the CIA’s covert warfare killed the Bear not only in Central Asia but everywhere, a great triumph of US arms. As might be imagined, this question is debated. Brzezinski certainly thought he had won the Cold War. He had told his Le Nouvel Observateur interviewer that Afghanistan I had “finally” led to “the break up of the Soviet Union” (1998: 76). Reagan’s partisans are convinced that it was his tough anti-Soviet stance, including support for Afghanistan I, that ended the Cold War. On the other hand, some analyses highlight the damaging effect of the USSR’s dismal economy as key to its disintegration (Strayer 1998: 56–60). Still others speak of a multiplicity of causes (Halliday 1992). Above all, the last Soviet president sought perestroika (restructuring) and got more of it than he had ever bargained for. I believe James Mann’s (2009: 346) terse observation is acute: “Reagan did not win the Cold War; Gorbachev abandoned it.”31

But there is an alternative view that does not understand Afghanistan I as a triumph. It argues that the New American Empire’s “giving billions of dollars and high-tech weaponry to Afghan jihadis was a huge catastrophe, contributing to the creation and rise of al-Qaeda and setting the background for the emergence of the Taliban” (Cole 2013a). It is certain that Afghanistan I led to the Taliban and al-Qaeda; that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) emerged from al-Qaeda; and that ISIL recently declared itself the Islamic State, claiming a worldwide caliphate. Equally certain is that the US has spent a great treasure in money, human lives, and time fighting these groups, a subject of later chapters.

Attention now turns to a conflict where Cold War antipathies were less important. Rather, because times were “a changin’,” security elites worried not about the inter-imperial but the land/capital contradiction, and US control over oil. This conflict is the Iran-Iraq War, which occurred largely concurrently with Afghanistan I.
The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988)

Iraqi air forces struck Iran, seeking to destroy the young Islamic Republic, on 22 September 1980. Though largely unsuccessful, the attack was followed a day later by a ground invasion involving six divisions along a 644-kilometer front. On that day, Carter (2010: 467) reported in his diary that there were “very serious problems on the Iran-Iraq border,” further noting that “both countries have ceased shipment of oil…. This involves almost three million barrels of oil per day.” Thus the Iran-Iraq War began with the US president noting to himself that it had implications for oil.32 The following analysis reveals how US operations during the Iran-Iraq War to maintain some control over this oil largely involved covert, indirect global warring, which after seven years became direct global warring. The outcomes of this warring would include solution of the strategic insolvency problem discussed earlier; transformation of the Persian Gulf into a deeply violent place; and establishment in this violent place of a new US surrogate to replace Iran. First, however, consider the Iran-Iraq War.

Old Irritants and a New (Mis-)Interpretation: A War of Four Phases

The Iran-Iraq War had four phases (Hiro 1991): 1980–1982, when Iraq invaded Iran; 1982–early 1984, during which Iran counterattacked, invading Iraq; mid 1984–1985, at which time a reinforced Iraq counterattacked Iran’s counterattack; and finally 1986–1988, a ferocious endgame in which Iran re-attacked Iraq and Iraq re-attacked the re-attack as the war became increasingly subject to direct US global warring. The causes of the war lay in old irritants and a new (mis-)interpretation.

1980–1982, Iraqi Invasion of Iran: Iran and Iraq have shared a 1,458-kilometer border since the 1600s. Iraq, the easternmost province of the Ottoman Empire, was contiguous with the Persian Empire, its border extending roughly along the Tigris River watershed in a line running from the Shatt al-Arab in the south to Kuh e-Dalanper in the north. Over the centuries, numerous border disputes vexed the two empires. One of these centered upon the Shatt al-Arab, the river formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers at Al Gurnah that flows 200 kilometers south to the Persian Gulf. Control over the waterway and questions of its border have been debated since the seventeenth century. The latest flare-up of this dispute ended in 1975 when Saddam Hussein, fifth president of Iraq, and the shah of Iran signed the Algiers Accord, fixing the boundary between the two countries along the deepest channel of the river. The Shatt al-Arab was, and is, Iraq’s only Persian Gulf outlet. Placing the boundary in the
river meant that Iraq lacked unimpeded access to the Gulf, a worrisome situation for the Iraqi government. Saddam only signed the accord because Iran promised to stop aiding Iraqi Kurds in their rebellion against Baghdad. Attempting to right the wrong of the Algiers Accord was an element in Saddam’s later decision to invade Iran.

Another factor that perhaps more significantly motivated Saddam’s desire for war was Iran’s revolutionary Ayatollahs’ attempt to export their revolution to Iraq. The revolution had installed Khomeini’s interpretation of Shiite Islam. The majority of Iraq’s population was Shiite, but the country was ruled by a secular, Baathist party. Moreover, “tension between the Shia masses and the regime built up steadily” in Iraq, producing antigovernment disturbances in 1977 and 1979 (Hiro 1991: 24). The “tension” was aggravated when Khomeini’s government endeavored to spread Iran’s Islamist revolution to Iraq, culminating in an 1980 unsuccessful attempt (1 April) to assassinate Deputy Premier Tariq Aziz. Saddam responded to the attempt by executing Muhammad Baqir Sadr (8 April), Iraq’s most respected Shiite Ayatollah, provoking Khomeini to call for Saddam’s overthrow. So another motivation—a strong one, indeed—for Saddam to destroy Khomeini was that Khomeini sought to destroy him.

Two final causes had to do with prizes to be won and prospects for success. Consider first the prizes. The Middle East had figured in UK imperial politics since the eighteenth century, reaching a high point upon Iraq’s transfer from the Ottoman to the British Empire at the end of World War I. However, in 1968, Her Majesty announced the UK’s departure from the Middle East in order to assume military responsibilities in NATO and the defense of Europe. This left a Persian Gulf power vacuum. Nixon’s Twin Towers policy was supposed to fill this void, but the policy crumbled when the Iranian tower came tumbling down.

Saddam’s attack on Iran was another attempt to fill that vacuum, for as Teicher and Teicher (1993: 65–66) report: “By … September 1980 Iraqi oil production had reached nearly four million barrels per day, second only to the production of the Saudis. Had Iraq succeeded in seizing Khuzestan Province (where Iran’s oil was) and Iran’s Kharg Island oil terminal, Saddam would have had control over eleven million barrels per day of oil production capacity, nearly one fifth of the world’s global oil consumption at the time,” which would have given him extensive “financial and political power.” With such prizes, Saddam would fill the Persian Gulf vacuum. According to Teicher and Teicher (1993: 66) this was Saddam’s “fundamental rationale” for invading Iran.

Moreover, it appeared to be a propitious time to invade. Iran (636,372 square miles and roughly 75 million inhabitants) is a far larger country than Iraq (169,234 square miles and roughly 34 million inhabitants).
While the shah ruled Iran as a US client-satrapy, Iran had been lavishly armed, so Baghdad prudently refrained from militarily challenging Tehran. However, in the months following the Islamic Republic’s founding Saddam received intelligence that Iran had experienced “rapid military, political and economic decline,” “low morale among military officers … and rapid deterioration in the effectiveness of … weaponry”; compounded by “conflict between the Iranian president Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr and religious leaders” (Hiro 1991: 36). Furthermore, Saddam “had the active co-operation of the recently deposed Iranian military and political leaders, who possessed vital information and commanded the loyalty of hundreds of Iranians in key positions” (ibid.: 37). Such intelligence and collaboration became the basis of an interpretation on Saddam’s part, which was that Khomeini’s purge of the military had rendered Iran “practically defenseless” (Pelletiere 1992: 18). Bani-Sadr (1991: 69–70), the Islamic Republic’s first president, recalled sending Saddam a warning just prior to the onset of fighting: “You imagine you can finish Iran with a lightning war because our army is disorganized. You dream of becoming the pre-eminent power in the region. … You can start a war, but you cannot decide its outcome.” Nevertheless, Saddam—harboring ancient grievances such as that over the Shatt al-Arab, enraged by Khomeini’s attempts to overthrow him, imagining Persian Gulf pre-eminence, and emboldened by his interpretation that Iran was “defenseless”—ignored his opponent’s counsel. Unfortunately for Iraq, Saddam’s interpretation turned out to be a (mis-)interpretation, as events revealed.

Four of the six invading Iraqi divisions were sent against Khuzestan, which borders Iraq to the west and the Persian Gulf to the south. Khuzestan was largely Arab in ethnicity and, as earlier noted, was a center of oil production, so Saddam reasoned that an attack there might secure both support from the inhabitants and his oil prize. Regrettably, the Iraqi troops advancing into Iran in 1980 lacked offensive skills. The invasion encountered unexpectedly fierce resistance and had stalled by December 1980. In Bani-Sadr’s (1991: 91) judgment, “Militarily, then … we were in a position to impose a peace advantageous to Iran.”

At this point Saddam announced that Iraq was switching to defense, and for about a year and a half thereafter there was little change at the front. In mid March 1982 Iran began an offensive, and the Iraqis were obliged to retreat. By June that year, this counteroffensive had recovered most of the areas earlier lost to Iraq. Saddam prudently chose to completely withdraw his armed forces from Iran, deploying them instead along the countries’ international border. Further, he announced (20 June 1982) that he would acquiesce to a ceasefire on the basis of the prewar status quo. There was spirited deliberation among the Iranian ruling elite as to whether to ac-
cept Saddam’s offer. One faction, including Army Chief of Staff General Ali Sayad Shirazi, was for acceptance; another, led by Speaker of Majlis Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, favored rejection. Khomeini sided with Rafsanjani and demanded elimination of the Baathist regime and its replacement with a Shiite Islamic republic, thereby extending the war six more years.

1982–Early 1984, Iranian Invasion of Iraq: Khomeini proclaimed on 21 June 1982 that Iran would invade Iraq and would not stop until an Islamic republic governed that country. Iran’s offensive employed human wave attacks led by pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards) and basij (teenage paramilitary volunteers), the latter wearing wooden keys around their necks to open Heaven’s gates upon their martyrdom. Iranian units crossed the border in force on 13 July making for Basra, Iraq’s second most important city. By this time, however, Saddam had more than doubled the Iraqi army, enlarging it from 200,000 soldiers (12 divisions and 3 independent brigades) to 500,000 (23 divisions and 9 brigades). Now it was the Iranians who encountered a tough defense. On different occasions during the advance on Basra, the basij were obliged to clear Iraqi minefields with their feet in order to allow the pasdaran to advance. Five human-wave attacks were repulsed by withering Iraqi fire and chemical weapons.

The 1982 Iranian summer offensives failed. Undaunted, Iran launched five major assaults along the front in 1983. None met with significant success. With the ground war substantially deadlocked, Saddam ordered aerial and missile attacks against Iranian cities on 7 February 1984. Iran retaliated against Iraqi cities. These exchanges became known as the “war of the cities.” The aerial attacks did not diminish Tehran’s taste for the offensive.

Some setbacks followed, but the Iranians had a major success when they captured part of the oil-rich Majnun Islands (16 March 1984). Despite an Iraqi counterattack featuring liberal use of mustard and sarin nerve gases, the Iranians maintained their gains and continued to hold them almost until the end of the war. The Iranian offensive ended on 19 March 1984. The Iraqis were unable to recapture their lost territory, but Iran was stopped from advancing upon Basra. Neither Khomeini nor Saddam showed interest in a truce.

Mid 1984–1985, Stalemate: By the middle of 1984, Iraq had been supplied with a varied, lethal ordnance from a large number of US clients. To break the Iranian land offensives, Baghdad began attacking Iranian tankers and Iran’s oil terminal at Kharg Island in early 1984. Tehran responded by attacking tankers carrying Iraqi oil, largely those of other Persian Gulf states,
especially Kuwait. Saddam hoped that attacks on Iranian shipping would provoke Tehran to take extreme measures in retaliation, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz. It did not, but an important naval dimension had been added to the conflict, with the “tanker war” involving 53 Iraqi and 18 Iranian raids on shipping in 1984 (Hiro 1991: 291).

