STABILISATION AND STAGNATION

If the fodder is good and the earnings are right, there’ll be no negative discussions …¹

(A comment by a board member in the LPG Buttstädt prior to a merger with the neighbouring LPG Essleben and the formation of a cooperative crop production unit.)

After a long period of social, political and economic transformation in the countryside, marked not least by conflict and compromise with collective farmers, the SED leadership could now exert its authority in a changed context. By the mid-1970s, SED policy was being implemented and the rural economy assessed and coordinated on new terms, providing a more stable foundation for further socialist modernisation in agriculture. Collective farmers and the state administration of agriculture in the districts were no longer so antagonised by conflict and uncertainty over the fundamental direction of agricultural development. Consequently, without the overt hostility to transformation among collective farmers that had characterised previous years, steps began to be taken. The administrative separation of crop and livestock farming was consolidated and the process of intensification and specialisation of production in agriculture advanced more rapidly.

The district state administration and LPG cadres could now be relied upon to be consistent in communicating SED policy to collective farmers. They acted with the backing of a more substantial and in most cases more efficiently run SED party organisation than had been the case five years previously.² With the terms of their participation in agriculture thoroughly transformed, collective farmers had no choice, but also often no desire, but to pursue their interests as far as possible in the context of the new structure of agricultural production, rather than in spite of it. By the same token, however, a heavy burden of expectation now rested on the SED leadership to prove the worth of the socialist modernisation of agriculture in improving the incomes and the working conditions of the agricultural workforce.

Although the early 1970s saw improving productivity levels in agriculture, there were, even then, signs that the structures now in place to
regulate agricultural production at the grass roots were prone to causing imbalances in the relationship between crop and livestock farming. As early as 1971 a small number of leaders of advanced KAPs had already begun to assert a degree of independence, motivated by the financial incentives to specialise in the production of a particular crop. In so doing they had, however, proved themselves unheeding of the concerns of LPG chairmen over the damage to the supply of livestock feed which such specialisation might entail. Establishing effective relations between crop and livestock farms continued to be a problem throughout the decade.

By 1980 general economic decline threw into stark relief the failure of agricultural functionaries in the district state and party apparatus and the LPG/KAP to regulate increasingly chronic imbalances in the relationship between crop and livestock farms. Arguably, with the completion of the separation of crop and livestock production and the concomitant reconfiguration of the agricultural workforce, the structures of agricultural administration had stabilised. Nevertheless, the terms on which stability had been achieved could not protect against – and indeed exacerbated – grounds for discontent among collective farmers in the coming years.

**Consolidation and Conflict**

During the second half of the 1970s, throughout the Bezirk, KAPs began to merge with one another, increasing the size of individual field plots and expanding the potential for large expanses of monocultural production. Along with this process of expansion and specialisation came further steps to develop the work organisation within the crop production farms. Brigades were increasingly organised according to specific tasks, rather than purely specific areas of the farm, in an attempt to concentrate and deploy, in the most rational way, the skills and machinery available. This entailed bringing to an end the connection between the individual farmer and a particular territory. What remained of the intimacy of understanding of local conditions, the inherited relationship between the farmer and his land and his locality were deemed in practice increasingly irrelevant, at least on the scale which had hitherto been the case.

At this stage, however, there were few reports of serious expressions of hostility to the new arrangements from collective farmers. Although the configuration of brigades and the prospect of working on distant territories was not always a welcome change, there was little to be gained
by opposing it. Greater quality and quantity of yields were now more widely seen by collective farmers to be primarily attainable via processes which occurred on a grand and necessarily supra-local scale. Having accepted the dilution of their rights to participate in the running of the farm and their rights to local self-determination, as a result of the expansion of the KAPs, there was nevertheless the expectation that at least incomes would be steadily improved.\(^5\)

Deployment of manpower and use of modern machinery, the systems of spreading fertiliser and pesticides, irrigation and drainage and the specialisation in particular cultures could occur most efficiently with as little territorial division within the crop farm as possible. Yet, the growing irrelevance of old boundaries between collective farms and the greater unity and coherence of the KAPs could be potentially problematic. In particular, the relationship between the leaders of KAPs and their nominal superiors, the chairmen of the LPG, became increasingly anomalous. As the structures and work organisation of the cooperative crop production units ceased to bear direct correlation to the constituent LPGs, so the ongoing sharing of administrative competence between KAP leaders and LPG leaders became increasingly difficult to uphold, not least on a personal basis.

The KAP was in theory still a subordinate structure to the LPG within the context of the cooperative community and hence was financially bound to the constituent collective farms. Yet, as the primary producers of the feed on which several collective farms relied and as the financially dominant institution in any cooperative community, this subordinate position appeared to be increasingly anomalous in practice. LPG chairmen had official seniority and an obligation to ensure that the LPG as an institution retained its dominant position. They were also duty-bound to ensure the LPG, as a livestock farm, was well served by the cooperative crop production unit. KAP leaders were, however, equally beset by demands. They were required to balance the not always equally influential demands of the various LPGs in their vicinity with the demands of the state, as well as seeing to their own financial security. Given the complexity of maintaining this balance of interests, it is perhaps unsurprising that relations between chairmen of LPGs and the leaders of KAPs could easily become fractious.\(^6\)

The institutions which had grown up out of cooperation between LPGs – such as the KAP – were not officially to be regarded as independent structures. They were certainly not to undermine the fundamental importance of the LPG as the dominant administrative structure through which agriculture was to be regulated on the ground and the interests of collective farmers represented. However, it was clear to most
farm managers, particularly as KAPs merged and established a complex internal structure and work organisation, that, although merely transitional institutions, the cooperative crop production units would (sooner rather than later) become de facto independent of their constituent LPGs. Uncertainty over how and when this would occur made for still more unease. During the early 1970s local agricultural administration was thus marked by instances of petty conflict and recrimination as the heads of KAPs sought to cut the ties of dependency on the LPGs as quickly as possible, while LPG chairmen strove nonetheless to maintain their authority.7

The step from KAP to independent LPG for Crop Production (LPG Pflanzenproduktion or LPG P) – from a transitory to a legally permanent, independent institution – occurred at different rates. Some model specialised LPG Ps had already been set up in Bezirk Erfurt after the VIII SED Party Congress in 1971.8 In the course of 1975 steps began to be taken in a small number of KOGs in Bezirk Erfurt to establish several more LPG Ps and thereby impose some order on the strivings for independence among some KAP heads.9 Those collective farmers who had technically been delegated from the LPGs into the KAP received thereby a new status as members of a wholly separate new LPG P. In the process their right as a member of an LPG to participation in the running of the collective farm in which they were employed was reasserted, as was their right to a household plot, which in some KAPs had provisionally been denied. Parallel to the LPG Ps, LPGs for Livestock Production (LPG Tierproduktion or LPG Ts) were formed out of what remained of the original collective farms, be it the cooperative livestock production facilities which had been set up between LPGs or the remnant livestock production in the individual farms themselves.

