

PART I

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# THEORY

# GLOBAL WARRING THEORY

## *A Critical Structural Realist Approach*

A traveler on a journey needs a map to tell her or him where to go. A scientific traveler's map is a theory, which tells her or him where to go to find the evidence that supports the theory. Of course, mapmakers know there are different methods of making maps, just as theoreticians recognize diverse approaches (paradigms or problematics) for constructing theories. This chapter has two parts. The first presents critical structural realism, an approach to formulating theory. The second then applies this approach to construct global warring theory, which accounts for the New American Empire's propensity for belligerence. Crucial to the chapter's intellectual work is the conceptualization of human being in terms of structure and contradiction, with these latter terms reconceptualized in terms of force and power.

### Critical Structural Realism

In the early 1970s, Clifford Geertz (1973: 20) suggested that the heart of anthropology should be "ethnographic description." Actually, anthropological research had utilized such description since Franz Boas, though Boas was careful to encourage the use of other techniques, especially those permitting observation of vast areas over long times. US archeology originated for this reason. But by the mid 1980s, the influential *Writing Culture* crew (Clifford and Marcus 1986) had taken Geertz's suggestion to heart, banishing from the discipline anything that was not ethnographic and further decreeing, "Ethnographic writings can properly be called fictions" (1986: 6). Then, nearly two decades after the publication of *Writing Cul-*

ture, Marcus (2002: 3) noticed something alarming: ethnographies were “objects of aestheticism and often summary judgment and evaluation” that were “judged quickly,” used “to establish reputation, and, then ... often forgotten.” An intellectual discipline whose major production is “often forgotten” is itself in danger of extinction. In what follows, the goal is not to eliminate ethnography but to suggest an additional, more epistemically robust and ontologically macroscopic anthropology based upon critical structural realist foundations to help make anthropology less forgettable.

## Realism

Realism is to be distinguished from positivism. Positivism, which occurs in several varieties, is a philosophy of science that in Auguste Comte’s version holds theology and metaphysics to be imperfect epistemologies, compared to science. *Deadly Contradictions* takes no stand on positivism, though it hardly seems promising to insist theology or metaphysics is a more promising way of knowing reality than science. Realism is equally distinguished from idealism, which holds that being is “dependent upon the existence of some mind” (Fetzer and Almeder 1993: 65). Realism is the belief that reality, or being (the terms are used interchangeably), is ontologically independent of mind (cognitive structures, conceptual schemes, etc.). Scientific realism—supported by Leplin (1984), Niiniluoto (2002), Psillos (2005) and Sokal (2008)—is the view that science has reliable techniques for seeking truth, and that the being explained by scientific approximate truths is the real world, as far as it is knowable.<sup>1</sup>

Realism is of interest due to an ontological underpinning based upon the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). This principle is powerful, controversial, and ancient, with expressions in both non-Western and Western thought. PSR assumed its modern, Western form in the work of Spinoza and Leibnitz (Pruss 2006). It states: Everything must have a reason or cause. If ontology is the study of the nature of reality, then what makes the PSR powerful is its conceptual immensity. Everything—all being, all reality—must have a cause. What makes the principle controversial is that there can be complications in answering the imperative “Prove it.” My own support for the PSR comes from the still older principle that *ex nihilo, nihil fit* (from nothing, comes nothing). Reality is not a universe of nothing: it is full of somethings, and if somethings cannot come from nothing, they must have come from (i.e., be caused by) something else. This suggests that the nature of reality consists in vast structures of somethings connected by causality with other somethings, reaching through all places and all times in all universes. The task of scholars is to seek the approximate truth of this structure of causal couplings. *Deadly Contradictions* undertakes its journey

to explore the structuring of human being. Consider, now, the structure in critical structural realism.

### *Structure, Force, and Power*

It is universally allowed that matter, in all its operations, is actuated by a necessary force, and that every natural effect is so precisely determined by the energy of its cause that no other effect, in such particular circumstances, could possibly have resulted from it. (Hume [1739] 2003)

In the quotation above David Hume announced the view that material things, including people, are “actuated by a necessary force,” a “cause” that has its “effect.” Actually, the Enlightenment-era Hume (1711–1776) was restating the older view of Hobbes (1588–1679; in Champlain 1971) that human power can be understood as the operation of causality. Understanding power as causality is a useful way to rethink structuralism as a method for analyzing structures as phenomena that are always in motion, always dynamic.<sup>2</sup> Let us turn to a French Mandarin of structuralism in order to formulate this reconceptualization.

As the structural Marxist mandarin Louis Althusser (1970: 36; emphasis in original) put it, “*The real*: it is structured,” in the sense that being, including human being, exhibits parts in some relationship to some other parts. This is a realist position. The objects of study in such an ontology are the realities of different sorts of structures. The structures I am interested in are not those imagined by the 1940–1960s French structuralists that, except in the work of the structural Marxists, ultimately concerned structures of the mind.<sup>3</sup>

Instead, critical structural realism studies “human being.” What is such being? Consider the following event, which took place in the American West but could have happened anywhere. An elderly couple who had been married for more than a half century pulled out of a store’s parking lot onto a heavily traveled road. The husband, the driver, did not see that a car was bearing down upon them, and there was a collision. When help arrived at the scene, they found the dying couple holding hands. In all places and in all times, that is what humans do. They hold hands, which is a trope for making connections. In this optic, a connection is doing something together, even if, as in the case of the elderly couple, it is the last thing they do.

“Human being” is a sector of reality—that of humanity, where humans reach out to connect with others. Structures are connected parts. They may be small and intimate—a dying couple reaching out to hold each other’s hands—or vast and impersonal, like transnational corporations’ thrusting of their hands into profit-making in all corners of the globe. In

this reality of human being it is force that has the power to make connection. Force and power are discussed at greater length below; for the moment, understand “reaching out” as the force that has the effect—the power—of “holding hands,” and consider the sorts of connections humans make.

A “social form” is any organization of connections in human being. It is heuristically understood to include practices, institutions, systems, and social beings. Persons using their force to do things in some sequence will be termed “actors” with regard to the things they do, the powers they create. Actors are the atomic parts of social forms. Actors in motion interacting with other actors, doing things, achieving particular forces and powers, will be understood as “practices” (as in surgical or dental practices). “Institutions” are co-occurring, interrelated practices (as in the institution of medicine). “Systems” are actions articulated into practices that are part of institutions connected with other institutions (as in political or economic systems). “Social beings” are the most complex forms of human being. They are articulated systems, whose connections may be within or between state social forms..

The different social forms in human being are generally “open” in that, in some way and at certain times, they interact with other structural units in human being, as well as animate and inanimate structures beyond it. They are also generally “autopoetic” in the sense that they are capable of reproducing and maintaining the social being. Finally, they are “reflexive,” that is, capable of reflecting upon events and altering actions and practices in accord with the information provided by reflection, to effect reproduction.<sup>4</sup> Human reflexivity is social, a point developed further later in the chapter.

*Agency:* Human actors and the structures they operate exhibit agency, here understood as a particular human faculty that attains power. Power is discussed more fully later; it can be provisionally understood here as outcomes, things done. Human power structures are composed of material things: people, living objects, and nonliving objects. A rock is a thing. In the absence of people it just sits there. Rocks do not plan what to do with themselves—to pop in on Granny, or do some shopping. People plan. They scheme—as in, “Let’s throw that rock!”—because they have a type of structure (the brains) that allows them to do this. Things like rocks lack brains and are plotless. Plotting is people’s use of the brain in order to use other materialities—people and things—to do something, that is, to have powers. Reality consists of things with brains and things without them, and it is useful to conceptualize their differences. Agency, a term whose function is to clarify this difference, is the use of the brain to combine different

material objects and humans to create a force that leads to an outcome, a power. Brainless objects lack agency.<sup>5</sup>

Bruno Latour insists that “Objects Too Have Agency” (2005: 63); for him, the domain of objects includes nonliving physical ones. Objectively, this is questionable (at least regarding the nonliving physical objects): by giving such objects agency Latour conflates them with people, obscuring that humans have brains and can plot, whereas nonliving objects lack brains and cannot. A conceptualization of being that eliminates existing difference is not especially accurate. Critically, Latour confuses influence with agency. “Influence” is a more general term; it is any force that can have, or contribute to having, an outcome. Agency is a particular type of influence: force that involves human plotting to achieve its power.

Humans use their agency in choreographing regular and repeated relationships with other people and things. The key term “choreographing” is generalized from its meaning in dance to denote the designing of sequences of movements in which motion of objects, including human objects, is specified in time and space. For example, first I pick up the stone, then I throw it. My relationship to the stone is a structure consisting of two parts (me and my stone) and might be thought of as a force that has an outcome: the power of a stone thrown. Now imagine that I am in some occupied territory amongst oppressed people. Somebody says, “Throw stones at the police.” When this is communicated from one brain to the others, a larger structure and force is created, that of a number of people practicing stoning the police. Objectively put, “agency” is working of human brains to choreograph other actors and their objects together in different spaces, doing different things at different times to achieve some force with some power. Human agency so understood is a condition of human being.

*E-Space, I-Space, and Hobbes:* In this ontology of human being composed of power structures, there are two structural domains: one based upon structures found in “E-space” (often termed the objective), including structures human and otherwise *external* to persons; and the other found in structures observed in “I-space” (alternatively the subjective) including biological forms *internal* to individuals, importantly the nervous system (Reyna 2002a). Though E- and I-space are indeed two structural domains, these domains are something of a monad. This is true because the brain is in the body and the body is out and about in the external world of social forms.