Rearmed by US clients, on 28 January 1985 Saddam began a ground offensive, the first since early 1980. It produced no significant gains and prompted Iran to respond with its own offensive, again directed against Basra (beginning 11 March 1985), which succeeded in seizing a part of the Baghdad-Basra highway that had earlier resisted capture. Baghdad replied to these reverses by launching chemical attacks against Iranian positions, initiating a second “war of the cities” with a massive air and missile campaign against Iranian urban areas. Bani-Sadr (1991: 209) reported that, at least for Iran, by “1985, general pessimism concerning a military solution to the war overwhelmed both the population and a large majority of the political officials.”

1986–1988, Endgame: “Pessimism” notwithstanding, Iran initiated yet another major offensive in southern Iraq on 9 February 1986 designed to break the stalemate. The offensive was directed against the Fao Peninsula, a marshy region adjoining the Persian Gulf in Iraq’s extreme southeast between Iraqi Basra and Iranian Abadan. It was the site of Iraq’s two main oil tanker terminals and controlled access to the Shatt al-Arab (and thus access to the port of Basra). The Fao attack succeeded. Iraq immediately began counteroffensives to retake it. All failed. Fao’s loss boosted Iranian morale and diminished Saddam’s credibility, raising the possibility that Iran might just prevail.

In May 1986 the Iraqis seized the Iranian border town of Mehran and offered to exchange it for Fao. Tehran rejected the offer and in July retook the town. That September Tehran attacked to the north in Iraqi Kurdistan; in October it organized a commando raid, in conjunction with Kurds, against Kirkuk; and in December, to end 1986 with a flourish, it directed a major assault against Basra. The New Year of 1987 began with a wave of Iranian offensives into northern and southern Iraq. Basra and the southern oil fields were the major objective. The Basra attack failed, but the Iranians met with greater success later in the year in the north, especially around Suleimaniya, opening the way to Kirkuk and the northern oilfields. However, Tehran was unable to consolidate these gains. Little land actually changed hands in 1987, and after seven years of violence an effective impasse once more prevailed.

On 20 July 1987 the United Nations Security Council passed the US-sponsored Resolution 598, calling for an end to fighting and a return to
prewar boundaries. Iraq accepted the resolution. Iran did not, prompting Iraq to return to the offensive in 1988. Saddam began his final and most deadly of the “war of the cities” in February. His troops retook the Fao Peninsula in April. Immediately thereafter, they began a sustained drive to clear Iranians out of all of southern Iraq, against which the Iranians put up little resistance.

At the same time that Iraq was in the process of expelling the Iranians from its territory, a series of US-Iranian naval and aerial engagements, discussed in the next section, alarmed Iran’s ruling elite, who worried that the US was intervening and doing so on Saddam’s side. Anxiety sharpened on 20 June when the US Navy blasted an Iranian passenger airline from the sky, killing all 290 persons on board. One Iranian scholar reports that “the Iranians interpreted [this action] … as a sign of American resolve to force Iran to accept the resolution” (Tousi 1997: 60). At this point Rafsanjani, instrumental in extending the war in 1982, had had enough. He urged ending the conflict. Khomeini acquiesced, and on 20 July 1988 Iran announced acceptance of Resolution 598. A month later Iraq also complied and the war ended.

Iran settled for the terms it had rejected six years earlier in 1982. Many, many more people had died or were wounded. There were over a million casualties. Much treasure was wasted. Iran lost 40 to 60 percent of its landforce military equipment in the last months of the war, and overall military expenses were in the order of a trillion, 1980 dollars (Hiro 1991: 1). The preceding narrative has told a grim tale of Iran and Iraq’s war. Absent from the story is the New American Empire’s role in it, an absence corrected in the upcoming section.

US Participation in the Iran-Iraq War

This section shows how the Security Elites 2.0 intervened in the Iran-Iraq war in ways that upgraded the US’s own capacities for exercising violent force in the region, while also “tilting” toward Iraq, attempting to transform it into a client satrapy.

*The Carter Administration during the Iran-Iraq War:* Recall that the majors had lost control over oil due to nationalization and OPEC, worsening the oil company/petro-state contradiction in the 1970s. The “energy crisis” declared during Nixon’s administration was the cultural discourse in which the land/capital contradiction’s intensification was recognized. The Nixon Doctrine was a public *délire* designed to fix the “energy crisis” vulnerability. However, the fix became unfixed when Iran collapsed as a “twin tower,” branding the US as the “Great Satan.” Worse, the Iran-Iraq War further
aggravated the situation because whoever won might dominate much of Near Eastern oil, preventing the US from controlling it. Thus, by 1980, the oil company/petro-state and land/capital contradictions agitated the I-spaces of the Security Elite 2.0.

When the Iran-Iraq War erupted, Carter did not speak of contradictions. Rather, two days after Iraq’s attack he wrote in his diary, “I conducted a National Security Council meeting. We agreed to do everything we could to terminate the Iran-Iraq conflict as soon as possible, to stay strictly neutral, … and to keep open the Strait of Hormuz” (2010: 467). Matters were not quite as simple as that. The US did a great deal to inflame the conflict and was anything but neutral.

A key problem was that the US was “virtually powerless” to influence hostilities at their onset (El-Azhary 1984: 89), an actuality that was recognized by the Carter administration. Gary Sick, a member of Carter’s NSC, reported that among NSC security officials at this time there was “a growing awareness … the United States was left strategically naked, with no safety net” (in O’Reilly 2008: 148). This provoked the hermeneutic puzzle of how to fix the problem of a “strategically naked” New American Empire—or, put differently, what should be done now that the Nixon Doctrine had failed to protect US Persian Gulf oil interests?

Actually, the Carter Doctrine, announced ten months earlier, already pointed the way to a fix. It was designed to discourage Soviet Persian Gulf meddling but contained a more general implication, warning, “Any attempt … to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be … repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” The procedural message was clear. Violent force would be used to control the oil-producing Middle East if other means failed. So understood, as earlier noted, the Carter Doctrine is understood as an “oil control” iteration of the global domination public délire.

However, a big procedural puzzle remained; US Middle Eastern strategic insolvency. This began to be resolved, Brzezinski (1983: 454) recalled, because the events of 1979–1980 prompted “formal U.S. recognition” of “three, instead of two, zones of central strategic importance to the United States: Western Europe, the Far East, and the Middle East.” Thus, a procedural message of the Carter Doctrine was to add a new, third area of central strategic importance to the US, the Middle East. In an area of such strategic importance, the US had to “establish a military presence” (Pelletiere 1992: 153), which got the Security Elites 2.0 into the development of violent force. There were three major ways to accomplish this: they could dedicate specific American military units to operations in the Gulf; they could “tilt” toward Iraq, hoping to make it a satrapy; or they could do both. The Carter administration opted for the third possibility.
First, it moved to augment its Gulf forces. This had, in principle, begun when Carter signed PD 18 in the summer of 1977, a part of which authorized a mobile force, composed of two Army divisions and one Marine division, capable of responding to worldwide contingencies. These units were the forerunner of the Rapid Deployment Force. Though authorized, this force was not implemented because it was largely unfunded, nor was it targeted toward the Persian Gulf. Two years later, Carter publicly announced he would actually establish such a force and that its area of operations would be the Near East. The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) began on March 1980 at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. Its mission was to “help maintain regional stability and the Gulf oil-flow westward” (Clementson 1983: 260). Earlier, between April and August 1980, Carter administration diplomats had negotiated troop and materiel access agreements with Kenya, Somalia, and Oman. They had equally negotiated landing rights in Morocco for US planes (O’Reilly 2008: 151).

The question of whether to seek allies in the region was more complicated and involved a fair amount of hermeneutic politics within the NSC. The logical, geostrategic candidate for such an ally was Iran. Now, however, under Khomeini, Iranian elites regarded the “Great Satan” as a “wounded snake” and held its diplomats hostage as its masses chanted “Down with America” while torching US flags on television. The alternative to Iran was Iraq, but here too there were problems. Foremost among these was that Iraq was something of a Soviet client, having signed a treaty to this effect in 1972. Moreover, Saddam was judged an extreme dictator.

One of the factions in the hermeneutic politics that emerged over Iraq was led by Brzezinski, who by the spring of 1980 “began to suggest publicly that Iraq was the logical successor to Iran as the dominant military power in the Persian Gulf” (Teicher and Teicher 1993: 62). Earlier Howard Teicher, then a mid-level bureaucrat in the Defense Department and his wife, Gayle Teicher, had written a report arguing that Iraq under Saddam was a country that could not be trusted to defend the US’s interests (ibid: 62–70). The politics between the extremely powerful Brzezinski and the very much junior Teicher was asymmetrical. Teicher found his position ignored. It “ran contrary to those of most of the national security bureaucracy” (1993: 69). A month after the RDJTF was founded, Carter lost the election to Reagan. Nevertheless, the work of choreographing US Middle Eastern violent force had begun. The US was a bit less “naked.” This work might be characterized as a “twin towers redux plus” policy. The “redux” part of the policy was the intention to bring back Iraq as a new twin to replace the defunct one. The “plus” part of the policy was that the US had begun the RDJTF to be able to put boots on the ground in the Middle East when required.
“Back in the saddle again”: The Reagan Administration during the Iran-Iraq War: Reagan had campaigned against Carter by promising to get the US “back in the saddle again.” This was the first line of the signature song of the singing cowboy Gene Autry, who in the 1940s and 1950s had entertained Hollywood audiences with his voice and acting. The lyric “back in the saddle again” evoked remounting a horse after a fall and being in charge once more, “out where a friend is a friend” while “totin’ my old 44.” Reagan’s theme song implied that with him as president, America would recover dominance after the tumble suffered during Carter’s presidency. Moreover, this America would be totin’, that is, carrying its 44 revolver in world where a friend is a friend; which is to say that Reagan’s America would stand armed and violent, with friendly clients that acted as friendly satrapies.

Promises and reality can diverge. Carter had established his Carter Doctrine as the public délire for addressing Persian Gulf vulnerability. His administration had begun the task of implementing this délire by instituting the RDJTF and beginning the tilt toward Iraq. Very early in his first administration Reagan endorsed the Carter Doctrine, saying that with it the US intended “to safeguard the West’s oil lifeline in the Persian Gulf area” (in O’Reilly 2008: 151). In October 1981, the Reagan administration extended the Carter Doctrine with what is sometimes called the Reagan Corollary.

At the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War there was concern that the fighting could spill over into the other twin tower, Saudi Arabia, and harm it. The Reagan Corollary was designed to address this situation, declaring that “Washington would take on any state in the area that threatened U.S. interests” (ibid.: 152). This “corollary” was not an alternative to the Carter Doctrine. It was an iteration strengthening it: if a state outside of the Middle East (say, Russia) threatened US oil interests, the US reserved the right to militarily react; if a state in the Middle East (like Iran or Iraq) endangered US oil interests there, the US could militarily respond. Teicher and Teicher (1993: 146) insist that the Reagan Corollary laid “the policy groundwork … for Operation Desert Storm.” Actually it was the Carter Doctrine that laid the groundwork for the Reagan Corollary. The Reagan administration’s acceptance of Carter’s public délire meant that “the United States embarked upon a decade of military improvements” (O’Reilly 2008: 151), actually begun under Carter. The “improvements” were twofold: replacement of the 44 with more forceful weaponry; and a new “friend,” Iraq governed by Saddam. Implementation of these “improvements” is recounted next.

Casper Weinberger was Reagan’s Secretary of Defense. He had been nicknamed “Cap the Knife” because of his cost-cutting proclivities as head
of Nixon’s Office of Budget and Management. Under Reagan the old moniker disappeared, replaced by a new one, “Cap the Ladle,” because he was charged with “directing the largest military buildup” in US history (up to that time) (Brownstein and Easton 1983: 450). Considerable funding for the “buildup” went to high-tech weapons systems, like Star Wars. However, Cap also ladled money to the strengthening of military units, such as the RDJTF.