During the course of the next four years KAPs began gradually to transfer to LPG Ps, and LPG Ts formed with varying degrees of specialisation. Although the formation of LPG Ps and LPG Ts resolved the ambiguous status of delegated LPG members and set the relationship between heads of crop and livestock farms on a new footing in theory, it did not resolve in practice all of the problems of the relationship between crop production and livestock production. The difficulties of coordinating the interests of LPG Ps and LPG Ts in the context of a shortage economy proved increasingly unmanageable as the 1970s drew to a close.

Ideally, the formation of large-scale crop farms with an advanced system of work organisation and specialisation of particular cultures would enable large overall increases in productivity. Increased consumer demand would be met, levels of agricultural imports would be
reduced and the demand for feed from ever-larger livestock holdings satisfied. With greater productivity in livestock farming, it was hoped too that production well in excess of domestic demand could be exported to gain valuable foreign currency. For this ideal situation to be realised, however, productivity from crop production farms would have to increase steadily, matching the demands of increasing numbers of livestock held in the country. As it happened, such consistent increases proved ultimately unattainable in practice, given the competition across the East German economy for essential materials and financial investment. The negative consequences of these limitations on production had real consequences for those communities dependent on agricultural production.

Amid a worsening economic situation in the GDR during the later 1970s, prompted not least by international oil crises, the relatively low status of agriculture within the SED’s investment priorities severely tested the efficiency with which the relationship between separate crop and livestock farms was regulated. In such straitened circumstances, neither the leading cadres of the LPGs and KAPs nor the agricultural functionaries of the state administration in the Bezirk, nor indeed the SED Kreisleitungen were effective in preventing some serious imbalances in the distribution of funds and resources to livestock farms.

As a consequence, working conditions, particularly in the smaller livestock farms, failed to improve and in some cases steadily worsened. Not only was there a shortage of feed available to feed the animals and maintain productivity, the rising costs facing LPG Ps and KAPs were also being passed on to livestock farms, reducing still further their ability to fund improvements to production facilities and working conditions. Those working in the increasingly deprived livestock farms found themselves hard pressed and thoroughly demoralised by the constant struggle to maintain productivity despite limited equipment and an irregular supply of fodder. Meanwhile, the economic problems faced by struggling LPGs manifested themselves in the loss of funds available for improvements to the communities in which they were based.

Inadequate Industrialisation

Given the state of agricultural development at the end of the 1960s, continuing the project of creating and then sustaining truly modern industrial production in agriculture during the 1970s could not be achieved cheaply. It required heavy initial investment in construction for storage and preparation of crops, as well as for intensive livestock holding.
However, it also required continuous investment to provide the build-
ings with heat and light and to sustain a regular supply of machinery
and vehicles as well as the fuel to run them. In addition, there were a
number of other expenses arising in part from the scale of production.
Money had to be found for medicines for livestock, which were prone
to mass outbreaks of disease when kept in large numbers in such close
proximity to one another, as well as for chemical fertiliser and pesti-
cides for crops planted in large open expanses, on not always wholly
suitable land. Where the money to pay for the transformation of agri-
culture would come from was no easy matter to solve.

Despite the expense, there was a general reluctance in the SED lead-
ership to risk popular discontent by passing on some of the cost of pro-
duction to the population. Motivated by the spectre of the 17 June 1953
uprising as well as the loss of face sustained by the SED leadership
during the shortages at the end of the Ulbricht era, Honecker remained
consistently opposed to cutting price subsidies for the population. At
the same time, the limits to which resources could be gained from col-
lective farmers themselves appeared to have been reached. There could
certainly be no reduction in income levels for farmers. Furthermore,
particularly once the last vestiges of private production in the Type I
LPGs had been subsumed into the Type III LPGs, there were no obvious
resources left in private hands to exploit. As a result, LPGs depended
very heavily on state subsidies on the prices they paid for machinery,
fuel and other resources, as well as loans to sustain the development of
agricultural production. The fact could not be helped, however, that –
given the limited extent of the GDR’s own natural resources – the cost
of the raw materials on which the development of agricultural produc-
tion (and indeed the GDR’s industry in general) relied, was heavily de-
pendent on the balance of world trade. During the 1970s, as prices on
world markets rose, the cost of production for industry and for agricul-
ture in the GDR rose rapidly, forcing the SED leadership to increase the
financial burden on the LPGs themselves, while reducing imports and
increasing exports of valuable commodities.

Under better economic conditions, it had been expected that crop
production would become still more efficient using intensive methods
to achieve dramatic increases in yields. At the same time the construc-
tion of intensive livestock sheds was expected to minimise feed require-
ments while raising productivity. However, by the start of the 1980s the
development of such efficient industrial production had proved impos-
ible because growing costs made sustained investment in agriculture
prohibitively expensive. Without this sustained investment, however, a
prioritisation of resources took place, making for a very uneven industr-
trialisation of agriculture. In all but a few LPGs, the improvements to working conditions, production facilities and incomes, which had been promised and which farmers had come to expect, failed to materialise. As conditions in some farms steadily worsened, what confidence there had been in the SED leadership to make good on promises of social equality and economic progress was seriously undermined.