Component structures in this monad can be represented by conceptualization of empirical and theoretical realms of analysis. At the “empirical” level, structural realities are described in terms of what is observed to happen, when in time, and where in space. For example, it might be perceived that in the summer a builder bought two tons of cement, a ton of bricks,

and three workers working forty days to construct a house he sold at three hundred thousand dollars in the fall. At the “theoretical” level, more general and abstract terms should be induced or deduced from happenings observed on the concrete level. One way this can be done with the previous example is to recognize more abstractly that the builder’s action can be explained in terms of capital and labor investments made to achieve a profit. Concepts regarding large amounts of space and time in E-space of an entire social being are macro-regions; those representing individual actors within a social being are meso-regions, and ones concerning what happens within individuals’ I-space represent micro-regions. *Deadly Contradictions* is largely interested in how macro-and meso-regions influence each other.

E- and I-space monads are organizations of force and power. Now it is time to bring Hume’s predecessor, Thomas Hobbes, more fully into the picture to present his view of power (Reyna 2001, 2003b). Hobbes (1651) saw power as the flow of causality in reality, with causes being forces having the capacity to produce effects, powers. An important rejection of such an approach is said to come from postmodernists, many of whom discard causality (Rosenau 1992). However, this was not the case for Michel Foucault, who broke away from Althusser to become essential in creating postmodernism. He claimed in 1975 that “in fact, power produces” and that among other things, “it produces reality” ([1975] 1991: 194). If something produces something else, then it can be said to cause it; and power, in Foucault’s view, “produces” something vast, “reality.” Foucault’s position was shared by the philosopher of science Wesley Salmon (1998: 298), for whom causal events “are the means by which structure and order are propagated ... from one space-time region ... to other times and places.”

Thus, reality is structured (according to Althusser). The structuring is the work of causality (according to Hobbes, Hume, Foucault, and Salmon). Earlier (Reyna 2002a), I argued that in this ontology relationships can be established between cause/effect and force/power. Force (cause) in an antecedent time and space has power (effect) in a subsequent time and space. This is a first property of causality, one that Hume long ago called “constant conjunction” (1739: 657). How is constant conjunction possible? One answer is that what connects cause to effect is something that intervenes between them and has the effect of “producing” (Bunge 1959: 46–48) the conjunction. The ontological significance of the preceding warrants further examination of force and power.

### *Force*

Force, as I use the term, is not necessarily solely physical coercion or violence; rather, it is employed in a more general sense, as cause. But cause, as

I here imagine it, contains within itself those materialities that do the “producing” of conjunction, connecting antecedent causes with subsequent effects.<sup>6</sup> These materialities are “force resources”: in causes what connects with effects. There are five varieties of resources whose utilizations are “exercises of force.” The first involves “instruments”—tools, monies (capital), technologies, and so on—things individuals have devised that, when used, make things happen. The second force resource is “land,” the raw materials that people use when they make things happen. A third force resource is “actors,” individuals performing practical or discursive action. “Discursive” action is use of the body to write or speak. “Practical” action is use of the body, usually with tools, to get something done. Labor, of course, has been a particularly important sort of practical action in economic groups. Actors using instruments on land can make things happen, if they have the fourth and fifth force resources, that is, cultural and authoritative resources, which are discussed next.

### *Culture and Hermeneutic Puzzles*

“Culture,” a fourth force resource, involves signs of the times learned and shared by people. Such signs are representations of being, or representations of representations that may or may not be about being. Humans lacking culture may experience reality but they don’t know it, and what they do not know they cannot communicate to others. Consider, for example, the case of Sarah Palin, the 2008 Republican Vice-Presidential candidate. On one occasion in the 2008 campaign,

members of her traveling party met Palin at the Ritz-Carlton near Reagan airport, in Pentagon City, Virginia—and found that, although she’d made some progress with her memorization and studies, her grasp of rudimentary facts and concepts was minimal. Palin couldn’t explain why North and South Korea were separate nations. She didn’t know what the Fed did. Asked who attacked America on 9/11, she suggested several times that it was Saddam Hussein. And asked to identify the enemy that her son would be fighting in Iraq, she drew a blank. (R. Adams 2010)

The purpose of this example is not to deride Ms. Palin (many people are ignorant of lots of cultural information), but to recognize that she did not know important aspects of her culture—for example, what the Fed (the most important financial institution in the US) does, or who attacked on 9/11 (it being difficult to oppose an enemy if you do not know who it is). The problem with not knowing one’s culture, or parts of it, is that one does not have information about being—of what is or what to do about it.

A distinction (Reyna 2002a) has been made between “neuronal” (I-space) and “discursive” (E-space) culture: the former is “enculturated”



(some now prefer “embodied”), that is, learned and stored in cortical memory networks; and the latter externalized, contained in speech or writing. Further, “perceptual” is distinct from “procedural” forms of neuronal and discursive culture, the former being information about *what is* and the latter being information about *what to do about it*. Cultural signs are assembled to provide information that contains messages. Cultural messages contain both perceptual and procedural cultural meaning, and may be widespread and enduring, or restricted and fleeting in populations. In the Trobriands, the interpretation of a certain necklace as a *soulava* was a perceptual cultural message; giving it away in the *kula* for a *mwali* armband was a procedural cultural message. In the US, a diagnosis is a perceptual message; a treatment is a procedural one. The term desire needs to be introduced because it is closely related to culture.

In Shakespeare’s *Much Ado About Nothing*, a comedy of errors whose protagonists get swept away by their feelings, Benedick, one of the play’s main characters, explains: “for man is but a giddy thing, and this is my conclusion” (1623). Right on, Benedick! Humans are not rational but giddy, for a neuroscientific reason.<sup>7</sup> The invention of functional magnetic resonance imaging enabled observation of the interconnection between cognition and emotion. Damasio (1994) and Rolls (2013) provide an introduction to research on this topic. Two conclusions might be drawn from it. The first is that human behavior does not arise solely from the neural networks that perform inductive or deductive calculation: emotional networks are always there too. Accordingly, “cognition and emotion are effectively *integrated* in the brain” (Pessoa 2009). This means that what a person intends to do is associated with some affect about doing it. Action, in this sense, is not so much rational as giddy. I term this flow along neuronal networks of cognition and affect “desire” (Reyna 2002a).<sup>8</sup> Elsewhere I have termed the particular structure of neuronal networks that produce desire and action a “cultural neurohermeneutic system” (Reyna 2002a, 2006, 2012, 2014).

Because humans are subject to desire, they do not so much “make decisions” as go with the flow. This is because actions are the result of the flow in the cultural neurohermeneutic system of affective and cognitive information along neural and hormonal networks that eventually stream into the motor cortex, whose transmissions move body parts, thereby making actions. Such transmissions, I believe, are accurately depicted as a giddy flow of desire. Consequently, perceptual and procedural culture normally tells you not only what is, but what you feel about it. See a big, furry thing, perceive it as a “lion”; proceed to run away, feeling really scared. Cultural hermeneutics, in this sense, does not understand only the perceptual and procedural meanings of cultural terms, but equally their affective valence. Consider, next, different varieties of cultural messages.

*Three Types of Cultural Messages:* Heuristically, three sorts of messages can be identified: technical, ideological, and world-view. These are distinct in terms of their scope, the social positions of those holding them, the combination of perceptual and procedural cultural messages they contain, the desires these nurture, and the degree to which their messages are likely to be contested or taken for granted. “Technical” messages typically have the lowest scope—that is, they are likely to concern the smallest realms of being, to be held by relatively few actors in small-sized groups; to contain more procedural messages; and not to be taken for granted. Examples of technical messages are administrative procedures of businesses or government; knowledge about how to perform technical processes (a barber’s knowledge of how to cut hair or a surgeon’s knowledge of how to cut bodies). Systems of law tend to be technical messages of broad scope in state systems. Technical messages might be thought of as the largely procedural messages of people in different social positions, be they barbers, surgeons, or lawyers. Actors responsible for implementing technical messages generally desire to do so. Otherwise they know they might make terrible mistakes about which they would feel bad.

“Ideological” messages are those of particular social positions in a population, advocating particular views that they desire to be widely accepted. Ideologies tend to have both metaphysical and epistemological elements; that is, notions about the nature of what is and of how to know what is. These elements tend to set actors’ desires by specifying values, what is good and bad. Certain nationalist ideologies value “my country, right or wrong,” so the adherents of such an ideology desire to support a country no matter what it does. Particular ideological messages may vary in their scope and in the number of groups espousing them. The anti-abortion ideology is of relatively limited scope, as its message is limited to the undesirability of abortion. However, it is an ideology favored by those in a fair number of social positions, at least in the US. Meanwhile, Marxism, an ideology with a vast scope including messages about the nature of natural being, economics, and politics, is favored by relatively few, in a small number of social positions, in the US. Anti-abortionists believe abortion is an evil, and feel really bad about women who have abortions. Ideological messages are likely to be contested. Pro-abortionists think anti-abortionists are misguided; neoconservatives are apoplectic about Marxism.

“World view” (or what some might term cultural hegemonic) messages are those of the broadest scope. Like ideologies, they tend to make ontological and epistemological claims. They are widely shared by groups in different social positions. They may specify procedural detail, but are very much about broad perceptual features of being, especially understanding of the nature of that being. The sociologist C. Wright Mills (1956: 222),

for example, speaking of the 1950s, insisted there was a “military metaphysic”—a “cast of mind that defines international reality as basically military”—that was widespread among powerful Americans. “Metaphysic” is an older term for “ontology”; hence Mills was advocating that a “military ontology” was the basis of the mid twentieth-century US world view, at least among those in powerful positions.

Equally, world views are concerned to stipulate what is valuable in a social form and should constitute its desires, as well as specify the reverse. In the American military world view, being is about winning and losing, you desire to win, and winning is a martial matter. World view messages often have powerful emotional meaning. For example, Americans with the military world view feel terrible about planning not to win a war. Often, though not invariably, world view messages are so strongly believed that they are taken for granted. For example, every modernist knows there are “people” and “animals” in the world. However, the Mundurucu, a people of Brazil’s Xingu River Basin described by Robert Murphy, had a different world view. Mundurucu believed there were “Mundurucu” and “*pariwat*”—hunt-able creatures, including animals as well as other humans who were not Mundurucu (Murphy 1960). It should be understood that the boundary between large ideologies and world views is not entirely clear. Are science and liberalism ideologies, or are they world views?