Grasping how Cap the Ladle reinforced the RDJTF requires knowledge of how the New American Empire organized, and organizes, its violent force. The 1947 National Security Act provided the legal foundation for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to create unified commands in strategic areas, places designated as potentially violent. At the end of World War II, Europe and Northeast Asia were strategic areas. Under Carter, at Brzezinski’s urging, the Middle East became a strategic area. A “unified command” was, and is, an organization capable of exercising violent force that includes at least two of the military services “unified” under a common leadership, the better to choreograph their cooperation.

The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, a result of Eisenhower’s conviction that the days of independent service action were finished, strengthened the National Security Act. It sought complete unification of all military planning, combat forces, and commands. Central to this act was the unified command plan, which designated the Unified Commands, or more simply, Commands. Two types of functional and geographic commands exist. “Functional” commands are those with specialized tasks. For example, different types commando units in the Army, Navy, and Air Force are all placed in a Special Operations Command. Geographic commands have areas of responsibility (AOR). The two earliest commands were those in Europe (EUCOM) and in the Asian Pacific (PACOM). AOR commands have a broad continuing mission and are led by a commander in chief. Eisenhower’s Reorganization Act established a clear chain of command from the president to the secretary of Defense to the commanders in chief. 35

By the time Weinberger became defense secretary a lively hermeneutic politics about Carter’s RDJTF had emerged—not over whether to have rapid deployment forces, but over how to proceed with them. One faction in this politics was critical of the existing RDJTF. Jeffrey Record (1981: vii), then of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, was a leader of this bloc and insisted that the RDJTF was a “fatally flawed military instrument for the preservation of uninterrupted access to vital Persian Gulf oil” because it had (1) unsuitable equipment for desert warfare, (2) inadequate mobility, (3) confused and divided command structures, and (4) insufficient funding. Solve these faults, Record swore, and the RDJTF would work.
Weinberger championed Record’s position and “addressed immediately” (Morrissey 2008: 107) the RDJTF’s faults, principally by transforming the RDJTF into its own unified command and increasing its funding to acquire equipment necessary for desert warfare and increased mobility. Weinberger announced in April 1981 that the RDJTF would become a separate geographic unified command with Southwest Asia, its AOR. “Southwest Asia” was Pentagonese for the Persian Gulf and surrounding countries. In the Pentagon’s positional culture Southwest Asia came to be known as the “Central Region” (ibid.: 118).

Consequently, on 1 January 1983 the RDJTF became the Central Command (CENTCOM), which included nineteen countries. Its commander became commander in chief of CENTCOM. In 1983, CENTCOM had 220,000 troops at its disposal. By 1986, it could call upon 400,000 soldiers. From the Army, it had one airborne division, one mechanized infantry division, one light infantry division, and one air cavalry brigade; from the Navy, three carrier battle groups, one surface action group, and five maritime patrol air squadrons; from the Air Force, seven tactical fighter wings and two strategic bomber wings; and from the Marines, one and one-third Marine amphibious forces.

CENTCOM was an “over the horizon” command, meaning its troops were stationed for the most part outside of Southwest Asia with the notion that they would be “projected” there as needed. CENTCOM’s key logistical problem was to get troops and equipment to the Middle East fast. To address this problem, “the Pentagon was procuring additional C-5 cargo aircraft and KC-10 cargo tanker aircraft, improving current aircraft such as the C-141 through wing modification and a stretch modification of the fuselage, and acquiring additional capacity through a restructured Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) enhancement program” (Isenberg 1984). Additionally, once US troops arrived in the Middle East, they needed strongholds. To provide these, “the Pentagon also continued to improve its access to facilities in the Southwest Asia area. The funds for military construction programs in that area for FY 1983–87 totaled nearly $1.4 billion, a 30 percent increase over the FY 1982–86 levels” (ibid.). As a consequence of the preceding, CENTCOM became “the military … instrument of the Carter Doctrine” (Morrissey 2008: 107), putting the New American Empire “back in the saddle again” to dominate the Middle East and its energy resources. But it still needed a friend, after Iran’s perfidy.

So Reagan’s Security Elites 2.0 did some diplomatic browsing in search of a friend. Iraq became their candidate, but recall that in principle Iraq was a Soviet ally.36 Early in 1981 Alexander Haig, Reagan’s first Secretary of State (1981–1982), had signaled “some shift” that had made Iraqi policy
more “moderate” (in El-Azhary 1984: 94); “moderate” being the State Department’s positional cultural term for a country not wedded to the USSR. Consequently, Reagan’s security elites began a courtship, wooing their possible new friend.

Courtships—diplomatic or matrimonial—involve gift exchanges. First off, the US offered Iraq a present of intelligence (June 1982) that was “quickly accepted”; thereafter Saddam’s relationship with the US “began to improve rapidly” (Teicher and Teicher 1993: 207). In January 1983, a counter gift was offered: Baghdad repudiated its USSR alliance, declaring “that Iraq had never been part of the Soviet strategy in the region” (Hiro 1991: 119). This so fired up the courtship that by the autumn of 1983 the NSC declared an Iraqi defeat would be a “major blow to US interests” (ibid.). Donald Rumsfeld, who was as prominent in Ford’s administration as he would be in that of Bush II, was sent to Baghdad in December 1983 as a sort of shadchan (Yiddish, matchmaker) to declare Reagan’s approval of Iraq. Unfortunately, Iraq’s battlefield situation was faltering during this courtship. In response, the NSC concocted a really big present for Saddam, NSDD 139 (1984), a “plan of action to avert an Iraqi collapse” (in Battle 2003). So Iraq and the US, after the courtship, finally got politically married, establishing diplomatic relations in November 1984. Was it to be an enduring matrimony? Time would tell; but for now Saddam was delighted, seeing the US, according to one diplomat, as a “huge candy store full of high-tech goodies,” the better to kill with (in Timmerman 1991: 77).

Military “goodies” began to flow to Baghdad in enormous quantities (Phythian 1997). They included the ingredients necessary for brewing the chemical and biological weapons (Riegle 1994) that were a distinctive mark of Iraqi war making. Some of this assistance involved denying weapons to Iran. Operation Staunch, begun in 1983, involved diplomatic pressure to prevent countries from arming Tehran. Further, two sorts of intelligence were provided: first, that of Iran’s battlefield dispositions, so that Saddam’s generals knew where Iran would attack, and with what numbers of troops and weaponry; second, that of Iraq’s own troop placements, which, when compared with those of Iran, allowed Baghdad to know if its soldiers were poorly placed.

In 1987 Reagan’s then NSA Frank Carlucci told US News and World Report he saw no reason ever to withdraw from the Persian Gulf (Tousi 1997: 56). Why should they? They had the new “44”—US CENTCOM—and the new “friend,” a heavily armed Iraq. Critically, the US had solved the problem of its Persian Gulf strategic insolvency. It was time to do some killing.

“In 1987, President Reagan issued CENTCOM with its first forward deployment order” (Morrissey 2008: 109). This was to defend Kuwaiti tank-
ers that had been reflagged as US ships. By law the US Navy was allowed to protect only US ships, so Kuwaiti ships were re-registered as American. Then, when Kuwait’s tankers took Iraq’s oil to market, Iran would attack these ships to damage Iraq’s oil exports. By the end of 1987, CENTCOM had a flotilla of forty-eight vessels in the Persian Gulf (Pelletiere 1992: 129).

The armada was soon in action. The reflagged Kuwaiti supertanker Bridgeton, escorted by the US Navy in the first convoy after the reflagging, was hit by an Iranian mine on 24 July 1987. A month later US naval helicopters destroyed the Iranian ship Iran Ajr. On 8 October they sank three Iranian patrol boats near Farsi Island. In retaliation Iran struck a reflagged Kuwaiti supertanker in Kuwaiti waters with a missile (16 October). Three days later, US warships destroyed two Iranian offshore oil platforms in retaliation for the retaliation. On 14 April 1988 a hole was blown in the side of a US ship, the Samuel B. Roberts, followed four days later by an American counterattack on two Iranian oil rigs in the Gulf, the destruction of an Iranian frigate, immobilization of another frigate, and the sinking of a patrol boat.

By this time Iran was engaged in two fights: a naval war against the US Navy; and a land war against the Iraqi counteroffensive in the Fao Peninsula. Pelletiere (1992: xiv) reports that by 1986 Iraq had established “an excellent general staff (shaped by the traditions of the Prussian military), which by the war’s end had developed the army into a first class fighting institution.” Additionally, their air force had secured dominance by 1987 and “regularly targeted Iranian oil platforms, electrical grids, railways, and key cities. For example, they struck at Iran’s holy city of Qom” (ibid.: 132). By 1987 events were bleak for Tehran.

They would become grimmer. On 3 July 1988 the US cruiser Vincennes was covertly in Iranian waters. Some crewmembers nicknamed the ship “Robocruiser” in reference to Robocop (1987), a recent film about a policeman transformed into a cyborg killing machine. The Vincennes was fitted out with an Aegis defense system that robotically tracked and attacked presumed enemy targets, and its Captain, Will Rogers III, was celebrated for his pugnacity (D. Evans 1993; Chomsky 1998). The Vincennes sailors’ designation of their ship as Robocruiser was thus a fitting allusion to its cybernetic belligerence. On that July morning, Air Iran Flight 655 had just taken off and was climbing to cruising altitude above the Vincennes. Rogers mistakenly believed his Aegis system had detected the aircraft descending in attack mode. Robocruiser performed its robotic duty and blasted Flight 655 out of the sky. Bodies and other collateral damaged rained down in the sea around the Vincennes.
Now they understood in Tehran. Now they knew what it meant to fight the Great Satan, with its Robocruisers and Saddamite satrapy. Now the Iranians ended the war. In a radio address at the time, a broadcaster read an announcement by Khomeini, voicing his sorrow concerning the cease-fire. The old Ayatollah, soon to die, who had led his people through an Islamist revolution avenging Kermit Roosevelt’s coup, mourned: “Happy are those who have departed through martyrdom. Happy are those who have lost their lives in this convoy of light. Unhappy am I that I still survive and have drunk the poisoned chalice” (in Bullock and Morris 1989: 1). In 1990, the US awarded Rogers the Legion of Merit for outstanding service in the killing of 290 innocents.

As Dylan had said, the times were indeed “a-changin’”: economic contradictions developed as Cold War political ones receded. The land/capital and oil company/petro-state contradictions emerged. To US Security Elites 2.0, this was, as Kissinger (1999: 666) expressed it, an “energy crisis.” They understood that to fix this vulnerability, they had to control oil, which meant they had to dominate the Middle East. However, they perceived that the US was militarily “naked” in Southwest Asia, posing a hermeneutic puzzle: How was the strategic insolvency of the Persian Gulf to be resolved?

The Carter Doctrine and the Reagan Corollary instituted the oil-control iteration of the global domination public délire, procedurally based upon the twin towers redux plus policy. The “redux” part of the policy was the return to twin towers, achieved by replacing Iran with Iraq. The “plus” part of the policy was the instituting of a US command, CENTCOM, to project violence force into the region. Nonviolent fixes to the Iran-Iraq War were not possible once Saddam had invaded Iran. Shultzian Permission was granted because the choice for the US was either to fight or to acquiesce to one of the opposing sides having enormous control over Persian Gulf oil. Washington began implementing the oil-control public délire with, first, indirect global warring by providing support to Saddam, and then direct, overt global warring in the form of naval operations.