**The End of ‘Realistic Plans’**

As the sector of the economy whose potential for further mechanisation and rationalisation was greatest, it had long been incumbent upon agriculture to accept steady and considerable reductions in its workforce. The departure of rural youth to work in industry had long been encouraged in order to fulfil the ever-increasing demand for labour. Access to machinery and funds to pay for it was thus vital to farms trying to replace lost manpower and improve working conditions for their ageing workforce. A reduction in labour costs in LPGs would certainly have made some funds available with which to purchase machinery and materials for construction. Cuts to farmers’ incomes could not, however, be seriously countenanced by LPG managers, well aware of the anger this would cause.

Collective farmers’ eventual acceptance of the limitation of their individual rights over (what had once been) their land and livestock depended at the very least on the state’s ability to guarantee a steady income. The austerity of the last years of the Ulbricht era, when incomes had been capped in order to raise minimum levels of accumulated capital, could not be repeated. LPG chairmen looked instead to the state to provide additional subsidies, alongside the investment of the LPGs’ own capital, in order to sustain the cost of both increasing incomes and the purchase of machinery.

It was also up to the state, of course, to ensure that the machines and materials required by agriculture were actually available for purchase. At the end of 1974 Gerhard Grüneberg had already begun to warn Gerhard Schürer at the State Planning Commission that the supply of combine harvesters was not keeping pace with the reduction in the agricultural workforce as a result of old age and the recruitment of young people to industry. A major side-effect of this imbalance between machinery and a reduced labour force was the requirement that farmers continue to do much manual labour and put in large numbers of overtime hours and forego weekends. Long-awaited and long-promised improvements in working conditions thus remained noticeably absent,
even if incomes continued to improve. As Grüneberg pointed out to Schürer, ‘the situation is such that we are seriously behind in carrying out socio-political measures for collective farmers’.10

In this situation Grüneberg was adamant that an increased export of agricultural machinery when it was badly needed at home could ultimately result only in a reduction of agricultural production. This in turn, he argued, would have a damaging effect on working conditions and serve only to undermine further the morale of farmers and with it the legitimising claims of the SED regime. A month later, in a memorandum for Erich Honecker, Gerhard Grüneberg pressed his point home further about the need to improve the provision of machinery for home agricultural development. The successes of the years following the VIII SED Party Congress (1971), he suggested, had been the result of a return to working with ‘more realistic plans’.

Such had been the drive for economic efficiency and rationalisation during the period of economic reform under Ulbricht, that impossible advances in productivity had been demanded of agriculture, given the investment made available. In contrast, in the first years of Honecker’s period in office, investment had been sufficient to enable real advances in productivity. This had to be sustained. Unless the steady supply of machines and spare parts continued, Grüneberg now argued, it could not be expected of farmers that they continue to increase production.11 Despite his lobbying of Erich Honecker, however, it was clear that agriculture occupied a relatively lowly position in the GDR’s economic priorities as decided by the SED’s leading economic functionaries, notably Günter Mittag and Gerhard Schürer. As long as the current balance in the world economy made it necessary for the GDR to limit its imports and maximise its exports, agriculture would have to make do with what it had already been provided with.

Problems with the supply of essential resources on world markets, particularly oil, had an immediate impact on agriculture in the GDR. In January 1975 instructions were issued by the Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt to the heads of all agricultural enterprises to reduce the levels of fuel used compared with the previous year, with the aim of reducing consumption by 20 per cent. This could not be helped, it was argued, owing to the enormous increase in the price on the world market which had limited the level of imports possible.12 In February 1975 a discussion was held in the Rat des Bezirkes outlining some of the economic problems facing the GDR in the coming year. Of primary concern was the fact that the prices for essential raw materials were increasing more rapidly on the world market than prices for finished products, in which the GDR primarily specialised. In order to deal with this the GDR would have to
increase exports to maintain a balance of trade, reduce imports of raw materials as far as possible and additionally increase its national debt.

Consequences of this problematic situation for rural communities were numerous. Supplies of both consumer goods to the population and machines and materials to agriculture were likely to be badly affected. With many farms in the midst of upgrading their production methods to an industrial scale with greater mechanisation, the knock-on effects of high oil prices on the cost and availability of transport, machinery and construction materials were a severe blow. With some LPGs and KAPs forced to delay construction of larger livestock sheds, land improvement schemes or the purchase of modern machine systems, the gulf in the productivity and working conditions which existed between different KAPs as well as between LPGs even within single districts became increasingly severe.

As the KAPs had merged and expanded to some extent, a similar process of consolidation had occurred in livestock production. However, the progress on this front by the mid-1970s had certainly been both much less rapid and much less consistent. Remaining Type I LPGs had been subsumed into the administration of the Type III LPGs even where no large-scale livestock sheds had been constructed. Neighbouring Type III LPGs, too, merged with each other thus combining their resources, with the goal of specialising (when possible) in a single branch of meat or dairy production or livestock rearing. However, in only a small number of cases had modern intensive livestock holding sheds been constructed by the mid-1970s. The rest of the LPG Ts were not nearly so advanced in terms of either their facilities or their degrees of specialisation. By 1977, although some concentration of production had occurred in most LPGs in Bezirk Erfurt, with the renovation or extension of livestock sheds, a large proportion of livestock continued to be kept in multiple small buildings which lacked even basic labour-saving machinery for feed distribution or manure removal. Except for a few major centres of livestock holding, most people employed in the livestock farming sector worked in small numbers in several sheds, where conditions had rarely changed significantly since the 1960s.

In the conditions of shortage, there was thus an increasingly obvious stratification of financial and productive status and with them political clout between livestock farms. In August 1975, suggestions by DBD members on how to organise things more effectively pointed out that realistic plans had to be worked out as to how much fodder was actually produced and how much was likely to be consumed by concentrated livestock holdings, at the expense of other livestock holdings in the locality. Between 1975 and 1976 a number of new large-scale in-
Industrial livestock holdings were opened in Bezirk Erfurt, among them two enormous concentrated pig farms in Hermstedt and Uthleben. As a consequence, other LPG Ts were to be deprived of a large part of their share of high-protein feed, which in turn would be bound to reduce their productivity.¹⁸

For the time being, in the mid-1970s, the problems facing agriculture were considerable but did not appear to be insurmountable. There was still room for further increases in production via further mechanisation, concentration and specialisation of production. By 1976 the potential of large specialised production units such as the KAP and LPG P to increase production levels had been proved in Bezirk Erfurt with increases in the gross production of 2.3 billion Marks. At the same time the level of productivity per head of the workforce had also increased by 34.2 per cent on the previous year, even though the level of wages had risen by 11.6 per cent. However, it could not be overlooked that the costs incurred had increased at a faster rate than the increase in gross production. The price of fuel, materials and machinery had gone up, while administrative costs had also increased considerably.¹⁹ Certainly, industrial-scale production was capable of producing more, but given the economic climate and the cost of essential materials on the world markets this increased production did not appear more cost efficient. Moreover, for the farmers themselves, working conditions and pay did not appear to be improving at anything like the rate they had been led to expect.