Finally, social forms seeking widespread powers in social beings possess and propagate world views and/or ideologies favorable to their positional cultures. For example, I will show how certain powerful actors used the economic crises that started in the 1970s to formulate a neoliberal ideology whose perceptual and procedural cultural messages influenced people in various social positions to perceive and act on these crises in ways that contributed to the economic power of actors in the position of financial elites (Duménil and Lévy 2004: 17). Five cautions need to be recognized concerning these different types of cultural messages.

*The Five Cautions:* First, the messages in technical, ideological, and world-view culture are not invariably consistent. For example, liberal ideologists believe capitalism and equality are great values to strive for, even though capitalism, by its very nature, is a system of inequality. Many with an American world view believe they are fighting for peace, which if not moronic is oxymoronic. Second, different cultural messages are not equally shared. Gynecologists know a lot more about women’s genitalia than do mathematicians specializing in Boolean algebra. Third, cultural messages are not immutable forms of cognitive and affective information. Rather, they are variable. For example, the term “reform” sent a progressive ideological message in the state of Wisconsin in the early twentieth century, when

“Fighting Bob” La Follette was the Republican governor (1901–1906). In the early twenty-first century, the Republican governor of Wisconsin, Scott Walker, was using the same term to send a reactionary, anti-union message.

Fourth, within their I-space people may enculturate cultural messages hailing from different social beings. For example, in Chad some individuals with whom I was acquainted had incorporated a fair amount of a particular Islamic brotherhood. However, at the same time they retained views about witchcraft that originated not in Islam, but from different African groups. Further, in their attire they adhered closely to French messages about what was *à la mode*. Dressed like Parisians, they were orthodox Tidjaniya who held African ideas about sorcery. These people were hybrids, and the attaching of different peoples’ cultural messages in the neuronal culture in a particular groups has come to be termed “hybridity” (Canclini 1995). Some have argued that hybridity is a “cultural logic” of current globalization (Kraidy 2005). I suspect some hybridity is, and has been, widespread in all populations.

Fifth, and most significantly, many people believe their cultural messages to be true. Some anthropologists have even been heard to insist: “If a people believe some cultural item to be true, then it is true.” This oversimplifies matters. Thinking something is true does not make it true. Some cultural information may be true, but other information may be untrue regardless of what the culture bearers happen to think about it. Among Malinowski’s Trobrianders, for example, a *tokwaybagula* was a good farmer, and farmers who worked hard and tilled lots of land were awarded this title (1922: 60–61). Trobrianders also believed that in the development of a newborn, “it is solely and exclusively the mother who builds up the child’s body, the man in no way contributing to its formation” (1929: 3), which ignores the role of the father’s DNA during gestation. Franz Boas, especially through his study of race, made the analysis of the truth of cultural truths a central practice of cultural anthropology.<sup>9</sup> Finally, what is so significant about cultural messages?

Culture is about force. Sending cultural messages is the sine qua non of the choreographing of force resources. This act communicates information concerning what to do about what is from certain actors using their discursive culture, to other actors’ neuronal culture in their I-space. Of course, “what is” are other force resources of action and tools. Cultural messages specify who the actors are, what their tools are, and how to use them, in particular exercises of force. A Chadian Arab sees a *fil* approaching. He yells to a bunch of children, “Fil fi! Jara, jara!” (There is an elephant! Run, run!). *Fil* is the perceptual culture (an elephant); *jara* the procedure (run). Communication of the Arab’s message, “Fil fi! Jara, jara!” choreographs the children’s action, giving the man agency to have the power of making the children run. This example may help to distinguish between the chore-

ography and exercising of force. Transmission of the cultural message is the choreographing of force. The Arab, his choreographing, the children running from one place at an earlier time to another place at a later time—this is the exercise of force. Without cultural force, the other force resources cannot be used. But without the other force resources, cultural force is just babbling in the wind. The contention that cultural messages make choreography of force resources possible raises an additional question: How is it that actors actually come to do their choreography?

One clue to answering this question is to recall Job. Old Testament Job suffered a series of disasters, horrendous puzzles to which he sought understanding. Life out in E-space throws problems at everybody, creating series of puzzles that need solving. Hermeneutics is often considered the interpretation of the meaning of texts, widely defined as everything from comic books to what happens to people. Earlier I have indicated that I take a cultural neurohermeneutic approach to hermeneutics, where what is at issue is not the meaning of texts but how the brain solves the puzzles thrown at it by specifying what is happening, how it feels, and what to do about it. “Hermeneutic puzzles” are the brain figuring out how to solve the problems thrown at it.

To illustrate, consider a hypothetical example. John Ondawain, an actor in decline, is ambling down a street in Barcelona, humming to himself: “The rain in Spain falls mainly on the plain.” John is ideologically a vegetarian. He sees Juan’s Steak House and Conchita’s Vegan Paradise, and makes a perceptual cultural interpretation, “two restaurants.” At roughly the same time his stomach grumbles. He feels “hunger,” an emotional interpretation. These interpretations construct what is; and by doing so they create a puzzle: what to do about what is, or in this instance: Where to eat? To solve this puzzle, Mr. Ondawain turns to a hermeneutic.

A “hermeneutic” is a choreographic message from technical culture, ideology, world view, or—as will be elaborated later—a public *délire*. The choreographic message involves a “perceptual/procedural pair” that inform actors about “what is” and “what to do about it,” thereby forming a desire choreographing force resources in space and time. A hermeneutic is an artifact of analysis that is discovered when a research observer identifies a perceptual/procedural pair in, say, an ideology. In a vegetarian hermeneutic, an important perceptual pair is “perceive vegetarian restaurant/proceed to it.” Remarking Conchita’s restaurant, Mr. Ondawain, choreographed by his vegetarian hermeneutic, desires to enter Paradise. Actors choreograph actors and objects in space and time by solving hermeneutic puzzles. In sum, cultural messages help solve hermeneutic puzzles, thereby allowing choreography of other force resources to produce powers. It is time to discuss the fifth force resource.

*Authority:* “Authoritative” force resources are a particular type of cultural resource. They consist of the right, in some way institutionally granted, to choreograph specific force resources in specific perceived situations. For example, Henry VIII (1491–1547), the very model of a modern major monarch who is said to have executed 72,000 people during his reign (including two of his wives), noticed that the monasteries were corrupt (a perceptual cultural judgment). This posed a hermeneutic puzzle to Bluff King Hal, as he was called: What should be done about the monasteries? Henry authorized their “dissolution” (as king, one of his authoritative resources was the right to terminate institutions). This authorization choreographed a string of events implemented by Vicar-General Thomas Cromwell, occasionally with resort to violent force, which removed the monasteries from church ownership and placed them in private (aristocratic) hands, making Bluff King Hal an early-modern privatizer.

Authoritative resources are unequally distributed in contemporary populations. Many individuals possess few authoritative resources. A few possess such resources in vast abundance. The term “window of authority” denotes the quantity of force resources to be exercised in the number of situations allocated to an actor. Those with lots of authoritative resources possess “large” windows; those with little authority have “small” windows. Generally, the size of actors’ windows of authority relates positively to the level of their positions within an institution: the higher you are, the bigger your window. The window of authority held by a janitor in a bank’s positional basement is tiny, compared to that of its president up in the positional penthouse. Clearly, the larger an actor’s window of authority, the greater is that actor’s agency. Now consider the difference between constructive and violent force.

*Constructive and Violent Force:* Constructive and violent forces can be distinguished in terms of the powers created by force. “Violent” force resources are exercised to have the effect of breaking things, the broken things being human bodies and material objects. Different police and military institutions are the most common variety of violent force. Equally, force resources are sometimes exercised to have the effect of building things. This is “constructive” force. Enterprises that make goods and services, parliaments that make laws, and schools that make educated people are all examples of constructive force. It is tempting to imagine that destructive and constructive forces are completely opposed, but this is not invariably the case. The family that rears children (an exercise of constructive force) may raise them to be soldiers (who exercise violent force). Conversely, sometimes violent force is exercised so that constructive force can become possible. The thirteen British colonies in North America conducted an insurgency

against the English government (1776–1783), an exercise of violent force that made possible the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia (1787), an exercise of constructive force that resulted in the US constitution. It is time now to consider power.

### *Power*

Power is *any* effects or outcomes of exercises of force. The emphasis on “any” is deliberate. Certain renderings of power, famously Parsons’s (1963), emphasize goal attainment. Mann (1986: 6) adopted such an understanding when he said that “power is the ability to pursue and attain goals.” A goal is the intentional side of desire, and it is certainly true that actors exercise force intending to do something (i.e., attain goals). However, sometimes the something attained was unintended, and to ignore these somethings is to condemn a whole category of powers to analytic oblivion. “Intended” powers are effects that were premeditated by actors choreographing the forces that brought on the effects. “Unintended” powers are effects that were unplanned by the actors exercising the forces that brought on the effects. Wellington’s victory at Waterloo was an intended power; Napoleon’s defeat was bitterly unintended.

*Kinetic and Potential Powers:* It is useful to distinguish between the total power social forms may possess and the actual powers they achieve when exercising force. The “potential power” of a social form is the total powers it is hypothetically capable of, given the total amount of force resources it possesses. The “kinetic power” of this social form is the intended powers it achieves when it actually exercises certain of its force resources. Clearly, the US has enormous potential power, France has less, and Chad the least. The relationship between potential and kinetic power is not invariably positive. A social being may have great potential power but not be especially good at exercising force resources to acquire great kinetic power. For example, the US certainly has greater potential power than Finland. However, in a comparative evaluation of the quality of education systems, the US ranked seventeenth among developed countries, while Finland ranked first (“Best Education” 2012). The US’s kinetic powers in education seem less than would be expected, given its overall potential power.