Hence, by 1989 the Middle East was a violent place patrolled by CENTCOM and the Iraqi military. In supporting Saddam’s regime, as Timmerman (1991: x) recognized, “Saddam Hussein was our creation, our monster.” Make no mistake about it: if there was hostility between the US and Islamic countries, it was not because of any conflict between Western religion and Islam, as Huntington proposed, but because Security Elites 2.0, like Huntington himself, had projected enormous violent force into the region to dominate its oil and thereby help reproduce the US Leviathan. It is time now to turn to another region in CENTCOM’s command, Libya, and to Reagan’s desire to do some carpentry on an opponent’s genitals.
Deadly Contradictions

Libya I

You know what I’d do if Qaddafi were sitting here right now? I’d nail his balls to this bench and then push him over backwards. (President Ronald Reagan speaking with the catcher on the Baltimore Orioles baseball team, in Gates [1996] 2007: 354)

US security elites have attacked Libya twice, first in the 1980s and second in the early years of the twenty-first century. What follows is an investigation of that first aggression, called Libya I. On 7 April 1986, following a meeting between the president and his senior security officials concerning what to do about Gaddafi, Reagan traveled to Baltimore to throw out the first pitch at the opening game of the baseball season. Prior to performing this ritual, he waited in the dugout, talking to the Orioles’ tough-as-nails catcher, Rich Dempsey. The president’s mind must have still been on the earlier meeting, because conversation turned to Libya; hence the president’s claim of a desire to “nail” the Libyan ruler’s “balls” to the “bench.”

Chadians—Libya’s southern, impoverished neighbors—used to refer to Libya as sakitbus (Chadian Arabic, “nothing”). After all, at independence in 1951, Libya was “one of the poorest countries in the world” (El-Kikhia 1997: 28), “a barely self-sustaining agricultural and tribal society” sprawled across the Sahara (Vandewalle 1998: 42). Average income was estimated at £15 a year (First 1974: 144). Though the seventeenth largest country in the world territorially, Libya had only an estimated 1.8 million people in 1968 (ibid.: 31). Its food-production was dominated by nomadic pastoralism and an irrigated agriculture that threatened scarce water supplies. It lacked raw materials and skilled labor, so its “major revenue sources were sales of scrap metal left behind by the belligerents during the war, sales of esparto grass, and rent from military bases leased by the United States and Great Britain” (Vandewalle 1998: 42). What could possibly be enraging about a sandbox in which essentially nobody was there; and where those few who did exist went about hawking junk metal and grass? Why did the president of the most powerful social being ever want to sexually torture the head of an insignificant and weak country?

Oil features prominently in the answer to this question. Commercially exploitable petroleum deposits were discovered in Libya in 1959 and put into production in 1961. Immediately thereafter Libya became “one of the largest oil producers in the Middle East” (Vandewalle 1998: 42). Salvaged metal and grass ceased to be leading economic sectors. Moreover, after Gaddafi’s regime began in 1969, Libya developed into one of the most aggressive nationalizers of its petroleum resources (First 1974: 199–200, 210–120; J. Wright 1989: 235–251; Vandewalle 2006: 59–60). Oil was nationalized in 1973 by a decree that gave the Libyan government 51 percent
of the “assets and business of the major oil producers” (Sicker 1987: 24). Nationalization placed Libya at the center of intensification of the oil company/petro-state version of the dominator/dominated contradiction.

Overnight, Libyan “government revenues rose spectacularly” (First 1974: 144). Gaddafi spent his new riches on “spectacular economic and political experiments” (Vandewalle 2006: 7), and it was the latter—in the judgment of Robert Gates, observing the Reagan administration from his CIA position—that drove the Reaganites to be “obsessed” with Gaddafi and to want to get him “in the worst way” ([1996] 2007: 352). Obsession, it will become clear, led to invention of another monster-alterity—the second since the old boys’ creation of the Soviet monster-alterity—and you have to destroy monsters. Drive a stake through their heart if the monster is a vampire. Hammer a nail through his balls if he is a monster-alterity.

The position essayed below maintains that not only was Libya at the center of the oil-company/petro-state contradiction, but by Gaddafi’s time, the New American Empire had replaced the old empires as the target of the dominated in the dominator-dominated contradiction as dominated peoples resisted the US Leviathan, some violently. Gaddafi’s “experiments” were part of this resistance, to which Reagan’s Security Elites 2.0 responded with a new hermeneutic. The argument proceeds first by documenting the nature of Libya-US warring. It then describes resistance to US imperial domination that developed both outside and inside Libya, and finally shows how this resistance provoked a new hermeneutic that created the new monster-alterity of the “terrorist”—as well as a new, anti-terrorist iteration of the global domination public délire—for the New American Empire to hunt down in Libyan sands.

Libya I: Getting Gaddafi in the Worst Way

From the perspective of most in the world, especially ordinary Americans, Libya I was a war that never was. No such a conflict appears on Wikipedia. Some, perhaps, remember that back in the 1980s there were “off shore skirmishes” over the Gulf of Sirte between US and Libya (Jentleson and Whytock 2005: 58), but a few skirmishes do not a war make. Few books or articles treat a First US-Libyan War. However, there is a widespread American English slang expression for wanting something very, very much: you want it “in the worst way.” Below it is shown how Reagan and his security elites, “obsessed” with Gaddafi, wanted in the worst way to destroy him and provoked over eight years (between 1981 and 1989) of covert and overt, direct and indirect global warring. The war had two theaters. One was in Libya itself, especially along its Mediterranean coast. The other was in the Republic of Chad, Libya’s southern neighbor. Events in the former
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theater were overt and covert as well as largely direct; those in the later theater were chiefly covert and indirect. Let us consider first the warring within Libya itself.

Overt Warring—The USS Monster Steams into Naval Action: Reagan imagined Gaddafi was “insane” (Reagan [2007] 2009: 233), a “mad dog,” a “terrorist” (in Shultz 1993: 686). Further, he appears to have believed the Libyan leader was gay, at one point remarking about his flamboyant clothing that “Gaddafi can look in Nancy’s closet anytime” (in B. Woodward 1987: 441). Nancy was Reagan’s wife, and gay men were supposed to cross dress in women’s clothes.42 Alexander Haig judged Gaddafi a “cancer” (McGehee 1996). John Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of State, compared him with “Hitler” (in Thompson, Kaldor, and Anderson 1986: 8). Gaddafi, then, was a Hitlerian, cancerous, crazed, terrorist queer—definitely a bad guy. Therefore imperial America steamed into naval action. Actually, there were four major engagements; details of which follow.

On 11 October 1973 the Gaddafi government decreed an extension of its territorial waters to include the entire Gulf of Sirte, a great Mediterranean bay extending into Libya, roughly between Tripoli and Benghazi.43 Tripoli, using a hyperbolic rhetoric, warned that transgressing this new border was crossing a “line of death.” Five months later the US State Department pronounced Libya’s decree “a violation of international law” (Stanik 2003: 28). Thereafter throughout the 1970s the US Navy regularly challenged Libya’s claim by sending carrier battle groups across the “line of death” in what were termed “freedom of navigation” (FON) exercises.44 FON challenges throughout the 1970s ended without any engagements.

Immediately on assuming the presidency, Reagan authorized two aircraft carrier battle groups to cross the “line of death,” which they did on 18 August 1981, drawing mock attacks from Libyan aircraft. The next day two US F-14 Tomcats flew a combat air patrol in support of other US aircraft engaged in a missile exercise. They were approached by two Libyan Sukhoi S-22 aircraft, Russian-built bombers that were no match for the F-14s. One of the Sukhois fired a missile at the Americans, who returned fire, destroying both the Libyan planes. This was the first encounter. The score from the US perspective: two planes for the guy with the “old 44.”

A second encounter in the Gulf of Sirte occurred in March 1986. This was Operation Prairie Fire. It was another FON exercise, but this time a monumental US armada was assembled: three carrier battle groups, forty-five ships, two hundred planes, and advanced nuclear powered submarines. The “line of death” was crossed. On 24 March, with this vast force bearing down upon them, Libya launched a number of Russian surface-to-air (SAM) missiles against the F-14s flying in support of the battle group.
The SAMs missed, and the armada returned fire. The score was an estimated 72 killed, 1 corvette sunk, 1 patrol boat sunk, 1 corvette damaged, 1 patrol boat damaged, and a number of SAM sites damaged or destroyed for the guy with the “old 44”; nothing for Libya.

A third engagement, the gravest, occurred three weeks after Operation Prairie Fire. In a television broadcast on 15 April 1986, Reagan declared: “My fellow Americans, at 7 o’clock this evening, Eastern time, air and naval forces of the United States launched a series of strikes against the headquarters, terrorist facilities, and military assets that support Muammar Qaddafi’s subversive activities” (in Bearman 1986: 287). The attack, called Operation Ghost Rider, involved thirty F-111 bombers. The targets were two airfields (one in Tripoli at the former US Wheelus Air Force Base; the other in Benghazi), air defense networks in Tripoli and Benghazi, the Bab al-Azizia barracks in Tripoli, and the Jamahiriyah barracks in Benghazi.

White House spokespersons stressed “that the targets … were only terrorist installations” (ibid.). This was untrue. The Murat Sidi Bilal camp housed a Palestinian Liberation Organization school, but the other targets were Libyan military installations, with the exception of the Bab al-Azizia barracks, which contained Gaddafi’s family dwellings, among other things. A total of nine F-111 fighter-bombers were supposed to bomb the Bab al-Azizia barracks—more than attacked any other target in the raid, which supports Seymour Hersh’s contention that their target was “Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi and his family” (1987). Libyan figures placed their dead around one hundred, with double that number wounded: “Among the known casualties were members of Gaddafi’s own family; his wife Safia and three children suffered pressure shock from the blast of a 2,000 lb bomb which hit their accommodation” (Bearman 1986: 287).45 Gaddafi himself was unhurt. One US official claimed it was “pure serendipity” that he was present at the barracks (Teicher and Teicher 1993: 350), but this claim rings hollow, especially in the light of evidence that US officials had been closely tracking Gaddafi’s movements prior to the attack (S. Hersh 1987). Note that in 1981 Reagan had signed Executive Order 12333, which stated, “No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination” (in B. Woodward 1987: 366). On the night of 15 April 1986, the New American Empire was in the business of assassination.

A fourth round of hostilities occurred three years later in 1989. US-Libyan relations had grown especially twitchy following Operation Ghost Rider. They became still twitchier when Pam Am flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland (21 December 1988), with intimations of Libyan involvement. Finally, in the waning days of 1988 and the beginning of 1989, twitchier became twitchiest when Reagan security officials began warning
of the construction of a large chemical weapons facility at Rabta, forty miles south of Tripoli. There was discussion about destroying the facilities (Silverberg 1990). In a threatening move, the aircraft carrier USS Kennedy was sent with its battle group to the Gulf of Sirte. On 3 January 1989 four Russian Mig 23 Floggers began threatening two F-14s on patrol. The US planes took evasive action. The threats continued. The F-14s shot down two of the Floggers. The Libyans had not fired on the Americans. This was the third encounter in the Gulf of Sirte and the fourth between the US and Libya during the Reagan administration. The score that day: two planes for the guy with the “old 44.”

Thus imperial America sailed into four naval encounters. Each was announced to the public and so was overt, the better to impress Reagan’s will to “nail” his opponent. Gaddafi emerged unscathed from each attack. However, overt operations were only part of the Reagan administration’s global warring against Libya. Clandestine conflict is reported next.

Making Contras in the Desert: Reagan signed an intelligence finding (18 June 1981) early in his presidency directing Casey’s CIA to provide support and training to anti-Gaddafi exiles. Four months later the CIA, with Saudi Arabia’s assistance, sponsored Muhammad Mugharief, a former Libyan diplomat, to found the National Front for Salvation of Libya (NFSL). At this time the CIA, implementing the Reagan Doctrine, was setting up “contras” in Nicaragua to fight the Sandinista revolutionary government that had overthrown the Somoza dictatorship. Vincent Cannistraro had headed the CIA Central American task force that supervised covert operations, including those of the Contras. He applied the Nicaraguan Contra model to Libya.