Problems of Scale

The decision to form separate LPG Ps and LPG Ts was confirmed at the IX SED Party Congress in 1976, precipitating the transfer of more KAPs to LPG P status and an even more radical expansion of individual farms. The size of LPG Ps/KAPs formed varied by some 2,000 hectares from district to district, but had in some parts of the Bezirk now reached extraordinary sizes, with those in the largely flat Kreis Sömmerda all encompassing over 5,000 hectares of agricultural land. KAPs in the flatlands could more easily justify merger on the grounds that it enabled the formation of large, continuous fields on which single crops could in theory be most efficiently harvested.²⁰ However, the sheer size of these farms presented their own difficulties.

With the expansion of the LPG Ps and LPG Ts to such sizes, individual collective farmers’ role in decision making was heavily diluted. They were no longer in a position to judge for themselves easily whether
or not the farm was being run correctly. In any case, they were subject to a much more dominant SED presence in the LPGs than had previously been the case, which tended to subdue and limit the expression of divergent opinion. LPGs were now run exclusively by highly trained, politically loyal cadres.21 As a consequence, however, it seemed that LPG members were beginning to abdicate responsibility for the success or failure of the farm to which they belonged.

In theory, the right to participate in decision making via the members’ assembly or the LPG board as well as the continuing right to a household plot had enabled the individual LPG member to maintain his traditional understanding of his profession as a farmer. His motivation to do well ought to rest on more than a desire to increase his wage. The average LPG member was still in theory driven by pride in his collective farm. In practice, however, attitudes among LPG members had undergone a shift, in line with the shift in their experience of agricultural work. Raising incomes was now the only certain means left to LPG chairmen of sustaining the efficiency of the workforce.

In 1977, an overview of farmers’ attitudes produced by the Department for Agriculture in the SED Bezirksleitung concluded that the socialist farm had comprehensively demonstrated its superiority over traditional farming. However, it also pointed out that there was an unhealthy reluctance among LPG chairmen to limit the levels of income claimed by their members. Some managers reportedly had adopted the attitude that ‘the main thing is making sure the money’s good, then the farmers will go along with everything’.22 Such comments in some sense broke a taboo. Notionally the transformation of agriculture had occurred without undue damage to farmers’ special status as owners and guardians of the land. It also showed up a serious handicap to organising cost-efficient agriculture.23 Even as the LPGs failed to reduce other production costs, wage bills too were bound to increase.

The rate of growth of production was now being outstripped by the rate at which money was being spent, compounded by increases in the wage bill.24 By 1979, the grand scale of crop production established in the LPG Ps and KAPs appeared to exacerbate rather than reduce the problems of rising costs. On the whole, Bezirk Erfurt was found to be neither especially good nor especially bad in comparison with the other Bezirke. Nevertheless, here as elsewhere the rising costs of production could quite simply not be matched by an equivalent increase in gross production. Although the level of concentration and specialisation in crop production was deemed to be on the whole justifiable in terms of the potential for further exploitation of the natural resources in the Bezirk, it was becoming increasingly difficult to manage the work re-
quired given the shortage economy. Above all, with crop plantations now on such a large scale, meeting agro-technical deadlines proved increasingly problematic without sufficient supplies of fuel or spare parts for machinery.

In livestock production, too, mergers appeared to fail to improve productivity. An essential reason for the merger of LPG Ts was to reduce the cost of management and spread the number of highly qualified cadres more efficiently. The heads of the new LPGs, like the KAPs, were overwhelmingly SED members in possession of a university or technical college degree. Furthermore, it was hoped that neglected livestock farms would benefit from a more even share of resources as a result of the mergers. In practice, however, mergers of LPG Ts often brought neither a concentration of resources, nor better management to livestock farming. With so many production sites spread across several villages, LPG chairmen reportedly found overseeing production and raising standards across the board exceedingly difficult. Unsurprisingly, too, the working conditions in these merged yet unmodernised livestock farms continued to be harsh.

Between 1971 and 1978 a total of 37.8 billion Marks had been invested in agriculture in the GDR. However, from 1975 onwards the decline in manpower in the LPGs, and the shortage of machinery available to balance this decline, had continued to have a negative effect on the rate at which productivity increased. A report in 1979 on the problem of maintaining a sufficient workforce throughout the farms in Bezirk Erfurt made it clear that here no further reduction could be sustained without a consequent downturn in production capability. The lack of machinery was certainly becoming an increasingly frequent topic for Eingaben to the ZK’s agriculture department by 1978.

On average the GDR was producing more per hectare than it had previously. The average gross turnover in crop production and in livestock production for the years 1974–78 exceeded that of the years 1969–73 in the GDR as in Bezirk Erfurt. Nonetheless, the progress of agricultural transformation had come at a price which appeared increasingly unsustainable, given the strain under which the East German economy was operating. As the pinch on the economy at large began to be felt, the SED’s leading agricultural functionaries in Berlin began to find themselves under increasing pressure. Their colleagues in the ZK began to call into question the level of state investment received by the LPGs. In particular the balance of price policy between industry and agriculture had become a bone of contention.

In a letter to Honecker at the start of May 1978, Gerhard Grünberg was moved to complain about one memorandum in particular.
It claimed to demonstrate that the scale of investment in agriculture since 1960 had brought little if any economic benefit and ought to be cut back, to the benefit of industry. In Grüneberg’s opinion the memorandum was ‘extremely one-sided, tendentious and in several points and figures factually wrong’. Nonetheless, there was little prospect in these circumstances of more funding being made available to agriculture. In the face of continuing reductions in the quotas of machinery being made available to the LPGs during the late 1970s, the SED’s leading agricultural functionaries in Berlin could only continue their calls for investment in agriculture to be sustained in order to balance the decline in the workforce. In particular, they argued, there was insufficient money being planned for agriculture even to maintain their original levels of machinery, let alone expand. Unless alternative economic decisions were made, they predicted, after a period of stagnation production levels would drop. The consequences for communities reliant on LPGs to sustain them were liable to be devastating.