*Strings and Logics:* It is time to introduce a notion of strings and logics into the analysis of power. Strings and logics are the placement in time and space of connected kinetic powers. So understood, strings and logics are history. History at the empirical level is the discovery of strings. At the theoretical level it is the logics of these strings. A “string” is a series of events

in space and time where cultural messages choreograph force resources to make a series of events occur. An “event” is a particular exercise of force that produces a particular power. Humans, then, possess not only the power to make events, but the still greater power of linking events together in strings. Farming might be thought of as a string. In Event 1, cultural messages choreograph force resources (the farmer, a tractor, and a plow) to prepare the land, with the power of producing a field ready for cultivation. In Event 2, cultural messages choreograph force resources (the farmer, the tractor, some seed potatoes, and a planter) to plant the field. In Event 3, cultural messages choreograph force resources (the farmer, the tractor, and a harrow) to weed the field. In Event 4, cultural messages choreograph force resources (the farmer, the tractor, and a potato harvester) to harvest the field.

The motion in social forms, it should be recognized, is their strings. Individual strings of actors are “actions.” A number of recurring strings of individuals choreographed together in different regions of human activity to do something is a “practice.” “Tasks” are strings and practices resulting from procedural culture in informal social groups. An “informal” group is one whose procedural culture is not especially explicit (i.e., standardized and written). “Operations” are strings and practices resulting from authorization by officials in formal groups. A “formal” group is one whose procedural culture is explicit (i.e., possesses standardized procedures that are written). Prior to the 1900s getting married was quite a task among the Nuer (Evans-Pritchard 1951). Now that many Nuer have joined Protestant churches, getting married can be an onerous operation. The strings in co-occurring, interrelated practices may be termed “institutions,” which may be formal or informal; strings in interrelated institutions are “systems”; those in systems coupled with other systems are “social beings.” These are the largest sorts of social beings that humans create, and some of them have global reach.

Certain strings follow a logic of social constitution, a term whose use here differs slightly from that in Malinowski. In *Argonauts* a social constitution is “the rules and regulations” of social life (Malinowski 1922: 11). In this sense of the term, the American constitution is literally the US Constitution. In *Deadly Contradictions* the concept is understood differently, as a particular type of logic that exercises constructive force to institute strings intended to create social order. In Malinowski’s view a social constitution is a fixed set of rules that organize social forms. As understood here, social constitution is not the rules themselves, but the logics that make a type of a rule called a public *délire*. The relationship between the concepts of social constitution and public *délires* is discussed further following the discussion of logics.



“Logics” are abstract accounts of the powers of strings.<sup>10</sup> Buying and selling involves two strings—those purchasing and those vending. Capital accumulation is a logic of buying and selling. A logic of order is one whose strings seek to reduce vulnerabilities, especially those that (we shall later learn) come from contradictions. A distinction can be made between multiple and hierarchical logics.

“Multiple” logics occur when the logics of institutions, or systems, operate to produce more than one power. Families, for example, follow multiple logics of sexual reproduction, enculturation, and consumption. Multiple logics may also be hierarchical; this generally happens in complicated institutional settings where numerous institutions’ powers are integrated into complex systems. In these situations some logics need to be performed for other logics to occur in the system. Logics that are the conditions for the performance of other logics are termed “sub-logics.” For example, consider a firm selling shoes. It needs at least one institution to make the shoes, one to get them to shoe stores, and one to advertise the shoes’ fine qualities; which is to recognize that the firm needs to have institutions performing production, distribution, and marketing sub-logics to achieve its capitalist logic of capital accumulation. The different tasks or operations of different strings that exhibit different logics are choreographed by different hermeneutics in peoples’ technical culture, ideology, or world view to be exercises of force that cause certain powers.

Logics may also be distinguished in terms of the extensiveness and density of their powers. “Power extensiveness” refers to the number of actors other actors have power over. Extensive logics are those where some actors have power over large numbers of other actors. The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS), with the power to extract taxes from more or less every worker in the country, has extensive power. “Lesser” logics are those where some actors have power over small numbers of other actors. Parents in families have power over their children and each other, usually fewer than ten people. Parents are lesser powers. “Power density” refers to the number of powers actors have over other actors. “Dense” logics are those where some actors have many powers over other actors. “Sparse” logics are those where some actors have few powers over other actors. The IRS can only collect taxes. Parents can sleep with each other, educate their children, and endlessly guide and discipline them. Thus, though the IRS has far more extensive power than do families, its power is far sparser. Your local IRS agent cannot go to bed with you. Power extensiveness refers to the size of the social being, whereas power density refers to the number of powers actors have in a social being. The strings considered in this text will largely involve different operations. The logics will tend to be multiple and hierarchical, involving extensive and dense powers of a particular type of social being.

This ends the introduction to structuralism. Its empirical scope ranges beyond Lilliputian narratives of ethnographic fictionalism toward large accounts of social being in all spaces and times. Indeed, the present work, consistent with this project, inspects the most powerful social being ever. Finally, what is the “critical” in critical structural realism?

### *The Critical*

The form of critical thought I fancy hews closely to that of Max Horkheimer (1937) in the Frankfurt School. Critical judgment concerns assessment of technical cultures, ideologies, and world views as well as the social beings found with them, with an eye to knowing them in order to improve them. Without question, such judgment presupposes an ethic: it is good to improve things for all people as much as possible, and it is wicked to improve things for only a small number of already privileged individuals. Making an ethical evaluation is exacting and a bit like solving a murder mystery. A murder has been perpetrated. Nobody knows who did it. There are lots of possibilities. The detective’s job is to figure out exactly what is the case—who did it and why—and only then can the accused be brought to judgment. A more general implication of this situation is that if you do not know what is happening, you cannot know if it is good or bad. This means that the realist practice of truth-seeking is a condition of moral judgment because it allows moral referees to know as accurately as possible what is, allowing them to judge whether it can be improved. Let us leave the empyrean heights of conceptualization for a closer look at a specific instance.

President Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on 10 December 2009. Remarkably, the lecture he chose to give accepting this honor was a justification of war. The president wanted his audience to know: “I face the world as it is, and cannot stand idle in the face of threats to the American people. Make no mistake, evil does exist. A nonviolent movement could not have halted Hitler’s armies. Negotiations cannot convince al-Qaida’s leaders to lay down their arms” (Obama 2009: 1). His general position was that US military killing was good because it could “bend history in the direction of justice” (*ibid.*). He was so enthusiastic about the virtue of war-making that he urged it upon all states, counseling that “all responsible nations must embrace the role that militaries with a clear mandate can play to keep the peace” (*ibid.*). I take Obama’s point—“evil does exist”—but must raise a question addressed in this book: Who are the evil whose practices’ reform will lead to improvement of the human condition?

Having introduced rudiments of a critical structural realist approach, this chapter now turns to applying it to constructing a theoretical map explaining US warfare.

## **Global Warring Theory**

Since 1945, US warfare has occurred throughout the world. So the theoretical map to explain this belligerence is termed global warring theory. Elsewhere (2009b), I have argued that Kajsa Ekholm Friedman's and Jonathan Friedman's perspective is pioneering because for the first time in anthropology, it made global social beings, which they term global systems, the object of analysis by taking concepts from structural Marxism (originally used to analyze modes of production) and applying them to social forms of global dimensions.<sup>11</sup> The social being we are investigating is a creature of global dimensions, which explains why the somewhere that global warring theory comes from is the one explored by the Friedmans.

The starting point of the Friedmans' work was a problem with the mode of production, specifically that production processes were themselves "dependent upon larger reproductive processes" (Friedman 1994: 17) that frequently operated beyond particular countries. This meant that social reproduction provided the theoretical foundations of global systems theory. In fact, worldwide reproductive processes created "global systems" that were "historical systems of shifting accumulation and empire formation" (Friedman 1978: 43); with imperial reproductive systems vulnerable to contradictions, understood "as the limit of functional compatibility between structures" (Friedman 1998: 48). Consequently, they understood "global history" as largely the "history of expansions and contractions of hegemonies, not unusually in the form of imperial organization in which the military component has been crucial" (James and Friedman 2006: xiv–xv). The global warring theory is an addition to global systems theory because it explains global warring in terms of reproduction, contradiction, and empire, concepts at the base of the Friedmans' perspective. However, it differs from the Friedmans' in that it starts from a different problem. Their theoretical starting point was frailties in the concept of mode of production. Global warring theory, consistent with critical structural realism's emphasis on force and power, is concerned with reproductive vulnerabilities due to contradictions.

In order to formulate global warring theory and address the problem of contradiction, it is necessary to elucidate the concepts that compose the theory.

### *Global Warring*

The first of these terms, "global warring," is what the theory explains. It is strings involving overt or covert, direct or indirect exercise of violent force managed by the security elites of an imperial state against a colony,

neo-colony, or region of interest someplace else on the globe. A “global war” is a particular instance of global warring.<sup>12</sup> Global warring is about imperial reproduction and occurs when security elites perceive—correctly or incorrectly—that violent force is useful to create, maintain, or enlarge the imperial state’s dominion, including any and all of its value-accumulating powers. Global warring may include situations where an imperial state conducts a number of global wars simultaneously or near simultaneously. A “colony” is a territory formally incorporated into an empire. A “neo-colony” or a client state is a territory in some way informally incorporated into an empire. Global warring is “colonial” where there is formal imperialism and “neocolonial” where there is informal imperialism.

Global warring is like throwing gasoline into a fire. It is a warfare accelerant that makes small wars bigger, because making global wars moves imperial violent force from the core to the colony or neo-colony. A colony or client may have X quantity of violent force prior to a global war. Then some imperial power moves Y amount of violent force to wage the global war, so that there is now X plus Y violent force, and a small war has grown bigger. Global warring coming from empires with huge accumulations of capital has the power to add enormously to the violent force in a colony or neo-colony. When civil war in Chad began in 1966, it was a small local conflict. The Chadian central government had the equivalent of a few million dollars per year to spend on fighting. I remember one Western diplomat expounding: “The rebels are a thousand kilometers away in Wadai. The government has only four trucks in N’Djamena. Two are broken, and who knows how much gas they have? How the hell are they going to even get there to fight them?” When, as readers will learn in Chapter 7, the Reagan administration intervened in this warring in the 1980s, it was reported to have injected \$100 million, while the French—the US’s neocolonial clients—were said to have supplied about \$500,000 per day from 1983 to 1986 (Reyna 2003b). A small local war had become a greater global war because the tiny X of the Chadian government’s violent force had been enormously augmented by the Y of the imperialists’ violent force.