Little is known about the personnel and activities of the NFSL. Mostly anti-Gaddafi exiles and especially ex-soldiers, they are reported to have had US and Israeli training. In the 1980s Libya invaded Chad with unpleasant consequences, one being the capture of a large number of its soldiers by the Chadians, a matter discussed in the following section. Some of the captured Libyans appear to have been placed in CIA custody. One of these was a Colonel Khalifa Hifter, who prior to capture had been a commander of the Libyan expeditionary force. The CIA recruited Hifter and in the mid 1980s provided him with the training and weaponry to create a contra-force, called the National Liberation Army (NLA), with approximately 700 troops. The NLA appears to have been integrated into the NFSL as its military arm. The only known NSFL operation was apparently directed by Cannistraro and Donald Fortier, an NSC officer. It was a May 1984 attack on the Gaddafi’s Tripoli residence. The attackers were sharply repulsed. There were to be further Reagan administration interventions in Chad.
“Bleeding Gaddafi”—Covert Warring in Chad: On Casey’s third day in office he received a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) entitled “Libya: Aims and Vulnerabilities.” In part this was in response to Libya’s armed intervention in Chad. In total there would be four Libyan occupations of different parts of Chad in 1978, 1979, 1980–1981, and 1983–1987. The SNIE contained a “Key Judgment” that “Gaddafi’s recent success in Chad ensures that his aggressive policies will pose a growing challenge to U.S. and Western interests” (in B. Woodward 1987: 94). Of course, such a key judgment provoked a hermeneutic puzzle: what to do about the “growing challenge”? The last line of the final paragraph of the SNIE noted that conservative Arab states like Sadat’s Egypt opposed Libya by “focusing their resources on quietly bleeding Gaddafi at his most vulnerable point—his overextension in Chad and the dangers this poses for him at home” (in ibid.: 96). “Quietly bleeding” Gaddafi in Chad seemed to Casey a splendid procedural solution to the hermeneutic puzzle. But why was Gaddafi in Chad, and just what operations would lead to his “bleeding”? This warrants a brief foray into Chadian post-Independence history.

François Tombalbaye was the first president of independent Chad (1960–1975). He led a southern, non-Muslim government that many Muslims, who resided in the northern two-thirds of the country, found objectionable. Starting in 1963, northern opposition to Tombalbaye turned violent. A Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad (FROLINAT) was organized in 1966 by individuals, one of whom had ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, to wrest control of the state.48 The French military intervened in support of Tombalbaye’s regime in the 1970s when it became clear that the Forces Armées Tchadiennes (FAT) could not defeat FROLINAT, which itself devolved into two major military factions that were increasingly hostile to each other: the Forces Armées du Nord (FAN) under Hissen Habré, and the Forces Armées Populaires (FAP) under Oueddei Goukouni. Chadian losses multiplied. FAT officers, fearful of the southern regime’s future, staged a coup against Tombalbaye in 1975. Félix Malloum, a FAT general, became the new president. Nevertheless, FAT losses to FROLINAT continued.

Malloum bowed to the inevitable and in 1978 signed a Charte Fon- damentale granting FROLINAT equal power in the central government, raising the question of the relative influences of the rivals Goukouni and Habré in that government. Habré became prime minister and immediately sought to dominate the government, provoking years of harsh conflict (1979–1982). By 1979, southern influence in the central government had ended and Habré was in control, though Goukouni challenged him.

Libya had assisted FROLINAT since before Gaddafi. After the 1969 revolution, this support increased: first there was provision of nonlethal assistance; next, supply of lethal assistance; and, finally, starting in 1978,
direct commitment of the Libyan armed forces. There were two reasons for increasing Libyan backing of FROLINAT. The first was that Gaddafi generally supported Islamic revolutionary movements. The second had to do with regulation of a colonial Chad-Libya border dispute. In 1935, France, Chad’s imperial dominator, acceded to a treaty that awarded to Italy, Libya’s dominator, the Aouzou Strip, a band of land in Chad’s extreme north. World War II intervened, and France and Italy never signed the treaty. Gaddafi hoped to press his claim on the Aouzou Strip via his Chadian meddling.

The problem for Libya was which of the two FROLINAT armies—FAN or FAP—it was to support. For a number of reasons Gaddafi chose Goukouni. Habré was a Daza, from the southern part of the Chadian desert. He had studied political science in Paris in the 1950s, absorbing some Maoist Marxism, to which Gaddafi was indisposed. Goukouni, on the other hand, was the son of the derdei (chief) of the Toubou, the northernmost ethnic group straddling the Chad-Libya border. Toubou in Libya were supportive of Gaddafi, so he felt more comfortable allying with their Chadian kin. In January 1978 Libyan soldiers invaded Chad for the first time, in alliance with Goukouni and in opposition to Habré. Now we return to Washington, and Casey’s contemplation of his SNIE.

Upon reading the SNIE, Casey knew that Habré opposed Goukouni and Goukouni was supported by Gaddafi, which meant the way to “bloody” Gaddafi was to support Habré. Casey appears to have discussed this policy with then Secretary of State Haig, who assented to it. A number of meetings followed, and a “second track,” as opposed to a first policy track, was developed. First-track policy was that of normal diplomacy, “second-track” was that of covert operations. The second track was presented to Reagan and led to him signing the 18 July 1981 intelligence order “releasing … covert support to Habré” (B. Woodward 1987: 97).

Over the following seven years, this support grew to hundreds of millions of dollars as the US, assisted by France, fought Libya by providing all sorts of assistance to Habré, short of US soldiers. The strings of combat went as follows: Libya would invade, reaching Chad’s capital, N’Djamena, at some point; then retreat following Chadian and French counterattacks, usually as far as the northern desert area called the Tibesti. By the beginning of 1987 the Libyans still had a force of 8,000 soldiers in northern Chad, backed by 300 tanks. They faced a Chadian army of 10,000 using Toyotas equipped with MILAN anti-tank missiles, with much of the materiel and training coming from covert US sources. There followed what has been called the “Toyota War,” in which the lumbering tanks proved no match for the nimble Toyota. Libyans were routed, and the following year they withdrew permanently from Chad. It was a triumph of covert US warring. Thousands of Libyans died; thousands were captured.
In sum, throughout Reagan’s administration the Security Elites 2.0 globally warred overtly and covertly against Libya, chalking up victories at sea, in the air, and on the ground in the desert. Nevertheless, their intended purpose, nailing Gaddafi, went unachieved. Why did the Reagan administration fight Libya I “in the worst possible way”?

The Making of a New Monster-Alterity: Anti-imperialism, Oil, and “Terrorist Goons”

We are sending a secret or private warning from me to him that harm to any of our people by his terrorist goons will be considered an act of war. (Reagan [2007] 2009:54).

The above quotation is from Reagan’s diary in January 1981. The “him” in the above quotation is Gaddafi. By the end of the 1970s, astute people outside America had penetrated the Leviathan’s camouflage. Old empires were dead. The New American Empire, the “shining city on the hill,” was a dominator in the business of exploitation, repression, and domination. Recognition of this provoked resistance, some of it violent. The Security Elites 2.0 interpreted the violent resistance as the work of “terrorist goons,” as Reagan put it in his diary in January of 1981. They attempted to eradicate the “goons” and in so doing revealed an explanation for Reagan’s obsessive warring against Gaddafi.

Resistance to the New American Empire: Since their earliest days, empires have always met with resistance. It was, as earlier discussed in chapter 3, a normal manifestation of the dominator/dominated contradiction. Skirmishes against British Redcoats at Concord and Lexington in 1776 ignited the American Revolution; bombs thrown at the czars or their officials in Imperial Russia eventually led to revolution in 1917; assassination of Austria’s Archduke Franz Ferdinand sparked the beginning of World War I. Most such violent resistance took, and takes, the form of “terrorism,” a term whose meaning is contested.

“Terrorism” might be heuristically defined as a form of warring whose perpetrators want to achieve their ends by exercising violence specifically to strike horror and dread into their opponent. Terrorism’s victims do what their adversary wants because they are terrified of the alternative. Horror and dread may be attained by striking politically powerful elites or innocent bystanders. Assassination, mutilation, bombing, torturing, hijacking, burning, and hostage-taking are common terrorist practices. Two types of terrorism occur. “Nonstate” terrorism is performed by individuals or groups against states. “State” terrorism is executed by governments against their opponents or their opponents’ supporters. A distinction is commonly made
between “domestic” and “international” terrorism, with the former terrorist practice within and the later terrorist practice across countries.52

Immediately following World War II, as explained in the previous chapter, the old empires encountered overwhelming internal, terrorist resistance. At the same time, people in the developing world, especially those parts of it most touched by the US, began to speak of a novel dominating force in the world—Yanqui imperialism, as they put it in Latin America. The event that most galvanized this recognition was the US Leviathan’s assault on Vietnam. American support for its client states and their elites (especially in Central America, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran) further motivated resistance in these areas.

US security elites often term terrorism a tactic of asymmetrical warfare (Buffaloe 2006). Their narrative, especially among neocons, is that terrorism in asymmetrical warfare is produced by religion, and specifically by fundamentalist Islam, which gives the narrative a Huntingtonian twist. Robert Pape and James Feldman (2010) conducted an analysis of a particularly grim sort of terrorism, that involving suicide bombing. They collected a sample of 2,100 cases of suicide terrorism in the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia between the years 1980 and 2009. They found that most cases were fueled by US military intervention.53 Labeling terrorism an aspect of asymmetrical warfare obscures the fact that it is a tactic of resistance to military intervention. The term “resistance terrorism” is a more accurate designation of the violent tactics employed against the New American Empire and its clients.

Often, resistance terrorism targeted the US elites handling the empire: on 1 May 1961 a Puerto Rican hijacked a US commercial airliner to Havana; on 28 August 1968 the US ambassador to Guatemala was assassinated by a rebel faction; on 3 September 1969 the US ambassador to Brazil was kidnapped by a Marxist revolutionary group; on 31 July 1970 a USAID advisor in Uruguay was kidnapped and killed by the Tupamaros. On 5 September 1972 there came a spectacular terrorist act: Black September, a Palestinian organization tied to Arafat’s Palestinian Liberation organization, kidnapped and eventually killed eleven Israeli athletes and their trainers at the Munich Olympics.54 Though directed at a US client, this action was bloody enough to grab the US government’s attention, putting terms like “international terrorism” and “counterterrorism” into Washington security elites’ cultural vocabulary for the first time (Naftali 2005). The Office for Combating Terrorism was initiated in the State Department.

After the Olympics attack, the pace of resistance terrorist acts quickened: on 2 March 1973 the US ambassador to Sudan was assassinated by Black September; on 4 May 1973 the US consul general was kidnapped in Mexico by the People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces; on 17 December
1973 five terrorists from an unknown organization attacked Pan Am Flight 110 in Rome, killing thirty-one; on 19 August 1974 the US ambassador to Cyprus was shot and killed by a sniper outside his embassy; on 27 January 1975 Puerto Rican nationalists bombed a Wall Street bar, killing four and injuring sixty. A 1976 CIA report noted an “enduring upsurge” in terrorism since 1967 (Milbank 1976: 1). The CIA certainly seemed correct, as on 4 February 1979 the US ambassador to Afghanistan was assassinated in Kabul.

Finally, on 4 November 1979 there came a dramatic blow: Iranian students took the entire US embassy in Tehran hostage. Everyone watched it live on television. It was the first reality TV, and it starred President Carter’s impotence at freeing the hostages. One colleague remarked to me at the time, “He can’t get it up to get ’em out.” But Carter did try to “get it up.” Operation Eagle Claw was sent with Delta Force Special Ops to rescue the hostages on 24 April 1980. Unfortunately, the eagle crashed—literally—because the operation’s commanders forgot to account for the haboob (Persian for “dust storm”). The storm occurred, the mission’s helicopters malfunctioned, and the mission was aborted, leaving Carter looking even more impotent, his political career terminated. At this moment, Secretary of State Vance chose to resign.

