I cut their throats like lambs. I cut off their precious lives (as one cuts) a string. Like the many waters of a storm, I made (the contents of) their gullets and entrails run down upon the wide earth. My prancing steeds harnessed for my riding, plunged into the streams of their blood as (into) a river. … With the bodies of their warriors I filled the plain, like grass. (Their) testicles I cut off, and tore out their privates like the seeds of cucumbers. (Description of Assyrian Emperor Sennacherib’s [704–681 BC] military exploits. In Belibtreu [1991: 11].)

The severed hand on the metal door, the swamp of blood and mud across the road, the human brains inside a garage, the incinerated, skeletal remains of an Iraqi mother and her three small children in their still-smoldering car. … Two missiles from an American jet killed them all—by my estimate, more than 20 Iraqi civilians, torn to pieces … (Chronicle of civilian deaths following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, roughly 2,700 years after, but not so far from, the scene of Sennacherib’s military triumphs. [Fisk 2003]).

Iperialism and empire: A system of domination of states and peoples maintained and extended by another state. Imperialism often involves territorial expansion but can also imply less direct forms of economic and political domination. … A consensus among scholars on the precise characteristics of imperial systems has been more elusive. (Calhoun 2002)

C ontemplate the above quotations. The chronicler of Assyrian Emperor Sennacherib’s reign recorded that the emperor “tore out’ the “privates” of his slain foes like “seeds of a cucumber.” A chronicle of civilian deaths during US warring in Iraq 2,700 years after Sennacherib’s rule, but not so far from it, has children “incinerated, skeletal remains.” Warring, with all its violence, is what imperial elites do, from Sennacherib to George W. Bush. This chapter offers an understanding of empires and imperialism, which, as Calhoun above reports, has been “elusive.”¹
Specifically, I propose a critical structural realist approach to empire, first by presenting basic components of the term; next by distinguishing premodern from modern imperialisms to give readers some idea of the diversity of imperial domination; and finally, having established some knowledge of imperial variety, helping readers to discover a particular matter that has been absent from recent understandings of empires and their imperialism. This discovery leads to Friedrich Nietzsche.

Imperialism as a Dynamics of Domination

One reason imperialism is so hard to pin down is that there were, and are, many sorts of empires and imperialisms. The ancient imperialisms of the Assyrians and Romans or the Shang Dynasty in China come to mind, as do the medieval imperialisms of the Carolingians in France, the Ottonians in Germany, the Plantagenets in Britain and France, as well as the more powerful Ottomans in the Middle East, Moghuls in India, or Yuan and Ming Dynasties in China. After AD 1400, the European modern imperialisms included the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, French, German, Italian, and British Empires, upon which it was said that the sun never set (though it did after 1945). Following World War II, a “new” imperialism arose, with the US the key example. Let us begin at the beginning.

In roughly BP 6000, no place on the globe was under imperial domination. People were organized into different forms of bands, tribes, and chiefdoms. By 1900 the entire world was effectively under, or had been under, imperial domination. This clearly shows the importance of imperialism in the strings of events that twist through human history. Mills, as we saw in the last chapter, observed that modernity was about the “enlargement and centralization” of economic, political, and military institutions. But it is possible to be more precise and suggest that since the invention of the state soon after BP 6000, the major power dynamic has been the “enlargement and centralization” of force resources in the economic, political, and military institutions of different empires. The preceding brings us to a complaint concerning Michel Foucault’s notion of power.

Foucault had it exactly wrong when he said, “Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere” (1990: 93). “Comes from everywhere”—a fine thunderbolt of rhetorical melodrama! However, did the gentleman really mean “everywhere”? Power may be everywhere, but does he not know that power comes from somewhere; that the somewhere is the location of the force resources that somebodies in the somewhere control, and that these somebodies are normally the elites in the economic, political, and military service of imperial
states? If one wishes to study the power dynamics of the most powerful social being in E-space over the last six millennia, one must study the somewhere—the social forms of imperial governance—that are the abode of elites with the force to dominate, which brings us to domination and value.

**Domination, Force, and Value**

There have been different sorts of imperialisms, but all the variants share one attribute. All are systems of force and power in which one state has the force to achieve the power of “domination,” as Calhoun pointed out, over other “states and peoples.” Here “domination” is broadly understood as structures where some (dominating) actors or social forms have some powers over other (dominated) actors or social forms. This power is far from complete, especially in earlier empires, where domination tended to be extensive but not especially dense, which is to say that such empires tended to dominate relatively large numbers of people in few areas of their lives.