These fears seem well founded. According to the Bezirksleitung in 1978, in Bezirk Erfurt an investment of 1 billion Marks had been made during the past two years to support the introduction of industrialised farming. However, there had by no means been a general improvement in the level of yields produced throughout the Bezirk. Despite their fundamentally similar terrain and quality of soil, the amount of produce per hectare harvested in Kreis Bad Langensalza considerably exceeded that of neighbouring Kreis Erfurt-Land. Analysing the balance of the economic results for agriculture, the Bezirk Directorate of the Bank for Agriculture and Food Industries found that in 1979 over half the crop production farms in Bezirk Erfurt were struggling to sustain any economic development. LPG Ps’ increased costs above all for repairs to ageing machinery had seriously compromised their profitability. Moreover in 1979 it was reported that in the majority of LPG Ps and KAPs in the Bezirk, problems with the formation of an effective work organisation had not been conducive to reducing excessive costs.

It was, however, livestock farms rather than the LPG Ps which tended to bear the brunt of rising costs and sinking productivity. In 1978, the lack of feed as a result of a poor grain harvest meant that the demand from LPG Ts could only be met by two-thirds in Bezirk Erfurt as a whole. As a result of shortages of feed and increases in costs, livestock production farms were thought to be in still worse a condition than the LPG Ps in 1979, with little margin for accumulation and thus little prospect of building up the investment necessary to transform the conditions of production.
The Failures of Cooperation

At one level, the reason for the continuing divide between crop and livestock farms could be found very simply in the absence or inactivity, in practice, of the administrative structures which were intended to regulate and coordinate the relationship. A document prepared for the office of Gerhard Grüneberg, in May 1976, on the future of agriculture noted that cooperative councils had ceased to function effectively in most districts.\(^{39}\) No body existed – outside the district state administration – which could actively ensure that a mutually beneficial relationship between crop and livestock production was maintained. The state administration appeared, however, to be unable to broker effective relations between crop and livestock farms.

A particular issue of complaint among the Eingaben sent to the ZK agricultural department during 1976 was the desperate need in livestock farms to replace old machinery and renovate livestock holdings in order to improve conditions for animals and humans alike. The lack of funds available to LPG chairmen to pay for these improvements was put down to the failure in particular of the Rat des Kreises to regulate the setting of feed prices and ensure there was a sufficient supply of feed for livestock, leaving livestock farms at a serious financial disadvantage compared with the LPG Ps and KAPs.\(^{40}\) A series of discussions held with farmers working with livestock in 1977 in Bezirk Erfurt reiterated these problems.\(^{41}\) There appeared, however, to be little prospect of resolving these complaints for the time being, as LPG Ps and KAPs tended, often with the backing of the Rat des Kreises, to extend their plantations of market crops at the expense of their feed crops.\(^{42}\)

Certainly in Bezirk Erfurt, with state approval, essential changes occurred in the use and quality of agricultural land which worked to the disadvantage of livestock farms. Large swathes of land had already been lost during the 1960s to building projects and mining, and, for the period between 1976 and 1980, it was expected that still more largely high-quality arable land would be lost to building, quarrying and water management schemes among other things. At the same time, there were strong financial incentives for LPG Ps and KAPs to use much of their most fertile land for fruit plantations to meet growing public demand. The replacement of this lost arable land by ploughing less fertile meadow and pasture land was bound, however, to lead to a serious overall drop in the productive capacity in the Bezirk.

Rather than reducing the amount of produce made available for public consumption, the brunt of this drop in productive capacity was born...
by a reduction in the amount of feed made available for livestock. On the one hand, there had been a reduction in the amount of pasture land available. On the other, there had been a reduction in the proportion of the yield devoted to providing feed for livestock. Thus while LPG Ps/KAPs met their obligations, the LPG Ts bore the brunt of any shortage. The amount of land available for fodder production per head of livestock dropped steadily between 1970 and 1978, leading inevitably to a stagnation and even a downturn in the productivity of the LPG Ts. Adding insult to injury, stability in the level of yields had clearly yet to be achieved in the GDR’s major crops. For all the mechanisation and new technology applied to agriculture, yields remained, as ever, enormously dependent on the clemency of the weather and it was this fluctuation which was passed on to local LPG Ts.43

At the end of 1977, the Rat des Bezirkes put forward some suggestions for rectifying the problems faced by the LPG Ts. Conditions in the livestock farms were to be improved by ensuring that LPG Ps were made to contribute money into a fund to pay for investment in future development. If ‘unjustifiably high’ differences existed in the financial resources of the LPG Ps and the LPG Ts which could be traced back to unfair prices then a financial settlement was to be reached or money contributed into a common fund.44 However, in 1978 conflicts between crop production enterprises and livestock production enterprises over the price, quantity, quality and delivery of fodder and the removal of manure continued to run.45 An investigation by the Workers’ and Farmers’ Inspectorate in 1978 into the state of LPG Ts around the GDR noted serious increases in livestock mortality. This, it was concluded, had resulted in part from the inability of the district state authorities to ensure that the interests of the LPG Ts were taken fully into account by crop farms.46

The problems of cooperation between LPG Ps and LPG Ts became more critical as economic problems became more serious. While LPG Ps failed to reach expected targets for increases in production, it was essential that the price for this failure was not automatically passed on to the LPG Ts. However, a fundamental lack of common interests between LPG Ps and LPG Ts led to an apparent lack of understanding on the part of the former for the ‘financial reproduction process’ of the latter. With the cooperative councils, which were intended to broker good relations between LPG Ps and LPG Ts, widely non-existent, there was a tendency for LPG Ps not to give sufficient priority to their partner LPG Ts’ needs. In Bezirk Erfurt, although 56.4 per cent of the gross production in agriculture came from livestock production, only 8.2 per cent of the accumulation of capital was carried out by livestock production.
farms themselves. As a result they remained largely beholden to the crop farms for sufficient investment to improve the working conditions of their members as well as to rationalise production. With crop farms failing to produce sufficient yields and thus unwilling to share their profits with livestock farms, the potential for an unequal distribution of wealth between crop and livestock production had increased.