Some scholars insist that warring only occurs after a certain number are killed (Singer and Small 1972). This seems arbitrary. Why is it that 1,000 rather than 1,001 combat deaths per year separates war from nonwar? If an empire operates to exercise violent force that kills any of the enemy, then it is warring. Occasionally, practices like raiding or organizing coups are not considered warring. But if an empire goes to the trouble of conducting raids or coups that kill people, then it is warring. Additional acts of war include blockades, embargos, or sanctions that kill not with weapons but by denying access to food or medicines. Finally, although some scholars do not include covert, indirect conflicts in accounts of warring, the fact that

killing may be hidden and performed by a proxy does not make it any less a war. Consequently, imperial operations of overt and direct as well as covert and indirect warring that causes fatalities are classified as global warring.

Imperial operations that prepare for overt and direct or covert and indirect combat, but where no fatalities have occurred, will be termed “preliminary global warring.” The building of bases, pre-positioning of supplies, and troop movements are forms of preliminary global warring. Imperial operations that in some way support another country’s warring will be called “secondary global warring.” Provision of different forms of violent force resources—weaponry, intelligence, transportation—is the hallmark of secondary global warring. This brings us to explication of the concepts needed to explain global warring. Discussion begins with contradiction.

### Contradictions

And do you know what “the world” is to me? ... a play of forces and waves of forces, at the same time one and many ... a sea of forces, flowing and rushing together ... out of the play of contradictions ...

—Nietzsche, *Will to Power*

‘... crises exist because ... contradictions exist’

—Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value*

This section argues that Marx was correct in his understanding of the relationship between contradictions and crisis. However, before making this argument, I suggest an approach to contradiction that is influenced by Nietzsche and compatible with critical structural realism, which conceptualizes contradictions as a particular “play of forces.” Why propose such a conceptualization?

One reason, a weighty one, is that Marxist dialectics, including the concept of contradiction, are often dismissed as of little utility—a “Hegelian monkey,” as Marvin Harris (1968) opined, on the back of rigorous social theory. Karl Popper (1940) authored a famous dismissal of Marxian dialectics. Jon Elster (1985: 37), a more sympathetic critic who analyzed Marx’s different usages of the dialectic, believed Marx dealt with dialectics in “vapid terms.” Yet the old monkey hangs in there, especially in a version that emphasizes comprehending dialectics in terms of contradictions (e.g., Harvey 2014). It does so even in the ruminations of those who might be expected to be opposed to it.

For example, Barron Youngsmith (2010: 6), no Marxist he, noted when talking about the Soviet collapse in 1989 that it was of course due to “internal contradictions.” Daniel Bell (1976: 10), another non-Marxist, declared

there were “contradictions within society.” Elster (1985: 37) believed that of all the different varieties of dialectics Marx employed, only that which dealt with social contradiction could be “an important tool for the theory of social change.” Structural Marxists who had come to a similar conclusion somewhat earlier than Elster were developing a view of contradiction that they believed coincided with “advanced scientific practice” (Godelier 1972: 90). A version of this view forms the basis of the notion of contradiction used in this text.

Louis Althusser and Maurice Godelier, important developers of the structural Marxist version of contradiction, viewed contradictions as conditions of human structures. Further, Godelier (1972: 90) believed that “what causes a contradiction to appear is the appearance of a limit, a threshold, to the conditions in which a structure does not change. Beyond this limit a change of structure must occur.” From the standpoint being formulated, the “structure” Godelier refers to is the social forms discussed earlier. Such social forms exercise force. In Nietzsche’s terms such exercises are “plays of force” (1885: 12503), but they are a particular type of play that moves social forms toward their limits. The concept of limit employed here is not from calculus but rather denotes some point, edge, or boundary that an action, practice, institution, system, or social being exercising force cannot exceed. “Contradictions,” so imagined, are plays of logic whose component strings move social forms exercising force toward their “limit of functional compatibility” (Friedman 1994: 48), beyond which there is disorder. The notion of “incompatibility” refers to the existence of conditions in a structure of force resources where parts that formerly interacted in exercises of force to produce powers are less and less able to achieve their former power. The parts in a social being are its force resources—land, action, instruments, and various forms of cultural and authoritative choreography—distributed to its component social forms. Parts become incompatible when those formally present disappear; when they become too few or too many; or when they are altered in a way that makes them defective. At the point of incompatibility structures become disordered and are therefore obliged to change.

Marx’s analyses of contradictions have been interpreted (Godelier 1972) as involving emerging incompatibilities during the exercise of forces within and between the productive forces and relations of capitalist systems. Mao Tse Tung (1937) and Althusser (1977) broadened the location of contradictions, extending them into political systems. Here, two important types of contradictions can be distinguished. First are those arising within and between political systems, called “political.” Intra-polity contradictions can occur between a central government and different regions, or between opposing institutional groups. The former existed in the US

prior to 1860, when irreconcilable relations between Washington and the South resulted in the Civil War (1860–1865). The latter exist today in the US between Tea Party groups that favor policies to eliminate government intervention, and liberal groups that support policies involving intervention. Inter-polity contradictions have very often existed between competing empires, when operations in one empire are incompatible with those in others. For example, the Norman Empire’s aspiration to acquire land in the Anglo-Saxon Empire in the eleventh century was incompatible with the English desire for the same land. Contradiction between empires will be termed “inter-imperial.”

The second variety of contradictions, called “economic,” includes those that exist within or between economic organizations. Two sorts of economic contradictions exist in capitalist systems: “cyclical” ones, where the contradiction produces alternation between growth and decline; and “systemic” ones, where the contradiction is such that its intensification threatens the ability of an economic system to reproduce.

When contradictions worsen, moving toward their limits, they “intensify.” They may also worsen because they “coalesce,” which refers to an increasing co-occurrence of contradictions.<sup>13</sup> Coalescence increases incompatibilities by having more strings in more places that hamper each other’s operation in different parts of the social being. Such coalescence may be so extensive that social being-wide incompatibilities emerge. For example, a conundrum of Marxist thought has been to explain why the 1917 revolution against capitalism came in Czarist Russia, the least capitalist of European states. One answer to this puzzle was that Russia was a site of an increasing coalescence of contradictions. There were contradictions pertaining to feudalism (between lords and serfs), to capitalism (between capital and labor), and to colonialism (between imperial core and its colonies) (see Althusser 1977).

Different social beings at roughly the same times may exhibit different collections of contradictions. Equally, the same social being at different times may have different collections of contradictions. The set of contradictions and their degree of intensification at any moment in a social being may be said to be its “concatenation.”

A word about the epistemological status of contradictions: They may be said to be representations of incompatible being at different levels of abstraction and generality. Macro-contradictions are those at higher realms of abstraction and generality in E-space. Meso-contradictions are those at lower such realms in E-space. Micro-contradictions, which occur within I-space, are not considered in this text. Marx’s contradictions—for example, that between labor and capital—are macro-contradictions. Labor and capital are abstract notions, each always seeking to extract as much value as

possible from the other; hence they are in contradiction. Land and capital will be shown to be a macro-contradiction in chapter 5. Meso-contradictions may be less abstract and general instances of macro-contradictions. For example, in chapter 7 an oil company/petro-state contradiction is identified between the enterprises that produce oil and the states in whose lands it is found. The oil companies and petro-states each try to accumulate as much value from oil as possible, meaning the more value the oil company gets, the less the petrostate gets, and vice-versa, which puts the two in contradiction. As will be shown, the oil company/petro-state contradiction is a particular instance of the land/capital contradiction.

So, in sum, contradictions are incompatible plays of force whose logic is toward disorder. In this sense Marx was absolutely correct: crises exist because contradictions provoke disorder. Introducing the notions of reproductive vulnerability and fixes is a first step to understanding how humans respond to crises.

### *Reproductive Vulnerabilities and Fixes*

Reproduction is, generally, re-creation of form, any form. Social reproduction, the type of reproduction considered in this text, is the re-creation of social forms. (Hereafter the term reproduction denotes social reproduction.) Human reproduction is autopoietic. Certain social forms, or parts of social forms, exist to reproduce the larger social whole. Marx ([1867] 1909, Chapters 23 and 24), talking about capitalist systems in the first volume of *Capital*, distinguished between “simple” and “extended” reproduction, the former being economic operations involving no growth and the latter being ones where there is growth. Marx clearly did not see extended reproduction as necessarily freeing economic systems from contradictions—indeed, he argued, on occasion it intensified contradictions. I understand simple and extended reproduction more generally as situations with or without growth or growth in any social form. What links contradiction to reproduction?

This question has a one-word answer: sensation. Actors caught in storms of contradiction sense something is wrong and, fearing they will go down with the ship, desire to relax the storm by fixing it. A notion of a reproductive fix aids understanding of the relaxing of contradiction, but to understand such fixes one has to know about reproductive vulnerabilities. Though structural-functionalists throughout the twentieth century strove to deny it, Marxists knew that social forms got into trouble because intensifying contradictions led to problems in reproducing, which eventually could become disorderly crises. Marx, however, appears to have had no word for reproductive difficulties in general. So when these occur, and when actors sense them, I will call such a difficulty a “vulnerability.”