In empires, the state is the social form whose operations perform domination. The state doing the dominating is “imperial.” It is the empire’s “core.” States and dominated peoples are the imperial state’s “dominion” (or empire). Less dominated states and peoples are said to be on the “periphery.” Empires tend to have “fused” (Harvey 2003: 23) economic and political systems and thus may be termed social beings. Domination is not automatic. Agents of domination—elites and their myrmidons—work day in and day out in imperial institutions to insure domination. Hence, the strings of empire are exercises of force with a specific logic aimed at achieving the power of reproducing domination, raising the question: What gets dominated in imperial systems?

In this area matters get elusive. In non-Marxist understandings of the term empire what tends to get dominated is the politics. For example, Michael Doyle (1986: 12) defines imperialism as a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the “effective sovereignty” of another. Marxist understandings stress the economics of domination (Brewer 1980). Lenin, for example, insisted that “imperialism is the epoch of finance capital and of monopolies, which introduce everywhere the striving for domination, not for freedom” ([1917] 1963). More generally, Marxist understandings of domination stress that it involves the power to extract economic value from the dominated and its accumulation by the dominators, imperial elites. As understood here, imperial domination is the ability of states to reproduce by exercising force to have power over other states or territories; also understood is that one of the most important of these powers is that of extracting force resources.
Monies, assets, and equities possessing use and/or exchange economic value are understood as the type of force resource earlier termed instruments. If “use-value” is the needs satisfied by a thing and “exchange value” is what can acquired for that thing, then it follows that the more that value is possessed, the more things can be acquired to satisfy more needs. Because economic value can be exchanged for the other forces resources, facilitating imperial reproduction, it is an especially attractive instrument for imperial elites.

This suggests that imperial dynamics require two systems: economic ones based on institutions with force resources that have the power to produce economic value; and political ones based on institutions with forces resources that have the power to ensure that economic extraction is supported, whether by peaceful or violent means. In the premodern world, economic and political institutions were often undifferentiated and centered on logics that extracted value largely from agricultural enterprise. An empire’s elite extracted surplus agricultural labor and products, employing different revenue institutions. That very same elite also provided the support to ensure that revenue extraction proceeded smoothly. The modern world witnessed imperial differentiation with the emergence of economic elites running capitalist institutions to extract money-value from the economic system, supported by and distinct from government elites in state regimes in the political system. In this view empires are social beings doing domination especially in other countries and other regions, as their elites amass force and, with force, power.

Imperial dynamics, then, are about force administration, whose managerial work can be expressed as follows:

1. Imperial operations involve logics with the power to produce domination by states over other states or territories;
2. Achievement of domination produces extraction of force resources, controlled by elites;
3. Extraction of force resources requires prior exercise of force resources;
4. Thus, imperial dynamics involve the production and reproduction of force.
5. The more the reproduction of force is insufficient to produce previous force levels, the greater the imperial reproductive vulnerability

Imperialism, so comprehended, is the dynamics of empire—the production and reproduction of imperial social beings, with elites doing whatever it takes to keep them going (simple reproduction) and, when possible, to grow them (extended reproduction).
Violence in Empires

As already noted, the work of domination is the conduct of exercises of force. Two sorts of exercises of force can be distinguished: those that do not utilize violence, and those that do. Nonviolent force is likely to achieve its intended powers when those to whom the force is applied desire what is intended for them, or at least do not oppose it. But when those who are to be dominated do not desire what is intended for them, they are likely to resist. In such situations, when nonviolent ways of making actors do what they resist have failed, violence is the recourse. It works by either eliminating those resisting domination, or terrorizing them into submission.

Now, if you make something you generally want to keep it, and do with it what you want. This suggests a generalization: actors who create value normally desire to keep it, exchange it for other valuables, or enlarge it. Elites within imperial social beings extract value from those who made it. Because what these elites do is take from those who made, they base their domination on frustration of the dominateds’ desires. Follow the reasoning here: imperial reproduction involves value extraction, threatening the desires of the dominated. Frustrated desire is likely to provoke resistance against those doing the frustration. Resistance can threaten the dominators’ value extraction, intensifying the dominator/dominated contradiction, raising the specter of reproductive vulnerability. This means that empires are subject to a fundamental contradiction: a dominator/dominated contradiction, where the more value dominators get, the less the dominated get, and vice versa. Between empires there is an imperial contradiction, in which different empires seek to dominate and extract value from each other. This is actually a version of the dominator/dominated contradiction in which the social forms doing domination and being dominated are empires.