In the GDR as a whole over 12,000 requests were made for withdrawal from an LPG at the beginning of 1978, an increase of over 1,500 on the year before. The majority of those wishing to leave were employed in livestock production, with over a quarter of requests specifically citing poor working conditions in LPG Ts. In 1980 a similar number made requests to withdraw from the LPGs. More than half of those who made requests to leave LPGs in Bezirk Erfurt cited quite simply a desire for improved living and working conditions.

With the financial burden passed on to the LPG Ts in the form of excessive charges for feed production and delivery, it was essential that the chairmen of the LPG Ps and LPG Ts, who still nominally formed together a cooperative council, maintained communication. The failure of these councils to function, existing on paper alone since the full administrative separation of crop from livestock production, had led to a complete breakdown in communication. The lack of detailed knowledge of (and perhaps also a lack of concern for) the financial position of neighbouring LPGs led inevitably to serious breakdowns in mutually beneficial relations between farms. In the case of the LPG P and the LPG T Töettelstadt it was found that the cooperative council had in effect ceased to exist by the end of 1979. Attempts to resurrect cooperation between the heads of the LPGs were found to flounder on the rocks of bitter disagreement between them. Even where they did exist, this was no guarantee that it was possible to reach a mutually beneficial agreement.

In November 1976 a meeting of the cooperative council for the KOG Walschleben in Kreis Erfurt-Land was held. The essential conflict of interests was played out here between the agricultural cadres in charge of crop production, those in charge of livestock and those in the state and party administrations at district level attempting to coordinate these two sides of production. In response to the planned supply of fodder offered by the LPG P, which appeared to fall far short of the amount required, the chairmen of the LPG Ts could only counter: ‘We cannot recognise this level of fodder production’ and ‘I will sign no contract which does not guarantee fully our fodder supply’. Although there was general sympathy for their position, the chairmen of the LPG Ts were forced to recognise that they would have to accept the contracted level
of supply on paper and then seek their own ways to meet their requirements. On the one hand, given its own obligations, the LPG P could not improve its offer, and, on the other, the Bezirk authorities would withhold financial aid from the LPG Ts unless they signed the contract. In the face of this intransigence and the lack of fodder available in the district, there was some desperation among the assembled cadres about where the LPG Ts would find the feed to fill the shortage. At this stage, complaining directly at the ZK in Berlin appeared to be the only possible solution.51

The minutes of a meeting of the cooperative council for the farms based around the LPG P Andisleben, Kreis Erfurt-Land in May 1979 reveal some of the basic difficulties facing LPG cadres trying to coordinate production in both crop and livestock farms. With several livestock farms supplied by the LPG P, large central silos had been constructed from which each was to take his agreed amount. While this reduced transport costs for the LPG P, it increased costs for the LPG Ts and raised mutual suspicion as to whether one LPG was not taking more than its fair share of the silage. As this exchange in the protocol of the meeting demonstrates, the shortage of feed made for strong competition between livestock farms:

K.M. (LPG T): ‘We have to get to the stage where every LPG has its own silo and farms with that.’

G.B. (LPG P): ‘It will continue to be the case that we have a few central silos from which several LPGs collect.’

K.D. (LPG T): ‘There are always LPGs which don’t stick to the agreements.’

M.S. (LPG T): ‘Sort things out in your patch before you go into other people’s.’

With the news that the Rat des Bezirkes was organising extra silage to be purchased from elsewhere outside the district which would have to be transported in, the chairman of the LPG P made a telling comment: ‘Actually over there is where the cattle belong. That’s what you were thinking too. This is no situation to be in – you are always hungry and we always get the blame.’ In other words, the real problem was that no effective balance had been struck in the Bezirk between the quantity of livestock held in any one area and the amount of land which was devoted to providing feed for them.52 It had been for precisely this reason that the administrative separation of crop and livestock production had been opposed in the first place.

A form of agriculture had been developed in the GDR which had shown, and continued to show, its potential for extraordinary levels
of yields. However, in order to sustain these levels, steady access to machinery, fuel and chemical fertiliser and pesticides were necessary at an affordable price, given the limitations of the GDR’s budget. As these resources became more scarce prices rose for crop production, making LPG Ps unprofitable unless they in turn passed on their additional costs to livestock production. LPG Ts, however, also suffered from a shortage of machinery and fuel. Moreover, given the cost of feed and the limits to the amount with which they were supplied, livestock farms found themselves unable to maintain their levels of production, let alone develop the number of animals they kept or the efficiency of the facilities in which they kept them.

Without the prospect of progress in the production facilities, there was little hope for improving conditions for those working in poorer LPG Ts. This had serious consequences for certain villages whose importance as sites of employment and settlement, and thus of commerce, was rendered increasingly obsolete. A vicious circle was created and fuelled by the separation of crop and livestock production which could only drive on an unequal differentiation of living standards between communities in the East German countryside.

**Rural Development under Honecker**

Following the completion of the transition of power within the SED leadership from Walter Ulbricht to Erich Honecker, at the VIII SED Party Congress in 1971 there was some optimism among farmers and agricultural functionaries alike that a change in course would rectify some of the economic problems which had manifested themselves so clearly in the years before. Initially, reports from the DBD in Bezirk Erfurt in November 1971 indicated that improvements had yet to make themselves felt. Complaints continued to be directed at the corruption of the system of supply between industry and agriculture which had developed during the bottlenecks of the late 1960s. Spare parts could in fact be obtained, it was rumoured, if one was willing to grease the palm of the supplier. To add insult to injury, the black market was reportedly open to inflation – as one DBD member put it: ‘What one got a few years ago for an extra 20 Mark note, is only possible these days with an extra 50 Mark note.’ Clearly, as greater investment was made in the provision of consumer goods, rural communities were able to benefit along with the rest of the population. Nonetheless the sense remained among LPG members that they were being given less than those who worked in industry.
Disparities in living standards between individual rural communities began, too, to become more pronounced. Some villages benefited from becoming new centres of industrial-style agricultural production. New housing was constructed to meet increased demand for living space from an expanded workforce and additional investment was made available by both the state and collective farms and agricultural industries based in the village to improve local infrastructure and amenities. Better road and rail connections to the district capital in their turn enabled access to a wider range of shops and services, and ensured that these villages retained a commuter population, which might otherwise have been forced to move elsewhere. The expansion of industry into the countryside enabled a number of villages to retain a reasonably large working population and thus a status as a regional centre. Other villages similarly continued to benefit from their close proximity to major urban centres and major industries, such as mining.