So by 1980, as Brian Jenkins (1980: 1) put it in a Rand Corporation report, “terrorism” had “become part of our daily news diet. Hardly a day passes without news of an assassination, political kidnapping, hijacking, or bombing somewhere.” Security elites, especially those destined to occupy positions in the Reagan administration, got it: terrorism was part of the “daily … diet,” and it could be politically devastating. Carter was savaged by reality TV that portrayed him as hopeless and hapless against terrorists. The rabbit didn’t get him—the media did, which had implications for warring in Libya.

The Making of a New Monster-Alterity:

Reagan thought the hostage crisis … had condemned the Carter administration … [so when he] came into office … hostages and terrorism were on everyone’s mind. (Nicolas Veliotes, assistant secretary of State, 1981–1984, in Toaldo 2008: 58)

Nicolas Veliotes, Rock and Roll Hall of Famer Johnny Otis’s younger brother, was assistant secretary of State for Near Eastern affairs at the outset of Reagan’s administration. Veliotes reported that Reagan attributed Carter’s loss to the terrorism of the “hostage crisis.” This meant that a new, job-threatening hermeneutic puzzle faced the incoming administration: How to deal with international terrorism? During the transition—the
period between the election and the inauguration of a new president—the CIA, along with other agencies, was asked to prepare position papers suggesting courses of action for the incoming president. Elaine Morton, a State Department official, recollected a conclusion of these documents: “The issue of international terrorism was used to demonstrate that the US could be forceful again. In a sense, terrorism was the weapon of the weak. Weak countries were starting to use it successfully against us so we had to fight against the instability brought by international terrorism in order to maintain our hegemony” (in Toaldo 2008: 58–59). A central point of this quotation is that even before Reagan took office there was understanding that the US “had to fight … terrorism … to maintain our hegemony.” Note the verb is strong. The US “had to” fight—not should fight or might fight, but had to fight. If the term “hegemony” is replaced with “empire,” and if “terrorism” is understood as US security elites’ interpretation of the resistance produced by the dominator/dominated contradiction, then what Morton was saying was that resistance terrorism so threatened the empire’s reproductive vulnerability that it “had” to “fight” it.

Reagan accepted this view. In a welcoming speech (27 January 1981) for the hostages freed from their Iranian captivity, he warned, “Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution” (Reagan 1981). The next day, Alexander Haig reiterated Reagan’s point in a way that emphasized the new administration’s difference from Carter’s, when he said, “terrorism will take the place of human rights in our concern, because it is the ultimate abuse of human rights” (in Stanik 2003: 34). Carter had made defense of human rights a centerpiece of his foreign policy. Reagan assigned terrorism to take this place in his foreign policy.

A hermeneutic politics emerged in the first year of the Reagan administration concerning procedural difficulties in the fight against terrorism. A first issue was the trouble of detecting terrorists who operated in secrecy. How could you deliver “swift … retribution” without knowing who did the act? A second set of questions turned on terrorism’s relationship to the Soviets. There were some, notably the CIA’s Casey, who believed the USSR managed a vast terrorist network. Others, largely in the State Department, were less convinced of Soviet terrorist activities. These debates were resolved in two National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs) and the founding of several institutions to wage the fight against terrorism.

Reagan signed the first of the directives, NSDD 30 on “Managing Terrorist Incidents,” on 10 April 1982. It announced that “the United States is committed, as a matter of national policy, to oppose terrorism domestically and internationally” (NSDD 30 1982: 1). NSDD 30 further specified who, in what institutions, would combat terrorism. Authority to combat
terrorism was delegated to “lead agencies.” These were the State Department for international terrorism and the FBI for domestic terrorism. For any terrorist incident, a Special Situation Group was to convene to advise the president. A Terrorist Incident Working Group drawing its membership from a number of government agencies was formed to “support” the Special Situation Group (ibid.: 2). An Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism, chaired by the State Department, was to “be responsible for the development of overall US policy on terrorism” (ibid.: 2). NSDD 30 made combating terrorism “national policy” and identified the agencies to lead the combat.

Reagan next signed NSDD 138 (3 April 1984) after an especially grim upsurge of Middle Eastern terrorism. On 3 October 1983, the Islamic Jihad Organization bombed the US Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 241 soldiers and wounding 60 others. For the Marines, it was the largest number of casualties since the Battle of Iwo Jima in World War II. A little over three months later the same group struck again, assassinating the president of the American University in Beirut (18 January 1984). Two months after that Hezbollah kidnapped, tortured, and killed the CIA Beirut station chief. A difficulty posed by these attacks is that it was not entirely clear who did them. For example, no one really knew who the Islamic Jihad Organization were—perhaps Hezbollah, perhaps not. NSDD 138 attempted to address this, among other, problems.

It was largely the work of Robert C. McFarlane, then Reagan’s NSA. NSDD 138 remains secret; all that is publicly available of it is an extract prepared by NSC staff. The extract begins by announcing that terrorism “is a threat to our national security” (NSDD 138 Extract 1984: 1). The extract proclaimed, “States that actively practice terrorism or actively support it, will not be allowed to do so without consequence” (ibid.: 1). This was an attempt to solve the problem of the elusiveness of terrorists. If particular terrorist perpetrators were difficult to identify, the states that supported them were less so, and any state that sponsored terrorism would suffer the “consequence.”

Still, secret portions of the “directive endorsed, in principle, the use of ‘proactive’ operations—that is preemptive raids and retaliatory strikes—to fight terrorist organizations and states that support them” (Stanik 2002: 93). News of this aspect of NSDD 138 reached the press. The Los Angeles Times stated that “Reagan had signed a new policy directive that authorized the use of preemptive strikes … against terrorists operating overseas” (ibid.: 93). This meant that violent force was to be the “consequence” meted out to terrorists before they did anything. Remember that the “old boys” had explicitly rejected the idea of preemptive warfare at the founding of the New American Empire. NSDD 138 approved it. The directive
also authorized formation of CIA and FBI covert action teams to administer the violence. NSDD 30 made it US policy to oppose terrorism. NSDD 138 made it clear that this was because terrorism threatened US “security,” that states sponsoring terrorism would be targets of US violent force, and that this force might be preemptive.

Together, the two NSDDs specified a new iteration of the global domination public délire, that of “anti-terrorism,” with the hermeneutic that if responsible officials perceptually found terrorists, they were procedurally authorized to use violent force against them. Further, this public délire may said to have spawned a new monster-alterity—not a political regime, like the old Soviet monster-alterity, but a particular choreographing of violence: that of terrorists. Fervent Security Elites 2.0, like Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North of “Irangate” notoriety, urged racing out and killing “cocksucker” terrorists (B. Woodward 1987: 361). What does all this have to do with Libya? It is time to explain why Reagan and his Security Elites 2.0 went after “cocksucker” Libyans.

“Special Attention”—The Should, Could, and Did of Global War on Libya: The Reagan administration attacked Libya because it should and it could, and so it did. First consider the “should” of Libya I. The new anti-terrorist public délire was a general proposition. US government policy prescribed that it should go after terrorists anywhere. Some reason or reasons were needed to apply it to Libya. Actually, Libya had been in the crosshairs well before Reagan took office. On 2 December 1979 a mob demonstrating support for the taking of Americans hostage in Tehran attacked and burned the US embassy in Libya’s capital, Tripoli. Carter’s government responded by formally designating Libya a state sponsor of terrorism (Vandewalle 1998). Why?

The reason has to do with the way Gaddafi positioned Libya vis-à-vis the dominator/dominated contradiction. Under Idris I, who ruled Libya as a king, there was “support for pro-Western regimes” (El-Kikhia 1997: 66), so much so that Libya became known as “a base for Imperialism” (J. Wright 1989: 84). Further, Idris’s government showered “unabashed distribution of wealth to its friends,” that is, to its wealthy supporters (El-Kikhia 1997: 72). Gaddafi had been born in open desert south of the city of Sirte, the son of a semi-nomad. He was sent at ten to school in Sirte, where he was treated as a poor bedu (pastoralist). Four years later he was sent to the Sebha Preparatory School, where he began “to feed his new-found interest in current affairs by listening to the radio, turning mostly to the Nasserist, anti-Western ‘Voice of the Arabs’ … and by absorbing forbidden books and pamphlets.” (J. Wright 1989: 125). As a result, there formed an anti-imperialist who became a military officer and then, with certain fellow of-
fficers, led a coup that swept the reactionary Idris I from his throne. The new regime made it crystal clear where it stood. Gaddafi announced, “We support all the world liberation movements” (in Sicker 1984: 124).

He was specific about opposing the US, announcing over Tripoli radio, “America is determined to subjugate the Arab homeland to its interests and its will. We on our part, are determined to resist America” (ibid.: 127). And Gaddafi did resist, by closing the US’s Libyan military base, nationalizing oil, supporting and financing the Palestinian cause, promoting anti-imperialist attitudes, and intervening regionally to challenge Western-oriented leaders, all undertakings facilitated by his oil wealth. Additionally, the regime stopped Idris’s practice of rewarding his “friends” and initiated one of aiding the poor, for as Ahmida (2005: 82) has reported, “The Libyan revolution brought about many positive changes for ordinary Libyans (especially women) including free medical care, a modern infrastructure, and free education.” Libya was not only fighting imperialism, it was aiding its “ordinary” folk, and it was doing so using wealth derived from its Western oil sales. Imperialist dollars were paying for Libyan resistance to imperialism.

Briefing of the incoming Reagan administration during the transition included reports of Libyan resistance. For example, one of the papers passed to Reaganes was “Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980,” an annual survey of terrorist events conducted by the CIA’s National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC 1981). It began by announcing that there were “more casualties” from terrorism “in 1980 than in any year since the analysis of statistics related to terrorism began in 1968” (NFAC 1981: ii). Americans were identified as terrorism’s “primary targets” (ibid.). Importantly, NFAC judged, “The government of Colonel Qadhafi is the most prominent state sponsor of and participant in international terrorism” (ibid.: 9). Remember that three days into office, Casey received the “Libya: Arms and Vulnerabilities” SNIE, which announced that Libya, with its aggressive support for terrorists, posed “a growing challenge to U.S. and Western interests” (in Burr and Collins 1999: 139). Libya was the “most prominent” sponsor of resistance terrorism.

Reagan’s Security Elites 2.0 perceived that Gaddafi had closed the US airbase in Libya. He had nationalized Libyan oil. He supported liberation movements throughout the world. He tried to topple “moderate” leaders (i.e., US clients). Worst, he took dollars earned from selling oil to the US Leviathan and its clients and used them to attack the US Leviathan and its clients. Shultzian Permission should be given, because nothing peaceful stopped the string of anti-imperial resistance. Hence, Reagan and his henchmen interpreted Gaddafi and his henchmen as “terrorist goons.” Accordingly, Gaddafi, because of his “support for international terrorism,” was
“selected for special attention” at the very first (21 January 1981) meeting of Reagan’s NSC (in Stanik 2002: 32). This was the “should” of the matter. Next considered is the “could.”

On the same day that Reagan signed NSDD 138, Secretary of State Shultz gave a speech in which he identified Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Libya as state sponsors of terrorism (ibid.: 94). In effect, Shultz was saying that America was threatened by a number of terrorist monster-alterities. Libya was certainly a resister of the New American Empire but—and this is crucial—to the US, Libya was an annoying fly. Why waste time swatting the fly? Why were other state-sponsors of terrorism not selected for “special attention”? Not all terrorist monster-alterities are the same.