A social being with reproductive vulnerabilities due to contradictions is not hermeneutically vulnerable (despite being actually vulnerable) until actors in it *sense* difficulties. Actors insensitive to difficulties are hermeneutically blind. Actors sensing reproductive vulnerabilities tend not to interpret them in terms of intensifying contradictions, but to understand them in terms of thoughts and feelings in their neuronal cultural memory that emerge in their I-space due to the sensations they have of the vulnerabilities. For example, certain conservative capitalists dismiss workers in the capitalist/proletariat contradiction as “lazy”; whereas some workers dismiss capitalists as “rich assholes.”

“Reproductive fixes”—what actors do about vulnerabilities—are hermeneutically derived choreographies that actors use to organize force resources to fix vulnerabilities that are sometimes minor and sometimes full-blown crises. Fixes applied to large systems in social beings are not one-off, catch-as-catch-can actions. They are public *délires*, choreographies with authority: policies, programs, laws, administrative pronouncements, imperial orders. For example, one fix for the energy crisis is fracking, a procedure authorized by governmental authorities that involves a complex technical culture of injecting water under pressure into rock formations so they will fracture and release oil or gas trapped within. This leads to a key question: How do actors respond to reproductive vulnerabilities and create fixes? The answer is that they get reflexive.

### Getting Reflexive

“Getting reflexive” is what an actor does by reflecting upon sensations of reality employing already-existing interpretations of it. When actors get reflexive they give social beings the possibility of autopoiesis. “Reflecting” reality is the realm of consciousness—the brain thinking about being, feeling it—and actors think and feel about reality in terms of their neuronal culture, that is, what is already remembered in their neural tissues concerning what to think and feel about being, and what the pre-existing interpretations of it are. Reproductive fixes are choreographies resulting from actors reflecting upon contradictory being, or in other words using hermeneutics derived from their positional culture to organize force resources to resolve plights. Such fixes instituted in some way by elites are public *délires*. Fixes are not invariably formulated once and for all, though this may be the case if the fix works. More often, though, fixes do not initially work, or they work only partially.

In such situations actors, especially elite ones, tend to become involved in “try-and-try-again” situations, or more accurately, reflect-and-reflect-again situations. Long ago Lewis Henry Morgan ([1877] 1985: 258) ob-

served that societies solved their needs by attempting and reattempting ways of addressing them. He called information gained from such repeated attempts “experimental knowledge.” President Franklin Roosevelt was certainly aware of this in 1932, as the US suffered the vulnerabilities of the Great Depression, when he said: “The country needs, and unless I mistake its temper, the country demands bold, persistent experimentation. ... It is common sense to take a method and try it. If it fails, admit it frankly and try another” (in Balz 2008).

Morgan’s experimental knowledge might be rethought in terms of situational and experimental fixation. Certain situations occur and reoccur, and reoccur again. When this happens, the situation tends to cause people to reflect upon it. Reflection upon reoccurring events may be said to be “situational fixation.” For example, if you get a toothache that lasts for ten minutes and then goes away, you do not think much of it. However, if that toothache continues for several days; then it is something you fixate upon and want to do something about. Generally, the more pleasing or painful a reoccurring situation, the more you fixate upon it. “Experimental fixation” is the desire to fix something upon which actors are situationally fixated; for elites such fixing amounts to instituting public *délires*. Generally, the greater the vulnerability revealed in situational fixation, the stronger the experimental fixation. Different procedures to fix the same vulnerability are said to be different “iterations” of public *délires*, and actors involved in such events are said to be “fixated.” For example, as chapter 6 will explain, US military elites in Vietnam who were experimentally fixated on their military’s poor performance instituted a number of iterations designed to win the conflict.

No matter how often actors reflect upon the vulnerability they experience, fixes may fail to work because they involve either hermeneutic deception or blindness. “Hermeneutic deception” refers to interpretations of situations that are intentionally partially or completely incorrect, causing actors to have trouble fixing problems associated with the situations due to erroneous understanding of them. For example, some US politicians interpret the problem of poverty as the result of poor people being lazy, knowing full well that this is untrue. An outcome of this hermeneutic deception is to recommend reduction of welfare programs, which unsurprisingly does not fix poverty. “Hermeneutic blindness” refers to interpretations that are unintentionally incorrect and thus also lead to situations where actors are hard put to fix problems they do not understand. For example, bleeding—long the reproductive fix for many illnesses—was a case of hermeneutic blindness, because its practitioners were blind to the causes of the diseases. Let us proceed to understand how reflexivity is related to reproductive fixes by linking the notion of reproductive vulnerability to hermeneutic puzzles and hermeneutic politics.

*Pragmatic Hermeneutics*: A “hermeneutic puzzle” arises when actors fixate upon any vulnerability they sense needs fixing. Some vulnerabilities may not rise to the level of contradictions. However, others will develop from contradictions, and powerful actors whose windows of authority pertain to them will be obliged to address them. Hermeneutic puzzles are ultimately in I-space, in the realm of conscious brain.<sup>14</sup> They are what actors comprehend about contradictions. The nineteenth-century steel industry titan Andrew Carnegie may not have known that the 1892 Homestead work stoppage was a manifestation of the capitalist/proletariat contradiction, but he certainly knew he was vulnerable to a “strike” and faced the puzzle of how to end it. An “individual” hermeneutic puzzle is anything an actor perceives needs fixing about her- or himself. Billie, a testosterone-drenched teenager, looks in the mirror before his big date with Doreen and comprehends a large pimple. The horror! An individual hermeneutic puzzle stares him in the face. A “social” hermeneutic puzzle pertains to social forms; it is the perception that arises when a particular vulnerability is present due to some contradictory situation. Billie, now a stockbroker, looks into the face of Doreen, now his secretary, who tells him the stock market has fallen five thousand points. *Quelle horreur!* A social hermeneutic puzzle stares him in the face. This leads us to ask how hermeneutic puzzles are solved.

They are solved through politics. “Hermeneutic politics,” generally, are struggles between actors, or networks of actors, over the desirability of different interpretations of hermeneutic puzzles. With regard to the privileged, they are struggles between elites over what public *délires* to authorize. Global warming, as we shall see later, presents a serious reproductive vulnerability. The puzzle of how to resolve this vulnerability has led to experimental fixation and a hermeneutic politics dominated on one side by those interested in market and on the other by those attracted to government fixes.

Hermeneutic politics tend to hermetically seal actors on opposing sides into particular interpretations. The notion of the hermetic seal, a concept related to that of groupthink or group mind, accounts for why collections of actors think and act alike. Specifically, “hermetic seal” is the operation of strings of events choreographed to enter actors’ I-space and make them think and feel X, in conjunction with the operation of strings of events choreographed to make them ignore not-X. Such strings stimulate desire for thinking and feeling X, and loathing for thinking and feeling non-X. So for example, in the families of US Republicans, children are taught nice and naughty: “It is nice to be a good Republican” and “It is naughty to be a crapulous Democrat.” Consequently, the hermeneutic puzzle of what to be politically for these children is solved; they are sealed into being Republican.

Actors sense the world as their organs of sensation in their I-space represent it. They interpret their sensations in terms of their neuronal cultural

messages. Actors, then, do not generally reflect upon the world in terms of contradiction and reproduction (unless they are Marxists). Rather, they reflect on their sensations in the only terms they can, the cultural messages of the different hermeneutics of the technical cultures, ideologies, and world views into which they have been enculturated. Remember, this enculturation is positional, so people in different positions tend to be hermetically sealed into those positions. A middle-class white cop in Los Angeles and a poor gangbanger are likely to interpret the hermeneutic puzzle of drugs rather differently. Autopoeisis, in sum, involves individual actors solving hermeneutic puzzles by employing their cultural neurohermeneutic systems, and then taking their interpretations into bouts of hermeneutic politics that lead to the instituting of public *délires*.

The interpretation of hermeneutic puzzles leading to hermeneutic politics that result in public *délires* is here said to be “social reflexivity,” about which three points should be stressed. First, social reflexivity—with its production of public *délires* that are tested and retested, and with different iterations of those *délires*—is a procedure (and not necessarily an especially accurate one) for producing knowledge of vulnerability-provoking realities. Second, the cultural neurohermeneutic system, specifically the material structures of the brain that sense reality, perceive what it is, and decide what to do about it, can be studied according to realist canons of neuroscience. Finally, human autopoeisis, being reliant upon social reflexivity, involves a “pragmatic hermeneutics” in which what is at issue is not the meaning of texts, but the effectiveness of practical action.

Clearly, not all actors bring equal powers to pragmatic hermeneutics. Contemplating privileged actors with more force resources at their disposal leads to a discussion of elites.

### *Elites as Tip of the Class Spear*

C. Wright Mills (1963: 25) observed that “the history of modern society may be readily understood as the story of the enlargement and the centralization of the means of power—in economic, in political and in military institutions.” Mills’s “means of power” is our “force resources.” What might the persons authorized to determine operations of force resources in important institutions be called? Mills (1956: 3–4) understood elites to be actors “whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make decisions having major consequences.” Though I am comfortable with this definition, which is consistent with critical structural realism’s emphasis on force and power, it seems helpful to elaborate on how is it that elites come to have “major consequences.” In this optic, “elites” are actors who

enjoy substantial agency because they occupy positions authorized to choreograph operation of large amounts of force resources, including those resources constituting fixes to resolve reproductive vulnerabilities. So they are the actors with the largest windows of authority in a social being, who address major hermeneutic puzzles.

It has been argued that elite and class analysis were opposed (see Higley and Pakulski 2009). Certain classic elite thinkers—Pareto (1900), Mosca (1897), and Michels (1915)—saw themselves as anti-Marxists, believing that actors did not become elites for reasons of class, and that elites governed society. Others, however, have argued for the convergence of elite and class theory (Etzioni-Halevy 1997: xxvi). This is the position adopted here: elites are considered to be class actors though the notion of class used is broader than that in classical Marxism, which restricts it to only economic actors. “Class” relations in the present perspective are those that exist between actors because of differences in their control of force resources (not just Marx’s productive ones). Upper classes control the greatest amount of force resources and use this control, among other things, to direct as much value as possible to themselves. Elites are those members of the upper class whose positions give them authority over the largest amounts of force resources. Lower classes are those with the least control over these resources, who struggle for as much value as possible with their lesser force resources.<sup>15</sup> Consequently, classes are in contradiction, and the “elites” who control vast amounts of force, are the tips of the upper classes’ spears in class conflict.