The long-term prospects for many other rural communities were considerably worse, however. With a declining agricultural workforce and struggling livestock farms, those villages – particularly those without a large commuter population – began to decline in status. As the young moved away to towns and industry, residents of these villages found that they were less and less able to make a persuasive economic argument for state investment in new amenities. At the same time, local collective farms could not be relied upon to provide the sustained financial or material support needed to fund improvements to local infrastructure. Roads were allowed to fall into disrepair, village shops and restaurants began to close and communal facilities, once paid for by the LPG, ceased to run.

Habitable housing was a particular problem in rural communities. The provision of state investment in modern housing made sense in certain key, expanding, villages. New housing and materials for renovation, however, were desperately required elsewhere too. From the early 1970s onwards, solutions to the housing problems in rural areas were sought in encouraging LPGs to support the aspirations of their members to go about constructing their own homes. This was a boon to those who were able to find the resources to do so. Certainly as early as 1971 the mayor of Germrode cited the positive response of villagers at the announcement of new plans to encourage people to build their own homes in line with the VIII SED Party Congress. In 1979 it was reported with some pride that in Kreis Sömmerda, seventeen houses had been built over the course of the last three years thanks to cooperation between the LPGs and the local state organs. Nonetheless, considering the size of the problem of housing in rural areas, such advances were
clearly not sufficient to resolve the issue. There were now also numerous complaints from LPG members who had been unable to gain access to the building materials they required, or who were disgruntled by broken promises of support from their LPG on these matters.56 It might well be argued that the pride farming families had felt in private ownership of land was sought now to some extent in home ownership.

This sense of pride was further reinvigorated by new encouragement for villagers to farm small plots and keep a small number of animals privately. Since the 2nd Plenary Session of the ZK in 1976, overzealous attempts by managers of crop farms to limit the extent of household plots and small allotments were criticised. Collective farmers were encouraged to claim and make use of their right to an *individuelle Hauswirtschaft*. Ideologically speaking, this re-emphasis on private ownership was a retrograde step for the SED regime. The social transformation of the countryside in the last twenty years had, after all, been aimed at diminishing the importance of private property. This step did, however, serve an immediate practical purpose. Under the conditions of Honecker’s ‘actually existing socialism’ encouragement of private property provided some valuable solutions to food supply and housing problems, as well as improving the morale of the proportion of the rural population who were able to take advantage. Nevertheless new grounds for obvious disparity between the prosperity of individual citizens had been created – between those who had connections and those who lacked them. Ultimately, the shortages of building materials and other resources, which proved to be more frequent in the 1980s, came to represent a major source of disgruntlement among the rural population.

During the 1970s agricultural production reached new heights. Technologically it had never been so advanced and the prospects for further improvement appeared to be good. New machinery and methods for crop production and the construction of high-tech production sites for concentrated livestock farming promised to improve efficiency as well as reduce the level of manual labour required in the future. At the same time, the benefits of Honecker’s new welfare- and consumer-orientated social and economic policy filtered through to the rural population, who were able increasingly not only to build their own houses but to have access to their own cars, televisions, radios, fridges and washing machines. But these improvements to living and working conditions were not experienced universally.

By the late 1970s, those villages that had failed to benefit from the industrialisation of agriculture were beginning to suffer from spiralling neglect. With an ageing population, deprived of investment and with only limited access to the materials, goods and services required to im-
prove their standard of living, the prospects for some rural communities looked bleak indeed. At the same time, it had become clear that the industrialisation of agriculture had in practice generated serious disparities between LPGs in terms of their financial solvency and the conditions in which farmers worked. Huge efforts continued to be made by farmers and LPG functionaries to maintain standards, despite shortages of essential resources (of machinery, fuel, feed grain). However, in an increasingly unfavourable economic climate, the organisation of farming created by the SED’s agricultural policy increasingly proved itself too fragile and susceptible to the weaknesses of the planned economy at a time of shortage. By the beginning of the 1980s the prospects for an imminent improvement to productivity and, with it, working conditions had largely evaporated in collective farms.

Conclusion

The second half of the 1970s saw a brave attempt to transform agriculture and rural society half fail and half succeed. There is no doubt that the formation of separate LPG Ps and LPG Ts was a radical step towards advanced and specialised production. However, the inability of the LPG Ps and Ts to function efficiently in the worsening economic climate and shortage economy demonstrated the fragility of this method of agricultural production in the face of wider economic constraints. Furthermore, the failure of LPG Ps and LPG Ts to cooperate with one another and the consequent severe differentiation in the living and working conditions of certain farmers gave the lie to the SED’s claims to provide social improvements to all.

In the late 1970s, in the face of such an uneven transformation of agricultural production, DBD members – many of whom occupied positions as mid-level managers in LPG Ts – called for steps to be taken to reinvigorate the cooperative councils. Two years later, in 1981, the X SED Party Congress saw an attempt to take heed of these concerns. This congress, which was preceded by the death of Gerhard Grüneberg, signalled a realisation that the current direction of agriculture was not conducive to efficient production given the reality of the economic situation in the GDR. Consequently plans were made to scale back the size of some excessively large individual farms and limit the extent of monocultural specialisation where it appeared to be damaging to production. This slight change in course did not arouse much indignation among farmers and LPG leaders, nor was it seized upon as an excuse to abandon separate crop and livestock production (as had occurred in
1969 at the 10th ZK Plenum). Not only had the proportion of the farming population been reduced and their local coherence and identity as indigenous farmers been negated by modernisation and industrialisation of agriculture, the introduction of industrial labour practices gave them a fundamentally different attitude towards their work and their position in the hierarchy. The most fundamental changes in the position of the farmers with respect to the land, their livestock and their locality had been accepted. Moreover, SED and DBD party organisations in the LPGs were better organised than ever and were able to influence the reception of the X SED Party Congress more effectively. At this stage the ability of the SED leadership to communicate its authority was not seriously in doubt. The seeds of material discontent among the rural population were, however, growing.