When imperial elites’ force extraction is threatened, they work to relax the dominator/dominated contradiction, sometimes by reducing the extraction, often by devising ideological and world view messages to hermetically seal the dominated into the view that they really desire the extraction of their value, which is a bit like convincing people they really enjoy extraction of their teeth. But if resistance continues, at some point such messages become unconvincing, and other nonviolent means of reducing their vulnerability fail. When this occurs, it is time for imperial elites to become raging bulls and violently oblige submission. In order to do this they must evolve structures for the exercise of violent force—standing armies, potent navies, ferocious weapons, specialized killers to work the weapons. Consequently, imperial social beings may have peaceful institutions of value extraction (buying and selling or systems of taxation), and they may have peaceful institutions of desire manipulation (religious or other forms of
mass media). But if they are to reproduce for any substantial period, they must have enduring institutions of violence.

Thus, the basics of imperialism are fivefold: (1) state domination of other states or regions (2) by elites in political and economic institutions in the dominating state, so that (3) the political and economic institutions of the dominating state reproduce through the extraction of value, (4) creating a dominator/dominated contradiction that, (5) when intensified and resistant to peaceful means of relaxation, requires dominator elites to exercise violence. In this view of imperialism, violence is not just something that happens when you have empires. It is a part of the anatomy of the social being—what it does some of the time to reproduce. With this in mind, let us develop a more complete account of imperial diversity, distinguishing the imperialism found in modernity from its premodern predecessors.

**Imperial Diversity**

When considering modern empires, it is helpful to contrast them with their premodern counterparts and then describe their transformation. To do so, consider the premodern exemplar of England during the time of Plantagenet rulers (1154–1485).

**Premodern Imperialism and Its Transformation**

The Plantagenets began with Henry II, included his sons Richard the Lionheart and John Lackland, and died out in the dynastic struggles of the Wars of the Roses. There was the empire itself, and places beyond it. The empire itself consisted of a hierarchy of vassals in reciprocal relations. Monarchs invited members of their entourage to swear fealty and gave those so swearing a fief (a territory) in return; or nobles held fiefs by virtue of inheritance. Such nobles (dukes, barons, earls, etc.) were the king’s vassals. Vassals with large fiefdoms created their own vassals by offering fiefs from their own lands to favorites from their retinue. At times sub-vassals found sub-sub vassals whom they enfeoffed. Vassals, sub-vassals, and sub-vassals owed allegiance and military service to their lords, who in turn provided vassals with protection and advancement. The system expanded territorially—that is, experienced expanded reproduction—when the monarch or some large vassal organized their vassals into armies that were used to acquire territory from places not in the empire. Under the Plantagenets these places were in France or on the Celtic fringes of the British Isles, and the resulting empire, at its height under Henry II, included much of the current UK and Western France.
The empire extracted and accumulated force resources in the form of goods and labor service deriving from the land. In principle, the monarch was the landowner, with his rights of ownership conferred on his vassals. Those who farmed the land did so either as free laborers or as serfs bound to a particular vassal’s lands. All vassals, by virtue of being landowners, were entitled to some portion of the agricultural produce and/or labor of the agrarian laborers. Fees paid for the use of a natural resource are a rent. Land is a natural resource. The amount of agricultural products or labor provided to nobles by an agrarian worker was a rent. Generally, the more land a monarch or vassal had, the more agrarian laborers he or she had, and the greater the rent that could be accumulated. Crucially, the units of government were those that accumulated rent. Political and economic systems were undifferentiated.

But this was not the whole story. Premodern empires also had markets where goods and services could be exchanged. When a seller received a sum of money for a product or service in excess of what it had cost, then that seller had made a monetary profit, that is, had accumulated capital. So premodern empires had two forms of value accumulation: rents and capital, the former predominating.