Classic Marxist thought insisted upon a complex relationship between class, consciousness, and action. Specifically, it held that a class position produces class consciousness, which in turn is responsible for class action. There is an enormous literature on this topic, a fair portion of it negative. Max Weber (1958) warmed liberal hearts with his critique of Marxist class analysis. Erik Olin Wright (1997) has presented a skilled Marxian class analysis. My understanding of the relationship between class and consciousness is based on the judgment of a CIA chief. George Tenet (2007: xxi), the CIA Director during the Clinton and Bush II administrations, once quipped, “Where you stand on issues is normally determined by where you sit.” Those sitting in the same situation sense similar actualities. These will impose on them certain desires, which will be expressed in broadly similar positional culture. This, then, is Tenet’s Tenet—the ex-CIA director’s recognition that the Marxists were right about class and consciousness.

Apologists for the wealthy often treat class warfare as something restricted to the revolting, meaner masses. Yet, it is the upper classes, sitting in their positions controlling most of the forces resources, who consequently have the wherewithal to wage class war. With this in mind, “class war” is understood to involve elites exercising force, fixing reproductive

vulnerabilities in ways congenial to their class—especially regarding the copious movement of value to themselves, as ordinary people eventually come to resist such predations.

Upper classes in contemporary social beings are capitalist elites regulating economic institutions (CEOs, CFOs, UFOs, Vice-Presidents, etc.); official elites regulating political institutions (presidents, dictators, ministers, parliamentarians, senior bureaucrats); educational elites (Chancellors, Vice-Chancellors, senior professors) regulating various institutions of schooling; cultural elites (religious, museum, and media heads) regulating cultural institutions; and, bluntly but accurately, killing elites (generals, admirals, chiefs of police) regulating military and police institutions. Elites with authority or influence over the killing elites control enormous force to inflict violence. Called “security” elites, these latter play a central role in the arguments that follow.

Finally, let us remark a category of elites loitering with intent amongst other elites in contemporary social beings. These are hermeneuts. Hermes was the Greek god who, on winged feet, brought messages from the higher gods to lower mortals. “Hermeneuts” are specialized educational or cultural elites who bring messages on the winged feet of media from the godlike highest elites to illuminate the I-space of others. Hermeneuts attach themselves, limpet-like, to these most powerful of elites, from which position they bring higher elites’ messages to other lesser elites or to lower-class masses. The messages hermeneuts bring are credible because they are specialists in producing persuasive communications. Their credibility results from their rhetoric or science. “Rhetoric” means that what they espouse just feels “true,” the way a piece of fiction does. “Science” means that what they argue appears “true,” because it appears supported by facts.

As rhetoricians or scientists they illuminate the consciousness of others. A preacher like Jerry Falwell was for the most part a hermeneut to the middling or poorer sort, whose ability to illuminate derived from his mastery of “unifying interpretive conventions” governing fundamentalist rhetoric (Harding 2000: xi). A military analyst like Albert Wohlstetter was a hermeneut to security experts, whose ability to illuminate concerned the need to derive “more effective ways” of “using” violent force (Bacevich 2005: 154) from his manipulation of the interpretive conventions of science. Elites produce a particular type of fix, which is discussed next as the narrative returns to the topic of social constitution and public *délires*.

### *Social Constitution and Public Délires*

So far the fixing of reproductive vulnerabilities is understood as a consequence of people becoming fixated and utilizing their hermeneutic selves

to solve the hermeneutic puzzles posed by their fixation. When a solution has arisen to the level of being generally approved in public discourse, it may be termed a public desire. The desires of elites become something else called public *délires*, and it is these that they employ to fix contradictions. Let us first discuss similarities between public desires and *délires*.

Both are “means of interpretation” helping actors know what to do about what is, that is, to choreograph being. This is because both desires and *délires* have their hermeneutics: they contain certain perceptual/procedural pairs informing actors “what is” and “what to do about it.” Public desires and *délires* do not always correspond, and it is an empirical matter to show when the two diverge. Public desires and *délires*, as means of interpretation, are “focus” prompters.<sup>16</sup> Reality is messy. Lots of things happen, and what to concentrate upon and when are not clear. Moreover, humans confront cluttered reality with a noisy clamor of differing hermeneutics from technological, ideological, and world views with often incompatible messages. Public desires and *délires* focus attention on a selected number of perceptions and procedures.<sup>17</sup>

Public *délires*, to distinguish them from desires, are *authorized* desires to choreograph what elites desire to be done to fix something. However, their implementation normally involves not only elites but also larger numbers of ordinary people, called the elite’s “public,” throughout different systems in a large social being. Further, elites fortify authorization by allocating force resources to implement the desire. Ordinary actors may not want elite *délires*, but want them or not, *délires* are going to be forced upon them.

Authorization of public *délires* may take many forms. They may be laws voted in by legislatures, administrative decrees from top management in business, executive branch orders, dictators’ dictates, the Pope speaking *ex cathedra*, Islamic clerics declaring fatwas. Because elites’ desires are so powerful, they are not simple desires. They are *über*-desires, authorized choreographing of many peoples’ desires in conformity with elite desires. They are full-blown “frenzies” or, in French, *délires*.

Elites do two things with public *délires*: institute them and implement them. The institution of a public *délire* is its social constitution. When elite hermeneutic politics occur to understand how the reproductive vulnerabilities of contradictions are to be perceived and fixed, the winner in the politics creates the public *délire*. During droughts in the US, for example, local elites sometimes face a contradiction in the use of water: irrigating lawns is in contradiction with using water to do other things, such as irrigate food crops. If lawns are watered, then agriculture becomes reproductively vulnerable, posing the hermeneutic puzzle: What to do in times of drought? In this situation, social reflexivity oftentimes operates in the town council deliberations that lead to the voting in of ordinances regulating

the public's water use. Usually these ordinances enjoin the public from watering their lawns, and people who do receive a stiff fine. Such ordinances are public *délire*s. Their hermeneutic is perceptual, in that unlawful water use is perceived; then procedural, in that fines are imposed upon ordinance violators. The voting in of the ordinance is the social constitution of the *délire*, and sending police to enforce rules about citizens' water use is its implementation. What public *délire*s are instituted depends upon who wins in hermeneutic politics.

How elites engage in hermeneutic politics and who wins depend upon the specifics of the social being determining institution of *délire*s. These specifics vary from case to case and need research to be theorized. However, it might be noted that in monarchies the sides in the politics might be court factions, and the winner might get a royal proclamation. In a democracy the sides would likely be different parties or factions within the parties, and winning often occurs via elections, legislative votes, and/or executive orders. In a business enterprise the sides might be composed of partisans of different bosses, such as the CEO versus the CFO, and winning might be by administrative decree. In contemporary social beings more generally, the winning fix is the one whose partisans persuade the actor or actors with the highest authority to institute public *délire*s that theirs is the better hermeneutic.

Public *délire*s vary in their scope, ambiguity, and degree of compulsion. A *délire* is low in scope and ambiguity if its perceptual/procedural pair refers to small amounts of social being and does so without vagueness. A *délire* is high in scope and ambiguity if its perceptual/procedural pair refers to large amounts of social being in ways that are perceptually or procedurally unclear. The degree of compulsion of a public *délire* is the extent to which elites whose windows of responsibility open on the social being covered by the *délire* are obliged to implement its procedures. A law specifying that a stretch of road will have a speed limit of 30 kilometers per hour is a public *délire* of low scope and ambiguity. The Monroe Doctrine (1823), announced during a State of the Union address by President James Monroe, forbid European attempts to colonize land or otherwise interfere with states in North and South America, and further warned that such interference would be perceived as aggression that the US would eliminate. Clearly, the scope of the Monroe Doctrine is vast—European meddling in the Western hemisphere. Equally clearly, it contains ambiguity—what constitutes “interference” in the New World? Ambiguity allows US governmental elites some freedom in judging whether to proceed to eliminate European meddling. For example, nineteenth-century US authorities turned a blind eye to the UK's intervening via heavy investment in certain South American countries.



Immanent in the hermeneutic puzzles and politics just presented is an underlying Nietzschean play. Recall from the quotation that opened this section that Nietzsche, in his posthumous work *The Will to Power* (2012), asked, “And do you know what “the world” is to me?” and responded that it was a “play of forces ... a sea of forces flowing and rushing together.” Human being is subject to a continual play of forces. The first play is of the logic of disorder, marching according to the dictates of contradiction. The second play is of the logic of social constitution, counter-marching according to niceties of social reflexivity.

It might be appreciated that this play is reactive and iterative. Contradictions strengthen, provoking new social vulnerabilities. Logics of social constitution operate. Security elites reflect, and reflect again and again, fixated upon hermeneutic puzzles posed by recurring vulnerabilities. Hermeneutic politics emerge and re-occur, making new iterations of old public *délires*. Actors are jiggled this way and that as new iterations are instituted and implemented. All this gives the play of human being a herky-jerky quality. Attention turns now to some nasty play: elites getting violent as part of the logic of social constitution.

### *Getting Violent*

Neither elites nor anybody else is innately, solely violent. Human biology makes people capable of both peaceful cooperation and bloody violence (Fry 2006). Actually, up to a point, elites seem a bit like the central character in Munro Leaf’s classic children’s book *The Story of Ferdinand* (1936). Ferdinand was a big, strong bull, but he did not enjoy fighting. He liked to sit under a tree, picking the flowers. Elites, like Ferdinand, enjoy relaxing in the shade of privilege, smelling the flowers of their valuables, and generally having a swell time. In part this is because raging bulls incur high costs and big risks. The bulls running post-9/11 wars are said to have spent trillions upon trillions of dollars. Of course, the key risk is that violent bulls can lose the family jewels and find themselves without valuables, dead, or injured. Normally, there are tried and true peaceful fixes for reproducing elite valuables. Generally, when you go to war, the expenses of violent force are added to the expenses needed to acquire valuables. So, to diminish risk and cost, elites first try peaceful reproductive fixes. However, make no mistake, elites are not total Ferdinands. They can rage, especially when their privilege and valuables appear threatened. When this occurs it is time to kill.