Notes

3. BArch DK 1 VA neu 2464 Ministerium für LFN, Probleme der Führungstätigkeit im Bereich der Landwirtschaft und Nahrungsgüterwirtschaft im Bezirk Erfurt, 1971 (undated).
6. SAPMO BArch DY30/1516 ZK der SED Abt. Landwirtschaft, Analyse zu einigen wichtigen Problemen der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung in der Pflanzen- und Tierproduktion, 21.12.1973, p. 235. In Bezirk Erfurt in particular the KAP Greussen, Kreis Sondershausen, KAP Leubingen, Kreis Sömmerda, KAP Sonneborn, Kreis Gotha and KAP Förtha in Kreis Eisenach were accused of making such premature applications for recategorisation. An additional problem was the breakdown in the use of members’ assemblies for all members of the LPG with the establishment of the KAP. As a consequence the principles of collective democracy were seen to be suffering.


15. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/C/2/17-541 Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt, Information an das Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung über die Arbeits und Lebensbedingungen der Genossenschaftsbäuerinnen, die in alten herkömmlichen Ställen der Tierproduktion arbeiten, 5.11.1976, p. 95.


21. Following the issuance of the new model statutes in 1977, forty-one new LPG Ps were formed from KAPs. Seventy-eight per cent of the chairmen of...
these LPGs had a university and 22 per cent a technical college education. Thirty-one of the forty-one chairmen were also SED members, six DBD, three CDU with only one cadre with no party membership whatsoever. SAPMO DY30/IV B 2/5/479 Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt, Information an das Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung über die Schritte der weiteren gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung von LPG, GPG, KAP und ZBE im Jahre 1978, 17.10.1977.


31. In April 1978 Bruno Kiesler – head of the ZK’s Agriculture Department – wrote to Gerhard Grüneberg complaining about a set of suggestions for the future economic development of agriculture which he had been asked to co-sign by the head of the Department for Planning and Finance in the ZK. These documents, he maintained, contained evaluations of developmental questions in agriculture which were clearly marked by the tendency to contrive to provide evidence that in the development of agriculture too much had been, and was continuing to be, invested, with little positive benefit. Many of these evaluations (which the statistical office as well as other
institutions had been commissioned to produce), Kiesler suggested, con-
tained consciously false representations and one-sided analyses. He went
so far as to repeat the attitude of certain people that ‘for a certain amount
of time, certain influential people have been systematically conducting a
witch-hunt against agriculture and – as they are connected to agriculture –
against certain people too.’ Suggestions primarily to force agriculture to
pay higher prices for industrial goods and to create a fund with which to
balance out any excessive investment were due to be presented to the sec-
retariat of the ZK a few days later, with the possible intention to have them
agreed upon at a time when, Kiesler suggested, Grüneberg would be ab-
sent. SAPMO BArch DY30/IV B 2/2.023/2 Büro Gerhard Grüneberg, Kiesler

32. SAPMO BArch DY30/IV B 2/2.023/2 Büro Gerhard Grüneberg, ‘Einige
wichtige Fakten zum Beitrag der Land- und Forstwirtschaft zur Produk-
tion des Nationaleinkommens der DDR’, 22.3.1978.

33. SAPMO BArch DY30/IV B 2/2.023/2 Büro Gerhard Grüneberg, Kiesler und

34. SAPMO BArch DY30/IV B 2/5/416 ZK der SED Abt. Parteiorgane, Protokoll
der Bezirksleitungssitzung Erfurt vom 12.4.1978, Referat von Genossen
Brauner, Sekretär der Bezirksleitung.

35. ThHStAW RdB Erfurt L043160 Wissenschaftlich-technisches Zentrum Er-
furt, Leistungsvergleich der Kreise des Bezirkes Erfurt im Zeitraum der 5-
1980.

36. SAPMO BArch DY30/1541 ZK der SED Abt. Landwirtschaft, Tendenzen,
Ergebnisse und Schlussfolgerung aus den 7 Bezirksanalysen, 24.4.1979,
p. 33.

37. SAPMO BArch DY30/IV B 2/5/416 ZK der SED Abt. Parteiorgane, Protokoll
der Bezirksleitungssitzung Erfurt vom 12.4.1978, Referat von Genossen
Brauner, Sekretär der Bezirksleitung.

38. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED
Erfurt IV/D/2/7-800 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Information
über die MV der BPO der Bezirksdirektion der Bank für Landwirtschaft
und Nahrungsgüterwirtschaft am 19.11.1979, p. 355.

39. SAPMO BArch DY30/IV B 2/2.023/1 Büro Gerhard Grüneberg, ZK der SED
Abt. Landwirtschaft, Aufgaben der Land-, Forst- und Nahrungsgüter-
wirtschaft und die weitere gesellschaftliche Entwicklung auf dem Lande,
25.5.1976.

40. SAPMO BArch DY30/IV B 2/2.023/24 Büro Gerhard Grüneberg, ZK der
SED Abt. Landwirtschaft, Einschätzung der Eingaben aus der Bevölkerung

41. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Er-
furt IV/D/2/9.01 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane Informationsbericht
Nr. 22/77, 28.7.1977, p. 54.

42. SAPMO BArch DY30 IV B 2/2.023/24 Büro Gerhard Grüneberg, ZK der SED
Abt. Landwirtschaft, Einschätzung der Eingaben aus der Bevölkerung im


51. KAS Rat des Kreises Erfurt 1451 Protokoll über die Kooperationsratssitzung, Kooperation Walschleben am 18.11.1976.

52. KAS Rat des Kreises Erfurt 1451 Protokoll der KOR Sitzung Pflanzen- Tierproduktion vom 22.5.1979.


57. ThHStAW Bezirksparteiarchiv der SED Erfurt, Bezirksleitung der SED Erfurt IV/D/2/15-575 DBD Bezirksverband an die Bezirksleitung, 30.1.1979, p. 83.