However, a reversal of the dominant form of value accumulation began with Western European imperial expansion in the fifteenth century. At first, when warring overseas, the Portuguese and Spanish attempted to transplant their medieval institutions of rent to newly acquired colonies, which generally withered. They then, like the Dutch, English, and French who followed, increasingly sought to accumulate force from other sources. Initially, this was through what Marx ([1867] 1909: 784–866) in Capital had termed “primitive accumulation”: the taking of objects with exchange value, especially gold and silver, by uneconomic means. Thereafter, force was increasingly acquired through trade from the sixteenth through the early eighteenth centuries. This time, sometimes called the Mercantilist Period, involved an expanding commercial capitalism based on great trading companies (such as the British East India Company and Dutch East India Company). This meant a proliferation of nongovernmental enterprises whose sole business was capital accumulation, which produced the differentiation of the economic from the political system.

The late eighteenth century saw the start of huge amounts of capital accumulating via an expanding industrial capitalism and the emergence of great industrial empires, especially those of the English, Germans, and Japanese. Next, as first recognized by Rudolf Hilferding ([1910] 1981), emphasized by Lenin ([1917] 1963), and seemingly borne out by recent financial history, starting in 1900 increasing quantities of capital were accumulated by expanding financial enterprises. This meant the economic
system was increasingly differentiated into commercial, industrial, and financial capitalist branches. In sum, whereas in premodern imperialisms elites managed undifferentiated governmental and economic systems that extracted force in the form of agrarian rents, their modern replacements directed highly differentiated economic and governmental systems to extract force as either commercial, industrial, or, increasingly, financial capital.

There is an implication here that needs to be made explicit. Bruno Latour (2012) has written a clever book, *We Have Never Been Modern*, whose title contains its thesis. I think him correct, though for reasons he might not recognize. If modernity, as defined in the introduction, is a time of concatenation of capitalist and state systems; and if these systems are imperial; then the human being of modernity is the hurly-burly of empires going about their business of force extraction. But, as the reader grasps, the history of pre-modernity since the origin of the state has equally been that of the vicissitudes of imperialism. So, make no mistake about it, Latour’s claim of the non-modernity of modernity is spot on because something ancient—empire—is part and parcel of modern states, with their differentiated economic and political systems and their commercial, industrial, and financial forms of capitalism. Further, it is helpful to recognize that modern imperialism, suffused with antiquity, has had either formal or informal structural alternates.

**Formal and Informal Imperialism**

The term “formal” was explicitly introduced into social thought by Max Weber when he wrote that a “formal organization” is “an association (*be trieb*) with a continuously and rationally operating staff” (1922: 52). By “staff” Weber meant the personnel of bureaucratic organizations. By “rationally” he understood a staff operating according to written governmental or administrative rules. John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson (1953) famously distinguished between formal and informal imperialisms. “Formal” imperialism concerns making “colonies”: territories with imperial administrative staffs governed by executive, legislative, and administrative laws incorporating them into the empires’ governance structure as either core or colonial officials. Gallagher and Robinson developed the notion of informal empire based on their interpretation of the UK’s economic and political activities in South America during the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century. “Informal” imperialism has perceptively been termed the “oblique mode” of empire making (Kiernan 1978: xv)—oblique because such imperialism does not directly and formally institute colonies, but rather organizes “neo-colonies” (“client states”), that is, territories that are not incorporated into core states’ structure but whose political
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economy is controlled to facilitate cores states’ domination, especially with regard to force extraction. This, Gallagher and Robinson observed, was exactly how Great Britain dominated nineteenth-century South America.

Formal empire is more transparent than its informal counterpart. Its administrative apparatus of domination is out there for everybody to see. There are ideological messages that glorify the domination. There is a Colonial Office. There are colonies that say they are colonies, with showy parades of plainly visible imperial soldiers, police, administrators, capitalists or their compradors, judges, missionaries—all colorful, all privileged, all dominating, all the time.

Of course, as already observed, formal domination stimulates the desires of the dominated. Many of the dominated loathed their dominators and learn from them how to revolt, intensifying the dominator/dominated contradiction. Since the American Revolutionary War (1776–1783), the contradictions of formal empire have been pretty revolting. Latin America followed the US into revolution throughout the nineteenth century. During the first half of the twentieth century much of the rest of the world developed nationalist or socialist independence ideologies—some violent (Chaliand 1989), others not (such as Gandhi’s Quit India campaign)—directed against imperial dominators.