Elite violence so understood may be treated as a function of the elimination of the usual, peaceful ways of reproducing elite classes. Nonviolent experimental fixations are likely to be perceived as faltering when contra-

dictions intensify and coalesce. This suggests the following relationship between elite reproduction and violence: the more security elites produce peaceful iterations of reproductive fixes that miscarry, the more such fixes become perceived as unworkable, and the greater the *délire* for violent fixes. The intensification and coalescence of contradiction is perceptually a situation where different iterations of reproductive fixes are understood to falter, leaving as the alternative violent ones; so, lacking peaceful alternatives, what else can they do?

George Shultz (1993: 678), one of President Reagan's secretaries of state, put the matter baldly when commenting on an occasion when the Reagan administration resorted to violence: "If nothing else worked, the use of force was necessary," the "force" here being understood to mean violent force. Let us call this "Shultzian Permission"—the principle that security elites will transform themselves into raging bulls, granting themselves permission to exercise violent force as a reproductive fix, when peaceful fixes appear to have failed.<sup>18</sup>

Shultzian Permission is granted when the actors granting it *believe* that peaceful fixes have failed, not when this has actually been demonstrated to be true. Belief that nonviolent fixes have been futile is normally established through hermeneutic politics, where elites offer varying interpretations of attempts at peaceful fixes. Hermeneutic deception and blindness may operate in the fixing of belief. For example, on 2 and 4 August 1964, the US Navy reported that it had been attacked by the North Vietnamese Navy in the Gulf of Tonkin. These attacks, which appear to have been deceptions, nonetheless led to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (7 August 1964) that authorized President Johnson to enormously escalate global warring in Vietnam. The fictitious Gulf of Tonkin incident was a hermeneutic deception warranting the granting of Shultzian Permission. There may be no formal moment when Shultzian Permission is granted; rather, security elites may just all come to the same understanding: "We tried peace. Now it is time for war." When a polity enters an ongoing war, Shultzian Permission tends to be granted because the fact of hostilities means that nonviolent fixes have failed. So why is global warring likely to occur? This leads us to the theory.

### *The Theory*

Contradiction, reproduction, and global warring are a theoretical system because they are joined in a relationship such that alteration in the first variable produces alterations in the others: Increased intensity and coalescence of contradictions results in more severe reproductive vulnerabilities, which cause global warring. Hermeneutic politics and public *délires* link the first two concepts to the third. They are reflexive concepts in

a double sense: first, they involve imperial elites reflecting upon contradictions in order to create public *délires* to fix vulnerabilities provoked by the contradictions; second, they involve these same elites in hermeneutic politics over whether particular situations can be interpreted as requiring implementation of particular public *délires*. The more peaceful fixes are perceived to fail, the more Shultzian Permission will prevail. War is the failure of peace, in this optic. Peace often fails in empires because, as later chapters will show, empires are vulnerable to contradiction. So finally, the *telos* of global warring theory is forbidding. Lots of people die.

Expressed more formally, the theory consists of six statements:

1. Intensification and coalescence of an empire's political and economic contradictions increase its reproductive vulnerabilities.
2. The greater these vulnerabilities, the greater the hermeneutic puzzles they pose and the more the hermeneutic politics of imperial elites create hermeneutics and public *délires* whose choreography fixes the vulnerabilities.
3. Because of the high costs and risks of violent fixes, initial fixes are likely to be peaceful, but the more there are fixless peaceful reproductive fixes, the more the hermeneutic politics of imperial elites grant Shultzian Permission to institute public *délires* that exercise violent force to achieve the reproductive fix.
4. The selection of a particular public *délire* to implement is aided by a hermetic seal favoring that *délire*.
5. The instituting of violent public *délires* turns colonies, neo-colonies, or regions of interest into violent places, producing global warring.
6. When the spatial dimensions of intensifying and coalescing contradictions grow, then the number of violent places throughout the globe grows, producing increased incidence of global warring.

It is important to recognize that not all actualities involved in the violence of global warring are analyzed in the text. Any warring involves a number of social beings as opponents in the violence. Consider the example of the French and Indian War (1754–1763), when the Iroquois allied with the British against the Hurons, Abenakis, and French. Complete analysis requires observation of *all* the different protagonists in the violence—a daunting empirical enterprise. This book's explanatory scope is not so ambitious. The concern is rather to understand why the US did the violent things it did, and whether this was consistent with the theory of global warring. This chapter has formulated the theory of global warring, which concerns imperial social beings. It is time now to think theoretically about such beings.

## Notes

1. Reyna (1994) has argued that no better way of knowing reality than science has been found, and has suggested ways (2004, 2010) that approximate truth might be found.

2. Regarding causality and power, Hobbes said: “correspondent to *cause* and *effect*, are *power* and *act*” (italics in original, in Champlain 1971: 68). Bourdieu conceptualized structure in terms of power (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97–99). However, rather than call this text Bourdieuan, one should note that both Bourdieu and Reyna are Hobbesian.

3. Marshall Sahlins has said the present is an “anti-structural age” (2013). It may be, but Bruno Latour (2005) has nonetheless published a book about *Reassembling the Social*. Concepts like assemblage, network, rhizome, and social machine are ultimately structural ideas.

4. The terms open, autopoietic, and reflexivity come from systems theory (see Luhmann 1995). Maturana and Varela (1973) introduced the notion of autopoiesis. The reflection in reflexivity involves brain operations of inputting information from external reality and then processing it emotively and cognitively.

5. Animals with developed central nervous systems have agency, but to a lesser degree than humans.

6. The forces analyzed in the text always involve humans. As such they are “social” as opposed to inanimate force. When readers read “force” on a page, it really means social force.

7. Economists have been abandoning the sinking ship of human rationality. For example, Akerlof and Shiller (2009), Nobel Prize winners in economics, recently argued the importance of “animal spirits” in economic behavior.

8. Deleuze and Guattari emphasize desire in *Anti-Oedipus* (1983). However, the understanding of desire in this text is not theirs but comes from neurobiology, which understands desire as brain operations producing intention and the feelings associated with intention.

9. Let us reject one view of culture: that of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803). He articulated the view that a *volk* (a “people”) has a single, uniform culture shared by effectively all its members (Herder 2002). Precisely put, this means one people, one culture, and (for racists) one race. However, recognition of the four attributes of cultural messages discussed in the text play havoc with Herderian culture. They indicate it is inaccurate to insist that each people has its culture. There is no Trobriand culture and there is certainly no American culture. What peoples have is a plethora of changing cultural messages—some technical, some ideological, some world view—often hybrid. The consequent recommendation is not to follow the Herder.

10. Widespread in social thought, the term logic is sometimes ambiguous. As used in this text, logic concerns powers: it is an abstract way of representing the powers of strings. Formal logic is an argument that goes in a certain direction, the conclusion. In critical structural realism, logic is the direction taken by the powers attained by different strings. E.g., the direction taken in the logic of capitalism is capital accumulation.

11. On the left, Ekholm Friedman and Friedman began formulating their global systems theory in the 1970s at roughly the same time that Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) was developing world systems theory. Eric Wolf’s *Europe and the People Without History*, published in 1983, sought to explain the sweep of modern history throughout the globe in terms of Mandel’s views on capitalism. David Harvey’s *The Condition of Postmodernity* (1990) investigated the global implications of a post-Fordist capitalism practicing flexible accumulation while experiencing space-time compression. Globalization became a topic among liberal thinkers in the 1990s. Thomas Friedman’s *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (1999) popularized it as a good thing.

12. Modelski and Morgan (1985) introduced the notion of global war, making it roughly equivalent to world war. I prefer the definition of the term offered in the text because not all global wars are world wars. Paskal (2010) also employed the term, apparently unaware of its earlier use.

13. The notion of the coalescence of contradictions owes something to Althusser. Following Lenin, he spoke of the “fusion” of an “accumulation” of contradictions producing rev-

olution (1977: 99). It is observed that contradictions often co-occur. When they do, they accumulate, which means that problems provoked by each contradiction add to those of every other co-occurring contradiction, i.e., they are fused together. This is coalescence, which produces a variety of instabilities that may include revolution.

14. The term consciousness is “loaded with fuzzy meanings” in part because although it is known that consciousness is the result of brain operations, what these are is not clear (Dehaene 2014: 8). However, the consciousness brain generates sensation, perception, cognition and emotion.

15. The text’s approach to class is a broadening of orthodox Marxism, in which class is about command over the economic means of production. However, in the present approach the means of production are but one sort of force resource capable of producing power. A complete investigation of power requires consideration of all force resources in E-space capable of producing powers. Classes in this optic are categories of persons controlling different types and amounts of force resources.

16. Symbolic interactionists might observe that public desires and *délires* “frame” situations. I agree but emphasize that this framing process takes place as part of a political struggle to control interpretation.

17. The notions of public desires and *délires* resemble Goffman’s (1974: 10) notion of frames as “the definitions of a situation.” Public desires and *délires* do define situations, in the sense of interpreting them. However, Goffman’s frames tend to be located in “subjective” realms (ibid.). Public desires and *délires*, though they may have been created in I-space, exist in E-space as discourse and behavior containing understandings.

18. Other US security elites have articulated the need to seek Shultzian Permission. After the Second Gulf War, for example, General Colin Powell (2012: 210) said: “War is never a happy solution, but it may be the only solution. We must exhaustively explore other possible solutions before we make the choice for war. Every political and diplomatic effort should be made to avoid war while achieving your objective.”