Raymond Tanter, an NSC member at the time, remembered, “Libya was more doable: it had fewer friends than Syria because it wasn’t really in the Soviet orbit…. On the other hand, the resupply of our troops would have been easier in the case of Libya because we could go there from Great Britain through Spain” (in Toaldo 2008: 66). Robert Gates, also at the NSC at the time, supports Tanter by saying that security officials believed that an attack on Iran would just “piss them off” and one against Syria would have an even worse consequence because it would “bring a conflict with the Soviets” (Gates [1996] 2007: 351). Consequently, Libya “became the target for U.S. retaliation against all state-supported terrorism” because “it was in the poorest position to sustain itself against U.S. action” (ibid.: 352). So the Security Elites 2.0 did Libya because it was “doable”—or at least, they thought it was.

Each of the bouts of warring in Libya I was sparked by implementation of the anti-terrorist hermeneutic. Consider the first August 1981 Gulf of Sirte naval engagement. As has just been shown, the transition papers prepared for the incoming Reagan administration identified Libya as a terror-sponsoring state, and on day two of his presidency Reagan had warned, “terrorists beware.” This was a perceptual cultural interpretation. The procedural cultural response was to send the navy into the Gulf of Sirte, with the result being the downing of two Libyan planes. While conducting this overt warring, the Security Elites 2.0 began covert warring against Libya in Chad. Why Chad? This has to do with the earlier discussed SNIE on Libya that Casey had read in his first week in office, which had pointed out that Gaddafi’s regional opponents (Egypt and Sudan) were “quietly bleeding Gaddafi at his most vulnerable point—his over extension in Chad” (Stanik 2002: 40). Casey and, then, Secretary of State Haig thought “bleeding” was great. They believed “that a Libyan defeat in Chad would foment widespread disaffection within the officer corps of the Libyan armed forces,” and that Habré could hand Gaddafi this “defeat” because they found him to be the “quintessential desert warrior” (ibid.). In sum, Casey and Haig,
using the SNIE, arrived at a procedural interpretation of what to do about Gaddafi, which was that the way to eliminate him was through Chad. They made their case to Reagan, who concurred with their interpretation and signed a covert “finding” (February 1981) supporting Habré. Covert operations were under way by the summer of 1981 and would last until 1988.

Operations Prairie Fire and Ghost Rider in 1986 were directly tied to particular terrorist incidents. Earlier in 1985 terrorists hijacked TWA Flight 847 (14 June), and later that year (27 December) they attacked the Rome and Vienna airports, with serious loss of life. The Reagan administration claimed Libya was responsible for them. The next year Reagan’s security elite believed they had acquired “smoking gun” evidence of Libya’s involvement in the 5 April 1986 attack on the La Belle discotheque in West Berlin, which killed one US soldier and injured sixty others (Gates [1996] 2007: 353). At a (mid July 1985) meeting of the security elite after the TWA hijacking, McFarlane opened by asserting that economic sanctions and diplomacy had failed against Gaddafi. Casey, Shultz, and Weinberger agreed (B. Woodward 1987: 409). This meant that nonviolent procedures had failed. It was time for violence. McFarlane (NSA), Poindexter (deputy NSA), and North (deputy director NSC for politico-military affairs) proposed a full-scale US and Egyptian invasion of Libya. This was voted down at a 22 July NSC meeting (Gates 2007: 353). Reagan recorded in his diary that at a later National Security Planning Group meeting on 6 January 1986 he exhorted, “We must do something in view of the massacres in the airports of Rome and Vienna” (Reagan [2007] 2009: 381), and so they did, proceeding to the aerial raids that were Operations Prairie Fire and Ghost Rider.

The final US overt attack on Libya, the 3 January 1989 raid, followed the pattern of the previous two attacks. First, there was a terrorist incident. In the case of the 3 January attack there were two incidents. The first was Pan Am Flight 103, which exploded over Lockerbie in Scotland on 21 December 1988, killing everyone on board. It was suspected and then concluded, to the satisfaction of the Security Elites 2.0, that Gaddafi was behind the bombing of Flight 103. Then, to make matters worse, in December of 1988 US intelligence discovered that the Libyans were building a chemical weapons plant at Rabta. Such a plant would open a whole new realm of possibilities for Libyan sponsorship of terrorism. Reagan ([2007] 2009: 664) remarked in his diary that the “plant … threatens the entire Middle East.” These cultural perceptions of a terribly threatening Libya were passed on as orders to the US navy to proceed once more into the Gulf of Sirte, once again with fatal consequences for elements of the Libyan air force.

Observe the string of events in this global warring. First there was a terrorist incident or incidents. Next the anti-terrorist iteration operated
with a perceptual cultural interpretation that the terrorism resulted from Libyan state-sponsored terrorism, provoking a procedural cultural interpretation to attack Libya. Finally there was the attack.

Treasury Secretary Donald Regan (1988: 329) remarked, concerning the April 1986 attack on Gaddafi’s residence, “however much it may have shocked liberal opinion here and abroad, it had a chilling effect on state-sponsored terrorism.” This view is correct but for reasons the Reaganites might not imagine. Jentleson (2006: 47) and Whytock, following a survey of the evidence bearing upon terrorism during and following the Reagan years, concluded that exercise of military force against resistance terrorism “largely failed” to stop it. In fact, according to another source, “Between 1989 and the end of the twentieth century, militant Islamist groups became more violent and thus posed an increased threat for the United States and its allies” (Couch 2010: 17). Reagan’s aggression toward Libya did not stop the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center, and certainly this attack had a chilling effect on the opinion that Reagan had solved the problem of terrorism. Let us recapitulate the arguments concerning the global warring in Libya I.

Gradually, dominated peoples in the 1970s and 1980s got it: there was a new imperial dominator out there in very late modernity the New American Empire. Opposition to it increased, which can be explained as the dominated resisting oppression and exploitation. The Security Elites 2.0 had a radically different understanding of the situation. They saw resistance as terrorism, an intensifier of the dominator/dominated contradiction that threatened US “security,” and consequently was a serious reproductive vulnerability. This provoked hermeneutic politics to fix the vulnerability, which was fixed by instituting the new anti-terrorist iteration of the global domination public délire.

When Reagan’s security elite perceived the failure of nonviolent ways of stopping Gaddafi’s support of terrorism, they granted Shultzian Permission and implemented the anti-terrorist public délire. In part they did so because Tripoli, notwithstanding its oil wealth, was so weak they could. The ensuing global warring, Reagan’s “obsession,” lasted from 1981 through 1988. It “largely failed.” Resistance terrorism persisted—as did Gaddafi, though he had been categorized as a terrorist monster, and would face troubles ahead, a topic in a later chapter.

Conclusion

To review this chapter’s work: Dylan got people in the 1970s and 1980s thinking that the times were “a-changin’.” They were. The contradictory
currents in the seas of modernity were altered: economic contradictions intensified; political ones were more complex. The inter-imperial contradiction led to violence in the Americas and a final flare-up with the Bear during the Soviet-Afghanistan War, but abruptly relaxed with the Soviet Union's demise. The dominated/dominator contradiction intensified after the Vietnam War as some dominated folk resorted to resistance terrorism against the American imperium. Political and economic contradictions coalesced.

In their different ways, the wars analyzed in this chapter were responses to the shifting contradictory forces, the strings of events in each war being consistent with the global warring theory. The Bear went over the mountain in Afghanistan I, intensifying the inter-imperial contradiction. Shultzian Permission was granted when Islamic rebels starting fighting, making peaceful fixes moot; whereupon US security elites, operating on the basis of the global domination public délière, went after the Soviet monster-ality. The Iran-Iraq War responded to intensification of the land/capital contradiction. Shultzian Permission was granted because once Baghdad and Tehran began hostilities, the US had to participate militarily or risk losing considerable control over Persian Gulf oil. Carter and Reagan instituted the oil-control iteration of the global domination public délière, and Reagan conducted US military operations by implementing it. Finally, Libya I was a response to intensification of the dominator/dominated contradiction in a situation where the control of oil was an issue. Shultzian Permission was granted because Gaddafi's provocations did not cease. To address this reproductive vulnerability Reagan instituted and implemented the anti-terrorist iteration of the global domination public délière.

So some of the changes Dylan sung about in the 1970s and 1980s were in the means of interpretation of violence. After 1989, the NSC 68 iteration of the global domination public délière faded. In very late modernity the New American Empire would be guided to battle by the oil-control and anti-terrorist iterations of the global domination public délière. The consequences of these changes are the story of the following chapters.

Notes

1. The old boys were either dead (Forrestal, Stimson, and Marshall) or ancient and super-annuated (Truman, Acheson, Kennan, and Lovett). You read about them in books. Charlie Wilson, for example, a key player in the Soviet-Afghan War, remembered reading "Kennan's prescription for dealing with Communism" (in Crile 2003: 26).

2. Reagan had been in the army during World War II. Far from any combat, he made propaganda movies. However, Bush I was a naval pilot and had been shot down in the Pacific. Alexander Haig, Reagan's first secretary of state (1981–1982) fought as an army officer in
both Korea and Vietnam, and was awarded medals for valor. George Shultz was a World War II combat Marine Corps officer. Casper Weinberger was a World War II army infantry officer. CIA Director William Casey was an OSS officer. Treasury Secretary Donald Regan was a Marine present at the battles of Guadalcanal and Okinawa. Younger members of Reagan’s security elite included NSA Colonel Bud MacFarlane (1983–1985), a Marine officer in Vietnam; NSA Admiral John Poindexter (1985–1986), commander of a naval destroyer squadron; NSA Frank Carlucci (1986–1987), a naval officer in the Korean War; and NSA General Colin Powell (1987–1989), an army officer in Vietnam.


4. Free trade zones, also termed Export Processing Zones (EPZs), are areas within a country, situated in places favorable to trade (e.g. rivers, ports), where goods may arrive or be exported, manufactured or reconfigured, under relaxed tax regimes. They have become “the predominant locations for light industrial manufacturing, with around seventy million workers in 3,500 EPZs” (Neveling 2015: 64). They have been largely placed in developing countries with low labor costs.

5. A “derivative” is a financial instrument—created by agreement between two people or parties—whose value is determined by an agreed price of an asset. Profits are made on derivatives when a person contracts to sell an asset at a price that turns out to be above the market price. For example, I might contract in January to sell a bushel of corn at $5. If the harvest has been abundant and the corn sells in September for $3 dollars per bushel, then I make a handsome profit because due to my derivative contract I sell at $5.

A collateralized debit obligation (CDO) is a security backed by a pool of bonds, loans, and other assets. If the pooled assets of a CDO remain good, its owner receives a profit. If they do not, perhaps the CDO holder should have arranged a credit default swap (CDS). A CDS is a contract in which the buyer of the CDS pays the seller a certain sum to ensure the buyer receives a payoff if a given credit instrument (typically a bond or loan) goes into default. That is, the buyer of a CDS acquires protection against a credit instrument going bad. A mortgage-backed security (MBS) is an asset-backed security or debt obligation that represents a claim on the cash flows from mortgage loans, most commonly on residential property. MBSs became worthless when poor mortgage holders started being unable to make their mortgage payments in 2006.

6. Weart (2008), Giddens (2009), and Joshua Howe (2014) discuss the hermeneutic politics of global warming.

7. The environmentalist/anti-environmentalist debate over global warming has been nasty, brutish, and long. A good point of insertion to it is Michael Crichton’s State of Fear (2004), a novel depicting eco-activists as terrorists.


11. Films of the US evacuation of the Saigon Embassy can be viewed on YouTube (Laurie 2010).

12. The notion of strategic insolvency appears to be been introduced by Walter Lippmann (1943).


14. Since the end of World War II, sixteen acronyms have been used for federal national security directives. “NSC,” made famous by NSC 68, was used from the Truman through the
Ford administrations. The “PD” acronym was favored during Carter’s administration (Relyea 2007).