Informal empire is opaque. Nobody calls dominated states colonies any more. They have their “independence” and “sovereignty.” There is no panoply of formal imperial institutions and actors. Imperial elites are withdrawn from the colonies, so everyday life appears untouched by their meddling. Consequently, a dominated state looks like any state, with its particular politics, its own economy, colorful stamps, a nice flag, and a rousing national anthem.

However, a closer look reveals them to be “neo-colonies,” a term coined by Nkrumah (1966), the first president of Ghana, after he recognized that the formal independence graciously being granted by the old imperial powers in the 1960s was just a new form of the old domination. Some scholars prefer the term “client state”; Gavan McCormack (2007), for example, has called Japan a client state of the US. Client states or neo-colonies are countries in which the imperial core has an enduring interest because the country is in some way useful to the core’s reproduction.

As elites well know, no trip would be agreeable without the assistance of luggage handlers to manage the baggage over there. When economic and political elites, themselves in the core of informal empires, deal with client states, these elites may be imagined as a sort of high-class baggage handlers. Their job is to handle the “baggage” in dominated countries to the satisfaction of the core. Let us call these persons “imperial handlers.” In economic systems they are the high executives in business, finance, and
the media; and in the governmental systems they are senior-level government officials, ambassadors, and military officers. Equally, there are economic and political elites in the dominated countries themselves whose chore is to assist in this domination. The elites in client states or neocolonies who assist imperial handlers in their domination occupy key positions in the dominated country’s economic and political institutions as presidents, prime ministers, generals, and the like. They are termed “subject” elites, because they are subject to their handlers. Many subject elites are “hybrid” actors, a notion discussed in chapter 5. In Afghanistan in the summer of 2010, for example, President Hamid Karzai was a subject elite supervised by three main handlers—Karl Eikenberry, the US ambassador to Kabul; US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke; and General David Petreaus, commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. There is no formal institution of subject elites and their handlers in informal empires. Rather, subject-elite/handler networks are designed ad hoc to handle each particular situation.

Subject elites tend to receive handsome rewards from their imperial handlers. Consider, for example, the case of President Kurman Bakiyev (2005–2010), former president of Kyrgyzstan in Central Asia. Bakiyev became something of a US client following the “Tulip Revolution” in 2005 that brought him to power, in which US involvement was reported (Spencer 2005). Despite competition for Bakiyev’s services from Russians seeking his assistance to re-establish influence in their former Central Asian territory, the US successfully recruited him because “Washington just bought up the Bakiyev family lock stock and barrel” (Bhadarkumar 2010). It did this by making “the Bakiyev family … a huge beneficiary of contracts dished out by the Pentagon ostensibly for providing supplies to the US air base in Manas near the Kyrgyz capital, Bishkek.” Some estimates put “the figure that the Pentagon awarded last year (2009) to businesses owned by members of the Bakiyev family as US$80 million” (ibid.).

Subject elites who rebel against their imperial handlers are punished. This was the fate of Ngo Dinh Diem, president of South Vietnam in the 1950s and early 1960s. The administration of President Kennedy became increasingly disenchanted with his ability to prosecute the war against North Vietnam. Accordingly, with the support of the CIA, a 1963 coup was planned with elements of the South Vietnam military, and Diem was “terminated with extreme prejudice” (the CIA’s euphemism for assassination).

Informal empire became more sustainable in the twentieth century because of “space-time compression” (Harvey 1990). Economic and government elites are now able to communicate instantly and to move various forms of economic or violent force rapidly to areas of the world as needed. Such a technology increased informal empires’ practicability, as political
and economic elites do not have to be there all the time. They can get there “just in time.” Increased sustainability made informal empires preferable because they were—and are, as earlier indicated—more nearly invisible and hence less susceptible to rebellion. The world never really knew that Saddam Hussein had been something of a US client. Then, when he began to act independently, the Bush I regime was able to rush in just in time with “shock and awe” to replace him.\(^6\) Thus, since the end of World War II the lesser visibility of informal empires, conjoined with greater powers of space-time compression, made them appear more sustainable than their formal counterparts. The reconceptualization of imperialism is almost complete. Nevertheless, something important requiring emphasis will lead us to Nietzsche and a monster.

**Nietzsche and a Monster**

This world: a monster of energy.