16. Carter’s proposed energy policy was in considerable measure the work of S. David Freeman. In the early 1970s Freeman had been the director of energy policy at the Ford Foundation and authored the report A Time to Choose: America’s Energy Future (1974), which became “the foundation of Carter’s energy policy” (Freeman 2007). Freeman, an engineer, was able to digest the data warning of peak oil and communicate its significance to Carter, another engineer (Kreisler 2003: 2).

17. The “attack rabbit” incident was as follows: Carter was in Plains fishing in a canoe on 20 April 1979, when a rabbit, chased by hounds, jumped in the water and swam toward the canoe. The media made this into a big story.

18. Rich (2005), Weidenbaum (2011), and Abelson (2006) provide accounts of the rise and influence of think tanks in the US. The Brookings Institution, founded in 1916, was the first think tank.

19. Discussions of neoconservatism can be found in Stelzer (2004), Steinfields (1979) and Irving Kristol (1995).

20. My mother surprised me by remarking that she had gone on one date with Reagan when he was a baseball announcer on Des Moines radio. I asked her what she had thought of him. She took a long drag on a Marlboro, reflected a while, and said, “I can’t remember.”

21. There is a considerable literature discussing Reaganomics, some supportive (Niskanen 1988); much critical from both conservative (Bartlett 2009) and progressive (Scheer 2010) perspectives.

22. US warring in the Americas occurred in the Caribbean (Grenada 1983); in Central America (El Salvador 1981, Panama 1989, and Nicaragua 1981–1989), and throughout South America (Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Uruguay, and Bolivia). With the exceptions of Grenada and Panama, the US was not a direct participant in these hostilities. Intervention occurred because Security Elites 2.0 believed a country was in danger of becoming communist due to Soviet or Cuban subversion. Hence, intensification of the inter-imperial contradiction, in ways that elites believed harmed the US, led to hostilities. Additionally, as Greg Grandin (2006: 6) has put it, the wars involved “imperial violence through proxies”; that is, Washington made indirect war, keeping its hand largely covert. A particular institution, the School of the Americas, was especially important as a US army training center for Latin American officers. Founded in 1946 in the Panama Canal Zone as the Latin America Ground School, it became the School of Americas in 1946 and moved to Fort Benning in Georgia in 1983, becoming in 2001 the Western Hemisphere Institute of Security Cooperation. By the early twenty-first century it had trained over 60,000 officers in combat-related skills, especially those related to counterinsurgency. The SOA took young military officers, often trained to conduct warfare against external foes, and taught them the skills of massacring, torturing, and raping their own. All the while, as Lesley Gill notes (2004: 66), it facilitated their acquisition of, “the ideology of the ‘American way of life’ by steeping them into a vision of empire that identified their aspirations with those of the United States.” The resulting conflicts have been termed “dirty wars” because they featured massacres, torture, and rape; and because it is so often difficult to distinguish insurgents from noncombatants, meaning that those abused tend to be peasant or urban poor civilians. In sum, SOA transformed Latin American officers into hybrid imperial elites who killed their own because it was the “American way.”

23. The phrase “the Bear went over the mountains” seems to have originated in a collection of junior Soviet officers’ vignettes of their combat in Afghanistan. The US military became interested in the text for its “tips” on how to fight mujahideen (Grau 1996).

24. Useful references concerning Afghanistan I from the US perspective include Coll (2004) and Crile (2003); from that of Russian soldiers Alexievich (1992) and from that of a

25. The question of whether Amin had CIA ties remains unsolved. Western sources tend to dismiss it. Bonosky (1985: 30–42) makes the case that Amin had them. In the early 1960s Amin had studied at Columbia’s Teachers College, where he became head of the Afghan Student Association. In 1967 Ramparts, a left-wing Catholic journal, revealed that the CIA had covertly funded international student groups since the 1950s, including the Afghan Student Association (S. Stern 1967). If Amin was ever recruited by the CIA, it was likely during his Columbia days.

26. Gorbachev said in his memoirs (2003: x) that his perspective was inspired by Alexander Dubchek’s “socialism with a human face,” which prevailed during Dubchek’s 1968 reforms that were crushed by Brezhnev. Others have said that Gorbachev, who was Andropov’s protégé, was actually trying to implement his mentor’s views (Konchalovsky 2011).

27. Morris claims that the US began Afghan operations in fall 1978, an earlier start than that named by Robert Gates, then on the National Security Council, who has them beginning in July 1979 ([1996] 2007: 146). I am unable to verify which assertion is correct. Blum (1995: 345), however, reported that the CIA began training mujahideen in Pakistan in 1978.

28. Steve Coll, who has written extensively on the Afghanistan I War, has asserted that “any claim that Brzezinski lured the Soviets into Afghanistan warrants deep skepticism” (2004: 581). I disagree. In the late 1960s Brzezinski was developing the Islamic card hermeneutic. In 1977, he set up the inter-agency NWG to help implement it. In 1978, the Saur Revolution and the ensuing mujahideen rebellion gave him the opportunity to try it in Afghanistan. From March through July 1979 a meeting string through Brzezinski’s SCC transformed the Islamic card hermeneutic from a mere hermeneutic into an authorized public délire. Brzezinski (1998: 76) admitted as much in an interview with Le Nouvel Observateur when he declared, “We didn’t push the Soviet’s to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would.” At this juncture, Brzezinski’s interviewer pointed out that the Soviets had stated that one of the reasons they invaded Afghanistan was to combat secret US involvement there. The interviewer asks Brzezinski if he “regrets” this. Brzezinski (1998: 76) bragged in response: “Regret what? The secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of driving the Russians into the Afghan trap. … Moscow had to carry on a war … that brought about the demoralization and finally the breaking up of the Soviet empire.” Coll may doubt that Brzezinski “lured” the Russians into Afghanistan. Brzezinski, to the contrary, boasts about it, believing it destroyed the Soviet Union.

29. Wilson’s role in Afghanistan I is told in a book by Crile (2003), which was made into the popular movie Charlie Wilson’s War (2007). Coll (2004: 125–125) describes the decision making that led up to NSDD 166.

30. It has been claimed that the Stingers were “decisive” in the war (Crile 2003: 437). Malley (2002) and Peter Scott (2003) believe otherwise. Only 500 Stingers were introduced. They were operational less than two months before the Politburo’s decision to end the war. There were too few Stingers and too little time for them to be decisive. More important in ending the war was Gorbachev’s desire to restructure the Soviet Union, which started with pulling out of Brezhnev’s folly.

31. Gorbachev (2003) himself supports this view, insisting that the Soviet Union was destroyed by internal developments.


33. Baathism, the ideology adhered to by the Baathist political party, has been important in Iraq and Syria since 1963. Michel Aflaq and Zaki al-Asuzi were its key founders in the late 1930s and 1940s. Their ideology was a mixture of socialism, nationalism, and Pan-Arabism
inspired less by Islam than by European nationalism (Choueiri 2000: 154–157, 197–206). Sami al-Jundi has said of al-Asuzi’s Baathism, “We were racists. We admired the Nazis” (in Perdue 2012: 72). Of course, there were many racists in the US and Europe who admired Nazis in the late 1930s.

34. A “44” was a 44-caliber revolver used in the Old West. Made by Remington, it competed with the Colt 45 and was arguably the preferred sidearm.


36. Iraq had been allied with the USSR since 1958 and in 1972 had signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

37. Timmerman describes what the weapons were, their costs, and who they came from (1991: 419–424). The Germans and the French were major weapons suppliers.

38. The US also provided some limited military support to Iran. This was illegal and became the basis of the Iran Contra Affair (L. Walsh 1998). However, Brzezinski had set Washington on the road to favoring Baghdad, a road on which the Reagan administration drove long and fast.

39. Seymour Hersh (1987), the journalist who revealed the US military’s 1969 My Lai massacre of Vietnamese civilians, also reported a Reagan administration “obsession” with Libya.

40. Sirte has a number of spellings in English texts. Sidra and Surt are often employed.

41. The major exception is Stanik (2003).

42. The homophobia of Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz is striking. At one meeting, still fixated on the Libyan leader’s flamboyant attire, Reagan wisecracked, “Why not invite Gaddafi to San Francisco, he likes to dress up so much” (San Francisco being considered a gay paradise at the time), to which Shultz snorted, “Why don’t we give him AIDS?” (in Woodward 1987: 474).

43. Gaddafi’s expansion of Libya’s territorial waters to include the entire Gulf of Sirte has been treated as an example of his megalomania. In fact, the gulf is a rich fishing grounds where bluefin tuna is especially abundant. The expansion of territorial waters was an attempt to protect Libya’s fishermen from developed countries’ fishing industries.

44. A carrier battle group consisted of one aircraft carrier, two guided missile cruisers, two anti-aircraft warships, and two anti-submarine destroyers or frigates.

45. Just as the Nazi Luftwaffe used Spanish cities as targets to test their new bombers during the Spanish Civil War, so the US military profited from Operation Ghost Rider’s use of Libyan targets to try out their new laser-guided missile systems. Hersh (1987) claimed that four of the nine systems on F-111s attacking Gaddafi failed.

46. The term “contra,” Spanish for “overthrow,” was an abbreviation of contrarrevolución.

47. This section has used information from Ralph McGehee’s (1996) CIABASE. McGehee is a former CIA officer. CIABASE is an Internet database from public sources.

48. The Muslim Brotherhood is one of the largest and most influential Islamist movements. Founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, it combines political activism with Islamic charity, and holds the Koran and Sunnah to constitute the perfect form of social and political organization. It has been influential throughout the Islamic world since the 1960s (Pargeter 2010).

49. A general understanding of Chad’s civil wars can be found in Azevedo (1998) and Reyna (2003b). Buijtenhuijs (1978) has written a rich account of the rise of FROLINAT. John Wright (1989) discusses Libya’s interests in the Central Sahara.

50. The French, in Operations Manta (1983) and Epervier (1986), did directly intervene in Chad with ground troops and fighter aircraft.

51. Habré governed in Chad as something of a US client until December 1990. His rule became increasingly authoritarian and repressive. With CIA assistance, he created an internal security service, the Documentation and Security Directorate, which murdered and tortured many people in conjunction with other police agencies (Human Rights Watch 2005). Rumor has it that Habré bought land in Colorado, perhaps as a retirement retreat. He never made it there. His increasingly brutal dictatorship was overthrown, with French assistance,
by Idriss Déby, once Habré’s army commander. In 2000 Habré was indicted for crimes against humanity.

52. There has been an enormous growth of terrorist studies since 9/11, a discipline that, according to Michael Howard, “attracts phonys and amateurs as a candle attracts moths” (in Hoffman 2008: 136). Crenshaw (1994), Laqueur (2000), and Hoffman (2006) provide useful introductions to the topic.

53. Neocons (Boot 2011) have criticized Pape and Feldman’s position as unpersuasive.

54. The Munich Massacre was planned by Abu Daoud, who joined the Palestinian resistance after witnessing the murder of family members and neighbors by Israeli commandos. He claimed that the operation was planned not to kill the Israeli athletes but to exchange them for Palestinian prisoners. The athletes were killed only after a bungled West German attempt to rescue them (Daoud 2007).

55. The debates over the difficulty of identifying terrorists and of the role of Moscow in terrorism are discussed in Toaldo (2008: 59–65)

56. The Voice of the Arabs was a radio station that broadcast from Cairo throughout the Middle East. It was especially influential in the 1950s and 1960s; advocating Pan-Arabism and anti-imperialism, and featuring the legendary singer Umm Kulthum.

57. According to Seymour Hersh (1987), at least some high-level US security officials disagreed that Libya had been involved in the La Belle bombing. At least one Libyan believes these accusations “turned out to be false” (Ahmida 2005: 81).

58. There has been heated debate over Libya’s involvement in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. Iran had an equally strong motivation, as the Vincennes had just downed the Iranian airliner. It has even been claimed that the CIA was involved in the downing of Flight 103. Ashton and Ferguson (2001) view the evidence against Libya skeptically.