—Friedrich Nietzsche, *Will to Power*

What is missing in our understanding of imperialism is the obvious thing. Sennacherib went around tearing out the “privates” of his foes in the Middle East. Twenty-seven centuries later, US imperial generals in the same area went around leaving its children “screaming and crying.” Everywhere and at all times in empires, according to Burbank and Cooper (2010: 2), “Violence and day-to-day coercion were fundamental”, because everywhere and at all times imperialism, as Timothy Parsons (2010: 4) put it, involved “a conquering power.” Why?

When the state was invented, as we saw, institutions that specialized in inflicting violence were developed in the governmental system. What an invention these violent institutions were. They combined large numbers of specialized ferocious actors (warriors) and large numbers of violent instruments (swords, lances, axes, etc.) with a specialized technical culture that conveyed knowledge of how to choreograph violent force resources. Armies were born, and a real appreciation emerged: killing people with such institutions was an excellent way to acquire valuable force and lots of it, even if those who created it did not want to give it up. You attacked a people, you defeated them, you took some of their wealth, and you kept on taking. If they didn’t give, you killed some more, and then they gave. Missing, then, from the understanding of imperialism is recognition of the connection between killing and force extraction. The invention of military institutions controlled by governmental elites made killing a force resource with the power to acquire, maintain, or expand force extraction.
Now Nietzsche enters. Added violent force is an instrument easily combined with other force resources to make added power. Power can be used to make more force. More force, more power. There is no social form better able to make more force and power than the fused economic and governmental systems of an empire. Of course, force and power get things done in social beings, so they are the “energy” that Nietzsche spoke of in the quotation that began this section. “This world” is “a monster of energy” because empires seek to continually add force and power.

Empires have been around for a long, long time, their imperialisms operating far back into antiquity. And empires do what empires do. Among other things, they kill lots and lots of people so that a few elites can control enormous value, force, and power. This means we have never really been modern. Rather, since invention of the state, human being has been in thrall to a social form that is a thing whereby elites dominate everybody else. As such, empires might be imagined as monsters of Nietzschean energy—Leviathans swimming in the seas of human being.

Finally, it has been posited that these Leviathans swim in contradictory seas. But does the empire itself, doing what it does, create those contradictions? Are empires social beings that, in constructing themselves, deconstruct themselves? Deadly Contradictions aims to address this question, and will do so by moving from the theoretical highlands guided by the map of global warring theory into empirical seas, in order to see whether the US Leviathan is observed to do what it is theoretically supposed to do. The two chapters in the next section, Plausibility I: The New American Empire, argue the plausibility of American empire.

Notes

1. One reason imperial understanding has been “elusive” is that the concept is highly contested. Another reason is that imperial phenomena are complex, and definitions have been opaque.

2. Timothy Parsons (2010) and Burbank and Cooper (2010) have investigated empires throughout the globe from ancient to modern times, discussing their emergence, logics, cultures, and conflicts. Darwin (2008) provides an overview of modern empires from 1400 until the present. Owen and Sutcliffe (1972), Mommsen (1980), Chilcote (2000), Harvey (2003), and Callinicos (2009) are theoretically useful.

3. A useful overview of Plantagenet England can be found in Prestwich (2005).

4. Wallerstein (1974) insisted that the seventeenth century witnessed the beginning of the replacement of imperial systems with that of single world system. This assertion is implausible. The rise of European imperialisms over larger and larger spaces of the globe began in the seventeenth century. Different empires were the structural units within and beyond which space was globally organized.

5. The degree of capital accumulation in premodern empires is a subject of debate. It is true that the great fairs of the thirteenth-century Europe were important mercantile enter-
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prises. It is equally correct that some medieval empires, such as that of the Vikings in the early middle ages or the Venetians in the later middle ages, emphasized trade. However, these empires flourished due to trade between great empires that themselves were largely based upon agrarian rents. Thus, the Viking empire in the east connected Northern Europe to Russia and the Middle East, while the Venetian empire was part of a world system that connected the Occident with the Orient (Abu-Lughod 1991).

6. Roger Morris, a National Security Council staff member during the administrations of Presidents Johnson and Nixon, wrote that “according to the former Ba’athist leader Hani Fkaiki, among party members colluding with the CIA in 1962 and 1963 was Saddam Hussein” (in D. Morgan 2003).